209;
Wellington’s correspondence with, 211, 221.
Stubbs, George, colonel, commanding Portuguese brigade, at Vittoria,
414, 419;
at Sorauren, 656;
at second Sorauren, 694.
Suchet, Louis Gabriel, duke of Albufera, marshal, advances on Madrid,
66;
his quarrels with King Joseph and Soult, 88, 89;
gathering of Spanish and British armies against, 162-6;
precarious position of, 279-81;
his campaign against Murray, 281-98, 488-500;
defeated at battle of Castalla, 292-309;
marches to relieve Tarragona, 501;
finds his advance blocked by Fort Balaguer, 515;
withdraws across the Ebro, 516.
Sumbilla, combat of, 718, 719.
Tarragona, defences of, 493;
siege of, 496;
relieved by Mathieu, 517.
Thackeray, Frederick, major, senior engineer at siege of Tarragona,
497;
protests against Murray’s abandonment of the siege, 511.
Thouvenot, general, governor of Vittoria, 378, 470.
Tiebas, combat of, 262.
Tolosa, combat of, 477-81.
Tomkinson, William captain 16th Light Dragoons,
his diary of events on the Douro, 6 _n._, 14 _n._, 15 _n._,
16 _n._, 18 _n._, 28 _n._, 38 _n._;
on Reille’s retreat, 438.
Tordesillas, exploit of Captain Guingret at, 83.
Toro, French garrison of, relieved by Foy, 10;
junction of Wellington and Hill at, 331-3.
Torquemada, riotous scenes at, 77.
Torrens, Henry, colonel, military secretary to Duke of York,
Wellington’s correspondence with, 224.
Tovey, George, captain, bayonet charge of his company on the Linduz,
618.
Treillard, Jean Paul, general, at Vittoria, 428;
at Sorauren, 688.
Vacani, Camillo, historian, with Palombini, 264-8;
his account of Tarragona, 496.
Valdemoro, riotous scenes at, 102, 105.
Valladolid, occupied by Clausel, 9;
his eviction by Wellington, 14;
abandoned by Wellington, 84;
King Joseph makes it his capital, 247;
evacuated by the French, 344.
Vandeleur, J. Ormsby, major-general, at combat of San Millan, 375;
at Vittoria, 412;
storms La Hermandad, 423.
Vandermaesen, general, at Roncesvalles, 615;
at Sorauren, 668;
at second Sorauren, 695;
at combat of Sumbilla, 718;
at Echalar, 734.
Venta del Pozo, combat of, 71-4.
Venta de Urroz, combat of, 711;
casualties at, 739.
Vera, abandoned by Lamartinière, 544.
Villacampa, Pedro, general, acts under Elio, 280, 281, 298.
Villadrigo, combat of, 75.
Villafranca, combat of, 475.
Villa Muriel, combat of, 79-82.
Villareal, combat of, 473.
Villatte, general, driven from Salamanca, 316-19;
at Vittoria, 393, 402;
attacks Morillo and the 71st, 415;
retirement of, 416, 429;
Soult’s complaints of, 713;
commands Bayonne reserve, 595;
his torpor, 602, 713.
Villena, castle of, capitulates to Suchet, 287, 288.
Vittoria, battle of, 384-450;
retreat of the French from, 433-50.
Wachholz, Ludwig, captain, notes of, 432;
on combat of the Linduz, 618-19.
Waldron, John, captain, exploit of, at Castalla, 295.
Wellesley, Hon. Henry, ambassador to Spain, his correspondence with
Wellington, 196-7, 525;
his dealings with the Regency of Spain, 205.
Wellesley, Richard, marquis, resigns from Perceval Cabinet, 214.
Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Marquis of, marches to Burgos, 3;
crosses the Douro, 12-13;
his pursuit of Clausel, 16-20;
siege of Burgos, 21-51;
his instructions to Hill, 57;
retreats from Burgos, 66-86;
orders Hill to retire from Madrid, 99;
his reasons for retreat, 111;
operations round Salamanca, 111-37;
retreats on Ciudad Rodrigo, 137-53;
his strictures on officers commanding divisions and brigades, 156-61;
criticism of his campaigns of 1812, 170-6;
at Freneda, 194;
made Generalissimo of Spanish armies, 196-204;
at Cadiz, 201;
on Portuguese finance, 211-13;
his relations with Whitehall, 214-24;
with the Duke of York, 223-4;
intrigues of Gordon against, 224-6;
his plan for campaign of 1813, 299-305;
plan for Tarragona expedition, 308;
leaves Hill in command of Southern Army, 320;
joins Graham, 329;
occupies Toro, 331-3;
his plan for transferring British base to the Bay of Biscay, 348-9;
for driving the French out of the Peninsula, 359;
his operations on the Ebro, 364-82;
plan of attack at Vittoria, 394;
his derogatory remarks on his army, 452, 453;
marches for Navarre, 455;
severity towards Norman Ramsay, 456-8;
pursues Clausel in vain, 467;
his orders for Murray’s expedition to Tarragona, 488;
dissatisfaction with Murray, 521;
influence of Armistice of Plässwitz on his plans, 525-6;
in the Bastan, 537-43;
in correspondence with Bathurst and Liverpool, rejects their
suggestion of transfer to Germany, 558, 561;
controversy with Melville, 567-8;
goes to St. Sebastian, 585;
his dispositions for the defence of the Pyrenees, 603-6;
concentrates against Soult, 647, 659;
his ride to Sorauren, 658-62;
prepares to attack Soult, 694;
at second Sorauren, 694-701;
pursuit of Soult, 707-40;
renounces advance into France, 737-40.
Whittingham, Sir Samford, general, his Spanish division, 163, 276;
at combat of Albeyda, 282;
at battle of Castalla, 293, 294;
in the Tarragona expedition, 492.
Wimpffen, Louis, general, Spanish chief of the staff to Wellington, 201.
Xixona, plot to betray, 279.
Yanzi, combat of, 720-4.
Yecla, combat of, 286-7.
York, Frederick, Duke of, his relations with Wellington, 223;
opposes Beresford’s claims to seniority, 228, 229;
disapproves of Provisional Battalions, 232-4.
Yrurzun, combat of, 461.
Zadorra, the river, its importance in battle of Vittoria, 384;
crossed by Kempt, 407;
by Picton, 411;
Reille’s defence along, 435.
Zamora, French garrison of, relieved by Foy, 11;
occupied by Daricau, 327;
occupied by Graham, 330.
[Illustration: THE CAMPAIGN OF VITTORIA May 22nd.-June 21st., 1813
Map to illustrate the positions of the armies at the commencement of
hostilities and the subsequent marches of Wellington’s Columns.]
FOOTNOTES
[1] August 23, from Madrid, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 374.
[2] Certainly Carlos de España and Morillo, probably some of the
Galicians, and even some of Elio’s or Ballasteros’ troops from the
South, if they proved able to feed themselves and march.
[3] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 424, to General Dumouriez, to whom Wellington
often sent an illuminating note on the situation.
[4] _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 390-1. Alten had the 3rd, 4th, Light, and
España’s divisions.
[5] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 377.
[6] Ibid., ix. pp. 383-4 and 386-7.
[7] Ibid., ix. p. 398.
[8] The best account of all this is in the diary for August of
Tomkinson of the 16th Light Dragoons, who was in charge of the outlying
party that went to Valtanas.
[9] The actual numbers (as shown in the tables given in vol. v,
Appendix xi--which I owe to Mr. Fortescue’s kindness) were July 15,
49,636; August 1, 39,301. The deficiency of about 600 cavalry lost had
been more than replaced by Chauvel’s 750 sabres. There was a shortage
of twenty guns of the original artillery, but Chauvel had brought up
six.
[10] Dispatch printed in _King Joseph’s Correspondence_, ix. p. 64.
[11] Clausel to Clarke, August 18th, 1812.
[12] The 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 25th Léger, the 1st, 15th, 36th, 50th,
62nd, 65th, 118th, 119th, 120th Line had to cut themselves down by
a battalion each: the 22nd and 101st, which had been the heaviest
sufferers of all, and had each lost their eagle, were reduced from
three to one battalion each. There had been seventy-four battalions
in the Army of Portugal on July 1st: on August 1st there were only
fifty-seven.
[13] See ‘Memorandum for General Santocildes’ of August 5.
_Dispatches_, ix. pp. 344-5.
[14] _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 389-90.
[15] The best account of all this is not (as might have been expected)
in Foy’s dispatches to Clausel, but in a memorandum drawn up by him in
1817 at the request of Sir Howard Douglas, and printed in an appendix
at the end of the life of that officer (pp. 429-30). Sir Howard had
asked Foy what he intended to do on the 23rd-27th August, and got a
most interesting reply.
[16] Diary of Foy, in Girod de l’Ain’s _Vie militaire du Général Foy_,
p. 182.
[17] Wellington to Bathurst, August 18th.
[18] Wellington to Castaños, September 2. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 394.
[19] See especially Sir Howard Douglas’s _Memoirs_, pp. 206-7, and
Tomkinson’s diary, p. 201. Napier is short and unsatisfactory at this
point, and says wrongly that Clausel abandoned Valladolid on the night
of the 6th. His rearguard was certainly there on the 7th.
[20] Castaños’s explanation was that Wellington’s letter of August 30,
telling him to march on Valladolid, did not reach him till the 7th
September, along with another supplementary letter to the same effect
from Arevalo of September 3.
[21] ‘The proclamation was made from the town-hall in the square: few
people of any respectability attended.’ Tomkinson, p. 202.
[22] Tomkinson, p. 203.
[23] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, Magaz, September 12. _Dispatches_,
ix. p. 422.
[24] Napier, iv. p. 335.
[25] Napier was not with the main army during this march, the Light
Division being left at Madrid. On the other hand Clausel had been very
polite to him, and lent him some of his orders and dispatches (Napier,
iv. p. 327). I fancy he was repaid in print for his courtesy. The
diaries of Tomkinson, Burgoyne, D’Urban, and Sir Howard Douglas do not
give the impression that the French ever stayed to manœuvre seriously,
save on the 16th.
[26] Head-quarters were at Valladolid, September 9; Cigales, September
10; Dueñas, September 11; Magaz, September 12; Torquemada, September
13; Cordovilla, September 14; Villajera, September 15; Pampliega,
September 16; Tardajos, September 17; Villa Toro, September 18. Ten
stages in about 80 miles!
[27] Wellington to Sir E. Paget, September 20. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 436.
