MCCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA.
Political attitude of West Virginia--Rebels take the
initiative--McClellan ordered to act--Ohio militia cross the
river--The Philippi affair--Significant dates--The vote on
secession--Virginia in the Confederacy--Lee in
command--Topography--The mountain passes--Garnett's army--Rich
mountain position--McClellan in the field--His forces--Advances
against Garnett--Rosecrans's proposal--His fight on the
mountain--McClellan's inaction--Garnett's retreat--Affair at
Carrick's Ford--Garnett killed--Hill's efforts to intercept--Pegram
in the wilderness--He surrenders--Indirect results
important--McClellan's military and personal traits.
The reasons which made it important to occupy West Virginia were
twofold, political and military. The people were strongly attached
to the Union, and had generally voted against the Ordinance of
Secession which by the action of the Richmond Convention had been
submitted to a popular vote on May 23d. Comparatively few slaves
were owned by them, and their interests bound them more to Ohio and
Pennsylvania than to eastern Virginia. Under the influence of Mr.
Lincoln's administration, strongly backed and chiefly represented by
Governor Dennison of Ohio, a movement was on foot to organize a
loyal Virginia government, repudiating that of Governor Letcher and
the state convention as self-destroyed by the act of secession.
Governor Dennison, in close correspondence with the leading
loyalists, had been urging McClellan to cross the Ohio to protect
and encourage the loyal men, when on the 26th of May news came that
the Secessionists had taken the initiative, and that some bridges
had been burned on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad a little west of
Grafton, the crossing of the Monongahela River where the two western
branches of the road unite as they come from Wheeling and
Parkersburg. The great line of communication between Washington and
the West had thus been cut, and action on our part was necessary.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. ii. p. 44.]
[Illustration: CAMPAIGNS IN WEST VIRGINIA 1861.]
Governor Dennison had anticipated the need of more troops than the
thirteen regiments which had been organized as Ohio's quota under
the President's first call, and had enrolled nine other regiments,
numbering them consecutively with the others. These last he had put
in camps near the Ohio River, where at a moment's notice they could
occupy Wheeling, Parkersburg, and the mouth of the Great Kanawha.
[Footnote: _Id_., pp. 46, 47.] Two Union regiments were also
organizing in West Virginia itself, of which the first was commanded
by Colonel B. F. Kelley of Wheeling. The left bank of the Ohio was
in McClellan's department, and on the 24th General Scott, having
heard that two Virginia companies had occupied Grafton, telegraphed
the fact to McClellan, directing him to act promptly in
counteracting the effect of this movement. [Footnote: _Id_., p.
648.]
On the 27th Colonel Kelley was sent by rail from Wheeling to drive
off the enemy, who withdrew at his approach, and the bridges were
quickly rebuilt. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 46, 49, 655.] Several of the
Ohio regiments were ordered across the river at the same time, and
an Indiana brigade under General Thomas A. Morris of that State was
hurried forward from Indianapolis. As the Ohio troops at Camp
Dennison which had been mustered into national service were in
process of reorganizing for the three years' term, McClellan
preferred not to move them till this was completed. He also adhered
to his plan of making his own principal movement in the Great
Kanawha valley, and desired to use there the Ohio division at our
camp. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 50, 656, 674.] The Ohio regiments first
sent into West Virginia were not mustered in, and were known as
State troops. General Morris reached Grafton on the 1st of June, and
was intrusted with the command of all the troops in West Virginia.
He found that Colonel Kelley had already planned an expedition
against the enemy, who had retired southward to Philippi, about
fifteen miles in a straight line, but some twenty-five by the
crooked country roads. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. ii. p. 66.]
Morris approved the plan, but enlarged it by sending another column,
under Colonel E. Dumont of the Seventh Indiana, to co-operate with
Kelley. Both columns were directed to make a night march, starting
from points on the railroad about twelve miles apart and converging
on Philippi, which they were to attack at daybreak on June 3d. Each
column consisted of about fifteen hundred men, and Dumont had also
two smooth six-pounder cannon. The Confederate force was commanded
by Colonel G. A. Porterfield, and was something less than a thousand
strong, one-fourth cavalry. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 70, 72.]
