The Cabinet meets--The Government on the verge of Dissolution--
The Second Cabinet--Palmerston lowers his Tone in the Cabinet--
But continues to bully in the Press--Taking of Beyrout--
Deposition of Mehemet Ali--Lord John acquiesces--Total Defeat
of Peace Party--Lord John Russell's False Position--His Views--
Lord Granville's Dissatisfaction--Further Attempts at
Conciliation--Prevarication of Lord Ponsonby--Newspaper
Hostilities--Discussion of the French Note of the 8th October--
Guizot's Opinion of the Note of the 8th October--Louis
Philippe's Influence on the Crisis--Summary of Events--Death of
Lord Holland--Lord Clarendon's Regret for Lord Holland--M.
Guizot's Intentions as to France--Effects of the Queen's
Partiality for Melbourne--Resignation to Thiers--Bickerings in
the Ministry--Lord John Russell's Dissatisfaction with Lord
Palmerston--Lord John resigns--Lord John demands the Recall of
Lord Ponsonby--Lord Palmerston defends Lord Ponsonby--M.
Guizot's Policy--Conciliatory Propositions fail--Attitude of
Austria--Asperity of Lord Palmerston--Operations in Syria--
Success of Lord Palmerston and his Policy--Baron Mounier's
Mission to London--Birth of the Princess Royal--Results of the
Success of Lord Palmerston's Measures--The Tories divided in
Opinion as to the Treaty--Retrospect of the Year--Lord Holland.
September 29th, 1840: Wednesday {p.320}
[Page Head: A CABINET ON THE EASTERN QUESTION.]
The Cabinet met on Monday evening and sat till seven o'clock. The
account of the proceedings which has reached me is to the last
degree amusing, but at the same time _pitoyable_. It must have
been _à payer les places_ to see. They met, and as if all were
conscious of something unpleasant in prospect, and all shy, there
was for some time a dead silence. At length Melbourne, trying to
shuffle off the discussion, but aware that he must say something,
began: 'We must consider about the time to which Parliament
should be prorogued.' Upon this Lord John took it up and said, 'I
presume we must consider whether Parliament should be called
together or not, because, as matters are now going on, it seems
to me that we may at any moment find ourselves at war, and it is
high time to consider the very serious state of affairs. I should
like,' he added, turning to Melbourne, 'to know what is your
opinion upon the subject.' Nothing, however, could be got from
Melbourne, and there was another long pause, which was not broken
till somebody asked Palmerston, 'What are your last accounts?' On
this Palmerston pulled out of his pocket a whole parcel of
letters and reports from Ponsonby, Hodges, and others, and began
reading them through, in the middle of which operation someone
happened to look up, and perceived Melbourne fast asleep in his
armchair. At length Palmerston got through his papers, when there
was another pause; and at last Lord John, finding that Melbourne
would not take the lead or say a word, went at once into the
whole subject. He stated both sides of the case with great
precision, and in an admirable, though very artful speech, a
statement which, if elaborated into a Parliamentary speech and
completed as it would be in the House of Commons, was calculated
to produce the greatest effect. He delivered this, speaking for
about a quarter of an hour, and then threw himself back in his
chair, waiting for what anybody else would say. After some little
talk, Palmerston delivered his sentiments the other way, made a
violent philippic against France, talked of her weakness and want
of preparation, of the union of all the Powers of Europe against
her, said that Prussia had 200,000 men on the Rhine, and (as Lord
Holland said) exhibited all the violence of '93. Lord John was
then asked, since such were his opinions, what course he would
advise? He said he had formed his opinion as to what it would be
advisable to do, and he produced a slip of paper on which he had
written two or three things. The first was, that we should
immediately make a communication to the French Government,
expressing our thanks for the efforts France had made to induce
the Pasha to make concessions for the purpose of bringing about a
settlement; and next, to call together the Ministers of the other
Powers, and express to them our opinion that it would be
desirable to re-open negotiations for a settlement of the dispute
in consequence of the effects produced by the mediation of
France. There then ensued a good deal of talk (in which, however,
the Prime Minister took no part), Lord Minto espousing
Palmerston's side, and saying (which was true enough), that
though Lord Holland and Clarendon, who had all along opposed the
Treaty, might very consistently take this course, he did not see
how any of those could do so who had originally supported and
approved of it; to which Lord John quietly and briefly said, 'The
events at Alexandria have made all the difference.' This was in
fact no answer; and Minto was quite right, especially as Lord
John had taken his line before the events at Alexandria were
known. Of the Ministers present besides Minto, Macaulay seemed
rather disposed to go with Palmerston, and talked blusteringly
about France, as he probably thought a Secretary of War should.
Labouchere was first one way and then the other, and neither the
Chancellor nor the Chancellor of the Exchequer said one word. The
result was an agreement, that it would be disrespectful to Lord
Lansdowne, considering his position, to come to any resolution in
his absence; and as he could not arrive before this day, that the
discussion should be adjourned till Thursday (to-morrow) by which
time he and Morpeth would be here. They were all to dine with
Palmerston, and a queer dinner it must have been.
October 1st, 1840 {p.322}
[Page Head: LORD JOHN'S PACIFIC SENTIMENTS.]
No progress made, everything _in statu quo_. The dinner at
Palmerston's on Monday after the Cabinet, went off well enough.
In the evening Clarendon had a long conversation with Lady
Palmerston, who repeated to him everything she had said to me,
and seemed confident enough that Palmerston would carry his point
at last. He told her, however, that if he persisted, the
Government must be broken up, as at least half a dozen would
resign, and that she must be aware Government could not go on if
either Palmerston or John Russell resigned (putting in Palmerston
out of civility). He thought he had made some impression on her.
The next day they all dined at Holland House. There he had again
some talk with Palmerston himself, amicable enough, but leading
to nothing; to what Clarendon said about breaking up the
Government, Palmerston did not reply a word. Afterwards
Palmerston had a long talk with Lord Holland, but not
satisfactory. Morpeth has arrived, and naturally enough was
extremely embarrassed. He had supported Palmerston originally,
and was not aware of any impending change of policy, or any
change in anybody's opinion, and he felt that it was an
extraordinary whisk round. Melbourne, of course, hopped off to
Windsor the moment the Cabinet was over, and instead of remaining
here, trying to conciliate people and arrange matters, he left
everything to shift for itself. Having shown the Queen a letter
of John Russell's, which she was not intended to see, he sent to
Lord John a letter of hers, which probably she did not mean him
to see either. She said, among other things, that she thought it
was rather hard that Lord Palmerston and Lord John could not
settle these matters amicably, without introducing their own
personal objects, and raising such difficulties. She added one
thing in her letter which may lead to some important
consequences. She said that it was her wish that some attempt
should be made to open communications with the French Government.
If Palmerston chooses to give way, he may make her wishes the
pretext for doing so, and yield to them what he refuses to
everybody else.
I saw Guizot, who showed me a letter he had written to Thiers,
telling him as far as he knew how matters stood, of the
difficulties there were, and entreating him to moderate the
French press. He also showed me a note from John Russell, in
which, after thanking him for not speaking to him at Holland
House, as it was better he should only talk to Palmerston or
Melbourne, he added that he begged he would not consider that the
articles which had lately appeared in the 'Morning Chronicle' and
'Observer' were approved of by the Government, and repudiated any
connexion or concurrence with them. He had pronounced in the
Cabinet a violent philippic against the newspapers, which was
entirely directed at Palmerston, who, he knows very well, writes
constantly in them, and Guizot knows this also. Guizot,
therefore, if he had any doubt before of Lord John's sentiments,
can have none now. An article appeared in the 'Times' on Tuesday
strongly in favour of peace and harmony with France and the
acceptance of the Pasha's offers. Guizot, of course, was
delighted with it; but I found it had taken in other quarters,
for Dedel asked me if I had read it, and said it was the true
view of the question, and Ben Stanley said the same thing to me
at dinner, and that he had found at Manchester and elsewhere a
strong public opinion, of which he was sure Palmerston was not
aware, and would not believe in if told. Dedel showed me a letter
from Fagel, giving an account of a conversation he had with Louis
Philippe, in which the King disclaimed any ambitious design or
desire for war, but said he was determined to put France in a
respectable state of preparation; very firm language. Dedel had
been at Peel's, but got nothing out of him except that he did not
know whether he should have made such a treaty, but as it was
made we ought to abide by it. The Tories will turn this business
to good account, end as it may; they have _beau jeu_. But what
Neumann said to Dedel is anything but confirmatory of
Palmerston's stories of Austrian _stoutness_, for he told him it
would be a very fortunate thing if the Sultan would accept
Mehemet Ali's new proposals.[1]
[1] [M. Neumann was the Austrian Minister in London; M.
Fagel the Dutch Minister in Paris.]
[Page Head: PRINCE METTERNICH'S SUGGESTION.]