[28] One of the regiments withdrawn to the north after suffering at
Arroyo dos Molinos, see vol. iv. p. 603.
[29] Wellington to Castaños. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 394.
[30] Wellington to George Murray. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 398.
[31] Wellington to Lord Bathurst. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 442.
[32] Jones, _History of the Peninsular Sieges_, i. p. 473.
[33] There were eight rank and file of the Royal Military Artificers
only, of whom seven were hit during the siege, and five R.E. officers
in all.
[34] By an odd misprint in Wellington’s _Supplementary Dispatches_,
xiv. p. 120, the order is made to allot the flank-_battalions_ instead
of the flank-_companies_ to the task.
[35] This narrative of the assault, not very clearly worked out in
Napier--is drawn from the accounts of Burgoyne, Jones, the anonymous
‘Private Soldier of the 42nd’ [London, 1821], and Tomkinson, the latter
the special friend and confidant of Somers Cocks.
[36] Wellington to Lord Bathurst. _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 443-4.
[37] For a dispute between the chief engineer, Burgoyne, who blamed the
Portuguese, and some officers in the Portuguese service who resented
his words, see Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. p. 123.
[38] Clarke to Marmont of August 18, and to Masséna of August 19.
[39] Napoleon to Clarke, Moscow, September 12.
[40] See Wellington to Hill of October 2. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 463.
[41] Jones, i. p. 329.
[42] Indeed the besiegers had largely depended on a dépôt of French
picks and shovels found by chance in the town of Burgos, after the
siege had begun.
[43] See especially Tomkinson, an old comrade of Cocks in the 16th
Light Dragoons, pp. 211-17.
[44] Wellington says 18 prisoners in his return. Dubreton claimed to
have taken 2 officers and 36 men in his report. Possibly the difference
was mortally wounded men, who were captured but died.
[45] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 450.
[46] Ibid., ix. p. 465.
[47] See Wellington to Castaños of 7 October. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 477.
[48] See Napier, iv. p. 412, who had the fact from Sir Edward
Pakenham’s own mouth.
[49] Howard Douglas’s proposal to get up big guns at once on September
20 is detailed at length in his biography, pp. 210-11. Napier has a
good deal to say on it. Jones and Burgoyne tell nothing about it,
but they were evidently nettled at the idea that Douglas, who had no
official position in the army, should have raised a proposal and got
Wellington to listen to it. I fancy that Douglas is one of the officers
alluded to by Burgoyne (_Correspondence_, i. p. 234) as unauthorized
persons, who volunteered useless advice. Gomm, p. 287, says, ‘we have
set to work idly without having the means we might have commanded.’
[50] Burgoyne, i. p. 220.
[51] Ibid., i. p. 233.
[52] Alexander Dickson remarks in his diary, p. 772, ‘This was done
to please General Clinton, and had nothing to do with the attack.’
Clinton’s troops were opposite this side of the Castle, and had as yet
not been entrusted with any important duty.
[53] Jones, i. p. 357.
[54] For this dialogue, told at length, see Burgoyne’s
_Correspondence_, ed. Wrottesley, i. p. 235.
[55] So I make out from the returns, but Beamish’s and Schwertfeger’s
Histories of the K.G.L. both give the lesser figure of 75--still
sufficiently high!
[56] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, October 26.
[57] Burgoyne’s _Correspondence_, i. p. 236.
[58] Dubreton and Belmas speak of a ‘grand nombre d’Anglais écrasés,’
the latter says 300! (Belmas, iv. pp. 501 and 548). Putting aside the
fact that there were no _English_ here at all, we may remark that
Burgoyne (i. p. 226) says that _three_ Spaniards were buried in the
ruins, and that the loss of the Portuguese in the whole affair is put
at 8 killed, 44 wounded, and 2 missing in Wellington’s report.
[59] By knocking off their remaining trunnions, which made them
permanently useless. Some of the captured French field-guns from the
hornwork were also destroyed.
[60] For detailed losses see table in Appendix I.
[61] See vol. v. pp. 255-6.
[62] Burgoyne commanding, John Jones the historian, Captain Williams,
and Lieutenants Pitts and Reid.
[63] Burgoyne, i. p. 230.
[64] Ibid., i. p. 233. There is much more in this interesting page of
Burgoyne’s explanation of the failure, which I have not space to quote.
[65] See above, pp. 3-4.
[66] Pringle was commanding the 5th Division (Leith being wounded);
Bernewitz the 7th (Hope having gone home sick on September 23):
Campbell, in charge of the 1st since Graham was invalided, was off duty
himself for illness when relieved by Paget. Bock commanded the Cavalry
Division vice Stapleton Cotton, wounded at Salamanca.
[67] Clearly expressed in letters as late as that to Hill of October 12.
[68] Viz. (figures of the Imperial Muster Rolls for October 15)
Army of Portugal 32,000 infantry, 3,400 cavalry; Army of the North:
Chauvel’s cavalry brigade (lent to the Army of Portugal since July)
700 sabres, Laferrière’s cavalry brigade 1,600 sabres, parts of Abbé’s
and Dumoustier’s divisions 9,500 infantry. Allowing another 2,000 for
artillery, sappers, &c., the total must have reached 53,000. Belmas
says that Caffarelli and Souham had only 41,000 men. Napier gives
them 44,000. Both these figures are far too low. No one denies that
Caffarelli brought up about 10,000 men; and the Army of Portugal, by
the return of October 15, had 45,000 effectives, from whom there are
only to be deducted the men of the artillery park and the ‘équipages
militaires.’ It must have taken forward 40,000 of all arms. See tables
of October 15 in Appendix II.
[69] Wellington on the 11,000 Galicians, Hill on Carlos de España
(4,000 men), Penne Villemur and Murillo (3,500 men), and the Murcian
remnants under Freire and Elio, which got separated from the Alicante
section of their Army and came under Hill’s charge, about 5,000.
[70] i. e. if they brought up Suchet’s troops from Valencia, beside
their own armies.
[71] Wellington to Hill, October 10. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 82.
[72] Wellington to Hill, October 12. Ibid., p. 485.
[73] Wellington to Popham, October 12. Ibid., p. 486.
[74] Wellington to Mackenzie, October 13. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 487.
[75] See Wellington to Hill of October 14, and Wellington to Popham of
October 17. Ibid., pp. 490 and 495.
[76] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 467.
[77] Schepeler, pp. 672-3.
[78] Wellington to Hill, October 5. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 469: ‘I do
not write to General Ballasteros, because I do not know exactly where
he is: but I believe he is at Alcaraz. At least I understand he was
ordered there [by the Regency]. Tell him to hang upon the left flank
and rear of the enemy, if they move by Albacete toward the Tagus.’
[79] Wellington to Popham. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 494.
[80] See above, pp. 1-2.
[81] Wellington says in his Dispatch to Lord Bathurst of October 26
that the Brunswick officer disobeyed orders, and was taken because he
did not retire at once, as directed.
[82] Souham to Clarke, October 22.
[83] This is the figure given by Colonel Béchaud in his interesting
narrative of the doings of Maucune’s division (_Études Napoléoniennes_,
ii. p. 396). Martinien’s lists show 3 casualties of officers only, all
in the 86th of Maucune’s division.
[84] For details see Wellington’s Order of March in _Supplementary
Dispatches_, xiv. pp. 144-5.
[85] The wheels of the artillery were all muffled with straw. The
cavalry went at a walk.
[86] So Colonel Béchaud’s narrative, quoted above, and most valuable
for all this retreat.
[87] These figures look very large--and exceed Napier’s estimate of
5,000 sabres. But I can only give the strength of the French official
returns, viz. Curto’s division 2,163, Boyer’s division 1,373, Merlin’s
brigade 746, Laferrière’s brigade 1,662; total 5,944. All these units
were engaged that day, as the French narrative shows, except that 4
only of the 6 squadrons of gendarmerie in Laferrière’s brigade were at
the front.
[88] Owing to losses at Garcia Hernandez and Majadahonda the Germans
were only 4 squadrons, under 450 effective sabres. The Light Dragoons
of Anson, all three regiments down to 2-squadron strength, made up
about 800.
[89] See vol. iv. pp. 565-9.
[90] Who was not himself any longer at their head, having been killed
in a private quarrel some weeks before. His men were this day under his
lieutenant Puente (Schepeler, p. 680).
[91] To Caffarelli’s high disgust: see his dispatch to Clarke of
October 30, where he calls Boyer’s action a ‘fatalité que l’on ne peut
conçevoir.’
[92] As Lumley did at Usagre against L’Allemand, see vol. iv. p. 412.
[93] Anson’s brigade fought, it is said, with only 600 sabres out of
its original 800, owing to heavy losses in the morning, and to the
dropping behind of many men on exhausted horses, who did not get up
in time to form for the charge. Bock’s brigade was intact, but only
400 strong. Of the French brigade 1,600 strong on October 15 by its
‘morning state’ two squadrons out of the six of gendarmes were not
present, so that the total was probably 1,250 or so engaged.
[94] Most of this detail is from the admirable account of von
Hodenberg, aide-de-camp to Bock, whose letter I printed in _Blackwood_
for 1913. There is a good narrative also in Martin’s _Gendarmerie
d’Espagne_, pp. 317-19.
[95] In a conversation with Foy (see life of the latter, by Girod de
l’Ain, p. 141) when he said that _all_ the cavalry generals of the
Army of Portugal except Montbrun, Fournier, and Lamotte were ‘mauvais
ou médiocres’--these others being Curto, Boyer, Cavrois, Lorcet, and
Carrié.
[96] Details are worth giving. The 2nd Dragoons K.G.L. had 52
casualties, the 1st 44. In Anson’s brigade the 11th Light Dragoons lost
49, the 12th only 20, the 16th 47. The officers taken prisoners were
Colonel Pelly and Lieutenant Baker of the 16th, Major Fischer (mortally
wounded) of the 1st Dragoons K.G.L., and Captain Lenthe and Lieutenant
Schaeffer of the 2nd Dragoons K.G.L. The two infantry battalions had 18
casualties, of whom 13 were men missing, apparently skirmishers cut off
in the fight earlier in the day on the Hormaza, or footsore men who had
fallen behind.
[97] H. Sydenham to Henry Wellesley, printed in _Wellington
Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 464-5. Sydenham understates,
however, the available force when he says that Anson had only 460
sabres and Bock only two squadrons. Hodenberg diminishes less, but
still too much, when he gives Bock 300 sabres and Anson 600. The real
numbers are given above.