The night was dark and stormy, and Porterfield's raw troops had not
learned picket duty. The concerted movement against them was more
successful than such marches commonly are, and Porterfield's first
notice of danger was the opening of the artillery upon his sleeping
troops. It had been expected that the two columns would enclose the
enemy's camp and capture the whole; but, though in disorderly rout,
Porterfield succeeded, by personal coolness and courage, in getting
them off with but few casualties and the loss of a few arms. The
camp equipage and supplies were, of course, captured. Colonel Kelley
was wounded in the breast by a pistol-shot which was at first
supposed to be fatal, though it did not turn out so, and this was
the only casualty reported on the National side. [Footnote: Colonel
Kelley was a man already of middle age, and a leading citizen of
northwestern Virginia. His whole military career was in that region,
where his services were very valuable throughout the war. He was
promoted to brigadier-general among the first, and was
brevet-major-general when mustered out in 1865.] No prisoners were
taken, nor did any dead or wounded fall into our hands. Porterfield
retreated to Beverly, some thirty miles further to the southeast,
and the National forces occupied Philippi. The telegraphic reports
had put the Confederate force at 2000, and their loss at 15 killed.
This implied a considerable list of wounded and prisoners, and the
newspapers gave it the air of a considerable victory. The campaign
thus opened with apparent _éclat_ for McClellan (who was personally
at Cincinnati), and the "Philippi races," as they were locally
called, greatly encouraged the Union men of West Virginia and
correspondingly depressed the Secessionists. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. ii. pp. 64-74.]
Nearly a month elapsed, when, having received reports that large
forces of the enemy were gathered at Beverly, McClellan determined
to proceed in person to that region with his best prepared troops,
postponing his Kanawha campaign till northwestern Virginia should be
cleared of the enemy.
Military affairs in West Virginia had been complicated by the
political situation, and it is necessary to recollect the dates of
the swift following steps in Virginia's progress into the
Confederacy. Sumter surrendered on Saturday, the 13th of April, and
on Monday the 15th President Lincoln issued his first call for
troops. On Wednesday the 17th the Virginia Convention passed the
Ordinance of Secession in secret session. On Friday the 19th it was
known in Washington, and on Saturday Lee and Johnston resigned their
commissions in the United States Army, sorrowfully "going with their
State." [Footnote: Johnston's Narrative, p. 10. Townsend's Anecdotes
of the Civil War, p. 31. Long's Memoirs of Lee, pp. 94, 96.] On the
following Tuesday (23d) the chairman of the Virginia Convention
presented to Lee his commission as Major-General and Commander of
the Virginia Forces. On the same day Governor Dennison handed to
McClellan his commission to command the Ohio forces in the service
of the Union. Although the Confederate Congress at Montgomery
admitted Virginia to the Confederacy early in May, this was not
formally accepted in Virginia till after the popular vote on
secession (May 23d) and the canvassing of the returns of that
election. Governor Letcher issued on June 8th his proclamation
announcing the result, and transferring the command of the Virginia
troops to the Confederate Government. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. ii. p. 911.] During the whole of May, therefore, Virginia's
position was unsettled. Her governor, by the authority of the
convention, regarded her as independent of the United States, but by
an inchoate act of secession which would not become final till
ratified by the popular vote. The Virginia troops were arrayed near
the Potomac to resist the advance of national forces; but
Confederate troops had been welcomed in eastern Virginia as early as
the 10th of May, and President Davis had authorized Lee, as
Commander of the Virginia forces, to assume control of them.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 827.]