_Evening_.--The Cabinet went off far better than could have been
expected; indeed, as well as possible under all the
circumstances. Lord John had previously intimated to Melbourne
that he should expect him to take the lead upon this occasion,
and it seems pretty clear that Melbourne had contrived to effect
some arrangement with Palmerston. Accordingly Melbourne (very
nervous) began, said that the question was in the same state as
when they last met, pronounced a few commonplaces, such as that
the success or failure of the coercive means might by this time
have been proved, only they could not yet know the event, but
ended with referring to a paper delivered some time ago by
Metternich, in which he had made certain contingent suggestions,
of which the last and most important was, that in the event of
'inefficacité des moyens' becoming apparent some communication
should be made to France for the purpose of drawing her again
into the alliance (or something to that effect; I cannot
recollect the exact words, but it was a peg on which a
communication might be hung), and asking Palmerston if he had not
got this paper.[2] Palmerston pulled it, all cut and dry, out of
his pocket and read it. A good deal of talk then ensued, and some
doubts and suspicions were expressed about France, which drew out
Lord Holland, who said, 'For God's sake, if you are so full of
distrust of France, if you suspect all her acts and all her
words, put the worst construction on all she does, and are
resolved to be on bad terms with her, call Parliament together,
ask for men and money, and fight it out with her manfully. Do
this or meet her in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, and cast
aside all those suspicions which make such bad blood between the
two countries.' This appeal (of which I only give the spirit) was
very well received, and, after some more talk, Palmerston said
that though he was still convinced success would crown the
efforts now making in the East, and that it was unnecessary to
take any other step, yet, if it was the wish and opinion of the
Cabinet that some communication should be made to France, he was
ready to make it. This was, of course, very well taken, and was a
prodigious concession and change from his former tone. A great
deal more discussion then ensued, and the result was that
Palmerston is to see the Ministers of the Conference, either
separately or together, to-morrow, and to propose to them that he
should make a communication to France on the basis of
Metternich's suggestion. There can be no doubt of Neumann's
acquiescence, and the Prussian will go with the Austrian; the
only doubt is Brunnow. They all agreed that nothing could be done
but with the common consent of all, and as Russia has behaved
exceedingly well since the signature of the Treaty, it would be
wholly unjustifiable not to treat her with perfect good faith and
every sort of consideration. If Brunnow objects, and will not
consent to the communication being made, another Cabinet is to be
summoned to-morrow afternoon; if he acquiesces, Palmerston is to
speak to Guizot immediately. If Brunnow is not consenting,
Palmerston will equally speak to Guizot, but, instead of making a
proposition, will say that Brunnow will apply for instructions,
and that we have requested him to do so, to enable us, with the
consent of all the three parties to the treaty, to make the
communication to France. Such is the substance and result of this
important Cabinet, which I have very roughly and imperfectly put
down, and I am conscious that I have forgotten some of the
details which reached me; however, I have preserved the essential
parts. Lord John (to whom it is all due) said very little,
Lansdowne not much; Hobhouse was talkative, but nobody listened
to him; Melbourne, when it was over, swaggering like any Bobadil,
and talking about 'fellows being frightened at their own
shadows,' and a deal of bravery when he began to breathe freely
from the danger.
[2] Metternich's paper was a suggestion which he put into
the mouth of the French Minister, and which he gave
Leopold, who sent it here. He said, 'If I were the
French Minister, I would say so and so,' to the effect
that if the means of coercion did not prove
efficacious, the Allies had better consider the matter
afresh in conjunction with France, who would assist in
settling it.
October 2nd, 1840 {p.326}
Last night it was decided that Palmerston should call the
Conference together, and propose to them to make a conciliatory
advance to France. All Europe is looking with anxiety for the
result of the Cabinet held yesterday; and this morning the
'Morning Chronicle' puts forth an article having every appearance
of being written by Palmerston himself (as I have no doubt it
was), most violent, declamatory, and insulting to France.
October 4th, 1840 {p.326}
[Page Head: LORD PALMERSTON DEFEATS CONCILIATION.]
I was obliged to break off, and now resume the narrative. It was
resolved at the Cabinet that Palmerston should summon the
Ministers of the Conference and ask their consent to his making
_some communication_ to Guizot. The Austrian and the Prussian
said they would consent to whatever Brunnow agreed to. Brunnow
said he could say nothing till he had consulted his Court; and he
added that England could do what she pleased, but that he would
not conceal from Palmerston that the Emperor would be exceedingly
hurt if any step of the kind was taken without his knowledge or
consent.[4] On this the Cabinet again met on Friday afternoon to
hear the report; but it must have been clear enough what the
result of Palmerston's interview with the Ministers would be,
after the appearance of the article in the 'Chronicle.' I made
the Duke of Bedford go to Lord John and tell him this ought not
to be endured; and that if I were he I would not sit for one hour
in the Cabinet with a man who could agree to take a certain line
(with his colleagues) over night, and publish a furious attack
upon the same the next morning. Lord John said he had already
written to Melbourne about it, that Palmerston had positively
denied having anything to do with the 'Morning Chronicle,' and he
did not see what more he could do; but he owned that all his
confidence in him was gone.
[4] [It is obvious that when Lord Palmerston agreed to make
a conciliatory overture to France, in order to allay
the storm in the Cabinet, and prevent the threatened
dissolution of the Ministry, he was perfectly aware
that Brunnow and the Emperor of Russia would not concur
in the proposal, or would, at least, delay it so long
that it would be useless. Moreover, Lord Palmerston
confidently relied, and in this it turned out he was
right, on the success of his naval measures against the
Pasha, and of the Pasha's inability to resist them. It
was this prompt success--prompt beyond all conception
and belief--that averted the catastrophe of a
dissolution of the Ministry or a breach with France.]
I received a note in the morning from Guizot desiring to see me,
and I went. I told him that the article was abominable, but that
so far from its being a true exposition of the intentions of the
Cabinet, they had resolved upon the attempt at conciliation which
Palmerston had himself agreed to make. I begged him to make
allowance for the difficulties of the case, and be contented with
a small advance; and I told him that the Cabinet were unanimously
agreed upon the necessity of adhering to their engagements with
their Allies, and at the same time endeavouring to bring about a
_rapprochement_ to France. He promised to make the best of it
with his Government, and, making them comprehend that there was a
strong peace party in the Cabinet, work in conjunction with that
party here to keep matters quiet.
In the morning I went to Claremont for a Council, where the
principal Ministers met; and after the Council they held a
Cabinet in Melbourne's bed-room. It was not, however, till this
morning that I knew the subject of their discussion. On arriving
in town, indeed, I heard that Beyrout had been bombarded and
taken by the English fleet, and a body of Turkish troops been
landed; but this was not known at Claremont, and not believed in
London. Before I was dressed, however, this morning, Guizot
arrived at my house in a great state of excitement, said it was
useless our attempting to manage matters in the sense of peace
here while Ponsonby was driving them to extremities at
Constantinople, and causing the Treaty to be executed _à
l'outrance_. He then produced his whole budget of intelligence,
being the bombardment of Beyrout, the landing of 12,000 Turks,
and the deposition of Mehemet Ali and appointment of Izzar Pasha
to succeed him. He also showed me a letter from Thiers in which
he told him of all this, said he would not answer for what might
come of it, that he had had one meeting of the Cabinet and should
have another; but Guizot said he thought he would very likely end
by convoking the Chambers.
I went immediately to John Russell and told him what a state
Guizot was in, and showed him the papers. He said they were aware
yesterday of the Constantinople news; that on receiving the
propositions of the Pasha by Rifat Bey, the Conference,
considering them as a refusal, had immediately proposed to
Redschid Pasha to pronounce his deposition;[5] he agreed, and
proposed to name a successor; they objected to this, but
ultimately consented to the appointment of a provisional
successor in the person of the Seraskier commanding the Turkish
troops in Syria; that it was not intended really to deprive
Mehemet Ali of Egypt, and the sentence of deposition was only
fulminated as a means of intimidation, and to further the object
of the treaty; Palmerston wrote to Lord Granville, and desired
him to make an immediate communication to Thiers to this effect.
Lord John admitted that it was all very bad, but seemed to think
he could do nothing more, and that nothing was left but to wait
and to preach patience. I went from him to Guizot, and told him
what had passed; but he said, with truth, that this resolution to
drive matters to extremity, and to go even beyond the Treaty,
made it very difficult to do any good here, and that the public
would not be able to draw those fine diplomatic lines and
comprehend the difference between a provisional and an actual
successor to Mehemet Ali. He was going to Palmerston, and I told
him Palmerston would no doubt tell him what had been conveyed to
Lord Granville.
[5] [The Conference of the Ambassadors of the Four Powers
at Constantinople, in which Lord Ponsonby played the
most prominent part, and laboured to drive matters to
the last extremity.]
[Page Head: LORD HOLLAND'S VIEW OF THE CASE.]
I then went to Holland House, found Lord Holland alone, and he
entered fully, and without reserve, into the whole question. From
him I learned that Metternich has expressed his strong
disapprobation of the violent steps that have been taken, and
that he wrote as much to Stürmer. Holland seemed to think that
there had been a great difference of opinion among the Ministers
of the Conference at Constantinople, but that Ponsonby had
ultimately prevailed in persuading them to depose the Pasha; that
he had concealed the fact of the division of opinion which had
been revealed here by Lord Beauvale's letter from Vienna. Lord
Holland went over the whole case, and told me everything that had
occurred in great detail, the whole, or certainly the greatest
part, of which I was already apprised of. Just now I saw Dedel,
who told me again that Neumann had said to him, 'Plût à Dieu que
le Sultan acceptât les dernières propositions de Mehemet Ali, car
cela nous tirerait d'un grand embarras.' Neumann is a time-
serving dog, for he holds quite different language to the
Palmerstons, and to them complains of Holland House, and talks of
firmness, resolution, &c.
