THE KANAWHA VALLEY
Orders for the Kanawha expedition--The troops and their
quality--Lack of artillery and cavalry--Assembling at
Gallipolis--District of the Kanawha--Numbers of the opposing
forces--Method of advance--Use of steamboats--Advance guards on
river banks--Camp at Thirteen-mile Creek--Night alarm--The river
chutes--Sunken obstructions--Pocotaligo--Affair at
Barboursville--Affair at Scary Creek--Wise's position at Tyler
Mountain--His precipitate retreat--Occupation of
Charleston--Rosecrans succeeds McClellan--Advance toward Gauley
Bridge--Insubordination--The Newspaper Correspondent--Occupation of
Gauley Bridge.
When McClellan reached Buckhannon, on the 2d of July, the rumors he
heard of Garnett's strength, and the news of the presence of General
Wise with a considerable force in the Great Kanawha valley, made him
conclude to order a brigade to that region for the purpose of
holding the lower part of the valley defensively till he might try
to cut off Wise's army after Garnett should be disposed of. This
duty was assigned to me. On the 22d of June I had received my
appointment as Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, superseding my
state commission. I had seen the regiments of my brigade going one
by one, as fast as they were reorganized for the three years'
service, and I had hoped to be ordered to follow them to McClellan's
own column. The only one left in camp was the Eleventh Ohio, of
which only five companies were present, though two more companies
were soon added.
McClellan's letter directed me to assume command of the First and
Second Kentucky regiments with the Twelfth Ohio, and to call upon
the governor for a troop of cavalry and a six-gun battery: to
expedite the equipment of the whole and move them to Gallipolis
_via_ Hampden and Portland, stations on the Marietta Railroad, from
which a march of twenty-five miles by country roads would take us to
our destination. At Gallipolis was the Twenty-first Ohio, which I
should add to my command and proceed at once with two regiments to
Point Pleasant at the mouth of the Kanawha, five miles above. When
all were assembled, one regiment was to be left at Point Pleasant,
two were to be advanced up the valley to Ten-mile Creek, and the
other placed at an intermediate position. "Until further orders,"
the letter continued, "remain on the defensive and endeavor to
induce the rebels to remain at Charleston until I can cut off their
retreat by a movement from Beverly." Captain W. J. Kountz, an
experienced steamboat captain, was in charge of
water-transportation, and would furnish light-draught steamboats for
my use. [Footnote: What purports to be McClellan's letter to me is
found in the Records (Official Records, vol. ii. pt. i. p. 197), but
it seems to be only an abstract of it, made to accompany his
dispatch to Washington (_Id_., p. 198), and by a clerical error
given the form of the complete letter. It does not contain the
quotation given above, which was reiterated before the letter was
closed, in these words: "Remember that my present plan is to cut
them off by a rapid march from Beverly after driving those in front
of me across the mountains, and do all you can to favor that by
avoiding offensive movements."
After the printing of the earlier volumes of the Records, covering
the years 1861-1862, I learned that the books and papers of the
Department of the Ohio had not been sent to Washington at the close
of the war, but were still in Cincinnati. I brought this fact to the
attention of the Adjutant-General, and at the request of that
officer obtained and forwarded them to the Archives office. With
them were my letter books and the original files of my
correspondence with McClellan and Rosecrans in 1861 and 1862.
Colonel Robert N. Scott, who was then in charge of the publication,
informed me that the whole would be prepared for printing and would
appear in the supplemental volumes, after the completion of the rest
of the First Series. Owing to changes in the Board of Publication in
the course of twenty years, there were errors in the arrangement of
the matter for the printer, and a considerable part of the
correspondence between the generals named and myself was
accidentally omitted from the supplemental volume (Official Records,
vol. li. pt. i.) in which it should have appeared. The originals are
no doubt in the files of the Archives office, and for the benefit of
investigators I give in Appendix A a list of the numbers missing
from the printed volume, as shown by comparison with my retained
copies.]
