[546] Digeon in his report insists that he thought there was something
more behind Longa. But this is _ex post facto_ allegation.
[547] Napier, v. p. 134.
[548] Cf. events in the Nimy-Obourg Salient at Mons on August 22, 1914.
[549] The classical instance of the proper defence of a river front
is (I suppose) Lee’s defence of the Rappahannock at the battle of
Fredericksburg. For the ruinous fate of an army which gets across at
one or two points of a long front, and is counter-attacked, cf. the
battle of the Katzbach, fought two months after Vittoria.
[550] Especially the bridges of Tres Puentes and Nanclares by which a
reconnaissance was made on June 20, and that of Mendoza up-stream. See
Jourdan, p. 473.
[551] Blakiston’s _Twelve Years of Military Adventure_, ii. p. 207.
[552] And this not belonging to the Army of the South, but to
d’Erlon--Avy’s 27th Chasseurs.
[553] This story is given by Gazan in his report, as a proof that
Jourdan had ample warning that there was danger from the north as well
as from the east.
[554] These troops were ‘nobody’s children’ and get ignored in Gazan’s
and Reille’s reports. But we hear of the 3rd Line defending Gamarra
Menor in one French report, a fact corroborated by its showing two
officer-casualties in Martinien’s lists--the guns are mentioned in
Tirlet’s artillery report. Cavalry of the Army of the North is vaguely
mentioned--its presence seems established by an officer-casualty of the
15th Chasseurs in Martinien. I suspect the presence of part of the 10th
Léger, which has an officer-casualty, Vittoria _22nd_ June, presumably
a misprint for 21st.
[555] _Dispatches_, x. p. 449, says that Reille had two _divisions_ in
reserve (they were only two _brigades_) in addition to his front line
holding the bridges: and cf. x. p. 450, which says directly that four
divisions of Reille’s army were present.
[556] Here comes in a curious incident, illustrating the extraordinary
carelessness of the French Staff. Gazan was very anxious to get
restored to him an artillery officer, a Captain Cheville, then a
prisoner. As an exchange for him he sent into the British lines on the
20th, Captain Leith Hay, a captured British intelligence officer, who
had been with the Army of the South for a month, and had witnessed the
whole retreat, during which he had been freely in intercourse with
General Maransin and many staff officers. On his release he was able to
tell Wellington that the French were definitely halted, and expected
to fight. Why exchange such a prisoner on such a day? See Leith Hay,
ii. p. 190. Cf. _Wellington Dispatches_, x. p. 443, which corroborates
Hay’s story.
[557] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 475.
[558] Digeon had obstructed the bridges of Arriaga and Gamarra. The
bridge of Villodas, below Gazan’s extreme right, had been partly
barricaded. Not so Nanclares, Mendoza, and the bridge immediately below
Tres Puentes.
[559] Diary of the 43rd officer, in Maxwell, ii. p. 40.
[560] There is a good account of the heroic death of Cadogan, a
much-loved colonel of the 71st, in the diary of his quarter-master,
William Gavin, of the same regiment. When aware that he was mortally
hit, Cadogan refused to be moved from the field, and had himself
propped up against two knapsacks, on a point from which his dying eyes
could survey the whole field, and watched the fight to the bitter end.
[561] From Gazan’s report in the French Archives, written at St.
Jean-Pied-du-Port in July--very much _ex post facto_. It was lent me by
Mr. Fortescue, along with several other Vittorian documents.
[562] Diary of Cooke of the 43rd in Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_,
ii. 42.
[563] Graham’s Report, _Wellington Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. 7-8.
[564] Cooke, the 43rd officer in Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_,
ii. 44. The guns were undoubtedly the Horse Artillery battery on the
high-road in front of Gazan’s centre.
[565] Of course, Cooke is understating the distance, which was about a
quarter of a mile.
[566] This interesting narrative of Captain Cooke of the 43rd must have
been in Napier’s hands before it was printed by Maxwell, as several
phrases from it are repeated in Napier, vol. v, p. 121. Sir William
himself was in England that day.
[567] He was, along with Stewart and Oswald, one of the three
divisional generals who committed the gross breach of orders during the
Burgos retreat mentioned above, p. 152.
[568] Cf. Burgoyne, _Life and Letters_, i. 263 (June 23, 1813), with
Picton’s letters in _Wellington Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. 225,
about ‘the 3rd Division being kept in the background, for Sir T. P. is
by no means a favourite with Lord W.’ Cairnes (in Dickson, ed. Leslie)
puts the change down as ‘most mortifying to Picton’.
[569] See Dalhousie to Wellington, in _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii.
p. 6, which leaves much unsaid.
[570] Narrative of one of Picton’s staff in Robinson’s _Life of
Picton_, ii. 195-6.
[571] The third battery originally at Ariñez was Villatte’s divisional
battery, which had gone off with him to the Puebla heights. Neither P.
Soult nor Treillard had guns with them.
[572] Such turning _might_ have been done either by the two belated
brigades of the 7th Division or by troops detached by Graham, who had
several brigades to spare, which he never used, but might have sent to
pass the Zadorra at the bridge of Yurre or the fords west of it, both
well behind the new French line.
[573] Who was this officer? _Not_ Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Cother of the
71st nor Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Harrison of the 50th. Hope of the 92nd,
in his rather detailed narrative of this fight, calls him ‘Colonel
R----.’ I cannot identify him. Conceivably, it may have been Colonel
Rooke, the senior officer of Hill’s staff who _may_ have been sent
up the heights, and _may_ have taken over command on Cadogan’s being
mortally wounded.
[574] So says the anonymous but invaluable ‘T. S.’ of the 71st.
Leith Hay, a prisoner with the French in this campaign, remarks that
they were all in their summer wear of long linen overcoats, with the
cross-belts put on above.
[575] They were released at Pampeluna on the surrender of that fortress
three months later, in a state of semi-starvation, having been carried
on with Villatte’s division during the French retreat. They described
to Gavin of the 71st, who happened to be present at the surrender,
their unhappy fortunes. See his diary, p. 25.
[576] Gazan’s most unconvincing account of all this engagement is that
‘General Villatte attacked the enemy with his usual vigour: nothing
could resist the shock of his division. The position, whose recapture
ought to have assured us the victory, was retaken, as well as the
height in front of Subijana. The enemy was routed at every point. Such
was the position of the Army of the South, when news came to the King
that our troops by the Zadorra were attacked, and could not maintain
themselves. I was told to break off my attack and retire to a position
further back.’
[577] The 71st lost, beside their well-loved colonel--the only man
mentioned in Wellington’s private letter of next morning to his brother
Henry (_Dispatches_, x. p. 454)--44 killed, 272 wounded, and nearly 40
prisoners: half the battalion. The 50th lost only 7 officers and 97
men; the 92nd no more than 20 men. If Villatte gave correct figures,
his total loss was only 2 officers and 289 men--including 22 prisoners.
Of these the 63rd, obviously the leading regiment, was responsible
for 135 casualties, the 95th for 94. The other two regiments had
practically no losses. These figures are very low, but seem to be
corroborated by Martinien.
[578] Its heavy loss of 33 officers and 515 men out of about 2,200
present was nearly all, I believe, suffered at this point. The 2/87th
with 244 casualties out of about 600 present lost 40 per cent. of its
strength. Chassé’s French brigade, the immediate opponents, had 800
casualties, nearly all at this moment.
[579] Why did not Dalhousie support Colville more promptly? He had a
bridge to cross, and some way to go, but was evidently late.
[580] These details come mainly out of the _Mémoire sur la Retraite des
Armées françaises_ in the French Archives, lent me by Mr. Fortescue.
Internal evidence shows it written by some member of D’Erlon’s staff.
Tirlet’s report is also useful.
[581] Captured by skirmishers of the 1/95th, as it was retreating up
the high road and was nearing Ariñez. The French infantry recovered
it for a moment by a counter-stroke, but as the Riflemen had cut the
traces and shot or removed the horses, they could not get the gun away.
Tirlet says the battery lost only _one_ gun, which is corroborated by
Costello of the 95th, present on the spot. Kincaid and other Riflemen
say three.
[582] There is a curious problem connected with a correspondence
(_Dispatches_, x. pp. 329-31) between Picton and Wellington on July
16--three weeks after the battle. Wellington apparently thought that
Picton blamed the 88th for losing Ariñez in the first assault, while
it was really only two companies of the 1/95th which had entered that
village and been driven out. He says that he had seen the 88th coming
into action in a very ragged line, and had himself halted them and
dressed their front, before he let them go on: after this he did not
notice what became of them, but saw them again after the fighting
formed on the other side of the village.
What Wellington did not witness is chronicled by Costello of the
1/95th: after describing the repulse of the Riflemen, he notes their
pleasure at seeing ‘our favourite third division’ coming down the road.
Ariñez was promptly retaken and the advance recommenced. ‘I noticed
a regiment, which by its yellow facings was the Connaught Rangers,
marching in close column of companies to attack a French regiment drawn
up in line on the verge of the hill, with a small village [Gomecha?]
in its rear. The 88th, although under a heavy cannonade from the
enemy’s artillery, continued advancing gallantly, while we skirmishers
took ground to the left, close to the road, in order to allow them to
oppose this line in front. Though we were hotly engaged I watched their
movements. The 88th next deployed into line, advancing all the time
towards their opponents, who seemed to wait very coolly for them. When
they had approached within 300 yards the French poured in a volley,
or I should rather say a running fire from right to left. As soon as
the British regiment recovered the first shock, and closed their files
on the gap that had been made, they commenced advancing at double
time till within fifty yards nearer to the enemy, when they halted
and in turn gave a running fire from the whole line, and then without
a moment’s pause, cheered and charged up the hill against them. The
French meanwhile were attempting to reload. But they were hard pressed
by the British, who gave them no time for a second volley. They went
immediately to the right about, making the best of their way to the
village behind.’
From this it is clear that the 88th fought on open ground, to the
right of Ariñez and the high road. It was the centre regiment of the
brigade: the 45th, therefore, must have been more to the right and well
south of the road; the 74th on the high road were the actual takers of
Ariñez. We have unluckily no description of Power’s Portuguese at the
moment--but they lost heavily--the casualties being 25 officers and 386
men. They _must_ have been engaged with Leval’s 2nd Brigade, which had
been stationed about and to the north of Gomecha, while the 1st Brigade
held the village of Ariñez and the hill behind.
[583] The amusing story told of this storm by Harry Smith in his
autobiography (i. pp. 97-8) is too good to be omitted. ‘My brigade
was sent to support the 7th Division, which was hotly engaged. I was
sent forward to report to Lord Dalhousie, who commanded. I found his
lordship and his Q.M.G. Drake in deep conversation. I reported pretty
quick, and asked for orders (the head of the brigade was just getting
under fire). I repeated the question, “What orders, my lord?” Drake
became somewhat animated, and I heard his lordship say, “Better take
the village.” I roared out, “Certainly, my lord,” and off I galloped,
both calling to me to come back, but “none are so deaf as those who
won’t hear.” I told General Vandeleur we were immediately to take the
village. The 52nd deployed into line, our Riflemen were sent out in
every direction, keeping up a fire nothing could resist.... The 52nd
in line and the swarm of Riflemen rushed at the village, and though
the ground was intersected by gardens and ditches nothing ever checked
us, until we reached the rear of it. There was never a more impetuous
onset--nothing could resist such a burst of determination.’ Smith’s
addition that the brigade took twelve guns in this charge seems (as Mr.
