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REVELATIONS OF THE LAST GERMAN
AMBASSADOR IN ENGLAND
MY MISSION TO
LONDON
1912-1914
_By_
PRINCE LICHNOWSKY
_With a Preface by_
PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY
NEW YORK: GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
PRICE TEN CENTS
MY MISSION TO
LONDON
1912-1914
BY
PRINCE LICHNOWSKY
_Late German Ambassador in England_
WITH A PREFACE BY
PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY
_Author of "The Policy of Sir Edward Grey," etc._
NEW YORK
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF
PROFESSOR W. MACNEILE DIXON
(UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW)
Address:
8, BUCKINGHAM GATE,
LONDON, S. W., ONE,
ENGLAND.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
The author of the following pages, Karl Max, Prince Lichnowsky, is a
member of a family which holds estates both in German and Austrian
Silesia, and has an hereditary seat in the Upper House of the Prussian
Diet. The father of the present Prince and his predecessor in the title
was a Prussian cavalry general, who, at the end of his life, sat for
some years in the Reichstag as a member of the Free Conservative Party.
His uncle, Prince Felix, was elected in 1848 to represent Ratibor in the
German National Assembly at Frankfort-on-Main; he was an active member
of the Conservative wing, and during the September rising, while riding
with General Auerswald in the neighbourhood of the city, was attacked
and murdered by the mob.
The present Prince, after serving in the Prussian army, in which he
holds the rank of Major, entered the diplomatic service. He was in 1885
for a short time attached to the German Embassy in London, and
afterwards became Councillor of Embassy in Vienna. From 1899 to 1904 he
was employed in the German Foreign Office, and received the rank and
title of Minister Plenipotentiary.
In 1904 he retired to his Silesian estates, and, as he states, lived for
eight years the life of a country gentleman, but read industriously and
published occasional political articles. He himself recounts the
circumstances in which he was appointed Ambassador in London on the
death of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein.
Baron Marschall, who had been Secretary for Foreign Affairs under the
Chancellorships of Count Caprivi and for a time under Prince Hohenlohe,
had achieved great success as Ambassador at Constantinople, and also,
from the German point of view, as chief German Plenipotentiary at the
Second Hague Conference in 1907. Baron Marschall was, to use an
expression of Bismarck's, "the best horse in Germany's diplomatic
stable." And great things were expected of him in London. But he lived
only a few months after his appointment.
Prince Lichnowsky's high social rank, his agreeable manners, and the
generous hospitality which he showed in Carlton House Terrace gave him a
position in English society which facilitated the negotiations between
England and Germany, and did much to diminish the friction that had
arisen during the time that Prince Buelow held the post of German
Chancellor.
The pamphlet which is here translated gives an account of his London
mission; after his return to Germany he has lived in retirement in the
country, but has contributed occasional articles to the Press. The
pamphlet, which was written in August, 1916, was not intended for
publication, but was distributed confidentially to a few friends. The
existence of it had long been known, but it was only in March of this
year that for the first time extracts from it were published in the
Swedish paper _Politiken_. Longer extracts have since appeared in the
London Press; for the first time a complete translation made from the
German original is now placed before the public.
PREFACE
Never perhaps in history has the world seen so great an exhibition, as
at the outbreak of this war, of the murderous and corrupting power of
the organised lie. All Germany outside the governmental circles was
induced to believe that the war was a treacherous attack, plotted in the
dark by "revengeful France, barbaric Russia, and envious England,"
against the innocent and peace-loving Fatherland. And the centre of the
plot was the Machiavellian Grey, who for long years had been encircling
and strangling Germany in order at the chosen moment to deal her a
death-blow from behind. The Emperor, the princes, the ministers, the
bishops and chaplains, the historians and theologians, in part
consciously and in part innocently, vied with one another in solemn
attestations and ingenious forgeries of evidence; and the people, docile
by training and long indoctrinated to the hatred of England, inevitably
believed and passionately exaggerated what they were told. From this
belief, in large part, came the strange brutalities and ferocities of
the common people of Germany at the opening of the war, whether towards
persons who had a right to courtesy, like the Ambassadors, or a claim on
common human sympathy, like the wounded and the prisoners. The German
masses could show no mercy towards people guilty of so hideous a
world-crime.
And now comes evidence, which in normal times would convince even the
German nation, that the whole basis of their belief was a structure of
deliberate falsehood; which shows that it was the Kaiser and his
Ministers who plotted the war; while it was England, and especially Sir
Edward Grey, who strove hardest for the preservation of peace.
It is the evidence of the German Ambassador in London during the years
1912-1914, Prince Lichnowsky, corroborated rather than confuted by the
comments of Herr von Jagow, who was Foreign Minister at the time, and
carried further by the recently published Memoranda of Herr Muehlon, one
of the directors of the Krupp armament factory at Essen. One could
hardly imagine more convincing testimony. Will the German people believe
it? Would they believe now if one rose from the dead?