Governor Dennison seconded our wishes with his usual earnestness,
and ordered the battery of artillery and company of cavalry to meet
me at Gallipolis; but the guns for the battery were not to be had,
and a section of two bronze guns (six-pounder smooth-bores rifled)
was the only artillery, whilst the cavalry was less than half a
troop of raw recruits, useful only as messengers. I succeeded in
getting the Eleventh Ohio sent with me, the lacking companies to be
recruited and sent later. The Twelfth Ohio was an excellent regiment
which had been somewhat delayed in its reorganization and had not
gone with the rest of its brigade to McClellan. The Twenty-first was
one of the regiments enlisted for the State in excess of the first
quota, and was now brought into the national service under the
President's second call. The two Kentucky regiments had been
organized in Cincinnati, and were made up chiefly of steamboat crews
and "longshoremen" thrown out of employment by the stoppage of
commerce on the river. There were in them some companies of other
material, but these gave the distinctive character to the regiments.
The colonels and part of the field officers were Kentuckians, but
the organizations were Ohio regiments in nearly everything but the
name. The men were mostly of a rough and reckless class, and gave a
good deal of trouble by insubordination; but they did not lack
courage, and after they had been under discipline for a while,
became good fighting regiments. The difficulty of getting
transportation from the railway company delayed our departure. It
was not till the 6th of July that a regiment could be sent, and
another followed in two or three days. The two Kentucky regiments
were not yet armed and equipped, but after a day or two were ready
and were ordered up the river by steamboats. I myself left Camp
Dennison on the evening of Sunday the 7th with the Eleventh Ohio
(seven companies) and reached Gallipolis in the evening of the 9th.
The three Ohio regiments were united on the 10th and carried by
steamers to Point Pleasant, and we entered the theatre of war.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. li. pt. i. p. 416: my report to
McClellan.]
My movement had been made upon a telegram from General McClellan,
and I found at Gallipolis his letter of instructions of the 2d, and
another of the 6th which enlarged the scope of my command. A
territorial district was assigned to me, including the southwestern
part of Virginia below Parkersburg on the Ohio, and north of the
Great Kanawha, reaching back into the country as I should occupy it.
[Footnote: The territorial boundary of McClellan's Department had
been placed at the Great Kanawha and the Ohio rivers, probably with
some political idea of avoiding the appearance of aggression upon
regions of doubtful loyalty.] The directions to restrict myself to a
defensive occupation of the Lower Kanawha valley were changed to
instructions to march on Charleston and Gauley Bridge, and, with a
view to his resumption of the plan to make this his main line of
advance, to "obtain all possible information in regard to the roads
leading toward Wytheville and the adjacent region." I was also
ordered to place a regiment at Ripley, on the road from Parkersburg
to Charleston, and advised "to beat up Barbonsville, Guyandotte,
etc, so that the entire course of the Ohio may be secured to us."
Communication with Ripley was by Letart's Falls on the Ohio, some
thirty miles above Gallipolis, or by Ravenswood, twenty miles
further. Guyandotte was a longer distance below Gallipolis, and
Barboursville was inland some miles up the Gurandotte River. As to
General Wise, McClellan wrote: "Drive Wise out and catch him if you
can. If you do catch him, send him to Colombus penitentiary." A
regiment at Parkersburg and another at Roane Court House on the
northern border of my district were ordered to report to me, but I
was not authorized to move them from the stations assigned them, and
they were soon united to McClellan's own column.
At Gallipolis I heard that a steamboat on the Ohio had been boarded
by a rebel party near Guyandotte, and the news giving point to
McClellan's suggestion to "beat up" that region, I dispatched a
small steamboat down the river to meet the Kentucky regiments with
orders for the leading one to land at Guyandotte and suppress any
insurgents in that neighborhood. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
Ii. pt. i. p. 417.] It was hazardous to divide my little army into
three columns on a base of a hundred miles, but it was thought wise
to show some Union troops at various points on the border, and I
purposed to unite my detachments by early convergent movements
forward to the Kanawha valley as soon as I should reach Red House,
thirty-two miles up the river, with my principal column.
Before I reached Charleston I added to my artillery one iron and one
brass cannon, smooth six-pounders, borrowed from the civil
authorities at Gallipolis; but they were without caissons or any
proper equipment, and were manned by volunteers from the infantry.
[Footnote: Ibid.] My total force, when assembled, would be a little
over 3000 men, the regiments having the same average strength as
those with McClellan. The opposing force under General Wise was 4000
by the time the campaign was fully opened, though somewhat less at
the beginning. [Footnote: Wise reported his force on the 17th of
July as 3500 "effective" men and ten cannon, and says he received
"perhaps 300" in reinforcements on the 18th. When he abandoned the
valley ten days later, he reported his force 4000 in round numbers.
