The ex-King of Westphalia--The Duke of Wellington at Court--
Failure of the Duke's Memory--Dinner at Devonshire House to
Royalties--Government defeated on Irish Registration Bill--The
King of Hanover's Apartments--Rank of Foreign Ministers--The
Duchess of Inverness--War with China--Murder of Lord William
Russell--Duke of Wellington on the China War--Weakness of
Government--Duke of Wellington's Conduct towards the
Government--The Queen shot at--Examination of the Culprit--
Retrospect of Affairs--Conciliatory Policy--Advantages of a
Weak Government--The Eastern Question--Lord Palmerston's Daring
and Confidence--M. Guizot and Mr. Greville--Pacific Views of
Louis Philippe--M. Guizot's Statement of the Policy of France--
Growing Alarm of Ministers--Alarm of Prince Metternich--Lord
John Russell disposed to resist Palmerston--History of the
Eastern Negotiation--A Blunder of M. Guizot--Important
Conversation with Guizot--Conflict between Lord John Russell
and Lord Palmerston--Energetic Resolution of Lord John--Lord
Palmerston holds out--Conciliatory Proposals of France--
Interview of Lord Palmerston and Lord John.
March 13th, 1840 {p.277}
[Page Head: JEROME BONAPARTE.]
I met Jérome Bonaparte yesterday at dinner at Lady Blessington's,
Count de Montfort, as he is called. He is a polite, urbane
gentleman, not giving himself any airs, and said nothing royal
except that he was going to Stuttgard, 'pour passer quelques
jours avec mon beau-frère le Roi de Würtemberg.' But these
brothers of Napoleon were nothing remarkable in their palmy days,
and one's sympathies are not much excited for them now. They rose
and fell with him, and, besides their brief enjoyment of a
wonderful prosperity, they have retired upon far better
conditions than they were born to. They are free and rich, and
are treated with no inconsiderable respect.
March 14th, 1840 {p.277}
Went to the House of Lords, and saw the Chancellor, who told me
he had forwarded the paper I sent him to Dr. Lushington, who
concurred in my suggestions, and he had ordered the Privy Council
Bill to be altered accordingly. Fell in with the Duke of
Wellington, who took my arm, told his cabriolet to follow, and
walked the whole way back to Apsley House, quite firm and strong.
He looks very old and worn, and speaks very slowly, but quite
distinctly; talked about the China question and other things, and
seemed clear enough. He was pleased with his reception at Court,
and told me particularly how civil Prince Albert had been to him,
and indeed to everybody else; said he never saw better manners,
or anybody more generally attentive. The Duchess of Kent talked
to him, and in a strain of satisfaction, so that there is
something like sunshine in the Palace just now.
March 18th, 1840 {p.278}
The first symptom of a failure in the Duke of Wellington's memory
came under my notice the day before yesterday. I had been
employed by Gurwood to negotiate with Dr. Lushington about some
papers written by the Duke when in Spain, which had fallen into
the Doctor's hands, and I spoke twice to the Duke on the subject,
the last time on Friday last, when I walked home with him from
the House of Lords. It was settled that the Doctor should write
to the Duke about them, who was to write an answer, after which
they were to be given up. But when the Doctor's letter arrived,
the Duke had forgotten the whole thing, and could not remember
what Lushington it was, and actually wrote a reply (which was not
sent, because my brother set him right) to Stephen Lushington,
the ex-Secretary to the Treasury. This is so remarkable in a man
so accurate, and whose memory is generally so retentive, that I
can't help noticing it, as the first clear and undoubted proof of
his failure in a particular faculty.
[Page Head: DINNER AT DEVONSHIRE HOUSE.]
I dined yesterday at Devonshire House, a dinner of forty people
to feast the Royalties of Sussex and Capua with their quasi-
Consorts, for I know not whether the Princess of Capua is
according to Neapolitan law a real Princess any more than our
Cecilia is a real Duchess,[1] which she certainly is not, nor
takes the title, though every now and then somebody gives it her.
However, there they were yesterday in full possession of all the
dignities of their husbands. The Duke made a mystery of the order
in which he meant them to go out to dinner, and would let nobody
know how it was all to be till the moment came. He then made the
Duke of Sussex go out first with the Princess of Capua, next the
Prince with Lady Cecilia, and he himself followed with the
Duchess of Somerset, and so on. After dinner the Duke of Sussex
discoursed to me about the oath and other matters. He is
dissatisfied on account of the banners of the Knights of the
Garter having been moved in St. George's Chapel, to make room for
Prince Albert's, I suppose; but I could not quite make out what
it was he complained of, only he said when such a disposition had
been shown in all quarters to meet Her Majesty's wishes, and
render to the Prince all honour, they ought not to push matters
farther than they can properly do, &c. ... something to this
effect. He is not altogether pleased with the Court; that is
evident.
[1] [The Duke of Sussex was married to Lady Cecilia
Underwood, though not according to the provisions of
the Royal Marriage Act. But the marriage was
recognised, and his lady was shortly afterwards created
by the Queen Duchess of Inverness.]
March 26th, 1840 {p.279}
Ministers were defeated by sixteen on Stanley's motion about
Irish Registration.[2] O'Connell made a most blackguard speech,
alluding with wretched ribaldry to the deathbed of Stanley's
mother-in-law, from which he had come to urge his motion, out of
deference to those whom he had brought up for it. One of the
worst of those disgraceful and stupid brutalities, which will
obliterate (if possible) the fame of the great things O'Connell
has done in the course of his career. What will Government do
upon this? It is impossible for anything to be more embarrassing.
It is humiliating to go on, after another great defeat, and it is
a bad question for them to dissolve upon. Weak in itself, and
with all the moral deformity of its O'Connellism, it will produce
no sympathy in this country, and not even a cry to stand upon at
a general election.
[2] [Lord Stanley's Irish Registration Bill, providing for
an annual revision of the lists by revising barristers,
was carried against the Government by 250 to 234 votes.
The Bill made considerable progress, and was warmly
supported by the Opposition, but eventually Lord
Stanley saw reason to abandon it. See _infra_, August
13, 1840.]
March 29th, 1840 {p.280}
They did not care about this division, but made very light of it.
However, it adds an item to the account against them, and is (say
what they will) a bad thing. It is bad too, to establish as a
principle that no defeats, nor any number of them, signify, as
long as they are not upon vital questions; it produces not only a
laxity of opinion and feeling upon public matters, but an
indifference and _insouciance_ on the part of their supporters,
which may some day prove very mischievous; for if they once are
permitted to assume that defeats do not signify, they will not be
at the trouble of attending when inconvenient, nor will they
encounter unpopularity for the sake of Government, and they will
very soon begin to judge for themselves, or to mistake what are
and what are not vital questions. Upon this occasion, Lord
Charles Russell went away the morning of the division without a
pair.
[Page Head: THE KING OF HANOVER'S APARTMENTS.]
Yesterday, at dinner at Normanby's, I met Lord Duncannon,[3] who
showed me the correspondence between him and the King of Hanover
about the apartments at St. James's. The case is this: When the
Queen was going to be married, the Duchess of Kent told Duncannon
that she must have a house,[4] and that she could not afford to
pay for one (the greater part of her income being appropriated to
the payment of her debts). Duncannon told her that there were no
royal apartments unoccupied, except the King of Hanover's at St.
James's; and it was settled that he should be apprised that the
Queen had occasion for them, and be requested to give them up.
Duncannon accordingly wrote a note to Sir F. Watson, who manages
the King's affairs here, and told him that he had such a
communication to make to his Majesty, which he was desirous of
bringing before him in the most respectful manner, and that the
arrangement should be made in whatever way would be most
convenient to him. Watson informed him that he had forwarded his
note to the King, and shortly after Duncannon received an answer
from the King himself, which was neither more nor less than a
flat refusal to give up the apartments. Another communication
then took place between Duncannon and Watson, when the latter
said that it would be very inconvenient to the King to remove his
things from the apartments without coming over in person, as the
library particularly was full of papers of importance. Duncannon
then proposed that the library and the adjoining room, in which
it was said that his papers were deposited, should not be
touched, but remain in his possession; that they should be walled
off and separated from the rest of the suite, which might be
given up to the Duchess for her occupation. This proposal was
sent to the King, who refused to agree to it, or to give up the
apartments at all. Accordingly the Queen was obliged to hire a
house for her mother at a rent of £2,000 a year. I told Duncannon
that they were all very much to blame for submitting to the
domineering insolence of the King, and that when they thought it
right to require the apartments, they ought to have gone through
with it, and have taken no denial. It was a gross insult to the
Queen to refuse to give up to her an apartment in her own palace,
which she desired to dispose of; and they were very wrong in
permitting such an affront to be offered to her. So Duncannon was
himself of opinion; but Melbourne, who is all for quietness,
would not allow matters to proceed to extremities, and preferred
knocking under--a mode of proceeding which is always as
contemptible as it is useless. The first thing is to be in the
right, to do nothing unbecoming or unjust, but with right and
propriety clearly on your side, to be as firm as a rock, and,
above all things, never to succumb to insolence and presumption.
[3] [Lord Duncannon was at this time First Commissioner of
Works, and the arrangements with reference to the Royal
Palaces fell within his department.]
[4] The Duchess, for particular reasons, objected to going
back to Kensington.
