Rhine, and thence upon the left of the Moselle a great Roman road ran
south-west to Augusta Treverorum (Treves), whence a whole series of
roads set forth to traverse Gaul in every direction. From Confluentes,
too, running north along the left bank of the Rhine, a road pushed on
northward through Bonn to Cologne, whence again a great highway ran
west and south across what is now Belgium and Picardy. This would seem
to have been the main route of Attila’s advance. At the southern entry
at Augst his armies could await, meet and perhaps cut off or defeat any
attack from Italy.
[Illustration: THE ATTACK OF ATTILA UPON GAUL AND THE RETREAT FROM
ORLEANS]
It was January when Attila set out, it was March when he found himself
at last before the gates of Gaul upon the Rhine. The spring and summer
lay all before him in which to ruin and to destroy what after all he
could not understand.
VI
ATTILA’S ADVANCE FROM THE RHINE TO ORLEANS
In the ruin of the secular Roman administration which the last fifty
years had seen, in the terror which the threat of Attila’s armies upon
the Rhine roused everywhere in the great and noble province of Gallia,
it would appear that many, if not all, of the cities still Roman, and
above all Christian, found in some constant and dominating mind a
substitute for, and a successor to, their ruined institutions. We see
this in Tongres, in Metz, in Rheims, in Orleans, above all we see it,
as we might expect, in Paris. The fate of these cities, the way they
met their fate is illuminating; and if it is inexplicable and to our
scepticism almost incredible, it is none the less certainly indicative
of the condition, spiritual and political, of that still Roman society.
It was Christianity which defeated Attila in Gaul as certainly as it
alone was able later to turn him back from the destruction of Italy.
The real victory, in spite of the great strokes of Aetius, was a
spiritual victory; a victory of Christianity over heathenism.
I forbear to draw the parallel with the struggle in which we are at
present engaged. Happily the most striking fact of the present contest
is that the Allies have at once seen through and cast from them the
brutal and hopeless philosophy of blasphemy and bosh, of “necessity”
and “frightfulness” which is the most violent form of atheism that has
yet attacked European society. Germany will perish by her “Kultur” as
certainly as the Huns did by their heathenism. Indeed, in action they
are identical and rest upon the same hopelessness, the denial of the
divinity not of God only but of man.
That the defeat of Attila was a Christian victory is obvious at once,
if we follow his footsteps. He began his attack from the crossing of
the Rhine at Confluentes and fell upon Belgic Gaul. Metz fell. “On the
very vigil of the blessed Easter,” says Gregory of Tours, “the Huns
crossing out of Pannonia, burning as they came, entered Metz. They
gave the city to the flames, massacred the people, putting all to the
sword, killing even the priests before the altar of God. In all the
city nothing remained save the oratory of the blessed Stephen the
Protomartyr and Levite.” He asserts further that this chapel was spared
only because St. Stephen himself invoked the aid of SS. Peter and Paul,
who here already had superseded Romulus and Remus, it might seem, as
the representatives of Rome, as Rome herself was about to become less
the capital of the world than of the Catholic Church.
All Lorraine lay under the torch of the Hun. He passed on into
Champagne. Rheims fell. The inhabitants had fled to the woods. St.
Nicasius the bishop was cut down before the altar as he recited a
part of the 118th Psalm: _Adhaesit pavimento anima mea; vivifica
me secundum verbum tuum._ His sister, named Eutropia, fearing the
brutality of the invaders, struck the murderer in the face and was cut
down with her brother. Suddenly, we read, the church was filled with
a strange thunder, the Huns fled in superstitious fear, deserting the
half-destroyed town. On the following day the inhabitants returned to
their ruins.
From Rheims the Hunnish flood swept on to St. Quentin and even to
Tongres; all northern Gaul from the Marne to the Rhine was laid waste,
everyone was a fugitive,--ruined, helpless. The peoples of the smaller
towns fled first to the greater, and then with the peasants fled into
the hills and the woods. It is in the fate of one of these little towns
later to be so famous, indeed the capital of the West, Lutetia or
Paris, that we have the most characteristic as it is the most amazing
episode of the defence.
Of St. Geneviève’s life we know little apart from the legend which has
transformed the wonderful reality into a delightful tale. St. Germanus
of Auxerre found her under the hill of Valerian, a little girl of
seven years, and his delight in her was but the first example of the
influence her character was to have upon men and events. She was the
spirit of Christian France incarnate. Joan of Arc is, as it were, but
a repetition of her, and over that later and more famous maid she has
this advantage; she was of Paris when Paris only had meaning, as it
were, in her and her act.
Of her legend one can never have enough; but here I will only give
that part of it which concerns this moment. “Tidings came to Paris,”
says Voragine, who has summed up in his marvellous narrative all the
earlier hagiographers: “Tidings came to Paris that Attila the felon
king of the Huns had enterprised to destroy and waste parts of France
and to subdue them to his domination. The burgesses of Paris, for great
dread that they had, sent their goods into other cities more sure. St.
Geneviève warned and admonished the good women of the town that they
should wake in fastings and in orisons by which they might assuage the
ire of Our Lord and eschew the tyranny of their enemies, like as did
sometime the holy women Judith and Esther. They obeyed her and were
long and many days in the church in wakings, fastings and in orisons.
She said to the burgesses that they should not remove their goods, nor
send them out of the town of Paris, for the other cities that they
supposed should be more sure, should be destroyed and wasted, but by
the Grace of God Paris should have no harm. And some had indignation at
her and said that a false prophet had arisen and appeared in their time
and began among them to ask and treat whether they should not drown her
or stone her. Whilst they were thus treating, as God would, came to
Paris after the decease of St. Germain, the archdeacon of Auxerre, and
when he understood that they treated together of her death he came to
them and said: ‘Fair sirs, for God’s sake do not this mischief, for
she of whom ye treat, St. Germain witnesseth that she was chosen of
God in her mother’s belly and lo, here be letters that he hath sent to
her in which he recommendeth him to her prayers.’ When the burgesses
heard these words recited by him of St. Germain and saw the letters,
they marvelled and feared God and left their evil counsel and did no
more thereto. Thus Our Lord kept her from harm, which keepeth always
them that be his, and defendeth after that the apostle saith, and for
her love did so much that the Tyrants approached not Paris, Thanks and
glory to God and honour to the Virgin.”
That is, as I say, the most characteristic and the most significant
episode, as it is the most amazing, of the defence. Paris was not
to fall, was not even to be attacked. Attila was surfeited with
destruction and loot, he was forced now to concentrate his attention
upon the attack on the Visigoths of the south lest Rome and Aetius
should stand in his way and imperil his whole campaign. His plan must
be to defeat the Visigoths before he was forced to face Aetius coming
up out of Italy, and with this on his mind he set out from Metz with
his main army, passed through Toul and Rheims, which were gutted,
through Troyes and Sens, which he was in too great haste to destroy,
and over the Sologne, held then by his ally the King of the Alans,
Sangibanus, and marched directly upon Orleans. That march represented
the work of a whole month. He left Metz in the early days of April, he
arrived before Orleans in the early days of May.
Orleans stands upon the most northern point of the Loire, the great
river which divides Gaul east and west into a northern and a southern
country. It has been the point around which the destinies of the Gauls
have so often been decided--one has only to recall the most famous
instance of all, the deliverance under Joan of Arc--that it is without
surprise we see it fulfilling its rôle in the time of Attila also.
From time immemorial, before the beginning of history, it had been an
important commercial city, for it stood not only on one of the greatest
and most fruitful rivers of western Europe, but, as I have said, upon
the marches of the north and south, whose gate it was. No one could
pass without its leave, at least in safety. Anciently it was known
as Genabum and there had been planned and conceived the great revolt
which so nearly engulfed Julius Cæsar, who burnt it to the ground. It
stood then, as later when it rose again, upon the northern bank of the
river and was joined with the south by a great bridge. The resurrection
after that burning was not long delayed, but it seems to have been less
magnificent than might have been expected and it certainly suffered
much from war, so that in 272, in the time of Aurelian, it was rebuilt
with a wall about it, and for this cause took the name of the Emperor.
Times, however, were sadly changed with the great city when Attila came
into Gaul. Much certainly was in ruin, the municipal government in full
decadence or transition and it was therefore with a dreadful fear in
her heart that Orleans watched the oncoming of the Huns. Nevertheless
the city put herself into a state of defence. The first direct assault
upon her was made by that Sangibanus, King of the Alans, and Attila’s
ally, who requested to be allowed to garrison it. Orleans refused and
closed her gates. At the same time she sent forth her bishop (and this
is as significant of the true state of affairs of government in Gaul as
the facts about Tongres, Rheims and Paris) into the south, still Roman,
to Arles to learn when Aetius might be expected in relief and how far
the Visigoths would move, not for their own defence only, but against
the common enemy.
Anianus, for such was the bishop’s name, thus appears as the
representative, the ambassador and the governor of the city. In Arles,
to his delight, he found not only a secure and even splendid Roman
government, but the great general himself, Aetius, who received him
with impress. Anianus urged the necessity of an immediate assistance.
He reckoned that it would be possible to hold out till the middle of
June, but no longer. Aetius heard him patiently and promised that by
then he would relieve the city. Anianus was not too soon, he had scarce
returned to Orleans when Attila began the siege.
It will be asked, and with reason, why it was that Rome had waited so
long before interfering to defend her great western province against
this “wild beast”? Why had Aetius not marched out of Italy at the head
of his armies months before? why had he waited till all the North
was a ruin before he carried the eagles over the Alps and confronted
this savage and his hordes with the ordered ranks of the army of
civilisation? The answer may be found in the war we are fighting
to-day against a similar foe. The French failed to defend the North
against the modern Attila because they were too long uncertain which
way he would come and where he would strike hardest. They could not
be sure which was the decisive point of the German attack. This it
was that kept so great a proportion of their armies in Alsace and
upon that frontier. They credited the German with more subtlety
than he possessed. They failed to grasp the gigantic simplicity of
the Barbarian plan; the mighty hammer-stroke that shattered Belgium
and plunged in to destroy all the North of France. They looked for
something less blindly brutal and more wise. They could not believe
that the German would destroy his whole case and outrage the moral
consciousness of the world by violating the neutrality of Belgium. They
failed to comprehend the essential stupidity of the Barbarian. They
were wrong.