October 7th, 1840 {p.329}
Dined at Holland House on Sunday. Palmerstons, John Russell, and
Morpeth, all very merry, with sundry jokes about Beyrout, and
what not. At night Lady Holland was plaintive to Palmerston about
an article in the 'Examiner,' in which Fonblanque had said
something about Holland House taking a part against the foreign
policy, and they talked together amicably enough. Lady Palmerston
and I had another colloquy, much the same as before. I told her
what Neumann had said, but nothing would make her believe it.
They have a marvellous facility in believing anything they wish,
and disbelieving whatever they don't like. In fact, Lord John
evidently has completely knocked under; he is unprepared to do
anything more, and so ready now to go on that he had himself
proposed to Palmerston that Stopford should be ordered to attack
Acre. Of course, Palmerston desired no better; and it seems to
have been agreed that conditional orders shall be sent to him--
that is, he is to attack if he is strong enough, and the season
is not too far advanced.
[Page Head: LORD PALMERSTON TRIUMPHS.]
I dined again to-day at Holland House, and in the evening Guizot
came. He told me that nothing could be more unsatisfactory than
his interview with Palmerston; very civil to himself personally
as he always was, but 'de Ministre à Ministre' as bad as
possible. He had told him of the communication Lord Granville was
desired to make to Thiers, but had not said one syllable of the
disposition of the Cabinet to make an overture, nor held out the
slightest expectation of the possibility of any modification.
Guizot repeated how much he is alarmed, and talked of the
probability of war. It is now quite clear that Palmerston has
completely gained his point. The peace party in the Cabinet are
silenced, their efforts paralysed. In fact, Palmerston has
triumphed, and Lord John succumbed. The Cabinet are again
dispersed, Palmerston reigns without let or hindrance at the
Foreign Office. No attempt is made to conciliate France; the war
on the coast of Syria will go on with redoubled vigour; Ponsonby
will urge matters to the last extremities at Constantinople; and
there is no longer a possibility of saying or doing any one
thing, for the whole question of reconciliation has been suffered
to rest upon the result of a communication which Brunnow
undertook to make to his Court, to which no answer can be
received for several weeks, and none definite will probably ever
be received at all. Palmerston's policy, therefore, will receive
a complete trial, and its full and unimpeded development, and
even those of his colleagues who are most opposed to it, and who
are destitute of all confidence in him, are compelled to go along
with him his whole length, share all his responsibility, and
will, after all, very likely be obliged to combat in Parliament
the very same arguments that they have employed in the Cabinet,
and _vice versâ_.
Lord John has disappointed me; and when I contrast the vigour of
his original resolutions with the feebleness of his subsequent
efforts, the tameness with which he has submitted to be overruled
and thwarted, and to endure the treachery, and almost the insult
of Palmerston's newspaper tricks, I am bound to acknowledge that
he is not the man I took him for. The fact is, that his position
has been one of the greatest embarrassment--but of embarrassment
of his own making. He consented to the Treaty of July, without
due consideration of the consequences it was almost sure to
entail. When those consequences burst upon him in a very
dangerous and alarming shape, he seems suddenly to have awakened
from his dream of security, and to have bestirred himself to
avert the impending evils; but while the magnitude of the peril
pressed him on one side, on the other he was hampered by the
consciousness of his own inconsistency, and that he could not do
anything without giving Palmerston a good case against him. And
when at last he did resolve to take a decisive step, he never
calculated upon the means at his disposal to bring about the
change of policy which he advocated. He moved, accordingly, like
a man in chains. He distrusted Palmerston, and did not dare tell
him so; Melbourne would not help him; he dreaded a breach partly
official, partly domestic, with Palmerston, and only thought of
keeping the rickety machine of Government together as long as
possible, by any means he could, and was content to leave the
issues of peace or war to the chapter of accidents. The rest of
the Cabinet seem to have been pretty evenly balanced, feeling (as
was very natural) that they had no good case for opposing
Palmerston, conscious that Lord John's alarms were not without
foundation, and that his position gave him a right to take a
decisive lead in the Cabinet; still they were not inclined to act
cordially and decisively with him, and hence vacillation and
uncertainty in their councils. Palmerston alone was resolute;
entrenched in a strong position, with unity and determination of
purpose, quite unscrupulous, very artful, and in possession of
the Foreign Office, and therefore able to communicate in whatever
manner and with whomsoever he pleased, and to give exactly the
turn he chose to any negotiation or communication, without the
possibility of being controlled by any of his colleagues. From
the beginning, Lord John seems never to have seen his way
clearly, or to have been able to make up his mind how to act. My
own opinion is, that if there had been a will, there might have
been found a way, to do something; but Palmerston had no such
will. On the contrary, he was resolved to defeat the intentions
of his colleagues, and he has effectually done so.
October 8th, 1840 {p.332}
[Page Head: LORD JOHN'S LAST EFFORT.]
Lord John Russell called on me yesterday morning, more to talk
the matter over than for any particular purpose. He was, as
usual, very calm about it all. I told him all I thought, and
asked him why Guizot's offer had not been made use of; when he
said that it had been considered, but for three reasons, which he
gave me, it had been judged impossible to make it the foundation
of a communication, and that Metternich's paper had been taken
instead. Two of the reasons were, 1st. That the Viceroy's offers
would probably have been already rejected at Constantinople;
2ndly. That the insurrection in Syria would have been organised,
and it might entail consequences on the Syrians that it would be
unjust to expose them to; 3rdly. The necessity of the previous
concurrence of the Allies. They all seemed to me very bad
reasons.
I told him that Palmerston had gained his point, and that the
whole thing turned upon the success of the insurrection. He
admitted that it did, and stated the grounds there were for
hoping that it would succeed. He owned to me that his reason for
consenting to the Treaty was the refusal of France to join in
coercive measures; which I told him was in my opinion the strong
point of Palmerston's case. The fact is, the offer of France is
come too late; the machine has been set in motion, and now there
is no stopping it. But I shall ever think that if the advances of
France had been met in another way, much might have been done.
Lord John said the Queen had talked to him, and had expressed her
anxiety for some settlement, but at the same time was quite
determined to make no unworthy concession.
My brother writes me word that Lord Granville is so disgusted at
his position, and at being kept entirely in the dark as to the
real position of affairs, that he is seriously thinking of
resigning. Bulwer[6] has, however, done his utmost to prevent
him, and advised him to write instead and earnestly recommend
that, if they meditate any change, whatever they mean to do
should be done immediately.
[6] [Mr. Henry Bulwer (afterwards Lord Dalling) was at that
time First Secretary of the Embassy in Paris, and an
ardent supporter of Lord Palmerston's policy--much more
so than the Ambassador, Lord Granville.]
I went to Lord John this morning, and read to him my brother
Henry's letter. He is alarmed, and says that no doubt much might
have been done in the way of conciliation that has not been done;
admits that Palmerston (through whom everything must necessarily
pass) will do nothing; and that the fact is he does not believe
in war, and does not care if it happens. He showed me a paper he
wrote with the project of making certain tranquillising
communications to the French Government; one of which was, that
if the Allies resolved to attack Egypt, they would first give
notice to France and try and arrange matters with her. The
Emperor of Russia, it appears, is all for attacking Egypt; but no
intention exists of taking Egypt from the Pasha in any case. I
told him again that I thought an opportunity had been lost of
responding to the last offer of France in a conciliatory way, and
Lord John said he thought so too; he had written a paper on the
subject, showed it to Melbourne--who highly approved of it, left
it with him, never heard more about it, and nothing was done.
Palmerston's extinguisher was, of course, put upon it. Lord John
said he was tired of attempting to do anything; and he now
appears to have resolved to wait patiently, and meet his destiny
with the stoical resignation of a Turk.
October 9th, 1840 {p.332}
Everything looking black these last two days, funds falling, and
general alarm. Lord Granville has written to Palmerston both
publicly and privately; in the former enforcing the necessity of
some speedy arrangement, if any there is to be; in the latter
remonstrating upon his own situation _vis-à-vis_ of the
Government. Lord John has again screwed his courage up to summon
the Cabinet, with the determination of making another attempt at
accommodation with France. He proposed this to Melbourne, who
said 'it was too late.' This is what he always does: entreats
people to _wait_ when they first want to move, and then when they
have waited, and will wait no longer, he says, 'it is too late.'
Lord John's design is to have a despatch written to Granville,
with which he is to go to Thiers, inviting a frank explanation
_de part et d'autre_, asking what France desires and expects,
saying what England intends and does not intend, entering into
the position in which all parties are placed, and expressing a
readiness to conciliate France in any way that we honourably and
consistently can, communicating to our Allies exactly what we
say.
[Page Head: NOTE FROM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.]
But what he would principally desire, and I perceive will not be
able to effect, is the supersession in some shape of Lord
Ponsonby, against whom grave charges do certainly lie. The other
day (the day before the Council at Claremont), Palmerston
produced at the Cabinet Ponsonby's despatch announcing the
deposition of Mehemet Ali, which he read aloud. Melbourne asked
if there was not something said indicative of some differences of
opinion among the Ambassadors (probably something grave struck
him), to which Palmerston responded that there was nothing. The
next day Beauvale's despatch arrived with the report of the
Austrian Internuncio to Metternich, who said that Ponsonby had
assembled the Ministers at his house on Rifat Bey's arrival, and
proposed the immediate _déchéance_ of the Pasha, to which he had
made no objection, but that his Russian colleague had objected.
His objections were, however, overruled by Ponsonby, who had
taken upon himself to say that he would make England responsible
for the whole and sole execution of the sentence of deposition.