We cannot yet guess at the answer. Indeed, there is another question
which must be answered first: For what motive, and with what possible
change of policy in view, has the German Government permitted the
publication of these papers and the circulation of Lichnowsky's
Memorandum as a pamphlet at 30 pfennig? Do the militarists think their
triumph is safe, and the time come for them to throw off the mask? Or
have the opponents of militarism, who seemed so crushed, succeeded in
asserting their power? Is it a plan to induce the ever docile German
populace to hate England less?
It must be a startling story for the Germans, but for us it contains
little that is new. It is an absolute confirmation, in spirit and in
letter, of the British Blue Book and of English books such as Mr.
Headlam's "History of Twelve Days" and Mr. Archer's "Thirteen Days."
Prince Lichnowsky's summing-up agrees exactly with the British
conclusions: The Germans encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia,
well knowing the consequences to expect; between the 23rd and 30th July
they rejected all forms of mediation; and on the 30th July, when Austria
wished to withdraw, they hastily sent an ultimatum to Russia so as to
make withdrawal impossible (pp. 39-40). A ghastly story of blindness and
crime; but we knew it all before.
Equally interesting is Prince Lichnowsky's account of the policy of
Germany and England before the war. He confirms our knowledge of the
"sinister vagueness" of German policy in Morocco, the steady desire of
England to come to an understanding and of Germany to elude an
understanding. As for our alleged envy of German trade, it was in
English commercial circles that the desire for an understanding with
Germany was strongest. As for our "policy of encirclement," it was the
deliberate aim of our policy, continuing the line of Lord Salisbury and
Mr. Chamberlain, to facilitate rather than hinder the legitimate and
peaceful expansion of a great force, which would become dangerous if
suppressed and confined.
The test cases were the Bagdad Railway and the Portuguese Colonies. We
agreed to make no objection to Germany's buying them when Portugal was
willing to sell; we agreed in the meantime to treat them as a German
sphere of interest and not to compete for influence there. We agreed,
subject to the conservation of existing British rights and to certain
other safeguards, to the completion of the great railway from the
Bosphorus to Basra, and to the recognition of the whole district tapped
by the railway as a German sphere of interest. The two treaties, though
completed, were never signed; why? Because Grey would sign no secret
treaty. He insisted that they must be published. And the German
Government would not allow them to be published! To Lichnowsky this
seemed like mere spite on the part of rivals who grudged his success,
but we see now that it was a deliberate policy. The war-makers could not
afford to let their people know the proof of England's goodwill.
Lichnowsky was a friend of England, but he was no pacifist or "little
German." His policy was to favour the peaceful expansion of Germany, in
good understanding with England and France, on the seas and in the
colonies. He aimed at "imperial development" on British lines; he
abhorred the "Triple Alliance policy" of espousing Austria's quarrels,
backing Turkey against the Balkan States, intriguing against Russia, and
seeing all politics in the terms of European rivalries with a background
of war. His own policy was one which, if followed loyally by the German
Government, would have avoided the war and saved Europe.
There are one or two traits in Lichnowsky's language which show that,
with all his liberality of thought, he is still a German. He accepts at
once, on the report of a German secret agent, the false statement that
Grey had concluded a secret treaty with France. He mentions, as if it
were a natural thing, the strange opinion that the _Standard_ was
"apparently bought by Austria." He describes Mr. Asquith as a pacifist
and Sir Edward Grey as both a pacifist and, ideally and practically, a
Socialist. One must remember the sort of views he was accustomed to at
Potsdam.
There can be no doubt that Lichnowsky was deliberately deceived by his
Government, and not much that he was chosen for his post in London with
a view to deceiving us. These things are all in gospel according to
Bernhardi. Lichnowsky himself was both an honest and an able
diplomatist, and there is the ring of sincerity in his words of
self-reproach: "I had to support in London a policy the heresy of which
I recognised. That brought down vengeance on me, for it was a sin
against the Holy Ghost."
If Grey, in the tangle of terrific problems that surrounded him, ever
erred, his sin was not against the Holy Ghost. The attack made on him at
the outset of the war by Radical idealists was easy to confute. If ever
a statesman strove, with due prudence, for peace, for friendship between
nations, for a transformation of armed rivalries into cordial and
democratic understandings, our great English Minister was that man. He
was accused as a maker of secret treaties; and we find him all through
the times of peace, and through all times when choice was still
possible, a steady refuser of secret treaties. He was accused as a
seeker for territory; and we find him, both in war and peace, steadily
opposing all territorial aggrandisement. Such was the policy approved by
the leaders of both English parties before the war.
