probably be some fuss, but the more firmly we took sides with Austria
the more would Russia give way. As it was, Austria was accusing us of
weakness and therefore we dare not leave her in the lurch. Public
opinion in Russia, on the other hand, was becoming more and more
anti-German, so we must just risk it.
In view of this attitude, which, as I found later, was based on reports
from Count Pourtales that Russia would not move under any circumstances,
and which caused us to spur Count Berchtold on to the utmost energy, I
hoped for salvation through British mediation, as I knew that Sir E.
Grey's great influence in Petrograd could be used in the direction of
peace. I therefore availed myself of my friendly relations with the
Minister to request him in confidence to advise moderation in Russia in
case Austria, as seemed likely, demanded satisfaction from Serbia.
At first the English Press preserved calm and was friendly to Austria,
because the murder was generally condemned. But gradually more and more
voices were heard insisting emphatically that, however much the crime
merited punishment, its exploitation for political purposes could not be
justified. Austria was strongly exhorted to use moderation.
When the ultimatum was published, all the papers with the exception of
the _Standard_--the ever-necessitous, which had apparently been bought
by Austria--were unanimous in condemnation. The whole world, excepting
Berlin and Vienna, realised that it meant war--indeed, "the world-war."
The British Fleet, which happened to have assembled for a naval review,
was not demobilised.
My efforts were in the first place directed towards obtaining as
conciliatory a reply from Serbia as was possible, since the attitude of
the Russian Government left room for no doubts about the gravity of the
situation.
Serbia responded favourably to the British efforts, as M. Pasitch had
really agreed to everything, excepting two points, about which, however,
he declared his willingness to negotiate. If Russia and England had
wanted the war, in order to attack us, a hint to Belgrade would have
been enough, and the unprecedented Note would not have been answered.
Sir E. Grey went through the Serbian reply with me, and pointed out the
conciliatory attitude of the Government of Belgrade. Thereupon we
discussed his proposal of mediation, which was to include a formula
acceptable to both parties for clearing up the two points. His proposal
was that a committee, consisting of M. Cambon, the Marquis Imperiali,
and myself, should assemble under his presidency, and it would have been
an easy matter for us to find an acceptable formula for the points at
issue, which mainly concerned the collaboration of Austrian Imperial
officials at the investigations in Belgrade. Given goodwill, everything
could have been settled at one or two sittings, and the mere acceptance
of the British proposal would have brought about a relaxation of the
tension, and would have further improved our relations with England. I
therefore strongly backed the proposal, on the ground that otherwise
there was danger of the world-war, through which we stood to gain
nothing and lose all; but in vain. It was derogatory to the dignity of
Austria--we did not intend to interfere in Serbian matters--we left
these to our ally. I was to work for "the localisation of the conflict."
Needless to say a mere hint from Berlin would have decided Count
Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success, and to accept
the Serbian reply. This hint was not given; on the contrary they urged
in the direction of war. It would have been such a splendid success.
After our refusal Sir Edward requested us to submit a proposal. We
insisted on war. I could not obtain any reply but that Austria had shown
an exceedingly "accommodating spirit" by not demanding an extension of
territory.
Sir Edward rightly pointed out that even without an extension of
territory it is possible to reduce a state to a condition of vassalage,
and that Russia would see a humiliation in this, and would not suffer
it.
The impression grew stronger and stronger that we wanted war under any
circumstances. It was impossible to interpret our attitude, on a
question which did not directly concern us, in any other way. The urgent
requests and definite assurances of M. Sazonow, followed by the Czar's
positively humble telegrams, the repeated proposals of Sir E. Grey, the
warnings of the Marquis San Giuliano and Signor Bollati, my urgent
counsels, all were of no avail. Berlin persisted; Serbia must be
massacred.
The more I pressed the less were they inclined to come round, if only
that I might not have the success of averting war in conjunction with
Sir Edward Grey.
Finally, on the 29th, the latter decided on the famous warning. I
replied that I had invariably reported that we should have to reckon
with English opposition if it came to a war with France. Repeatedly the
Minister said to me: "If war breaks out, it will be the greatest
catastrophe the world has ever seen."