Fortescue remarks) to be of more doubtful value.
Naturally there is nothing of this in Dalhousie’s dispatch--a most
disappointing paper. It is mostly in a self-exculpatory tone, to
justify his lateness and the absence of his two rear brigades. He
_says_ that they came up at the same time as Vandeleur, which is
certainly untrue, as neither of them had a single casualty all day.
And they could not have failed to catch a shell or two if they had
been anywhere near the fighting-line during the subsequent capture
of Crispijana and Zuazo. Mr. Fortescue’s note that Captain Cairnes’s
letter in the _Dickson Papers_, p. 916, proves that Barnes’s brigade
had arrived by this time, is a misdeduction from Cairnes’s carelessness
in talking of Grant’s brigade as ‘our first brigade,’ meaning thereby
our leading brigade, not the brigade officially numbered 1. When
Cairnes says that the ‘first brigade’ and the guns were ‘in their
place,’ while the rest arrived very late in the action, we need only
contrast the casualty lists--1st Brigade _nil_, 2nd Brigade 330
casualties, 3rd Brigade _nil_, to see what he means.
[584] It will be noticed that I put La Hermandad as the village where
the heavy fighting took place, and which Vandeleur’s brigade stormed.
All historians up to now have followed Napier in making Margarita the
important place. A glance at the map will show that the latter village
is too far forward to have been held for any time, after Leval had
evacuated his original position on the great knoll facing Tres Puentes
and Villodas.
I have to point out that neither Wellington nor Lord Dalhousie
in the two contemporary dispatches (_Dispatches_, x. p. 451, and
_Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. pp. 4-6) mention either place by
name--only speaking of ‘a village.’ D’Erlon’s staff-officer in the
report of the Army of the Centre says that Margarita was held for some
time but was rendered untenable by Leval’s retreat--so that Darmagnac
had to go back to the heights behind. Gazan’s report says that the
British were masters of Margarita before he took up his position on
the heights above Ariñez, and that the _heights behind Margarita_
were the fighting position of D’Erlon. Of the diarists or chroniclers
who issued their books _before the fifth volume of Napier_ came out,
and who were present on this part of the field, Green (68th), Wheeler
(51st), Captain Wood (82nd), mention no village names, nor do Lord
Gough’s and Captain Cairnes’s contemporary letters, nor Geo. Simmons’
contemporary diary. Nor does Sir Harry Smith’s amusing account of his
dealings with Lord Dalhousie before ‘the village’ which Vandeleur took
(_Autobiography_, i. pp. 97-8) quoted in the preceding note.
After Napier’s book stated that the Light Division battalions took
Margarita, and Gough with the 2/87th La Hermandad (a reversal of the
real time and facts as I think), most later writers accepted these
statements as gospel. But the report of Kruse, commanding the Nassau
regiment, absolutely proves that Napier is wrong. Moreover, the rough
map, annexed to D’Erlon’s original report of the battle in the French
Archives, gives Hermandad as the position of Darmagnac, with his march
thither _from_ Gomecha and _to_ Zuazo indicated by arrows. Kruse’s
report may be found at length in the Nassau volume of Saussez’s _Les
Allemands sous les Aigles_, pp. 340-1.
[585] This British claim is corroborated by the narrative of the French
surgeon Fée, present at Abechuco that day.
[586] Though he had lost several when La Martinière was driven out of
Gamarra Mayor (see above, p. 425) and Abechuco.
[587] The other regiments of Hay’s brigade were evidently kept in
reserve, for the casualties of the 1/38th were eight only, and those
of the 1/9th 25. The 8th Caçadores of Spry’s brigade lost 40 men, the
Portuguese Line battalions only 41 between the four of them.
[588] Sergeant James Hale of the 1/9th, who has left us the only good
detailed account of the fighting at Gamarra with which I am acquainted
(pp. 105-6).
[589] Numbers impossible to determine, as they are never borne in the
muster rolls of the Army of the Centre. But as they were 2,019 strong
on July 16, when Soult reorganized the whole Army of Spain, they were
probably 2,500 strong before the battle.
[590] So Tirlet, making allowances for the lost pieces.
[591] Viz. the divisional batteries of the 2nd Division (one British,
one Portuguese), 3rd, 4th, 7th, Light, and Silveira’s Divisions, two H.
A. batteries attached to the cavalry, two British and one Portuguese
batteries of the reserve, and three Spanish guns belonging to Morillo.
[592] These notes are partly from Tirlet’s very interesting artillery
report, partly from the narrative of the staff-officer of the Army of
the Centre, already often quoted above.
[593] See tables of losses in Appendices, nos. xi and xii.
[594] _Memoirs_, p. 479.
[595] _Diary_ of Wachholz, attached with a Brunswick light company to
the 4th Division, pp. 315-16.
[596] Thirty guns according to Garbé’s report--40 according to that of
D’Erlon’s staff-officer, quoted above.
[597] Blaze, p. 244.
[598] What regiment was this? Obviously one of Colville’s or
Grant’s--as obviously not the 51st, 68th, 82nd, 87th, 94th, from all
of which we have narratives of the battle, which do not mention their
being charged by cavalry or forming square. There remain the _Chasseurs
Britanniques_, 1/5th, 2/83rd--it may have been any of these.
[599] Tomkinson of the 16th, fighting not far off, says that these
squadrons ‘got into a scrape’ by charging about 2,000 French cavalry
(p. 249). They lost 2 officers and 57 men. This was obviously the
affair of which Digeon speaks. His 12th Dragoons, which charged the
square, lost 22 casualties.
[600] One each of the 12th and 16th.
[601] The best account of all this is in the invaluable Tomkinson’s
_Diary_ (pp. 250-1). There is also an interesting narrative by Dallas,
who took part in the charge, though he had no business there (pp.
92-3). The French cavalry were the 15th Dragoons and 3rd Hussars.
They suffered heavily--the former regiment losing 4 officers and 53
men, the latter 4 officers and 30 men. The British dragoons got off
lightly, all things considered, with 1 officer and 11 men hit in the
12th, and 1 officer and 20 men in the 10th. Tomkinson much praises the
French infantry. ‘I never saw men more steady and exact to the word of
command. I rode within a yard of them, they had their arms at the port,
and not a man attempted to fire till we began to retire.’
[602] Cf. the reports of the Army of Portugal, Tomkinson, Hale of the
1/9th, and Graham’s very sketchy dispatch, which says that the infantry
was much delayed at the bridges, but that ‘the greatest eagerness was
manifested by all the corps. The Caçador battalions of both Portuguese
brigades followed with the cavalry.... The enemy’s flight, however,
was so rapid that no material impression could be made on them, though
more than once charged by squadrons of General Anson’s brigade.’
(_Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 9.)
[603] Gazan says in his report that he only abandoned the guns because
he found the roads south of Vittoria blocked by fugitive vehicles from
Vittoria.
[604] L’Estrange of the 31st says that some of the French, moving
almost in the middle of advancing British brigades, were mistaken for
Spaniards, and allowed to get off unharmed. Surtees of the 2/95th tells
a similar story.
[605] The lancers are shown in Martinien’s lists to have lost six
officers, the hussars four. The casualties of the 18th Hussars (3
officers and 37 men) and of the 10th (16 men) were certainly got in
this affair, which was evidently hot while it lasted. The best account
of Joseph’s last half-hour on the battlefield is in the _Mémoires_ of
Miot de Melito (iii. pp. 280-1), who was at the King’s side and shared
his wild ride.
[606] Of the artillery Tirlet’s report shows that 104 were field guns
actually used in the battle. The remaining 47 were partly the reserve
guns of the Army of the North, left stacked at Vittoria when Clausel
took his divisions to hunt for Mina, and partly guns of position from
the garrisons of Burgos, Vittoria, Miranda, &c.
[607] There is a report of the regiment in the _Archives Nationales_
setting forth that it did not lose its eagle, but the flag of the
battalion reduced by Imperial orders in the spring, which was in the
regimental fourgon.
[608] It inspired him with the idea of designing a British marshal’s
baton on which lions were substituted for eagles. Wellington naturally
got the first ever made.
[609] All this from Leith Hay (always an interesting narrator), vol.
ii. pp. 203 and 208.
[610] Oddly enough, two contemporary diaries mention Mr. D.’s luck.
He got by no means the biggest haul. Sergeant Costello of the 1/95th
says that he got over £1,000. A private of the 23rd carried off 1,000
dollars in silver--a vast load! Green of the 68th records that two of
his comrades got respectively 180 doubloons, and nearly 1,000 dollars
(p. 165).
[611] Tomkinson, p. 254.
[612] Miot de Melito, iii. p. 279.
[613] There are amusing accounts of the conversation of this lively
lady in the narratives of Leith Hay and Dr. McGrigor, who took care of
her.
[614] But Lecor had a straggler or two out of one of his
line-battalions--no doubt men who had gone off marauding, like most of
the missing in the British list.
[615] _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 8.
[616] See e. g. Swabey’s note on his dangerous ride with Graham along
the Esla, at the end of May, ‘whether the General is blind or mad I
have not decided--he must have been one or the other to ride in cold
blood over those rocks and precipices.’ Swabey’s _Diary_, p. 595.
[617] Cairnes’s _Diary_, p. 926.
[618] Fée, _Souvenirs de la guerre d’Espagne_, pp. 249-50.
[619] He is thinking of the nights after the storms of Rodrigo and
Badajoz.
[620] _Dispatches_, xii. p. 473. The regiment named is a newly arrived
cavalry unit, which attracted the Commander-in-Chief’s special notice
by its prominence in plundering.
[621] Wellington to Bathurst, _Dispatches_, xii. p. 496.
[622] Personal diaries seem to show that this was the case with
Cadogan’s brigade on the right, and the whole 5th Division on the left.
[623] This interesting fact is recorded in a conversation of Wellington
with Croker, which contains some curious notes on the battle (Croker,
ii. p. 232).
[624] Thinking that he had only his own two divisions of the Army of
the North, and Taupin’s of the Army of Portugal, while really Barbot’s
division was also with him.
[625] The former going by El Burgo and Alegria, the latter by Arzubiaga
and Audicana.
[626] Murray to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. pp. 3-4.
[627] See his dispatch to Wellington dated from Tolosa on June 26th.
[628] See vol. iv. p. 327.
[629] See Colonel Frazer’s account in his _Peninsular Letters_, p. 186.
[630] See, for this statement of the Duke’s, Fortescue’s _British
Army_, vol. ix. p. 199.
[631] See Duncan’s _History of the Royal Artillery_, vol. ii. pp.
356-60, an indictment of Wellington’s whole policy to the corps, and
especially of his famous Waterloo letter on their conduct in 1815.
[632] Reille reported that the straggling was so portentous that only
4,200 infantry were with the eagles on July 24th. See Vidal de la
Blache, i. p. 79.