[98] Napier, iv. p. 361. Corroboration may be had on p. 120 of the
_Journal_ of Green of the 68th, who says that his colonel was much
puzzled to know how so many men had succeeded in getting liquor, and
that one soldier was drowned in a vat, overcome by the fumes of new
wine.
[99] This was Bonnet’s old division: Chauvel had been commanding it
since Bonnet was disabled at Salamanca. But he had been wounded by a
chance shot at Venta del Pozo on the 23rd, and Gauthier, his senior
brigadier, had taken it over.
[100] Some 27 men of the 3/1st, taken prisoners here, represent this
party in the casualty list of October 25. The battalion was not
otherwise seriously engaged.
[101] Who were drawn from the 4th, 30th, and 44th.
[102] For a romantic story of how one was discovered see Napier, iv. p.
363, a tale which I have not found corroborated in any other authority.
[103] I had not been able to make out how the 1/9th came to lose these
prisoners till I came on the whole story in the Autobiography of Hale
of the 1/9th, printed at Cirencester 1826, a rare little book, with a
good account of this combat. He is my best source for it on the British
side.
[104] Hale, p. 95, quoted above.
[105] I have been using for the French side mainly the elaborate
and interesting narrative of Colonel Béchaud of the 66th, recently
published in _Études Napoléoniennes_, ii. pp. 405-11.
[106] See Béchaud, p. 410.
[107] These modest figures of Foy’s report to Souham are much
exaggerated in most French narratives of the affair.
[108] There is a full account of this business in Foy’s dispatch to
Souham of the next morning, in which occur all the facts given by
Guingret in his own little book. That officer’s narrative must be taken
as fully correct.
[109] All this from Burgoyne, i. p. 244. Napier does not mention the
earthworks, which were batteries for six guns each.
[110] There he wrote his dispatch, concerning the late combats, to
Clarke. Napier never mentions Caffarelli’s departure--a curious
omission.
[111] p. 437.
[112] See vol. v. pp. 538-9.
[113] Deprez, travelling with great speed, reached Paris and
interviewed Clarke on September 21. The Minister, who was no friend of
Soult’s, told him that neither he himself nor the King could dare to
depose the Marshal without the Emperor’s permission. Deprez then posted
on to Moscow, and overtook the Emperor there on October 18. Napoleon
in his reply practically ignored the quarrel, contented himself with
administering a general scolding to all parties, and directed them to
‘unite, and diminish as far as possible the evils that a bad system had
caused.’ But who had inaugurated the system? He himself!
[114] Joseph to Clarke, September 7.
[115] See Soult to Joseph of October 11, and other days.
[116] Which were the 27th Chasseurs and 7th Polish Lancers.
[117] For details see Table of the Army of Spain of the date October
15th, in Appendix II to this volume.
[118] Joseph to Soult, Valencia, October 12.
[119] See above, vol. v. p. 332.
[120] Napier and Jourdan say that Cearra was killed; but he only
suffered concussion of the brain, and survived to tell Schepeler (p.
688) how his sword and its sheath were melted into one rod of metal
by the lightning which ran down the side of the couch on which he was
lying at the moment.
[121] See, e. g., Schepeler (p. 689), who was present.
[122] See _Dispatches_, ix. p. 518.
[123] This is clearly stated in Wellington’s note to Hill of October
10. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 481.
[124] Ibid., p. 485.
[125] When Penne Villemur moved in, and went behind the Tagus, I cannot
make out exactly. But it was before October 25th, as at that time
Erskine’s British cavalry had no longer any screen in front of them.
[126] All these dispositions come from a table of routes sent to
D’Urban by Jackson, Hill’s chief of the staff (Quartermaster-general),
on the 24th.
[127] Jackson, Q.M.G., to D’Urban, 27th night: ‘Sir Rowland has
determined to concentrate behind the Jarama, on account of the state of
the fords upon the Tagus, and their number,’ &c.
[128] They had been at Arganda behind the Tajuna on the previous day,
when Hill was still thinking of defending the line of the Tagus. See
_Diary of Leach_, p. 287.
[129] Jackson to D’Urban, October 27: ‘Keep your patrols on the Tagus
as long as they can with prudence stay there, with orders to follow the
march of your main body.’ On the next day the order is varied to that
quoted above.
[130] Owing to disgraceful carelessness on the part of a brigadier
of the British 2nd Division much of the boat-bridge of Fuente Dueñas
(which had been brought over to the north bank) had not been burnt when
the troops retired. Many boats were intact; some of the French swam
over, and brought back several of them. (D’Urban MSS.)
[131] Wellington to Hill, Cabezon, October 27. _Dispatches_, ix. pp.
518-19.
[132] See for this Wachholz (of the Fusilier brigade), Schepeler,
Purdon’s history of the 47th, &c. Wachholz’s Brunswick Company
straggled so that of 60 men he found only 7 with him at night. Several
were lost for good. Wellington put the colonel of the 82nd under
arrest, because he had lost 80 men this day.
[133] D’Erlon’s old division now commanded by this brigadier.
[134] Always a reckless falsifier of his own losses (he said that he
had only lost 2,800 men at Albuera!), Soult wrote in his dispatch
that he had only about 25 wounded at the Puente Larga. The figure I
give above is that of the staff-officer d’Espinchel, whose memoirs
are useful for this campaign. By far the best English account is that
of H. Bunbury of the 20th Portuguese (_Reminiscences of a Veteran_,
i. pp. 158-63). I can only trace three of the five French officers
in Martinien’s lists--Pillioud, Caulet, Fitz-James, but do not doubt
d’Espinchel’s figures though his account of the combat is hard to
fit in with any English version. He speaks with admiration of the
steadiness of the defence.
[135] All this from Soult’s dispatch to the King of October 31, from
Valdemoro, and Jourdan’s to Clarke from Madrid of November 3rd.
[136] See _Diary of Swabey, R.A._, p. 428, in _Journal of the Artillery
Institution_, vol. xxii.
[137] The importance of the second evacuation of Madrid is brought
out by no historian of the war except Vacani, vi. pp. 188-90. Napier
barely mentions it. A curious story of the fate of certain English
prisoners of Hill’s army, who were forgotten in prison, and came out
again to liberty when the French army moved on, may be found in the
autobiography of Harley of the 47th Regiment.
[138] Napier (iv. p. 373) says that Joseph left a garrison and his
impedimenta in Madrid--I can find no trace of it in the contemporary
accounts, e. g. of Romanos (_Memorias de un Setenton_) or of Harley
who was about the town during the second week of November. Vacani
distinctly says that Joseph had to take on even his sick (vi. p. 190).
Cf. also Arteche, xi. pp. 309-12.
[139] Napier, iv. p. 373, says that Joseph went by the route of Segovia
to Castile. I cannot think where he picked up this extraordinary idea.
Jourdan’s dispatch of November 10 from Peñaranda gives all the facts.
It was on the 5th, near Villacastin, that Soult told Joseph that Hill
was about to be joined by Wellington and that the two might crush him.
The King at once sent orders to Drouet to come up by forced marches
from Madrid. The Army of the Centre started next day. Palombini did not
get off till the 8th (Vacani, vi. p. 190), but the head of the column
reached Villacastin that same day.
[140] Wellington to Hill, November 3. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 532.
[141] His first definite information as to this was from a Spaniard who
on November 4 saw 3,000 French infantry marching through Torquemada
towards Burgos (_Dispatches_, ix. p. 544). Even so late as November 8th
he did not rely on this important news as correct.
[142] From Rueda, November 5, morning. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 537.
[143] They had really not the 50,000 on which Wellington speculated
(’45,000 men I should consider rather below the number’ (_Dispatches_,
ix. p. 544) ) but 60,000 or very nearly that number. But, on the day
when Wellington was writing, their rear had not even started from
Madrid, and Soult’s 40,000 men were strung out all along the road.
[144] As a matter of fact, using the best map of 1812 available to me
(Nantiat’s), it would seem that the line Rueda-Fuentesauco-Salamanca is
about 50 miles, that by Rueda-Nava del Rey-Pitiegua-Salamanca about 55
miles, while the route suggested for the French, circuitous and running
in more than one place by country cross-paths, is over 65 miles long,
not to speak of its being a worse route for topographical reasons.
[145] An under-estimate by several thousands. Wellington did not know
of Aussenac’s brigade from Bayonne, over 3,000 men, which had now been
attached provisionally to the Army of Portugal.
[146] The total which marched was 60,000, so Wellington was even more
correct than he supposed in his notion that 45,000 was too small a
figure.
[147] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Pitiegua, November 8. _Dispatches_,
ix. pp. 544-5.
[148] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 520.
[149] Wellington to Hill, Rueda, November 5. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 537.
[150] Ibid., p. 539.
[151] I cannot find the details of the marching orders of the
divisions; but from personal diaries I seem to deduce that the 5th and
7th Divisions marched by Alaejos, the 1st and 6th by Castrejon and
Vallesa, while the cavalry not only provided a rearguard but kept out
flank detachments as far as Cantalapiedra on one side and the lower
Guarena on the other.
[152] All this from the detailed routes of march in the dispatches of
Jackson (Hill’s Q.M.G.) to D’Urban on November 4-5-6.
[153] See his dispatch of November 8 from Flores de Avila.
[154] For an adventure with these rascals, who threatened to shoot one
of Hill’s aides-de-camp, see Schepeler, p. 691.
[155] The ground on which Del Parque had fought his unlucky battle in
1809.
[156] These movements from Jourdan to Clarke, of November 10, and Soult
to Clarke of November 12.
[157] See the Notes of the Baden officer Riegel (vol. iii. p. 537), who
complains bitterly of the piercing north wind, and the lack of wood to
build fires.
[158] D’Espinchel (ii. p. 71) says that the voltigeurs got within the
walls, but were expelled on each occasion. The English narratives deny
that they ever closed, or reached the barricades.
[159] Soult to Joseph, 8 a.m. on the 11th, ‘bivouac sur la hauteur en
arrière d’Alba de Tormes.’
[160] General Hamilton’s account of the business (Dispatch to Hill,
_Wellington Dispatches_, ix. p. 558) is very clear. There is also
a good account of the Alba fighting in Colonel Gardyne’s excellent
history of the 92nd.
[161] All their names verifiable from Martinien’s admirable lists of
‘_Officiers tués et blessés_.’
[162] See Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 441, for the meeting.
[163] Wellington to Hill, November 10, 4.30 p.m. (_Dispatches_, ix. p.
549).