After that, events followed each other rapidly. When at last Count
Berchtold, who up till then had, at the behest of Berlin, played the
strong man, decided to come round, we replied to the Russian
mobilisation, after Russia had negotiated and waited for a whole week in
vain, with the ultimatum and the declaration of war.
THE ENGLISH DECLARATION OF WAR
Sir Edward was still looking for new ways of avoiding the catastrophe.
Sir W. Tyrrell called on me on the morning of the 1st August to tell me
that his chief still hoped to find a way out. Would we remain neutral if
France did? I understood that we should then agree to spare France, but
he had meant that we should remain altogether neutral--towards Russia
also. That was the well-known "misunderstanding." Sir Edward had asked
me to call in the afternoon. As he was at a meeting of the Cabinet, he
called me up on the telephone, Sir W. Tyrrell having hurried to him at
once. In the afternoon, however, he talked only about Belgian neutrality
and the possibility that we and France might face one another in arms
without attacking.
Thus this was not a proposal at all, but a question without any
guarantee, as our interview, which I have mentioned before, was to take
place soon afterwards. Berlin, however, without waiting for the
interview, made this report the foundation for far-reaching measures.
Then there came M. Poincare's letter, Bonar Law's letter, King Albert's
telegram. The waverers in the Cabinet--excepting three members who
resigned--were converted.
Till the very last moment I had hoped that England would adopt a waiting
attitude. Nor did my French colleague feel at all confident, as I heard
from a private source. Even on the 1st August the King had given the
President an evasive reply. But England was already mentioned as an
opponent in the telegram from Berlin announcing the imminent danger of
war. Berlin was therefore already reckoning on war with England.
Before my departure Sir E. Grey received me, on the 5th, at his house. I
had called at his request. He was deeply moved. He told me he would
always be prepared to mediate. "We don't want to crush Germany."
Unfortunately this confidential interview was made public, and Herr von
Bethmann Hollweg thus destroyed the last chance of gaining peace through
England.
The arrangements for our departure were perfectly dignified and calm.
The King had previously sent his equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, to express
his regrets at my departure and that he could not see me himself.
Princess Louise wrote to me that the whole family were sorry we were
leaving. Mrs. Asquith and other friends came to the Embassy to take
leave.
A special train took us to Harwich, where a guard of honour was drawn up
for me. I was treated like a departing Sovereign. Such was the end of my
London mission. It was wrecked, not by the wiles of the British, but by
the wiles of our policy.
Count Mensdorff and his staff had come to the station in London. He was
cheerful, and gave me to understand that perhaps he would remain there,
but he told the English that we, and not Austria, had wanted the war.
RETROSPECT
Looking back after two years, I come to the conclusion that I realised
too late that there was no room for me in a system that for years had
lived on routine and traditions alone, and that only tolerated
representatives who reported what their superiors wished to read.
Absence of prejudice and an independent judgment are resented. Lack of
ability and want of character are praised and esteemed, while successes
meet with disfavour and excite alarm.
I had given up my opposition to the insane Triple Alliance policy, as I
realised that it was useless, and that my warnings were attributed to
"Austrophobia," to my _idee fixe_. In politics, which are neither
acrobatics nor a game, but the main business of the firm, there is no
"phil" or "phobe," but only the interest of the community. A policy,
however, that is based only on Austrians, Magyars, and Turks must come
into conflict with Russia, and finally lead to a catastrophe.
In spite of former mistakes, all might still have been put right in
July, 1914. An agreement with England had been arrived at. We ought to
have sent a representative to Petrograd who was at least of average
political capacity, and to have convinced Russia that we wished neither
to control the straits nor to strangle Serbia. "_Lachez l'Autriche et
nous lacherons les Francais_" ("Drop Austria and we will drop the
French"), M. Sazonow said to us. And M. Cambon told Herr von Jagow,
"_Vous n'avez pas besoin de suivre l'Autriche partout_" ("You need not
follow Austria everywhere").
We wanted _neither wars nor alliances_; we wanted only treaties that
would safeguard us and others, and secure our economic development,
which was without its like in history. If Russia had been freed in the
West, she could again turn to the East, and the Anglo-Russian rivalry
would have been re-established automatically and without our
intervention, and not less certainly also the Russo-Japanese.