Official Records, vol. ii. pp. 290, 292; 1011.]
The Great Kanawha River was navigable for small steamboats about
seventy miles, to a point ten or twelve miles above Charleston, the
only important town of the region, which was at the confluence of
the Kanawha and Elk rivers. Steamboats were plenty, owing to the
interruption of trade, and wagons were wholly lacking; so that my
column was accompanied and partly carried by a fleet of stern-wheel
steamers.
On Thursday the 11th of July the movement from Point Pleasant began.
An advance-guard was sent out on each side of the river, marching
upon the roads which were near its banks. The few horsemen were
divided and sent with them to carry messages, and the boats
followed, steaming slowly along in rear of the marching men. Most of
two regiments were carried on the steamers, to save fatigue to the
men, who were as yet unused to their work, and many of whom were
footsore from their first long march of twenty-five miles to
Gallipolis from Hampden station, where they had been obliged to
leave the railway. The arrangement was also a good one in a military
point of view, for if an enemy were met on either bank of the
stream, the boats could land in a moment and the troops disembark
without delay.
Our first day's sail was thirteen miles up the river, and it was the
very romance of campaigning. I took my station on top of the
pilot-house of the leading boat, so that I might see over the banks
of the stream and across the bottom lands to the high hills which
bounded the valley. The afternoon was a lovely one. Summer clouds
lazily drifted across the sky, the boats were dressed in their
colors and swarmed with the men like bees. The bands played national
tunes, and as we passed the houses of Union citizens, the inmates
would wave their handkerchiefs to us, and were answered by cheers
from the troops. The scenery was picturesque, the gently winding
river making beautiful reaches that opened new scenes upon us at
every turn. On either side the advance-guard could be seen in the
distance, the main body in the road, with skirmishers exploring the
way in front, and flankers on the sides. Now and then a horseman
would bring some message to the bank from the front, and a small
boat would be sent to receive it, giving us the rumors with which
the country was rife, and which gave just enough of excitement and
of the spice of possible danger to make this our first day in an
enemy's country key everybody to just such a pitch as apparently to
double the vividness of every sensation. The landscape seemed more
beautiful, the sunshine more bright, and the exhilaration of
out-door life more joyous than any we had ever known.
The halt for the night had been assigned at a little village on the
right (northern) bank of the stream, which was nestled beneath a
ridge which ran down from the hills toward the river, making an
excellent position for defence against any force which might come
against it from the upper valley. The sun was getting low behind us
in the west, as we approached it, and the advance-guard had already
halted. Captain Cotter's two bronze guns gleamed bright on the top
of the ridge beyond the pretty little town, and before the sun went
down, the new white tents had been carried up to the slope and
pitched there. The steamers were moored to the shore, and the low
slanting rays of the sunset fell upon as charming a picture as was
ever painted. An outpost with pickets was set on the southern side
of the river, both grand and camp guards were put out also on the
side we occupied, and the men soon had their supper and went to
rest. Late in the evening a panic-stricken countryman came in with
the news that General Wise was moving down upon us with 4000 men.
The man was evidently in earnest, and was a loyal one. He believed
every word he said, but he had in fact seen only a few of the
enemy's horsemen who were scouting toward us, and believed their
statement that an army was at their back. It was our initiation into
an experience of rumors that was to continue as long as the war. We
were to get them daily and almost hourly; sometimes with a little
foundation of fact, sometimes with none; rarely purposely deceptive,
but always grossly exaggerated, making chimeras with which a
commanding officer had to wage a more incessant warfare than with
the substantial enemy in his front. I reasoned that Wise's troops
were, like my own, too raw to venture a night attack with, and
contented myself with sending a strong reconnoitring party out
beyond my pickets, putting in command of it Major Hines of the
Twelfth Ohio, an officer who subsequently became noted for his
enterprise and activity in charge of scouting parties. The camp
rested quietly, and toward morning Hines returned, reporting that a
troop of the enemy's horse had come within a couple of miles of our
position in search of information about us and our movement. They
had indulged in loud bragging as to what Wise and his army would do
with us, but this and nothing more was the basis of our honest
friend's fright. The morning dawned bright and peaceful, the
steamers were sent back for a regiment which was still at Point
Pleasant, and the day was used in concentrating the little army and
preparing for another advance.
