BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, JULY 1, 2, 3, 1863
Expectation of revelations--Longstreet and Lee--Attacks not in
good combination between the three corps--July 2, situation
unfavorable--Our heavy attack on the right--Ground and guns
taken--Round Top reinforced checks us--Longstreet leads--Hood and
Longstreet--Am slightly wounded--Lieutenant-Colonel Freemantle,
Coldstream Guards--Captain Ross, Austrian Army--July 3, necessity
of a stroke--Pickett's charge--His repulse--Lee's noble
encouragements--July 4, not attacked--Holding ground--Withdrawal at
night--The retreat, and passage of the river.
On the tremendous and decisive battle of Gettysburg, now about to
engage the two armies, more has probably been written than on any
battle since Waterloo. There seems to be a feeling abroad that great
secrets explaining why we were beaten are yet to be told and that they
are locked up in the breasts of a few men, one of them the present
writer, Longstreet's chief of staff. There is absolutely nothing in
that expectation; no living man knows more about the battle than has
already been written.
Lee has made his report. Longstreet has written a book and said his
say. The staff has little or nothing to add. Communications were in
the main between Lee and Longstreet, verbally, or occasionally by note
direct.
The story has been in part told by Longstreet. We can discover that
he did not want to fight on the ground or on the plan adopted by the
General-in-Chief. As Longstreet was not to be made willing and Lee
refused to change or could not change, the former failed to conceal
some anger. There was apparent apathy in his movements. They lacked the
fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield. His plans may
have been better than Lee's, but it was too late to alter them with the
troops ready to open fire on each other. Ewell on the left, A. P. Hill
and Longstreet on the right, seemed never able to work together, and I
can well imagine the great soul of our Commander deeply furrowed with
the difficulties about him and what was going on to the disadvantage
of the army. This is all I shall permit myself to express on this
well-worn but ever interesting subject. One can build many theories,
but theories only will they be; besides, my opinion is already given
that the loss of the campaign was due to the absence of Stuart's
cavalry.
I proceed to jot down idly some "choses vues" of the military events
and incidents of the three great days of this remarkable historic
battle and the days immediately about it.
The situation on the morning of the 2nd was far from favorable to us.
First of all, our position, compared with the enemy's, was not good. It
may be said to have been decidedly inferior. We were the outer line,
he held the inner. We were the cord to the arc on which his heavy
columns were massed. True, there were some positions on the left that
were in Ewell's possession and could be well used. Round Top and his
high shoulders were on our right, and held by us would be everything.
This Lee quickly saw and tried for. They made the key for the position,
and with it dangling at our girdle the lock would have yielded and the
door opened. But we were too late on our right. An attack, powerful
indeed, at 4 p. m. was quite different from the commanding General's
expectation of one in the forenoon.
Late on the first, and early on the second, Hill and Ewell were heavily
engaged with apparently no satisfactory results.
On the second, quite late, 4 p. m., Longstreet made his long-deferred
attack on the enemy's left. It was done in smashing style by McLaws's
and Hood's divisions and a few of Hill's troops, Longstreet personally
leading the attack with splendid effect.
His fine horsemanship as he rode, hat in hand, and martial figure, were
most inspiring.
We gained ground rapidly and almost carried Round Top, but the morning
delay was fatal. It had been heavily reinforced while we were pottering
around in sullen inactivity. Undoubtedly Lee's intention was to make
the attack in the forenoon and support it with strong movements by Hill
and Ewell. I think it would have won, notwithstanding the difficulties
of the position. The attempt was made to move the troops to the right
into position without discovery by the enemy, but it was abortive.
We were seen from the start and signaled constantly. Much valuable time
was lost by this trial, which with better knowledge of the ground by
General Lee's engineers would not have been attempted.
At nightfall the combat was over and we were dragging off our captured
cannon and standards, and caring for our dead and wounded.
The loss in storming the position on the right was heavy. When Hood's
division was across the turnpike, under orders to attack, he begged me
to look at it, report its extreme difficulty, and implore Longstreet to
make the attack another way. This was done, but the answer I took to
Hood was that the attack must instantly be made, that General Lee had
so directed; and forward and upward the gallant Hood charged, almost
gaining the plateau of Round Top, the key of the enemy's left.