[164] Same to same, November 11 (ix. p. 550).
[165] Same to same, pp. 550-1.
[166] Jourdan to Joseph, head-quarters at Peñaranda: early on November
12.
[167] Soult to Joseph, night of November 11, from the bivouac behind
Alba de Tormes.
[168] As the table of the French Armies of Spain for October 15 in the
Appendix shows, the Army of the South had on that day 47,000 men under
arms (omitting ‘sick’ and ‘detached’), the Army of the Centre 15,000,
the Army of Portugal 45,000 (including Aussenac’s brigade and Merlin’s
cavalry, both attached to it provisionally). This gives a total of
107,000, without sick or detached. The Army of Portugal may have lost
1,000 men in action at Villadrigo and Villa Muriel, &c.: the Army of
the South not more than 400 at the Puente Larga, Alba de Tormes, &c.
The Army of the Centre had not fought at all. A deduction has to be
made for Soult’s very large body of men attached to the Artillery Park,
and for a smaller number in the Army of Portugal--say 3,000 men for the
two together. Souham had left a small garrison at Valladolid--perhaps
1,500 men. If we allow 5,000 men for sick and stragglers between
October 20 and November 12 there must still have been a good 90,000 men
present. Miot (who was present) calls the total 97,000 (iii. p. 254),
making it a little too high, I imagine.
[169] Maucune and Gauthier (late Chauvel). See _Wellington Dispatches_,
ix. p. 556.
[170] Souham naturally expressed his indignation. See Miot, iii. p.
252-3.
[171] D’Urban reports on November 12th: ‘Enemy’s troops in continual
movement, and he made a careful reconnaissance of the river from Huerta
to Exeme [above Alba].’ On the 13th he writes: ‘The enemy moved all
his troops between Huerta and Alba by his left into the woods behind
Exeme on the high road to Avila. From thence he can either go in that
direction or cross the Tormes by fords above Alba bridge.’
[172] This fact, very important in justification of Wellington’s long
stay on San Cristobal, is not mentioned in any of his dispatches. But
there is a full account of the skirmish in the _Mémoire_ of Colonel
Béchaud of Maucune’s Division, printed in _Études Napoléoniennes_, iii.
pp. 98-9.
[173] The reconnaissance was executed by Leith Hay, who found the
French flank at Galisancho and reported its exact position. See his
_Narrative_, ii. pp. 99-100.
[174] Details from Foy’s _Vie militaire_, ed. Girod de l’Ain, p. 118,
and Béchaud (quoted above), pp. 99-100.
[175] His original intention to attack is clearly stated in
_Dispatches_, ix. p. 559, and the statement is corroborated by D’Urban.
[176] D’Urban, an eye-witness, thinks that Wellington ought to have
called up Hill and attacked, despite of all difficulties. ‘Lord
Wellington arrived upon the ground at about 12 noon, and at first
appeared inclined to attack what of the enemy had already passed, with
the divisions and cavalry on the spot. The success of such a measure
appeared certain, and would have frustrated all the enemy’s projects.
However, his opinion changed: they were allowed to continue passing
unmolested.’
[177] _Mémoires_, p. 448. Cf. also Napier, iv. p. 381, who seems to
share the idea. ‘Why, it may be asked, did the English commander,
having somewhat carelessly suffered Soult to pass the Tormes and turn
his position, wait so long on the Arapiles position as to render a
dangerous movement (retreat in face of the enemy and to a flank)
necessary?’
[178] This horrid reminiscence I found in the unpublished letters
of Hodenberg of the 1st Heavy Dragoons K.G.L., which I reprinted in
_Blackwood’s Magazine_ in the year 1913.
[179] Details about the exact drawing-up of the second line and
reserves seem impossible to discover. I have only accurate notes as
to the position of the front line and some of the cavalry and the 1st
Division.
[180] For doing this Jourdan criticized Soult for over-caution, and
wasting of time, describing this measure as timid and unnecessary.
_Mémoires_, p. 443.
[181] Donaldson of the 94th. _Recollections_, p. 179.
[182] The 4th Division formed the infantry rearguard on the southern
road, the Light Division that on the central road.
[183] Colonel James Willoughby Gordon seems not to have been a
success as quarter-master-general. Very soon after his arrival we get
notes in the earlier part of the Salamanca campaign that intelligent
officers ‘thought he would not stop long with the Army.’ Cf.
Tomkinson, p. 224: ‘Nothing could equal the bad arrangements of the
Quartermaster-General--the cavalry all retired by one road, allowing
that of the enemy to follow our infantry’ [of the central column on
November 18]--which was not covered, all the horse having gone on the
western or left road. Wellington had a worse accusation against him
than mere incapacity (of this more will be found in chap. iii of sect.
xxxv)--that of sending letters home which revealed military secrets
which got into the English papers. In September he made up his mind
that Gordon must not see his dispatches, and must be ‘kept at as great
distance as possible’ (_Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 427-8). He
was sent home before the next campaign.
[184] D’Urban’s diary.
[185] See Foy, _Vie militaire_, p. 190. He was a witness to the
conversation. And cf. Espinchel, _Mémoires_, ii. p. 73, who gets the
hour too late and exaggerates the contact of the armies. He says that
12 of Hill’s guns opened on the French light cavalry. Cf. also Joseph
to Clarke of December 20.
[186] Espinchel, ii. p. 73.
[187] Joseph to Clarke, in a long dispatch of December 20. Ducasse’s
_Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix. pp. 119-20.
[188] See above, p. 126.
[189] For the curious adventures of Captain v. Stolzenberg commanding
this little party, and of the horde which he shepherded, see
Schwertfeger’s History of the K.G.L., ii. pp. 262-3.
[190] _Mémoires_ of Béchaud, quoted above, p. 101.
[191] Foy, _Vie militaire_, pp. 189-90.
[192] Soult to King Joseph, Matilla, 16th November 1812.
[193] There is a good account of the skirmish in the _Mémoires_ of
Espinchel, ii. p. 73, who frankly allows that the French light cavalry
were both outmanœuvred and repulsed with loss. The returns of the three
French regiments show 22 killed, _no_ wounded, and 25 missing--an odd
proportion. Apparently the wounded must all have been captured. The 1st
Hussars K.G.L. had 7 wounded and 7 missing, the rest of Alten’s brigade
under 20 casualties. This brigade was now _three_ regiments strong
instead of two, having had the 2nd Hussars K.G.L. from Hill’s Army
attached to it at Salamanca.
[194] Napier says that the column went through Tamames, but no
2nd, 3rd, or 4th Division diary mentions that considerable town as
passed--they all speak of solitudes and oak-woods alone. Wellington’s
orders on the night of November 16 (_Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. p.
157) give ‘La Neja’ as Hill’s destination, and this oddly spelt place
is undoubtedly Anaya de Huebra.
[195] Memoirs of Donaldson of the 94th, pp. 181-2.
[196] See the Memoirs of Grattan of the 88th, and Bell of the 34th.
[197] See Wellington’s Marching Orders for the 17th in _Supplementary
Dispatches_, xiv. pp. 157-8, for the cavalry. A perverse reading of
them might make the cavalry start too early for ‘the brook which passes
by La Maza and Aldehuela’, where they are told to be at dawn. They are
not actually directed to wait for the infantry rearguard.
[198] There is a full account of his capture in the memoirs of
Espinchel, ii. p. 77, the officer whose men took Paget prisoner.
[199] The movements of this day are made very difficult to follow by
the fact that Wellington in his dispatches (ix. 464-5) calls Hill’s
column the right, and the Spanish column the left, of the three in
which the Army marched. Vere’s _Diary of the Marches of the 4th
Division_ does the same. But these directions are only correct when the
army faced about and stopped to check the French. On the march Hill’s
was the left column, and the Spaniards the right. For this reason I
have called them the southern and northern columns respectively.
[200] Soult to Joseph, November 17, from before San Muñoz.
[201] So the regimental histories (both good) of these corps. Napier
gives one more company of the 43rd.
[202] Napier, iv. p. 385.
[203] Autobiography of Green of the 68th, p. 127.
[204] British ‘missing’ one officer (General Paget) and 111 men,
Portuguese ‘missing’ 66 men.
[205] Reminiscences of Hay, 12th Light Dragoons, p. 86.
[206] Espinchel commanded that which went farthest, to the bridge in
front of Santi Espiritus: he says that the whole road was lined with
broken-down carts and carriages, and strewn with dead men. About 100
British stragglers were gathered in.
[207] The tale may be found with details, told from Wellington’s point
of view, in _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 494. The chief offender
was W. Stewart, who had succeeded to the command of the 1st Division on
Paget’s capture the preceding day. The others Wellington describes as
‘new-comers’ so they must have been Oswald and Lord Dalhousie, for the
other divisional commanders in this column, Clinton and C. Alten, were
not in any sense ‘new-comers’. I think, therefore, that Mr. Fortescue
is wrong in giving the names of the culprits as Stewart, Dalhousie, and
Clinton.
[208] See Napier, iv. p. 386. But cf. Fitzroy Somerset’s version in
Greville Memoirs, i. pp. 136-7.
[209] Donaldson of the 94th, p. 184. Grattan (p. 315) has a story of a
Connaught Ranger who ate, in addition to his rations, six ox-heads on
six successive days, and died of inflammation of the bowels.
[210] Grattan, pp. 303 and 305-6.
[211] Seventeen of the Chasseurs Britanniques were tried all together
for desertion in October 1812! They were mostly Italians. And for one
man recaptured and tried, how many got away safely?
[212] See _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 601-2.
[213] See _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 562 and 570.
[214] See the Life of Burgoyne, who was sent to look after the
threatening symptoms, vol. i. p. 246.
[215] The troops of the Army of Portugal began to march east as early
as November 20, long before Soult got back into touch with them.
Jourdan to Clarke, from Salamanca, November 20.
[216] The 1st Division seems to have been quartered about the upper
Mondego between Celorico and Mangualde, the 3rd in villages between
Moimenta and Lamego, the 4th about São João de Pesqueira, the 5th,
Pack and Bradford, in the direction of Lamego, the 6th and 7th on the
lower Mondego and the Alva under the Serra da Estrella, as far as I
can make out from regimental diaries. There is no general notice as to
cantonments in the _Wellington Dispatches_ to help. But see General
Orders for December 1, 1812, as to the post-towns for each division.