It was well known that the prevailing sentiment in West Virginia was
loyal to the Union, and each party avoided conflict there for fear
of prejudicing its cause in the election. Hence it was that as soon
as the vote was cast, the aggressive was taken by the Virginia
government in the burning of the bridges near Grafton. The fire of
war was thus lighted. The crossing of the Ohio was with a full
understanding with Colonel Kelley, who recognized McClellan at once
as his military commander. [Footnote: I treated the relations of Lee
and Virginia to the Confederacy in a paper in "The Nation," Dec. 23,
1897, entitled "Lee, Johnston, and Davis."] The affair at Philippi
was, in form, the last appearance of Virginia in the role of an
independent nation, for in a very few days Lee announced by a
published order that the absorption of the Virginia troops into the
Confederate Army was complete. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. ii.
p. 912.] It will be well to understand the topography of the
Virginia mountains and their western slope, if we would reach the
reasons which determined the lines of advance chosen by the
Confederates and the counter moves of McClellan. The Alleghany range
passing out of Pennsylvania and running southwest through the whole
length of Virginia, consists of several parallel lines of mountains
enclosing narrow valleys. The Potomac River breaks through at the
common boundary of Virginia and Maryland, and along its valley runs
the National Road as well as the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. The
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad also follows this natural highway, which
is thus indicated as the most important line of communication
between Washington and the Ohio valley, though a high mountain
summit must be passed, even by this route, before the tributaries of
the Ohio can be reached. Half-way across the State to the southward,
is a high watershed connecting the mountain ridges and separating
the streams tributary to the Potomac on the north from those falling
into the James and New rivers on the south. The Staunton and
Parkersburg turnpike follows the line of this high "divide" looking
down from among the clouds into the long and nearly straight defiles
on either hand, which separate the Alleghany Mountains proper from
the Blue Ridge on the east and from Cheat Mountain and other ranges
on the west. Still further to the southwest the James River and the
New River interlace their headwaters among the mountains, and break
out on east and west, making the third natural pass through which
the James River and Kanawha turnpike and canal find their way. These
three routes across the mountains were the only ones on which
military operations were at all feasible. The northern one was
usually in the hands of the National forces, and the other two were
those by which the Confederates attempted the invasion of West
Virginia. Beverly, a hundred miles from Staunton, was near the gate
through which the Staunton road passes on its way northwestward to
Parkersburg and Wheeling, whilst Gauley Bridge was the key-point of
the Kanawha route on the westerly slope of the mountains.
General Lee determined to send columns upon both these lines.
General Henry A. Wise (formerly Governor of Virginia) took the
Kanawha route, and General Robert S. Garnett (lately Lee's own
adjutant-general) marched to Beverly. [Footnote: Official Records,
vol. ii. pp. 908, 915.] Upon Porterfield's retreat to Beverly,
Garnett, who had also been an officer in the United States Army, was
ordered to assume command there and to stimulate the recruiting and
organization of regiments from the secession element of the
population. Some Virginia regiments raised on the eastern slope of
the mountains were sent with him, and to these was soon added the
First Georgia. On the 1st of July he reported his force as 4500 men,
but declared that his efforts to recruit had proven a complete
failure, only 23 having joined. The West Virginians, he says, "are
thoroughly imbued with an ignorant and bigoted Union sentiment."
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 239.] Other reinforcements were promised
Garnett, but none reached him except the Forty-fourth Virginia
Regiment, which arrived at Beverly the very day of his engagement
with McClellan's troops, but did not take part in the fighting.
[Footnote: _Id_., pp. 240, 274.]
Tygart's valley, in which Beverly lies, is between Cheat Mountain on
the east, and Rich Mountain on the west. The river, of the same name
as the valley, flows northward about fifteen miles, then turns
westward, breaking through the ridge, and by junction with the
Buckhannon River forms the Monongahela, which passes by Philippi and
afterward crosses the railroad at Grafton. The Staunton and
Parkersburg turnpike divides at Beverly, the Parkersburg route
passing over a saddle in Rich Mountain, and the Wheeling route
following the river to Philippi. The ridge north of the river at the
gap is known as Laurel Mountain, and the road passes over a spur of
it. Garnett regarded the two positions at Rich Mountain and Laurel
Mountain as the gates to all the region beyond and to the West. A
rough mountain road, barely passable, connected the Laurel Mountain
position with Cheat River on the east, and it was possible to go by
this way northward through St. George to the Northwestern turnpike,
turning the mountain ranges.
[Illustration: COMBAT AT RICH MOUNTAIN.]