We had M. Guizot at dinner.[5] They all say he is agreeable, but
I have not been in the way of his talk. He is enchanted and
elated with his position, and it is amusing to see his
apprehension lest anybody should, either by design or
inadvertence, rob him of his precedence; and the alacrity with
which he seizes on the arm of the lady of the house on going out
to dinner, so demonstrative of the uneasy grandeur of a man who
has not yet learnt to be familiar with his own position. With
reference to diplomatic rank, I only heard last night, for the
first time, that the Duke of Sutherland had, some time ago,
addressed a formal remonstrance to Palmerston, against Foreign
Ministers (not Ambassadors) having place given them at the Palace
(which means going first out to dinner over himself _et suos
pares_), a most extraordinary thing for a sensible man to have
done, especially in such high favour as his wife and her whole
family are. He got for answer, that Her Majesty exercised her own
pleasure in this respect in her own palace. The rule always has
been that Ambassadors (who represent the persons of their
Sovereigns) have precedence of everybody; Ministers (who are only
agents) have not; but the Queen, it appears, has given the _pas_
to Ministers Plenipotentiaries, as well as to Ambassadors, and
ordered them to go out at her dinners before her own subjects of
the highest rank.[6]
[5] [M. Guizot had just been appointed French Ambassador in
London under the Government of M. Thiers, who took
office on the 1st March of this year.]
[6] [It was afterwards settled by Her Majesty that Foreign
Ministers should take precedence _after_ Dukes and
before Marquesses.]
April 3rd, 1840 {p.282}
They have made Lady Cecilia Underwood a duchess. Everybody
considers it a very ridiculous affair, but she and the Duke are,
or affect to be, enchanted, though nobody can tell why. She is
Duchess of Inverness, though there would have been more meaning
in her being Countess of Inverness, since Earl of Inverness is
his second title. However, there she was last night at the ball
at Lansdowne House, tucked under the Duke's arm, all smiles, and
shaking hands vehemently in all directions in acknowledgement of
congratulations. I was curious (as others were) to see what it
would all come to, and what, in fact, she was to take (in the way
of royalty) by her motion, and, as I thought, this was just
nothing. The Queen sat at the end of the room, with the Duchess
of Cambridge on one side of her, and a chair (for Prince Albert)
on the other. The Duke of Sussex took the Duchess of Inverness
half way up the room, deposited her amidst a cluster of people,
and then went alone to pay his respects to the Queen. Lady
Lansdowne wrote to the Queen to ask her pleasure whether the
Duchess of Inverness should be asked to sup at her table. Her
Majesty replied that she could not object to the Duchess of
Inverness supping there, provided care was taken that she did not
go out or take place before any other duchess. I saw Prince
Albert for the first time. He is exactly like the drawing of him:
a handsome face without much expression; but without speaking to
him and hearing him speak, it is difficult to judge of his looks.
Everybody speaks well of him.
April 13th, 1840 {p.283}
[Page Head: WAR WITH CHINA.]
The China debate[7] went off on the whole well enough for the
Government, though they only got a majority of ten, owing in
great measure to the number of casualties on their side. Poyntz
died the night before the division, and the breath was hardly out
of his body before an express was despatched by the Tory whipper-
in, to desire that nobody would on any account pair with Captain
Spencer (his son-in-law). In this nice balance of parties, human
life seemed only to be of interest as votes are influenced by it.
Macaulay recovered his reputation on this occasion, and made a
good speech. Palmerston closed the debate with a capital speech,
but neither side appears to me to have really hit the right nail
on the head, or to have worked out the strong parts of the case.
Follett did more than anybody. Thesiger made his first
appearance, but not with any great success. We had on the Friday
a Council for the Order to seize Chinese ships, &c., and on the
Saturday another for completing the forms. There was a
considerable discussion as to whether the Order (being of a
warlike nature) should be signed by the Privy Councillors, and
there was no case _exactly_ in point. However, they decided,
after much enquiry and examination into precedent, that it should
not be.[8]
[7] [On April 7 Sir James Graham moved a Vote of Censure on
Ministers for the measures which had plunged the
country in hostilities with China. Mr. Macaulay
followed him, and made an able speech. The Resolution
was rejected after three nights' debate by 271 to 261
votes.]
[8] [Orders in Council for Reprisals and Capture of Ships
constitute a Declaration of War, and are signed by all
the Privy Councillors present. This course was taken in
1854 on the Declaration of War against Russia.]
May 15th, 1840 {p.284}
A month, and nothing written here, or written, read, or done,
elsewhere. Went to Newmarket for the Craven meeting, then to
Bretby for a week, then Newmarket again, and back to London on
Friday.
Just after I got back to Newmarket, the intelligence arrived of
the extraordinary murder of Lord William Russell, which has
excited a prodigious interest, and frightened all London out of
its wits. Visionary servants and air-drawn razors or carving-
knives dance before everybody's imagination, and half the world
go to sleep expecting to have their throats cut before morning.
The circumstances of the case are certainly most extraordinary,
and though every day produces some fresh cause for suspecting the
man Courvoisier, both the fact and the motives are still
enveloped in great mystery. People are always ready to jump to a
conclusion, and having made up their minds, as most have, that he
must have done the deed, they would willingly hang him up at
once. I had the curiosity to go the day before yesterday to
Tothill Fields Prison to see the man, who had just been sent
there. He is rather ill-looking, a baddish countenance, but his
manner was calm though dejected, and he was civil and respectful,
and not sulky. The people there said he was very restless, and
had not slept, and that he was a man of great bodily strength. I
did not converse with him.
May 17th, 1840 {p.284}
Just after writing the above, I went to the house in Norfolk
Street, to look at the premises, and the places where the watch
and other things were found hidden. It was impossible not to be
morally convinced that the house had not been broken into, that
the indications of such violence were fabricated, and that the
goods must have been secreted by Courvoisier, consequently, that
by him the murder was committed; but there is as yet no evidence
to convict him of the actual commission of the deed, and though I
believe him to be guilty, I could not, on such a case as there is
as yet, find him so if placed on a jury. I am very sceptical
about evidence, and know how strangely circumstances sometimes
combine to produce appearances of guilt where there may be none.
There is a curious case of this mentioned in Romilly's Memoirs,
of a man hanged for mutiny upon the evidence of a witness who
swore to his person, and upon his own confession after
conviction, and yet it was satisfactorily proved afterwards that
he had been mistaken for another man, and was really innocent. He
had been induced to confess at the instigation of a fellow-
prisoner, who told him it was his best chance of escaping.
[Page Head: NARROW ESCAPE OF A CULPRIT.]
Lord Ashburton, when we were talking of this, told me an anecdote
of General Maitland (Sir Thomas), which happened at some place in
the West Indies or South America. He had taken some town, and the
soldiers were restrained from committing violence on the
inhabitants, when a shot was fired from a window, and one of his
men killed. They entered the house, went to the room from the
window of which the shot had been fired, and found a number of
men playing at billiards. They insisted on the culprit being
given up, when a man was pointed out as the one who had fired the
shot. They all agreed as to the culprit, and he was carried off.
Sir Thomas considering that a severe example was necessary,
ordered the man to be tied to the mouth of a cannon, and shot
away. He was present, but turned his head away when the signal
was given for blowing this wretch's body to atoms. The explosion
took place, when to his amazement the man appeared alive, but
with his hair literally standing 'like quills upon the fretful
porcupine,' with terror. In the agony of the moment he had
contrived to squeeze himself through the ropes, which were
loosely tied, and get on one side of the cannon's mouth, so that
the ball missed him. He approached Maitland and said, 'You see,
General, that it was the will of Heaven my life should be spared;
and I solemnly assure you that I am innocent.' Maitland would not
allow him to be executed after this miraculous escape, and it
turned out, upon further enquiry, that he _was_ innocent, and it
was some other man who had fired the shot.
[Page Head: DUKE OF WELLINGTON SUPPORTS GOVERNMENT.]
For the last month there has been something like a cessation of
political warfare, not from any diminished desire on the part of
the Opposition to harass the Government, but from want of means
to do so. In the House of Lords the other night, Lord Stanhope
brought on the China Question; when the Duke of Wellington got
up, and to the delight of the Government, and the dismay and
vexation of the Tories, threw over Stanhope (in a very good
speech), asserted the justice of our quarrel with China, refused
to discuss the question of policy at all, warmly defended and
eulogised Elliot, moved the previous question, and then quitted
the House, without waiting to hear Stanhope's reply. It was
gratifying to see his energy and vigour, and to see them exerted
on one of those occasions when his great mind and patriotic
spirit never fail to show themselves. Whenever a question has, in
his view, assumed a national character, he scatters to the wind
all party considerations; such he now considers the Chinese war
to be. We are involved with China, nation against nation, and he
will not by word or deed put in jeopardy the smallest of the
mighty interests at stake, for the sake of advancing some party
purpose, and damaging the Government. In like manner, he thinks
that Elliot has bravely, faithfully, and to the best of his
ability, done his duty; that if he has committed errors of
judgement they should be overlooked, and that he should be
supported, encouraged, and defended. This is the real greatness
which raises him so far above all the ordinary politicians of his
day, and which will confer on his memory imperishable renown. It
is rendered the more striking by his conduct on Friday on the
Irish Municipal Bill, which is a mere party question, where he
showed that he could be as violent as any Tory could desire. I
called on Barnes[9] on Saturday, and found him much disgusted at
the Duke's China speech, and anxious to know how it could have
happened. When I told him that it was always so with him, and
that he never would be merely factious, Barnes said (which, is
true enough) that it is extraordinary, if he had intended to
adopt such a tone in the House of Lords, that he should have
allowed Graham to bring forward his motion in the House of
Commons, and it certainly does place Graham in a mortifying
position, for the Duke's speech is a complete answer to Graham's
motion.
[9] [The editor of the 'Times' newspaper.]