Nothing of this was hinted in Ponsonby's own despatch, and the
false account therefore which it conveyed of what had passed
raised a general and strong feeling of indignation.
In the afternoon I saw Guizot, whom I found very reasonable, full
of regret for the violence at Paris, and admitting that it was
not only mad but ridiculous; said he had urged as forcibly as he
could that they should do nothing for several days, and pay no
attention to any events that might occur on the Syrian coast;
that he had written to the Duc de Broglie and entreated him to
exert all his influence to keep matters quiet; and then he said
that he still did not despair of peace if we would only do
_something_ to pacify and conciliate France; that _some_
concession in return for hers she must have, and without which
her Government had not the power to maintain peace; that his
conviction was, that if we would give Mehemet Ali Candia, or a
little more of Syria--two out of the four Pashaliks--that this
would be accepted, and that surely the alliance and concurrence
of France were worth as much as this. I went from him to John
Russell, and told him what he had said.
October 10th, 1840 {p.335}
[Page Head: RECEPTION OF THE FRENCH NOTE.]
The Cabinet met this afternoon. Lord John Russell was to have
taken the lead and developed his conciliatory notions, but a new
turn was given to affairs by a note which Guizot placed in
Palmerston's hands just before the Cabinet, which he only
received from Paris this morning.[7] He called on Palmerston and
gave it him; but without any observations. Palmerston brought it
to the Cabinet, where it was read, and, to the extreme surprise
of everybody, it was to the last degree moderate, and evincing a
disposition to be very easily satisfied. This note is ill
written, ill put together, and very tame. What a difficult task a
French Minister must have, to defend at once such a note and such
an expense as had been incurred! Probably Guizot did not much
admire the production. The consequence was that the discussion
turned on this document, and Palmerston immediately showed a
disposition to haggle and bargain, and make it a pretext for
extorting from France the best terms she could be got to yield,
and all this in the spirit of a pedlar rather than of a
statesman. This was, however, overruled. A better and more
liberal disposition pervaded the majority, and it was settled
that Palmerston should see Guizot and speak to him in a
conciliatory tone, and that a note, in a corresponding spirit,
should be drawn up and sent to the French Government. This note
is, however, to be first submitted for the approbation, and, if
necessary, alteration of the Cabinet, so that care will be taken
to make it what it ought to be. It would now appear that the
French Government would be well enough satisfied if the original
terms offered to Mehemet Ali were still held out to him, and if
it is made clear that he will in no case be molested in the
hereditary possession of Egypt; but Palmerston began talking of
leaving him Egypt _for his life_, which was, however, instantly
put down by the majority. A more decided disposition appeared in
the majority of the Cabinet to adopt the conciliatory policy;
whereas they exhibited at the previous meetings rather a doubtful
manner, without, however, on any occasion saying much either way.
Palmerston displayed the same overweening confidence, and the
same desire to conceal whatever militated against his opinion.
Besides talking of the success they had already obtained (which
after all amounts to very little), he said he had seen somebody,
who had seen somebody else, who knew that Louis Philippe was
absolutely determined against war under any circumstances. It
turned out that there was a despatch from Sir Charles Smith
(between whom and Napier there is some jealousy or
misunderstanding), in which he says that the position they occupy
is of no use whatever, but is purely defensive, and if Ibrahim
does not attack the Turks, and expose himself to a defeat, they
can do nothing against him. This, however, Palmerston held cheap,
because it did not square with his wishes. On the whole the
result was satisfactory; and if anybody but Palmerston was at the
Foreign Office, everything must be settled at once; but he is so
little to be trusted that there is always danger while he is
there.
[7] [This was the celebrated Note of which Thiers gave me a
printed copy when I dined with him on the 8th October
at Auteuil. I came back to Paris, sat up all night with
a friend to translate it, and despatched it to England
next morning. My translation appeared in the 'Times' on
the same day the Note was given to Lord Palmerston--
which was another grievance. It was a very lengthy
document, recapitulating the whole conduct of France in
this affair, but ending in a very tame conclusion.
Unfortunately Lord Palmerston did not display the same
moderation, and his Notes continued to be as
acrimonious as ever.--H.R.]
I went almost immediately to Guizot, and told him that the
reception of his note had given a new turn to the discussion, but
that it had given the greatest satisfaction, and they were
certainly not prepared for such a moderate communication. He
laughed, shrugged his shoulders, and said, 'He should think they
were not,' any more than he was, that nothing could equal his
surprise at receiving it, that it was very ill written, ill
arranged, and he owned to me, in confidence, that he thought it
went even farther than it ought; farther than he (much as he
desired peace) could ever have consented to go. He did not
disguise from me, and almost said in terms, that he thought it
very discreditable, and strikingly inconsistent with their
previous language and ostentatious preparations. I said that I
could not comprehend how such a note could emanate from the same
quarter as all the denunciations and threats we had lately heard,
and that though Thiers had, as everybody knew, a great deal of
_savoir faire_, he would have some difficulty in defending both
the note and the preparations. He seemed by no means sorry at the
idea of Thiers having got into a scrape and dilemma, but not at
all satisfied at the figure which France is made to act in the
affair, and not much liking to play any part in the transaction.
It is for this reason that he gave Palmerston the note without
any remarks on its contents. When I asked him how it was all to
be accounted for, he told me that the truth was, it was owing to
the dissensions in the French Cabinet, and the determination of
the King; and that it was the only mode by which an entire
rupture in the Cabinet could be avoided. He said, however, that
he would have preferred the rupture rather than a violent
difference of opinion ending in such a measure. (At least as I
understood him, but I am not quite clear as to his meaning on
this point.) I told him that Palmerston would see him, and would
(or ought at least to) speak to him in a very conciliatory tone;
but that if he did not do so, if he was wanting in any proper
expression of the sense of our Government of the conduct of that
of France, and if he evinced any disposition to haggle and drive
a bargain, he was not to believe that he expressed the sentiments
of the Cabinet, but merely gave utterance to his own. We agreed
that at all events the road to peace was still open, and could
hardly be missed. He said, it depended on us, and only entreated
that the communication we made to the French Government might be
full, cordial, and satisfactory, giving them all the assurances
they could require, setting their minds at rest as to Egypt, and
generally in a tone as conciliatory and moderate as theirs to us.
He earnestly deprecated the idea of any bargaining, and said that
if Palmerston hinted at such a thing with him he must make his
proposals directly to Paris, for he would listen to none such
here. On the whole, he is well satisfied at the prospect of the
preservation of peace, but very much dissatisfied, and even
disgusted, at the manner in which this consummation is likely to
be brought about; conscious and ashamed of the false position in
which the Government of France is placed, probably by their own
conduct from the beginning, but certainly by their violent and
declamatory language, so full of invective and menace, their
expensive and ostentatious preparations, and now their tame (and
if it were possible they could be afraid), pusillanimous
conclusion. He did not say a great deal, but what he did say was
with energy and strong feeling, and these I am certain are his
sentiments.
[Page Head: POLICY OF LOUIS PHILIPPE.]
The real truth I take to be that the King is the cause of the
whole thing. With that wonderful sagacity which renders him the
ablest man in France, and enables him sooner or later to carry
all his points, and that tact and discernment with which he knows
when to yield and when to stand, he allowed Thiers to have his
fall swing; and to commit himself with the nation, the King
himself all the time consenting to put the country in a
formidable attitude, but making no secret of his desire for
peace; and then at the decisive moment, when he found there was a
division in the Cabinet, throwing all his influence into the
pacific scale, and eventually reducing Thiers to the alternative
of making a very moderate overture or breaking up the Government.
The King in all probability knew that in the latter event Thiers
would no longer be so formidable, and that there would be the
same division in the party as in the Cabinet, and that he should
be able to turn the scale in the Chamber in favour of peace. It
is probable that His Majesty looks beyond the present crisis, and
sees in the transaction the means of emancipating himself from
the domination of Thiers, and either getting rid of him, or, what
would probably be more convenient and safe, reducing him to a
dependence on himself.
Livermere, October 17th, 1840 {p.339}
All this week at Newmarket, where I received regular information
of all that went on. Before I left town I saw Lord Holland and
Lord John Russell. The latter expressed himself better satisfied
than he had yet been, but was still doubtful how far Palmerston
could be trusted. Palmerston made no communication to Guizot, and
seemed resolved to interpose every delay, though everybody kept
on urging that something should be done without loss of time. But
he assured Melbourne that in a few days we should hear of the
total evacuation of Syria, and that then we should be in a better
condition to treat. His colleagues, however, began to get alarmed
at these delays, and none more than Melbourne, who would not say
or do anything to accelerate Palmerston's movements, though he
acknowledged to others that, so far from partaking of his
confidence in the success of the operations in Syria, he expected
no good news from that quarter. Palmerston went to Windsor, and
there the Queen herself began to urge him more strongly than she
had ever done, for she hears constantly from Leopold, who is mad
with fright, and who imparts all his fears to her. All this did
at last produce something, for there was a Cabinet the day before
yesterday, at which a despatch to Ponsonby was read, in which he
was desired to move the Sultan to reinstate the Pasha in the
hereditary government of Egypt, and this had been shown to
Guizot, who had expressed himself satisfied with it. This, it may
be hoped, will be sufficient, for the Note _requires_ no more
than this, and it may be taken as an earnest of our desire to
meet the wishes of France. If it only produces a pacific
paragraph in the King's speech the crisis will be over.