On July 13th we moved again, making about ten miles, and finding the
navigation becoming difficult by reason of the low water. At several
shoals in the stream rough wing-dams had been built from the sides
to concentrate the water in the channel, and at Knob Shoals, in one
of these "chutes" as they were called, a coal barge had sometime
before been sunk. In trying to pass it our leading boat grounded,
and, the current being swift, it was for a time doubtful if we
should get her off. We finally succeeded, however, and the
procession of boats slowly steamed up the rapids. We had hardly got
beyond them when we heard a distant cannon-shot from our
advance-guard which had opened a long distance between them and us
during our delay. We steamed rapidly ahead. Soon we saw a man
pulling off from the south bank in a skiff. Nearing the steamer, he
stood up and excitedly shouted that a general engagement had begun.
We laughingly told him it couldn't be very general till we got in,
and we moved on, keeping a sharp outlook for our parties on either
bank. When we came up to them, we learned that a party of horsemen
had appeared on the southern side of the river and had opened a
skirmishing fire, but had scampered off as if the Old Nick were
after them when a shell from the rifled gun was sent over their
heads. The shell, like a good many that were made in those days, did
not explode, and the simple people of the vicinity who had heard its
long-continued scream told our men some days after that they thought
it was "going yet."
From this time some show of resistance was made by the enemy, and
the skirmishing somewhat retarded the movement. Still, about ten
miles was made each day till the evening of the 16th, when we
encamped at the mouth of the Pocotaligo, a large creek which enters
the Kanawha from the north. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. li.
pt. i. p. 418.] The evening before, we had had one of those
incidents, not unusual with new troops, which prove that nothing but
habit can make men cool and confident in their duties. We had, as
usual, moored our boats to the northern bank and made our camp
there, placing an outpost on the left bank opposite us supporting a
chain of sentinels, to prevent a surprise from that direction. A
report of some force of the enemy in their front made me order
another detachment to their support after nightfall. The detachment
had been told off and ferried across in small boats. They were dimly
seen marching in the starlight up the river after landing, when
suddenly a shot was heard, and then an irregular volley was both
seen and heard as the muskets flashed out in the darkness. A
supporting force was quickly sent over, and, no further disturbance
occurring, a search was made for an enemy, but none was found. A gun
had accidentally gone off in the squad, and the rest of the men,
surprised and bewildered, had fired, they neither knew why nor at
what. Two men were killed, and several others were hurt. This and
the chaffing the men got from their comrades was a lesson to the
whole command. The soldiers were brave enough, and were thoroughly
ashamed of themselves, but they were raw; that was all that could be
said of it. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. li. pt. i. p. 421.]
We were here overtaken by the Second Kentucky, which had stopped at
Guyandotte on its way up the river, and had marched across the
country to join us after our progress had sufficiently covered that
lower region. From Guyandotte a portion of the regiment, under
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Neff, had gone to Barboursville and
had attacked and dispersed an encampment of Confederates which was
organizing there. It was a very creditable little action, in which
officers and men conducted themselves well, and which made them for
the time the envy of the rest of the command.
The situation at "Poca," as it was called in the neighborhood, was
one which made the further advance of the army require some
consideration. Information which came to us from loyal men showed
that some force of the enemy was in position above the mouth of
Scary Creek on the south side of the Kanawha, and about three miles
from us. We had for two days had constant light skirmishing with the
advance-guard of Wise's forces on the north bank of the river, and
supposed that the principal part of his command was on our side, and
not far in front of us. It turned out in fact that this was so, and
that Wise had placed his principal camp at Tyler Mountain, a bold
spur which reaches the river on the northern side (on which is also
the turnpike road), about twelve miles above my position, while he
occupied the south side with a detachment. The Pocotaligo, which
entered the river from the north at our camp, covered us against an
attack on that side; but we could not take our steam-boats further
unless both banks of the river were cleared. We had scarcely any
wagons, for those which had been promised us could not yet be
forwarded, and we must either continue to keep the steamboats with
us, or organize wagon transportation and cut loose from the boats.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. li. pt. i. p. 420; dispatch of
17th also.] My urgent dispatches were hurrying the wagons toward us,
but meanwhile I hoped the opposition on the south bank of the river
would prove trifling, for artillery in position at any point on the
narrow river would at once stop navigation of our light and unarmed
transports. On the morning of the 17th a reconnoitering party sent
forward on the south side of the river under command of
Lieutenant-Colonel White of the Twelfth Ohio, reported the enemy
about five hundred strong intrenched on the further side of Scary
Creek, which was not fordable at its mouth, but could be crossed a
little way up the stream. Colonel Lowe of the Twelfth requested the
privilege of driving off this party with his regiment accompanied by
our two cannon. He was ordered to do so, whilst the enemy's
skirmishers should be pushed back from the front of the main column,
and it should be held ready to advance rapidly up the north bank of
the river as soon as the hostile force at Scary Creek should be
dislodged.