It is an attack from the other side that now reaches him. If the war had
been short and successful, this would not have occurred. But a long and
bitter and dangerous war of necessity creates its own atmosphere, and
the policy that was wisdom in 1913, when the world was at peace and our
relations with Germany were improving, strikes us now perhaps as
strangely trustful and generous. Yet, if we try to recover that mental
calm without which the nations will never till the end of time be able
to restore their wasted wealth and rebuild the shattered hopes of
civilisation, I think most Englishmen will agree that Grey's policy was,
as we all thought it at the time, the right and the wise policy. To let
all the world know that we would never join in any attack on Germany,
but would never permit any attack on France; to seek to remove all
causes of friction between England and Germany, as they had been removed
between England and France and between England and Russia; to extend the
"Entente Cordiale" by gradual steps to all nations who would come into
it, and to "bring the two groups of Europe nearer." This was the right
policy, whether it succeeded or failed; and it will, in spirit at
least, some day be the right policy again.
No Englishman, I think, will regret the generous courtesy which sent off
the German Ambassador with a guard of honour, "like a departing
sovereign." No one will regret our Prime Minister's silent tears when
the war became inevitable, or Grey's conviction that it would be "the
greatest catastrophe in history"--not even if mad German militarists
drew the conclusion that the only motive for such grief must be the fear
of defeat. For my own part I am glad that, at the last interview with
Lichnowsky, Grey assured him that, if ever a chance came of mediation
between the combatants, he would take it, and that "we have never wished
to crush Germany."
Surely, even now in the crisis of the war, it is well to remember these
things. The cleaner our national conscience the keener surely will be
our will to victory. The slower we were to give up the traditions of
generosity and trustfulness that came from our long security the firmer
will be our resolution to hold out, through whatever martyrdom may be
yet in store for us, until we or our children can afford once more to
live generously and to trust our neighbours. In the long run no other
life is worth living.
G. M.
CONTENTS
PAGE
MY APPOINTMENT 1
MOROCCO POLICY 2
SIR EDWARD GREY'S PROGRAMME 4
THE ALBANIAN QUESTION 5
THE NEAR EAST AND THE POLICY OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 7
THE CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS 10
THE BALKAN CONFERENCE 12
THE SECOND BALKAN WAR 13
LIMAN VON SANDERS 14
THE COLONIAL TREATY 15
THE BAGDAD TREATY 20
THE QUESTION OF THE NAVY 21
COMMERCIAL JEALOUSY 23
THE COURT AND SOCIETY 24
SIR EDWARD GREY 26
MR. ASQUITH 28
NICOLSON 29
TYRRELL 30
ATTITUDE OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE 30
IN CASE OF WAR 31
THE SERBIAN CRISIS 31
THE ENGLISH DECLARATION OF WAR 37
RETROSPECT 38
MY RETURN 40
THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY 40
THE ENEMY POINT OF VIEW 41
BISMARCK 42
OUR FUTURE 43
MY MISSION TO LONDON
1912-14
MY APPOINTMENT
In September, 1912, Baron Marschall died after he had only been at his
post in London for a few months. His appointment, which no doubt was
principally due to his age and the desire of his junior officer to go to
London, was one of the many mistakes of our policy.
In spite of his striking personality and great reputation, he was too
old and too tired to adjust himself to the Anglo-Saxon world, which was
completely alien to him; he was rather an official and a lawyer than a
diplomat and statesman. From the very beginning he was at great pains to
convince the English of the harmlessness of our fleet, and naturally
this only produced the contrary effect.
Much to my surprise, I was offered the post in October. I had retired to
the country as a "Personalreferent" after many years of activity, there
being then no suitable post available for me. I passed my time between
flax and turnips, among horses and meadows, read extensively, and
occasionally published political essays.
Thus I had spent eight years, and it was thirteen since I had left the
Embassy at Vienna with the rank of Envoy. That had been my last real
sphere of political activity, as in those days such activity was
impossible unless one was prepared to help a half-crazy chief in
drafting his crotchety orders with their crabbed instructions.
I do not know who was responsible for my being appointed to London. It
was certainly not due to H.M. alone--I was not one of his intimates,
though he was at all times gracious to me. I also know by experience
that his nominees generally met with successful opposition. Herr von
Kiderlen had really wanted to send Herr von Stumm to London! He
immediately manifested unmistakable ill-will towards me, and endeavoured
to intimidate me by his incivility. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was at
that time kindly disposed towards me, and had paid me a visit at Graetz
only a short time before. I am therefore inclined to think that they all
agreed on me because no other candidate was available at the moment. But
for Baron Marschall's unexpected death, I should no more have been
called out of retirement then than at any other time during all those
previous years.
MOROCCO POLICY
It was certainly the right moment for a new effort to establish better
relations with England. Our enigmatic Morocco policy had repeatedly
shaken confidence in our pacific intentions. At the very least, it had
given rise to the suspicion that we did not quite know what we wanted,
or that it was our object to keep Europe on the _qui vive_, and, when
opportunity offered, to humiliate France. An Austrian colleague, who had
been in Paris for a long time, said to me: "Whenever the French begin to
forget about _revanche_, you always remind them of it with a jack-boot."
