AMERICA'S CHARITY AND SPAIN'S DIPLOMACY.
The new governor-general of Cuba was Don Ramon Blanco, as to whose
character accounts differ. It is probable that while he is not the
high-minded, honorable gentleman that Campos was, he is far, very far
from being such an unmitigated beast as his predecessor.
Before he reached Cuba, which was the last of October, 1897, he stated
in an interview:
"My policy will never include concentration. I fight the enemy, not
women and children. One of the first things I shall do will be to allow
the reconcentrados to go out of the town and till the soil."
This sounds very just and right, but, as a matter of fact, the policy
enounced was never carried out, not even in minor particulars. The
persecution of the pacificos remained as bitter and relentless as ever.
Perhaps General Blanco is not entirely to blame for this, as the
pressure brought to bear against his expressed ideas both by the home
government and by the "peninsulars" in Havana, who had been in full
accord with the methods of the "Butcher," was so strong as scarcely to
be resisted.
Blanco issued an amnesty proclamation soon after his arrival in Havana,
but the insurgents paid little or no attention. Their experience in
such matters in the past had been too stern to be forgotten.
In the field, Blanco was also most unsuccessful, gaining nothing but
petty victories of no value whatever. The pay of the Spanish soldiers
was terribly in arrears, and their rations were of the most meagre
description. No wonder that they were disheartened, and in no condition
to fight.
In a word, Blanco absolutely failed, as completely as had his
predecessors, in quelling the rebellion.
The people of the United States were becoming more and more enraged at
the atrocities committed at their very door, and more and more anxious
that the Cubans should have the independence which they themselves had
achieved.
Moreover, there was a large number of Americans in the island who were
made to suffer from the policy of reconcentration. Citizens of the
United States, a large number of them being naturalized Americans, were
constantly being seized and imprisoned, on suspicion alone, no proof
whatever being advanced, of their furnishing aid and comfort to the
insurgents. They were placed in filthy cells, no communication with the
outside world being allowed them. This is what the Spaniards term
"incommunicado."
No writing materials were allowed them and nothing whatever to read. The
windows were so high up that no view was to be obtained. The cells were
damp with the moisture of years and had rotten, disease-breeding floors,
covered with filth of every description. Moreover, they were overrun
with cockroaches, rats and other vermin.
The sustenance furnished the prisoners was wretched, and even such as it
was, it was not given to them regularly. More often than not, they were
left for long hours to suffer the pangs of hunger and thirst.
A notable instance of Americans being seized and imprisoned in these
loathsome dungeons is the following:
A little schooner called the "Competitor" attempted to land a
filibustering expedition. She was captured, after most of her passengers
had been landed, and her crew, numbering five, were tried by a court
which had been instructed to convict them, and sentenced to death. They
would undoubtedly have been executed, as some years before had been the
prisoners of the ill-fated Virginius, had it not been for the prompt
intervention of the United States, spurred thereto by General Fitz Hugh
Lee.
The conviction was growing stronger and stronger in the United States
that something should be done to mitigate the terrible suffering in
Cuba.
The Red Cross Association, a splendid charitable organization, at the
head of which was Miss Clara Barton, undertook this noble work of
relief. The government of the United States lent its assistance and
support. Large sums of money and tons of supplies of food were
contributed throughout the Union, both by public and private donations.
The newspapers everywhere, North, East, South and West, did magnificent
service in furthering the good work.
Spain, instead of showing gratitude, rather resented this, and there was
considerable difficulty to prosecute the labor of charity. Still, the
efforts, in the interests of suffering humanity were by no means
unavailing.
President McKinley speaks of the movement as follows:
"The success which had attended the limited measure of relief extended
to the suffering American citizens of Cuba, by the judicious expenditure
through consular agencies, of money appropriated expressly for their
succor by the joint resolution approved May 24, 1897, prompted the
humane extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body of
sufferers. A suggestion to this end was aquiesced in by the Spanish
authorities. On the twenty-fourth of December last, I caused to be
issued an appeal to the American people, inviting contributions, in
money or in kind, for the starving sufferers in Cuba, following this on
the eighth of January by a similar public announcement of the formation
of a Central Cuban Relief Committee, with headquarters in New York city,
composed of three members representing the American National Red Cross
Society, and the religious and business elements of the community. The
efforts of that committee have been untiring and have accomplished much.