[633] Which had relieved Cassagne’s division, the rearguard on the 23rd.
[634] The regiment of Nassau alone returned 76 casualties that day.
[635] And took over command on the night of the 22nd; see _Pakenham
Letters_, June 26, 1813.
[636] Whose riotous and undisciplined conduct so irritated Wellington
that he directed that all the officers in charge should miss their next
step in regimental promotion, by being passed over by their juniors.
[637] I have only mentioned the movement of the 6th Division and R.
Hill’s cavalry above: there is no doubt as to what they did, and on
the 30th they are both at Lerin, according to the location given by
_Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 39. But there is a puzzle about
Oswald’s 5th Division on the 26th-30th, which I was long unable to
solve. Wellington in his dispatch to Bathurst of July 3 (_Dispatches_,
x. p. 501) says that he moved not only Clinton from Vittoria but
Oswald from Salvatierra towards Logroño, on the march to intercept
Clausel. He ought to have known if any one did! But I was not able to
find any trace of the 5th Division having actually gone to Logroño:
to march back from Salvatierra to Vittoria, and thence to follow
Clinton to Logroño and Lerin would have been a very long business. Now
regimental diaries of the 3/1st and 1/9th prove that the division was
at Salvatierra on the 25th, and marched back to Vittoria on the 26th.
But the best of them (Hale of the 1/9th) says that from Vittoria the
division was turned back towards Pampeluna, and reached a spot within
two leagues of it on the third day. At this point it was turned off
northward and marched by Tolosa to join Graham’s column and assist at
the siege of St. Sebastian. All accounts agree that it reached the
neighbourhood of that fortress on July 5th-6th. Allowing six days for
the march Vittoria-St. Sebastian, we have only the 27th, 28th, 29th,
30th June for the supposed march Salvatierra-Vittoria-Logroño, and
return. The solution at last came to hand in General Shadwell’s Life
of Colin Campbell of the 1/9th (Lord Clyde). Here it is mentioned,
apparently on some record of Campbell’s, that his brigade only got to
La Guardia, one march beyond Trevino, and was then turned back and sent
north (_Life of Campbell_, i. p. 18). This is no doubt correct.
[638] _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 33.
[639] Wellington’s letters to Hill, Copons, and Castaños in
_Dispatches_, x. pp. 470-1, all state very shortly that he hopes to cut
off Clausel if he tries to get back into France by Jaca. All that is
said is, ‘I do not think we shall be able to do much against Clausel.
He has passed Tudela on the way to Saragossa. I propose to try for him
on the road to Jaca’ (to Hill). The letters to the Spanish generals do
not speak of Clausel’s going through Saragossa, but of his marching
across Aragon to Jaca.
[640] See ‘Dispositions for the 28th June,’ _Supplementary Dispatches_,
viii. p. 33.
[641] Wellington to Castaños, Monreal, June 30, _Dispatches_, x. p.
477, and to Bathurst, x. p. 496 and ibid. 501.
[642] Elaborate dispositions for their distribution round the fortress
are given in the Order dated June 30 (_Supplementary Dispatches_, viii.
pp. 34-6).
[643] See above, p. 378. For all the narrative which follows Foy’s
well-written dispatches, printed in full in his life by Girod de l’Ain,
are a primary authority. But I think that historians have given him a
little more credit than he deserves--he is a very engaging witness. As
to his own strength, that of his enemies, and the losses on both sides,
he is no more trustworthy than Soult or Masséna. It may suffice to say
that he makes the British 4th and 5th Divisions present at Tolosa, and
gives Longa 6,000 men.
[644] Foy to Jourdan, 20 June, in Girod de l’Ain’s appendix, pp. 393-4.
[645] Batteries of Smith and Arriaga. Julius Hartmann, commanding
Artillery Reserve, accompanied them; see _Dickson Papers_, June 22.
[646] From the journal of operations of General Giron’s Army, lent me
by Colonel Arzadun.
[647] In his _Diary_ (Girod de l’Ain, p. 210) Foy says that he had only
_one_ battalion of the 6th Léger, in his formal dispatch to Clarke
(ibid. 395) he says that he had two.
[648] In reporting to Giron Longa mentions his 53 prisoners, and says
that his own losses were ‘inconsiderable.’ _Journal of the Army of
Galicia_, June 22.
[649] _Journal of the Army of Galicia_, June 23.
[650] Maucune reported 200 casualties (Foy, ed. Girod de l’Ain, p.
333), Graham 93, mostly in the 5th Caçadores. St. Pol’s Italians had
beaten off Longa without losing more than 100 men--Giron does not give
Longa’s loss, which was probably a little more.
[651] 1st Division about 4,500 bayonets, Pack and Bradford 4,500,
Anson’s cavalry 650.
[652] Giron’s two Galician divisions 11,000, Porlier 2,500, Longa 3,000.
[653] His own division and Maucune’s about 3,000 each, St. Pol’s
Italians 1,500, garrisons from Bilbao, Durango, and other western
places about 3,000, De Conchy’s brigade of Army of the North [64th (2
battalions), 22nd (1 battalion), 1st Line (2 companies), and 34th (4
companies)] 2,000, garrisons of Tolosa and other places in Guipuzcoa
about 2,500.
[654] Girod de l’Ain, p. 400.
[655] This was merely the noise of the rearguard action of Cassagne
with Wellington’s advance, near Yrurzun, on the afternoon of that day.
[656] See above, p. 274.
[657] The column was led--for reasons which are not given--not by its
own Caçador battalion, but by three companies of the 4th Caçadores and
two of the 1st Line, borrowed from the neighbouring brigade of Pack.
Graham praises the conduct of this detachment.
[658] Foy (Girod de l’Ain, p. 400) says that if his orders had been
obeyed there would have been a battalion and not a detachment holding
the access to the hill. Graham (_Wellington Supplementary Dispatches_,
viii. p. 44) declares that though many of Bradford’s men fought well,
‘the officers did not seem to understand what they were about, or how
to keep their men in the proper place,’ and a good many hung back.
[659] Very different figures from those of Foy’s dispatch, which stated
that eight minutes of terrible fire laid low 500 of the assailants!
(Girod de l’Ain, p. 402).
[660] There is one paragraph of Foy’s dispatch which I cannot make out.
He says that two British regiments tried to storm the hill of Jagoz,
and were repulsed by the voltigeur companies alone of the brigade
which held it. I cannot fit this in to any British narrative--the
only red-coated battalions in that part of the field were the line
battalions of the K.G.L., and they had certainly been engaged against
Bonté and the Italians, and afterwards tried to storm the Pampeluna
Gate. Longa’s men only were opposite the Jagoz position, as far as I
can make out.
[661] For all this see Rey’s letter in the _Pièces justificatives_ of
Belmas’s History of Sieges in Spain, iv. p. 662.
[662] Under General Deconchy, who got a new brigade when his old one
was thrown into San Sebastian.
[663] Dubourdieu’s battery belonging to the British 1st Division, and
four guns of Giron’s own small artillery equipment.
[664] Lecestre’s _Lettres inédites de Napoléon_, ii. p. 265.
[665] Severoli reached Valencia on May 2 (Vacani, vi. p. 207), so
was not drawn down in consequence of Murray’s move of May 25, as Mr.
Fortescue seems to imply in _British Army_, ix. p. 49. He had with him
two battalions each of the 1st Line and 1st Ligero, with a weak cavalry
regiment.
[666] 2nd of Burgos, detached by Wellington’s order. See Murray’s
_Court Martial_, p. 371.
[667] These changes of units had caused some re-brigading. Murray
had transferred the 4th K.G.L. and the Sicilian ‘Estero’ regiment
to Clinton’s division, but taken away from the latter and given to
Mackenzie the 2nd Italian Levy, the 1/10th and the 1/81st. But Clinton
was given charge over Whittingham’s Spaniards, and authorized to use
them as part of his division, so that his total command was now much
larger than Mackenzie’s.
[668] Pontevedra and Principe.
[669] It is interesting to compare the May 31 morning state of the Army
of Catalonia with the list of battalions which Murray reports as having
been brought down to the neighbourhood of Tarragona. All are there save
two (Fernando 7th and Ausona) left at Vich under Eroles (see Table in
Appendix), twelve battalions were with Copons.
[670] One of the 20th Line, one of the 7th Italian Line.
[671] Not only was the whole of the enceinte of the lower city
abandoned, but the outer enceinte of the upper city on its east and
north sides, from the bastion of El Rey to that of La Reyna (see map of
Tarragona, p. 524 of vol. iv).
[672] _Court Martial Proceedings_, p. 228. He adds that his only
chance (as he thought) was that conceivably he might find Tarragona so
ill-fortified that he might risk an immediate assault on unfinished
defences.
[673] Ibid., p. 292.
[674] _Court Martial Proceedings_, p. 183.
[675] Ibid., p. 165.
[676] The Quartermaster-General of the Army.
[677] _Proceedings_, p. 168.
[678] Note, Napier, v. p. 147.
[679] All this from Vacani (vi. p. 321), the only full French source:
I can find no mention of this abortive demonstration from the British
side.
[680] _Court Martial Proceedings_, p. 49.
[681] Murray’s evidence at the Court Martial, p. 50.
[682] Prevost’s very moderate loss was 1 officer and 4 men killed, 1
sergeant and 38 men wounded. This includes Spaniards.
[683] _Court Martial_, Murray’s defence, p. 228.
[684] _Murray’s Defence_, p. 232.
[685] Murray to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 467.
[686] Musnier’s division had 4,100 men present, by its return of June
15th. Pannetier’s column consisted of two battalions each of the
3rd Léger and 20th Line and one of the 5th Léger and a squadron of
Westphalians--by the return of the same date 2,600 in all. The hussars
were 650 sabres--adding the squadron of dragoons (200), the gunners of
three batteries, train, &c.; the whole may have made just under 8,000
of all arms. See Tables in Appendix, p. 755.
[687] Decaen to M. Mathieu, 5th June: see Vidal de la Blache, i. 353.
[688] Suchet to Decaen, Valencia, May 31. See Vidal de la Blache, i. p.
352.
[689] Report of Brigadier Llauder, commanding Copons’ left wing, to
Murray, _Proceedings_, p. 190. Llauder adds that he had discovered that
Mathieu’s column was only 5,500 strong.
[690] See especially Clinton’s evidence on pp. 180-2 of Murray’s _Court
Martial_.
[691] See Manso’s letter and Guillot’s report on pp. 275-6 of the
_Court Martial Proceedings_.
[692] For which see _Court Martial Proceedings_, pp. 282-3.
[693] His main blunder was that he took Pannetier’s brigade to be a
separate item of 3,000 men, over and above the 9,000 men coming from
Valencia of whom his emissary had written. He also doubled Suchet’s
cavalry, by supposing that the 9th bis of Hussars and the 12th Hussars
were two separate regiments. But they were the same unit, the number
having recently been changed by order from Paris.
[694] _Court Martial Proceedings_, p. 285.
[695] See evidence of Bentinck, p. 175, and Clinton, p. 180, of _Court
Martial Proceedings_.