I do not quite understand how we can consistently send such an
instruction to our Ambassador _separately_. The Sultan pronounced
the deposition of Mehemet Ali by the advice of the Four Powers
(that is, by that of the four Ambassadors), and I know not how we
are entitled to do this act rather than any other without the
concurrence of the rest. It was admitted that we could make no
overture to France, no pacific communication even, without the
consent of all. The Pasha has been solemnly deposed, all the
Powers advised this measure, and now we are alone and separately
recommending that he should be again restored to the government
of Egypt. Russia may not coincide in this recommendation; his
deposition from Egypt is now a part of the Treaty. Whatever was
the secret intention of the parties, we are now bound,[8] if the
Porte insists on it, to exert all our power to expel the Pasha
from Egypt as well as from Syria. Such are the inconsistencies
into which the precipitate violence of Ponsonby has plunged us.
[8] It is held (though this seems a nice point) that we are
_not_ bound.
Downham, October 23rd, 1840 {p.340}
[Page Head: DEATH OF LORD HOLLAND.]
From Livermere to Riddlesworth last Monday, and home to-day. This
morning I learnt (by reading it in the 'Globe') the sudden death
of Lord Holland, after a few hours' illness, whom I left not a
fortnight ago in his usual health, and likely to live many
years.[9] There did not, probably, exist an individual whose loss
will be more sincerely lamented and severely felt than his. Never
was popularity so great and so general, and his death will
produce a social revolution, utterly extinguishing not only the
most brilliant, but the only great house of reception and
constant society in England. His marvellous social qualities,
imperturbable temper, unflagging vivacity and spirit, his
inexhaustible fund of anecdote, extensive information, sprightly
wit, with universal toleration and urbanity, inspired all who
approached him with the keenest taste for his company, and those
who lived with him in intimacy with the warmest regard for his
person. This event may be said with perfect truth to 'eclipse the
gaiety of nations,' for besides being an irreparable loss to the
world at large, it turns adrift, as it were, the innumerable
_habitués_ who, according to their different degrees of intimacy,
or the accidents of their social habits, made Holland House their
regular and constant resort. It is impossible to overrate the
privation, the blank, which it will make to the old friends and
associates, political and personal, to whom Holland House has
always been open like a home, and there cannot be a sadder sight
than to see the curtain suddenly fall upon a scene so brilliant
and apparently prosperous, and the light which for nearly half a
century has adorned and cheered the world, thus suddenly and for
ever extinguished. Although I did not rank among the old and
intimate friends of Holland House, I came among the first of the
second class of those who were always welcome, passed much of my
time there, and have been continually treated with the greatest
cordiality and kindness, and I partake largely and sincerely of
the regret that must be so deep and universal.
[9] Lord Holland said, just before he died, to the page,
'Edgar, these Syrian affairs will be too much for me.
Mehemet Ali will kill me.'
Downham, October 24th, 1840 {p.341}
I have a letter from Clarendon this morning from Windsor,
overwhelmed with the news of Lord Holland's death (which he had
just received)
'when his mind was as vigorous and his perceptions as
clear as ever, and when his advice, and the weight of his
experience, were more necessary to his country than at
any period of his life. To myself I feel that the loss is
irreparable. He was the only one in the Cabinet with whom
I had any real sympathy, and upon the great question now
in dispute I feel almost powerless, for, with the anility
of Melbourne, the vacillation of John, and the
indifference of all the rest, Palmerston is now more
completely master of the ground than ever.'
He goes on to say:
'Guizot came down here last night; he goes to Paris on
Sunday, to be present at the opening of the Chambers, and
to defend himself. More, however, than that is in his
mind, I am sure, and his feelings towards Thiers are
anything but friendly. Thiers, it seems, means to put up
Odillon Barrot (Guizot's favourite aversion) for the
presidency of the Chamber, and, it is said, to resign if
he is beaten. This, Guizot told me, was an inconceivable
_faiblesse_, or an unpardonable _légèreté_; but that
whichever it was, he should oppose it, and had written to
tell the Duke de Broglie so, in order that he might not
be accused of taking the Government by surprise. He said
to me, "_Donnez-moi quelque chose à dire_, let it be ever
so small, provided it is satisfactory. I will impose it
on Thiers, or break up his administration; but unless I
can have something of the kind, and, above all, something
wherewith to _resserrer les liens entre les deux pays_,
which is my great ambition, I shall neither be able to
_calmer les esprits_ nor to take on myself the
government."'
He then goes on to say that Guizot tells him--and his own letters
confirm it--that the late _attentat_ on the King had made a much
stronger impression, and excited more alarm, than any former one,
and he had proposed to Melbourne to send a special ambassador to
congratulate the King on his escape, who should also be
instructed to _peace-make_; and suggested that the Duke of
Bedford, Lord Spencer, or himself, should go. Melbourne admitted
it would be a very good thing to establish some direct
communication with the King and Thiers, as well as the truth of
all the reasons by which he supported this proposal; but the
following day he came down with a whole host of petty objections,
'which seemed to prevail in his perplexed and unserviceable
mind.' The Duke of Bedford writes to me that he expects this
state of things will lead to a fresh combination of parties, and
the breaking-up of this Government.
This is what, in my opinion, it ought to lead to; for, having now
been behind the scenes for some time, I have satisfied myself of
the danger of the interests of such a country as this being
committed to such men as our Ministers. How astonished the world
would be!--even the bitterest and most contemptuous of their
political opponents--if they could be apprised of all that has
passed under my observation during the last two months.
Newmarket, October 27th, 1840 {p.343}
At Downham laid up with the gout, and now here. Heard of Thiers'
resignation on Sunday, and nothing since; but Lady Palmerston
writes me word Guizot went to take leave of them in high spirits,
and that there was no doubt he would accept the Foreign Office.
Thiers had promised not to oppose the new Government.[10]
[10] [I breakfasted with M. Guizot at Hertford House on the
24th October, having arrived in London on the 21st from
Paris, where I had spent the preceding fortnight, and
had learned from Thiers, and other friends there, the
French side of these curious transactions. A courier
arrived in London on the morning of the 24th, bringing
a letter from the King to M. Guizot, which he showed
me. It was written in his own bold hand, and contained
the words, 'Je compte sur vous, mon cher Ministre, pour
m'aider dans ma lutte tenace contre l'anarchie!'
Whilst I was in Paris, where the greatest irritation
and alarm prevailed, my old friend and master, Count
Rossi, retained his composure, and said to me, tapping
a sheet of paper as he spoke, 'When it comes to the
Draft of the Speech from the Throne to be delivered to
the Chambers, this will break up. The King will not
consent to adopt Thiers' warlike language.' This is
exactly what occurred some ten days later. Rossi had a
deeper insight into political causes and events than
any other man whom I have known.--H.R.]
[Page Head: M. GUIZOT SUCCEEDS M. THIERS.]
Guizot left London pretty well determined to take the Government;
and after some little discussion everything was settled, and the
new Cabinet proclaimed. The Press instantly fell upon him with
the greatest bitterness, and the first impression was that he had
no chance of standing, but the last accounts held out a better
prospect. I have had no communication with him but a short note
he wrote me on his departure, expressing his regret not to have
seen me, and begging I would communicate with Bourqueney, and let
him call upon and converse with me. I wrote to him yesterday a
long letter, in which I told him how matters stood here, and
expressed my desire to know what we could do that would be of use
to him. In the meantime there has been a fresh course of
wrangling, and a fresh set of remonstrances on the part of the
peace advocates here, and lively altercations, both by letter and
_vivâ voce_, between Lord John and Melbourne, and Lord John and
Palmerston. Clarendon, in a visit of six days at Windsor, worked
away at the impenetrable Viscount, and Lord Lansdowne battered
him with a stringent letter, pressing for the adoption of some
immediate measure of a pacific tendency; and in a conversation
which Clarendon had with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he
found him well inclined to the same policy, so that there is an
important section of the Cabinet disposed to take an active part
in this direction. But Palmerston at the same time wrote to
Melbourne in a tone of the greatest contempt for all that was
saying and doing in France, and, of course, elated by the recent
successes in Syria, which, with his usual luck, have happened at
this critical moment, and certainly do appear to be decisive.[11]
[11] [Lord Palmerston's object in all these critical
discussions with his colleagues had simply been to gain
time for the operations in Syria against the Pasha to
take effect, for he had never ceased to maintain that
they would be completely successful, and in this,
whether by superior information, by clearer judgment,
or by extreme good fortune, he proved to be in the
right, which ensured his ultimate triumph. But if there
had been the slightest failure, or check, or delay in
any part of the operations, it must have proved fatal
to the Government.]
[Page Head: LORD JOHN THREATENS TO RESIGN.]