[217] Their cases are in General Orders for 1813, pp. 51-3. Each was
condemned to six months’ suspension, but the members of the court
martial petitioned for their pardon, on account of the privations of
the time. Wellington grudgingly granted the request ‘not concurring
in any way in the opinion of the court, that their cases in any way
deserved this indulgence.’
[218] Bunbury, aide-de-camp to General Hamilton, referring to
Wellington’s memorandum, makes solemn asseveration that his troops got
no distribution whatever for those four days. The general himself had
no bread. Acorns were the sole diet.
[219] Private and unpublished diary of General D’Urban.
[220] Grattan of the 88th, p. 307.
[221] Tomkinson, p. 227.
[222] They had been ordered in May 1812, but had not been distributed
by November. See _Dispatches_, ix. p. 603.
[223] The figures may be found on pp. 170-1 of the Statistical
‘Ejércitos Españoles’ of 1822, referred to in other places.
[224] See Tables in Appendix. The British battalions were 1/27th and
a grenadier battalion formed of companies of the regiments left in
Sicily. The light battalion was formed of companies from the 3rd, 7th,
8th Line of the K.G.L. and from de Roll and Dillon. The Italians were
‘2nd Anglo-Italian Levy’. There was a field battery (British), but only
13 cavalry (20th Light Dragoons).
[225] See p. 279, below.
[226] See Suchet, _Mémoires_, ii. p. 269.
[227] The best account is in Gildea’s _History of the 81st Regiment_,
pp. 104-8.
[228] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 487.
[229] 161 of the 20th Light Dragoons, and 71 of the ‘Foreign Hussars,’
a newly raised corps, mainly German, which did very creditably in 1813.
[230] Wellington to Lord Bathurst. _Dispatches_, ix, p. 535.
[231] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 545.
[232] See Wellington to H. Clinton (W. Clinton’s brother) on December 9
(_Dispatches_, ix. p. 614), and to Lord Bathurst (ibid., p. 616).
[233] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 573.
[234] These figures seem to represent about 1,400 prisoners at Rodrigo,
4,000 at Badajoz, 300 at the Almaraz forts, 600 at the Salamanca
forts, 7,000 at the battle of Salamanca, 2,000 at the Retiro, 1,300 at
Astorga, 700 at Guadalajara, with 2,000 more taken in smaller affairs,
such as the surrenders of Consuegra and Tordesillas, the combat on
the Guarena, the pursuit after Salamanca, and Hill’s operations in
Estremadura.
[235] This looks a large figure, but over 150 guns were taken at
Rodrigo, more than that number at Badajoz, several hundred in the
Retiro, and infinite numbers in the Cadiz lines and the arsenal of
Seville, not to speak of the captures at Astorga, Guadalajara, Almaraz,
and in the field at Salamanca, &c.
[236] Foy, _Vie militaire_, p. 193. Napoleon to Clarke, October 19,
1812.
[237] Report of Colonel Desprez to Joseph of his interview with the
Emperor at Moscow on October 19th. _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix.
p. 178.
[238] Ibid., p. 179.
[239] See above, vol. v, pp. 194-5.
[240] Napier’s statement that Napoleon was thinking of this project
when he declared Soult to be the ‘only military head in Spain’ is
entirely unjustified by the context from which he is quoting. The
Emperor therein makes no allusion to the Seville project. See Ducasse’s
_Correspondance_, ix. pp. 178-9.
[241] See his letter quoted above, vol. v, pp. 255-6.
[242] Jones, _Sieges of the Peninsula_, ii. p. 430.
[243] Jones remarks that ‘we had to leave it to the valour of the
troops to surmount intermediate obstacles which in a properly conducted
siege would be removed by art and labour’ (_Sieges_, i. p. 163).
[244] See above, vol. v, p. 270.
[245] See above, vol. v, p. 316.
[246] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 574.
[247] Memorandum for Baron Alten, Madrid, 31st August 1812.
[248] The bad weather on the Tagus only began October 30th.
[249] See above, pp. 112-13.
[250] See above, p. 142.
[251] Not including 2/59th at Cadiz, but including the 1/6th, 20th, and
91st which only landed in November, and the battalions of the 1st Foot
Guards which had only just joined during the Burgos retreat.
[252] The Portuguese infantry had suffered quite as heavily--cold being
very trying to them, though summer heat affected them less than the
British. The 20th Portuguese, starting on the retreat from Madrid with
900 men, only brought 350 to Rodrigo.
[253] 4,400 for the infantry, 350 for cavalry, plus drafts for
artillery, &c.
[254] Where the new Second Guards Brigade had a dreadful epidemic of
fever and dysentery, and buried 700 men. It was so thinned that it
could not march even in May, and missed the Vittoria campaign.
[255] Brigades were not always kept together, the regiments being a
little scattered. Individual battalions were in Baños, Bejar, Bohoyo,
Montehermoso, &c.
[256] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 449.
[257] See _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix. p. 462.
[258] For a curious narrative of adventures in Madrid, November 4-10,
by a party of English prisoners who escaped in the confusion that
followed the outmarch of the French, see the Memoirs of Captain Harley
of the 47th, ii. pp. 42-50.
[259] Fortunately for themselves most of King Joseph’s Spanish
partisans, who fled from Madrid in July to Valencia, were still under
Suchet’s charge and had not returned, or their lot would have been a
hard one.
[260] _Miot de Melito_, iii. p. 258.
[261] The 2nd Division (see above, p. 90) had been taken from Soult and
lent to the Army of the Centre during the operation of November. It was
never given back.
[262] A good picture of the state of Central Spain in January and
February 1813 may be got from the Memoirs of d’Espinchel, of the 2nd
Hussars, an officer charged with the raising of contributions in La
Mancha--a melancholy record of violence and treachery, assassination
by guerrilleros and reprisals by the French, of villages plundered and
magistrates shot. D’Espinchel had mainly to deal with the bands of El
Medico and the Empecinado. See his _Souvenirs militaires_, pp. 86-110.
[263] Vide v. pp. 550-8.
[264] See Mina’s Life of himself, pp. 39-43. He declares that the
French custom-house at Yrun paid him 100 _onzas de oro_ (£300) a month,
for leave to pass goods across the Bidassoa.
[265] The remains of Thomières’ unlucky division, cut to pieces at
Salamanca--the 1st, 65th, and 101st Line.
[266] 64th Line.
[267] _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix. p. 224.
[268] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 452.
[269] Clarke to King Joseph, _Correspondance du Roi_, ix. p. 186.
[270] See vol. ii, pp. 465-6.
[271] For text see Toreno, iii. p. 149.
[272] _Wellington Dispatches_, ix. p. 467.
[273] Ibid., pp. 474-5, October 5.
[274] Bathurst to Wellington, October 21. _Supplementary Dispatches_,
vii. p. 462.
[275] See above, pp. 61-2.
[276] Roughly correct: the joint force of the Castilian and
Estremaduran divisions in October 1812 was 8,000 men with the
colours--there were some 7,000 men in dépôts and garrisons.
[277] In November the 3rd Army had about 5,000 men with the colours,
3,000 in dépôt: the 2nd, 7,000, excluding the guerrilleros of the
Empecinado and Duran.
[278] Two days later Wellington sent Carvajal a definite instance
of this friction. The Civil Intendant of Old Castile had collected
a magazine for the benefit of the garrison of Rodrigo. The
Captain-General had seized it, and used it to support his own staff.
_Dispatches_, ix. p. 623.
[279] Wellington to Carvajal. _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 604-5.
[280] For the exact text of the reply see the Spanish Minister of War’s
letter. _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. pp. 170-1.
[281] See _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 529-30 and 546.
[282] Wellesley to Castlereagh. _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 530.
[283] They were the Duke of Infantado, Admiral Villaviciencio, and
Señors Ignacio Rivas, Mosquera, and Villamil. The last two were reputed
very anti-British.
[284] This Act had been a great demonstration of the ‘Liberales’, and
they were desirous of punishing certain canons and bishops who had
refused to read it publicly in their cathedrals; an odd parallel to the
case of James II and the Seven Bishops in English history.
[285] Including the presentation of a thundering letter from the
British Prince-Regent: see H. Wellesley to Wellington, July 28,
_Supplementary Dispatches_, viii. p. 160 and ibid., p. 188.
[286] See especially below the difficulties with the Galician army as
to ammunition, and the Andalusian reserve as to transport and magazines.
[287] _Dispatches_, x. pp. 211-12.
[288] See _Dispatches_, x. p. 181, when Wellington writes in March:
‘There is not a single battalion or squadron fit to take the field, not
in the whole kingdom of Spain a dépôt of provisions that would keep one
battalion for one day--not a shilling of money in any military chest.’
[289] _Wellington Dispatches_, x. p. 199.
[290] See above, vol. iii. pp. 193, 415-17, and iv. p. 71. The best
sketch of the personalities of the Portuguese regency is that in
Lord Wellesley’s _Memorandum respecting Portugal_, in _Wellington
Dispatches, Suppl._, vii. pp. 199-204, a very interesting document.
[291] Now Marquis de Borba by his father’s death in 1812.
[292] See e. g. _Wellington Dispatches_, x. pp. 37 and 106-7.
[293] See e. g. the cases dealt with in _Wellington Dispatches,
Suppl._, vii. pp. 240 and 316.
[294] e. g. _Wellington Dispatches_, x. p. 129, and another case
accompanied by the murder of a soldier, x. p. 117.
[295] See _Wellington Dispatches_, x. pp. 131, 191, and 201.
[296] See _Wellington Dispatches_, x. p. 88 and ix. p. 615.
[297] See Wellington to Forjaz, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 353.
[298] See Wellington to Bathurst, ibid., ix. pp. 461-2.
[299] Wellington to the Prince-Regent of Portugal, _Dispatches_, x. pp.
284-7.
[300] Wellington to Stuart, ibid., x. pp. 342, &c.
[301] See Meneval’s _Mémoires_, iii. p. 317.
[302] It was generally known in London next day. See Sir G. Jackson’s
_Memoirs_, iii. p. 447.
[303] Liverpool to Wellington. _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp.
502-3.
[304] Lord Liverpool doubted whether Prussia or Austria would move.
Prussia might stir, if only she was sure that Austria would support
her. But ‘the councils of Vienna at this time are abject.’
[305] Though on February 17 Wellington heard of the departure northward
of the 7th (Polish) Lancers, and some squadrons of Gendarmerie
belonging to the Army of the North. But this was too small a move to
serve as the base of a deduction. _Dispatches_, x. p. 125.
[306] Wellington to Bathurst. _Dispatches_, x. p. 177.
