enemy by no means so warm as when we opened on the day before. Our
mortar platforms were much injured by the firing already. The 24
pounder battery had to be re-revetted entirely--terreplein levelled.
During this day and night the magazine was excavated, and the frame
put up. Two traverses made--the positions of platforms and embrasures
determined. Two platforms laid and the guns run in--the embrasures
for them being partly _cut_. One other gun was run to the rear of the
battery.
[March] 24th. On duty with Captain Saunders again--could get no
directions so I had the two partly cut embrasures marked with sand bags
and dirt, and set a party at work to cover the magazine with earth
as soon as it was finished. During this day the traverses[42] were
finished, the platforms laid, the magazine entirely finished, and a
large number of sand bags filled for the revetments of the embrasures.
The “Naval Battery” opened today, their fire was fine music for us, but
they did not keep it up very long. The crash of the eight-inch shells
as they broke their way through the houses and burst in them was very
pretty. The “Greasers” had had it all in their own way--but we were
gradually opening on them now. Remained out all night to take charge of
two embrasures. The Alabama Volunteers, who formed the working party,
did not come until it was rather late--we set them at work to cut down
and level the top of parapet--thickening it opposite the third and
fourth guns. Then laid out the embrasures and put seven men in each.
Foster had charge of two, Coppée of two, and I of two. Mine were the
only ones finished at daylight--the Volunteers gave out and could
hardly be induced to work at all.
[March] 25th. Mason and Stevens relieved Beauregard and Foster--but
I remained. I had the raw hides put on--and with a large party of
Volunteers opened the other embrasures. This was done in broad
daylight, in full view of the town--yet they had not fired more than
three or four shots when I finished and took in the men. The battery
then opened. We then gave it to Mexicans about as hotly as they wished.
We had ten mortars--three 68s, three 32s, four 24s, and two eight-inch
howitzers playing upon them as fast as they could load and fire.
Captain Anderson, 3rd Artillery, fired on this morning thirty shells in
thirty minutes from his battery of three mortars (No. 1).
As I went to our camp I stopped at Colonel Totten’s tent to inform
him of the state of affairs--he directed me to step in and report to
General Scott. I found him writing a despatch. He seemed to be very
much delighted and showed me the last words he had written which were
“indefatigable Engineers.” Then we were needed and remembered--the
instant the pressing necessity passed away we were forgotten. The echo
of the last hostile gun at Vera Cruz had not died away before it was
forgotten by the Commander in Chief that such a thing existed as an
Engineer Company.[43]
[Illustration: Facsimile reproduction of a pencil sketch by McClellan.
CHURCH AT CAMARGO, SEEN FROM THE PALACE.]
The superiority of our fire was now very apparent. I went out again
at 3 P. M.--met Mason carrying a large goblet he had found in a
deserted ranch. Found Captain Lee engaged in the construction of a
new mortar battery for four mortars, immediately to the left of No.
1--in the parallel. There was a complete cessation of firing--a flag
having passed in relation to the consuls, I think. The platforms of
this battery were laid, but not spiked down. A traverse was made in
boyau between Nos. 1 and 2, just in front of the entrance of the large
magazine of No. 1, it being intended to run a boyau from behind this
traverse to the left of the new battery. I laid out a boyau connecting
Stevens’s communications with the _short_ “parallel” of No. 2, then
Captain Lee explained his wishes in relation to the new battery and
left me in charge of it. I thickened the parapet from a ditch in
front--inclined the superior slope _upward_, left the berm, made the
traverses, had the platforms spiked, etc. The mortars were brought
up and placed in the battery that night. Captain Saunders sent me to
repair the embrasures of the 24 pounder battery--doing nothing himself.
He then sent me to excavate the boyau I had laid out.