After we had repulsed M. Delcasse's efforts to arrive at an
understanding with us about Morocco, and prior to that had formally
declared that we had no political interests there--which conformed to
the traditions of the Bismarckian policy--we suddenly discovered a
second Krueger in Abdul Aziz. We assured him also, like the Boers, of the
protection of the mighty German Empire, with the same display and the
same result; both demonstrations terminated with our retreat, as they
were bound to do, if we had not already made up our minds to embark on
the world-war. The distressing congress at Algeciras could not change
this in any way, still less the fall of M. Delcasse.
Our attitude promoted the Russo-Japanese and later the Anglo-Japanese
_rapprochement_. In face of "the German Peril" all other differences
faded into the background. The possibility of a new Franco-German war
had become apparent, and such a war could not, as in 1870, leave either
Russia or England unaffected.
The uselessness of the Triple Alliance had been shown at Algeciras,
while that of the agreements arrived at there was demonstrated shortly
afterwards by the collapse of the Sultanate, which, of course, could not
be prevented. Among the German people, however, the belief gained ground
that our foreign policy was feeble and was giving way before the
"Encirclement"--that high-sounding phrases were succeeded by
pusillanimous surrender.
It is to the credit of Herr von Kiderlen, who is otherwise overrated as
a statesman, that he wound up our Moroccan inheritance and accepted as
they were the facts that could no longer be altered. Whether, indeed, it
was necessary to alarm the world by the Agadir incident I will leave
others to say. It was jubilantly acclaimed in Germany, but it had caused
all the more disquiet in England because the Government were kept
waiting for three weeks for an explanation of our intentions. Lloyd
George's speech, which was meant as a warning to us, was the
consequence. Before Delcasse's fall, and before Algeciras, we might
have had a harbour and territory on the West Coast, but after those
events it was impossible.
SIR EDWARD GREY'S PROGRAMME
When I came to London in November, 1912, the excitement over Morocco had
subsided, as an agreement with France had been reached in Berlin. It is
true that Haldane's mission had failed, as we had required the assurance
of neutrality, instead of being content with a treaty securing us
against British attacks and attacks with British support. Yet Sir Edward
Grey had not relinquished the idea of arriving at an agreement with us,
and in the first place tried to do this in colonial and economic
questions. Conversations were in progress with the capable and
business-like Envoy von Kuehlmann concerning the renewal of the
Portuguese colonial agreement and Mesopotamia (Bagdad Railway), the
unavowed object of which was to divide both the colonies and Asia Minor
into spheres of influence.
The British statesman, after having settled all outstanding points of
difference with France and Russia, wished to make similar agreements
with us. It was not his object to isolate us, but to the best of his
power to make us partners in the existing association. As he had
succeeded in overcoming Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian differences, so
he also wished to do his best to eliminate the Anglo-German, and by a
network of treaties, which would in the end no doubt have led to an
agreement about the troublesome question of naval armaments, to ensure
the peace of the world, after our previous policy had led to an
association--the Entente--which represented a mutual insurance against
the risk of war.
This was Sir E. Grey's plan. In his own words: Without interfering with
our existing friendship with France and Russia, which has no aggressive
aims and does not entail any binding obligations on England, to arrive
at a friendly _rapprochement_ and understanding with Germany, "to bring
the two groups nearer."
As with us, there were two parties in England at that time--the
Optimists, who believed in an understanding, and the Pessimists, who
thought that sooner or later war was inevitable.
The former embraced Messrs. Asquith, Grey, Lord Haldane, and most of the
Ministers in the Radical Cabinet; also the leading Liberal papers, such
as the _Westminster Gazette_, _Manchester Guardian_, _Daily Chronicle_.
The Pessimists were mainly Conservative politicians like Mr. Balfour,
who repeatedly made this clear to me; also leading Army men, like Lord
Roberts, who pointed out the necessity of universal military service
("The Writing on the Wall"); further, the Northcliffe Press and the
eminent English journalist Mr. Garvin, of _The Observer_. During my
period of office, however, they abstained from all attacks, and
maintained both personally and politically a friendly attitude. But our
naval policy and our attitude in 1905, 1908, and 1911 had aroused in
them the conviction that after all it would some day come to war. Just
as it is with us, the former are now being accused in England of
short-sightedness and simplicity, whereas the latter are looked on as
the true prophets.
THE ALBANIAN QUESTION
The first Balkan War had led to the collapse of Turkey and thus to a
defeat for our policy, which had been identified with Turkey for a
number of years. Since Turkey in Europe could no longer be saved, there
were two ways in which we could deal with the inheritance: either we
could declare our complete disinterestedness with regard to the frontier
delimitations and leave the Balkan Powers to settle them, or we could
support our "Allies" and carry on a Triple Alliance policy in the Near
East, thus giving up the role of mediator.
From the very beginning I advocated the former course, but the Foreign
Office emphatically favoured the latter.
The vital point was the Albanian question. Our Allies desired the
establishment of an independent Albanian state, as the Austrians did not
want the Serbs to obtain access to the Adriatic, and the Italians did
not want the Greeks to get to Valona or even to the north of Corfu. As
opposed to this, Russia, as is known, was backing Serbia's wishes and
France those of Greece.