Garnett thought the pass over Rich Mountain much the stronger and
more easily held, and he therefore intrenched there about 1300 of
his men and four cannon, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. ii. p. 268.] The position chosen
was on a spur of the mountain near its western base, and it was
rudely fortified with breastworks of logs covered with an abatis of
slashed timber along its front. The remainder of his force he placed
in a similar fortified position on the road at Laurel Mountain,
where he also had four guns, of which one was rifled. Here he
commanded in person. His depot of supplies was at Beverly, which was
sixteen miles from the Laurel Mountain position and five from that
at Rich Mountain. He was pretty accurately informed of McClellan's
forces and movements, and his preparations had barely been completed
by the 9th of July, when the Union general appeared in his front.
[Footnote: _Id_., pp. 241, 248.]
McClellan entered West Virginia in person on the 21st of June, and
on the 23d issued from Grafton a proclamation to the inhabitants.
[Footnote: _Id_., pp. 194, 196.] He had gradually collected his
forces along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and these, at the time
of the affair at Rich Mountain, consisted of sixteen Ohio regiments,
nine from Indiana, and two from West Virginia; in all, twenty-seven
regiments with four batteries of artillery of six guns each, two
troops of cavalry, and an independent company of riflemen. Of his
batteries, one was of the regular army, and another, a company of
regulars (Company I, Fourth U. S. Artillery), was with him awaiting
mountain howitzers, which arrived a little later. [Footnote: As part
of the troops were State troops not mustered into the United States
service, no report of them is found in the War Department; but the
following are the numbers of the regiments found named as present in
the correspondence and reports,--viz., 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th,
9th, 10th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 22d
Ohio; 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th Indiana, and
1st and 2nd Virginia; also Howe's United States Battery, Barnett's
Ohio Battery, Loomis's Michigan Battery, and Daum's Virginia
Battery; the cavalry were Burdsal's Ohio Dragoons and Barker's
Illinois Cavalry. VOL. I.--4] The regiments varied somewhat in
strength, but all were recently organized, and must have averaged at
least 700 men each, making the whole force about 20,000. Of these,
about 5000 were guarding the railroad and its bridges for some two
hundred miles, under the command of Brigadier-General C. W. Hill, of
the Ohio Militia; a strong brigade under Brigadier-General Morris of
Indiana, was at Philippi, and the rest were in three brigades
forming the immediate command of McClellan, the brigadiers being
General W. S. Rosecrans, U. S. A., General Newton Schleich of Ohio,
and Colonel Robert L. McCook of Ohio. On the date of his
proclamation McClellan intended, as he informed General Scott, to
move his principal column to Buckhannon on June 25th, and thence at
once upon Beverly; [Footnote: Official Records, vol. ii. p. 195.]
but delays occurred, and it was not till July 2nd that he reached
Buckhannon, which is twenty-four miles west of Beverly, on the
Parkersburg branch of the turnpike. Before leaving Grafton the
rumors he heard had made him estimate Garnett's force at 6000 or
7000 men, of which the larger part were at Laurel Mountain in front
of General Morris. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 205.] On the 7th of July he
moved McCook with two regiments to Middle Fork bridge, about
half-way to Beverly, and on the same day ordered Morris to march
with his brigade from Philippi to a position one and a half miles in
front of Garnett's principal camp, which was promptly done.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 200.] Three days later, McClellan concentrated
the three brigades of his own column at Roaring Creek, about two
miles from Colonel Pegram's position at the base of Rich Mountain.