Aetius was wrong also, but with perhaps more excuse. He could not make
up his mind where the real attack of Attila upon the Empire was to be
delivered. What if the descent upon Gaul were but a feint and Italy
were the real objective, Lombardy the true battlefield? There was this
also; in Africa, Genseric, Attila’s ally, waited and threatened to
descend upon the coast. Aetius overrated the intelligence of his enemy
as much as did Joffre. Neither understood the force which opposed him,
which it was to be their business and their glory to meet and to break.
Like Joffre, too, when Aetius at last found himself face to face with
the reality of the situation he must have dared only not to despair.
The successes of the Huns had decided the Visigoths to remain on the
defence within their own confines; they refused to attack. Everywhere
the Roman delay had discovered treason among the tribes who should have
been their allies against a common foe. Aetius could only not despair.
He addressed the Visigoths, though perhaps with more right, much as we
might address to-day the Americans. “If we are beaten you will be the
next to be destroyed; while if you help us to win yours will be the
glory.” The Visigoths replied as America is doing to-day: “It is not
our business; see you to it.”
They were wrong, the victory of Rome was as necessary for the future as
our victory is to-day.
Much indeed was already achieved to that end by the mere presence of
Aetius in Gaul. Suddenly the whole country was changed, everywhere the
peoples sprang to arms, the noble and the peasant, the bourgeois of the
cities, the bond and the free. From Armorica came an heroic company,
the Ripuarian Franks and the Salian Franks having seen the ruin of the
Roman cities of the country they had been permitted to occupy, the
Burgundians also returned to, if they had indeed ever left, their old
allegiance. So successful at last was the diplomacy of Rome that when
even Sangibanus appeared Aetius feigned to be ignorant of his treason.
The great general prepared with a good heart for the attack, but was
determined to do everything possible to mobilise the Visigoths with his
other forces. It was with this object that at last he sought the aid
of Avitus, the senator, a very great Gaulish nobleman who lived in the
city of Clermont, the chief town of the Auvergne.
In Avitus we have a figure which at once arrests our attention amid all
the welter of Barbarians of which even Gaul was full. In him we see,
and are assured, that the civilisation of Rome was still a living thing
in the West, that it had not been overwhelmed by savages or lost in a
mist of superstition. Avitus indeed seems to have stepped suddenly
out of the great Roman time, he reminds us of what we have learned to
expect a Roman noble of the time of Marcus Aurelius, or for that matter
of St. Ambrose, to be. In him we see one we can greet as a brother; we
should have been able to discuss with him the decline of the Empire.
A rich man, coming of a noble family which for long had enjoyed the
highest honour and the heaviest official responsibility, a scholar, a
connoisseur, above all a somewhat bored patriot, he was also a soldier
distinguished for his personal courage. He had already in 439 been
successful in arranging a treaty for Rome with the Visigoths, and it
was to him in this hour of enormous peril that Aetius turned again. He
found him in his beautiful, peaceful and luxurious villa of Avitacum
amid the foothills of the mountains of Auvergne, living as so many of
our great nobles of the eighteenth century lived, half a farmer, half a
scholar, wholly epicurean and full of the most noble self-indulgence,
surrounded by his family, his son and daughter, and his friends, poets
and scholars and delightful women. His son Ecdicius was the heir both
of his wealth and his responsibilities, his daughter Papianella had
married Sidonius Apollinaris of Lyons, a man already famous as a poet
and coming of a distinguished Gallo-Roman family. It was this man who
in the moment of crisis appeared on behalf of civilisation at the
Visigoths’ Court--we could not have had a more noble representative.
His mission was wholly successful; but the time spent in showing the
Visigoths where their interests lay was to cost Orleans dear. The
devoted city wholly surrounded and every day submitted to the assaults
and the clouds of arrows of the Huns, hearing no news of any relief,
was in despair. In vain the Bishop Anianus went in procession through
the streets, and even among the troops on the ramparts, bearing the
relics of his church; they called him traitor. Still firm in his faith
in God and in the promise of Aetius, daily he made men climb the last
high tower in expectation of deliverance. None came, no sign of the
armies of Aetius could be discerned. Day after day the mighty roads
southward lay in the sun white and empty of all life. At last he sent
by stealth a messenger to Aetius with this message: “My son, if you
come not to-day it will be too late.” That messenger never returned.
Anianus himself began to doubt and at last heard counsels of surrender
almost without a protest; indeed consented himself to treat with the
Huns. But Attila was beside himself at the length of the resistance, he
would grant no terms. Nothing remained but death or worse than death.
Upon the following morning, the week having been full of thunder,
the first rude cavalry of the Huns began to enter the city through
the broken gates. The pillage and massacre and rape began, and, as
to-day in Belgium, we read with a certain order and system. Nothing
was spared, neither the houses of the citizens, nor their holy places,
neither age nor sex. It seemed as though all would perish in a vast and
systematic vandalism and murder.
Suddenly a cry rose over the noise of the butchery and destruction.
The Eagles! The Eagles! And over the mighty bridge that spans the
Loire thundered the cavalry of Rome, and the tumultuous standards of
the Goths. They came on; nothing might stop them. Step by step they
won the bridge head, they fought upon the shore, in the water, through
the gates. Street by street, fighting every yard, the Imperial troops
pushed on, the glistening eagles high overhead. House by house, alley
by alleyway was won and filled with the dead; the Huns broke and fled,
the horses stamped out their faces in the byways, in the thoroughfares
there was no going, the Barbarian carrion was piled so high; Attila
himself was afraid. He sounded the retreat.
That famous and everlasting day was the 14th of June, for Aetius had
kept his word. Orleans had begun the deliverance of Gaul and of the
West.
VII
THE RETREAT OF ATTILA AND THE BATTLE OF THE CATALAUNIAN PLAINS
The retreat of Attila from Orleans would seem to have been one of
the most terrible of which we have any record. The Gothic chronicler
Jornandes, writing a hundred years after the events he describes,
wholly or almost wholly at the mercy of a Gothic and so a Barbarian
legend, would seem, though poorly informed as to facts and details, to
be fully justified in the general impression he gives of the horror and
disaster which befell the Hunnish host. It is certain that Attila’s
withdrawal of his army must have been not only difficult but impossible
without disaster: too many and too brutal crimes had been committed for
the ruined population of northern Gaul to permit it an easy passage
in retreat. The devastated country could no longer supply its needs,
everywhere ruined men awaited revenge: it can have been little less
than a confused flight that Attila made with his thousands towards the
Rhine, with Aetius and Theodoric ever upon his flanks.
Nor was he to escape without battle. The Imperial armies pressing
on behind him gained upon him daily, a sufficient comment upon his
state, and it was really in despair that he reached at last the city
of Troyes, more than a hundred miles from Orleans, an open city which
there might, he hoped, be time to loot, and so to restore to some
extent the confidence and the condition of his people. That he was not
able to loot Troyes is the best evidence we could have of the energy of
the Imperial pursuit; but here again we meet with one of those almost
incredible interpositions of the spiritual power that we have already
seen at Tongres, at Rheims, at Paris, and not least at Orleans. It must
have meant almost everything to Attila on his hurried and harassed
road north-east out of Gaul to be able to feed and to rest his army at
Troyes, where the great road by which he had come crossed the Seine.
That he was not able to do this was doubtless due fundamentally to
the pressure of Aetius upon his flanks, but there was something more,
we are told. Just as Anianus of Orleans had by his prayers saved his
city, so Lupus of Troyes defended his town in the same way. He, the
Bishop, and now perhaps the governor, of Troyes went forth to Attila,
faced and outfaced him, and indeed so impressed and even terrified the
superstitious Barbarian that he left Troyes alone and passed on, taking
only the Bishop himself with him a prisoner in his train. “For,” said
he, mocking him even in his fear, “if I take a man so holy as you with
me I cannot fail of good luck even to the Rhine.”
Attila passed on; he had crossed the Seine; before him lay the passage
of the Aube, and it was here that the advance guard of the Imperial
armies first got into touch with their quarry. It was night. Attila
had left the Gepidae to hold the crossing, and it was they who felt
the first blows of Aetius whose advance guard was composed of Franks;
the fight endured all night and at dawn the passage was won and some
15,000[12] dead and wounded lay upon the field. Attila had crossed into
Champagne, but the Imperial army was already at his heels; he would
have to fight. The battle which followed, one of the most famous as it
is one of the most important in the history of Europe, whose future was
there saved and decided, would seem to have been fought all over that
wide and bare country of Champagne between the Aube and the Marne, and
to have been finally focussed about the great earthwork still called
the Camp of Attila by Châlons; it is known to history as the battle of
the Catalaunian plains.
It may well be that the fight at the passage of the Aube had given
Attila time to reach that great earthwork, one of the most gigantic and
impressive things in Europe, which rises out of that lost and barren
country of Champagne like something not wholly the work of man. There
he halted; convinced at last that he could not escape without battle,
he encamped his army and made ready for the conflict.