[696] Evidence of Captain Milner, ibid., p. 397. This was not true at
the moment, early in the morning.
[697] Donkin to Murray, 3 p.m. 11th June. _Court Martial Proceedings_,
p. 360.
[698] He recalls this forgotten disaster in his defence (p. 300). A
landing force cut off by storms from its transports had to surrender
whole.
[699] _Court Martial Proceedings_, pp. 285-6.
[700] Donkin’s evidence, _Court Martial Proceedings_, p. 448.
[701] Williamson’s evidence, _Proceedings_, p. 124.
[702] Williamson’s evidence, ibid., p. 125.
[703] Mr. Fortescue has, I think, misinterpreted this order, when
he says that it told Clinton to march to the same spot as the first
(_British Army_, ix. p. 63), for Constanti is not in the direction of
the Gaya, but on the opposite flank, west of the Francoli river.
[704] A queer misprint in this dispatch makes it say ‘the enemy will
march.’
[705] Evidence of Captains Withers and Bathurst, R.N., _Court Martial
Proceedings_, pp. 86 and 95.
[706] Mackenzie in his evidence says his men began at 2 p.m. to get
into the boats.
[707] Evidence of Bentinck, ibid., p. 176. The cavalry went off at 3
p.m.
[708] The hours of this belated work are stated very differently by
various naval witnesses, some of whom say that they worked till 1
a.m., others till 4 a.m., others till 7; one thinks that embarkations
continued till well into the forenoon of the 13th--say 11 o’clock. At
any rate, the hour must have been long after daylight had come--which
was at 4.15, as is recorded by one witness.
[709] The total loss of Murray’s Army during the Tarragona operations
was:
_Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._ _Total._
British, Germans, Calabrese,
Italian Levy 14 60 5 }
Sicilians -- 15 -- } 102
Whittingham’s Spaniards 1 7 -- }
Bertoletti’s garrison lost 13 killed and 85 wounded = 98. The enemies
did each other little harm!
[710] Not apparently the whole division, for Mackenzie calls it ‘a
small body of infantry.’
[711] Suchet, _Mémoires_, ii. p. 315.
[712] Date stated by some as the 16th, but the earlier day seems
correct. See Mackenzie’s evidence, pp. 152-3: he was uncertain as to
the date.
[713] Hallowell says on the evening of the 14th or the 15th, he forgets
which. But the latter date must be the true one.
[714] Hallowell’s speech, p. 554 of the _Court Martial Proceedings_.
[715] Pannetier’s rearguard followed on the 17th. See letter of the
Alcalde of Perello, _Court Martial_, p. 361.
[716] Hallowell’s speech, _Court Martial Proceedings_, p. 556.
[717] By Mr. Fortescue, _History of the British Army_, ix. 67.
[718] See above, p. 515.
[719] _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. pp. 18-19, June 23.
[720] Ibid., p. 20.
[721] _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 22.
[722] Wellington to Murray, July 1, _Dispatches_, x. p. 487.
[723] _Dispatches_, x. p. 495, to Lord Bathurst, July 2.
[724] To the same, _Dispatches_, x. p. 496.
[725] To O’Donoju, Minister of War, _Dispatches_, x. pp. 492-3; to
Castaños, x. p. 475; to Lord Bathurst, x. pp. 473-4.
[726] ‘We and the powers of Europe are interested in the success of the
War in the Peninsula. But the creatures who govern at Cadiz appear to
feel no such interest. All that they care about really is the praise
of their foolish Constitution.... As long as Spain shall be governed
by the Cortes, acting upon Republican principles, we cannot hope for
any permanent amelioration.’ _Dispatches_, x. p. 474, Wellington to
Bathurst, June 29.
[727] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, _Dispatches_, x. p. 491.
[728] _Dispatches_, x. pp. 523-4.
[729] Ibid., x. p. 521.
[730] Ibid., x. pp. 553-4. When this letter was written to Lord William
Bentinck, Wellington had received no London dispatch for twenty days,
mainly owing to bad weather in the Bay of Biscay.
[731] Ibid., x. pp. 613-14, to Lord Bathurst.
[732] Ibid., x. p. 478, to Bentinck.
[733] Ibid., x. pp. 477-9.
[734] Ibid., x. p. 531.
[735] Full details in O’Donnell’s report to Wellington of July 1, 1813.
_Dispatches_, p. 503. Toreno makes an odd mistake in calling the French
commander de Ceva: this was the name of the junior officer who drew up
the capitulation.
[736] Not to be confounded with General Cassagne, who long commanded a
division in the Army of Andalusia.
[737] Late Hamilton’s division in 1810-11-12.
[738] Lord Dalhousie was left in command--a great slight to Picton--all
the more so after what had happened at Vittoria. See _Supplementary
Dispatches_, viii. p. 249.
[739] Late Cadogan’s.
[740] Pringle arrived and took command of this brigade a fortnight
later. Meanwhile the senior battalion commander led it.
[741] Reille had only two chasseur regiments with him.
[742] See the indignant letters of French officials quoted in Vidal de
la Blache, i. pp. 69 and 165-7.
[743] For the Army of Portugal only two chasseur regiments were left:
for the Army of the North only one: for the Army of the Centre only the
weak Nassau squadrons. But 13 out of the 14 cavalry regiments of the
Army of the South remained behind.
[744] Chassé’s brigade lost 850 men of 1,700 present, and the Nassau
regiment in the German brigade had similar casualties, though the Baden
regiment got off more lightly.
[745] It should be noted that Daricau’s 6th Division was now led by
Maransin--its old commander having been badly wounded at Vittoria.
Maransin’s late brigade, still extra-divisional as at Vittoria, had
been made over to Gruardet.
[746] Jourdan answered that it _was_ a false movement, but that on June
29th he could not possibly foresee that the King would change his mind
as to the destination of the Army of the South. See Vidal de la Blache,
i. p. 103.
[747] See Vidal de la Blache, i. pp. 103-4.
[748] Under Cameron of the 92nd as senior colonel--Cadogan who fell at
Vittoria not having yet been replaced.
[749] Viz. Villatte’s and Maransin’s divisions, and Gruardet’s brigade
of his own army, and Braun’s brigade of the Army of the Centre.
[750] On May 1 the three 2nd Division brigades had shown 7,200
bayonets--they had lost 900 men in action at Vittoria. If we allow for
sick and stragglers and other casual losses, they cannot possibly have
had 6,000 men in line on July 5.
[751] All these absurd theories are to be found in Gazan’s reports to
Jourdan of July 4 and 5. See Vidal de la Blache, i. pp. 106-7.
[752] The troops of the Army of the North which Foy had collected from
the Biscay garrisons, the brigades of Deconchy, Rouget, and Berlier of
which we have heard so much in a previous chapter.
[753] Foy, Lamartinière, Maucune and Fririon (late Sarrut). There were
behind them the King’s Spaniards and the raw Bayonne reserve.
[754] _Dispatches_, x. p. 512. The total losses having been 124 on all
three days, Wellington’s ‘no loss’ means, of course, practically no
loss.
[755] The clearest proof of Gazan’s resolute resolve not to stand,
and of the complete mendacity of his dispatches concerning his heavy
fighting on the 4th-5th and 7th, is that he returned the total of his
losses at 35 killed and 309 wounded. As he had six brigades, or 13,000
men at least, engaged, it is clear that there was no serious fighting
at all--a fact borne out by Hill’s corresponding return of 8 killed,
119 wounded, and 2 missing in the whole petty campaign.
[756] Cf. Lecestre, _Lettres inédites_, ii. p. 1037, where the Emperor
says on July 3 that he cannot make out what is happening; and that
Joseph and Jourdan are incapables.
[757] See, e. g., Joseph to Clarke, p. 336 of vol. ix of his
_Correspondance_.
[758] See vol. v, p. 97.
[759] ‘Les malheurs de l’Espagne sont d’autant plus grands qu’ils sont
ridicules.’ Napoleon to Savary, Dresden, 20 July: Lecestre, _Lettres
inédites_, ii.
[760] Even that he was withdrawing the British Army from Portugal.
Lecestre, ii. 998, May 5.
[761] Though he did once make the observation that ‘on ne conduit pas
des campagnes à 500 lieues de distance,’ in a lucid interval.
[762] See v. pp. 194-6.
[763] Napoleon to Cambacérès, Lecestre, ii. 1055.
[764] See above, p. 88.
[765] See the very interesting pages of Vidal de la Blache, i. pp.
142-3.
[766] See Roederer’s account of the interview in Vidal de la Blache, i.
pp. 132-3. Napoleon had suggested him as the best person for the errand.
[767] Napoleon to Cambacérès, Lecestre, _Lettres inédites_, ii. 1055.
[768] ‘Joey Bottles’ is the English equivalent.
[769] See especially the caustic paragraphs in Lecestre, ii. 1045,
1047, 1055, to Clarke and Cambacérès.
[770] So Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. viii. Vidal de la Blache, i. p.
140, says 5,000 francs only, which seems an impossibly small sum for
Marshal’s half pay.
[771] Napoleon to Cambacérès, Lecestre, ii. 1045.
[772] Napoleon to Maret, No. 28 in _Lettres de Napoléon non insérées
dans la Correspondance, Aug.-Sept.-Oct. 1813_. Paris, 1907.
[773] Bathurst to Wellington, June 23, _Supplementary Dispatches_,
viii. pp. 17-18.
[774] Liverpool to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. pp.
64-5, dated July 7.
[775] Wellington to Bathurst, July 12, from Hernani. _Dispatches_, x.
p. 524.
[776] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, July 23, from Lesaca, ibid., x. p.
568. Cf. same to same, x. p. 596.
[777] _Dispatches_, x. p. 570.
[778] See Wellington to Torrens, _Dispatches_, x. p. 616.
[779] See Wellington to Bathurst, _Dispatches_, x. p. 599, and other
epistles on same topic.
[780] Called the Mirador (’look-out’), Queen’s, and Principe batteries:
there were others facing sea-ward, which were of no account in this
siege, as no attack from the water-side took place.
[781] See Jones’s _Sieges of the Peninsula_, ii. p. 94.
[782] The governor surrendered the town on August 1, but retired into
the castle of La Mota, where he capitulated a few days later, just as
Rey did in 1813.
[783] Jones’s _Sieges of the Peninsula_, ii. p. 14.
[784] Dickson’s diary, July 12, 1813, p. 960 of Colonel John Leslie’s
edition of the _Dickson Papers_.
[785] Jones, ii. p. 97.
[786] See above, p. 478.
[787] See Graham to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p.
62. The K.G.L. brigade of the 1st Division was present for a few days.
[788] Wellington to Graham, _Dispatches_, x. p. 512.
[789] _Wellington Dispatches_, x. p. 525.
[790] Melville to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. pp.
224-5.
[791] Wellington to Melville, _Dispatches_, xi. p. 115.
[792] See the interesting account of his cross-country ride on June
25-9 in his _Letters from the Peninsula_, pp. 167-74.
[793] See Frazer, p. 195.
[794] In detail Jones gives them as twenty 24-pounders, six
18-pounders, four 68-pound cannonades, six 8-inch howitzers, and four
mortars.
