CHAPTER XX

PREPARING FOR GETTYSBURG

Preparations for summer campaign--Army reorganized--Three Army

Corps--A. P. Hill made lieutenant-general, commanding Third

Corps--Lieutenant-General Ewell commanding Second Corps--Stuart's

cavalry reviewed--Its fine condition--Longstreet and his scout

Harrison--Lee's intricate operations--Stuart's cavalry movements--He

crosses below--The loss to Lee--The march through Maryland and

Pennsylvania--No depredations--Halt at Chambersburg--Scout Harrison

reports Meade in command, superseding Hooker--Ewell ordered to

leave--March resumed, A. P. Hill leading, gaining decided success.

General Lee began now to prepare for his summer campaign. It was

secretly settled that it should be an invasion of Pennsylvania.

There were many things that assisted in arriving at this decision in

the conferences with the president and chiefs of the Government at

Richmond. Virginia had been fiercely fought over, and ravaged by the

tramp of hostile armies. Now, it looked as if the enemy should feel

something of such sacrifices. If we could live on the supplies we hoped

to find north of the Potomac, the already serious question of food and

forage for our men and animals would lighten up temporarily, at least;

and finally, the men of arms were eager for the movement and most

enthusiastic at the start.

First of all, Lee had to reorganize his army. Jackson's death made

this necessary; besides, the two corps had grown, individually, rather

large for effective handling. He created a third corps and placed A.

P. Hill in command of it, perhaps the best arrangement possible at

the time. One division was taken from Longstreet--Anderson's; one from

Jackson--Heth's, and the third, under Pender, was made up of unassigned

commands, of which there were quite a number between Richmond and the

General's camps.

The second (Ewell's) was of Early's, Rodes's, and E. Johnson's

divisions.

The first (Longstreet's) was of Hood's, McLaws's and Pickett's

divisions.

Suitable artillery details were made to meet these changes, which went

in effect smoothly and effectively.

On the cavalry, special care was bestowed. It had been heavily

strengthened and much improved by selections of men and horses. For

some time, during inaction, they had been getting good forage and

pasturage. Now, when the time was near for the use of this formidable

arm under Stuart, its able and famous leader, it was ready for the

Commander-in-Chief.

What irony of fate that the great approaching campaign should be fought

and lost without that bold leader and his riders being at Lee's touch,

when indeed he wanted them, bitterly missing having Stuart and his

great body of unsurpassed horse near by him.

The activity of preparation went through all

departments--Quartermaster's, Subsistence, Ordnance, and Medical.

It could be guessed that the military operations would be of great

severity and exaction and it behooved all officers of supply to be

ready; to fail would be fatal.

The cavalry were assembled under Stuart in Northern Virginia, on lands

growing richer and richer in grass with the advancing weeks. It was

a magnificent day, befitting the superb body of cavalry that, under

Stuart, marched rapidly in review before the Commander-in-Chief. A

sight it was not soon to be forgotten. The utmost order prevailed.

There could be no doubt that the cavalry was as ready for the work

before us as was our matchless infantry.

Longstreet sent for his favorite scout, Harrison. His instructions

were to proceed into the enemy's lines, where he was to stay until the

last part of June. Then he was to report to General Longstreet, it was

hoped, with the amplest and most accurate information. "Where shall

I find you, General, to make this report?" asked Harrison. "With the

army," was Longstreet's grim answer; "I shall be sure to be with it."

He was very far from giving even to his trusted scout information as

to his movements. But Harrison knew all the same; he knew pretty much

everything that was going on.

The operation now performed by General Lee was intricate, of much

delicacy and hazard. It was to move from his position in front of

Hooker without exposing any part of his forces, or Richmond, to be

attacked in detail, and this important part of the grand maneuver was

left to Longstreet and his corps, with the cavalry in communication.

The corps of Ewell (formerly Jackson's) and A. P. Hill were sent ahead

by easy marches, keeping a certain distant touch with Longstreet. The

mountain gaps were filled with Stuart's cavalry and the enemy held in

close observation. All went well. Hooker made no attempt to follow. Lee

moved toward Washington leisurely, as if to meet him there later.