Arrangements for free transportation to Cuba have greatly aided the
charitable work. The president of the American Red Cross and
representatives of other contributory organizations have generously
visited Cuba and co-operated with the consul-general and the local
authorities to make effective disposition of the relief collected
through the efforts of the Central Committee. Nearly $200,000 in money
and supplies has already reached the sufferers and more is forthcoming.
The supplies are admitted duty free, and transportation to the interior
has been arranged, so that the relief, at first necessarily confined to
Havana and the larger cities, is now extended through most if not all of
the towns through which suffering exists. Thousands of lives have
already been saved. The necessity for a change in the condition of the
reconcentrados is recognized in the Spanish government."
And yet Spain resented these charitable efforts, as being opposed to her
policy. The people of the United States, in sending this money and these
supplies, had nothing else in view but charity, a longing to do all that
they could to relieve the anguish of an oppressed and tortured people.
There was no ulterior motive whatever.
A large amount of the sums contributed was diverted to a purpose very
different from that for which it had been intended.
The Spanish government, more through fear of the condemnation of the
other European nations than anything else, voted about six hundred
thousand dollars for the relief of the starving reconcentradoes.
But this was a ruse, a sum chiefly on paper. General Lee, and his
testimony is incontrovertible, says:
"I do not believe six hundred thousand dollars, in supplies, will be
given to those people, and the soldiers left to starve. They will divide
it up here and there; a piece taken off here and a piece taken off
there. I do not believe they have appropriated anything of the kind. The
condition of the reconcentrados out in the country is just as bad as in
General Weyler's day. It has been relieved a good deal by supplies from
the United States, but that has ceased now.
"General Blanco published a proclamation, rescinding General Weyler's
bando, as they call it there, but it has had no practical effect. In the
first place, these people have no place to go; the houses have been
burned down; there is nothing but the bare land there, and it would take
them two months before they could raise the first crop. In the next
place, they are afraid to go out from the lines of the towns, because
the roving bands of the Spanish guerillas, as they are called, would
kill them. So they stick right in the edges of the town, just like they
did, with nothing to eat except what they can get from charity. The
Spanish have nothing to give."
The government and people of Spain now became very much afraid of the
attitude of the United States. They knew that something had to be done,
so to speak, to throw a sop to Cerberus. Therefore Sagasta, the premier
of Spain, conceived the idea of granting to Cuba a species of autonomy.
But, with the usual Spanish diplomacy, it was not autonomy at all. It
purposed to be home rule, but every article gave a loop-hole for Spain
not to fulfill her obligations.
It was a false and absurd proposition, intended to deceive, but too
flimsy in its fabric to deceive any one. It was rotten clean through,
and was opposed by everyone except the framers of the autonomistic
papers, General Blanco, his staff and a few others, who hoped, but hoped
in vain, great things from the proclamation.
The Cuban leaders, who at one time would have hailed with joy such a
concession, if they had been assured that the provisions would have been
followed out loyally and without fraud, now rejected the autonomistic
proposition with scorn and loathing.
Their battle cry was now, and they were determined it ever should be:
"Independence or death!"
It was too late. There was no possibility now of home rule under Spanish
domination.
Gomez even went so far as to declare that any one who should attempt to
bring to his camp any offer of autonomy would be seized as a spy and
shot.
General Lee, speaking of the proposed autonomy, says:
"Blanco's autonomistic government was doomed to failure from its
inception. The Spanish soldiers and officers scorned it because they did
not desire Cuban rule, which such autonomy, if genuine, would insure.
The Spanish merchants and citizens were opposed to it because they too
were hostile to the Cubans having control of the island, and, if the
question could be narrowed down to Cuban control or annexation to the
United States, they were all annexationists, believing that they could
get a better government, and one that would protect in a greater measure
life and property under the United States flag than under the Cuban
banner. On the other hand, the Cubans in arms would not touch it,
because they were fighting for free Cuba. And the Cuban citizens and
sympathizers were opposed to it also."
Senor Palma sums up the question of autonomy as follows:
"Autonomy would mean that the Cuban people will make their own laws,
appoint all their public officers, except the governor-general, and
attend to the local affairs with entire independence, without, of
course, interference by the metropolis. What then would be left to
Spain, since between her and Cuba there is no commercial intercourse of
any kind? Spain is not and cannot be, a market for Cuban products, and
is moreover unable to provide Cuba with the articles in need by the
latter. The natural market for the Cuban products is the United States,
from which in exchange Cuba buys with great advantage flour, provisions,
machinery, etc. What then, I repeat, is left to Spain but the big debt
incurred by her, without the consent and against the will of the people
of Cuba? We perfectly understand the autonomy of Canada as a colony of
Great Britain. The two countries are closely connected with each other
by the most powerful ties--the mutual interest of a reciprocal
commerce."