May 26th, 1840 {p.287}
At Newmarket last week. While there the debate took place on the
Registration Bill, carried by a majority of only three, by the
defection of Howick and Charles Wood, which was caused, as is
said, entirely by the influence of Lord Grey, who is always out
of humour with the Government, glad to give them a knock, though
ostensibly their friend. However this may be, there was nothing
inconsistent in their conduct, and Wood accounted for his vote
very fairly. The Tories were triumphant for a moment, but these
defeats are now so common and so unproductive of any
consequences, that after the first shouting was over nobody
seemed to attach much importance to it. The Cambridge and Ludlow
elections having gone against them is of greater consequence,
because they show that the tide is running that way, and that a
dissolution must in all probability be ruinous to them. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer's budget seems to have been very
successful, and all agree that he did his part exceedingly well.
Yesterday I met the Duke of Wellington. He was walking in the
garden of the park adjoining his own, promenading two young
ladies--Lord Salisbury's daughters--arm in arm. He left them and
took me to walk with him to Lansdowne House. He began discoursing
about the state of affairs, and lamenting that there was, and
could be, no strong Government, and that there never would be
till people were convinced by experience of the necessity of
having one. He then said, 'If other people would do as I do,
support the Government when they can, and when the Government
ought to be supported, it would be much better.' I said I agreed
with him, and that it had given me the greatest pleasure to read
his speech on China. He said, 'All I know is, that it is
absolutely necessary that question should be settled, and the
justice of our cause be made manifest.' I said, I was sure it was
what he would feel, and that he had done just what I expected,
but that he must be aware there were many of his own people who
were by no means so well pleased, but, on the contrary, to the
last degree annoyed and provoked at his speech. He replied, 'I
know that well enough, and I don't care _one damn_. I was afraid
Lord Stanhope would have a majority, and _I have not time not to
do what is right_.'
June 12th, 1840 {p.288}
[Page Head: THE QUEEN SHOT AT.]
On Wednesday afternoon, as the Queen and Prince Albert were
driving in a low carriage up Constitution Hill, about four or
five in the afternoon, they were shot at by a lad of eighteen
years old, who fired two pistols at them successively, neither
shots taking effect. He was in the Green Park without the rails,
and as he was only a few yards from the carriage, and, moreover,
very cool and collected, it is marvellous he should have missed
his aim. In a few moments the young man was seized, without any
attempt on his part to escape or to deny the deed, and was
carried off to prison. The Queen, who appeared perfectly cool,
and not the least alarmed, instantly drove to the Duchess of
Kent's, to anticipate any report that might reach her mother,
and, having done so, she continued her drive and went to the
Park. By this time the attempt upon her life had become generally
known, and she was received with the utmost enthusiasm by the
immense crowd that was congregated in carriages, on horseback,
and on foot. All the equestrians formed themselves into an
escort, and attended her back to the Palace, cheering vehemently,
while she acknowledged, with great appearance of feeling, these
loyal manifestations. She behaved on this occasion with perfect
courage and self-possession, and exceeding propriety; and the
assembled multitude, being a high-class mob, evinced a lively and
spontaneous feeling for her--a depth of interest which, however
natural under such circumstances, must be very gratifying to her,
and was satisfactory to witness.
Yesterday morning the culprit was brought to the Home Office,
when Normanby examined him, and a Council was summoned for a more
personal examination at two o'clock. A question then arose as to
the nature of the proceeding, and the conduct of the examination,
whether it should be before the Privy Council or the Secretary of
State. We searched for precedents, and the result was this: The
three last cases of high treason were those of Margaret
Nicholson, in 1786; of Hatfield, in 1800 (both for attempts on
the life of the Sovereign); and of Watson (the Cato Street
affair), for an attempt on the Ministers in 1820. Margaret
Nicholson was brought before the Privy Council, and the whole
proceeding was set forth at great length in the Council Register.
There appeared no entry of any sort or kind in the case of
Hatfield; and in that of Watson there was a minute in the Home
Office, setting forth that the examination had taken place
_there_ by Lord Sidmouth, assisted by certain Lords and others of
the Privy Council. There was, therefore, no uniform course of
precedents, and Ministers had to determine whether the culprit
should be brought before the Privy Council, or whether he should
be examined by the Cabinet only--that is, by Normanby as
Secretary of State, assisted by his colleagues, as had been done
in Watson's case. After some discussion, they determined that the
examination should be before the Cabinet only, and consequently I
was not present at it, much to my disappointment, as I wished to
hear what passed, and see the manner and bearing of the
perpetrator of so strange and unaccountable an act. Up to the
present time there is no appearance of insanity in the youth's
behaviour, and he is said to have conducted himself during the
examination with acuteness, and cross-examined the witnesses (a
good many of whom were produced) with some talent. All this,
however, is not incompatible with a lurking insanity. His answers
to the questions put to him were mysterious, and calculated to
produce the impression that he was instigated or employed by a
society, with which the crime had originated, but I expect that
it will turn out that he had no accomplices, and is only a
crackbrained enthusiast, whose madness has taken the turn of
vanity and desire for notoriety. No other conjecture presents any
tolerable probability. However it may turn out--here is the
strange fact--that a half-crazy potboy was on the point of
influencing the destiny of the Empire, and of producing effects
the magnitude and importance of which no human mind can guess at.
It is remarkable how seldom attempts like these are successful,
and yet the life of any individual is at the mercy of any other,
provided this other is prepared to sacrifice his own life, which,
in the present instance, the culprit evidently was.
August 13th, 1840 {p.290}
[Page Head: REVIEW OF THE SESSION.]
Two months have elapsed since I have written anything in this
book, owing to an unaccountable repugnance, which daily grew
stronger, to take up my pen for that purpose. It is true that I
had nothing of great interest to note down, but I could
frequently have found something worth recollecting if I had not
been too idle, too occupied with other things, or paralysed by
the disgust I had taken to the task of journalising. It is now
too late to record things as I was told them, or events as they
occurred, and all is confusion in my recollections. If I were now
to begin to describe the transactions of the late two months, I
should be writing history, for which I am in no way qualified.
However, as I must make up my mind to begin again, and write
something, or give up the practice altogether, and as I don't
choose (just yet, at least) to do the latter, I will scribble
what occurs to me, and take a short survey of the Parliamentary
campaign that is just over. The danger, whether real or supposed,
which the Queen ran from the attempt of the half-witted coxcomb
who fired at her, elicited whatever there was of dormant loyalty
in her lieges, and made her extremely popular. Nothing could be
more enthusiastic than her reception at Ascot, where dense
multitudes testified their attachment to her person, and their
joy at her recent escape by more than usual demonstrations.
Partly, perhaps, from the universality of the interest evinced,
and partly from a judicious influence or more impartial
reflection, she began about this time to make her Court much less
exclusive, and all these circumstances produced a better state of
feeling between the Court and the Tories, and helped to soften
the acrimony of political warfare.
Throughout the Session the Ministerial majorities continued to be
small and uncertain; but it was all along evident that the
Government would not be turned out, that the leaders of the
Opposition did not wish to turn them out, and that the
differences which prevailed in the Tory party rendered it
anything but desirable a change should take place. Consequently,
for one reason or other, the Government were never pressed hard
upon any points on which defeat would have compelled them to
resign. The greatest, most hard-fought, and lengthened contest
was upon Stanley's Irish Registration Bill, which was admirably
devised as a party measure, very ably worked, and in support of
which the whole body of the Tories came down, night after night,
with a constancy, zeal, and unanimity, really remarkable. Their
repeated majorities elated them to such a pitch that they were
ready, one and all, to relinquish everything else, to come and
vote on these questions. It was evident, however, that all their
exertions would be foiled by the determination of their opponents
to interpose such delays and obstacles as must prove fatal to the
measure; and it was not the least judicious part of Stanley's
management when he came down to the House, and, after his long
series of victories, announced that he had abandoned his Bill for
this year. It was an extremely embarrassing question to
Government, and one upon which they could not appear in a
favourable point of view. On one hand they were compelled to aid
and abet their Irish allies in their opposition to this Bill, so
fatal as it would have been to their influence in all the
vexatious and unfair modes which they adopted; and on the other
hand it showed how little this self-called Reform Ministry cared
for any measure of Reform, or rather how heartily they were
opposed to any of which the tendency would be injurious to their
own political influence. There never was a simpler question of
Reform than this, a clearer case of wrong, or one which more
loudly demanded a remedy; but the wrong was one by which they
largely benefited, and the correction of it would have the effect
of augmenting the power of their opponents. Accordingly, by every
species of sophistry, by falsehoods of all kinds, by vehement
denunciations and endeavours to arouse the passions of the Irish
people, they moved Heaven and earth to thwart and defeat the
measure. There was, however, only one moment at which the
Government were in any jeopardy, for they very early resolved not
to let the majorities against them shake them out of their seats.
But when Stanley, complaining of the unfair means which had been
employed to prevent his bringing on his measure in its different
stages, announced that he would invade the days reserved for
Government business, Lord John Russell began darkly to hint at
the impossibility of the Government conducting the public
business if the House sanctioned such an encroachment, and much
irritation was exhibited for a short time. Both parties, however,
got calm, and a compromise was the result. The Government offered
Stanley certain days, which he immediately accepted,
acknowledging that nothing but an extreme provocation would
justify the course he had threatened to adopt, and so the storm
blew over; and this question was nearly the only one which
produced any violent debates and close divisions. Besides the
usual light skirmishing and the taunts, accusations, and
reproaches, here and there thrown out against the Government,
there were no serious attacks upon their policy and measures,
either domestic or foreign; and upon the whole, setting apart the
smallest of their dependable majority, they got through the
Session with remarkable success, and have closed it apparently
stronger, and with more of public confidence and approbation by
many degrees than they enjoyed at the opening. And I believe this
to be the truth, notwithstanding the fact that almost all the
elections occurring during the Session (in which there have been
contests) have been carried by the Tories.