Stuart's part with his cavalry was now most important. It is contended

by some that Lee left it finally optional for him to decide upon his

movements. Whether to follow the army by crossing the river in the west

of the ridge or by one of the lower fords. In the latter event it was,

as it proved, to lose Lee and leave him without his strong arm in an

enemy's country. It has been attempted to show also that the order by

which Stuart moved came from Longstreet. But this must be dismissed;

positive information to the contrary being at hand. Surprising to say,

it now appears that Stuart left the army with his fine command and

started on his too fascinating raid, not only by his own preference,

but actually in violation of Lee's orders, which failed to reach him.

All doubt had passed from Lee's mind and he had ordered Stuart to keep

with him. The latter was raiding, and Lee's campaign was lost.

Major McClellan, Stuart's A. A. G. and chief of staff, in his history

of that cavalry (an excellent work) declares that in his opinion the

absence of Stuart was the cause of Lee's trouble; and for myself I have

never doubted it. It is not to be supposed that no cavalry whatever was

left with the army. Stuart's defenders have taken pains to point that

out. There was a squadron or two, here and there, a regiment at one

place, and a brigade under an efficient commander left in the rear. But

these separate little commands amounted to nothing. It was the great

body of that splendid horse under their leader Stuart that Lee wanted.

He was the eyes and ears and strong right arm of the commander, and

well may he have missed him. All through the marches he showed it.

Stuart was on a useless, showy parade almost under the guns of the

Washington forts, and his horse, laurel-wreathed, bore the gay rider

on amid songs and stories. He had some opposition, of course, and had a

share of fighting in Ashby's Gap and the plain on the east.

When he rejoined Lee it was with exhausted horses and half worn-out men

in the closing hours of Gettysburg.

Had he been with Lee where would our commander have made his battle?

Possibly, not on that unfavorable ground of Gettysburg. Lee with his

personally weak opponent, and Stuart by him, could almost have chosen

the spot where he would be sure to defeat the Union Army.

This, however, somewhat anticipates; going back we find our three corps

with their military pushed across the river with energy. The Second

(Ewell's), the Third (A. P. Hill's), and Longstreet last. All infantry

and artillery across, leaving only about a brigade of cavalry on the

south side. The enemy for some days had quite disappeared from our

observations. The march proceeded through Maryland and Pennsylvania

in good form, General Lee's orders against depredations being most

peremptory. At Chambersburg a halt was made over Sunday and our corps

had the place well guarded and protected from plunder by loose bodies

of men. Our chief commissary, Moses, made a forced requisition and got

some supplies and necessaries, not very much.

At night I was roused by a detail of the provost guard bringing up a

suspicious prisoner. I knew him instantly; it was Harrison, the scout,

filthy and ragged, showing some rough work and exposure. He had come

to "Report to the General, who was sure to be with the army," and

truly his report was long and valuable. I should here say that in

every respect it was afterwards fully confirmed by events and facts.

Harrison gave us the first complete account of the operations of the

enemy since Hooker left our front. He brought his report down to a

day or two, and described how they were even then marching in great

numbers in the direction of Gettysburg, with intention apparently of

concentrating there. He also informed us of the removal of Hooker and

the appointment of George Meade to command of the Army of the Potomac.

How many commanders had Lee made for that army! Harrison's report was

so exceedingly important that I took him at once with me, and woke

Longstreet. He was immediately on fire at such news and sent the scout

by a staff officer to General Lee's camp near by. The General heard

him with great composure and minuteness. It was on this, the report

of a single scout, in the absence of cavalry, that the army moved.

Important as was the change, the commanding General was not long in

deciding. He sent orders to bring Ewell immediately back from the North

about Harrisburg, and join his left. Then he started A. P. Hill off at

sunrise for Gettysburg, followed by Longstreet. The enemy was there,

and there our General would strike him.

The march was much impeded by too many troops and trains on one road

and Ewell's men breaking in on the route next day to get to their

position.

The army thus moved forward, and A. P. Hill leading, struck the enemy

near, and in, the town of Gettysburg sharply on the afternoon of July

1. We were following some little distance in the rear, and heard the

lively fire of cannon and rifles, and soon after got the news of Hill's

and Ewell's decided success in an important preliminary engagement.

Many prisoners and much material remained with the Confederates. This

stimulated every one forward, and Ewell taking position on our left,

we were all snugly in bivouac at a good hour, with Longstreet's two

divisions, McLaws and Hood, about four miles in rear, but ready for

movement next day. Pickett had been doing guard duty at Chambersburg

and was not yet up, but would be in the morning. The serious mishap of

the day was Ewell's failure to seize the heights on the left. General

Lee expected it of him, and we know of no impediment.

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