Murat Halstead, who is invariably logical and correct, puts the whole
matter in a few trenchant words:
"There is nothing to regard as possible in any of the reforms the
Spaniards are promising with much animation and to which they ascribe
the greatest excellence, to take place after the insurgents have
surrendered their arms. Spain is, as always, incapable of changing her
fatal colonial policy, that never has been or can be reformed."
Spain's fatal colonial policy. Could there be truer words?
Let us pause for a moment to contemplate what this fatal colonial policy
has cost her.
At one time she swayed the destinies of Europe and had possessions in
every continent. Samuel Johnson, in writing of her, said:
"Are there no regions yet unclaimed by Spain?
Quick, let us rise, those unhappy lands explore,
And bear oppression's insolence no more."
The whole reason of Spain's downfall is the ruthless and savage
character of the Spanish people.
Due to her oppression, note the following list of colonies which she has
lost:
1609. The Netherlands.
1628. Malacca, Ceylon, Java and other islands.
1640. Portugal.
1648. Spain renounced all claim to Holland.
1648. Brabant and other parts of Flanders.
1649. Maestricht, Hetogenbosch, Breda, Bergen-of-Zoom, and many other
fortresses in the Low Countries. In this year also she practically
surrendered supremacy on the seas to Northern Europe.
1659. Rousillon and Cardague. By the cession of these places to France,
the boundary line between France and Spain became the Pyrenees.
1668. Other portions of Flanders.
1672. Still more cities and towns in Flanders.
1704. Gibraltar.
1704. Majorca, Minorca and Ivizza.
1791. The Nootka Sound settlements.
1794. St. Domingo.
1800. Louisiana.
1802. Trinidad.
1819. Florida.
1810-21. Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chili,
Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Patagonia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
San Salvador, Hayti and numerous other islands.
Spain has now not a foot of territory on the American continent, and
very shortly she will not have a foot anywhere except within the
confines of her own home.
To return again to the proposed autonomy of Cuba.
At the time it was offered Gomez, that grand old man of Cuba said:
"This is a war to the death for independence, and nothing but
independence will we accept. To talk of home rule is to idle away time.
But I have hopes that the United States, sooner or later, will recognize
our belligerency. It is a question of mere justice, and, in spite of all
arts of diplomacy, justice wins in the long run. The day we are
recognized as belligerents, I can name a fixed term for the end of the
war.
"With regard to paying an indemnity to Spain, that is a question of
amount. A year ago we could pay $100,000,000, and I was ready to agree
to that. Now that Spain owes more than $400,000,000, we will not pay so
much."
It was too late now to speak of reforms or of home rule in any shape.
The Cubans were not willing to nurse illusions. They were resolved on
absolute freedom or nothing.
Any form of Spanish rule would mean the entire subjection of the Cubans,
and, had they accepted the proposed autonomy, there is no doubt but that
the future would have been as bad, if not worse, than the past.
Public opinion in the United States was never so deeply aroused as it
was now. Citizens in all ranks of life were calling loudly for
interference, which, in the name of civilization and humanity, should
end the horrible state of affairs in Cuba.
The United States was Cuba's natural defender and protector, and now,
both press and public declared, was the time to act.
The president was fully aware of the gravity of the situation, but with
rare discretion, for which future historians will give him due credit,
he bided his time, preferring, if possible, peace with honor.
In his first message relating to the Cuban situation, President McKinley
said:
"If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to
ourselves, to civilization and humanity, to intervene with force, it
shall be without fault on our part, and only because the necessity of
such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of
the civilized world."
General Stewart L. Woodford, our minister to Spain, behaved with the
utmost courtesy and did everything in the power of mortal man to avoid
hostilities.
One cause of the American people's irritability, and in all justice
there was much reason for it, was Spain's pretence that the Cuban war
had been prolonged because of America's inability or non desire to
maintain neutrality. Nothing could be falser or more absurd, for the
United States had invariably, whenever possible, stopped all
filibustering expeditions to Cuba. The records will bear out this
statement, without any possibility of refutation. More than two millions
of dollars had been expended by the United States in Spain's interest.
Certainly, gratitude or its equivalent is a word that does not appear in
the Spanish lexicon.