But just before the news came of the surrender of the Emir
Beschir, Lord John had taken up the question in a much more
serious and decisive tone than he ever did before; and in
correspondence with Melbourne, and _vivâ voce_ with Palmerston,
had announced his determination to quit the Government
altogether. The occasion for this vigorous outbreak was the
arrival of a box of Foreign Office papers, in which, besides some
long rigmaroles of Metternich's, there was a proposal
(transmitted by Beauvale) for a congress for the settlement of
all disputes, together with the draft of a short answer which
Palmerston had written and sent, declining the offer. This Lord
John considered to pass all endurance, no matter whether the
congress was advisable or not; but that such an important
suggestion should be received and rejected without any
communication of it to the other members of the Government,
especially to him who was their leader in the House of Commons,
was so outrageous that he was resolved not to pass it over, and
he accordingly wrote his opinion upon it to Melbourne in the
strongest terms, recommending him to transfer the lead of the
House of Commons to Palmerston, and to dispose of his office as
he pleased, as he would no longer go on; and he said that though
there must be a Cabinet in a few days to settle about Parliament,
he should not attend any more of them. To this Melbourne wrote a
curious answer, because it was indicative of no approbation of,
or confidence in, his brother-in-law and colleague. He said he
thought Lord John had taken this up too strongly (he thinks
everything is too strong), but that he had sent his letter to
Palmerston, who would, no doubt, see him or write to him on the
subject. He then went on to say that he presumed Lord John had
well considered his determination, which would be, _ipso facto_,
the dissolution of the Government, as he would not consent to
carry it on with Palmerston as leader of the House of Commons;
that the retirement of Lord John, and the substitution of
Palmerston in such a post, would be such an announcement to all
Europe of the intentions of the British Government to persevere
in the extreme line of his policy, that he could not for a moment
contemplate such a thing. Therefore, if Lord John persisted, the
Government was at an end. Shortly after, Palmerston called on
Lord John. He admitted that he had done wrong--that he ought to
have consulted him, and have made him privy to his answer, but
that he had attached so little importance to the proposal, and
had considered it so totally out of the question, that he had
replied offhand.
[Page Head: LORD PALMERSTON DEFENDS LORD PONSONBY.]
They then went into the question itself, when Palmerston took
that advantageous ground which he has always held and asked him
how he reconciled his present opinions with his strenuous support
of the Treaty itself, and complained again of his acting as he
had done, while success was attending the coalition. They seem to
have parted much as they met, with mutual dissatisfaction, but
without any quarrel. Lord John, however, resolved upon action,
and ultimately determined to propose the recall of Ponsonby as
the _sine quâ non_ of his continuance in office. The violence of
these disputes, and the peril in which the existence of the
Government seemed to be placed, brought Melbourne up to town, and
Lord John came to meet him, and imparted to him his intentions.
Just in the nick of time, however, arrived the news of the Emir's
flight, which seemed to be almost conclusive of the Syrian
question. On this, Palmerston took courage, and, no longer
insisting upon supporting Ponsonby _à tort et à travers_,
entreated that a damp might not be cast upon the enterprise just
as the final success was at hand; and employed the argument _ad
misericordiam_ with regard to Ponsonby by saying, that he would
be entitled to a pension if he was left there till December, and
it would be hard to recall him before that term was accomplished.
Lord John (never sufficiently firm of purpose) at last agreed to
wait for the receipt of the official accounts of recent events in
Syria which was expected in a few days, and to defer his demand
for Ponsonby's recall till then, and Palmerston seems to have
satisfied him that he is not at all desirous of quarrelling with
France. Indeed, Palmerston himself threw out, that it might be
expedient to find a provision for the family of the Pasha, and
render the grant of some appointments to his sons instrumental to
the settlement of the question. There was a strange article, too,
in the 'Morning Chronicle' the other day, which talked of the
probability of Ibrahim's being driven out of Northern Syria, and
his entrenching himself within the Pashalik of Acre, which would
then prevent the accomplishment of the Treaty of July. All this
looks as if Palmerston was beginning to think he was driving
matters too far, and that it was necessary to lower his tone and
modify his policy, unless he was prepared to retire from office.
At all events, Lord John was pacified for the moment by this
indication of more moderate intentions, and began to hope better
things for the future. To-morrow the Cabinet is to meet again.
While all these wranglings are going on here, and nothing is
done, but a great deal contemplated, Bourqueney presses for
_something_ on our part and keeps repeating that every minute is
precious. On the other hand, the Emperor of Russia is highly
satisfied with the state of things as it is, and he intimated to
Bloomfield that he should be extremely indisposed to consent to
any scheme for a fresh arrangement in which France should
participate, while our vague notion is, that the coalition should
fall to the ground as soon as its object is attained, and that we
should bring in France as a party to some final settlement of the
East, and dotation of the sons of Mehemet Ali. In the meantime
the Chambers met yesterday, and all depends upon their
proceedings.
November 7th, 1840 {p.347}
Lord Palmerston has written a long and able letter, setting forth
all the reasons why no special mission should be sent to
Constantinople, and why Ponsonby should not be recalled; a
skilful defence of Ponsonby showing how right he had been about
Syria; what unprecedented influence he had obtained, having got
both the Turkish fleet and army placed under the command of
Englishmen, and how he had infused such spirit into the Turkish
councils that they had made exertions of which nobody thought
they were capable, and manifested a vigour it was not imagined
they possessed. This letter must have been a very good one, for
it entirely brought over Lord John to his opinion, and even
convinced Clarendon himself; and the former had already written
to Palmerston to say that he gave up his demand for Ponsonby's
recall. There is, however, still too much reason to believe, that
Palmerston is bent upon quarrelling with France,[12] and that he
is now fighting to gain time in hopes of some commotion in Egypt
itself, which might lead to the complete ruin of the Pasha.
[12] [This was the real charge against Lord Palmerston and
his policy, and it is impossible to doubt that he was
actuated in the whole of this affair, not so much by a
desire to support the Sultan and to ruin the Pasha of
Egypt, as by the passionate wish to humble France, and
to revenge himself on King Louis Philippe and his
Ministers for their previous conduct in the affairs of
Spain. At this very moment, far from wishing to
strengthen M. Guizot in his efforts to maintain peace,
Lord Palmerston addressed to him a most offensive
despatch, and published it, with a view to weaken and
injure the French Ministry.--H.R.]
[Page Head: M. GUIZOT'S LETTER.]
This evening Bourqueney called on me, and brought me a letter
which he had received the day before from Guizot, which I shall
copy here.
M. Guizot's Letter to Baron Bourqueney.
Mon Cher Baron,--Le discours de la Couronne est
définitivement arrêté. Je crois que vous le trouverez
conforme à la vérité des choses et aux convenances de la
situation. Vous recevrez une circulaire que j'adresse à
tous mes agents. J'y ai essayé de marquer avec précision
l'attitude que le Cabinet veut prendre et qu'il gardera.
Mais ce ne sont là que des paroles: il faut des
résultats. On les attend du Cabinet. Il s'est formé pour
maintenir la paix, et pour trouver aux embarras de la
question d'Orient quelque issue; pour vivre il faut qu'il
satisfasse aux causes qui l'ont fait naître. La
difficulté est extrême. L'exaltation du pays n'a pas
diminué, la formation du Cabinet donne aux amis de la
paix plus de confiance, mais elle redouble l'ardeur des
hommes qui poussent, ou qui se laissent pousser, à la
guerre; les malveillants et les rivaux exploiteront,
fomenteront les préjugés nationaux, les passions
nationales. La lutte sera très-vive et le péril toujours
imminent. Je dirai la vérité. Je m'applique à éclaircir
les esprits et à contenir les passions: je ne puis que
cela. Ce n'est pas assez; pour que le succès vienne à la
raison, il faut qu'on m'aide. Deux sentiments sont ici en
présence, le désir de la paix et l'honneur national. Je
l'ai souvent dit à Londres, je le répète de Paris. Le
sentiment de la France--je dis de la France, et non pas
des brouillons et des factions--est qu'elle a été traitée
légèrement, qu'on a sacrifié légèrement, sans motif
suffisant, pour un intérêt secondaire son alliance, son
amitié, son concours. Là est le grand mal qu'a fait la
Convention du 15 Juillet, là est le grand obstacle à la
politique et à la paix. Pour guérir ce mal, pour lever
cet obstacle, il faut prouver à la France qu'elle se
trompe, il faut lui prouver qu'on attache à son alliance,
à son amitié, à son concours, beaucoup de prix, assez de
prix pour lui faire quelque sacrifice. Ce n'est pas
l'etendue, c'est le fait même du sacrifice qui importe,
qu'indépendamment de la Convention du 15 Juillet quelque
chose soit donné, évidemment donné, au désir de rentrer
en bonne intelligence avec la France, et de la voir
rentier dans l'affaire, la paix pourra être maintenue et
l'harmonie générale rétablie en Europe. Si on vous dit
cela se peut, je suis prêt à faire les démarches
nécessaires pour atteindre à ce but, et à en accepter la
responsabilité, mais je ne veux pas me mettre en
mouvement sans savoir si le but est possible à atteindre.
Si on vous dit que cela ne se peut pas, qu'on entend s'en
tenir rigoureusement aux premières stipulations du
traité, et ne rien accorder, ne rien faire qui soit pour
la France une preuve qu'on désire se rapprocher d'elle,
pour le Cabinet une force dans la lutte qu'il a à
soutenir, la situation restera violente et précaire, le
Cabinet se tiendra immobile, dans l'isolement et
l'attente. Je ne réponds pas de l'avenir. Dites cela à
Lord Palmerston, c'est de lui que l'issue dépend. Il vous
parlera de l'état de la Syrie, de l'insurrection du
Liban, des progrès que font les Alliés. Répondez
simplement que c'est là pour la France une raison de se
montrer plus facile à satisfaire, mais que ce n'est pas
pour l'Angleterre une raison de ne rien faire en
considération de la France. Je n'ai encore rien dit, rien
écrit nulle part. J'attends ce qu'on vous dira à
Londres....