In this terrible and tragic place he held council, and superstitious
as ever in the supreme moment of his career, began to consult an
endless procession of soothsayers, augurs and prophets upon the coming
battle. From the entrails of birds, or the veins upon the bones of
sheep, or the dying gestures of some animal, his sorcerers at last
dared to proclaim to him his coming defeat, but to save their heads,
perhaps, they added that the general of his enemies would perish in
the conflict. It is sufficient witness to the genius of Aetius, to
the fear he inspired in the Hun, and should be a complete answer to
his enemies and traducers, that Attila, when he heard this, from
despair passed immediately to complete joy and contentment. If after
all Aetius defeated him at the price of his life, what might he not
recover when his great adversary was no more! He therefore made ready
with a cheerful heart for the conflict. Jornandes, whom we are bound to
follow, for he is our chief, if not quite our only authority for all
this vast onslaught of the Hun upon the Gaul, describes for us, though
far from clearly, the configuration and the development of the battle.
In following this writer, however, it is necessary to remember that he
was a Goth, and relied for the most part upon Gothic traditions; also,
above all, it is necessary not to abandon our common sense, protest he
never so insistently.
Jornandes tells us that Attila put off the fight as long as possible
and at last attacked, or so I read him, not without fear and
trepidation, about three o’clock in the afternoon, so that if fortune
went against him the oncoming of night might assist him to escape.
He then sketches the field. Between the two armies, if I read him
aright, was a rising ground which offered so much advantage to him who
should occupy it that both advanced towards it, the Huns occupying it
with their right and the Imperialists with their right, composed of
auxiliaries.
On the right wing of the Romans Theodoric and his Visigoths held the
field, on the left wing Aetius and the Romans; between them holding the
centre and himself held by Aetius and Theodoric was the uncertain Alan
Sangiban.
The Huns were differently arranged. In the midst, surrounded by his
hardest and best warriors, stood Attila considering as ever his
personal safety. His wings were wholly composed of auxiliaries, among
them being the Ostrogoths with their chiefs; the Gepidae with their
King; and Walamir the Ostrogoth; and Ardaric, King of the Gepidae,
whom Attila trusted and loved more than all others. The rest, a crowd
of kings and leaders of countless races, waited the word of Attila.
For Attila, king of all kings, was alone in command and on him alone
depended the battle.
The fight began, as Jornandes insists, with a struggle for the
rising ground between the two armies. The advantage in which seems
to have rested with the Visigoths, under Thorismund, who thrust back
the Huns in confusion. Upon this Attila drew off, and seeing his
men discouraged, seized this moment to harangue them, according to
Jornandes, somewhat as follows:
“After such victories over so many nations, after the whole world has
been almost conquered, I should think it ridiculous to rouse you with
words as though you did not know how to fight. I leave such means to a
new general, or to one dealing with raw soldiers. They are not worthy
of us. For what are you if not soldiers, and what are you accustomed to
if not to fight; and what then can be sweeter to you than vengeance and
that won by your own hand? Let us then go forward joyfully to attack
the enemy, since it is always the bravest who attack. Break in sunder
this alliance of nations which have nothing in common but fear of us.
Even before they have met you fear has taught them to seek the higher
ground and they are eager for ramparts on these wide plains.
“We all know how feebly the Romans bear their weight of arms; it is
not at the first wound, but at the first dust of battle they lose
heart. While they are forming, before they have locked their shields
into the _testudo_, charge and strike, advance upon the Alans and press
back the Visigoths. Here it is we should look for speedy victory. If
the nerves are cut the members fail and a body cannot support itself
upright when the bones are dragged out of it. Lift up your hearts and
show your wonted courage, quit you like Huns and prove the valour of
your arms, let the wounded not rest till he has killed his enemy, let
him who remains untouched steep himself in slaughter. It is certain
that nothing can touch him who is fated to live, while he will die
even without war who will surely die. And wherefore should fortune
have made the Huns the vanquishers of so many nations if it were not
to prepare them for this supreme battle? Why should she have opened to
our ancestors a way through the marshes of Azov unknown till then if
it were not to bring us even to this field? The event does not deceive
me; here is the field to which so much good fortune has led us, and
this multitude brought together by chance will not look into the eyes
of the Huns. I myself will be the first to hurl my spear against the
enemy, and if any remain slothful when Attila fights, he is but dead
and should be buried.”
These words, says Jornandes, warmed the hearts of the Huns so that they
all rushed headlong into battle.
We know really nothing of the tremendous encounter which followed, the
result of which saved the Western world. It is true that Jornandes
gives us a long account of it, but we are ignorant how far it is likely
to be true, whence he got it, and how much was his own invention.
That the battle was immense, we know; Jornandes asserts that it had
no parallel and that it was such that, if unseen, no other marvel in
the world could make up for such a loss. He tells us that there was a
tradition that a stream that passed over the plain was swollen with
blood into a torrent: “they who drank of it in their thirst drank
murder.” It was by this stream, according to Jornandes, that Theodoric,
King of the Visigoths, was thrown from his horse and trampled under
foot and slain, and so fulfilled the prophecy which Attila’s sorcerers
had declared to him. The fall of the King appears so to have enraged
the Visigoths--and here we must go warily with Jornandes--that they
engaged the enemy more closely and almost slew Attila himself in their
fury. Indeed, it was their great charge which flung him and his guard,
the Hunnish centre, back into the mighty earthwork which before them
seemed but a frail barrier so enormous was their rage. Night fell upon
the foe beleaguered and blockaded within that mighty defence.
In that night Thorismund, the son of Theodoric, was lost and found
again. Aetius, too, separated in the confusion of the night from his
armies, found himself, as Thorismund had done, among the waggons of the
enemy, but like Thorismund again found his way back at last and spent
the rest of the night among the Goths.
When day dawned, what a sight met the eyes of the allies. The vast
plains were strewn with the dying and the dead, 160,000 men had fallen
in that encounter, and within that terrible earthwork lay what was left
of the Huns, wounded and furious, trapped as Alfred trapped Guthrum
later upon the Wiltshire downs.
The battle had cost the Imperialists dear enough. Nor was their loss
all. The death of Theodoric brought with it a greater anxiety and
eventually cost Aetius his Gothic allies. A council of war was called.
It was determined there to hold Attila and starve him within his
earthwork. In the meantime search was made for the body of Theodoric.
After a long time this was found, “where the dead lay thickest,” and
was borne out of the sight of the enemy, the Goths “lifting their harsh
voices in a wild lament.” It is to be supposed that there Theodoric
was buried. And it is probable that the bones and swords and golden
ornaments and jewels which were found near the village of Pouan by
the Aube in 1842 may well have been the remains of Theodoric and his
funeral, for the fight doubtless raged over a great territory, and it
is certain that the king would be buried out of sight of the foe. On
the other hand, these bones may have belonged to a Frankish chief who
had fallen in the fight for the passage of the Aube.
But it is in his account of the events that followed the burial of
Theodoric that we most doubt our guide Jornandes. He declares that
Thorismund, Theodoric’s son and successor, wished to attack the Hun
and avenge his father’s death; but that he consulted Aetius as the
chief commander, who “fearing if the Huns were destroyed, the Goths
might still more hardly oppress the Empire, advised him to return to
Toulouse and make sure of his kingdom lest his brothers should seize
it. This advice Thorismund followed without seeing the duplicity of
Aetius.” Such an explanation of the treason of the Goths was doubtless
accepted by the Gothic traditions and especially comfortable to
Jornandes. It is incredible, because any observer could see that Attila
was not so badly beaten that he was not a far greater danger to the
Empire than ever the Visigoths could be. To let him escape, and that is
what the departure of Thorismund meant, was treason, not to the Goths,
but to the Empire. It served the cause not of Aetius but of Thorismund,
not of Rome but of the Goths, whose loyalty was never above suspicion
and whose slow adhesion to the Imperial cause had been the talk of Gaul
and the scandal of every chancellery.
But Aetius could not have been much astonished by the desertion, and
it was no less, of Thorismund. Rome was used to the instability of her
Barbarian allies who if they really could have been depended upon, if
they had really possessed the quality of decision, and known their own
minds would no longer have been Barbarians. It was Attila who was
amazed. He had given himself up for lost when looking out from that
dark earthwork at dawn he saw the Visigothic camp empty and deserted,
and at the sight “his soul returned into his body.” Without a moment’s
hesitation, broken as he was, he began a retreat that Aetius was not
able to prevent or to turn into a rout, which he could only ensure and
emphasise. Upon that long march to the Rhine all the roads were strewn
with the Hunnish sick and wounded and dead, but the main army, what was
left of the half-million that had made the invasion, escaped back into
the forests of Germany. Gaul was saved, and with Gaul the future of the
West and of civilisation. But Attila was not destroyed.
FOOTNOTES:
[12] Jornandes, _R. Get._, 41. According to the Abbe Dubos the “XC
millibus” which appears in the text of Jornandes is the mistake of a
copyist for “XV millibus.”
VIII
ATTILA’S ATTACK UPON AND RETREAT FROM ITALY
It might seem to be a hard question to answer whether Attila was
really beaten or not in Gaul. This at least is certain, the retreat
from Orleans to the Camp by Châlons was a disaster for him, and the
great battle which followed was only not annihilating because of the
desertion of the Visigoths. Attila saved what that retreat and battle
had left of his army, and without delay, for necessity pushed him on,
turned to prove upon the body of Italy itself that he was still the
“universal tyrant” and the “scourge of God.”
Historians of the decline and fall of the Empire, of the invasions of
the Barbarians, have consistently expressed surprise, often not unmixed
with contempt and derision, that Attila was allowed to escape. But it
must be remembered that it is the almost unbroken characteristic of the
Barbarian wars that the invaders did escape; so Alaric continually
avoided destruction at the hands of Stilicho; and if the Visigoths were
thus able to save themselves how much more was Attila whose armies were
so largely composed of mounted men. It might seem that the superiority
of the Barbarian lay in just that, mobility; the rude and savage men
that composed their armies were content and able to live upon the
country they ravaged, they were not dependent as were the Imperial
armies upon their bases and their supply; they were always a bolt shot
at a venture. Their success is paralleled in our own day by that of
the Boers in South Africa. We do not blame Roberts and Kitchener that
they allowed De Wet to escape them for so long; we understand that
it was inevitable it should be so. Not thus argued the Romans. Full
of discontent, rotten with intrigue and corruption as the Imperial
Government was, there were many who from personal hatred and ambition,
or mere treason, blamed and traduced Aetius for the escape of Attila
which they had planned and prayed for in their hearts. Any weapon was
good enough to use against the great general who apparently suffered
neither fools nor traitors gladly, and was as ambitious if as able as
Stilicho. Every sort of calumny was used against him. It was recalled
that he had had intimate relations with Roua, the uncle of Attila, it
was suggested that he had purposely spared the Huns.