About 11.30 the discharge of a few rockets by _our_ rocketeers caused
a stampede amongst the Mexicans--they fired escopettes and muskets
from all parts of their walls. Our mortars reopened about 1.30 with
the greatest vigor--sometimes there were six shells in the air at the
same time. A violent Norther commenced about 1 o’clock making the
trenches very disagreeable. About three quarters of an hour, or an hour
after we reopened we heard a bugle sound in town. At first we thought
it a bravado--then reveillé, then a parley--so we stopped firing to
await the result. Nothing more was heard, so in about half an hour
we reopened with great warmth. At length another chi-wang-a-wang was
heard which turned out to be a parley. During the day the terms of
surrender of the town of Vera Cruz[44] and castle of San Juan de Ulua
were agreed upon, and on 29th of March, 1847 the garrison marched out
with drums beating, colors flying and laid down their arms on the plain
between the lagoon and the city ... muskets were stacked and a number
of escopettes ... pieces of artillery were found in the town and ... in
the castle.
After the surrender of Vera Cruz we moved our encampment--first to
the beach, then to a position on the plain between our batteries and
the city. Foster was detached on duty with the other Engineers to
survey the town and castle. Smith and myself were to superintend the
landing of the pontoon and engineers trains, and to collect them at
the Engineer Depot. Between the Quartermasters and Naval Officers this
was hardly done when we left. I dismantled the batteries, magazines
etc.--then amused myself until we left, with the chills and fever.
J[immie] S[tuart] being too sick to go on with his regiment came over
to our camp and stayed with us. Instead of being sent on in our proper
position, at the head of Twiggs’s Division, we were kept back and
finally allowed to start on the same day that Worth started[45]--we
received no orders to move, merely a permission. Our teams (6) were
the worst I ever saw--they had just been lassooed as they swam ashore,
and neither they nor their teamsters had ever seen a wagon before. We
left Vera Cruz on the 13th [April]. By dint of applying some of the
_knowledge_ I had acquired under Guy Henry’s parental care, I succeeded
in getting four teams to Ve[r]gara (Twiggs’s headquarters during the
siege). As Smith and Foster did not come up I rode back to see what
was the matter and found that they had arrived at a point opposite the
middle of the city, broken down two sets of teams, got one teamster’s
arm and hand badly kicked--and the devil to pay in general. At last
they got on, and by leaving half the loads by the roadside we managed
by hard swearing to get to within one-half mile of El Rio Medio by
dark.
The road so far was horrible, being hilly and very sandy. Our mules
were so weak and miserable that the men actually had to push the wagons
along, and it was easy to see that our march was to be very severe upon
all concerned. General Worth and his staff passed us as we were busily
engaged in “cussing” a team up a hill--we then learned for the first
time that Santa Anna was at Cerro Gordo with a large force. When we
encamped this night everybody was tired to death, and the only event
worthy of recollection was the thrashing that a certain lazy nigger
“Isaac” received from his frisky “bos.”
On the [14th] we made an early start and after “persuading” the mules
up the hill beyond Rio Medio we got along without very much trouble
until we arrived at Santa Fé. Here the wagons were unloaded and leaving
me with about ten men Smith and Foster went back after the loads left
at Ve[r]gara. Jimmie [Stuart] and I struck up an acquaintance with
the Alcalde--a very nice sort of a man. I found a couple of cavalry
barracks etc. We amused ourselves chatting with the Alcalde all
day--who tried hard to stampede us with guerilla tales etc. Captain
Hughes came up late in the afternoon, Smith arrived after dark, having
left the wagons with the ordnance people about half a mile behind.
While G. W. [Smith] was at supper, Jimmie, who had been amusing
himself by playing monte with the Rancheros, came back and amused us by
an account of a _muy poquito muchachito_ [a very little boy] about four
years old playing monte and smoking paros [_puros_, or cigars].
Foster came up at last, and we all turned in. Santa Fé is a poor little
affair--no water, but rather a fine view of a large extent of rolling
country.
On the 15th I started back after the wagons before daybreak “unwashed
and uncombed.” After a vast amount of swearing at “Seven Bottles,” of
whom more anon, I got all the wagons up to Santa Fé--set the men to
work at loading the wagons--got my breakfast, and at last we started.
Country at first a rolling prairie--finally more broken and woody. We
passed some of the most magnificent forests I ever saw--trees covered
with most beautiful flowers--the fields also--the villages were
completely deserted. About the middle of the day we stopped at a stream
to rest.--While taking our lunch under the bridge an old stupid Dutch
teamster brought down his mules to water and finally proceeded to water
himself. He drank seven (!) claret bottles full of water and at length
finding that process too slow he _took to his bucket_! We went on and
overtook the ordnance fellows at ....... Had a good supper and a fine
sleep, although they did try to stampede us about Lancers etc.--but
they could not do it.