[307] Ibid., p. 207, March 17.
[308] By an intercepted letter from the King to Reille, dated March 14,
now in the ‘Scovell Cyphers,’ which mentions both facts.
[309] Wellington to Graham, April 7. _Dispatches_, x. p. 270.
[310] In the ‘Scovell Cyphers,’ like the dispatch quoted above.
[311] Wellington to Bathurst, January 26. _Dispatches_, x. p. 39; cf.
ibid., p. 256.
[312] _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 601-2, April 7.
[313] Wellington to Bathurst. _Dispatches_, x. p. 307.
[314] For details see Schwertfeger’s _History of the K.G.L._, vol. i,
pp. 500-50.
[315] See letters in von Wacholz’s Diary, pp. 311-12. It is doubtful if
the men, largely waifs and prisoners of all nations, felt the same zeal
as the officers.
[316] See vol. i, pp. 371, &c.
[317] _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 449-50.
[318] Henry Wellesley to Wellington. _Supplementary Dispatches_, x, pp.
571-3.
[319] Bathurst to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. 577, and
Castlereagh to Sir Charles Stuart, ibid., p. 586, March 3, 1813.
[320] See above, vol. v, pp. 342-7.
[321] Wellington to Bathurst. _Dispatches_, x. pp. 384-5.
[322] For this forgotten raid in December 1813, see _Études
Napoléoniennes_, 1914, p. 191. For the Genoa affair see C. T. Atkinson
in the _R.U.S.I. Journal_, 1915.
[323] See Wellington to Torrens, May 28, 1812. _Dispatches_, ix. p.
182. Yet Wellington, unconsulted though he had been, expresses his
thanks to the Duke for fixing upon a successor to Murray.
[324] _Creevey Papers_, i. p. 173.
[325] _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 427-8.
[326] _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p, 457.
[327] Oddly enough, Wellington wanted the Duke of York to take the
initiative and odium, by appointing Gordon to a home post. The Duke
refused, holding that Wellington must take the responsibility.
[328] _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 499.
[329] Ibid., p. 527.
[330] See examples on page 138, above.
[331] See above, pp. 151-2.
[332] See Wellington to Torrens, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp.
494-5.
[333] Ibid., p. 486.
[334] _Wellington Dispatches_, ix. p. 592.
[335] Wellington to Bathurst, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 484.
[336] Duke of York to Bathurst, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp.
516-17.
[337] He was bothering Lord Bathurst for a peerage, which he was not
yet destined to obtain. _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 515. He was
put off with the colonelcy of a cavalry regiment.
[338] Bathurst to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp.
538-9.
[339] Ibid., vii. pp. 577-8.
[340] The 2nd, 20th, 51st, 68th, 74th, 77th, 94th Regiments.
[341] The 9th, 11th, 24th, 27th, 30th, 34th, 39th, 44th, 47th, 53rd,
58th, 66th, 81st, 83rd, 87th, as also _Chasseurs Britanniques_ and
Brunswick-Oels.
[342] 2nd, 2/24th, 2/30th, 2/31st, 2/44th, 51st, 2/53rd, 2/58th,
2/66th, 68th, 2/83rd, 94th.
[343] 1st Prov. Batt. = 2/31st and 2/66th; 2nd = 2nd and 2/53rd; 3rd =
2/24th and 2/58th; 4th = 2/30th and 2/44th.
[344] e.g. the 51st and 68th. _Wellington Dispatches_, ix. p. 609.
[345] The Duke to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp.
524-5.
[346] Wellington to Torrens, _Dispatches_, x. pp. 77-8.
[347] The Duke to Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 553,
February 17.
[348] Ibid., vii. pp. 581-3.
[349] The 2/30th and 2/44th.
[350] The 51st, 68th, 2/83rd, and 94th.
[351] 2nd, 2/24th, 2/31st, 2/53rd, 2/58th, 2/66th.
[352] 7th, 10th, 15th, 18th Hussars.
[353] 2/59th (from Cadiz), 2/62nd, 76th, 77th (from Lisbon garrison),
2/84th, 85th.
[354] On all this the reader interested in military finance will
find excellent commentaries in chap. i of vol. ix of Mr. Fortescue’s
_History of the British Army_, which appeared three months after this
chapter of mine was written.
[355] See _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. p. 212.
[356] Ibid., vii. pp. 539-41.
[357] He was captured by a raiding party, while watching the enemy from
too short a distance, on August 31.
[358] So Clarke to the King, _Corresp. du Roi Joseph_, vol. ix. p. 189.
[359] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 452.
[360] See _Corresp. du Roi Joseph_, ix. p. 187.
[361] See account in the Memoirs of Patterson of the 50th, pp. 303-5.
[362] See dispatch in Girod’s _Vie militaire du Général Foy_, pp.
386-7. The whole is written in a boastful and unconvincing style,
unworthy of such a good soldier. Colonel Harrison’s report is
singularly vague and short. He only says that the enemy made off,
leaving their dead behind.
[363] Desprez to Joseph, from Paris, January 3, _Corresp. R. J._ ix.
pp. 180-2.
[364] _Nap. Corresp._ xxiv, no. 19411.
[365] See vol. v. pp. 538-9.
[366] Miot de Melito, iii. pp. 263-4.
[367] See above, pp. 215-16.
[368] Two regiments which had only two battalions in February 1813 got
cut down to one apiece.
[369] A brigade not a division, since the Hessian regiment perished at
Badajoz.
[370] He had also later to give up the 22nd, a weak one-battalion
regiment of 700 bayonets.
[371] See above, p. 188.
[372] Even the 2nd Dragoons, the first regiment scheduled, though it
started in March, shows casualties at Vittoria, so did not get away.
[373] See Joseph to Suchet, _Correspondance_, ix. p. 200.
[374] See _Mémoires du Roi Joseph_, ix. p. 134.
[375] Clarke to Joseph, _Correspondance_, ix. p. 193 (February 2).
[376] Ibid. (February 12), pp. 194-5.
[377] Clarke to Joseph, February 12. Ibid., pp. 197-9.
[378] See above, p. 219.
[379] _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix. p. 290, written just before
Clarke got news of Wellington’s start.
[380] See above, pp. 190-91.
[381] Dispatch of February 26, _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix. p.
206.
[382] See vol. iv. p. 472.
[383] _Mémoires_, iv. p. 202.
[384] ‘Au lieu de les poursuivre, de les inquiéter, d’aller au devant
de leurs entreprises, on attendait la nouvelle de leurs tentatives
sur un point pour s’y porter soi-même: on agissait toujours après
l’événement.’ Clarke to Clausel, _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix. p.
210.
[385] Clarke to Clausel, March 9, _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix.
209-12--a very long and interesting dispatch, of which this is only a
short _précis_.
[386] For a long account of the Combat of Poza, see Vacani, vol. vi.
pp. 228-33.
[387] Martinien’s lists show casualties in the 3rd, 52nd, and 105th
Line and 10th Léger of Abbé’s division on this day, so he had clearly
gone out in force.
[388] The interesting dispatch of Leguia, the captor of Fuenterrabia,
will be found in the Appendix to Arteche, vol. xiii.
[389] Mina’s claim to have annihilated these unfortunate troops is
sustained by Martinien’s lists, which show 8 officers killed and 23
wounded in the 25th Léger and 27th Line, at Lerin, March 31. There
would not be more than 40 or 45 officers present with two battalions.
[390] Expressed at some length in the great guerrillero’s _Memoirs_.
[391] Who has a long and interesting narrative of the expedition in his
vol. vi. pp. 240-50.
[392] Vacani’s statement that the Italian division lost this day only
110 men, is made absurd by the lists in Martinien, which show that
the 4th, 6th, and 2nd Ligeros lost that day 3 officers killed and 16
wounded--which implies a total casualty list of at least 350.
[393] In Martinien’s lists there are five officer-casualties given for
this fight, but they do not include all the names of officers mentioned
as killed by Vacani in his narrative.
[394] Not the 24th as in Vacani and Belmas. See Girod de l’Ain’s _Life
of Foy_, p. 260.
[395] Figures in Belmas are (in detail) Foy’s own division (10
battalions) 5,513 men, Palombini’s (5 battalions) 2,474, artillery 409,
Sarrut’s division about 4,500. Foy left behind Aussenac’s brigade about
1,500, and the garrison of Bilbao about 2,000.
[396] For horrid details of mishandlings of both sexes see Marcel (of
the 6th Léger) in his _Campagnes d’Espagne_, pp. 193-4. Marcel is a
_raconteur_, but Belmas bears him out (iv. p. 566).
[397] Napier says the Spanish loss was 180--which seems more probable.
The British ships lost one officer and sixteen men wounded, by Bloye’s
report. As to the French loss, we have the names of 3 officers killed
and 6 wounded during the operation--which looks like 150 to 180
casualties.
[398] See above, vol. ii. p. 341.
[399] 1/10th, 1/27th, 1/58th, 1/81st, and 2/27th which came in time for
Castalla, also a battalion of grenadier companies of units in Sicily.
[400] 4th and 6th Line battalions, and a light battalion composed of
the light companies of 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and of De Roll and
Dillon.
[401] Three companies of De Roll and four of Dillon--the whole making
up a battalion 800 bayonets and the Calabrese Free Corps.
[402] 1st and 2nd Italian Levy, and two battalions of Sicilian Estero
Regiment.
[403] Those of Villacampa, Mijares, and Sarsfield.
[404] For details see letter of February 22nd in Sir Samuel
Whittingham’s _Memoirs_, pp. 172-4. He says that Colonel Grant,
commanding the 2nd Italian Levy, had made himself cordially detested by
his men by ‘employing the minute worry of the old British School,’ and
that Bourke of the 1st Italian Levy had much more control over his men.
[405] Murray to Wellington. _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. p. 191.
[406] See his letter of March 19th, written after the skirmish: ‘Our
army is concentrating itself, and a few days I hope will bring on a
general action, in which I hope to play my part’ (_Memoirs_, p. 188).
[407] Murray to Wellington. _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. p. 200.
[408] Napier blames the British Government for having got things into
such a position of double command that Bentinck could withdraw from
Spain troops which he had sent there, and which had passed under
Wellington’s authority (v. p. 54). Wellington seems to have made no
objection to this particular recall (_Dispatches_, vii. p. 260),
thinking (I suppose) that the risk of losing Sicily was much more
serious than the deduction of 2,000 men from the Alicante side-show.