We could also have considered the question of the reduction of
armaments, and need no longer have troubled ourselves about Austrian
complications. Then Austria would have become the vassal of the German
Empire, without any alliance--and especially without our seeking her
good graces, a proceeding ultimately leading to war for the liberation
of Poland and the destruction of Serbia, although German interest
demanded the exact contrary.
I had to support in London a policy the heresy of which I recognised.
That brought down vengeance on me, because it was a sin against the Holy
Ghost.
MY RETURN
As soon as I arrived in Berlin I saw that I was to be made the scapegoat
for the catastrophe for which our Government had made itself responsible
against my advice and warnings.
The report was deliberately circulated in official quarters that I had
allowed myself to be deceived by Sir E. Grey, because, if he had not
wanted war, Russia would not have mobilised. Count Pourtales, whose
reports could be relied on, was to be protected, not least on account of
his relationship. He had conducted himself "magnificently," he was
praised enthusiastically, and I was blamed the more severely.
"What does Serbia matter to Russia?" this statesman said to me after
eight years in office at Petrograd. The whole thing was a British trick
that I had not noticed. At the Foreign Office they told me that war
would in any case have come in 1916. Then Russia would have been ready;
therefore it was better now.
THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
As is evident from all official publications--and this is not refuted by
our White Book, which, owing to the poverty of its contents and to its
omissions, is a gravely self-accusing document--
1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although German
interests were not involved and the danger of a world-war must have
been known to us. Whether we were aware of the wording of the
Ultimatum is completely immaterial.
2. During the time between the 23rd and 30th July, 1914, when M.
Sazonow emphatically declared that he would not tolerate any attack
on Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although
Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost
the whole of the Ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two
points at issue could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold
was even prepared to content himself with the Serbian reply.
3. On the 30th July, when Count Berchtold wanted to come to terms,
we sent an ultimatum to Petrograd merely because of the Russian
mobilisation, although Austria had not been attacked; and on the
31st July we declared war on Russia, although the Czar pledged his
word that he would not order a man to march as long as negotiations
were proceeding--thus deliberately destroying the possibility of a
peaceful settlement.
In view of the above undeniable facts it is no wonder that the whole of
the civilised world outside Germany places the entire responsibility for
the world-war upon our shoulders.
THE ENEMY POINT OF VIEW
Is it not intelligible that our enemies should declare that they will
not rest before a system is destroyed which is a constant menace to our
neighbours? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years' time they
will again have to take up arms and again see their provinces overrun
and their towns and villages destroyed? Have not they proved to be right
who declared that the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardi governed the
German people, that spirit which glorified war as such, and did not
loathe it as an evil, that with us the feudal knight and Junker, the
warrior caste, still rule and form ideals and values, not the civilian
gentleman; that the love of the duel which animates our academic youth
still persists in those who control the destinies of the people? Did not
the Zabern incident and the parliamentary discussions about it clearly
demonstrate to foreign countries the value we place on the rights and
liberties of the citizen if these collide with questions of military
power?
That intelligent historian Cramb, who has since died, an admirer of
Germany, clothed the German conception in the words of Euphorion:
Dream ye of peace?[1]
Dream he that will--
War is the rallying cry!
Victory is the refrain.
[Footnote 1: The original has "war," presumably owing to a
misprint.--TRANSLATOR.]
Militarism, which by rights is an education for the people and an
instrument of policy, turns policy into the instrument of military power
when the patriarchal absolutism of the soldier-kingdom makes possible an
attitude which a democracy, remote from military Junker influence, would
never have permitted.
So think our enemies, and so they must think when they see that, in
spite of capitalistic industrialisation and in spite of socialist
organisation, "the living are still ruled by the dead," as Friedrich
Nietzsche says. The principal war aim of our enemies, the
democratisation of Germany, will be realised!