Started early on the 16th [April]--country remarkably broken--even
mountainous. We passed several very long hills, at which it was
necessary to treble our poor little teams. Met Simon Buckner[46] with
a beef party. Arrived at Puerto Nacional just before Worth’s Division
left it (about 2 P. M.). Saw all the fellows and made our preparations
to start at twelve at night. Took a fine bath in the clear mountain
stream, and then dinner. After dinner we went to see Santana’s
Hacienda--found a little boy in it who was frightened to death at the
Barbarians. A réal [a small coin, about 12½ cents] soon quieted him.
The bridge has a curved axis--it is a beautiful piece of architecture.
It would be impossible to cross it were the heights around properly
defended and the bridge itself occupied. The bridge and heights
might all be turned by enterprising light infantry, for the stream is
fordable. From the nature of the ground it would be impossible for
artillery or cavalry to turn it without _great trouble and labor_.
Reveillé at 11.30--started at quarter past twelve--of course no
undressing. S[tuart] “thought as he was already dressed there could be
no hurry.” Night pitch dark. About an hour before daybreak found in
the road a saddle (American) and a pool of blood--some poor devil of a
straggler from Worth’s Division probably murdered. After ascending the
hill just beyond this spot, G. W. [Smith], J. S[tuart] and myself laid
down in the road to sleep--that half hour’s sleep just before going
into battle was the sweetest I ever enjoyed. Passed in the course of
the morning a great many stragglers from Worth’s Division--they had
lagged behind in the night march. About two miles from Plan del Rio we
were sitting in a ranche waiting for the wagons, when a wagonmaster
came galloping by saying that the Lancers had cut off the train. The
escort of dragoons was about 800 yards nearer Plan del Rio than we. We
galloped back--the escort not far behind and found that our wagons were
safe, but that the Lancers had cut off a few of the stragglers whom we
had passed.
Suddenly a turn of the road displayed Plan del Rio[47] at our feet--the
little valley filled with troops, horses, artillery, wagons, etc. We
arrived at about 10.30 A. M.--found the Engineers and took a lunch
with them. G. W. S[mith] and myself then rode out to Twiggs’s position
with Captain Lee--we arrived just in time to see the ball open [i. e.,
the battle of Cerro Gordo]. Saw old Twiggs, who wondered “Where the
devil did you two boys come from?” and started back to bring up the
company. On the way back a round shot came about as near my head as
would be regarded agreeable in civil life and then missed enfilading
the 2nd Infantry about a foot and a half. When we got back to El Plan,
I was ordered to join [Lieut. Z. B.] Tower with ten men--to go with
Gid Pillow and the Mohawks.[48] Did my best that afternoon _to find
out where we were to go in the morning but none of them would tell me
anything about it_. G. W. left me ten of the best men in the company,
and took Foster and the rest with him to report to General Twiggs.
It seemed to be a mutual thought that the chances all were that we
would not meet again! The idea of being killed by or among a parcel of
Volunteers was anything but pleasant.
Got up before daybreak--woke up the men--had the mare fed and
saddled--drank some coffee--distributed tools to my party and was
ready for battle long before our dear Mohawks had their breakfasts.
Also gave some tools to the Volunteers. My men had hatchets, axes and
billhooks--the Volunteers [had] axes, sap-forks and billhooks. At
length all was ready and much to my surprise we marched straight up
the road toward Jalapa. So little did I know of our point of attack--I
only knew that we were to attack either their right or front, and that
we would as surely be whipped--for it was a Volunteer Brigade. I led
off with my detachment, and after passing the greater part of Worth’s
Division--which was formed in column of platoons in the road--we turned
off to the left, nearly opposite the point where Twiggs turned to
the right. Tower directed me to place my men on the path inclining
_most to the left_. I did so and rested my men, whilst waiting for the
Volunteers who were a long distance behind. At length General Pillow
came up, and seeing my men, directed that they should be placed on the
path _inclining to the right_.