My advice was to treat this question as outside the scope of the
Alliance, and to support neither the Austrian nor the Italian claims.
Without our aid it would have been impossible to set up an independent
Albania, which, as anyone could foresee, had no prospect of surviving;
Serbia would have extended to the sea, and the present world-war would
have been avoided. France and Italy would have quarrelled over Greece,
and if the Italians had not wanted to fight France unaided they would
have been compelled to acquiesce in Greece's expansion to the north of
Durazzo. The greater part of Albania is Hellenic. The towns in the south
are entirely so; and during the Conference of Ambassadors delegations
from principal towns arrived in London to obtain annexation to Greece.
Even in present-day Greece there are Albanian elements and the so-called
Greek national dress is of Albanian origin. The inclusion of the
Albanians, who are principally Orthodox and Moslem, in the body of the
Greek state was therefore the best and most natural solution, if you
left Scutari and the north to the Serbs and Montenegrins. For dynastic
reasons H.M. was also in favour of this solution. When I supported this
view in a letter to the monarch I received agitated reproaches from the
Chancellor; he said that I had the reputation of being "an opponent of
Austria," and I was to abstain from such interference and direct
correspondence.
THE NEAR EAST AND THE POLICY OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE
We ought at last to have broken with the fatal tradition of pursuing a
Triple Alliance policy in the Near East also, and have recognised our
mistake, which lay in identifying ourselves in the south with the Turks
and in the north with the Austro-Magyars. For the continuance of this
policy, upon which we had entered at the Berlin Congress, and which we
had actively pursued ever since, was bound to lead in time to a conflict
with Russia and to the world-war, more especially if the requisite
cleverness were lacking in high places. Instead of coming to terms with
Russia on a basis of the independence of the Sultan, whom even Petrograd
did not wish to eject from Constantinople, and of confining ourselves to
our economic interests in the Near East and to the partitioning of Asia
Minor into spheres of influence while renouncing any intention of
military or political interference, it was our political ambition to
dominate on the Bosphorus. In Russia they began to think that the road
to Constantinople and the Mediterranean lay _via_ Berlin. Instead of
supporting the active development of the Balkan States--which, once
liberated, are anything rather than Russian, and with which our
experiences had been very satisfactory--we took sides with the Turkish
and Magyar oppressors.
The fatal mistake of our Triple Alliance and Near East policy--which had
forced Russia, our natural best friend and neighbour, into the arms of
France and England and away from its policy of Asiatic expansion--was
the more apparent, as a Franco-Russian attack, which was the _sole_
hypothesis that justified a Triple Alliance policy, could be left out of
our calculations.
The value of the Italian alliance needs no further reference. Italy will
want our money and our tourists even after the war, with or without an
alliance. That this latter would fail us in case of war was patent
beforehand. Hence the alliance had _no value_. Austria needs our
protection in war, as in peace, and has no other support. Her dependence
on us is based on political, national, and economic considerations, and
is the greater the more intimate our relations with Russia are. The
Bosnian crisis taught us this. Since the days of Count Beust no Vienna
Minister has adopted such a self-confident attitude towards us as Count
Aehrenthal during the later years of his life. If German policy is
conducted on right lines, cultivating relations with Russia,
Austria-Hungary is our vassal and dependent on us, even without an
alliance or recompense; if it is wrongly conducted, then we are
dependent on Austria. Hence there was _no reason_ for the alliance.
I knew Austria too well not to be aware that a return to the policy of
Prince Felix Schwarzenberg or Count Moritz Esterhazy was inconceivable
there. Little as the Slavs there love us, just as little do they wish to
return into a German Empire even with a Habsburg-Lorraine emperor at its
head. They are striving for a federation in Austria on national lines, a
state of things which would have even less chance of being realised
within the German Empire than under the Double Eagle. The Germans of
Austria, however, acknowledge Berlin as the centre of German Might and
Culture, and are well aware that Austria can never again be the leading
Power. They wish for as intimate a connection with the German Empire as
possible, not for an anti-German policy.
Since the 'seventies the position has fundamentally changed in Austria,
as in Bavaria. As, in the latter, a return to Great German separatism
and old Bavarian policy is not to be feared, so with the former a
resuscitation of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Schwarzenberg was not
to be expected. By a federation with Austria, however, which resembles a
big Belgium, since its population, even without Galicia and Dalmatia, is
only about half Germanic, our interests would suffer as much as if we
subordinated our policy to the views of Vienna or Budapest--thus
espousing Austria's quarrels ("_d'epouser les querelles d'Autriche_").
Hence we were not obliged to take any notice of the desires of our ally;
they were not only unnecessary but also dangerous, as they would lead to
a conflict with Russia if we looked at Oriental questions through
Austrian spectacles.
The development of the alliance, from a union formed on a single
hypothesis for a single specific purpose, into a general and unlimited
association, a pooling of interests in all spheres, was the best way of
producing that which diplomacy was designed to prevent--war. Such an
"alliance policy" was also calculated to alienate from us the sympathies
of the strong, young, rising communities in the Balkans, who were
prepared to turn to us and to open their markets to us.