BISMARCK
Bismarck, like Napoleon, loved conflict for itself. As a statesman he
avoided fresh wars, the folly of which he recognised. He was content
with bloodless battles. After he had, in rapid succession, vanquished
Christian, Francis Joseph, and Napoleon, it was the turn of Arnim, Pius,
and Augusta. That did not suffice him. Gortschakow, who thought himself
the greater, had repeatedly annoyed him. The conflict was carried almost
to the point of war--even by depriving him of his railway saloon. This
gave rise to the miserable Triple Alliance. At last came the conflict
with William, in which the mighty one was vanquished, as Napoleon was
vanquished by Alexander.
Political life-and-death unions only prosper if founded on a
constitutional basis and not on an international one. They are all the
more questionable if the partner is feeble. Bismarck never meant the
Alliance to take this form.
He always treated the English with forbearance; he knew that this was
wiser. He always paid marked respect to the old Queen Victoria, despite
his hatred of her daughter and of political Anglomania; the learned
Beaconsfield and the worldly-wise Salisbury he courted; and even that
strange Gladstone, whom he did not like, really had nothing to complain
about.
The Ultimatum to Serbia was the culminating point of the policy of the
Berlin Congress, the Bosnian crisis, the Conference of London: but there
was yet time to turn back.
We were completely successful in achieving that which above all other
things should have been avoided--the breach with Russia and England.
OUR FUTURE
After two years' fighting it is obvious that we dare not hope for an
unconditional victory over the Russians, English, French, Italians,
Rumanians, and Americans, or reckon on being able to wear our enemies
down. But we can obtain a peace by compromise only by evacuating the
occupied territory, the retention of which would in any event be a
burden and cause of weakness to us, and would involve the menace of
further wars. Therefore everything should be avoided which would make it
more difficult for those enemy groups who might possibly still be won
over to the idea of a peace by compromise to come to terms, viz., the
British Radicals and the Russian Reactionaries. From this point of view
alone the Polish scheme is to be condemned, as is also any infringement
of Belgian rights, or the execution of British citizens--to say nothing
of the insane U-boat plan.
"Our future lies on the water." Quite right; therefore it is not in
Poland and Belgium, in France and Serbia. This is a return to the days
of the Holy Roman Empire and the mistakes of the Hohenstaufens and
Habsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not that of Drake and
Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes. The policy of the Triple Alliance is a
return to the past, a turning aside from the future, from imperialism
and a world-policy. "Middle Europe" belongs to the Middle Ages,
Berlin-Bagdad is a blind alley and not the way into the open country, to
unlimited possibilities, to the world-mission of the German nation.
I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or Serbia, or any other
state, but only of the Triple Alliance policy, which was bound to divert
us from our aims and bring us onto the inclined plane of a Continental
policy. It was not the German policy, but that of the Austrian Imperial
House. The Austrians had come to regard the Alliance as an umbrella
under the shelter of which they could make excursions to the Near East
when they thought fit.
And what must we expect as the result of this war of nations? The United
States of Africa will be British, like those of America, Australia and
Oceania. And the Latin states of Europe, as I predicted years ago, will
enter into the same relations with the United Kingdom that their Latin
sisters in America maintain with the United States. The Anglo-Saxon will
dominate them. France, exhausted by the war, will only attach herself
still more closely to Great Britain. Nor will Spain continue to resist
for long.
And in Asia the Russians and the Japanese will spread and will carry
their customs with their frontiers, and the South will remain to the
British.
The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxons, Russians, and Japanese, and
the German will remain alone with Austria and Hungary. His rule will be
that of thought and of commerce, not that of the bureaucrat and the
soldier. He made his appearance too late, and his last chance of making
good the past, that of founding a Colonial Empire, was annihilated by
the world-war.
For we shall not supplant the sons of Ichwe. Then will be realised the
plan of the great Rhodes, who saw the salvation of humanity in the
expansion of Britondom--in British Imperialism.
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.
Hae tibi erunt artes: pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.
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Transcriber's Notes
Original spelling and grammar retained with the following exceptions:-
Contents NICHOLSON ==> NICOLSON
Page xi The attack made on him at the ouset of the war ==> The attack made
on him at the outset of the war
Page 4 (Badgad Railway) ==> (Bagdad Railway)
Page 26 There is not the same unbridgable gulf ==> There is not the same
unbridgeable gulf