The staff had been hard at work day and night, and my exhausted frame
found rest that night in the snuggest fence corner in sight. The ground
to weary bones felt as good as a feather bed. In addition, I had been
suffering from a painful but not serious wound. Riding with Dearing's
artillery late in the afternoon, while exchanging some shots, a
shrapnel burst directly over us, one of the large projectiles striking
me on the right arm near the shoulder. It was not broken or pierced,
paralyzed for use for at least ten days, and quite black down to the
wrist. Painful, of course, it was, but a small matter where there was
so much death and mangling.
On the march through Virginia we had received a delightful acquisition
to our headquarters party, in Lieutenant-Colonel Freemantle, of the
Coldstream Guards.
He had entered the Confederacy on a visit of observation, well
fortified with credentials from his own government, and, traveling
through all the Confederate States, had arrived in Richmond just in
time to join Lee's army in its invasion of Pennsylvania.
With good letters of introduction he had been sent to us and there
could not be a finer fellow. He roughed it with the hardest, and
took everything as it came. A quick, observant eye and indefatigable
sightseer, apparently nothing escaped him. When the campaign was ended
and the Confederates making their way back to Virginia, Freemantle
said his farewells and made the best of his way to New York, whence
he immediately took steamer for England. There he published an
entertaining little book, "Three Months in the Southern States," which
was later reproduced by a worn-out, decrepit old press at Mobile, a
copy of the issue being now a great rarity. Freemantle had met Southern
men of all kinds, and his book has many pen pictures by this fine
officer and friend of ours. His regiment a corps d'élite, soon sent
him to the staff, where he distinguished himself, and successively
obtained rank as major-general, lieutenant-general, and general, with
several military orders of coveted distinction. He is now Sir Arthur
Lyon-Freemantle, K. C. M. G.,[1] and of other good-service orders. He
commanded the brigade of guards in Egypt, and has just finished (about
retiring) his four years' tour of duty as Governor of Malta, one of
the greatest of the British military posts. He is delightful to every
Confederate he can put his hands upon.
[1] Sir Lyon-Freemantle has since died.
There was another foreign officer with us at this time, and for some
months later, Captain Fitzgerald Ross, very Scotch as to name, but
Austrian to the core. He came of one of those military Scotch or north
of Ireland families that centuries ago settled in many parts of Europe
and generally rose to distinction.
On the morning of July 3, it was apparent that a great blow must be
delivered to Meade's army. He could not be persuaded to leave his
formidable positions and instruments and attack us, and Lee could not
retreat without another effort, indecisive as had been those of the 2d.
Our General, as has been said, did not mind blood when it had to be
shed. It is the soldier's calling. Here was a case in point: His
army and trains could only be saved by a tremendous strike straight at
the enemy. The time for maneuvering had passed and he prepared for what
was before him. He believed his troops could do what he asked of them;
never yet had they failed him.
The attack was to be made as soon as possible, under direction of Lee's
"War Horse," that stout warrior James Longstreet, with three brigades
of Pickett's division (right), Heth's division of Hill's corps (left),
with supports of several brigades of other divisions thrown into
position.
An artillery "feu d'enfer" was to precede the attack, directed by E.
P. Alexander, who was to give the signal when in his judgment the
artillery had made the greatest impression, and then the troops were
to move instantly across the wide, lead-swept plain, against the
heavy masses of blue on the crest of the heights. All this was done
at about 2 o'clock, Longstreet accepting Alexander's signal message
with dejection, it seemed. Indeed, the delay in attacking which
undoubtedly hurt us was apparently caused by his objections made known
to the Commander-in-Chief, but of course all this is set out from that
standpoint in Longstreet's own book.
It was soon over. Pickett's men got far up the acclivity and many were
soon among the enemy. There was, however, some wavering on our left,
which weakened us, and we broke, tearing back pell-mell torn by shot
and shell across the width of that bloody plain, a sight never before
witnessed--part of the Army of Northern Virginia in full, breathless
flight.
But there was no pursuit and the run soon stopped. The soldiers got
together, picked up arms, and in a short time were ready for another
combat.
If there was repulse and its usual result, a quick flight for cover,
there was also something else. A charge that, considering the
difficulties of position, comparison of numbers, was so steady to the
objective point, and so near success as to make it one of the greatest
feats of arms in all the annals of war. Every brigade commander and
colonel and lieutenant-colonel of Pickett's division was shot down. The
brave Armistead and Garnett at the head of their brigades fell inside
the enemy's parapet, and the gallant Kemper, hard hit and left for
dead, lay with the men of his leading line. To-day, the detail of the
great charge, not as barely hinted at here, but as described in full
with ample particulars, mounts one's blood, stirs all hearts with deep
tragedy and pride. Well do we know that amid all things to happen, the
memory of Pickett's charge will forever live in song and story of that
fair land for which the Southern soldier poured out his blood like
water.