The advance on both lines had been made with only a skirmishing
resistance, the Confederates being aware of McClellan's great
superiority in numbers, and choosing to await his attack in their
fortified positions. The National commander was now convinced that
his opponent was 10,000 strong, of which about 2000 were before him
at Rich Mountain. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 203, 204.] A reconnoissance
made on the 10th showed that Pegram's position would be difficult to
assail in front, but preparations were made to attack the next day,
while Morris was directed to hold firmly his position before
Garnett, watching for the effect of the attack at Rich Mountain. In
the evening Rosecrans took to McClellan a young man named Hart,
whose father lived on the top of the mountain two miles in rear of
Pegram, and who thought he could guide a column of infantry to his
father's farm by a circuit around Pegram's left flank south of the
turnpike. The paths were so difficult that cannon could not go by
them, but Rosecrans offered to lead a column of infantry and seize
the road at the Hart farm. After some discussion McClellan adopted
the suggestion, and it was arranged that Rosecrans should march at
daybreak of the 11th with about 2000 men, including a troop of
horse, and that upon the sound of his engagement in the rear of
Pegram McClellan would attack in force in front. By a blunder in one
of the regimental camps, the reveillé and assembly were sounded at
midnight, and Pegram was put on the _qui vive_. He, however,
believed that the attempt to turn his position would be by a path or
country road passing round his right, between him and Garnett (of
which the latter had warned him), and his attention was diverted
from Rosecrans's actual route, which he thought impracticable.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. ii. pp. 215, 256, 260. Conduct of
the War, vol. vi. (Rosecrans), pp. 2,3.] The alert which had
occurred at midnight made Rosecrans think it best to make a longer
circuit than he at first intended, and it took ten hours of severe
marching and mountain climbing to reach the Hart farm. The turning
movement was made, but he found an enemy opposing him. Pegram had
detached about 350 men from the 1300 which he had, and had ordered
them to guard the road at the mountain summit. He sent with them a
single cannon from the four which constituted his only battery, and
they threw together a breastwork of logs. The turnpike at Hart's
runs in a depression of the summit, and as Rosecrans, early in the
afternoon, came out upon the road, he was warmly received by both
musketry and cannon. The ground was rough, the men were for the
first time under fire, and the skirmishing combat varied through two
or three hours, when a charge by part of Rosecrans's line, aided by
a few heavy volleys from another portion of his forces which had
secured a good position, broke the enemy's line. Reinforcements from
Pegram were nearly at hand, with another cannon; but they did not
come into action, and the runaway team of the caisson on the
hill-top, dashing into the gun that was coming up, capsized it down
the mountain-side where the descending road was scarped diagonally
along it. Both guns fell into Rosecrans's hands, and he was in
possession of the field. The march and the assault had been made in
rain and storm. Nothing was heard from McClellan; and the enemy,
rallying on their reinforcements, made such show of resistance on
the crest a little further on, that Rosecrans directed his men to
rest upon their arms till next morning. When day broke on the 12th,
the enemy had disappeared from the mountain-top, and Rosecrans,
feeling his way down to the rear of Pegram's position, found it also
abandoned, the two remaining cannon being spiked, and a few sick and
wounded being left in charge of a surgeon. Still nothing was seen of
McClellan, and Rosecrans sent word to him, in his camp beyond
Roaring Creek, that he was in possession of the enemy's position.
Rosecrans's loss had been 12 killed and 49 wounded. The Confederates
left 20 wounded on the field, and 63 were surrendered at the lower
camp, including the sick. No trustworthy report of their dead was
made. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. ii pp. 215, 260, 265. C. W.,
vol. vi. (Rosecrans) pp. 3-5.]
The noise of the engagement had been heard in McClellan's camp, and
he formed his troops for attack, but the long continuance of the
cannonade and some signs of exultation in Pegram's camp seem to have
made him think Rosecrans had been repulsed. The failure to attack in
accordance with the plan has never been explained. [Footnote: C. W.,
vol. vi. p. 6. McClellan seems to have expected Rosecrans to reach
the rear of Pegram's advanced work before his own attack should be
made; but the reconnoissance of Lieutenant Poe, his engineer, shows
that this work could be turned by a much shorter route than the long
and difficult one by which Rosecrans went to the mountain ridge. See
Poe's Report, Official Records, vol. li. pt. i. p. 14.] Rosecrans's
messengers had failed to reach McClellan during the 11th, but the
sound of the battle was sufficient notice that he had gained the
summit and was engaged; and he was, in fact, left to win his own
battle or to get out of his embarrassment as he could. Toward
evening McClellan began to cut a road for artillery to a neighboring
height, from which he hoped his twelve guns would make Pegram's
position untenable; but his lines were withdrawn again beyond
Roaring Creek at nightfall, and all further action postponed to the
next day.