August 18th, 1840 (continued at the Grove) {p.292}
This improved condition of the Ministry is attributable partly to
the success of their measures and the efficient manner in which
the most important offices have been filled, and partly to the
dissensions which prevailed among their adversaries, some
striking symptoms of which were exhibited to the public. At the
end of the Session, Sir Robert Inglis said to one of the
Government people: 'Well, you have managed to get through the
Session very successfully.' 'Yes,' said the other, 'thanks to
your dissensions among yourselves.' 'No,' said Sir Robert, 'it is
not that, but it is the conduct of your leader, his honesty,
courage, and ability, which has enabled you to do so.' Ley, the
Clerk of the House of Commons, and a man of great experience,
said he had never seen the business so well conducted as by John
Russell. Besides this, his reputation in his office is immense,
where all his subordinates admit that Colonial affairs never were
so well administered. But there can be no doubt that the ill-
humour, which on several occasions broke out, sometimes between
the leaders and sometimes among the masses of the party--'The
Tory Democracy,' as the 'Standard' calls them--was of essential
service to the Government. This first began at the end of last
year upon the Privilege question, which Peel took up vehemently,
and at once identified himself with John Russell in support of
the privileges of the House of Commons. The moment Parliament
opened, this matter came under discussion, and for some time
exclusively occupied the attention of the House of Commons. There
could be no doubt that if Peel had changed his mind and taken the
adverse side, he would have thrown the Government into great
difficulty and embarrassment, but instead of doing so he took the
Privilege side still more warmly than before, threw himself into
the van of the contest, and was the most strenuous and the ablest
advocate in the cause. Nothing could exceed the disappointment
and annoyance of the great body of the Tories at his conduct.
Many of them opposed him, and though Graham, Stanley, and others
of the principal men voted with him, they did so very
reluctantly, and maintained an invincible silence throughout all
the discussions. When at last it was settled that a Bill should
be introduced, and that Bill had passed the House of Commons,
considerable doubt existed whether it would pass the Lords, the
Duke of Wellington's opinion being decidedly at variance with
Peel's on the question. Nothing could have gratified his party
more than the rejection of this Bill by the Lords, but however
well inclined the Duke was to reject it, he knew that this would
be too desperate a game to play, and while it might lead to the
dissolution of the Government, it would entail that of the Tory
party also. Many conferences took place between Graham and
Arbuthnot and Lyndhurst, the result of which was, that the Duke
was persuaded to let the Bill pass, but this was not accomplished
without much murmuring against the obstinacy of Peel.
[Page Head: THE DUKE CONTROLS THE TORIES.]
Soon afterwards the China question was brought forward by Graham,
but whatever benefit they expected to derive from this attack on
the Government was entirely marred by the Duke's speech in the
House of Lords, in which he completely threw over Graham, as well
as all who supported him; and while this vexed and offended the
Tory leaders in the Commons, the 'Democracy' were as indignant
with the Duke as they had lately been with Peel. After this, a
sort of running fight went on (Stanley's battles presenting the
only important results) up to the period of the introduction of
the Canada Bill.[10] To this Peel offered no opposition whatever,
and it passed the House of Commons with his concurrence, and
consequently without difficulties or even divisions. But as soon
as it got into the Lords, the Duke broke out in fierce hostility
against it, denounced its provisions in the most unmeasured
terms, and for a considerable time nobody knew whether they would
throw it out or not. Peel (it appeared) had taken his line and
supported the Bill, without any previous concert with the Duke,
and the latter, as well as all the Tory Lords, were exceedingly
indignant at finding themselves so far committed by his conduct
that it became absolutely impossible for them to throw it out.
Why Peel did not communicate with the Duke, I cannot divine, or
why it was not made a great party measure, and a resolution taken
to act in concert. Lyndhurst spoke to me (one day that I met him)
with great bitterness against Peel. I asked him, 'What do you
mean to do?' 'Oh, God knows; pass the Bill, I suppose, there's
nothing else left for us to do.' Wharncliffe, while bewailing the
schism, and the bad effect of its manifestation, attributed
Peel's reserve to temper, and some remains of _pique_ at what had
previously passed about the Privilege and China questions. But
whatever was the cause, Peel was quite right not to oppose this
Bill, unless he was prepared with a better measure, and to take
office with the intention of acting upon a different principle,
and he distinctly said that he had nothing better to suggest. The
subsequent conduct of the Duke throughout the whole proceeding in
the House of Lords was curiously indicative of the actual state
of his mind, of his disposition, and his faculties. His
disposition is become excessively excitable and irritable, his
faculties sometimes apparently weakened, and at others giving
signs of all their accustomed vigour. He came down to the House
and attacked this Bill with an asperity quite inconsistent with
his abstaining from throwing it out. He loaded it with every sort
of abuse, but allowed it to pass almost without any alteration.
In thus doing to the measure all the moral damage he could, he
gave way to his passion, and acted a part which I am convinced he
would not have done in his better days, and which was quite at
variance with the patriotic spirit by which he is usually
animated. His violence not unnaturally encouraged his equally
ardent but less prudent followers, to a more practical attack,
and Hardwicke gave notice of his motion. The Duke, however, was
fully alive to all the consequences that would result from the
rejection of a Bill to which Peel had given an unqualified
support in the House of Commons, and he resolved to exert all his
great authority to restrain the zeal that his own speeches had so
highly inflamed. He accordingly summoned the Lords to Apsley
House, and made them a speech in which he stated all the reasons
for which it was desirable not to throw out the Bill; and
Aberdeen told Clarendon that in his life he had never heard a
more admirable statement. It required, however, all his great
influence to restrain them, and though they acquiesced (as they
always do at his bidding) with surprising docility, they did so
with the greatest reluctance.
[10] [This was a Bill for dealing with the Canada Clergy
Reserves.]
London, August 19th, 1840 {p.296}
In the conversation at which Aberdeen told Clarendon this, he
dilated upon the marvellous influence of the Duke, and the manner
in which he treated his followers, and the language they endured
from him. Clarendon asked him whether, when the Duke retired, he
had any hopes of being able to govern them as well; to which he
replied that he had not the slightest idea of it; on the
contrary, that it would be impossible, that nobody else could
govern them, and when his influence was withdrawn, they would
split into every variety of opinion according to their several
biases and dispositions. He said he did not think the Duke of
Wellington had ever rendered greater service in his whole life
than he had done this session in moderating violence and keeping
his own party together and in order, and that he could still do
the most essential service in the same way, and much more than by
active leading in Parliament.
[Page Head: ADVANTAGES OF A WEAK GOVERNMENT.]
Out of this state of things a practical consequence has ensued of
no slight importance, and one which has shown that if there are
evils and disadvantages incident to a weak Government, these are
not without some counterbalancing good. Both parties began to
feel the necessity of dealing with certain questions of pressing
importance in a spirit of compromise and mutual concession.
Neither were strong enough to go on insisting upon having
everything their own way, and each was conscious that the other
had a fair right to require some sacrifice, so far as it could be
made without compromising on either side any vital principle.
Accordingly several questions were amicably and quietly settled,
in all probability in a more just, expedient, and satisfactory
way than they would have been by either party uncontrolled and
unrestrained. The Irish Corporation Bill, which for years has
been a topic of bitter contention, has at last been carried with
very little difficulty and discussion. The alterations of the
Lords were quietly accepted by the Commons, and the ultras on
both sides were alone dissatisfied at the consummation. Then the
Education Question, which last year raised a regular storm, both
in Parliament and out, has been arranged between the Government
and the heads of the Church, and the system is permanently
established in such a manner as to allay all fears and
jealousies. In the same spirit, I expect that next year some mode
will be found of conciliating Stanley's Bill with the Government
Bill of Irish Registration, and that some measure not quite but
tolerably satisfactory to all parties will be devised, and the
evil complained of, to a certain degree, be checked. These are
advantages of no small moment, and it is very questionable
whether the work of government and legislation is not more wisely
and beneficially done by this concurrence of antagonistic
parties, and compromise and fusion of antagonistic opinions, than
it could be in any other way. All strong Governments become to a
certain degree careless and insolent in the confidence of their
strength, but their weakness renders them circumspect and
conscientious. Governments with great majorities at their back
can afford to do gross jobs, or take strong party measures; but
when their opponents are as strong as themselves, and their
majorities are never secure, they can venture upon nothing of the
kind. All oppositions must affect a prodigious show of political
virtue, and must be vigilant and economical, no matter how lax
may have been their political morality when in power. But no
politician, or party man, has any tenderness for an abuse the
profit of which is to accrue to his adversary, and in this way
good government may happen to be the result of a weak Ministry
and a strong Opposition.
August 24th, 1840 {p.297}
[Page Head: THE TREATY OF JULY.]