The Twelfth and two companies of the Twenty-first Ohio were ferried
over and moved out soon after noon. The first reports from them were
encouraging and full of confidence, the enemy were retreating and
they had dismounted one of his guns; but just before evening they
returned, bringing the account of their repulse in the effort to
cross at the mouth of the creek, and their failure to find the ford
a little higher up. Their ammunition had run short, some casualties
had occurred, and they had become discouraged and given it up. Their
loss was 10 men killed and 35 wounded. If they had held on and asked
for assistance, it would have been well enough; but, as was common
with new troops, they passed from confidence to discouragement as
soon as they were checked, and they retreated.
The affair was accompanied by another humiliating incident which
gave me no little chagrin. During the progress of the engagement
Colonel Woodruff and Lieutenant-Colonel Neff of the Second Kentucky,
with Colonel De Villiers of the Eleventh Ohio, rode out in front, on
the north bank of the river, till they came opposite the enemy's
position, the hostile party on our side of the stream having fallen
back beyond this point. They were told by a negro that the rebels
were in retreat, and they got the black man to ferry them over in a
skiff, that they might be the first to congratulate their friends.
To their amazement they were welcomed as prisoners by the
Confederates, who greatly enjoyed their discomfiture. The negro had
told the truth in saying that the enemy had been in retreat; for the
fact was that both sides retreated, but the Confederates, being
first informed of this, resumed their position and claimed a
victory. The officers who were captured had gone out without
permission, and, led on by the hare-brained De Villiers, had done
what they knew was foolish and unmilitary, resulting for them in a
severe experience in Libby Prison at Richmond, and for us in the
momentary appearance of lack of discipline and order which could not
fairly be charged upon the command. I reported the facts without
disguise or apology, trusting to the future to remove the bad
impression the affair must naturally make upon McClellan.
The report of the strength of the position attacked and our
knowledge of the increasing difficulty of the ground before us, led
me to conclude that the wisest course would be to await the arrival
of the wagons, now daily expected, and then, with supplies for
several days in hand, move independent of the steamers, which became
only an embarrassment when it was advisable to leave the river road
for the purpose of turning a fortified position like that we had
found before us. We therefore rested quietly in our strong camp for
several days, holding both banks of the river and preparing to move
the main column by a country road leading away from the stream on
the north side, and returning to it at Tyler Mountain, where Wise's
camp was reported to be. I ordered up the First Kentucky from
Ravenswood and Ripley, but its colonel found obstacles in his way,
and did not join us till we reached Charleston the following week.
On the 23d of July I had succeeded in getting wagons and teams
enough to supply the most necessary uses, and renewed the advance.
We marched rapidly on the 24th by the circuitous route I have
mentioned, leaving a regiment to protect the steamboats. The country
was very broken and the roads very rough, but the enemy had no
knowledge of our movement, and toward evening we again approached
the river immediately in rear of their camp at Tyler Mountain. When
we drove in their pickets, the force was panic-stricken and ran off,
leaving their camp in confusion, and their supper which they were
cooking but did not stop to eat. A little below the point where we
reached the river, and on the other side, was the steamboat "Maffet"
with a party of soldiers gathering the wheat which had been cut in
the neighboring fields and was in the sheaf. I was for a moment
doubtful whether it might not be one of our own boats which had
ventured up the river under protection of the regiment left behind,
and directed our skirmishers who were deployed along the edge of the
water to hail the other side. "Who are you?" was shouted from both
banks simultaneously. "United States troops," our men answered.