About half of Pegram's men had succeeded in passing around
Rosecrans's right flank during the night and had gained Beverly.
These, with the newly arrived Confederate regiment, fled southward
on the Staunton road. Garnett had learned in the evening, by
messenger from Beverly, that Rich Mountain summit was carried, and
evacuated his camp in front of Morris about midnight. He first
marched toward Beverly, and was within five miles of that place when
he received information (false at the time) that the National forces
already occupied it. He then retraced his steps nearly to his camp,
and, leaving the turnpike at Leadsville, he turned off upon a
country road over Cheat Mountain into Cheat River valley, following
the stream northward toward St. George and West Union, in the
forlorn hope of turning the mountains at the north end of the
ridges, and regaining his communications by a very long detour. He
might have continued southward through Beverly almost at leisure,
for McClellan did not enter the town till past noon on the 12th.
Morris learned of Garnett's retreat at dawn, and started in pursuit
as soon as rations could be issued. He marched first to Leadsville,
where he halted to communicate with McClellan at Beverly and get
further orders. These reached him in the night, and at daybreak of
the 13th he resumed the pursuit. His advance-guard of three
regiments, accompanied by Captain H. W. Benham of the Engineers,
overtook the rear of the Confederate column about noon and continued
a skirmishing pursuit for some two hours. Garnett himself handled
his rear-guard with skill, and at Carrick's Ford a lively encounter
was had. A mile or two further, at another ford and when the
skirmishing was very slight, he was killed while withdrawing his
skirmishers from behind a pile of driftwood which he had used as a
barricade. One of his cannon had become stalled in the ford, and
with about forty wagons fell into Morris's hands. The direct pursuit
was here discontinued, but McClellan had sent a dispatch to General
Hill at Grafton, to collect the garrisons along the railroad and
block the way of the Confederates where they must pass around the
northern spurs of the mountains. [Footnote: Reports of Morris and
Benham, Official Records, vol. ii. pp. 220, 222.]
His military telegraph terminated at the Roaring Creek camp, and the
dispatch written in the evening of the 12th was not forwarded to
Hill till near noon of the 13th. This officer immediately ordered
the collection of the greater part of his detachments at Oakland,
and called upon the railway officials for special trains to hurry
them to the rendezvous. About 1000 men under Colonel James Irvine of
the Sixteenth Ohio were at West Union, where the St. George road
reaches the Northwestern Turnpike, and Hill's information was that a
detachment of these held Red House, a crossing several miles in
advance, by which the retreating enemy might go. Irvine was directed
to hold his positions at all hazards till he could be reinforced.
Hill himself hastened with the first train from Grafton to Oakland
with about 500 men and three cannon, reached his destination at
nightfall, and hurried his detachment forward by a night march to
Irvine, ten or twelve miles over rough roads. It turned out that
Irvine did not occupy Red House, and the prevalent belief that the
enemy was about 8000 in number, with the uncertainty of the road he
would take, made it proper to keep the little force concentrated
till reinforcements should come. The first of these reached Irvine
about six o'clock on the morning of the 14th, raising his command to
1500; but a few moments after their arrival he learned that the
enemy had passed Red House soon after daylight. He gave chase, but
did not overtake them.
Meanwhile General Hill had spent the night in trying to hasten
forward the railway trains, but none were able to reach Oakland till
morning, and Garnett's forces had now more than twenty miles the
start, and were on fairly good roads, moving southward on the
eastern side of the mountains. McClellan still telegraphed that Hill
had the one opportunity of a lifetime to capture the fleeing army,
and that officer hastened in pursuit, though unprovided with wagons
or extra rations. When however the Union commander learned that the
enemy had fairly turned the mountains, he ordered the pursuit
stopped. Hill had used both intelligence and energy in his attempt
to concentrate his troops, but it proved simply impossible for the
railroad to carry them to Oakland before the enemy had passed the
turning-point, twenty miles to the southward. [Footnote: Report of
Hill, Official Records, vol. ii. p. 224.]