Passed the greatest part of last week at the Grove, where
Clarendon talked to me a great deal about the Eastern Question,
and Palmerston's policy in that quarter. Palmerston, it seems,
has had for many years as his fixed idea the project of humbling
the Pasha of Egypt.[11] In the Cabinet he has carried everything
his own way; all his colleagues either really concurring with
him, or being too ignorant and too indifferent to fight the
battle against his strong determination, except Lord Holland and
Clarendon, who did oppose with all their strength Palmerston's
recent treaty; but quite ineffectually. They had for their only
ally, Lord Granville at Paris, and nothing can exceed the
contempt with which the Palmerstonians treat this little knot of
dissentients, at least the two elder ones, who (they say) are
become quite imbecile, and they wonder Lord Granville does not
resign. Palmerston, in fact, appears to exercise an absolute
despotism at the Foreign Office, and deals with all our vast and
complicated questions of diplomacy according to his own views and
opinions, without the slightest control, and scarcely any
interference on the part of his colleagues. This apathy is mainly
attributable to that which appears in Parliament and in the
country upon all foreign questions. Nobody understands and nobody
cares for them, and when any rare and occasional notice is taken
of a particular point, or of some question on which a slight and
evanescent interest is manifested, Palmerston has little
difficulty in dealing with the matter, which he always meets with
a consummate impudence and, it must be allowed, a skill and
resolution, which invariably carry him through. Whether the
policy which he has adopted upon the Eastern Question be the
soundest and most judicious, events must determine; but I never
was more amazed than at reading his letters, so dashing, bold,
and confident in their tone. Considering the immensity of the
stake for which he is playing, that he _may_ be about to plunge
all Europe into a war, and that if war does ensue it will be
entirely his doing, it is utterly astonishing he should not be
more seriously affected than he appears to be with the gravity of
the circumstances, and should not look with more anxiety (if not
apprehension) to the possible results; but he talks in the most
off-hand way of the clamour that broke out at Paris, of his
entire conviction that the French Cabinet have no thoughts of
going to war, and that if they were to do so, their fleets would
be instantly swept from the sea, and their armies everywhere
defeated. That if they were to try and make it a war of opinion
and stir up the elements of revolution in other countries, a more
fatal retaliation could and would be effected in France, where
Carlist or Napoleonist interest, aided by foreign intervention,
would shake the throne of Louis Philippe, while taxation and
conscription would very soon disgust the French with a war in
which he did not anticipate the possibility of their gaining any
military successes. Everything may possibly turn out according to
his expectations. He is a man blessed with extraordinary good
fortune, and his motto seems to be that of Danton, 'De l'audace,
encore de l'audace, et toujours de l'audace.' But there is a
flippancy in his tone, an undoubting self-sufficiency, and a
levity in discussing interests of such tremendous magnitude,
which satisfies me that he is a very dangerous man to be
entrusted with the uncontrolled management of our foreign
relations. But our Cabinet is a complete republic, and Melbourne,
their ostensible head, has no overruling authority, and is too
indolent and too averse to energetic measures to think of having
any, or to desire it. Any man of resolution and obstinacy does
what he will with Melbourne. Nothing was ever so peremptory and
determined as John Russell about Poulett Thomson's peerage, which
the others did not at all like, but which he not only insisted
upon, but actually threatened to resign unless it was done by a
given day. It was with the greatest difficulty they could prevail
on him to defer its being gazetted till Parliament was up,
Duncannon and others dreading that it would excite the choler of
the Duke of Wellington, and very likely provoke him to fall foul
of some of their Bills.
[11] [The Treaty between England, Russia, Austria, and
Prussia for the settlement of the affairs of the East,
by compelling the Pasha of Egypt to relinquish Syria,
and to restrict his dominion in Egypt, was signed in
London on July 15, 1840. France having declined to
concur in this policy, the Treaty was signed without
her, and without her knowledge. This event was of the
gravest consequence, and brought Europe to the brink of
war.]
M. Dedel[12] told me the other day that he thought, without
reference to his policy, Palmerston had conducted himself with a
_légèreté_ quite unaccountable; that the Duke of Wellington, when
he was at Windsor, had talked over the state of affairs with
Melbourne, and said to him, 'I do not say that I disapprove of
your policy as far as regards Mehemet Ali; perhaps I do not think
that you go far enough; not only would I not leave him in
possession of a foot of ground in Syria, but I should have no
scruple in expelling him from Egypt too. But what is Mehemet Ali
or the Turk in comparison with the immeasurable importance of
preserving peace in Europe? this is the thing alone to be
regarded, and I give you notice that you must not expect our
support in Parliament of the policy which you have chosen to
adopt.'[13] In the meantime there is an increasing impression
here that no war will take place; public opinion is not yet much
excited, and is nothing like so excitable as it is in France upon
questions of foreign policy, where everybody thinks and talks on
the subject; but if it ever is effectually roused, it will be
much stronger and probably more consistent here than there. My
brother writes me word that the King is most anxious to preserve
peace, and is now feeling the pulse of the country, and doing his
utmost to ascertain what the state of public opinion is, for his
own guidance in the approaching crisis. Though now acting in
apparent unison with Thiers, he would have no scruple in
resisting the course of policy in which Thiers is embarked, if he
found he could count upon the support of the country in his own
pacific views; and it is the possibility of such a contest
occurring in France which renders the question so very delicate
and difficult, and makes the issue dependent on contingencies
which no sagacity can foresee or provide for. Out of this
complication Palmerston's wonderful luck may possibly extricate
him, though it must be owned that he is playing a very desperate
game.
[12] [Dutch Minister at the Court of St. James.]
[13] Clarendon, to whom I told this, said it was not true:
he had said nothing about their support, but had said,
'I approve of your policy, but you must have no war.'
September 5th, 1840 {p.300}
[Page Head: OPPOSITION TO LORD PALMERSTON.]
I have been more in the way of hearing about the Eastern Question
during the last week than at any previous time, though my
informants and associates have been all of the anti-Palmerston
interest--Holland House, and Clarendon, Dedel (who objects to the
form more than the _fond_), and Madame de Lieven, who is all with
Guizot, because he is devoted to her, and she feels the greatest
interest where she gets the most information. Clarendon showed me
the other day a long letter which he wrote to Palmerston in March
last, in which he discussed the whole question, stating the
objections to which he thought Palmerston's policy liable, and
suggesting what _he_ would have done instead. It was a well-
written and well-reasoned document enough.
Those who are opposed to Palmerston's policy, and even some who
do not object to the policy itself so much as to the manner in
which it has been worked out, feel confident that the means will
fall very short of accomplishing the end, and that peace will be
preserved by their very impotence at a great expense of the
diplomatic reputation of the parties concerned; and they are
confirmed in this notion by the failure of some of the
anticipations in which Palmerston so confidently indulged,
especially the conduct of the Pasha and the Syrian insurrection.
Clarendon says that, 'whatever his opinions may have been, now
that they are fairly embarked in Palmerston's course, he must as
earnestly desire its success as if he had been its original
advocate.' But both he and Lord Holland have been so vehemently
committed in opposition to it, that, without any imputation of
unpatriotic feelings, it is not in human nature they should not
find a sort of satisfaction in the frustration of those measures
which they so strenuously resisted, and this clearly appears in
all Lord Holland said to me, and in Lady Holland's tone about
Palmerston and his daring disposition.
September 6th, 1840 {p.301}
On arriving in town this morning, I found a note from M. Guizot,
begging I would call on him, as he wanted to have a few minutes'
conversation with me. Accordingly I went, and am just returned.
His object was to put me in possession of the actual state of
affairs, and to read me a letter he had just received from
Thiers, together with one (either to Thiers or to him) from their
Consul-General at Alexandria.
[Page Head: THE POLICY OF FRANCE.]
Thiers' letter expressed considerable alarm. After describing the
failure of Walewski and the other French agents, and enlarging
upon the efforts they had made, and were still making, to
restrain the Pasha, and prevent his making any offensive
movement, he said that this was the Pasha's ultimatum. He
offered, if France would join him and make common cause with him,
to place his fleets and armies at her disposal, and to be
governed in all things by her advice and wishes, a thing utterly
impossible for France to listen to. Upon the impossibility of
this alliance being represented to him, the prudence of keeping
quiet strenuously urged upon him, and the utmost endeavours made
to convince him that a defensive policy was the only wise and
safe course for him, he had engaged not to move forward, or take
any offensive course unless compelled to do so, by violence
offered to him; his army was concentrated at the foot of the
Taurus, and there (but in a menacing attitude) he would consent
to its remaining; but if any European troops were to advance
against him, or be transported to Syria, any attempt made to
foment another insurrection in Syria, or any attack made upon his
fleet, or any violence offered to his commerce, then he would
cross the Taurus, and, taking all consequences, commence
offensive operations. In that case, said Guizot, Constantinople
might be occupied by the Russians, and the British fleet enter
the Sea of Marmora; and if that happened, he could not answer for
the result in France, and he owned that he (and Thiers expressed
the same in his letter) was in the greatest alarm at all these
dangers and complications. He had seen Palmerston this morning,
and read Thiers' letter to him. I asked him if it had made any
impression on Palmerston. He said, 'Not the slightest;' that he
had said, 'Oh! Mehemet Ali cédera; il ne faut pas s'attendre
qu'il cède à la première sommation; mais donnez-lui quinze jours,
et il finira par céder.' Guizot said that the failure of so many
of his predictions and expectations had not in the slightest
degree diminished Palmerston's confidence, and that there was in
fact no use whatever in speaking to him on the subject. Guizot is
evidently in great alarm, and well he may be, for there can be no
doubt that his Government are in a position of the greatest
embarrassment, far from inclined to war, the King especially
abhorring the very thoughts of it, and at the same time so far
committed that if the four allies act with any vigour and drive
Mehemet Ali to desperation, France must either kindle the flames
of war, or, after all her loud and threatening tone, succumb in a
manner not only intolerably galling to the national pride, but
which really would be very discreditable in itself.