To all this bitterness much was added by the acts of Aetius himself.
Immeasurably proud, like Stilicho, he pretended to claim the hand
of the Princess Eudoxia, the daughter of the Emperor Valentinian,
for his son; moreover, among his other preparations against a new
attack of Attila was a plan to remove the Emperor into Gaul; that he
might replace him himself, his enemies declared. So violent grew the
opposition to this last project that it had to be abandoned. Aetius was
content to send Valentinian to Rome, while he himself, with his army,
held Ravenna and the line of the Po.
In the first chapter of this book I have briefly explained the Imperial
theory of the defence of Italy; that theory I have at greater length,
and I think for the first time, set forth in a previous work.[13] Here
I must very briefly recapitulate in saying that the valley of the Po,
the whole Cisalpine Plain between the Alps and the Apennines, was in
the Imperial theory, and rightly, the defence of Italy. That defence
was barred again upon the inward or southern side by the barren and
therefore impassable range of the Apennines,--impassable, that is,
save at the eastern extremity, where the Via Emilia ran between the
mountains and the sea into the city of Rimini. That narrow pass was
commanded and held not by Rimini, which was indefensible, but by
Ravenna which, on account of its position in the marshes, could not be
taken and scarcely attacked. It was the due and wise recognition of
these facts that caused the Emperor Honorius to take up his residence
in Ravenna when Alaric crossed the Alps. That city had been the key to
the defence of Italy ever since; it remained so now, therefore Aetius
went thither gathering his army along the Via Emilia behind the line of
the Po to await the final adventure of Attila.
Having failed to destroy the Eastern Empire, having failed in his
attack upon the western provinces, the only thing that remained for
Attila to attempt was the destruction and rape of the soul of all,
the citadel of civilisation, Italy and Rome. It was the hardest task
of all, therefore in his prudence, and he was always prudent, he had
not tried it till now. It was his last throw. It was to fail, and that
so contemptibly that his campaigns East and West in comparison
seem like triumphs. Like Kaiser Wilhelm II., what Attila lacked in
real force he strove to supply with blasphemy and boasting. He was
as ill-informed and as ignorant of the real nature and strength of
the forces opposed to him as the German statesmen of our day; he
exaggerated and relied upon the corruption of the Empire; above all,
like the Kaiser, he failed to see that the future frowned against him
dark and enormous as the Alps.
[Illustration: CISALPINE GAUL AND THE DEFENCE OF ITALY]
Tradition rightly imposed upon Aetius the defence of Italy at the
expense as it were of Cisalpine Gaul; it insisted that Cisalpine Gaul
was to be the scene of the encounter. He determined to hold the line of
the Po as he had held the line of the Loire; there was no need to be
doubtful of his success. Already so many Barbarian invaders had found
destruction in the immensity of that great plain. Nevertheless Aetius
reinsured himself and Rome; he reinsured himself with Constantinople.
It was no longer Theodosius the Calligrapher who sat on the Eastern
throne, but Marcian the soldier. To him Valentinian sent ambassadors;
Marcian heard them and promised an army. If, then, Aetius could lure
Attila on far enough, but not too far for the safety of Italy, if he
could hold him in the Cisalpine Plain, Marcian coming into Pannonia
would be in time to cut off his retreat, and so at last the Hun would
be utterly destroyed, and the bones of his great host might bleach
beside the rivers of Lombardy. There at any rate we have the best
explanation of what followed.
Before the winter was over, the winter of 451-452, Attila was already
moving south-west out of Barbary over the Danube, and at last by the
great Roman road through Pannonia, crossing the Julian Alps as Alaric
had done before him to cross the Isonzo, to lay siege to the first
great Italian fortress, then perhaps, save Ravenna, the strongest place
in all Italy, Aquileia, the capital of the province of Venetia. The
walls of this mighty stronghold which was some sixty stadia from the
sea were washed by the rivers Natiso and Turrus. I say it was, save
Ravenna, the strongest place in Italy. It had been made so about the
end of the fourth century, but it had much longer ranked third among
Italian fortresses, only outstripped by Milan and Capua. Though set
in the plain it was so strongly held with walls and towers that it
enjoyed the reputation of being impregnable. Both Alaric and Radagaisus
had passed it by; in the early spring of 452 Attila laid siege to
it. For three months he laboured in vain; no engine he possessed, no
contrivance he could command, no labour he could compel, were enough
to break those Roman walls and to batter down the gates of this virgin
fortress. He hoped to starve it out, but in three months the number of
his armies, their depredations and ravages of the countryside began to
tell far more against him than against the beleaguered city. Living on
the country as he must do he was himself like to go hungry; moreover
the spring heats in the marshy plains were already due, his hosts were
discontented, they expected the loot of Italy, they began to remember
the siege of Orleans and the battle of Châlons.
Furious at being denied, enraged with his people, and perhaps most
of all with himself, the Hun was about to pass on as Alaric had done
in spite of the danger which was greater far now than in the time of
the Goth, when one evening, so it is said, as he moodily rode within
sight of the walls and towers of his inaccessible prey after the heat
of the day he saw by chance a stork preparing to leave her nest on
one of the towers of the great city, and to fly with her young into
the country. In this he saw an assurance of victory. On the morrow
once more he hounded his Huns to the assault: and no man since that
day has found even the ruins of Aquileia.[14] It was not defeat, it
was extermination, complete pillage, and fire. So horrible were the
cruelties there committed that they can only be compared with what the
Germans have done, and in our day, in Belgium. History records the fate
of a young and beautiful woman, Dougna by name, who, pursued by a band
of Huns, wrapped her head in her veil and flung herself from the walls
into the Natiso.
The fall of Aquileia, the extermination of its inhabitants and the
horrors that were committed terrorised all Venetia. It was the Prussian
doctrine of “frightfulness” carried out with as little scruple as,
though more excuse than, that we have seen at work with so great an
amazement, and rage, and disgust here in the West upon the body of our
Godchild Belgium. Attila marched on; Altinum and Concordia suffered
the same fate; they too disappear from the pages of history; Padua and
Modena were ravaged and burnt. Vicenza, Verona, Brescia, Bergamo, Milan
and Pavia opened their gates, they were but spoiled, their inhabitants
exchanged death for slavery. In that long night such as might flee fled
away doubtless demanding of God whither they should go. God led them to
the lagoons.
That Attila thought he was already victorious when he looked on his
ruins as Kaiser Wilhelm did when his “heart bled for Louvain” (blood
from a stone indeed!) an incident twice recorded by Suidas bears
witness. It seems that in Milan, among the mural decorations of the
palace, was one representing two Roman Emperors enthroned and clothed
in the purple with certain Barbarians, Huns or Scythians, prostrate,
demanding mercy at their feet. This work Attila ordered to be effaced
and in its stead to be painted one in which he himself sat enthroned,
while before him the two Roman Emperors poured gold from great sacks
which they bore on their backs. A witty, if brutal jest; futile, too,
since along the Po still flashed the eagles of Aetius and already over
the Alps came the rumour of the armies of Byzantium.
And, indeed, in the heart of Attila there was more fear than hope, fear
of the gods of this strange and lovely country he had ruined, of the
gods of the marshes and the heats that were already devastating his
armies with fever, of those gods Peter and Paul whom he had already
learnt to dread in Gaul and whose City, the most ancient and the most
holy in the world, it was in his heart next to ravage and to sack; fear
of his own armies now heavy with loot and riches, anxious for home and
already on the verge of starvation in a country they had made utterly
barren; fear most of all, perhaps, of his own destiny. “What,” he asked
himself, “if I conquer like Alaric only to die as he did?”
That the very name of Rome was still terrible to the Barbarians is
certain. They feared her name. Nevertheless the pride of Attila and
his ambition conquered his fear of his army, of his destiny, of the
name of Rome. He was determined to go on, and with this intention he
ordered his troops to concentrate from Padua, Vicenza, Verona, Brescia,
Bergamo, Milan and Pavia upon Mantua, whence he proposed to cross the
Po, probably at Hostilia, and so to descend upon the Via Emilia at
Bologna.
This move seems to have disturbed Rome profoundly. The enemies of
Aetius were there in the ascendant with the Emperor, and their
influence with the government was enough to cause a deep disquietude
with regard to the strategy of the great general. They remembered
Alaric; they remembered Radagaisus; they recalled the fate of Orleans,
and the escape after the battle of Châlons, above all they whispered
of Aquileia, Altinum and Concordia which were no more. In this state
of panic they left Aetius out of account, they forgot the army of
Marcian already on the move, they repudiated the whole strategy of
their general and with it their own traditions. They decided to send an
especial and unprecedented embassy to Attila, to offer a price for the
safety of Italy. The ambassador they chose was the Pope.
Perhaps this amazing act ought not to astonish us, for we have seen
the like so often in Gaul. The acts of Anianus of Orleans, of Lupus
of Troyes, should have prepared us for the supreme act of S. Leo the
Great. That they have not done so is sufficient to prove to us that
we have failed to understand the time. Moreover, this great embassy
was not the first Leo had undertaken on behalf of the Imperial Court.