Nothing can be better, more serious, or better calculated to
produce an effect, if anything can, upon our impenetrable
Cabinet. Bourqueney showed it in the first instance to Melbourne,
who told him to show it to Palmerston; but he said he had
scruples in doing that lest Palmerston should make him an answer
calculated to exclude all hope of accommodation; but Melbourne
hinted that he would take care of this, and accordingly he took
it to Palmerston this morning. He read it, said it was very
moderate, and praised the tone and language. But when Bourqueney
began to ask what he had to say to the _fond_, he only talked of
the practical difficulties, and ended without saying anything the
least promising or satisfactory, though nothing decidedly the
reverse. Bourqueney had previously been with Billow, who is just
come back, and who desires no better on the part of his
Government than to join in any conciliatory measure we may adopt;
and Esterhazy, who is expected every hour, will, he doubts not,
be equally well disposed. But although such is the disposition
both of Austria and Prussia, though the Queen is earnestly
desirous of seeing tranquillity and security restored, and almost
all, if not quite all, the Cabinet, are in favour of an
accommodation with France, and France herself is prepared to
accept the slightest advance offered in a conciliatory spirit,
the personal determination of Palmerston will probably
predominate over all these opinions and inclinations. He will put
down or adjourn every proposal that is made, and if any should be
adopted in spite of him, he will take care to mar it in the
execution, to remove no difficulties, and create them where they
don't already exist. The most extraordinary part of the whole
affair is, that a set of men should consent to go on with another
in whom they have not only no confidence, but whom they believe
to be politically dishonest and treacherous, and that they should
keep gravely discussing the adoption of measures with a full
conviction that he will not fairly carry them out. It is like
Jonathan Wild and his companions playing together in Newgate. I
understand the last decision of the Cabinet is that Guizot is to
be invited to say what would suit his case. There would be a
difficulty in specifying what concessions we should make, either
for Mehemet Ali or his sons, because events are proceeding
rapidly in Syria, and we _might be_ offering what we have already
restored to the Sultan, and what the Porte has assisted to
recover for itself. It is settled that all this shall be fairly
stated to Guizot, with an assurance that we are desirous of
assisting him, together with our willingness to concert with him
the means. This may do, if honestly and truly carried out.
Friday, November 13th, 1840 {p.349}
[Page Head: TERMS OF CONCILIATION.]
The day before yesterday Bourqueney called on me, and brought me
a letter from Guizot in reply to the one I had written him. He
then proceeded to tell me all that had occurred since I had
before seen him, and to this effect: On Saturday the Cabinet had
resolved upon an invitation to Guizot to announce his wishes and
ideas, and proposed a frank explanation _de part et d'autre_ on
the whole question. On Sunday, Palmerston communicated this to
Bourqueney, and very faithfully. On Sunday or Monday arrived a
despatch from Metternich, first of all confirming Neumann as sole
Minister to the Conference, and secondly announcing that any
concession in Syria was _now_ quite out of the question. This he
told Bourqueney, and conveyed to Palmerston, to whom it was a
great accession of force, and by this the disposition of Austria,
and with it that of Bülow, became entirely changed, and very
unfavourable to any transaction. On Monday morning Bourqueney
received a letter from Guizot saying that he had had a conference
with Lord Granville, to whom he had suggested various
alternatives for a settlement on the basis of a concession, which
Granville was by the same post to transmit to Palmerston, and he
at the same time told Bourqueney what they were: Egypt
hereditary, St. Jean d'Acre for life, and either Tripoli or
Candia for one of his sons; or the hereditary Pashalik of Acre
instead. On Monday night Bourqueney met Palmerston at dinner at
the Mansion House, when he said to him, 'You have heard from Lord
Granville, and he has transmitted to you M. Guizot's proposals
(or suggestions).' 'No,' said Palmerston, 'I have heard from Lord
Granville, but he sent me nothing specific on the part of Guizot.
But come to Lady Palmerston's to-night from hence, and we will
talk it over.' He went there, and Palmerston read to him a long
despatch from Granville, but which, to his surprise, did not
contain any of the specific propositions which Guizot had
notified to him, and, conceiving that Granville must have certain
good reasons for this reticence, he resolved to say nothing of
them either, and confined himself to mere general inquiries as to
what could be done, to which he obtained no satisfactory reply,
not a hope being held out of any concession. In this condition of
affairs he came to me to tell me what passed and consult me as to
the future. I told him that though there was the same desire for
a reconciliation with France, and the same anxiety to assist M.
Guizot on the part of my friends, when they came to consider what
was possible and would be safe and justifiable, they were unable
to find any expedient to meet the immense practical difficulties
of the case; that events had proceeded with such celerity, and
placed the question in so different a position, that concessions
formerly contemplated as reasonable and possible were now out of
the question. They all felt that they could offer nothing in
Syria; that it was possible the Sultan might be actually in
possession of any town or territory at the moment they were
offering it, and that now justice to the people, honour and
fidelity to our allies, especially to the Sultan himself, forbade
us to make any concession whatever in that quarter. Bourqueney
did not deny the force of this, but he said Guizot was sanguine
as to the acceptance of some such terms as he had suggested, and
it was of the last importance he should be undeceived, and made
acquainted with the real truth, and know what he had to rely on.
He said he would write, but he entreated me to write to him too,
and to tell him the substance of what I had imparted to him.
Accordingly I did write to Guizot at great length, setting forth
in terms as strong as I could, and without any disguise, the
difficulties of the case, and the utter unreasonableness of the
French public in requiring, as a salve to their vanity, terms
which we could neither in good policy or good faith concede. We
both agreed that under existing circumstances it was not
desirable that Guizot should make any proposal to our Government,
and so we both of us told him. Such was the result of a
conversation which when reported to Guizot will be a bitter
disappointment to him; but I concur with the rest, that we could
not now make any of the concessions he was disposed to ask.
Bourqueney suggested that if the chances of war should be
hereafter favourable to the Pasha, if the Allies should make no
impression upon Acre or the south-west part of Syria, then
possibly some transaction on such a basis might be possible.
This, however, it was useless to discuss. Yesterday I saw Dedel,
who has lately been at Walmer, and he told me the Duke of
Wellington's opinion exactly coincided with ours, coincided both
as to the impossibility of our making any concession in Syria,
and to its perfect inutility if we did. We might degrade
ourselves, weaken our own cause, but we should neither strengthen
Guizot nor satisfy the cravings of French vanity and insolence,
still less silence that revolutionary spirit which, not strong
enough in itself, seeks to become formidable by stimulating the
passions and allying itself with all the vanity, pride, and
restlessness, besides desire for plunder, which are largely
scattered throughout the country.
It is curious that Austria, hitherto so timid, should all of a
sudden become so bold, for besides this notification to Neumann,
Metternich has said that, though we have instructed Ponsonby to
move the Sultan to restore Mehemet Ali to Egypt, he has not given
the same instructions to Stürmer, and that he wants to see the
progress of events and the conduct of the Pasha before he does
so.
[Page Head: LORD PALMERSTON'S IRRITATING LANGUAGE.]
Events have so befriended Palmerston that he is now in the right,
and has got his colleagues with him; but where he is and always
has been wrong is in his neglect of forms; the more _fortiter_ he
is _in re_, the more _suaviter_ he ought to be _in modo_. But
while defending his policy or attacking that of France, he has
never said what he might have done to conciliate, to soften, and
to destroy those impressions of intended affronts and secret
designs which have produced such violent effects on the French
public. On the contrary, he has constantly, in his State papers,
and still more in his newspapers, said what is calculated to
irritate and provoke them to the greatest degree; but Dedel says
this has always been his fault, in all times and in all his
diplomatic dealings, and this is the reason he is so detested by
all the Corps Diplomatique, and has made such enemies all over
Europe. Guizot will now be cast on his own resources, and must
try whether the language of truth and reason will be listened to
in France; whether he can, by plain statements of facts, and
reasonable deductions therefrom, dissipate those senseless
prejudices and extravagant delusions which have excited such a
tempest in the public mind. It is clear enough to me that if he
cannot, if vanity and resentment are too strong for sober reason
and sound policy, no concessions we could make would save him
from downfall, or save Europe from the consequences of this moral
deluge.
November 15th, 1840 {p.353}
Two days ago, Lord John Russell called on me. We had some talk,
but nothing very conclusive. He said the operations in Syria
could not go on much longer, and we are threatened with the
greatest of all evils, the hanging over of the question for
another year. This he thought the worst thing of all. It is
curious that he told me Stopford wrote word he must send his
ships into port, and all the authorities, military and naval, say
nothing can be done after the 20th. Palmerston keeps telling
Bourqueney they can go on all the winter, and that the operations
will not be suspended at all. I asked Lord John, if the campaign
did close, leaving the Pasha in possession of all the south-west
of Syria from Damascus to the Desert, and Acre unattacked,
whether on such a status an agreement could not be concluded,
terminating the contest by the concession of the original terms
of the treaty. He said Melbourne would like that very well, but
that there would be difficulties, and France would not come into
the treaty on those terms. I told him I was pretty sure France
would, though I did not tell him what had passed between
Bourqueney and me. However, I sent for Bourqueney, and told him
to propose nothing new, but to wait till the campaign was over,
and in the meantime to prepare the way for some specific
proposition which France might make in a spirit of amicable
intervention to put an end to the contest.
December 4th, 1840 {p.354}
[Page Head: DEBATE IN THE FRENCH CHAMBER.]
In the course of the last three weeks, and since I last wrote, a
mighty change has taken place; we have had the capture of St.