He wrote at any rate to Murray to send them off at once, if he had not
done so already. The fault, of course, lay with Bentinck, for denuding
Sicily before he was sure of the stability of the new Constitution.
[409] Murray to Wellington, April 2. _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii.
p. 605. The 6th K.G.L. was present at Castalla on April 13th.
[410] Wellington, _Dispatches_, x. p. 162.
[411] The best account of all this from the Spanish point of view is
a dispatch written by Colonel Potons y Moxica, Elio’s chief of the
staff, in the Record Office, ‘East Coast of Spain’ file. It is equally
valuable for the battle of Castalla.
[412] Consisting of 2/27th British, Calabrese Free Corps, 1st Italian
Levy, and the rifle companies of 3rd and 8th K.G.L.
[413] Two squadrons 20th Light Dragoons, the troop of Foreign Hussars,
and some of Whittingham’s Spaniards, two squadrons of Olivenza.
[414] I do not know who was commanding this division (3rd of the
Murcian army) in April: its divisional general, Sarsfield, was absent.
It included Bailen, Badajoz, America, Alpujarras, Corona, and Guadix:
O’Ronan had it in the preceding autumn.
[415] Potons y Moxica’s dispatch says that ‘la entrega del castillo
provino de una especie de sedicion en la tropa de Velez Malaga,’
which is conclusive. Why Napier (v. 57) calls Velez Malaga ‘the
finest regiment in the Spanish army’ I cannot conceive. It was one of
O’Donnell’s old regiments, cut to pieces at Castalla in the preceding
July, and hastily filled up with drafts. I suspect that Napier is
paraphrasing Suchet’s description of this corps as ‘mille hommes de
belles troupes.’ Except that they had been recently re-clothed from the
British subsidy, there was nothing ‘fine’ about them.
[416] In his own narrative he says that he sent in the 1st and 3rd
Léger, 14th, 114th, and 121st Line--a big deployment of forces.
[417] The best account of the combat of Biar is that of the anonymous
officer of the 2/27th, quoted at length by Trimble in his _History of
the Inniskilling Regiment_, pp. 61-2. See also the less trustworthy
Landsheit (of the ‘Foreign Hussars’), ii. pp. 86-9.
[418] De Roll-Dillon, 81st, and one of Whittingham’s Spanish
battalions. They had some casualties--the Spaniards 29, De Roll-Dillon
probably 25: its total casualty list for the days April 12-13 of 34
cannot be divided between the two actions.
[419] It is impossible to disentangle the losses of Adam’s brigade on
April 12 and April 13, given together in Murray’s report. But on the
second day the 2/27th regiment was the only unit seriously engaged.
The total for both days was killed 1 officer and 56 men, wounded 10
officers and 231 men, missing 32 men: or a total of 330. If we _deduct_
40 for assumed losses of the 2/27th on the second day, and 30 more for
casual losses of the other units on April 13--they were engaged but
not seriously--and _add_ 29 for losses in Whittingham’s battalion (he
gives the figure himself) and 25 (including 9 missing) for those in De
Roll-Dillon (which was barely under fire on the second day and lost 34
altogether), we must conclude that the total was very close to 300.
[420] The light company 7th K.G.L., two newly arrived squadrons of
Brunswick Hussars, and two batteries.
[421] 2/27th, Calabrese Free Corps, 1st Italian Levy, two light
companies K.G.L.
[422] 1/27th, 4th and 6th K.G.L., ‘Estero’ regiment (two battalions).
[423] 1/10th, 1/58th, 1/81st British, composite battalion of De
Roll-Dillon, 2nd Italian Levy.
[424] Cordoba, Mallorca, Guadalajara, 2nd of Burgos, 2nd of Murcia, 5th
Grenadiers.
[425] Chinchilla, Canarias, Alicante, Cazadores de Valencia,
Voluntarios de Aragon.
[426] Two squadrons each of Olivenza and Almanza.
[427] Napier, v. 58, quoting Donkin MSS., which are unpublished and
unfindable.
[428] Landsheit, ii. p. 91.
[429] Suchet says that to support the voltigeurs he sent in only _four_
battalions of the 3rd Léger and 121st--but most undoubtedly the 114th
attacked also, for it lost four officers killed and nine wounded, as
many as the 3rd Léger, and this means 250 casualties at least in the
rank and file.
[430] Whittingham, _Memoirs_, p. 197.
[431] Mr. Fortescue (_British Army_, ix. p. 43) seems rather to lean to
the idea that the staff, or at any rate Catanelli, resolved to force
Murray to fight despite of himself. This may have been the case.
[432] Cordoba and 2nd of Burgos.
[433] Guadalajara.
[434] Murcia, Majorca, and 5th Grenadiers.
[435] 1st Léger, in reserve on the Cerro del Doncel.
[436] During which occurred the dramatic duel in front of the line
between Captain Waldron and a French Grenadier officer mentioned in
Napier, v. p. 59. The picturesqueness of the story induced some critics
to doubt it. But there is no getting over the fact that Waldron gave
his opponent’s weapon, which was a sword of honour presented by the
Emperor, to the Quartermaster-General (Donkin), who forwarded it to
the Duke of York, and the Commander-in-Chief gazetted Waldron to a
brevet-majority in consequence. (See Trimble’s _Historical Record
of the 27th_, p. 64.) It is extremely odd (as Arteche remarks) that
Suchet in his short and insincere account of Castalla tells a story
of a _French_ officer who killed an English officer in single combat
(_Mémoires_, ii. p. 308).
[437] I am inclined to think the latter, as it is doubtful whether,
with the spur between, Adam’s fighting-ground was visible from
Whittingham’s.
[438] Taking Murray’s casualty list for comparison with Suchet’s, we
find that he had 4 officers killed and 16 wounded to 649 men at Biar
and Castalla, i. e. 1 officer to 32 men. But this was an exceptionally
low proportion of officers lost. At such a rate Suchet might have lost
2,000 men! I take 1,300 as a fair estimate.
[439] Cf. Wellington, _Dispatches_, x. pp. 354-5, in which Wellington
asks what sort of a victory was it, if Suchet was able to hold the pass
of Biar, only two miles from the battlefield, till nightfall?
[440] See Appendix on Castalla losses, English and French, at the end
of the volume.
[441] Six companies of Dillon came from Sicily, to replace the 2/67th
at Cartagena.
[442] Wellington to Dumouriez, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. 482-3,
and to Cooke, ibid. pp. 477-8.
[443] Wellington to Liverpool, November 23, 1812. _Dispatches_, ix. p.
572.
[444] Wellington to Graham, January 31. _Dispatches_, x. p. 67.
[445] Wellington to Bathurst. Ibid., p. 104.
[446] _Dispatches_, x. p. 464.
[447] Wellington to Henry Wellesley. _Dispatches_, x. p. 239.
[448] Wellington to Stapleton Cotton, ibid., p. 268, and to Bathurst,
ibid. 295, speaking of the extraordinary dry spring. Dickson notes in
his _Diary_ that for two months before April 4 there had been no rain.
[449] See _Dispatches_, x. pp. 372-3.
[450] Wellington to Beresford, April 24. _Dispatches_, x. p. 322.
[451] See above, pp. 224-5.
[452] Wellington to Bathurst, _Dispatches_, x. 372.
[453] Wellington to Bathurst, May 6. _Dispatches_, x. p. 361.
[454] Algarve, and Hussars of Estremadura.
[455] Pontevedra and Principe.
[456] Castaños himself during the campaign acted more as
Captain-General than as Army-Commander--stationing himself at Salamanca
and reorganizing the districts just recovered from the French.
[457] Apparently not without reason, if we can trust King Joseph’s
correspondence, which contains notes of a treasonable intrigue in
May, between certain officers of the 3rd Army and General Viruez, an
_Afrancesado_ at Madrid. See _Correspondance du Roi_, ix. pp. 130 and
466.
[458] Total force a nominal 15,000, but dépôts, hospitals, petty
garrisons, &c., absorbed a full third--the cavalry was 441 sabres only.
[459] See Codrington to Wellesley, January 18, in _Supplementary
Dispatches_, vii. p. 569.
[460] Sarsfield with one of the two Catalan field divisions was
normally operating as a sort of guerrillero on the Aragonese side.
Manso generally hung about the Ampurdam with a brigade.
[461] The H.A. troops were ‘A’ Ross, ‘D’ Bean, ‘E’ Gardiner, ‘F’
Webber-Smith, and ‘I’ Ramsay. The foot companies were those of
Dubourdieu (1st Division), Maxwell (2nd Division), Douglas (3rd
Division), Sympher K.G.L. (4th Division), Lawson (5th Division),
Brandreth (6th Division), Cairnes (7th Division). Tulloh’s Portuguese
company was attached to the 2nd Division, Da Cunha’s to Silveira’s
division. The reserve was composed of Webber-Smith’s H.A. troop,
Arriaga’s Portuguese heavy 18-pounders, and Parker’s foot company. See
Colonel Leslie’s edition of the _Dickson Papers_, ii. p. 719.
[462] Long was now in charge of Hill’s cavalry _vice_ Erskine, a
general whose acts have so often required criticism. This unfortunate
officer had committed suicide at Brozas during the winter, by leaping
out of a lofty window while _non compos mentis_. The moment he was
removed Wellington abolished the ‘2nd Cavalry Division’, and threw its
two brigades into the general stock under Stapleton Cotton for the
campaign of 1813.
[463] Wellington to Hill, _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. pp. 206 and
216.
[464] 12th Dragoons, of Digeon’s division.
[465] This is Wellington’s own observation, _Dispatches_ x. 397, to
Graham from Matilla.
[466] Wellington to Graham, _Dispatches_, x. 401.
[467] That the charges were not pushed home is shown by the
casualties--10 wounded in the Royals, 1 killed no wounded in the 1st
Hussars K.G.L.
[468] Creditable as was the conduct of Villatte’s infantry, it is
hyperbole to say with Napier (v. p. 98) that ‘the dauntless survivors
won their way in the face of 30,000 enemies!’ For only 1,600 British
horsemen were up, and the nearest allied infantry was 6 or 8 miles away.
[469] Jourdan (_Mémoires_, p. 464) holds that Villatte was to blame,
and ‘engagea le combat mal à propos,’ but considers that he was
‘faiblement suivi’ by Fane and Alten. He acknowledges the loss of
some of Villatte’s guns, probably in error, for Wellington speaks
of captured caissons only in his report of the affair. Martinien’s
list of casualties shows hardly any officer-casualties on this day in
Villatte’s division.