While Longstreet by no means approved the movement, his soldierly eye
watched every feature of it. He neglected nothing that could help it
and his anxiety for Pickett and the men was very apparent.
Fearing some flank attacks if we succeeded, he had sent Latrobe to the
left to warn the officer against its possibility. I went sharply off in
search of Pickett to watch his right and if necessary move some troops
in for meeting such an attempt. I did not meet with General Pickett
and was soon up with Garnett and Armistead. The former was ill that
morning, but was at the head of his men where he was to fall. Just
here a shell burst under my horse (my best), a splendid chestnut mare,
and down she came, both hind legs off. I luckily got another from a
mounted man near by, who rather ruefully gave up his horse and saved
my saddle for me. Latrobe also had his horse killed over on the left;
other staff officers were also sent forward with the troops and shared
in the charge.
General Lee's extreme agitation when he witnessed the repulse and race
of our men for cover from that murderous fire has not been exaggerated
in the prints. The noble soul was stirred to its inmost depths at the
sight of the awful and fruitless sacrifices his men had made at his
command. His generous heart could only say, "It is my fault, I take it
all--get together, men, we shall yet beat them." I saw no man fail him.
It was on July 3 that a mail from the Department at Richmond brought my
commission as lieutenant-colonel, A. A. G. Latrobe's and Fairfax's, as
inspectors, came along a few days later.
Notwithstanding our great losses of the second and third, we were
permitted to hold the field on the fourth by Meade's inactivity. His
army was very strong, had not suffered as had ours, and an enterprising
general might seemingly have had us on the run in short order.
But no! he had taken a taste of our mettle the day before and wanted
no more of it. A bridge of gold for his enemy was the card for Meade's
hands. It is said on good authority that at a council called by Meade
he was in favor of retiring, and it was only by strenuous, bold
opposition of two or three of his generals that he was prevented and
induced to keep his ground.
Thus during all the fourth we were in preparation for the rear movement
that must begin that night. Lee's position had become serious, but
undismayed were the Confederate Chief and his three corps commanders.
He knew he could count on their tried courage and experience.
The night of July 4, 1863, was of awful weather--rain in torrents,
howling winds, and roads almost impassable; all trains had been sent
back during the day, as well as the reserve artillery. At night
artillery in position and pickets were withdrawn and the army moved
back by its left--Ewell, Hill, and Longstreet. It marched all night and
part of next day, and then Lee with characteristic audacity selected a
line of defense, entrenched and fortified it, and offered Meade battle
for several days, while his immense trains were safely crossing the
Potomac. Meade declined the challenge, and Lee resuming the retreat,
crossed on the bridge of boats that had been thrown over the river at
Falling Waters by the engineers--and a crazy affair it was, too.
Our corps was all night crossing, and at dawn I was able to approach
General Lee on the south bank, "tête de pont," with a report to that
effect, adding that now everything was clear for General Hill's
infantry. The General's anxiety was intense. He expected to be attacked
at the passage of the river. There was good reason to fear; why Meade
failed to do so is yet to be explained. General Lee, like every one,
had been up the whole night, and his staff officers were stretched in
sleep on the ground. He desired me to recross the bridge for him, see
General Hill in person, and urge him to the utmost haste in getting his
men over, stopping only when imperatively necessary.
I immediately pushed back, finding the road deep in mud but clear of
any impediment to the men. Broken wagons or a dismounted gun or two had
been cleared away and thrown one side. General Lee's message was given
and Hill asked me to assure the Commander that he should safely get
across, notwithstanding a slight attack that was even then developing
itself on his rear brigade--Pettigrew's. Some men were captured, but we
suffered most loss in the death of that promising officer.
Returning, I reported to the General that "all was clear. Hill was
about three-quarters of a mile from the bridge and marching rapidly to
it." "What was his leading division?" I was asked. "General Anderson,
sir." "I am sorry, Colonel; my friend Dick is quick enough pursuing,
but in retreat I fear he will not be as sharp as I should like."
Just then a heavy gun was fired lower down, filling the gorge of the
river with most threatening echoes. "There," said the General, "I was
expecting it, the beginning of the attack." But he was wrong. The enemy
made no further demonstration and Hill came safely across. Our corps
had found camp some ten miles south of the river and there I soon threw
myself down for rest and food. After a week of the most exhausting
physical and mental trial it was indeed time for some repose.