Jean d'Acre and the debate in the French Chambers.[13] Palmerston
is triumphant; everything has turned out well for him. He is
justified by the success of his operations and by the revelations
in the speeches of Thiers and Rémusat. So, at least, the world
will consider it, which does not examine deeply and compare
curiously in order to form its judgements; and it must be
acknowledged that he has a fair right to plume himself on his
success. His colleagues have nothing more to say; and as Guizot
makes a sort of common cause with him in the Chamber, and Thiers
makes out a case for himself by declaring objects and designs
which justify Palmerston's policy and acts, and as the Pasha is
now reduced to the necessity of submission, the contest is at an
end. Guizot continued up to the eve of the discussion to press us
to do or say something to assist him; but when he found we could
or would do nothing, he took the only line that was left him, and
the best after all, and threw himself on the sense and reason of
the country. He told the truth, and justified himself by
vindicating us. He has done very well, and shown himself a good
debater; but the discussion has been disgracefully personal, and
with all the talent displayed they have not an idea how a
deliberating assembly ought to conduct its debates, and the
disclosures and revelations of official secrecy and confidence
have been monstrous. Thiers has all along been playing a false,
shuffling, tricky part, and at last he got so entangled in the
meshes of his own policy, and so confused by the consequences of
his double dealing, that he evidently did not know what to do;
and the King had no difficulty in getting him out of a Government
that he could no longer conduct. He says now that he meant to
make war by and by; but though these menaces and the reasons he
gives afford Palmerston his best justification, and are appealed
to triumphantly by him and his friends, my own conviction is that
Thiers would gladly have closed the account by a transaction, and
that _at last_ he would have come into the Treaty--if Palmerston
would have let him in--upon terms much worse for the Pasha than
those to which he would not have consented before July. Nothing
that has occurred shakes my conviction that Palmerston was very
wrong not to endeavour to bring France into the Treaty and to
offer the _status quo_, though it is very possible France would
have refused it. If the French Government were on the one hand
resolved to agree to nothing, and under no circumstances to join
in coercing the Pasha, Palmerston on the other was as obstinately
determined to settle the business his own way, and not to make
any proposal to France which she would or could accept. They both
stood aloof, and both were immensely to blame. Palmerston has
taken his success without any appearance of triumph or a desire
to boast over those who doubted or opposed him; whatever may be
said or thought of his policy, it is impossible not to do justice
to the vigour of his execution. Mr. Pitt (Chatham) could not have
manifested more decision and resource. He would not hear of
delays and difficulties, sent out peremptory orders to attack
Acre, and he provided in his instructions with great care and
foresight for every contingency. There can be no doubt that it
was the capture of Acre which decided the campaign; and the
success is much more attributable to Palmerston than to our naval
and military commanders, and probably solely to him.
[13] [The bombardment and capture of St. Jean d'Acre by the
allied fleet took place on the 3rd November, whilst
these diplomatic troubles were going on in London and
Paris. The French Chambers opened on the 6th November.]
Yesterday I saw the Baron Mounier, who is come over here, on a
sort of mission, to talk about possible arrangements, from
Guizot. He still pertinaciously urges our doing or saying
something demonstrative of a disposition to be reconciled with
France, and that, in the ultimate settlement of the Eastern
Question, we wish to show her some deference. He wants (Syria
being gone) that we should make out that it is from consideration
for France that Egypt is left to the Pasha. I told him the only
difficulty appeared to be that, as we had already announced we
had no intention to strip him of Egypt, and had signified long
ago that we had advised the Sultan to restore him to that
Government, I did not see how we could now make any such
declaration available, and that it would go for nothing. But he
said he thought by a not difficult employment of diplomatic
phraseology much might be done; and he suggested that there must
be some definite settlement of the whole question, including
stipulations and guarantees for the Syrian population (of the
mountains, I presume), and to this France might be invited to
accede. In short, nothing will satisfy her but having a finger in
the pie upon any terms. What Guizot now wants is to renew the
English alliance. So he said when he went away; but it may well
be doubted whether the French are not too sulky with us and too
deeply mortified not to make this an unpopular attempt just now.
Mounier is the son of Mounier the Constitutionalist, entirely in
Guizot's confidence, a talkative man not seemingly brilliant, but
he is well versed in affairs, an active member of the Chamber of
Peers, and considered indispensable there as a _rédacteur_ and
transactor of Parliamentary business.
December 13th, 1840 {p.357}
For the last week at Norman Court, during which little or nothing
has happened; but I heard one or two things before I left town.
Guizot had made a direct application to Palmerston for his
permission to attribute the leaving of Egypt to Mehemet Ali, to
the influence of France, and to a desire to gratify her. This
Palmerston (through Lord Granville) refused; but Guizot had not
waited for the answer, and in his speech he said so, and it was
not without its use. But while everything was on the point of
being settled, Metternich (who is always in hot or cold fits of
courage or cowardice) sends over a proposal that Egypt shall only
be granted to Mehemet Ali for his own and his son's lives, and
not hereditary. For what possible reason this absurd proposition
was made, unless to create embarrassment and rekindle
animosities, nobody can conceive; though probably the real
solution is that Metternich is in his dotage, has no policy in
his brain, and acts from foolish impulses. I have heard no more
of it; and though Palmerston would not be at all averse to the
proposal as a matter of inclination, I do not suspect him of the
folly of listening to it, and, if he did, his colleagues would
not.
December 29th, 1840 {p.357}
[Page Head: LORD MELBOURNE IN HIGH SPIRITS.]
Went on Thursday last to the Grange, and returned yesterday. Just
before I went, the Duke of Bedford called on me; he was just come
from Woburn, where he had had a great party--Melbourne, like a
boy escaped from school, in roaring spirits. They anticipate an
easy session, and all Melbourne's alarm and despondency are
quickly succeeded by joy at having got out of a scrape, and
confidence that all difficulties are surmounted and all
opposition will be silenced. But it now comes out that of all who
were opposed to Palmerston's policy, not one--not even Lord
Holland--was _in his heart_ so averse to, and so afraid of it, as
Melbourne himself; and, nevertheless, he would say nothing and do
nothing to impede or alter it. Palmerston is now doing his best
to flatter Lord John out of any remains of sourness or soreness
that their recent disputes may have left in his mind; and
(passing over all that subsequently occurred) he writes to him to
invite him to Broadlands, and says that while their recent
successes have far exceeded the most sanguine expectations, he
never shall forget how much of them is owing to the powerful
support which he (Lord John) gave to him (Palmerston) in the
_Treaty_. There is, it must be owned, astuteness in this; for
Lord John's original support of the Treaty, and Palmerston's
success in the operations, bind them indissolubly together, and
it is very wise to put this prominently forward and cancel the
recollection of all the rest.
[Page Head: TORY OPINION OF LORD PALMERSTON'S POLICY.]
But while public opinion appears to be universally pronounced in
Palmerston's favour, and the concurrent applause of all the Tory
papers indicates the satisfaction of that party, some
circumstances lead me to believe that their approbation of the
Treaty of July, and of all Palmerston's proceedings under it, is
by no means so certain as the Government believe. At the Grange I
found Lord Ashburton loud in his condemnation of the whole thing,
talking exactly as we have all been talking and writing for many
weeks past; and what surprised me much more was, that, in a
conversation which I had with Granville Somerset yesterday, he
expressed precisely the same opinions; and when I expressed my
surprise at his language, and said that I had fancied all the
Tories were enraptured with Palmerston, he replied that he had no
reason to believe any such thing; that he had not met (among the
many with whom he had conversed) with any such general and
unqualified approbation; and he believed both the Duke and Peel
had carefully abstained from pronouncing any opinion whatever on
the subject, leaving themselves entire liberty to deal with the
whole question as they might think fit. The notion is, that the
Tories are charmed with a transaction which separates us from
France, but Lord Ashburton and Granville Somerset--a bigoted
Tory, if ever there was one--inveighed against the Treaty
precisely because it had produced that consequence. It is the
approbation expressed by Aberdeen, both before and since our
successes, which has led to the general belief that the Tories
are with the Government on this matter, for Aberdeen is regarded
as their mouthpiece upon all questions of foreign policy. I had
another conversation with Mounier just before he went. He had
been to Strathfieldsaye, and was delighted with his reception by
the Duke, and with the tone and tenor of his talk, anxious for a
reconciliation with France, and entering into the whole history
of our mutual relations from the Restoration to the present day,
as he said, with the greatest clearness, precision, and solidity.
He admitted that Guizot's was a very difficult situation, and the
restoration of amicable feelings between the two countries very
difficult also, but a thing earnestly to be desired.
December 31st, 1840 {p.359}
The end of the year is a point from which, as from a sort of
eminence, one looks back over the past, happy if the prospect is
not gloomy, and if the retrospect carries with it no feelings of
regret and self-reproach. The past year has been full (as what
year is not?) of events, of which that which has made the deepest
impression on society is the death of Lord Holland. I doubt, from
all I see, whether anybody (except his own family, including
Allen) had really a very warm affection for Lord Holland, and the
reason probably is that he had none for anybody. He was a man
with an inexhaustible good humour, and an ever-flowing nature,
but not of strong feelings; and there are men whose society is
always enjoyed but who never inspire deep and strong attachment.
I remember to have heard good observers say that Lady Holland had
more feeling than Lord Holland--would regret with livelier grief
the loss of a friend than this equable philosopher was capable of
feeling. The truth is social qualities--merely social and
intellectual--are not those which inspire affection. A man may be
steeped in faults and vices, nay, in odious qualities, and yet be
the object of passionate attachment, if he is only what the
Italians term '_simpatico_.'