"Hurrah for Jeff Davis!" shouted the others, and a rattling fire
opened on both sides. A shell was sent from our cannon into the
steamer, and the party upon her were immediately seen jumping
ashore, having first set fire to her to prevent her falling into our
hands. The enemy then moved away on that side, under cover of the
trees which lined the river bank. Night was now falling, and,
sending forward an advance-guard to follow up the force whose camp
we had surprised, we bivouacked on the mountain side.
In the morning, as we were moving out at an early hour, we were met
by the mayor and two or three prominent citizens of Charleston who
came to surrender the town to us, Wise having hurriedly retreated
during the night. He had done a very unnecessary piece of mischief
before leaving, in partly cutting off the cables of a fine
suspension bridge which spans the Elk River at Charleston. As this
stream enters the Kanawha from the north and below the city, it may
have seemed to him that it would delay our progress; but as a large
number of empty coal barges were lying at the town, it took our
company of mechanics, under Captain Lane of the Eleventh Ohio, but a
little while to improvise a good floating bridge, and part of the
command passed through the town and camped beyond it. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. li. pt. i. p. 425.] One day was now given to
the establishment of a depot of supplies at Charleston and to the
organization of regular communication by water with Gallipolis, and
by wagons with such positions as we might occupy further up the
river. Deputations of the townspeople were informed that it was not
our policy to meddle with private persons who remained quietly at
home, nor would we make any inquisition as to the personal opinions
of those who attended strictly to their own business; but they were
warned that any communication with the enemy would be remorselessly
punished.
We were now able to get more accurate information about Wise's
forces than we could obtain before, and this accorded pretty well
with the strength which he reported officially. [Footnote: _Ante_,
p. 63 note.] His infantry was therefore more than equal to the
column under my command in the valley, whilst in artillery and in
cavalry he was greatly superior. Our continued advance in the face
of such opposition is sufficient evidence that the Confederate force
was not well handled, for as the valley contracted and the hills
crowded in closer to the river, nearly every mile offered positions
in which small numbers could hold at bay an army. Our success in
reaching Charleston was therefore good ground for being content with
our progress, though I had to blame myself for errors in the
management of my part of the campaign at Pocataligo. I ought not to
have assumed as confidently as I did that the enemy was only five
hundred strong at Scary Creek and that a detachment could dispose of
that obstacle whilst the rest of the column prepared to advance on
our principal line. Wise's force at that point was in fact double
the number supposed. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. ii. p. 1011.]
It is true it was very inconvenient to ferry any considerable body
of troops back and forth across the river; but I should nevertheless
have taken the bulk of my command to the left bank, and by occupying
the enemy's attention at the mouth of Scary Creek, covered the
movement of a sufficient force upon his flank by means of the fords
farther up that stream. This would have resulted in the complete
routing of the detachment, and it is nearly certain that I could
have pushed on to Charleston at once, and could have waited there
for the organization of my wagon train with the prestige of victory,
instead of doing so at 'Poca' with the appearance of a check.
McClellan recognized the fact that he was asking me to face the
enemy with no odds in my favor, and as soon as he heard that Wise
was disposed to make a stand he directed me not to risk attacking
him in front, but rather to await the result of his own movement
toward the Upper Kanawha. [Footnote: Dispatches of July 16 and 20.]
Rosecrans did the same when he assumed command; but I knew the hope
had been that I would reach Gauley Bridge, and I was vexed that my
movement should have the appearance of failing when I was conscious
that we had not fairly measured our strength with my opponent. As
soon, therefore, as the needful preparations could be made, I
decided upon the turning movement which I have already described,
and our resolute advance seems to have thrown Wise into a panic from
which he did not recover till he got far beyond Gauley Bridge.