[795] See Hartmann’s _Life_, pp. 153-4.
[796] Nos. 4, 5 in map.
[797] Nos. 1, 2, 3 in map.
[798] No. 6 in the map.
[799] Why does Belmas, who was very well informed, and used Jones’s
book, call the stormers ‘les Anglais’ and say that they lost 150 men?
(_Sièges_, iv. p. 608). He knew from Jones that they were Caçadores
only (Jones, ii. p. 21), and that their loss was under 70.
[800] Right column, to attack the cemetery and fortified houses--150 of
5th Caçadores, 150 13th Portuguese Line, three companies 1/9th Foot,
three companies 3/1st Foot (Royal Scots) all under Hay, Brigadier
of the 5th Division. Left column: 200 of 5th Caçadores, 200 of 13th
Portuguese Line, three companies 1/9th Foot--all under Bradford
commanding Portuguese independent brigade. Why did not Oswald use his
own Portuguese brigade, but draw on Bradford? Possibly because Spry’s
brigade were discouraged by the failure of their Caçador battalion on
the 15th.
[801] Generally in British narratives called the Cask Redoubt, because
wine casks had been used to revet the shifting sand of which the soil
was there composed.
[802] Batteries 8 and 7 in the map.
[803] Batteries 13 and 14 in the map.
[804] Batteries 12 and 11 in the map.
[805] No. 6 in the map.
[806] There is a curious contradiction between Jones and Belmas as to
the fate of the Cask Redoubt. The latter says that the British took
it--the former that the garrison abandoned it, though not attacked.
[807] ‘From the looseness of the sand in which the battery was
constructed, it was found impossible to keep the soles of the
embrasures sufficiently clear to use the three short 24-pounders
mounted on ship carriages--after a few rounds they had to cease
firing.’ Jones, ii. p. 28.
[808] Burgoyne’s _Life and Correspondence_, i. p. 267.
[809] Burgoyne, who took out the flag of truce, says that the French
officer who met him on the glacis used very angry words (ibid.).
[810] See _Dickson Papers_, ed. Col. Leslie, p. 970. The second breach
is marked as ‘Lesser Breach’ on the map.
[811] Burgoyne, whose diary of the siege is one of the primary
authorities, says that in his opinion the mine could have been much
more useful than it was. ‘On the discovery of the drain, I should
have immediately have altered the whole plan of attack. I would have
made a “globe of compression” to blow in the counterscarp and the
crest of the glacis, and then at low water have threatened an attack
on the breaches, exploded the mine, and have made the real assault on
the hornwork, which not being threatened had few people in it, and
would undoubtedly have been carried easily.’ There was, he says, good
cover in the hornwork, which would have been easily connected with
the parallel, and used as the base for attacking the main front, with
breaching batteries in its terre-plein and the crest of the glacis.
Burgoyne, i. p. 271. But this is wisdom after the event.
[812] Jones, ii. p. 36.
[813] For all these details see Belmas, iv. pp. 620-1.
[814] Burgoyne says (i. 369) that the engineers on the 24th settled
that the mine was no more than a signal ‘with a chance of alarming
them’. On the 25th it would seem that a little more attention, but not
nearly enough, was given to this useful subsidiary operation.
[815] Burgoyne says at 4.30.
[816] This is slurred over in the British narratives except _Dickson’s
Diary_, p. 973. Belmas gives some account of it, however, though he
calls the assailants British instead of Portuguese (iv. p. 623). They
were some companies of the 8th Caçadores.
[817] Most of this narrative is from Colin Campbell’s long and
interesting letter to Sir J. Cameron, printed on pp. 25-30 of his
_Life_ by General Shadwell.
[818] Gomm, p. 312.
[819] Frazer’s _Letters from the Peninsula_, p. 205.
[820] The 38th lost 53 men, the 9th 25, the Portuguese 138 in the
side-attack. Why need Belmas, who had Jones’s book before him, give the
total of British losses as 2,000? (_Sièges_, iv. 625).
[821] Though Jones says that he saw some wounded bayoneted.
[822] Printed in Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_, vol. ii.
[823] Campbell’s letter quoted above in his _Life_, i. p. 30.
[824] ‘The men, panic stricken, turned and could never be rallied,’
writes Frazer next day (p. 204). ‘One party, I believe of the 9th and
38th, went up to the breach and then turned and ran away,’ says Larpent
(p. 200). Neither saw the actual assault in the dark.
[825] So at least he wrote to Castaños on the 24th: ‘j’espère que cette
affaire est finie.’ _Dispatches_, x. p. 564.
[826] See Frazer, p. 206, and Burgoyne, i. p. 269.
[827] See Wellington to Graham, night of the 25th, _Dispatches_, x. p.
566.
[828] Permission was given to leave four guns behind in the main
breaching batteries and two on Monte Olia, to keep up a semblance of
continued attack. _Dispatches_, x. p. 566.
[829] The British officer in command in the trenches, Major O’Halloran,
was court martialled, but acquitted. It was proved that he had given
the correct orders to the Portuguese captains of the companies on
guard, who had not obeyed them. All the prisoners except 30 were
Portuguese.
[830] The history of this proclamation is curious. Clarke, or Napoleon
himself, considered it too full of insults of a person who was, after
all, the Emperor’s brother. So it had to be disavowed: Soult wrote to
Paris that he had not authorized it, and Clarke had the ingenuity to
print in the French newspapers that it was an invention of the English
government, intended to disgust the Spanish partisans of King Joseph,
and to advertise the ill feeling that prevailed between the French
army and the Imperial family. See Vidal de la Blache, i. p. 138; as he
remarks, the style is all Soult’s, and there is not a trace of foreign
diction in it. No Englishman or Spaniard could have written it.
[831] Joseph to Napoleon, 1st February 1813.
[832] See notably the case of General Excelmans.
[833] See especially the proclamation of March 6, 1815.
[834] _Mémoires_ of St. Chamans, p. 35.
[835] Maximilien Lamarque, ii. p. 182.
[836] Stanhope’s _Conversations with Wellington_, p. 20.
[837] The gendarmerie were those who had come from the ‘legions’,
employed in 1811-12-13 as garrisons in Northern Spain. They were
embodied in units, horse and foot, and used as combatants (as at the
combat of Venta del Pozo, for which see p. 71).
[838] As Table XVI in the Appendix shows, Foy’s division received
two of Sarrut’s regiments: Cassagne’s (now Darmagnac’s) took all
the French infantry of the old Army of the Centre: Villatte’s (now
Abbé’s) was given two of Abbé’s regiments of the Army of the North:
Conroux’s division absorbed Maransin’s independent brigade: Barbot’s
(now Vandermaesen’s) received two regiments of the Army of the North:
Daricau’s (now Maransin’s) got half Leval’s ‘scrapped’ division, Taupin
the other half of it: Maucune absorbed one of Vandermaesen’s old
regiments, Lamartinière one of Sarrut’s.
[839] 120th Line of Lamartinière.
[840] 2nd Léger of same, which suffered heavily at Vittoria while under
Sarrut.
[841] 20,957 to be exact.
[842] Not only the _Afrancesados_ but some of the Army of the North
troops withdrawn from the Biscay garrisons had a poor record, and had
disgusted Foy in his recent Tolosa fight. These were high-numbered
battalions, recently made up from the Bayonne conscript reserve.
[843] The best proof of the efficiency of the bulk of Villatte’s corps
is that when Vandermaesen’s and Maucune’s divisions were cut to pieces
in the battles of the Pyrenees, Soult made up a new brigade for each of
them out of the Reserve. Joseph’s French Guards fought splendidly at
San Marcial. The Germans were very steady veteran troops.
[844] Vidal de la Blache, i. p. 160.
[845] See above, p. 533. Jourdan to Joseph, July 5. The memorandum had
been made over to Soult. Cf. Clere, _Campagne du Maréchal Soult_, p.
46, and Vidal de la Blache, i. p. 182.
[846] One asks oneself why Soult did not give Reille the Maya attack,
saving him two-thirds of his journey, and send D’Erlon to join Clausel
at St. Jean-Pied-du-Port, by a march much shorter than Reille was asked
to make.
[847] It is said that persons acquainted with the country told Soult to
send the whole column round by Bayonne, on account of the artillery,
but that he refused. As a matter of fact, Lamartinière’s division and
some of the guns _did_ go that détour, owing to the broken bridge.
[848] Wellington to Graham, July 22. _Dispatches_, x. p. 559.
[849] Ibid., p. 563, same to same.
[850] _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 113.
[851] Ibid., p. 114.
[852] Wellington to Graham, July 24, _Dispatches_, x. p. 563.
[853] Same morning, to Giron, ibid., p. 564.
[854] Wellington to Graham, 25th July, _Dispatches_, x. p. 566.
[855] Wellington to Graham, _Dispatches_, x. p. 570.
[856] See especially Lemonnier-Delafosse, pp. 211-12, and Wachholz of
Brunswick-Oels, p. 321.
[857] Vittoria and light companies of Doyle, La Union, and Legion
Estremena.
[858] La Union and the Legion, minus their light companies.
[859] Doyle and 2nd of Jaen.
[860] Sometimes called the Puerto de Val Carlos.
[861] See the very interesting letter of Bainbrigge of the 20th,
printed as an Appendix to the regimental history of that corps, p. 390.
[862] Bainbrigge says that it was 7 a.m. before the regiment reached
the Linduz, but that it was an hour earlier is demonstrated by the fact
that they heard firing at Roncesvalles after arriving. Now Byng’s fight
on the Leiçaratheca began at 6 a.m. Therefore Ross was on the Linduz
earlier.
[863] What became of this Spanish company? Captain Tovey of the 20th
(see history of that corps, p. 408) says that the French ‘made the
Spanish picquet, who were posted to give us intelligence, prisoners,
without their firing a shot’. Another account is that having seen Ross
arrive, they quietly went off to rejoin their brigade, without giving
any notice.
[864] There is a curious and interesting account of all this in the
Memoirs of Lemonnier-Delafosse, aide-de-camp to Clausel, who was twice
sent to stir up Barbot, whose conduct he describes in scathing terms
(pp. 212-14). Clausel says that the 50th stormed the Leiçaratheca. That
it stormed an abandoned position is shown by the figure of its losses.
What Clausel does not tell can be gathered from Byng’s workmanlike
dispatch to Cole, in _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. pp. 128-9.
[865] Of the 27th and 130th Line.
[866] I confess that I doubt these figures. Martinien’s lists show the
27th Line with seven officer-casualties, the 1st Line with two, the
25th Léger with three, the 130th with two. Fourteen officer-casualties
ought to mean more like 280 than 100 casualties of all ranks. In the
whole Pyrenean campaign the French army lost 120 officers to 12,300
men--nearly 30 men to each officer. Clausel asks us to believe that
at Roncesvalles the proportion was one officer to twelve men! Yet, of
course, such disproportion is quite _possible_.