Lieutenant Tower made some remark about changing the route, and also
that we would be more apt to be seen when crossing some ravine if we
went to the right. I remember distinctly that the impression made
upon me by the conversation was that General Pillow had against the
opinion of Lieutenant Tower changed the _route to be followed_ in
order to attain the point of attack. I had no idea of the importance
of the change and that it could lead to a different point of attack. I
afterward found that the different paths led to very different parts
of the enemy’s position, the one we actually followed bringing us in a
very exposed manner against the front of the works, whilst if we had
taken the one advised by Lieutenant Tower we should have turned the
right of their works and have been but little exposed to their fire.
The fault of the erroneous selection was General Pillow’s, except that
Lieutenant Tower should, as the senior Engineer with the column, have
taken a firm stand and have forced General Pillow to have pursued the
proper path. It was certainly a fine opportunity for him to show what
stuff he was made of--but unfortunately he did not take advantage of it
at all.
We at length moved off by the flank. My detachment [was] at the head,
and during the movement--at all events before the firing against us
commenced--we heard the musketry of the attack of Twiggs’s Division
upon the Telegraph Hill.[49]
After moving about two-thirds of a mile from the main road we reached
a certain crest bordering upon a ravine, whence a strong picket of
Mexicans was observed. Tower advised General Pillow to incline his
Brigade well to the right in order to cross the ravine lower down and
out of view. The General directed Colonel [Francis M.] Wynkoop[50] to
countermarch--file twice to the right and move upon a certain dead tree
as his point of direction (Colonel Campbell’s [1st] Tennessee Regiment
to support him). He was then to form his men for the attack and charge
upon hearing a concerted signal from the rest of the Brigade. Colonel
[William T.] Haskell[51] at once commenced forming his Regiment in
a column of platoon, the flank of the column toward the work. His
men having straggled a great deal this arrangement was attended with
some difficulty--the men being literally shoved into their places one
by one. Hardly two platoons were formed when General Pillow shouted
out at the top of his voice--“Why the H--l dont Colonel Wynkoop file
to the right?” I may here observe that we had heard very distinctly
the commands of the Mexican officers in their works. This yell of
the General’s was at once followed by the blast of a Mexican bugle
and within three minutes after that their fire opened upon us. The
General may have shouted this before a single platoon of Haskell’s was
formed--but the interval must have been very short, because Wynkoop’s
Regiment had not reached its destination and had not formed there when
the firing commenced.
When the Mexican fire opened Haskell’s Regiment became at once
“confusion worse confounded.” Some of the men rushed toward the works,
many broke to the rear, very many immediately took cover behind the
rocks, etc. I at once asked General Pillow for orders to proceed
“_somewhere_” with my detachment--for I had as yet received no orders
or directions from anyone and was utterly ignorant of the ground. While
talking with the General--who was squatting down with his back to
the work--he was wounded in the arm, upon which his aide, Lieutenant
Rains, appeared from somewhere in the vicinity and they together went
off to the rear, on the run. I then went in amongst the Tennesseeans
and found at once that it was useless to attempt doing anything there,
as that Regiment (Haskell’s) was utterly broken and dispersed and
the Pennsylvania Regiment, which was to support them, had kept so
well in reserve that they could not be found. I then went over to the
other side of the ravine--the firing had by this time nearly if not
altogether ceased.
Upon arriving there I found Campbell’s Regiment in pretty good order
and _in good spirits_, the Pennsylvania Regiment (Wynkoop’s) in most
horrible confusion. Campbell was moving on toward the work, and I at
once advised General Pillow to halt him until some order could be
restored to the other Regiments. He took my advice and directed me to
give the order to Campbell, which I did. I thought that it was by no
means certain that Campbell alone could carry the works and that if
he were checked or repulsed all was lost, for there was not a company
formed to support him. Besides, although his Regiment was moving on
well, they were not then under fire, nor had they been under any fire,
to speak of, that day--so I doubted the steadiness of their movements
when their advance should have brought them in sight and under the fire
of, the Mexicans.
Colonel Haskell came up without his cap about this time and a very
warm conversation ensued between him and General Pillow--the General
accusing him of misconduct and deserting his troops, the Colonel
repelling his assertions and stating that his Regiment was cut to
pieces. I at once, without saying a word to either the General or the
Colonel, called to my party and directed them to beat the bushes for
“2nd Tennesseeans” and to bring all they could find to where we were.