Guizot dwelt very much upon their long-continued and earnest
efforts to make the Pasha moderate and prudent, and on the offers
he had made to join the allies, and unite the authority of France
to that of all the others for the purpose of preventing the Pasha
from advancing a step further, provided they would leave him in
his present possessions. I certainly never saw a man more
seriously or sincerely alarmed, and I think (now that it is so
near) that the French Government would avoid war at almost any
cost; but the great evil of the present state of affairs is, that
the conduct of the question has escaped out of the hands of the
Ministers and statesmen by whom it has hitherto been handled, and
henceforward must depend upon the passions or caprice of the
Pasha, and the discretion of the numerous commanders in any of
the fleets now gathered in the Mediterranean, and even upon the
thousand accidents to which, with the most prudent and moderate
instructions from home, and the best intentions in executing
them, the course of events is exposed. As Guizot said, Europe is
at the mercy 'des incidents et des subalternes.' He promised to
keep me informed of everything that might occur of interest.
September 10th, 1840 {p.303}
The day after I saw Guizot I related to Clarendon all that had
passed, when he told me that Melbourne was now become seriously
alarmed, so much so that he had written to John Russell, 'he
could neither eat, nor drink, nor sleep,' so great was his
disturbance. Lord John was also extremely alarmed, and both he
and Melbourne had been considerably moved by a letter the former
had received from the Duke of Bedford, enclosing one from Lord
Spencer, in which he entered into the whole Eastern Question; and
said that it was his earnest desire to give his support to the
Government in all their measures, but that it would be contrary
to his judgement and his conscience to support them in their
policy on this question. This appears to have made a great
impression upon them, but not the least upon Palmerston, who is
quite impenetrable, and who always continues more or less to
influence his colleagues; for Lord John, after meeting Palmerston
at Windsor, came back easier in his mind, and, as he said, with a
conviction (not apparently founded on any solid reason), 'that
they should pull through.' Palmerston, so far from being at all
shaken by anything Guizot said to him, told him that the only
fault he had committed was not taking Lord Ponsonby's advice and
proceeding to action long ago. The second edition of the 'Times'
mentions a violent note delivered by Pontois to the Porte. I
thought this of such consequence that I sent the paper to Guizot,
and begged him, if he could, to afford the means of contradicting
it. He wrote me word he would, as soon as he had _des
renseignements plus précis_. In the meantime, I find Metternich
has protested against the tone of Pontois' communication, which
was verbal and not written. His own account of it to Thiers
exhibited strong, but not indecent language.
In the evening (day before yesterday), Guizot dined at Holland
House, and met Clarendon and Lord John Russell, with the latter
of whom he had a long talk, and he hoped that he had made an
impression on him. Yesterday morning I was enabled to read the
Cabinet minute, submitting to the Queen the expediency of making
the Treaty, to which was appended the dissent of Clarendon and
Holland, with their reasons assigned in a short but well-written
and well-reasoned paper. The Queen desired to keep it, and there
can be little doubt that in her heart she coincides with them,
for Leopold is frightened out of his senses, and is sure to have
made her in some degree partake of his alarm. She told Melbourne
that, of all things, what astonished her most was the coolness
and indifference of Palmerston. It is remarkable that Clarendon,
who expresses himself with energy, was never asked to Windsor
while Leopold was there, Palmerston being there the whole time;
and the day that Leopold departed, Clarendon was invited.
[Page Head: ADMIRAL NAPIER'S PROCLAMATION.]
Yesterday morning arrived a fresh budget of alarming news,
amongst the rest a proclamation of Admiral Napier, which people
are disposed to consider a forgery and an impossibility, but
which was believed at Paris and by Guizot here, and consequently
raised a storm there, and put the Ambassador in despair.
Clarendon went to him in the afternoon, when he broke out: 'Mon
cher Comte, I appeal to you, as representing the Government, to
tell me what I am to think of such a proceeding as this, and how
is it possible that I can continue to 'gérer les affaires de mon
gouvernement' here, if such provocations as this proclamation are
to occur.' Clarendon acknowledged that if this proclamation was
authentic, nothing was to be said in its defence, but urged that
no definite judgement should be formed till they had some
conclusive information; but he told me, that he should not be
surprised to find that it was authentic and in virtue of
instruction from Ponsonby, and he fully expected Palmerston would
highly approve of it. When it was suggested to Palmerston that it
might with every effort be impossible to prevent the Pasha from
crossing the Taurus, he said, 'So much the better if he did, that
he would not be able to retreat, his communication be cut off,
and his ruin the more certainly accomplished.'
September 12th, 1840 {p.305}
Yesterday at Windsor for a Council, when Prince Albert was
introduced. The Ministers who were there had a sort of Cabinet
afterwards, and a discussion about increasing the naval force,
which Lord Minto thought they could not venture to do without
calling Parliament together; but they agreed that this was to be
avoided, and would be on every account objectionable. They might
incur any expense for naval affairs on their own responsibility,
and Parliament would be sure to bear them out. After dinner, a
messenger came, and Melbourne went out to read the contents of
his box. I remarked that nobody occupied _his_ chair next the
Queen; it was left vacant, like Banquo's, till he came back, so
that it was established as exclusively _his_. I heard this
morning what this box contained: letters from Sir F. Lamb,[14] to
Palmerston, in which he told him that he wished him every success
in his present undertaking, would do everything that he could to
assist him, but acknowledged that he had not the least notion
what he could do, or how anything could be done by anybody;
intimating his conviction, in short, that their Convention was
not executable. As for Metternich, he is at his wit's end, and
occupied night and day in thinking how he can _se tirer
d'affaire._ He tells Lamb that as to contributing a guinea or a
soldier towards the operation, it is quite out of the question,
and begs him never to mention such a thing, and that if the
Treaty could quietly fall to the ground it would be a very good
thing. It is, however, entirely contemplated by the other Powers
that Russia shall occupy Constantinople, and march to the
assistance of the Sultan if necessary; but it is quite clear that
Metternich is resolved to prevent a war by any means, and that he
would not care for his share of humiliation or the object of the
Convention being baffled. All this, however, does not damp the
ardour or diminish the confidence of Palmerston, who says,
'Everything is going on as well as possible.'
[14] [Sir Frederic Lamb, afterwards Lord Beauvale, was at
this time ambassador at the Court of Austria.]
When I got to town I found a note from Guizot begging I would
call on him. I went, and he read me a letter from Thiers about
'the note' of M. de Pontois at Constantinople, in which he
explained that it was a verbal communication, and not a note, and
that it had been grossly exaggerated; and he read me Pontois'
despatch to Thiers. I then asked him if he knew anything of
Metternich and his disposition; and when he said, no, and asked
me very anxiously if I could tell him anything, I told him that I
thought it was so strongly turned towards peace, and he was so
anxious to relieve himself from the embarrassment in which he was
placed, that they might turn it to good account, if they were to
set about it.
September 13th, 1840 {p.307}
All last week at Doncaster; nothing new, but a considerable rise
in the funds, indicating a reviving confidence in peace. Have
seen nobody since I came back.
September 22nd, 1840 {p.307}
[Page Head: ALARM OF LORD MELBOURNE AND LORD JOHN.]
Came from Gorhambury yesterday. Got a letter from the Duke of
Bedford, in which he says, 'John has been here for the last week
and has spoken very freely and openly to me on the state of our
foreign relations. Matters are very serious, and may produce
events both at home and abroad which neither you nor I can
calculate upon. John is very uneasy and talks of going to town.
You are aware that he came up from Scotland unexpectedly. Between
ourselves, I think he is disposed to make a stand, and to act, if
occasion requires it, a great part--whether for good or evil, God
alone knows. Nobody, not even his colleagues, except Melbourne,
knows what is passing.' In a postscript he said that Lord John
had urged Melbourne to summon a Cabinet, and, accordingly, one is
summoned to meet next Monday. This is mysterious, but it can only
mean one thing. Lord John, already alarmed by Lord Spencer's
letter, and dreading the possibility of a war, is resolved to
oppose Palmerston's headlong policy, and, if it be necessary, to
risk a rupture in the Cabinet, and take upon himself the
administration of Foreign affairs. The Foreign Office was
originally that which he wished to have, and when Melbourne
returned to office, they proposed to Palmerston to take either
the Home or Colonial, but he would not hear of anything but the
Foreign department.
I talked over this letter with Clarendon last night (from whom I
have no secrets), and he, while fully agreeing in the propriety
of calling the Cabinet together, and making the future
transaction of foreign affairs a matter for the Government and
not for the Foreign Office only, and of course well disposed to
buckle on his armour on this question, acknowledged that
Palmerston would have very good reason to complain of any strong
opposition from that quarter, inasmuch as he had been all along
encouraged to proceed in his present line of policy by the
concurrence and support of John Russell, who was in fact just as
much responsible as Palmerston himself for the present state of
affairs.
The beginning of the business may be traced to a Cabinet held at
Windsor last autumn, when the general line of policy, since acted
upon by Palmerston, was settled. From that time, however, the
rest of the Ministers seem never to have interfered, or taken any
interest in the matter, and Palmerston conducted it all just as
he thought fit. This year Cabinet after Cabinet passed over, and
no mention was ever made of the affairs of the East, till one
day, at the end of a Cabinet, Palmerston, in the most easy
nonchalant way imaginable, said that he thought it right to
mention that he had been for a long time engaged in negotiation
upon the principles agreed upon at the Cabinet at Windsor, and
that he had drawn up a Treaty, with which it was fit the Cabinet
should be acquainted. At this sudden announcement his colleagues
looked very serious, but nobody said a word, except Lord Holland,
who said, 'that he could be no party to any measure which might
be likely to occasion a breach between this country and France.'