[867] While we have quite a number of good personal narratives
of the fight on the Linduz, I have found for the fight on the
Leiçaratheca nothing but the official reports of Clausel, Byng, and
Morillo, save the memoirs of George L’Estrange of the 31st and of
Lemonnier-Delafosse, who is interesting but obviously inaccurate, since
he says that the French regiment which carried the hill was the 71st.
Not only was it the 50th, as Clausel specially mentions, but 71 was a
blank number in the French Army List.
[868] Four, not five, because the light company of the 20th was absent
with the other light companies far to the right: so the wing was only
four companies strong, or three deducting Tovey’s men. Wachholz forgets
this.
[869] Wachholz, p. 322.
[870] Tovey fortunately wrote a narrative of this little affair, which
may be found in the history of the 20th, p. 408. He says: ‘The enemy’s
light troops opened so galling a fire that Major-General Ross called
out for a company to go to the front. Without waiting for orders I
pushed out with mine, and in close order and double-quick cleared
away the skirmishers from a sort of plateau. They did not wait for
us: on reaching its opposite side we came so suddenly on the head of
the enemy’s infantry column, which had just gained a footing on the
summit of the hill, that the men of my company absolutely paused in
astonishment, for we were face to face with them. The French officer
called to us to throw down our arms: I replied “bayonet away,” and
rushing on them we turned them back down the descent. Such was the
panic and confusion caused by the sudden onset, that our small party
(for such it was compared to the French column) had time to regain the
regiment, but my military readers may rest assured that it required to
be done _double quick_.’
[871] This ditch had been cut by the Spaniards in 1793 as an outer
protection to their redoubt on the Linduz.
[872] Wachholz, p. 324.
[873] The 6th Léger, 69th (2 battalions), 76th, and 36th show
casualties, the rear regiments (39th and 65th) none. Nor does Maucune’s
division. Similarly on the British side none of Anson’s or Stubbs’s
battalions contribute to the list.
[874] As we have seen already, Clausel puts his loss at the
Leiçaratheca at 160, to Byng’s and Morillo’s 120. At the other end of
the line Ross’s brigade had lost 216 men--139 of them in the 20th, 31
in the 7th, 42 in the 23rd, 4 in the Brunswick company. [I know not
where Napier got his strange statement that this company lost 42 men:
their captain, Wachholz, reports 2 killed and 2 wounded.] Foy’s six
front battalions had lost 10 officers and 361 men. The total Allied
loss was about 350, there having been a few casualties among Campbell’s
Portuguese and among the Spaniards at Orbaiceta. The total French loss
was not less than 530. Both figures are very moderate. Cole estimated
the French casualties at 2,000 men! Soult wrote that he had almost
exterminated the 20th, whose total loss had been 139.
[875] Cole to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 127.
[876] Wellington to Liverpool, _Dispatches_, x. p. 596.
[877] See vol. iv. pp. 389-90.
[878] Cole to Murray, Linzoain, July 26th. Wrongly dated July 27th in
_Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 124.
[879] See diary of Dr. Henry, who was at Elizondo, and notes how all
the senior officers rode out eastward (p. 161).
[880] Bell, vol. i. p. 102; Cadell, p. 161.
[881] One from each battalion plus the odd company of the 5/60th
attached to each 2nd Division brigade.
[882] See Hope’s _Military Memoirs_, p. 319. Sceptical observers with
telescopes said that the objects seen were droves of bullocks.
[883] See Moyle Sherer (who commanded the picquet), p. 257.
[884] Major Thorne, assistant quartermaster-general. Moyle Sherer says
that Thorne owned that there was a small column on the move, but that
he judged it to be a battalion shifting its quarters, or a relief of
outposts.
[885] Mr. Fortescue (_History of the Army_, ix. p. 258) thinks that the
34th got up in time to join in their last struggle. But Bell of that
regiment says ‘we laboured on, but all too late--a forlorn hope--our
comrades were _all_ killed, wounded, or prisoners. The enemy had full
possession of the ground.’ Bell’s _Rough Notes_, i. p. 103.
[886] Bell’s _Rough Notes_, i. p. 103.
[887] Bell, i. p. 104.
[888] All this is most difficult to follow, our numerous sources
contradicting each other in matters of detail in the most puzzling
fashion. For this part of the narrative I have used, beside the
dispatch of William Stewart, the books of Moyle Sherer of the 34th, who
commanded the Aretesque picquet and was taken prisoner--Sir George Bell
of the same regiment, Cadell of the 28th, Hope and Sergeant Robertson
of the 92nd, Patterson of the 50th, the two anonymous diarists ‘J.
S.’ and the ‘Scottish Soldier’ of the 71st, besides D’Erlon’s and
Darmagnac’s original dispatches, lent me by Mr. Fortescue. I take it
that each authority may be followed for the doings of his own corps,
but is of inferior weight for those of other units. Patterson says that
the 34th was at one time in close touch with the 50th, Cadell that the
28th and 92nd worked together, while Hope says that the 28th was only
seen by the 92nd right wing after it had ended its terrible first entry
into the fight. Patterson says that he saw O’Callaghan of the 39th
fighting along with the 50th in the third episode of the combat, when,
according to other sources, that regiment had already retreated south
toward the valley with the 34th. Stewart’s dispatch only speaks of the
28th and 34th retiring in that direction, not the 39th. A confused
fight has left confused memories. I cannot be sure of all the details.
[889] The statement in Napier and succeeding writers that the wounded
of the right wing of the 92nd formed a bank behind which the French
advance halted, and stood to receive the fire of the left wing of that
same corps, whose bullets hit many of its comrades, comes from the
narrative of Norton of the 34th (Napier, V. appendix, p. 442), who was
some way off. That the troops which came up were the right wing 71st,
and not the left wing 92nd, seems to me proved by the narrative of Hope
of the 92nd, who distinctly says that the right wing were relieved by
the 71st, and that the left wing were still holding the Maya position
and under Stewart, who had just arrived, along with the left wing of
the 71st (_Military Memoirs_, p. 210).
[890] He himself in his dispatch only says that it was after 1 p.m.
[891] Tulloh (commanding 2nd division batteries) to Dickson, in
_Dickson Papers_, p. 1022. Wellington’s censure of Stewart may be found
in _Dispatches_, x. p. 588, and his reply to the latter’s self-defence
in xi. p. 107. The details are hard to follow: Wellington says that
Pringle ordered the guns to be taken off by the road to Maya--that
Stewart directed that they were to go back, and look to ‘the mountain
road to Elizondo’ as their proper line of retreat. When it became
necessary for them to retire at all costs, that road was already in the
hands of the French. But I do not know precisely what Wellington meant
by the mountain-road to Elizondo. Does it mean the track by which the
28th and 34th had retired?
[892] See Stewart’s Report to Hill, Berueta, July 26.
[893] Robertson, pp. 109-10.
[894] Stewart’s dispatch says that it was the 82nd who fought with
stones.
[895] This was not the brigade to which the 82nd belonged, but the
reserve brigade of the 7th Division, short of one of its units, the 3rd
Provisional.
[896] Cf. _Dispatches_, x. pp. 597-8.
[897] ‘Lettres de l’Empereur Napoléon non insérées dans la
_Correspondance_, publiées par X. Paris and Nancy, 1909,’ page 3. It is
amusing to find out what Napoleon III omitted of his uncle’s letters.
[898] ‘Lettres de l’Empereur Napoléon non insérées dans la
_Correspondance_,’ p. 13.
[899] Wellington’s letter to Graham, giving the false report that
D’Erlon had been repulsed at Maya, is dated at 10 p.m. The letter to
O’Donnell must be a little later, as it repeats this error, but adds
that a note has come in from Cole, saying that he was heavily engaged
at noon. _Dispatches_, x. pp. 566-7.
[900] The dispatch giving this information (_Dispatches_, x. p. 570)
is wrongly dated in the Wellington correspondence. It should be July
_26th_ at 4 a.m. The hour of the receipt of Hill’s and Stewart’s
reports is not given.
[901] All in _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. pp. 120-1.
[902] Hill to Murray, _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 121.
[903] The orders to Pack and Dalhousie may be found in _Supplementary
Dispatches_, xix. p. 258-9, dated from Almandoz--obviously before
Cole’s dispatch had come to hand.
[904] This letter in _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. pp. 124-5, is
there wrongly dated July 27th (for 26th). Cole, of course, was no
longer at Linzoain on the 27th.
[905] To Picton from Almandoz, _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. p. 259.
[906] Picton to Murray, 8.30 p.m., _Supplementary Dispatches_, xviii.
pp. 121-2.
[907] See above, p. 622.
[908] See above, p. 591.
[909] These are his own words, in his Report of August 2.
[910] Foy to Reille, July 20.
[911] Reille to Soult, July 27.
[912] The tall hat is vouched for by George L’Estrange of the 31st, and
Wachholz from Ross’s brigade, the furled umbrella by Bainbrigge of the
20th, all eye-witnesses, whose narratives are among the few detailed
accounts of this retreat.
[913] Words overheard by Bainbrigge in his own company.
[914] See Quartermaster-General to Picton, enclosing letter for Cole,
sent off from Lesaca on July 23 (_Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. pp.
112-13), which must have reached Picton at Olague on the 24th.
[915] This seems a more controvertible plea. Orders went out from
Lesaca on the 23rd, and must have reached Picton not very late in the
day on the 24th. Supposing he had marched from Olague on the afternoon
of the 24th, he would have been at Zubiri (only 6 miles off) on that
same night, or even at Viscarret. And from Zubiri to Roncesvalles is
not an excessive day’s march for the 25th, especially when firing was
to be heard at the front.
[916] The remaining four were in the Caçador battalion of Stubbs’s
Portuguese brigade.
[917] Unfortunately all French losses are given _en bloc_ for the
six days July 27 to August 1, and the casualties of each day cannot
be disentangled. The casualties of Maya and Roncesvalles _can_ be
ascertained, but not those of the subsequent days.
[918] Viz. about 6,000 of Cole’s division, 5,000 of his own, 1,700 of
Byng’s brigade, 2,500 of Campbell’s Portuguese at Eugui, only a few
miles away, and something under 4,000 of Morillo’s Spaniards.
[919] See Belmas, iv. p. 803.
[920] Napier says (v. p. 225), and all subsequent historians have
followed him, that Picton originally intended to place Cole on a line
between Oricain and Arleta, i. e. on the low back-slope of the ridge.
This seems to me almost incredible, as this ground is all running
downhill, completely commanded by the much loftier crests about the
Col. Surely no one, according to the tactical ideas of 1813, would
take up a defensive position half-way down a slope whose summit is
abandoned to the enemy. I can find no authority save Napier (who was
not in the battle) for this curious statement. And I am justified, I
think, in holding that the San Miguel hill was the place where Picton
intended to place Cole, by the narrative and sketch-map of Wachholz of
Ross’s brigade, who places the first position of the 4th Division on a
well-marked hill immediately to the right of Villaba, and close to the
3rd Division’s ground at Huarte. This _must_ mean San Miguel.
[921] R. Hill’s, Ponsonby’s, the Hussar brigade, and D’Urban’s
Portuguese, Fane’s brigade, which was observing on the side of Aragon,
did not arrive this day.
[922] One of the 4th Line.