They soon returned with quite a number.
In the course of conversation I told General Pillow that I did not
think that he could carry the works without some Regulars. He assented
and directed me to go at once in search of General Scott and ask him,
from him (Pillow) for a detachment of Regulars--whatever number he
could spare, saying that he would make no movement until my return.
I immediately ran down to the road where I expected to find General
Scott and Worth’s Division and there found that the General had gone
on. I jumped on my mare and galloped around by Twiggs’s road and at
length found the General about half way up the ridge over which Worth’s
Division passed to reach the Jalapa road--the rear of Worth’s Division
was then crossing. I told the General my message and he directed me to
say to General Pillow that he had no Regulars to spare, that the last
of Worth’s Division was then passing over, that Santa Anna had fallen
back with all his army, except about 5000 men, toward Jalapa, that he
expected to fight another battle with Santa Anna at once, and that he
thought it probable that the 5000 men cut off would surrender--finally
that General Pillow might attack again, or not, just as he pleased. He
evidently was not much surprised and not much “put out” that Pillow was
thrashed, and attached no importance to his future movements.
With this reply I returned, and could not for a long time, find any of
the valiant Brigade. I at length found Wynkoop’s Regiment. He told me
that white flags were flying on the work and that one or two had come
down toward his position--but that as he did not know what they meant,
could not raise a white handkerchief in the crowd, and had no one who
could speak Spanish, he had held no communication with them. I told him
what they meant and said that when I had seen General Pillow I would
return and go to meet them. As I left he asked me if I could not give
him an order to charge--I said “_No_”--then said he--“Tell General
Pillow that if I dont get an order to charge in half an hour, I’ll be
d--d if I dont charge anyhow”--this after I had told him that the white
flag meant a surrender!!!
I at length found General Pillow some distance in rear and reported.
Castor came up a moment or two afterward and told General Pillow that
he had been sent to inform him that the Mexicans had surrendered--on
which I took my men down the road and directing them to come on and
rejoin the company as soon as possible--I galloped on to overtake it.
During my conversation with General Scott he mentioned that he had
_seen_ the charge of Twiggs’s Division and spoke of it as the most
beautiful sight that he had ever witnessed. He said everything in
praise of his “rascally Regulars.”
With reference to the operations of Twiggs’s Division.--During the
afternoon of the 17th [April] the hill opposite to and commanded by the
Telegraph Hill was carried by Harney’s ([Persifer F.] Smith’s) Brigade
and the enemy pursued partly up the Telegraph Hill by the Rifles
and 1st Artillery. They were, however, _recalled_ to the hill first
mentioned, which was occupied in force.
During the night one twenty-four pounder, one twelve pounder and a
twenty-four pound howitzer were with great difficulty hauled up and
put in position behind a slight epaulment. There were also a couple
of the Mountain Howitzers and some Rocketeers. Shields’s[52] Brigade
of Volunteers were somewhere in the vicinity to support and were
employed to man the drag ropes used to haul up the pieces. It may be
well to mention that they were more than once “_stampeded_” while
engaged in this by the mere discharge of a piece--no ball coming near
them. Another detachment of New York Volunteers was engaged during
the afternoon and night of the 17th in hauling an eight-inch howitzer
along the crest on the other side of the “Rio” in order to take an
enfilade or reverse fire upon the Mexican works. Taylor’s Battery was
with Twiggs, Dunean came around with Worth--Steptoe was with Twiggs.
The cavalry and rest of the artillery were in the Jalapa road ready to
advance in pursuit.
Harney was directed to storm the hill, Reilly to cut off the retreat
of the Mexicans by the Jalapa road--Worth to support. The affair of
the 18th was opened, on our side, by the fire of our artillery. The 24
pounder was badly served and did little or no real damage. At length
Harney charged over the valley with the 1st Artillery, 3rd and 7th
Infantry, the Rifles being thrown out to cover his left. He carried
the hill in gallant style. Reilly allowed himself to deviate from his
proper path and instead of pushing straight on for the Jalapa road, he
amused himself by skirmishing to his right and left--so that he did not
accomplish the purpose for which he was sent, that is, he _did not_ cut
off Santa Anna’s retreat.