[470] See the elaborate dispatch of June 28 (to Hill, _Dispatches_, x.
pp. 402-4).
[471] See Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 466.
[472] For all this see Wellington to Hill, _Dispatches_, x. pp. 402-4.
[473] There are some slips either in the original or the copy of the
Marching Orders printed in _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. pp. 215-16.
For Carazedo, given on the itinerary of the 1st Division, is many miles
from it, though it _is_ on the proper line of the 5th Division, which
was going to Outeiro and not to Braganza. Limão on the itinerary of the
3rd Division should be Vinhas, if I am not mistaken.
[474] Another odd error in Marching Orders given in _Wellington
Dispatches_, x. p. 368, had turned the Portuguese heavy guns into
infantry ‘18th Portuguese Brigade’ which should read ‘Portuguese
18-pounder brigade.’ There was no higher numbered Portuguese infantry
brigade than the 10th. This misprint has misled many historians.
[475] See Tomkinson, p. 232, for the road by Chaves and Monforte.
[476] Improvised by dismantling artillery carriages. Wellington to
Bathurst, _Dispatches_, x. 388.
[477] Wellington to Graham, _Dispatches_, x. p. 392.
[478] Minus Grant’s hussars, who only arrived on the 27th.
[479] Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 464. Note that Napier (v. 102) has got
this expedition a week too late--May 29-30. His statement that the
French cavalry got in touch with the northern wing of Graham’s army
and was closely followed by British scouting parties, is contradicted
by the absolute silence about any touch with the French in the diary
of Tomkinson, whose regiment was at Tabara and must have been the one
which Boyer would have met.
[480] Digeon’s own report, which chanced to be entirely inaccurate, was
that on the 29th his reconnaissance reported that there were signs of
intentions to throw trestle bridges across the Esla opposite the ford
of Morellas, the lowest ford on the Esla toward the Douro, and at Santa
Enferina opposite San Cebrian, where Spanish troops were visible. Also
that at Almendra there was a post of British hussars. Only the third
item was correct. (_Archives Nationaux_--copy lent me by Mr. Fortescue.)
[481] Tomkinson says that his regiment, the 16th Light Dragoons,
was 20 hours on horseback this day, continually hurried off and
countermarching (p. 235).
[482] Julian Sanchez’s lancers, from Hill’s wing, moving from
Penauseude, got in the same night to Zamora.
[483] Digeon has an elaborate and unconvincing account of this affair
in the long dispatch quoted above. He says that he had two regiments
(16th and 21st Dragoons) drawn up in front of a bridge and ravine,
awaiting the return of a reconnaissance sent to Toro: that the
detachment arrived hotly pursued by British hussars, whereupon he
resolved to retire, and told the brigade to file across the ravine. But
the 16th Dragoons charged without orders, in order to save the flying
party, and got engaged against fourfold numbers, while the 21st was
retiring. They did wonders: killed or wounded 100 hussars, captured an
officer and 13 men, and retired fighting on the battery and infantry at
Pedroso, losing only 100 men.
[484] Two officers of the 16th were taken: the lists in Martinien show
only one more officer wounded--from which we should gather that the
resistance must have been poor. For a regiment fighting strongly should
have had more officer-casualties than three to 208 other ranks. The
16th Dragoons must have been pretty well destroyed--with 1 officer and
108 men unwounded prisoners, 1 officer and 100 men wounded prisoners,
and 1 officer and an unknown number of other ranks wounded but not
captured. This was the same regiment which had lost the 1 officer and
32 men taken by their own carelessness at Val de Perdices on the 31st.
It had been less than 400 strong by its last preserved morning-state.
[485] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 463.
[486] See above, p. 327.
[487] 45th Ligne and 12th Léger.
[488] 2nd Hussars, 5th and 10th _Chasseurs à Cheval_. For an
interesting narrative of Maransin’s and P. Soult’s manœuvres about
Toledo, see the book of Wellington’s intelligence officer, Leith Hay,
who was then a prisoner with them, having been captured while scouting
(vol. ii. pp. 142-55).
[489] Clausel was sent a dispatch on May 27 _not_ ordering him to come
south at once, but requesting him to send back Barbot, Taupin, and
Foy if his operations were now completed in Navarre! _Mémoires du Roi
Joseph_, ix. 280.
[490] Viz. four and a half divisions of the Army of the South, two of
the Army of the Centre, one of the Army of Portugal, the King’s French
Guards, and his trifling Spanish auxiliary force.
[491] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 466.
[492] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 467.
[493] Wellington to Graham, _Dispatches_, x. p. 411.
[494] Wellington to Giron, _Dispatches_, x. 413 and 414, and to
O’Donoju, x. pp. 414-15.
[495] Viz. Wellington to Colonel Bourke from Melgar, June 10,
_Dispatches_, x. p. 429.
[496] Wellington to Bourke from Melgar, June 10, _Dispatches_, x. 429.
[497] As, for example, in the letter to Bathurst about ships.
_Dispatches_, x. 416.
[498] These sort of courtesies were most misplaced. The subject of
discussion was the exchange of the British officer captured at Morales
(see above, p. 332) for a French officer whom Gazan was anxious to
get back. See _Dispatches_, x. 421, Wellington to Gazan; Jourdan’s
_Mémoires_, p. 467; and the narrative of the flag-bearer in Maxwell’s
_Peninsular Sketches_, ii. pp. 97-8.
[499] Tomkinson’s _Diary_ (16th Light Dragoons), pp. 239-40.
[500] Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_, ii. 37.
[501] _Dispatches_, x. 437.
[502] 1st and 5th with Bradford’s Portuguese.
[503] Food having run low, owing to the mule-transport falling behind.
[504] 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th Divisions and Pack’s Portuguese.
[505] Presumably Maucune’s brigade, which had been there some time, as
well as the convoy escorts.
[506] ‘Grant begged Lord Wellington to allow him to attack the
retiring infantry, but in spite of his pressing solicitations was not
permitted.’ Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_, ii. 99.
[507] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 469.
[508] Cf. Miot de Melito in Ducasse, ix. p. 468.
[509] Cf. Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 470; Wellington _Dispatches_, x.
pp. 436-7; Digeon’s Report, and the Appendix in Arteche, xiii. p. 486.
Toreno (iii. p. 230) says that the citizens held that the French had
intended the mine to work when they were gone, and to destroy the city
and the incoming allied troops, but leans to the view that ignorance of
the power of explosives explains all.
[510] _Dispatches_, x. p. 436.
[511] Sometimes called the bridge of Policutes, from the name of the
village on the opposite bank.
[512] Tomkinson’s _Diary_, p. 341.
[513] Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_, ii. p. 38.
[514] e.g. Wachholz of Brunswick-Oels, attached to the 4th Division, p.
314.
[515] See, for example, vol. ii. p. 586 and vol. iv. p. 159.
[516] These were the words of Colonel Arnaud, senior aide-de-camp to
Gazan, conversing (most incautiously) with his prisoner Leith Hay,
whose diary is most interesting for these days. See Leith Hay, ii. p.
176.
[517] Foy to Jourdan, Bergara, June 19.
[518] Some of Hill’s troops used the bridge of Rampalares also, a few
miles west of Puente Arenas.
[519] But did not follow the main road to Osma, going off by a by-path
north of the sierras to Orduña.
[520] _Dispatches_, x. p. 450.
[521] Pakenham’s _Private Correspondence_ (ed. Lord Longford, 1914)
gives no help. He only writes on June 24th, ‘Lord W. left me to protect
his rear: I executed my duty, but have lost my laurel.... I have
satisfied myself, and I hope my master’ (p. 211).
[522] In _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. the two papers on pp. 641 and
644 should be read together, the first giving the moves for Graham and
the Light and 4th Divisions, the second for Hill and the 3rd and 7th
Divisions.
[523] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 472.
[524] Not Barbacena as in Napier: the latter place is in Portugal.
[525] They lost 1 officer and 1 man wounded only.
[526] Tomkinson’s _Diary_, p. 242.
[527] At least Martinien’s lists show one officer killed and five
wounded--all but one in Sarrut’s regiments--which at the usual rate
would mean 120 casualties.
[528] Most of these details are from the excellent account by an
officer of the 43rd in Maxwell’s _Peninsular Sketches_, ii. pp. 39-40.
This narrative was evidently seen by Napier, who reproduces many of its
actual words, as I have done myself. It must have been lent him long
before it was printed in 1845.
[529] Martinien’s lists show only 1 officer killed and 5 wounded this
day in Maucune’s division--this means about 120-50 casualties, but of
course does not include the unwounded prisoners from the baggage-guard.
Jourdan says that the division had ‘une perte assez considérable.’
[530] See _Vie militaire du Général Foy_, pp. 206-7.
[531] _Vie militaire du Général Foy_, p. 206. The editor, Girod de
l’Ain, seems to prove that Foy got no other dispatch, though Jourdan
declares that several had been sent to him.
[532] It would appear, however, that though the 1st and 5th Divisions
and Anson’s cavalry never went near Orduña, yet Bradford and Pack’s
Portuguese (without artillery) had got so near it on the preceding day
that Wellington let them go through it, bringing them back to the main
body via Unza by a mountain path. See _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii.
p. 647.
[533] Probably by Angulo, and the valley of the Gordajuela.
[534] He says so in his letter to the Conde d’Abispal, _Dispatches_, x.
pp. 445-6. ‘Je les attaquerai demain, _s’ils ne font pas la retraite
dans la nuit_.’
[535] Napier, v. p. 114.
[536] There is a good account of the skirmish on the Bayas in Wachholz,
p. 314. He remarks on the abominable weather, ‘incredible for the time
of year--continuous unbearable cold and rain--the sun visible only for
short intervals. Very bad roads.’
[537] For all this see Tomkinson’s _Diary_, p. 243. His statement that
the column went off on the Orduña road by _mistake_ and was at once set
right, seems to me conclusive against Napier’s views.
[538] An English eye-witness calls it ‘nowhere fordable’: a French
eye-witness ‘fordable everywhere’; both are wrong. Cf. Fortescue, ix.
p. 152.
[539] Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 474.
[540] See Toreno, iii. pp. 233-6.
[541] There is an account of this skirmish in Digeon’s report, and in
Hay’s _Reminiscences under Wellington_, pp. 107-8.
[542] Jourdan, p. 473.
[543] The fortified position north of the defile of Salinas, where the
road from Bilbao to France joins the great _chaussée_.
[544] i. e. the position above the northern exit from the plain of
Vittoria.