No discussion, however, took place at that time, and it was
agreed that the further consideration of the matter should be
postponed till the next Cabinet. The following day, Palmerston
wrote a letter to Melbourne, in which he said that he saw some
hesitation and some disapprobation in the Cabinet at the course
which he had recommended for adoption, and as he could only hope
to succeed by obtaining unanimous support, he thought it better
at once to place his office at Melbourne's disposal. Melbourne
wrote an answer begging he would not think of resigning, and
reminding him that the matter stood over for discussion, and then
sent the whole correspondence to Clarendon. Clarendon immediately
wrote word that he felt under so much obligation to Palmerston
that it was painful to him to oppose him; but as he could not
support him in his Eastern policy, it was much better that _he_
should resign, and begged Melbourne would accept _his_
resignation. Melbourne however said, 'For God's sake, let there
be no resignations at all,'[15] that his and Lord Holland's
retirement would have the effect of breaking up the Government;
and then it was suggested that they might guard themselves by a
minute of Cabinet (that which they subsequently drew up and gave
the Queen) from any participation in the measures they objected
to. After this, Palmerston continued to do just as he pleased,
his colleagues _consentientibus_ or at least _non
dissentientibus_, except Holland and Clarendon, with whom
nevertheless he seems (especially the latter) to have gone on
upon very good terms. Latterly, however, since the affair has got
so hot and critical, though their social relations have been
uninterrupted, and the Palmerstons have been constantly dining at
Holland House, Palmerston has never said one word to Lord Holland
on the subject, and he is unquestionably very sore at the
undisguised manner in which Lord Holland has signified his
dislike of Palmerston's foreign policy, and the great civilities
that Lord and Lady Holland have shown to Guizot for some time
past.
[15] I own I cannot see why. Their retirement would have
proved the unanimity of the rest, and would rather have
strengthened Palmerston than not.
The manner in which business is conducted and the independence of
the Foreign Office are curiously displayed by the following fact.
Last Wednesday a Protocol was signed (very proper in itself), in
which the four Powers disclaimed any intention of aggrandising
themselves in any way. The fact of this Protocol was told to
Clarendon by Dr. Bowring, who had heard it in the City, and to
Lord Holland by Dedel, neither of these Ministers having the
slightest notion of its existence. In the meantime, while the
apprehensions of Melbourne and John Russell, thus tardily
aroused, have urged them to the adoption of a measure which may
possibly break up the Government, or at all events bring about
some important changes of one sort or another, the French are
making vigorous preparations for war, and, having persuaded the
Pasha to send a new proposal to Constantinople, Thiers has
intimated that, if this be rejected, France will give him active
support, and then war will be inevitable. The crisis, therefore,
seems actually on the point of arriving, and while all the world
here fancies that war is impossible, it appears to be nearer than
ever it was.
Guizot committed a great _gaucherie_ the other day (the last time
he was at Windsor), which he never could have done if he had had
more experience of Courts, or been born and had lived in that
society. The first day, the Queen desired he would sit next to
her at dinner, which he did; the second day the Lord-in-waiting
(Headfort) came as usual with his list, and told Guizot he was to
take out the Queen of the Belgians, and sit somewhere else; when
he drew up and said, 'Milord, ma place est auprès de la Reine.'
Headfort, quite frightened, hastened back to report what had
happened; when the Queen as wisely altered, as the Ambassador had
foolishly objected to, the disposition of places, and desired him
to sit next herself, as he had done the day before.
September 23rd, 1840 {p.310}
[Page Head: DIFFERENCES IN THE CABINET.]
I called on Guizot yesterday morning, found him apprised of the
meeting of the Cabinet on Monday next, when I told him that I
could not help thinking he might materially contribute to the
adoption of some resolution conducive to peace, that I had no
doubt there would be very lively discussions at this Cabinet, and
it was of great importance he should, if he could, afford an
_appui_ to the peace party. He said he would willingly do
anything he could. I said, 'for example, could he say on the part
of his Government, that, in the event of the new terms proposed
by Mehemet Ali being accepted, France would guarantee their due
performance on the part of the Pasha, and that she would join in
coercive measures against him if he attempted to infringe them,
or commit any act of aggression against the Porte?' He said,
'that he was not _authorised_ to make such a declaration, but he
had no doubt he could engage so far, and that France would not
hesitate to pledge herself to join the other Allies and act
against Mehemet Ali in such a case as I had supposed.' I asked
him if he would write to his Government forthwith, as there was
still time to get an answer before the Cabinet met, and he
promised he would; but, he added, that with every desire to say
what might furnish an argument for those in the Cabinet who are
disposed to accept the proffered arrangement, he did not know how
to hold any communications--for with Palmerston he could not, and
Melbourne and John Russell were out of town. I told him, however,
that Lord John would be in town on Thursday, and he promised he
would call on him on Friday and talk to him; adding that he
thought the last time he saw him he was well disposed. I told him
that Lord John was not a man who said much, and that I could not
answer for his opinions, but that I was quite convinced
Palmerston would find some of his colleagues seriously alarmed,
and no longer disposed to submit quietly to whatever he might be
pleased to settle and to dictate. He asked me who were the
Ministers with the greatest influence, and whose opinions would
sway the Cabinet; and I told him Melbourne and John Russell,
without a doubt, and whatever they resolved upon, the rest would
agree to. But it is most extraordinary that while all reflecting
people are amazed at the Government being scattered all abroad at
such a momentous crisis, and instead of being collected together
for the purpose of considering in concert every measure that is
taken, as well as the whole course of policy, with any changes
and modifications that may be called for, the Ministers
themselves, such of them at least as are here, cannot discover
any occasion for any Cabinets or meetings, and seem to think it
quite natural and proper to leave the great question of peace or
war to be dealt with by Palmerston as a mere matter of official
routine. Lord Minto and Labouchere could not imagine why a
Cabinet was called, nor by whom, and Palmerston still less. The
day before the summons, he told Labouchere he might safely go
into the country, as there was no chance of a Cabinet; and now
Minto can only imagine that they are summoned to discuss the time
to be fixed for the prorogation or the meeting of Parliament.
September 26th, 1840 {p.310}
[Page Head: LORD JOHN CALLS A CABINET.]
On Wednesday I went to Woburn, and, as soon as I arrived, the
Duke carried me off to his room and told me everything that had
taken place, and the exact present posture of affairs. John
Russell has for some time past been impressed with the necessity
of bringing the Eastern Question to a settlement, to avert all
possibility of a war with France, and he has repeatedly urged
Melbourne in the strongest terms to do something to prevent the
danger into which the policy of the Treaty is hurrying us. None
of the Ministers, except Melbourne himself, and Palmerston, have
been apprised of these remonstrances, nor are any of them at this
moment aware of what has been and is passing. Palmerston has been
indignant at the opposition thus suddenly put forward by Lord
John, and complains (not, I think, without very good cause), that
after supporting and sanctioning his policy, and approving of the
Treaty, he abandons him midway, and refuses to give that policy a
fair trial. This he considers unjust and unreasonable, and it
must be owned he is entitled to complain. Lord John, however, as
far as I can learn, not very successfully justifies himself by
saying that it was one thing to defend _the treaty_, of which he
approved and does still, and another to approve _the measures_
which are apparently leading us into a war. Between the urgent
remonstrances of Lord John and the indignant complaints of
Palmerston, Melbourne has been at his wit's end. So melancholy a
picture of indecision, weakness, and pusillanimity as his conduct
has exhibited, I never heard of. The Queen is all this time in a
great state of nervousness and alarm, on account of Leopold;
terrified at Palmerston's audacity, amazed at his confidence, and
trembling lest her uncle should be exposed to all the dangers and
difficulties in which he would be placed by a war between his
niece and his father-in-law. All these sources of solicitude,
pressure from without, and doubt and hesitation within, have
raised that perplexity in Melbourne's mind which has robbed him
(as he told Lord John) of appetite and sleep. At length, after
going on in this way for some time, matters becoming so bad
between Palmerston and Lord John that Palmerston refused to have
any communication with him, Lord Spencer's letter, the continued
state of danger, and the prospect of some arrangement growing out
of the new propositions, made Lord John determine to take a
decided course, and he accordingly requested Melbourne to call a
Cabinet, which was done, and this important meeting is to take
place on Monday next. At this Cabinet, Lord John is prepared to
make a stand, and to propose that measures shall be taken for
bringing about a settlement on the basis of mutual concession,
and he is in fact disposed to accept the terms now offered by the
Pasha with the consent and by the advice of France. He
anticipates Palmerston's opposition to this, and his insisting
upon a continuance of our present course; but he is resolved in
such a case to bring matters to an issue, and if he is overruled
by a majority of the Cabinet, not only to resign, but to take a
decisive part in Parliament against Palmerston's policy, and to
do his utmost there, with the support which he expects to obtain,
to prevent a war. He is aware that his conduct might not only
break up the Whig Government and party, but that it may bring
about an entirely new arrangement and combination of parties, all
of which he is willing to encounter rather than the evils and
hazards of war. On the other hand, if Palmerston refuses to
accede to his terms, and if unsupported by the Cabinet he tenders
his resignation, Lord John is ready to urge its acceptance, and
himself to undertake the administration of our foreign affairs.
In short, he has made up his mind, and that so strongly, that I
do not think it possible he can fail either to carry his point or
to break up the Government, or at least bring about very material
changes in it.
Prepared as I was, by the Duke of Bedford's letter, for something
of this sort, I was not prepared for anything so strong and
decisive; and while I expressed my satisfaction at it, I did not
conceal my opinion that Lord John's course had not been at all
consistent, and that Palmerston, when the moment of discussion
came, would have a good case against his antagonist colleague.
While I was at Woburn, I had constant running talk about this
matter with the Duke, but not a word with Lord John, to whom I
never uttered, nor he to me.