During the pontificate of Sixtus III (432-40), when Leo was Roman
Deacon, Valentinian III had sent him to Gaul to settle a dispute and
bring about a reconciliation between Aetius their chief military
commander in that province and Albinus the chief magistrate. Sixtus
III died on August 19, 440, while Leo was in Gaul, and the ambassador
was chosen as his successor.
The great Pope did not go alone upon this his last great mission, with
him were two illustrious nobles, the Consul Gennadius Avienus, who
after the Emperor was the greatest noble in the West, and the Prefect
Trigetius. They set out from Rome by the Via Flaminia and met Attila
as they had intended before he crossed the Po, on the Mincio near
Mantua--in a place called the Campus Ambuleius. It was there one of the
most grave and famous conferences that have ever been held in Europe
met.
The ambassadors were all in official dress, Leo wore his pontifical
vestments, the golden mitre, a chasuble of purple with the pallium.
It was he who dealt with Attila, in what manner we know not, but with
complete success. It was not the armies of Aetius after all that saved
Italy, and with Italy all that was worth having in the world, but an
old and unarmed man, Leo our Pope, for above him in the sky the Hun
perceived, so he declared, the mighty figures of S. Peter and S. Paul;
his eyes dazzled, he bowed his head. Yielding, he consented to retreat
and evacuate Italy and the Empire. It is as though the new head and
champion of civilisation, of Christendom, had declared himself. It was
the Pope.
The terms of the treaty then made were doubtless shameful enough to
old Roman ideas, for they certainly involved an annual tribute to
the Hun, from whom, moreover, no indemnity was exacted for the ruin
of the Transpadana. But the great fact of the situation created by
Leo overshadowed all this; Italy, the soul of the West, was saved.
If, as we have a right to suppose, Aetius had no direct part in this
achievement, both he and Marcian were probably indirectly responsible
for it and in fact had far more to do with it than Leo. Were the
Roman armies nothing, then, or the Byzantine threat against Attila’s
communications only a dream?
Not so. Attila retreated because like another Barbarian he “could do no
other,” and even so he dared not retrace his way over the Julian Alps,
for Marcian was already in Moesia, and ready and anxious to meet and to
punish him. He retreated instead upon that Verona which he had ruined,
crossed the Alps there, and after pillaging Augsburg, was lost, as it
proved for ever, in the storm of the north and the darkness of his
Barbary.
FOOTNOTES:
[13] See my “Ravenna; a Study” (Dent), 1912.
[14] So Jornandes who asserts that Aquileia was so utterly destroyed
“ita ut vix ejus vestigia ut appareant reliquerint.”
IX
ATTILA’S HOME-COMING
Such was the return, such was the failure of Attila. He had looked to
hold the world in fee; he returned for the last time across the Danube
his desire unaccomplished, his hopes dead. He had struck first the East
and perhaps ruined it, but he had failed to take Constantinople. He had
struck Gaul and left its cities shambles, but he had not destroyed the
armies of Aetius. He had desired Rome for his plunder and his pride,
but Leo had turned him back before he crossed the Po. Every attack
had ended in a long retreat; if he brought ruin to a hundred Imperial
cities, at last he but achieved his own. He returned to his wooden
stockade in the heart of Hungary with all his hopes unfulfilled, all
his achievements undone, a ruined man.
That he did not realise his failure is but to emphasise the fact that
he was a Barbarian. To him, doubtless, destruction and booty, ruin and
loot seemed the end of war, he had not even in this his last hour
begun to understand what the Empire was. And so if we ask ourselves
what in reality the enormous energy of the Hunnish onslaught achieved
in the first half of the fifth century, we are compelled to answer,
nothing; nothing, that is, consciously and directly. Unconsciously
and indirectly, however, the restless brutality of Roua and of Attila
brought to pass these two great and even fundamental things; it was
the cause of the passing of Britain into England, and it founded the
republics of the lagoons which were to produce Venice the Queen of the
Adriatic.
Of all this, of his failure as of those strange achievements, Attila
was wholly unaware. He came home like a conqueror to his wooden palace
in the midst of a great feast prepared for him, to be greeted as
Priscus describes he had been greeted before, on his return from the
ruin of the East and his failure to reach Constantinople. He had made
the West his tributary; he was laden with the gold and the spoil of
northern Italy. It was enough for him, and so he made ready with joy to
marry yet another wife, to add yet one more to his concubines; not that
Honoria who would have been the sign of his victory, but one rather a
prey than a prize, pitiful in her youth and helpless beauty, Ildico,
or as the German legends call her Hildegrude, perhaps a Frankish or a
Burgundian princess.
It is said, we know not with how much truth, that upon that long and
last retreat as he crossed the river Lech by Augsburg an old woman with
streaming hair, a witch or a sorceress, cried out to him thrice as he
passed, “Retro Attila!” It is part of the legend which makes so much of
his history.
Upon the night of his last orgy or wedding he had feasted and drunk
beyond his wont and he was full of wine and of sleep when he sought the
bed of the beautiful and reluctant Ildico, the last of his sacrifices
and his loot. What passed in that brutal nuptial chamber we shall never
know. In the morning there was only silence, and when his attendants
at last broke into the room they found Attila dead in a sea of blood,
whether murdered by his victim or struck down by apoplexy cannot be
known. It is said that Ildico had much to avenge--the murder of her
parents and her brothers as well as her own honour.
From that dreadful, characteristic chamber the Huns bore the body of
their King, singing their doleful uncouth songs, to bury him in a
secret place prepared by slaves who were duly murdered when their work
was accomplished. Jornandes has preserved or invented for us the great
funeral dirge which accompanied the last Barbarian rite. It celebrated
Attila’s triumphs over Scythia and Germany which bore his yoke so
meekly, and over the two Emperors who paid him tribute.
He left no memorial but his terror written in the fire and smoke of
burning cities, and that tradition of “frightfulness” to which Kaiser
Wilhelm II first appealed to his troops on their departure for China,
and which he is practising upon the body of Europe to-day. For upon
his death Attila’s vast and barbaric hegemony fell to pieces. Enormous
revolts broke it in sunder, and e’er many years had passed the very
memory of it was forgotten.
“Kingless was the army left:
Of its head the race bereft.
Every fury of the pit
Tortured and dismembered it.
Lo, upon a silent hour,
When the pitch of frost subsides,
Danube with a shout of power
Loosens his imprisoned tides:
Wide around the frighted plains
Shake to hear his riven chains,
Dreadfuller than heaven in wrath,
As he makes himself a path:
High leap the ice-cracks, towering pile
Floes to bergs, and giant peers
Wrestle on a drifted isle;
Island on ice-island rears;
Dissolution battles fast:
Big the senseless Titans loom,
Through a mist of common doom
Striving which shall die the last:
Till a gentle-breathing morn
Fires the stream from bank to bank,
So the Empire built of scorn
Agonized, dissolved and sank.”
SOURCES
I
AMMIANI MARCELLINI RERUM GESTARUM LIBER XXXI
II. 1. Totius autem sementem exitii et cladum originem diversarum, quas
Martius furor incendio solito miscendo cuncta concivit, hanc comperimus
causam. Hunnorum gens, monumentis veteribus leviter nota, ultra paludes
Maeoticas glacialem oceanum accolens, omnem modum feritatis excedit. 2.
Ubi quoniam ab ipsis nascendi primitiis infantum ferro sulcantur altius
genae, ut pilorum vigor tempestivus emergens corrugatis cicatricibus
hebetetur senescunt imberbes absque ulla venustate, spadonibus
similes: compactis omnes firmisque membris, et opimis cervicibus:
prodigiosae formae et pandi, ut bipedes existimes bestias, vel quales
in commarginandis pontibus effigiati stipites dolantur incompte. 3.
In hominum autem figura licet insuavi ita visi sunt asperi, ut neque
igni, neque saporatis indigeant cibis, sed radicibus herbarum agrestium
et semicruda cuiusvis pecoris carne vescantur, quam inter femora sua
et equorum terga subsertam, fotu calefaciunt brevi. 4. Aedificiis
nullis umquam tecti: sed haec velut ab usu communi discreta sepulchra
declinant. Nec enim apud eos vel arundine fastigatum reperiri tugurium
potest. Sed vagi montes peragrantes et silvas, pruinas, famem, sitimque
perferre ab incunabulis adsuescunt. Peregre tecta nisi adigente
maxima necessitate non subeunt; nec enim apud eos securos existimant
esse sub tectis. 5. Indumentis operiuntur linteis, vel ex pellibus
silvestrium murium consarcinatis: nec alia illis domestica vestis est,
alia forensis. Sed semel obsoleti coloris tunica collo inserta non
ante deponitur aut mutatur, quam diuturna carie in pannulos defluxerit
defrustata. 6. Galeris incurvis capita tegunt: hirsuta crura coriis
munientes haedinis: eorumque calcei formulis nullis aptati, vetant
incedere gressibus liberis. Qua causa ad pedestres parum accommodati
sunt pugnas: verum equis prope adfixi, duris quidem, sed deformibus,
et muliebriter iisdem nonnumquam insidentes, funguntur muneribus
consuetis. Ex ipsis quivis in hac natione pernox et perdius emit
et vendit, cibumque sumit et potum, et inclinatus cervici angustae
iumenti, in altum soporem adusque varietatem effunditur somniorum.
7. Et deliberatione super rebus proposita seriis, hoc habitu omnes
in commune consultant. Aguntur autem nulla severitate regali, sed
tumultuario optimatum ductu contenti, perrumpunt, quidquid inciderit.