The difference between the power of a Ruling House and a National State,
between dynastic and democratic ideas of government, had to be decided,
and as usual we were on the wrong side.
King Carol told one of our representatives that he had entered into the
alliance with us on the assumption that we retained the leadership; but
if this passed to Austria, that would alter the foundations of the
relationship, and under such circumstances he would not be able to go
on with it.
Things were similar in Serbia, where, contrary to our own economic
interests, we were supporting the Austrian policy of strangulation.
Every time we have backed the wrong horse, whose breakdown could have
been foreseen: Krueger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of Wied,
ending--the most fatal of all mistakes--with the great plunge on the
Berchtold stable.
THE CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS
Shortly after my arrival in London, at the end of 1912, Sir E. Grey
proposed an informal conversation to prevent the Balkan War developing
into a European one, after we had unfortunately refused, on the outbreak
of the war, to agree to the French proposal of a declaration of
disinterestedness. The British statesman from the very beginning took up
the position that England had no interest in Albania, and had no
intention of going to war over this question. He merely wished to
mediate between the two groups as an "honest broker" and smooth over
difficulties. He therefore by no means took sides with the Entente, and
during the eight months or so of the negotiations his goodwill and his
authoritative influence contributed in no small degree to the attainment
of an agreement. We, instead of adopting an attitude similar to the
English one, invariably took up the position which was prescribed for us
by Vienna. Count Mensdorff was the leader of the Triple Alliance in
London; I was his "second." It was my duty to support his proposals.
That clever and experienced man Count Szoegyenyi was conducting affairs
in Berlin. His refrain was "Then the _casus foederis_ will arise," and
when I once ventured to doubt the truth of this conclusion I was
severely reprimanded for "Austrophobia." It was also said that I had an
"hereditary weakness"--the allusion being to my father.
On all questions we took sides with Austria and Italy--about Albania, a
Serbian port on the Adriatic, Scutari, and also about the delimitation
of the frontiers of Albania--while Sir E. Grey hardly ever supported the
French or Russian claims. He mostly supported our group in order not to
give a pretext like the one a dead Archduke was to furnish later on.
Thus with his assistance it was possible to coax King Nikita out of
Scutari again. Otherwise this question would already have led to a
world-war, as we should certainly not have ventured to induce "our ally"
to give way.
Sir E. Grey conducted the negotiations with circumspection, calm, and
tact. When a question threatened to become involved, he sketched a
formula for agreement which was to the point and was always accepted.
His personality inspired equal confidence in all the participants.
As a matter of fact we had again successfully emerged from one of those
trials of strength which characterise our policy. Russia had been
obliged to give way to us on all points, as she was never in a position
to procure success for the Serbian aims. Albania was established as a
vassal state of Austria and Serbia was pressed back from the sea. Hence
this conference resulted in a fresh humiliation for Russian self-esteem.
As in 1878 and in 1908, we had opposed the Russian plans although no
_German_ interests were involved. Bismarck was clever enough to mitigate
the mistake of the Congress by the secret treaty and by his attitude in
the Battenberg question; but we continued to pursue in London the
dangerous path, upon which we had once more entered in the Bosnian
question, nor did we leave it in time when it led to the precipice.
The ill-humour which prevailed in Russia at that time was shown during
the conference by attacks in the Russian Press against my Russian
colleague and Russian diplomacy. The dissatisfied circles made capital
of his German descent and Roman Catholicism, his reputation as a friend
of Germany, and the accident that he was related both to Count Mensdorff
and to me. Without possessing a very distinguished personality, Count
Benckendorff is endowed with a number of qualifications that distinguish
a good diplomat--tact, polished manners, experience, courtesy, and a
natural eye for men and matters. He was always at pains to avoid a
brusque attitude, and was supported in this by England and France.
Later I once remarked to him: "I presume that Russian feeling is very
anti-German." He replied: "There are also very strong and influential
pro-German circles, but in general people are anti-Austrian."
It is hardly necessary to add that our "Austrophilie a outrance"
(friendship for Austria through thick and thin) was hardly calculated to
loosen the Entente and to direct Russia towards her Asiatic interests!
THE BALKAN CONFERENCE
At the same time the Balkan Conference was sitting in London and I had
occasion to come into contact with the leaders of the Balkan States. M.
Venizelos was certainly the most distinguished personality. At that time
he was anything rather than anti-German, and visited me several times;
he was especially fond of wearing the ribbon of the Order of the Red
Eagle--he even wore it at the French Embassy. His prepossessing charm
and ways of a man of the world secured him much sympathy. Next to him M.
Daneff, at that time Bulgarian Premier and confidant of Count Berchtold,
played a great part. He gave the impression of a subtle and energetic
man, and it is probably only due to the influence of his Vienna and
Budapest friends, of whose homage he often made fun, that he was induced
to commit the folly of entering upon the second Balkan War and of
refusing Russian arbitration.