Yesterday I returned to town, when I found that Lord John had
written both to Lord Holland and Clarendon, shortly, but saying
that he thought the new proposals made the matter stand very
differently. I dined at Holland House, where the Palmerstons
dined also. My own opinion from the first moment was, that
Palmerston never would agree to any arrangement, but I thought it
just possible, if he became impressed with the magnitude of the
danger, that he might anticipate Lord John, by himself suggesting
some attempt to profit by the disposition of the Pasha to make
concessions. But any such possibility was speedily dissipated, by
a conversation which I had with Lady Palmerston, who spoke with
the utmost bitterness and contempt of these proposals, as totally
out of the question, not worth a moment's attention, and such as
the other Powers would not listen to, even if we were disposed to
accept them; and that we were now bound to those Powers, and must
act in concert with them. She told me a great deal, which I knew
(from other sources) not to be true, about Metternich's
resolution not to make the slightest concession to France and the
Pasha; and her brother Frederic's strenuous advice and opinion to
that effect. She complained, and said that Frederic complained,
of the mischief which was done by Cabinets which only bred
difficulties, intrigues, and underhand proceedings, and plainly
intimated her opinion that all powers ought to be centred in, and
all action proceed from, the Foreign Office alone. I told her
that I could not see the proposals in the same light as she did,
that some mutual concessions in all affairs must be expected, and
that she was so accustomed to look at the matter only in a
diplomatic point of view that she was not sufficiently alive to
the storm of wrath and indignation which would burst upon the
Government, if war did ensue upon the rejection of such terms as
these, which, as far as I had been able to gather opinions,
appeared to moderate impartial men fair and reasonable in
themselves, and such as we might accept without dishonour. We had
a very long talk, which was principally of importance as showing
the state of her husband's mind, and I told Lord Holland
afterwards what I had said to her, at which he expressed great
satisfaction. I found afterwards that there has been a
correspondence between Palmerston and Holland, begun by the
former, and the object of it to vent his complaints at the
undisguised hostility of Holland House to the Treaty and its
policy. It ended by Holland's refusing to continue it, and
referring Palmerston to the Cabinet on Monday, when the whole
question would come under consideration.
[Page Head: COUNT WALEWSKI'S MISSION TO EGYPT.]
This morning I received a note from Guizot, begging I would call
on him as soon as I could. I went almost directly, when he
produced a letter from Thiers, in which he desired Guizot to go
immediately to Palmerston, and in the most formal and solemn
manner to deny, in his name and in the name of France, that the
mission of Walewski[16] had had any such object as that which had
been imputed to it; that he had not endeavoured to persuade the
Pasha not to accede to the terms imposed upon him, and that if he
was disposed to accept them, 'La France ne se montrerait pas plus
ambitieuse pour lui qu'il ne l'était pour lui-même,' and would
certainly not interfere to prevent the execution of the Treaty.
Moreover, he was to say that Walewski had not gone to
Constantinople as the agent of the Pasha, but only to convey to
M. de Pontois the intelligence of the communication which the
Pasha had made to the Sultan through Rifat Bey, Rifat Bey having
been despatched on the 6th with a very submissive letter from
Mehemet Ali to the Sultan, in which he asked him to grant certain
terms, the substance of which has been already made known. Guizot
then said that he had likewise received authority to declare that
if the Sultan accepted the terms proposed by Mehemet Ali, or even
some modification of them (such as France could approve of), with
the consent and concurrence of his Allies, and if he invited
France to be a party to the new arrangement, and to join in
guaranteeing a due execution of its provisions, France would
accept such invitation, and would join the other Allies in
compelling Mehemet Ali to a strict observance of the arrangement,
and would, if necessary, use measures of coercion and hostility
against him if he failed in a due performance, or infringed the
limits assigned to him. I told M. Guizot that nothing could be
more satisfactory than these communications, and he said that he
had already asked for an interview with Palmerston, in order to
impart the same to him. He then wanted to know if he might speak
to Lord John if he met him at Holland House or elsewhere; but I
advised him not, and told him that Palmerston was suspicious and
jealous, and would take umbrage at any of his colleagues holding
communications upon affairs which were his peculiar concern. He
acquiesced altogether, and it was agreed that I should call on
him to-morrow morning and hear what had passed between Palmerston
and him. I took the opportunity of telling him on that occasion
that the great evil, and that which rendered all negotiation and
arrangement so difficult, was the absence of all reciprocal
confidence, that we had none in his Minister (Thiers), and that
the national pride and vanity (of which we, like themselves, had
a share) were wounded by the ostentatious preparations for war,
and the menacing and blustering tone of the press. He
acknowledged these evils and their bad effects, and only shrugged
up his shoulders at what I said about Thiers, of whom he has no
good opinion himself, as is well known.
[16] [Count Walewski had been despatched to Alexandria with
a mission from M. Thiers, and one of the grievances of
Lord Palmerston against France was that this emissary
was supposed to have been sent either to encourage
Mehemet Ali in his resistance to the Allied Powers, or
to negotiate a separate arrangement between the Pasha
and the Sultan, under the auspices of France, so as to
cut the ground from under the other Powers. This M.
Thiers stoutly denied in his correspondence, and he
denied it to me with equal energy when I dined with him
at Auteuil on October 8.]
When I left him, I wrote a long letter to the Duke of Bedford,
detailing all that had passed, and as I cannot now doubt that
Lord John knows his brother communicates with me, and it was of
importance that he should be apprised immediately of what had
passed, I resolved to send him my letter to read, and desired him
to forward it to Woburn. He afterwards dined with me, and when he
came to dinner, he said he had read my letter, and that it was
very important.
September 27th, 1840 {p.317}
[Page Head: CONCILIATORY PROPOSALS.]
Went to Guizot, who began by telling me he had been with
Palmerston yesterday, who had acknowledged _très loyalement_ that
there was not and could not be any truth in the report (about
Walewski), said his manner to him (as it had always been) was
excellent. Guizot then complained of the facility with which he
gave ear to reports like these and to all that was said against
France; but he left him well enough satisfied with his reception.
He then asked in what state the question was, and I told him that
it was in such a state that I had no hesitation in saying war was
impossible, and that if the 'transaction' was such as we could in
honour accept, we should accept it; that the best thing to be
hoped was, that Palmerston would make up his mind to a
'_transaction_' in the Cabinet, and would himself take the
initiative; but that at all events there were others who were
resolved not to pursue any longer this course of policy, and that
if he was inexorable it must end in his resignation.
Before I went to Guizot I saw Clarendon, who had had a good deal
of talk with Lord John, who spoke to him just in the strain which
the Duke of Bedford had already described to me. Melbourne is to
be in town to-day, and what Lord John expected and hoped was,
that he would be able to persuade Palmerston to give way, and
himself propose to acquiesce in Mehemet Ali's proposals. In that
case, Lord John said, he should not say a word. If Palmerston
would not do so, then it would be for him to take his own course,
and he and Clarendon have both agreed to resign if they should be
overruled; and the latter said he thought he could answer for
Lord Holland doing the same. While returning home I was overtaken
by Palmerston, who was on his way to Lord John's house; and they
are now closeted together, so that at least they will have it all
out before the Cabinet to-morrow. Guizot gave me a copy of
Cochelet's despatch, with an account of what had passed between
Mehemet Ali, himself, Walewski, and the four Consuls-General,
which ended in the transmission of his new proposal to the Porte.
September 28th, 1840 {p.318}
Lord John and Palmerston had a long conversation, amicable enough
in tone, but unsatisfactory in result. However, Lord John did not
appear to be shaken in his determination, but rather inclined to
an opinion that Palmerston would himself be disposed to give way.
Any such expectation ought to have been dissipated by a letter
which Lord John received meanwhile from Palmerston, in which he
talked with his usual confidence and levity of 'the certainty of
success,' the 'hopeless condition of the Pasha,' and the facility
with which the Treaty would be carried into effect.[17]
[17] Everything turned out according to his anticipations.
[Page Head: LORD PALMERSTON'S RESOLUTION.]
In the morning, after I had been with Guizot (and after
Palmerston's interview with Lord John), he went to Palmerston and
communicated fully the offer of France, saying he would not enter
into the details of the question, but he could not help reminding
him of the failure of so many of his confident expectations.
Palmerston said that there would be no sort of difficulty in
enforcing the Treaty, and that then France might join if she
pleased. Guizot replied that this was out of the question, that
France was now ready to join in a transaction fair and honourable
to both parties, but she would not stand by, see the question
settled without her, and then come in to bolster up an arrangement
made by others, and with which she had no concern. In the evening
he went to Holland House, where he told Melbourne what he had
communicated to Palmerston; found him in a satisfactory
disposition, but Melbourne said that there was a danger greatly to
be feared, and that was, that our ambassador at Constantinople,
who was very violent against Mehemet Ali, and not afraid of war,
might and probably would urge the immediate rejection of the
Pacha's proposal and every sort of violent measure.[18] Guizot,
naturally enough, expressed (to me) his astonishment that the
Prime Minister should hold such language, and that, if he had an
ambassador who was likely to act in such a manner so much at
variance with his political views, he did not recall him or
supersede him by a special mission. This, however, was very
characteristic of Melbourne; and I told Clarendon, urging him to
insist that some positive understanding should be come to, upon
the conduct to be adopted by Ponsonby. There can be no doubt that
Palmerston and Ponsonby between them will do all they can to
embroil matters, and to make a _transaction_ impossible, and
Palmerston writes just what he pleases without any of his
colleagues having the least idea what he says. The result of the
whole then is, that the Cabinet meet at three to-day, and that
Lord John will have to stand forth in opposition to Palmerston's
policy, and to propose the adoption of measures leading to an
amicable arrangement. A few hours will show how the rest are
disposed to take it.
[18] As he did.