8. Et pugnant nonnumquam lacessiti, sed ineuntes proelia cuneatim
variis vocibus sonantibus torvum. Utque ad pernicitatem sunt leves et
repentini; ita subito de industria dispersi vigescunt, et incomposita
acie cum caede vasta discurrunt: nec invadentes vallum, nec castra
inimica pilantes prae nimia rapiditate cernuntur. 9. Eoque omnium
acerrimos facile dixeris bellatores, quod procul missilibus telis,
acutis ossibus pro spiculorum acumine arte mira coagmentatis, sed
distinctis: cominus ferro sine sui respectu confligunt, hostesque, dum
mucronum noxias observant, contortis laciniis illigant, ut laqueatis
resistentium membris equitandi vel gradiendi adimant facultatem. 10.
Nemo apud eos arat, nec stivam aliquando contingit. Omnes enim sine
sedibus fixis, abseque lare vel lege, aut ritu stabili dispalantur,
semper fugientium similes: cum carpentis, in quibus habitant: ubi
coniuges taetra illis vestimenta contexunt, et coërunt cum maritis,
et pariunt, eo adusque pubertatem nutriunt pueros. Nullusque apud
eos interrogatus, respondere, unde oritur, potest, alibi conceptus,
natusque procul, et longius educatus. 11. Per indutias infidi,
inconstantes, ad omnem auram incidentis spei novae perquam mobiles,
totum furori incitatissimo tribuentes. Inconsultorum animalium ritu,
quid honestum inhonestumve sit, penitus ignorantes: flexiloqui et
obscuri, nullus religionis vel superstitionis reverentia aliquando
districti: auri cupidine immensa flagrantes: adeo permutabiles, et
irasci faciles, ut eodem aliquoties die a sociis nullo irritante
saepe desciscant, itidemque propitientur nemine leniente. 12. Hoc
expeditum indomitumque hominum genus, externa praedandi aviditate
flagrans immani, per rapinas finitimorum grassatum et caedes, adusque
Alanos pervenit, veteres Massagetas: qui unde sint, vel quas incolant
terras (quoniam huc res prolapsa est) consentaneum est demonstrare,
geographica perplexitate monstrata, quae diu multa luda..., et
varia, tandem reperit veritatis interna ...* ...* ad.... 13. Hister
advenarum magnitudine fluenti Sauromatas praetermeat adusque amnem
Tanaim pertinentes, qui Asiam terminat ab Europa. Hoc transito, in
immensum extentas Scythiae solitudines Alani inhabitant, ex montium
adpellatione cognominati, paullatimque nationes conterminas crebritate
victoriarum attritas ad gentilitatem sui vocabuli traxerunt ut Persae.
14. Inter hos Neuri mediterranea incolunt loca, vicini verticibus
celsis, quos praeruptos geluque torpentes aquilones adstringunt. Post
quos Budini sunt, et Geloni perquam feri, qui detractis peremptorum
hostium cutibus indumenta sibi, equisque termina conficiunt, bellatrix
gens. Gelonis Agathyrsi collimitant, interstincti colore caeruleo
corpora simul et crines: et humiles quidem minutis atque raris, nobiles
vero latis, fucatis et densioribus notis. 15. Post hos Melanchlaenas
et Anthropophagos palari accepimus per diversa, humanis corporibus
victitantes: quibus ob haec alimenta nefanda desertis, finitimi omnes
longa petiere terrarum. Ideoque plaga omnis Orienti aestivo obiecta,
usque dum venitur ad Seras, inhabitabilis mansit. 16. Parte alia prope
Amazonum sedes Alani sunt Orienti acclines, diffusi per populosas
gentes et amplas, Asiaticos vergentes in tractus, quas dilatari adusque
Gangen accepi fluvium, intersecantem terras Indorum, mareque inundantem
australe.
17. Ibi partiti per utramque mundi plagam Alani (quorum gentes
varias nunc recensere non refert) licet dirempti spatiis longis, per
pagos, ut Nomades, vagantur immensos: aevi tamen progressu ad unum
concessere vocabulum, et summatim omnes Alani cognominantur mores
et media et efferatam vivendi, sed iam immaturam. 18. Nec enim ulla
sunt illisce tuguria, aut versandi vomeris cura, sed carne et copia
victitant lactis, plaustris supersidentes, quae operimentis curvatis
corticum per solitudines conferunt sine fine distentas. Cumque ad
graminea venerint, in orbiculatam figuram locatis sarracis ferino
ritu vescuntur: absumptisque pabulis, velut carpentis civitates
impositas vehunt, maresque supra cum feminis coëunt, et nascuntur in
his et educantur infantes: et habitacula sunt haec illis perpetua;
et quocumque ierint, illic genuinum existimant larem. 19. Armenta
prae se agentes cum gregibus pascunt: maximeque equini pecoris
est eis sollicitior cura. Ibi campi semper herbescunt, intersitis
pomiferis locis: atque ideo transeuntes quolibet, nec alimentis nec
pabulis indigent: quod efficit humectum solum et crebri fluminum
praetermeantium cursus. 20. Omnis igitur aetas et sexus imbellis circa
vehicula ipsa versatur, muniisque distringitur mollibus: iuventus vero
equitandi usu a prima pueritia coalescens, incedere pedibus existimat
vile: et omnes multiplici disciplina prudentes sunt bellatores. Unde
etiam Persae, qui sunt originitus Scythae, pugnandi sunt peritissimi.
21. Proceri autem Alani paene sunt omnes et pulchri, crinibus
mediocriter flavis, oculorum temperata torvitate terribiles, et
armorum levitate veloces, Hunnisque per omnia suppares, verum victu
mitiores et cultu: latrocinando et venando adusque Maeotica stagna
et Cimmerium Bosporon, itidemque Armenios discurrentes et Mediam.
22. Utque hominibus quietis et placidis otium est voluptabile; ita
illos pericula iuvant et bella. Iudicatur ibi beatus, qui in proelio
profuderit animam: senescentes enim et fortuitis mortibus mundo
digressos, ut degeneres et ignavos conviciis atrocibus insectantur:
nec quidquam est, quod elatius iactent, quam homine quolibet occiso;
proque exuviis gloriosis, interfectorum avulsis capitibus detractas
pelles pro phaleris iumentis accommodant bellatoriis. 23. Nec templum
apud eos visitur, aut delubrum, ne tugurium quidem culmo tectum cerni
usquam potest: sed gladius barbarico ritu humi figitur nudus, eumque
ut Martem, regionum, quas circumcircant, praesulem verecundius colunt.
24. Futura miro praesagiunt modo: nam rectiores virgas vimineas
colligentes, easque cum incantamentis quibusdam secretis praestituto
tempore discernentes, aperte, quid protendatur, norunt. 25. Servitus
quid sic ignorabant, omnes generoso semine procreati: iudicesque etiam
nunc eligunt, diuturno bellandi usu spectatos. Sed ad reliqua textus
propositi revertamur.
II
EX HISTORIA BYZANTINA PRISCI RHETORIS ET SOPHISTAE
_Excerpta de Legationibus Gentium ad Romanos._
(Niebuhr. Bonn. 1829.)
1. Scythae, quo tempore mercatus Scytharum et Romanorum frequenti
multitudine celebrabatur, Romanos cum exercitu sunt adorti, et multos
occiderunt. Romani ad Scythas miserunt, qui de praesidii expugnatione
et foederum contemptu cum eis expostularent. Hi vero se non ultro
bellum inferentes, sed factas iniurias ulciscentes, haec fecisse
responderunt. Margi enim episcopum in suos fines transgressum, fiscum
regium et reconditos thesauros indagatum expilasse. Hunc nisi dederent
una cum transfugis, ut foederibus convenerit, (esse enim apud eos
plures,) bellum illaturos. Quae cum Romani vera esse negarent, barbari
vero in eorum, quae dicebant, fide perstarent, iudicium quidem de his,
quae in contentione posita erant, subire minime voluerunt, sed ad
bellum conversi sunt. Itaque transmisso Istro, oppidis et castellis
ad ripam sitis plurima damna intulerunt, et inter cetera Viminacium,
quae Moesorum urbs est in Illyrico, ceperunt. His gestis, cum multi
in sermonibus dictitarent, episcopum dedi oportere, ne unius hominis
causa universa Romanorum respublica belli periculum sustineret:
ille se deditum iri suspicatus, clam omnibus civitatem incolentibus
ad hostes effugit, et urbem traditurum, si sibi Scytharum reges
liberalitate sua consulerent, pollicitus est. Ad ea cum beneficium
omni ratione se repensuros promitterent, si rem ad exitum perduceret,
datis dextris et dictis iureiurando utrinque praestito firmatis, ille
cum magna barbarorum multitudine in fines Romanorum est reversus. Eam
multitudinem cum ex adverso ripae in insidiis collocasset, nocte dato
signo exsiliit, et urbem in manus hostium traduxit. Et ab eo tempore
barbarorum res in diem auctiores melioresque fuerunt.
2. Sub Theodosio Iuniore Imperatore Attilas Hunnorum rex delectum ex
suis habuit, et litteras ad Imperatorem scripsit de transfugis et de
tributis, ut, quaecumque occasione huius belli reddita non essent,
quam citissime ad se mitterentur, de tributis autem in posterum
pendendis legati secum acturi ad se venirent: nam si cunctarentur aut
bellum pararent, ne se ipsum quidem Scytharum multitudinem diutius
contenturum. His litteris lectis, Imperator nequaquam Scythas, qui
ad se confugissent, traditurum dixit, sed una cum illis in animo
sibi esse, belli eventum exspectare. Ceterum se legatos missurum qui
controversias dirimerent. Ea sicuti Romani decreverant, ubi Attilas
rescivit, ira commotus Romanorum fines vastavit, et castellis quibusdam
dirutis, in Ratiariam urbem magnam et populi multitudine abundantem
irruptionem fecit.