M. Take Jonescu was also frequently in London and then visited me
regularly. I knew him from the time when I was Secretary at Bucharest.
He was also one of Herr von Kiderlen's friends. In London he was
endeavouring to obtain concessions to Rumania from M. Daneff by means of
negotiations, in which he was assisted by the very able Rumanian
Ambassador Misu. It is known that Bulgarian opposition brought about the
failure of these negotiations. Count Berchtold (and we of course with
him) was entirely on Bulgaria's side, otherwise by putting pressure on
M. Daneff we might have secured the desired satisfaction for Rumania and
placed her under an obligation to us; she was finally estranged from the
Central Powers by Austria's attitude during and after the second Balkan
War.
THE SECOND BALKAN WAR
The defeat of Bulgaria in the second Balkan War and the victory of
Serbia, with the Rumanian invasion, naturally constituted a humiliation
for Austria. The plan to rectify this by an expedition against Serbia
seems to have been evolved in Vienna soon after. The Italian revelations
prove this, and it may be assumed that Marquis San Giuliano, who
described the plan--most aptly--as a _pericolosissima aventura_, saved
us from being involved in a world-war as early as the summer of 1913.
Owing to the intimacy of Russo-Italian relations, the Vienna plan was
doubtless known in Petrograd. In any case, M. Sazonow openly declared at
Constanza, as M. Take Jonescu told me, that an Austrian attack on Serbia
would be a _casus belli_ for Russia.
When one of my staff returned from leave in Vienna in the spring of 1914
he said that Herr von Tschirschky had declared that there would soon be
war. As I, however, was always left in ignorance about important events
I considered this pessimism to be unfounded.
As a matter of fact it would appear that, ever since the peace of
Bucharest, Vienna was bent on securing a revision of the treaty by her
own effort and was apparently only waiting for a favourable pretext.
Vienna statesmen could, of course, depend on our support. They were
aware of that, as they had been repeatedly accused of lack of firmness.
In fact, Berlin was pressing for a "rehabilitation of Austria."
LIMAN VON SANDERS
When I returned to London in December, 1913, from a lengthy leave, the
Liman von Sanders question had led to a fresh crisis in our relations
with Russia. Sir E. Grey, not without concern, pointed out to me the
excitement there was in Petrograd over it: "I have never seen them so
excited."
I received instructions from Berlin to request the Minister to exert a
restraining influence in Petrograd, and to assist us in settling the
dispute. Sir Edward gladly did this, and his intervention contributed in
no small degree to smooth the matter over. My good relations with Sir
Edward and his great influence in Petrograd were repeatedly made use of
in similar manner when we wished to attain anything there, as our
representative proved himself quite useless for such a purpose.
During the fateful days of July, 1914, Sir Edward said to me: "When you
want to obtain anything in Petrograd you always apply to me, but if I
appeal to you for your influence in Vienna you fail me."
THE COLONIAL TREATY
The good and confidential relations which I had succeeded in
establishing, not only with society and the most influential people like
Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also with the great public at public
dinners, produced a marked improvement in the relations of the two
countries. Sir Edward honestly tried to confirm this _rapprochement_,
and his intentions were most apparent on two questions--the Colonial and
the Bagdad Railway Treaties.
In 1898 Count Hatzfeld and Mr. Balfour had signed a secret agreement
dividing the Portuguese colonies into economic spheres of influence
between us and England. As the Government of Portugal had neither the
power nor the means to open up her extended possessions or to administer
them properly, she had already thought of selling them before and thus
relieving her financial burdens. An agreement had been come to between
us and England which defined the interests of both parties, and which
was of the greater value because Portugal is entirely dependent on
England, as is generally known.
On the face of it this agreement was to safeguard the integrity and
independence of the Portuguese State, and merely declared the intention
of being of financial and economic assistance to the Portuguese.
Literally, therefore, it did not contravene the ancient Anglo-Portuguese
Alliance of the fifteenth century, which was last renewed under Charles
II. and gave a reciprocal territorial guarantee.
In spite of this, owing to the endeavours of Marquis Soveral, who was
presumably aware of the Anglo-German agreement, a new treaty--the
so-called Treaty of Windsor--was concluded between England and Portugal
in 1899, confirming the old agreements, which had always remained in
force.
The object of negotiations between us and England, which had commenced
before my arrival, was to amend and improve our agreement of 1898, as it
had proved unsatisfactory on several points as regards geographical
delimitation. Thanks to the accommodating attitude of the British
Government I succeeded in making the new agreement fully accord with our
wishes and interests. The whole of Angola up to the 20th degree of
longitude was assigned to us, so that we stretched up to the Congo State
from the south; we also acquired the valuable islands of San Thome and
Principe, which are north of the Equator and therefore really in the
French sphere of influence, a fact which caused my French colleague to
enter strong but unavailing protests.
Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; the Licango formed
the border.
The British Government showed the greatest consideration for our
interests and wishes. Sir E. Grey intended to demonstrate his goodwill
towards us, but he also wished to assist our colonial development as a
whole, as England hoped to divert the German development of strength
from the North Sea and Western Europe to the Ocean and to Africa. "We
don't want to grudge Germany her colonial development," a member of the
Cabinet said to me.