At Charleston I learned of the Bull Run disaster, and that McClellan
had been ordered to Washington, leaving Rosecrans in command of our
department. The latter sent me orders which implied that to reach
Charleston was the most he could expect of me, and directing me to
remain on the defensive if I should succeed in getting so far,
whilst he should take up anew McClellan's plan of reaching the rear
of Wise's army. [Footnote: Dispatches of July 26 and 29.] His
dispatches, fortunately, did not reach me till I was close to Gauley
Bridge and was sure of my ability to take possession of that defile,
some forty miles above Charleston. An additional reason for my
prompt advance was that the Twenty-first Ohio was not yet
re-enlisted for the war, was only a "three months" regiment whose
time was about to expire, and Governor Dennison had telegraphed me
to send it back to Ohio. I left this regiment as a post-garrison at
Charleston till it could be relieved by another, or till my success
in reaching Gauley Bridge should enable me to send back a detachment
for that post, and, on the 26th July, pushed forward with the rest
of my column, which, now that the First Kentucky had joined me,
consisted of four regiments. Our first night's encampment was about
eleven miles above Charleston in a lovely nook between spurs of the
hills. Here I was treated to a little surprise on the part of three
of my subordinates which was an unexpected enlargement of my
military experience. The camp had got nicely arranged for the night
and supper was over, when these gentlemen waited upon me at my tent.
The one who had shown the least capacity as commander of a regiment
was spokesman, and informed me that after consultation they had
concluded that it was foolhardy to follow the Confederates into the
gorge we were travelling, and that unless I could show them
satisfactory reasons for changing their opinion they would not lead
their commands further into it. I dryly asked if he was quite sure
he understood the nature of his communication. There was something
probably in the tone of my question which was not altogether
expected, and his companions began to look a little uneasy. He then
protested that none of them meant any disrespect, but that as their
military experience was about as extensive as my own, they thought I
ought to make no movements but on consultation with them and by
their consent. The others seemed to be better pleased with this way
of putting it, and signified assent. My answer was that their
conduct very plainly showed their own lack both of military
experience and elementary military knowledge, and that this
ignorance was the only thing which could palliate their action.
Whether they meant it or not, their action was mutinous. The
responsibility for the movement of the army was with me, and whilst
I should be inclined to confer very freely with my principal
subordinates and explain my purposes, I should call no councils of
war, and submit nothing to vote till I felt incompetent to decide
for myself. If they apologized for their conduct and showed
earnestness in military obedience to orders, what they had now said
would be overlooked, but on any recurrence of cause for complaint I
should enforce my power by the arrest of the offender at once. I
dismissed them with this, and immediately sent out the formal orders
through my adjutant-general to march early next morning. Before they
slept one of the three had come to me with earnest apology for his
part in the matter, and a short time made them all as subordinate as
I could wish. The incident could not have occurred in the brigade
which had been under my command at Camp Dennison, and was a not
unnatural result of the sudden assembling of inexperienced men under
a brigade commander of whom they knew nothing except that at the
beginning of the war he was a civilian like themselves. These very
men afterward became devoted followers, and some of them life-long
friends. It was part of their military education as well as mine. If
I had been noisy and blustering in my intercourse with them at the
beginning, and had done what seemed to be regarded as the
"regulation" amount of cursing and swearing, they would probably
have given me credit for military aptitude at least; but a
systematic adherence to a quiet and undemonstrative manner evidently
told against me, at first, in their opinion. Through my army life I
met more or less of the same conduct when assigned to a new command;
but when men learned that discipline would be inevitably enforced,
and that it was as necessary to obey a quiet order as one emphasized
by expletives, and especially when they had been a little under
fire, there was no more trouble. Indeed, I was impressed with the
fact that after this acquaintance was once made, my chief
embarrassment in discipline was that an intimation of
dissatisfaction on my part would cause deeper chagrin and more
evident pain than I intended or wished.
The same march enabled me to make the acquaintance of another army
"institution,"--the newspaper correspondent. We were joined at
Charleston by two men representing influential Eastern journals, who
wished to know on what terms they could accompany the column. The
answer was that the quartermaster would furnish them with a tent and
transportation, and that their letters should be submitted to one of
the staff, to protect us from the publication of facts which might
aid the enemy. This seemed unsatisfactory, and they intimated that
they expected to be taken into my mess and to be announced as
volunteer aides with military rank. They were told that military
position or rank could only be given by authority much higher than
mine, and that they could be more honestly independent if free from
personal obligation and from temptation to repay favors with
flattery. My only purpose was to put the matter upon the foundation
of public right and of mutual self-respect. The day before we
reached Gauley Bridge they opened the subject again to Captain
McElroy, my adjutant-general, but were informed that I had decided
it upon a principle by which I meant to abide. Their reply was,
"Very well; General Cox thinks he can get along without us, and we
will show him. We will write him down."