3. Post pugnam in Chersoneso commissam Romani cum Hunnis pacem per
Anatolium legatum fecerunt, et in has conditiones convenerunt: profugos
Hunnis reddi, sex millia auri librarum pro praeteritis stipendiis
solvi; duo millia et centum in posterum singulis annis tributi nomine
pendi. Pro unoquoque captivo Romano, qui in Romanorum fines, non
soluto redemptionis pretio, evasisset, duodecim aureorum mulctam
inferri. Quae si non solveretur, qui captivum recepisset, restituere
teneri. Romanos neminem ex barbaris ad se confugientem admittere. In
has quidem foederum leges Romani sponte consensisse videri volebant:
sed necessitate coacti, superante metu, qui Romanorum ducum mentes
occupaverat, quantumvis duras et iniquas conditiones sibi impositas
summo pacis consequendae studio ducti lubentibus animis susceperunt,
et gravissimum tributum pendere non recusabant, quamquam opes
imperii et regii thesauri non ad necessarios usus, sed in absurda
spectacula, in vanos honorum ambitus, in immodicas voluptates et
largitiones consumptae fuerant, quales nemo sanae mentis vel in maxime
affluentibus divitiarum copiis sustineret, nedum Romani isti, qui
rei militaris studium adeo neglexerant, ut non solum Scythis, sed et
reliquis barbaris, qui proximas imperii Romani regiones incolebant,
vectigales facti essent. Itaque tributa et pecunias, quas ad Hunnos
deferri oportebat, Imperator omnes conferre coegit: nulla etiam eorum
immunitatis habita ratione, qui terrae onere, tanquam nimis gravi ad
tempus, sive Imperatorum benignitate, seu iudicum sententia, levati
erant. Conferebant etiam aurum indictum qui in Senatum ascripti
erant, ultra quam facultates ferre poterant, et multis splendida et
illustris fortuna vitae commutationem attulit. Conficiebantur enim
pecunias, quae unicuique imperatae erant, cum acerbitate et contumelia
ab iis, quibus huius rei cura ab Imperatore erat demandata. Ex quo,
qui a maioribus acceptas divitias possidebant, ornamenta uxorum et
pretiosam suam supellectilem in foro venum exponebant. Ab hoc bello tam
atrox et acerba calamitas Romanos excepit, ut multi aut abstinentia
cibi, aut aptato collo laqueo vitam finierint. Tunc igitur, parvo
temporis momento exhaustis thesauris, aurum et exules (nam Scotta,
qui susciperet, advenerat,) ad Scythas missi sunt. Romani vero multos
ex profugis, qui dedi reluctabantur, trucidarunt, inter quos aliqui
fuerunt e regiis Scythis, qui militare sub Attila renuerant et Romanis
se adiunxerant. Praeter has pacis conditiones Attilas Asimuntiis quoque
imperavit, ut captivos, quos penes se habebant, sive Romanos, sive
barbaros, redderent. Est autem Asimus oppidum validum, non multum ab
Illyrico distans, quod parti Thraciae adiacet, cuius incolae gravibus
damnis hostes affecerunt. Non illi quidem se murorum ambitu tuebantur,
sed extra propugnacula certamina sustinebant contra infinitam Scytharum
multitudinem et duces magni apud eos nominis et existimationis. Itaque
Hunni omissa spe ab oppugnando oppido destiterunt. Illi autem vagantes
et a suis longius aberrantes, si quando hostes exisse et praedas ex
Romanis egisse, exploratores denuntiabant, inopinantes aggressi parta
ab eis spolia sibi vindicabant, numero quidem inferiores adversariis,
sed robore et virtute praestantes. Itaque Asimuntii plurimos ex Scythis
in hoc bello necaverunt, et multos Romanorum in libertatem asseruerunt,
et hostium transfugas receperunt. Quamobrem Attilas, se exercitum
non ante moturum, aut foederis conditiones ratas habiturum professus
est, quam Romani, qui ad Asimuntios pervenissent, redderentur, aut pro
his mulcta conventa solveretur, et liberarentur abducti in servitutem
barbari. Quum, quae contra ea dissereret, non haberet Anatolius
legatus, neque Theodulus, praesidiariorum Thraciae militum dux, (nihil
enim rationibus suis barbarum movebant, qui recenti victoria elatus,
promte ad arma ferebatur, ipsi contra propter recens acceptam cladem
animis ceciderant,) Asimuntiis per litteras significarunt, ut Romanos
captivos, qui ad se perfugissent, restituerent, aut pro unoquoque
captivo duodecim aureos penderent, et Hunnos captivos liberarent.
Quibus litteris lectis, Romanos, qui ad se confugissent, liberos
se abire sivisse, Scythas vero, quotquot in suas manus venissent,
trucidasse responderunt. Duos autem captivos retinere, propterea quod
hostes, obsidione omissa, in insidiis collocati, nonnullos pueros, qui
ante munitiones greges pascebant, rapuissent, quos nisi reciperent,
captivos iure belli sibi acquisitos, minime restituros. Haec
renuntiarunt qui ad Asimuntios missi fuerant. Quibus auditis, Scytharum
regi et Romanis principibus placuit exquiri pueros, quos Asimuntii
raptos esse querebantur. Sed nemine reperto, barbari ab Asimuntiis
capti sunt dimissi, prius tamen fide a Scythis accepta, non esse
apud ipsos pueros. Iuraverunt etiam Asimuntii, se Romanos, qui ad se
effugissent, libertate donasse, quamvis adhuc multos in sua potestate
haberent. Nec enim sibi perierasse videbantur, modo suos a barbarorum
servitute salvos et incolumes praestarent.
4. Pace facta, Attilas rursus legatos ad Romanos Orientales mittit,
qui transfugas repeterent. At illi legatos plurimis donis ornatos,
cum nullos perfugas apud se esse asseverassent, dimiserunt. Misit
et iterum Attilas alios, quibus non minus amplis muneribus ditatis,
tertia ab eo, post illam itidem quarta legatio advenit. Ille enim
Romanorum liberalitatem, qua utebantur, veriti, ne a foederibus barbari
discederent, ludibrio habens, novas subinde causas fingebat, et vanas
occasiones legatorum mittendorum excogitabat, et ad suos necessarios,
quos liberalitate ornare volebat, eas legationes deferebat. Romani vero
in omnibus rebus Attilae dicto audientes erant, et quae praecipiebat,
domini iussa ducebant. Non solum enim a bello contra eum suscipiendo
eorum rationes abhorrebant, sed et Parthos, qui bellum apparabant,
et Vandalos, qui maritimas oras vexabant, et Isauros, qui praedis
et rapinis grassabantur, et Saracenos, qui regiones ad Orientem
excursionibus vastabant, metuebant. Praeterea gentes Aethiopum in
armis erant. Itaque Romani animis fracti Attilam colebant, sed ceteris
gentibus resistere conabantur, dum exercitus comparabant, et duces
sortiebantur.
5. Edecon, vir Scytha, qui maximas res in bello gesserat, venit
iterum legatus cum Oreste. Hic genere Romanus Paeoniam regionem,
ad Saum flumen sitam, incolebat, quae ex foedere inito cum Aetio,
Romanorum Occidentalium duce, barbaro parebat. Itaque Edecon in
palatium admissus, Imperatori litteras Attilae tradidit, in quibus de
transfugis non redditis querabatur, qui nisi redderentur, et Romani a
colenda terra abstinerent, quam bello captam suae ditioni adiecerat,
ad arma se iturum minabatur. Ea vero secundum Istrum a Paeonibus ad
Novas usque in Thracia sitas in longitudinem extendebatur. Latitudo
autem erat quinque dierum itinere. Neque vero forum celebrari, ut
olim, ad ripam Istri volebat, sed in Naisso, quam urbem a se captam
et dirutam quinque dierum itinere expedito homini ab Istro distantem,
Scytharum et Romanorum ditionis limitem constituebat. Legatos quoque
ad se venire iussit controversa disceptaturos, non ex quolibet hominum
genere et ordine, sed ex consularibus illustriores, quos si mittere
intermiserint, se ipsum ad eos arcessendos in Sardicam descensurum. His
litteris lectis, digresso ab Imperatore Edecone, cum Bigila, qui ea,
quae Attilas verbis Imperatori denuntiari voluit, interpretatus erat,
cum reliquas quoque domos obiret, ut in conspectum Chrysaphii spatharii
Imperat. veniret, qui plurimum auctoritate et gratia apud Imperatorem
valebat, admirabatur barbarus regiarum domuum magnificentiam. Bigilas
autem, simulatque barbarus in colloquium venit cum Chrysaphio,
interpretans retulit, quantopere laudasset Imperatorias aedes, et
Romanos beatos duceret propter affluentes divitiarum copias. Tum
Edeconi Chrysaphius dixit, fore eum huiusmodi domuum, quae aureis
tectis praefulgerent, compotem et opibus abundaturum, si, relicta
Scythia, ad Romanos se conferret. “Sed alterius domini servum,
Edecon ait, nefas est eo invito tantum facinus in se admittere.”
Quaesivit ex eo eunuchus, an facilis illi ad Attilam pateret aditus,
et num qua potestate apud Scythas esset. Ille sibi necessitudinem
intercedere cum Attila, respondit, et decretam sibi cum nonnullis
aliis Scythiae primoribus eius custodiam. Nam per vices unumquemque
eorum praescriptis diebus cum armis circa Attilam excubias agere. Tum
eunuchus, si fide interposita se obstringeret, inquit, se maximorum
bonorum illi auctorem futurum. Cui rei tractandae otio opus esse.