[923] Reille’s report of August 1st.
[924] Clausel in his report says that he arrived in time to see the 4th
Division cross the hill of Oricain.
[925] Perhaps Carlos de España’s division, arriving from the south.
[926] All this from the very interesting narrative of Clausel’s
aide-de-camp Lemonnier Delafosse (p. 220), who bore the first message
to Soult, and was (like his chief) much irritated by the Marshal’s
caution and refusal to commit himself. Clausel had got a completely
erroneous notion of the enemy’s intentions--like Ney at Bussaco.
[927] Quartermaster-General to Sir R. Hill, _Supplementary Dispatches_,
viii. pp. 259-60.
[928] Wellington to Pack, _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 122,
wrongly dated 1 o’clock--it should be 10 o’clock. Wellington was at
Sorauren by 11.
[929] Final destination not given--clearly it might be down the
high-road to Pampeluna; but if Picton had retreated still further and
raised the siege, it might be to Lizaso, to join Hill and the rest.
[930] Wellington described his ride to Larpent, his Judge-Advocate
General, a week later, in the following terse language (Larpent, p.
242): ‘At one time it was rather alarming, certainly, and a close
run thing. When I came to the bridge of Sorauren I saw French on the
hills on one side, and it was clear that we could make a stand on the
other hill, in our position of the 28th, but I found that we could not
keep Sorauren, as it was exposed to their fire and not to ours. I was
obliged to write my orders accordingly at Sorauren, to be sent back
instantly. For if they had not been dispatched back directly, by the
way I had come, I must have sent them four leagues round, a quarter of
an hour later. I stopped therefore to write accordingly, people saying
to me all the time, “The French are coming!” “The French are coming!” I
looked pretty sharp after them every now and then, till I had completed
my orders, and then set off. I saw them just near the one end of the
village as I went out of it at the other end. And then we took up our
ground.’ Wellington then added, in a confidential moment, that there
need have been no fuss or trouble, if only Cole had kept sending the
proper information on the 26th and 27th. If only his intention of
going right back to Pampeluna had been known earlier, the 6th and
7th Divisions could have been up on the 27th, and Hill’s corps too,
which had been kept at Irurita and Berueta for 36 hours, because the
situation in the south was concealed by Cole’s reticence. ‘We should
have stopped the French much sooner.’
[931] French critics expressed surprise that Wellington did not tell
Pack to fall on Clausel’s flank and rear. But the 6th Division,
attacking from Olague, would have been out of touch with the rest of
the army, and Wellington did not believe in attacks by isolated corps
uncombined with the main army, and unable to communicate with it. See
Dumas’ _Campagne du Maréchal Soult_, p. 163.
[932] Bainbrigge’s narrative in Smyth’s _History of the XXth_, p. 396.
[933] Ibid. Bainbrigge was standing close to both.
[934] Larpent, p. 243.
[935] Lemonnier-Delafosse, p. 219.
[936] Soult to Clarke, July 28.
[937] _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 123.
[938] Ibid., p. 124.
[939] See above, p. 661.
[940] Reports of Maucune and Lamartinière dated August 3rd and 4th.
[941] Clausel’s report of August 2.
[942] There is a most curious and difficult point in this history of
the first phase of the action. Clausel says, and he is of course a
primary authority, that though Conroux was already deeply engaged with
the 6th Division, ‘was being fired on from all sides, was suffering
severe losses, and had already had one of his brigadiers disabled’
[Schwitter], he told him that he must join in the attack ‘swerving to
the left so as to mount the hill in the direction originally assigned
to him’, which was done and Conroux immediately repulsed. I cannot
see how this was physically possible. How could Conroux, if already
disadvantageously engaged with the 6th Division, and ‘fired at from
all sides’, break off this fight and attack any point of the hill of
Oricain? If he had gone away in that direction, _who was there to
hold Sorauren against Pack’s people, who were pressing in on it, and
(as Clausel says) only a musket-shot away from it_? As far as I can
make out, Conroux must have been sufficiently employed in fending off
Pack and maintaining Sorauren, so as to cover the flank of the other
divisions, for the next hour or two. No other authority but Clausel
gives any hint that Conroux got away from Pack and joined in the
general assault. And I am constrained to think that Clausel (strange as
it may seem) is making a misstatement--and that when Conroux is said to
have been ordered to attack the hill by swerving to the left, he can
only have been keeping off Pack. I note that Vidal de la Blache and
Mr. Fortescue try to accept Clausel’s story, but that General Beatson
(_With Wellington in the Pyrenees_, pp. 170-2) ignores it.
[943] I include, in reckoning Picton’s force at Bussaco, his own
division and the three battalions of Leith’s first brigade which
brought him help. In Cole’s Oricain figures are reckoned the 4th
Division, Byng’s brigade, Campbell’s Portuguese, and two Spanish
regiments.
[944] Lemonnier-Delafosse of the 31st Léger.
[945] This exceptional use of grenadiers in the skirmishing line, I
get from an observation of Bainbrigge of the 20th, who expresses his
surprise that the troops with whom he was engaged, though acting as
_tirailleurs_, were not light infantry, but men in tall bearskin caps
like the Guard, ‘some of the finest-looking soldiers I ever met’ (p.
400).
[946] The 10th Caçadores, Campbell’s light battalion, was a very weak
unit of only 250 bayonets.
[947] Clausel’s report of August 2.
[948] D’Haw of the 34th Léger.
[949] The fourth battalion of the brigade, the 1/40th was detached
below on the Spaniards’ Hill.
[950] Lemonnier-Delafosse, pp. 227-8.
[951] The Buffs lost only 2 men, the 1st Provisional (2/31st and
2/66th) only 5--so can hardly have been engaged,--but the 1/57th had 63
casualties.
[952] The above narrative is reconstructed from Reille’s two reports
(the divisional report of Lamartinière, however, is useless) and from
narratives of Stretton of the 40th in Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_,
and Mills in the history of the regiment by Smythies.
[953] There is little about this affair in the British narratives.
Diarists were rare in the 6th Division. The only point of interest I
found in them is the mention of mule-guns used by the French.
[954] Larpent, p. 221. Cf. Napier, v. p. 226: ‘That will give time
for the 6th Division to arrive, and I shall beat him’--words true in
thought but perhaps never spoken by Wellington.
[955] Lapéne, p. 80.
[956] Soult to Clarke, report of the battle.
[957] See statistics in Appendix XXII.
[958] Narrative of Captain G. Wood of the 1/82nd, pp. 192-3.
[959] See _Dickson Papers_, Tulloh’s letter, p. 1022.
[960] Hill to Quartermaster-General, _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii.
p. 142.
[961] Dalhousie to Quartermaster-General, ibid.
[962] 28th Léger.
[963] 22nd Chasseurs.
[964] Soult’s general orders of July 23rd.
[965] Soult to Clarke, from Zabaldica, evening of the 28th.
[966] See St. Chamans, quoted above, p. 590.
[967] Expressed most clearly, perhaps, in the Orders issued by the
Chief of the Staff, Gazan, to the Corps-Commanders on July 29:
‘L’intention du Général en Chef est de se porter avec toute l’armée sur
la communication de Pampelune à St. Estevan.’
[968] Ordre du 29 Juillet; see also Gazan to Reille of same date.
[969] Quartermaster-General to Dalhousie and Hill, _Supplementary
Dispatches_, viii. p. 151.
[970] Ibid., Q.M.G. to Hill, p. 152. In this Da Costa’s brigade is
called the Conde de Amarante’s _division_, but Campbell had not yet
joined Da Costa.
[971] Q.M.G. to Alten, _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. pp. 150-1.
[972] Foy (Girod de l’Ain), p. 219.
[973] These guns did not belong to Brandreth’s battery, the divisional
artillery of the 6th Division, but oddly enough to Cairnes’s battery,
which belonged to the 7th. See Duncan’s _History of the Royal
Artillery_, ii. p. 190.
[974] Sympher’s, of the K.G.L.
[975] Foy in Girod de l’Ain, p. 220.
[976] That the firing began at dawn immediately is stated by Larpent,
p. 210. That the troops were under arms before daylight is noted by the
anonymous _Soldier of the 42nd_, p. 199. The attack by the 6th Division
on Sorauren was appreciably before the descent of Cole and Byng from
the heights of Oricain.
[977] Girod de l’Ain, p. 221.
[978] 43rd Line (2 battalions).
[979] Maucune’s 34th Léger reports 13 officers and 531 men prisoners
out of a strength of 773. Why does Captain Vidal de la Blache, usually
accurate, give this as Maucune’s total loss in prisoners? (cf. p.
251). His other battalions contribute another 550. Conroux’s 55th and
58th Line give respectively 282 and 348 prisoners--the other regiments
smaller but appreciable lists of captured.
[980] Interesting accounts of this fight may be found in the narratives
of Wood of the 82nd, Green of the 68th, and Wheeler of the 51st--all in
Inglis’s brigade. They are, however, most confused, none of them having
much notion of how or where they came into the general scheme of the
fight. All speak of the steepness of the ground.
[981] I cannot make out for certain when Le Cor’s Portuguese joined
Dalhousie on the 30th, coming from the Marcalain road, where they had
been placed on the previous evening. Probably not early, as they had
64 casualties only (mostly in 2nd Caçadores), while the other brigades
had 200 apiece. The fact that the losses are nearly all in the light
battalion shows that a skirmishing pursuit was the task of Le Cor’s men.
[982] Clausel’s report is (perhaps naturally) very reticent, and would
give a reader who had no other sources to utilize a very inadequate
account of the day’s work--no one could possibly gather from it that
Conroux lost 600 prisoners and Vandermaesen 300, or that the whole
corps was in great disorder. For a picture of Conroux’s division
scattered over the hills, and its general storming at the fugitives,
see Lemonnier-Delafosse, p. 232.
The hours at which events took place on Clausel’s wing are hard to
settle. I follow him in making the artillery begin to play on Sorauren
_long_ before 7, the infantry attack soon after that hour, and the loss
of Sorauren about 9.
[983] So Lamartinière, who admits that there was ‘un peu de désordre’
but confesses much less than Foy, for whose account see Girod de l’Ain,
p. 221.
[984] Picton’s division lost 89 in Brisbane’s brigade, 20 among Power’s
Portuguese, none in Colville’s brigade.
[985] So Foy. Reille thinks that it was Sarrasibar, 3 miles farther
east.
[986] Girod de l’Ain, p. 223.
[987] See Vidal de la Blache, p. 280, for complaints by the French
_maires_ of atrocities committed.
[988] See above, p. 681.
[989] See above, p. 664.
[990] All this in Q.M.G. to Hill, &c., in _Supplementary Dispatches_,
viii. pp. 154-5, where it is stupidly printed _after_ the evening
orders given at 9 p.m.
[991] Soult says by way of Zubiri, Eugui, and Lanz, which seems a
vast circuit--this march must surely have been made on the preceding
evening: in the dark it would hardly have been possible.
[992] 75th Line. Darmagnac says in his report that its colonel attacked
the second position without orders. Martinien’s lists show that it lost
16 officers--presumably therefore over 300 men.