They left the camp the same evening, and wrote letters to their
papers describing the army as demoralized, drunken, and without
discipline, in a state of insubordination, and the commander as
totally incompetent. As to the troops, more baseless slander was
never uttered. Their march had been orderly. No wilful injury had
been done to private property, and no case of personal violence to
any non-combatant, man or woman, had been even charged. Yet the
printing of such communications in widely read journals was likely
to be as damaging as if it all were true. My nomination as
Brigadier-General of U. S. Volunteers was then before the Senate for
confirmation, and "the pen" would probably have proved "mightier
than the sword" but for McClellan's knowledge of the nature of the
task we had accomplished, as he was then in the flood-tide of power
at Washington, and expressed his satisfaction at the performance of
our part of the campaign which he had planned. By good fortune also,
the injurious letters were printed at the same time with the
telegraphic news of our occupation of Gauley Bridge and the retreat
of the enemy out of the valley. [Footnote: As one of these
correspondents became a writer of history, it is made proper to say
that he was Mr. William Swinton, of whom General Grant has occasion
to speak in his "Personal Memoirs" (vol. ii. p. 144), and whose
facility in changing his point of view in historical writing was
shown in his "McClellan's Military Career Reviewed and Exposed,"
which was published in 1864 by the Union Congressional Committee
(first appearing in the "New York Times" of February, March, and
April of that year), when compared with his "History of the Army of
the Potomac" which appeared two years later. Burnside accused him of
repeated instances of malicious libel of his command in June, 1864.
Official Records, vol. xxxvi. pt. iii. p. 751.] I was, however,
deeply convinced that my position was the right one, and never
changed my rule of conduct in the matter. The relations of newspaper
correspondents to general officers of the army became one of the
crying scandals and notorious causes of intrigue and demoralization.
It was a subject almost impossible to settle satisfactorily; but
whoever gained or lost by cultivating this means of reputation, it
is a satisfaction to have adhered throughout the war to the rule I
first adopted and announced.
Wise made no resolute effort to oppose my march after I left
Charleston, and contented himself with delaying us by his
rear-guard, which obstructed the road by felling trees into it and
by skirmishing with my head of column. We however advanced at the
rate of twelve or fifteen miles a day, reaching Gauley Bridge on the
morning of the 29th of July. Here we captured some fifteen hundred
stands of arms and a considerable store of munitions which the
Confederate general had not been able to carry away or destroy. It
is safe to say that in the wild defile which we had threaded for the
last twenty miles there were as many positions as there were miles
in which he could easily have delayed my advance a day or two,
forcing me to turn his flank by the most difficult mountain
climbing, and where indeed, with forces so nearly equal, my progress
should have been permanently barred. At Gauley Bridge he burned the
structure which gave name to the place, and which had been a series
of substantial wooden trusses resting upon heavy stone piers. My
orders definitively limited me to the point we had now reached in my
advance, and I therefore sent forward only a detachment to follow
the enemy and keep up his precipitate retreat. Wise did not stop
till he reached Greenbrier and the White Sulphur Springs, and there
was abundant evidence that he regarded his movement as a final
abandonment of this part of West Virginia. [Footnote: Floyd's
Dispatches, Official Records, vol. li. pt. ii. pp. 208, 213.] A few
weeks later General Lee came in person with reinforcements over the
mountains and began a new campaign; but until the 20th of August we
were undisturbed except by a petty guerilla warfare.
McClellan telegraphed from Washington his congratulations,
[Footnote: Dispatch of August 1.] and Rosecrans expressed his
satisfaction also in terms which assured me that we had done more
than had been expected of us. [Footnote: Dispatch of July 31.] The
good effect upon the command was also very apparent; for our success
not only justified the policy of a determined advance, but the
officers who had been timid as to results were now glad to get their
share of the credit, and to make amends for their insubordination by
a hearty change in bearing and conduct. My term of service as a
brigadier of the Ohio forces in the three months' enrolment had now
ended, and until the Senate should confirm my appointment as a
United States officer there was some doubt as to my right to
continue in command. My embarrassment in this regard was very
pleasantly removed by a dispatch from General Rosecrans in which he
conveyed the request of Lieutenant-General Scott and of himself that
I should remain in charge of the Kanawha column. It was only a week,
however, before notice of the confirmation was received, and
dropping all thoughts of returning home, I prepared my mind for
continuous active duty till the war should end.