During the 12th Pegram's situation and movements were unknown. He
had intended, when he evacuated his camp, to follow the line of
retreat taken by the detachment already near the mountain-top, but,
in the darkness of the night and in the tangled woods and thickets
of the mountain-side, his column got divided, and, with the rear
portion of it, he wandered all day of the 12th, seeking to make his
way to Garnett. He halted at evening at the Tygart Valley River, six
miles north of Beverly, and learned from some country people of
Garnett's retreat. It was still possible to reach the mountains east
of the valley, but beyond lay a hundred miles of wilderness and half
a dozen mountain ridges on which little, if any, food could be found
for his men. He called a council of war, and, by advice of his
officers, sent to McClellan, at Beverly, an offer of surrender. This
was received on the 13th, and Pegram brought in 30 officers and 525
men. [Footnote: Report of Pegram, Official Records, vol. ii. pp.
265, 266.] McClellan then moved southward himself, following the
Staunton road, by which the remnant of Pegram's little force had
escaped, and on the 14th occupied Huttonsville. Two regiments of
Confederate troops were hastening from Staunton to reinforce
Garnett. These were halted at Monterey, east of the principal ridge
of the Alleghanies, and upon them the retreating forces rallied.
Brigadier-General H. R. Jackson was assigned to command in Garnett's
place, and both Governor Letcher and General Lee made strenuous
efforts to increase this army to a force sufficient to resume
aggressive operations. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 247, 254.] On
McClellan's part nothing further was attempted till on the 22d he
was summoned to Washington to assume command of the army which had
retreated to the capital after the panic of the first Bull Run
battle.
The affair at Rich Mountain and the subsequent movements were among
the minor events of a great war, and would not warrant a detailed
description, were it not for the momentous effect they had upon the
conduct of the war, by being the occasion of McClellan's promotion
to the command of the Potomac army. The narrative which has been
given contains the "unvarnished tale," as nearly as official records
of both sides can give it, and it is a curious task to compare it
with the picture of the campaign and its results which was then
given to the world in the series of proclamations and dispatches of
the young general, beginning with his first occupation of the
country and ending with his congratulations to his troops, in which
he announced that they had "annihilated two armies, commanded by
educated and experienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain fastnesses
fortified at their leisure." The country was eager for good news,
and took it as literally true. McClellan was the hero of the moment,
and when, but a week later, his success was followed by the disaster
to McDowell at Bull Run, he seemed pointed out by Providence as the
ideal chieftain who could repair the misfortune and lead our armies
to certain victory. His personal intercourse with those about him
was so kindly, and his bearing so modest, that his dispatches,
proclamations, and correspondence are a psychological study, more
puzzling to those who knew him well than to strangers. Their turgid
rhetoric and exaggerated pretence did not seem natural to him. In
them he seemed to be composing for stage effect something to be
spoken in character by a quite different person from the sensible
and genial man we knew in daily life and conversation. The career of
the great Napoleon had been the study and the absorbing admiration
of young American soldiers, and it was perhaps not strange that when
real war came they should copy his bulletins and even his personal
bearing. It was, for the moment, the bent of the people to be
pleased with McClellan's rendering of the rôle; they dubbed him the
young Napoleon, and the photographers got him to stand with folded
arms, in the historic pose. For two or three weeks his dispatches
and letters were all on fire with enthusiastic energy. He appeared
to be in a morbid condition of mental exaltation. When he came out
of it, he was as genial as ever. The assumed dash and energy of his
first campaign made the disappointment and the reaction more painful
when the excessive caution of his conduct in command of the Army of
the Potomac was seen. But the Rich Mountain affair, when analyzed,
shows the same characteristics which became well known later. There
was the same over-estimate of the enemy, the same tendency to
interpret unfavorably the sights and sounds in front, the same
hesitancy to throw in his whole force when he knew that his
subordinate was engaged. If Garnett had been as strong as McClellan
believed him, he had abundant time and means to overwhelm Morris,
who lay four days in easy striking distance, while the National
commander delayed attacking Pegram; and had Morris been beaten,
Garnett would have been as near Clarksburg as his opponent, and
there would have been a race for the railroad. But, happily, Garnett
was less strong and less enterprising than he was credited with
being. Pegram was dislodged, and the Confederates made a precipitate
retreat.