[993] See casualty tables in Appendix. Maransin had no losses, having
never been engaged. Hill made an astounding blunder in estimating his
total loss at 400 in his report to Wellington. Nine British and 36
Portuguese officers were hit--exactly the same number as the French
officer-casualties.
[994] Hill had Fitzgerald’s and O’Callaghan’s British brigades--2,600
deducting Maya losses, Da Costa’s brigade 2,300, Ashworth’s 2,800, and
some squadrons of Long’s light dragoons--about 8,000 in all. D’Erlon
had, also deducting 2,000 Maya losses, over 18,000 infantry in his
three divisions--not to speak of the cavalry division just arrived.
[995] Soult to Clarke, August 2.
[996] _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. pp. 152-3.
[997] _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 154, written at Ostiz, 30th
July, many hours after the preceding note to Alten, also written on the
30th but from Villaba. It is endorsed by G. Murray, Lizaso, 11 a.m.,
31st July.
[998] One battalion and one cavalry regiment, see above, p. 681.
[999] Wellington to Q.M.G., Irurita, 3 p.m.
[1000] Narrative of L’Estrange of the 31st, p. 121.
[1001] In his report, as he explains, ‘je m’occupai de déblayer la
route, qui était encombrée d’équipages et de cavalerie.’
[1002] D’Erlon in his report of August 3 says that ‘the majority of
the enemy’s soldiers were drunk,’ an involuntary tribute to their wild
pluck.
[1003] The 7th Division had a steep scramble and a tough fight; see the
diary of Green of the 68th, p. 162.
[1004] A fact mentioned only by D’Erlon and by Rigaud’s history of the
5/60th, Fitzgerald’s corps.
[1005] So I deduce from there being precisely 10 officer-casualties in
Abbé’s regiments, according to Martinien’s lists.
[1006] Hill and the Quartermaster-General, George Murray, had settled
at 11 a.m. that Wellington’s original order was only ‘momentarily
suspended’ and not cancelled, by the necessity for driving in
‘the column of the enemy now retiring by the Donna Maria road.’
_Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 163.
[1007] _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 159.
[1008] Wellington to O’Donnell, Irurita 6 a.m., on the 1st August.
_Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 163.
[1009] 1/120th Line of Lamartinière.
[1010] Who were picked up by Reille some miles north of Santesteban,
having been sent forward on the Sumbilla road overnight, in charge of
the convoy of wounded. See Reille’s Report.
[1011] Reduced to five battalions, since it had detached one regiment
to the head of the column, and was short of two battalions which had
escaped by Almandoz, and one which had escaped by Zubiri and Eugui
following Foy. See above, pp. 699-700.
[1012] The chasseur regiments only--the dragoons having escorted the
artillery to Roncesvalles. Place in the column not quite certain--but
see the narrative of Lemonnier-Delafosse for P. Soult’s presence.
[1013] To Alten, 12 noon, from near Almandoz. _Dispatches_, x. p. 574.
[1014] _Dispatches_, x. p. 573.
[1015] Graham to Wellington, July 30, 5 a.m. _Supplementary
Dispatches_, viii. p. 156.
[1016] Napier (v. p. 243) and Stanhope (pp. 71-2) both say that they
had the anecdote from the Duke himself--but wrote many years after
1813. But Larpent’s absolutely contemporary diary also has the tale (p.
218) written down on August 3, only two days after the supposed event.
[1017] Wellington to O’Donnell. _Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p.
163.
[1018] Some good diarists had been wounded at Sorauren, and fail us
after the 28th July.
[1019] One of the French officers killed on August 1, Hutant of the
59th, is registered as ‘tué en défendant l’aigle.’ Now with such
absurdly small casualty lists as those shown above, the eagle can only
have been in danger if the regiment was ‘on the run.’
[1020] I had immense difficulty in identifying this battalion, which
belonged to Barcena’s division, as Wellington mentions in his letter to
Lord Liverpool of August 4 (_Dispatches_, x. p. 598). But Wellington
calls it there a cazadore battalion, which it was not, but an old line
battalion. The trouble was first to find the composition of Barcena’s
division in July 1813, and then to hunt in Spanish regimental histories
(those of the Conde de Clonard) for a claim by any of those corps to
have been at the bridge of Yanzi on August 1. Alone among all the
regiments Asturias makes this claim--but the corps-historian says not
one word about its meritorious service--evidently unknown to him.
[1021] Reille says in his report that the order ‘halt,’ issued at
the head of the column, was repeated down the column of dragoons and
turned in the noise and confusion into ‘demi tour’. Whereupon the rear
regiments thought the column was cut off, and galloped back in panic.
‘Halte’ is not very like ‘demi tour’--but there was no doubt about the
panic.
[1022] We learn from Lamartinière’s report that it was one of the 118th
regiment.
[1023] He declares in his report that he never heard of the trouble
until nightfall.
[1024] Report of Maucune, dated August 3.
[1025] Report of Reille.
[1026] Report of the Right Wing--dated that night, August 1.
[1027] D’Erlon complains that he found no French troops whatever facing
the bridge--i. e. the 118th and Maucune had disappeared long before his
front battalion got up. The battalions engaged were the 5th Léger and
63rd and 64th Line--whose officer-casualties for that day were 1 killed
and 8 wounded.
[1028] The best account of all this is in Graham’s report,
_Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. p. 261.
[1029] All these marches are mainly detailed from the excellent
narrative of Quartermaster Surtees of the 3/95th, pp. 223-6,
supplemented by that of Captain Cooke of the 1/43rd.
[1030] See above, p. 700.
[1031] See above, p. 707.
[1032] See above, p. 710. It was written at Ostiz on the night of the
30th, but only sent off by G. Murray from Lizaso on the morning of the
31st.
[1033] See Cooke, i. p. 315.
[1034] Cooke, i. pp. 315-16.
[1035] Some, therefore, of P. Soult’s chasseurs must have been with the
rearguard.
[1036] Cooke, i. p. 317.
[1037] Surtees, p. 226.
[1038] _Dispatches_, x. p. 591.
[1039] Probably also we must add the responsibility for Hill and the
2nd Division being at Elizondo this day, owing to the false march which
they had made--on Wellington’s orders--from the Puerto de Arraiz to the
Velate road.
[1040] Wellington in _Dispatches_, xi. p. 7, blames Barcena for
this--one would have supposed that Graham and Giron were still more
responsible, as they were in higher command.
[1041] Orders for Q.M.G. from Santesteban, 9.30 a.m. _Supplementary
Dispatches_, viii. p. 164.
[1042] Wellington to Graham, 8 p.m., from Santesteban. _Dispatches_, x.
p. 574.
[1043] Cooke, i. 819.
[1044] A brigadier in Maransin’s division.
[1045] Larpent’s diary, p. 214.
[1046] Harry Smith, i. p. 115.
[1047] Dalhousie to Cairnes in _Dickson Papers_, ed. Leslie, p. 1020.
[1048] 2/24th and 2/58th.
[1049] Wellington thought this the most desperate and gallant charge he
had ever seen. _Dispatches_, x. p. 591.
[1050] Report of Clausel, August 2. ‘Les troupes relevées n’ayant
pu, malgré les efforts des généraux Conroux et Rey, s’arrêter sur
la position indiquée, et s’étant jetées sur celles qui repoussaient
l’attaque de la direction d’Échalar, il s’ensuivit un peu de confusion,
et on fut obligé de les laisser aller jusqu’à l’hauteur de la division
Taupin.’
[1051] Ross’s brigade had a few casualties in each battalion--37 in all.
[1052] ‘Devant la division Maransin je n’ai vu que des tirailleurs,’
says Clausel. From the sequence of brigades in the 7th Division, I
think these must have been Lecor’s people.
[1053] Cooke, i. p. 320. Both he and Surtees mention that the evicted
French battalion was the 2nd Léger--a fact not to be found in the
reports of Lamartinière or of Reille.
[1054] The total French loss was probably not very great--as happens
when troops give at once, and are not pursued. Conroux’s division only
records 5 officer-casualties, Vandermaesen’s 8--which should mean a
total casualty list of 300 or so. But it is astonishing to find Reille
reporting that Maucune lost only about 20 men; if so, the flank-guard
cannot have stood at all.
[1055] Soult to Clarke, August 2, and August 6.
[1056] _Dispatches_, x. p. 591.
[1057] Ibid., x. p. 611. August 7.
[1058] 6,440 to be exact. Of which 4,708 were British and 1,732
Portuguese. The latter figure is worked out from the detailed
Portuguese returns in Appendix No. XXI, and is perceptibly lower than
Wellington’s original estimate of 2,300: stragglers no doubt had been
rejoining.
[1059] e. g. the troops on the Roncesvalles road, the two battalions
of Lamartinière which followed Foy, and Maransin’s 28th Léger from
Elizondo--at least 2,500 in all.
[1060] Cassagne succeeded Barrois shortly after.
[1061] After D’Erlon was removed to command the Army of the Centre,
this division was at different times under Remond and Semélé.
[1062] Attached to Whittingham. Regiments of Olivenza and Almanza.
[1063] 3rd Léger, properly belonging to Lamarque’s brigade from
Catalonia, was short of four companies left in garrisons.
[1064] The second battalions of these corps were left behind, along
with the 11th and 20th Ligne, two squadrons of 4th Hussars, one of 24th
Dragoons, the 3/5th Léger, and some 250 Italian Light Horse, to hold
down the kingdom of Valencia.
[1065] In Portuguese Units officers and men are given together.
[1066] The other Guards’ Brigade, 1st and 3rd batts. of 1st Guards, was
left at Oporto and did not rejoin till August.
[1067] 2/31st and 2/66th.
[1068] 2nd and 2/53rd.
[1069] 2/24th and 2/58th.
[1070] These figures are estimated from what was still surviving of
each unit when Soult reorganized the army in July 16. The Royal Guards
infantry had then 2,019 men, the line cavalry 64 officers and 500 men,
the line infantry 1,168, though it had lost over 300 men at Vittoria
and a much greater number from desertion. I take it that to allow 300
extra men at the battle for the Guard infantry, 100 more for the Line
cavalry, and 800 more for the Line infantry cannot be far out.
[1071] About 40 prisoners of the 1/71st are lost among the general
total of 223 ‘missing and stragglers’: these were the only actual
prisoners lost in the battle. See p. 416 of this volume.
[1072] i. e. 2/31st and 2/66th.
[1073] i. e. 2nd and 2/53rd.
[1074] Brunswick-Oels Head-Quarters were in the 7th Division, but
companies were distributed all around the Army. These casualties partly
belong to outlying companies, not to Head-Quarters.
[1075] Pannetier’s flying column, which tried to relieve Tarragona,
consisted of 3/5th Léger, and two battalions each of 20th Line and 3rd
Léger, with the Westphalian chasseurs: a little under 3,000 men.
[1076] But originally an A. of S. regiment, transferred to A. of N. in
January.
[1077] Originally an A. of P. regiment, but transferred to A. of N. in
January 1813.
[1078] General William Stewart, commanding the Division.
[1079] Colonel Fitzgerald, 5/60th, commanding a Brigade.