Hoc vero sibi fore, si ad coenam rediret sine Oreste et reliquis
legationis comitibus. Facturum se pollicitus barbarus coenae tempore
ad eunuchum pergit. Tum per Bigilam interpretem datis dextris et
iureiurando utrimque praestito, ab eunucho, se de rebus, quae Edeconi
minime damno, sed fructui et commodo essent, verba facturum, ab
Edecone, se, quae sibi crederentur, non enuntiaturum, etiamsi exsequi
nollet. Tunc eunuchus Edeconi dixit, si in Scythiam rediens Attilam
sustulerit, et Romanorum partibus accesserit, vitam in magnis opibus
beate traducturum. Eunucho Edecon assensus est. Ad hanc rem peragendam
opus esse pecuniis, non quidem multis, sed quinquaginta auri libris,
quas militibus, quibus praeesset, qui sibi ad rem impigre exsequendam
adiumento essent, divideret. Cum eunuchus, nulla mora interposita, dare
vellet, dixit barbarus, se prius ad renuntiandam legationem dimitti
oportere, et una secum Bigilam, qui Attilae de transfugis responsum
acciperet; per eum enim se illi, qua ratione aurum sibi mitteret,
indicaturum. Etenim Attilam se, simulatque redierit, percunctaturum,
ut reliquos omnes, quae munera sibi et quantae pecuniae a Romanis dono
datae sint. Neque id celare per collegas et comites licitum fore. Visus
est eunucho barbarus recta sentire, et eius est amplexus sententiam.
Itaque eo a coena dimisso, ad Imperatorem consilium initum detulit, qui
Martialium, magistri officiorum munere fungentem, ad se venire iussum
docuit conventionem cum barbaro factam: id enim illi credi et committi
iure magistratus, quem gerebat, necesse fuit. Nam omnium Imperatoris
consiliorum magister est particeps, sub cuius cura sunt tabellarii,
interpretes et milites, qui palatii custodiae deputati sunt. Imperatore
autem et Martialio de tota re consultantibus placuit, non solum
Bigilam, sed et Maximinum legatum mittere ad Attilam.
6. Bigila insidiarum in Attilam manifeste convicto, Attilas, ablatis ab
eo centum auri libris, quas a Chrysaphio acceperat, extemplo Orestem
et Eslam Constantinopolim misit, iussitque Orestem, crumena, in quam
Bigilas aurum, quod Edeconi daretur, coniecerat, collo imposita, in
conspectum Imperatoris venire atque eunuchum interrogare, num hanc
crumenam nosset; deinde Eslam haec verba proferre, Theodosium quidem
clari patris et nobilis esse filium, Attilam quoque nobilis parentis
esse stirpem, et patrem eius Mundiuchum acceptam a patre nobilitatem
integram conservasse. Sed Theodosium tradita a patre nobilitate
excidisse, quod tributum sibi pendendo suus servus esset factus.
Non igitur iustam rem facere eum, qui praestantiori et ei, quem
fortuna dominum ipsi dederit, tanquam servus improbus clandestinas
paret. Neque se prius criminari illum eo nomine destiturum, quam
eunuchus ad supplicium sit traditus. Atque hi quidem cum his
mandatis Constantinopolim pervenerunt. Eodem quoque tempore accidit,
ut Chrysaphius a Zenone ad poenam deposceretur. Maximinus enim
renuntiaverat, Attilam dicere, decere Imperatorem promissis stare,
et Constantio uxorem, quam promiserit, dare, hanc enim, invito
Imperatore, nemini fas fuisse desponderi: aut enim eum, qui contra
ausus fuisset, poenas daturum fuisse, aut eo Imperatoris res deductas
esse, ut ne servos quidem suos coercere posset, contra quos, si vellet,
se auxilium ferre paratum. Sed Theodosius, iracundiam suam palam fecit,
cum bona puellae in publicum redegit.
7. Cum primum Attilae nuntiatum est, Martianum post Theodosii mortem
ad imperium pervenisse, et quae Honoriae accidissent, ad eum, qui in
Occidente rerum potiebatur, misit, qui contenderent, Honoriam nihil
se indignum admisisse, quam matrimonio suo destinasset; seque illi
auxilium laturum, nisi summa quoque imperii ei deferretur. Misit et
ad Romanos Orientales tributorum constitutorum gratia. Sed re infecta
legati utrimque sunt reversi. Etenim qui Occidentis imperio praeerat,
respondit, Honoriam illi nubere non posse, quod iam alii nupsisset.
Neque imperium Honoriae deberi. Virorum enim, non mulierum, Romanum
imperium esse. Qui in Oriente imperabat, se minime ratam habere tributi
illationem, quam Theodosius consensisset: quiescenti munera largiturum;
bellum minanti viros et arma obiecturum ipsius opibus non inferiora.
Itaque Attilas in varias distrahebatur sententias, et illi in dubio
haerebat animus, quos primum aggrederetur. Tandem melius visum est ad
periculosius bellum prius sese convertere, et in Occidentem exercitum
educere. Illic enim sibi rem fore non solum cum Italis, sed etiam cum
Gothis et Francis: cum Italis, ut Honoriam cum ingentibus divitiis
secum abduceret: cum Gothis, ut Genserichi gratiam promereretur.
8. Et Francos quidem bello lacessendi illi causa fuit regum ipsorum
obitus et de regno inter liberos controversia, quum maior natu
Attilam auxilio vocasset, Aëtium minor, quem Romae vidimus legationem
obeuntem, nondum lanugine efflorescente, flava coma, et capillis propter
densitatem et magnitudinem super humeros effusis. Hunc etiam Aëtius
filii loco adoptaverat, et plurimis donis ornatum ad Imperatorem, ut
amicitiam et societatem cum eo faceret, miserat. Quamobrem Attilas
antequam in eam expeditionem ingrederetur, rursus legatos in Italiam
misit, qui Honoriam poscerent: eam enim secum matrimonium pepigisse:
cuius rei ut fidem faceret, annulum ab ea ad se missum per legatos,
quibus tradiderat, exhiberi mandavit. Etiam dimidiam imperii partem
sibi Valentinianum debere, quum ad Honoriam iure paternum regnum
pertineret, quo iniusta fratris cupiditate privata esset. Sed quum
Romani Occidentales in prima sententia persisterent et Attilae mandata
reiicerent, ipse toto exercitu convocato maiore vi bellum paravit.
9. Attilas, vastata Italia, ad sua se retulit, et Romanorum
Imperatoribus in Oriente bellum et populationem denuntiavit, propterea
quod tributum sibi a Theodosio constitutum non solveretur.
EX HISTORIA GOTHICA PRISCI RHETORIS ET SOPHISTAE
_Excerpta de Legationibus Romanorum ad Gentes._
(Niebuhr. Bonn. 1829.)
1. Cum Rua, Hunnorum rex, statuisset cum Amalsuris, Itimaris,
Tonosuribus, Boiscis ceterisque gentibus, quae Istrum accolunt, quod
ad armorum societatem cum Romanis iungendam confugissent, bello
decertare, Eslam componendis Romanorum et Hunnorum controversiis
adhiberi solitum misit, qui Romanis denuntiaret, se a foedere, quod
sibi cum illis esset, recessurum, nisi omnes Scythas, qui ad eos se
contulissent, redderent. Romanis vero consilium de mittendis ad Hunnos
legatis capientibus, Plinthas et Dionysius, hic ex Thracia, ille ex
Scythia oriundus, ambo exercituum duces, et qui consulatus dignitatem
apud Romanos gesserant, hanc legationem obire voluerunt. Ut vero
visum est non ante legatos proficisci, quam Eslas ad Ruam rediisset,
Plinthas una cum Esla misit Singulachum, unum ex suis necessariis, qui
Ruae persuaderet cum nullo alio Romanorum, quam cum ipso, colloquium
inire. Cum autem, Rua mortuo, Hunnorum regnum ad Attilam pervenisset,
Senatus decrevit Plintham legationem ad Attilam exsequi. Quo S.C.
Imperatoris suffragio comprobato, Plintham cupido incessit, Epigenem,
qui sapientiae laude celebris erat et quaesturae dignitatem obtinebat,
socium legationis sibi adsciscere. Qua de re lato quoque suffragio
ambo in eam legationem profecti sunt, et Margum pervenerunt. Est autem
Margus urbs in Illyrico Mysorum ad Istrum sita, ex adverso Constantiae
arcis, ad alteram fluminis ripam collocatae, quo et regii Scythae
convenerant. Extra civitatem equis insidentes utrique congressi sunt.
Nec enim barbaris de plano verba facere placuit, et legati Romani suae
dignitatis memores eodem quoque apparatu in Scytharum conspectum venire
statuerunt, ne sibi peditibus cum equitibus disserendum foret. Itaque
placuit, profugos omnes, etiam qui multo ante profugerant, una cum
captivis Romanis, qui non soluto redemtionis pretio ad sua redierant,
dedi: aut pro unoquoque captivo Romano his, qui eum bello ceperant,
octo aureos dari, Romanos belli societatem cum barbara gente, quae
bellum cum Hunnis gerat, non facere. Conventus ad mercatus paribus
legibus celebrari, et in tuto Romanos e Hunnos esse. Foedera rata
manere et observari, si quoque anno septingentae auri librae tributi
nomine Scythis regiis a Romanis penderentur, cum antea tributum annuum
non fuisset nisi trecentarum quinquaginta librarum. His conditionibus
pacem Romani et Hunni pepigerunt, qua iureiurando patrio ritu utrimque
praestito firmata, utrique ad sua redierunt. Itaque qui ex barbaris ad
Romanos transierant redditi sunt, de quorum numero erant filii Mama
et Attacam ex regio genere, quos Scythae receptos in Carso, Thraciae
castello, crucis supplicio affecerunt, et hanc ab his fugae poenam
exegerunt. Pace cum Romanis facta, Attilas et Bleda ad subigendas
gentes Scythicas profecti sunt, et contra Sorosgos bellum moverunt.
2. Theodosius misit Senatorem, virum consularem, ad Attilam legationem
obiturum. Et ille quidem quamvis legati nomen adeptus esset, minime
tamen est ausus terrestri itinere Hunnos adire: sed iter per Pontum
Euxinum instituit, et in Odessenorum civitatem navigavit, in qua
Theodulus dux commorabatur.