The British Government originally intended to include the Congo State in
the agreement, which would have given us the right of pre-emption and
enabled us to penetrate it economically. We refused this offer nominally
in view of Belgian susceptibilities. Perhaps we wished to be economical
of successes? With regard also to the practical realisation of its real
though unexpressed intention--the later actual partition of the
Portuguese colonies--the treaty in its new form showed marked
improvements and advantages as compared with the old one. Cases had been
specified which empowered us to take steps to guard our interests in
the districts assigned to us. These were couched in such a manner that
it was really left to us to decide when "vital" interests arose, so
that, with Portugal entirely dependent on England, it was only necessary
to cultivate further good relations with England in order to carry out
our joint intentions at a later date with English assent.
Sir E. Grey showed the sincerity of the British Government's desire to
respect our rights by referring to us Englishmen who wished to invest
capital and asked for the support of the British Government in the
districts assigned to us by the new agreement, even before this was
completed and signed, and by informing them that their enterprise
belonged to our sphere of influence.
The agreement was practically completed at the time of the King's visit
to Berlin in May, 1913. At that time a conference took place in Berlin
under the presidency of the Imperial Chancellor; in this conference I
also took part, and certain further wishes of ours were defined. On my
return to London I succeeded, with the assistance of Councillor of
Legation von Kuehlmann, who was working at the agreement with Mr. Parker,
in having our last proposals incorporated, so that the whole agreement
could be paragraphed by Sir E. Grey and by me in August, 1913, before I
went on leave.
But now fresh difficulties arose which prevented its being signed, and I
did not obtain the authorisation to conclude it till a year later--that
is, shortly before the outbreak of the war. It was, however, never
signed.
Sir E. Grey was only willing to sign _if the agreement were published
together with those of 1898 and 1899_. England had, as he said, no other
secret treaties besides these, and it was contrary to established
principles to keep binding agreements secret. Therefore he could not
make any agreement without publishing it. He was, however, willing to
accede to our wishes with regard to the time and manner of publication,
provided that such publication took place within one year from the date
of signature.
At our Foreign Office, where my London successes had caused increasing
dissatisfaction, and where an influential personage, who acted the part
of Herr von Holstein, wanted the London post for himself, I was informed
that the publication would endanger our interests in the colonies, as
the Portuguese would then not give us any more concessions.
The futility of this objection is apparent from the consideration that
the Portuguese, in view of the closeness of Anglo-Portuguese relations,
were most probably just as well aware of the old agreement as of our new
arrangements, and that the influence which England possesses at Lisbon
renders their Government completely impotent in face of an Anglo-German
agreement.
Another pretext had therefore to be found for wrecking the treaty. It
was suggested that the publication of the Treaty of Windsor, which had
been concluded during the time of Prince Hohenlohe--though it was only a
renewal of the Treaty of Charles II., which had always remained in
force--might endanger the position of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, as a
proof of British hypocrisy and perfidy!
I pointed out that the preamble of our agreement expressed the same
thing as the Treaty of Windsor and as other similar treaties, namely,
that we would protect the sovereign rights of Portugal and the
inviolability of its possessions. In vain! In spite of repeated
discussions with Sir E. Grey, at which he made many fresh suggestions
for the publication, the Foreign Office persisted in its attitude, and
finally arranged with Sir E. Goschen that matters should be left as they
were!
The treaty, which offered us extraordinary advantages, the result of
more than a year's work, was thus dropped because it would have been a
public success for me.
When I mentioned the subject to Mr. Harcourt at a dinner at the Embassy
in the spring of 1914, the Minister for the Colonies told me that he was
placed in a difficult position, and did not know how to act. The present
position was intolerable--he wished to safeguard our interests, but was
in doubt whether he should proceed on the terms of the old or the new
treaty. It was therefore urgently desirable to clear up the situation
and to settle the matter, which had dragged on for such a long time.
In reply to a dispatch in this sense I received instructions couched in
terms which showed more emotion than civility, telling me to abstain
from any further interference in the matter.
I now regret that I did not immediately travel to Berlin and place my
post at the disposal of the monarch, and that I had not lost faith in
the possibility of arriving at an understanding with those in authority,
a sinister mistake which was to take its revenge a few months later in
such a tragical way.
However little I even then enjoyed the goodwill of the highest official
of the Empire, as he feared that I was aspiring to his post, yet I must
in justice to him say that during our last interview before the outbreak
of war, at the end of June, 1914, to which I will refer later, he gave
me his assent for the signature and publication of the treaty. In spite
of this it required repeated applications on my part, which were
supported by Herr Dr. Solf in Berlin, before sanction was finally
obtained at the end of July, 1914. As the Serbian crisis at that time
already imperilled the peace of Europe, the completion of the treaty had
to be postponed. It also is one of the sacrifices of this war.
THE BAGDAD TREATY