INDIAN SPEECHES
(1907-1909)
BY VISCOUNT MORLEY
OM
_The modern and Western spirit is assuredly at work in the Indian
countries, but the vital question for Indian Governments is, How far
it has changed the ideas of men_?--SIR HENRY MAINE.
1909
NOTE
A signal transaction is now taking place in the course of Indian
polity. These speeches, with no rhetorical pretensions, contain some
of the just, prudent, and necessary points and considerations, that
have guided this transaction, and helped to secure for it the sanction
of Parliament. The too limited public that follows Indian affairs with
coherent attention, may find this small sheaf of speeches, revised as
they have been, to be of passing use. Three cardinal State-papers have
been appended. They mark the spirit of British rule in India, at three
successive stages, for three generations past; and bear directly upon
what is now being done.
_November_, 1909.
CONTENTS
I. ON PRESENTING THE INDIAN BUDGET. (House of Commons, June 6, 1907)
II. TO CONSTITUENTS. (Arbroath, October 21, 1907)
III. ON AMENDMENT TO ADDRESS. (House of Commons, January 31, 1908)
IV. INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE. (London, July, 1908)
V. ON PROPOSED REFORMS. (House of Lords, December 17, 1908)
VI. HINDUS AND MAHOMETANS. (January, 1909)
VII. SECOND READING OF INDIAN COUNCILS BILL. (House of Lords)
VIII. INDIAN PROBATIONERS. (Oxford, June 13, 1909)
APPENDIX
THREE STATE-PAPERS: 1833, 1858, 1908
INDIAN SPEECHES
I
ON PRESENTING THE INDIAN BUDGET
(HOUSE OF COMMONS. JUNE 6, 1907)
I am afraid I shall have to ask the House for rather a large draft
upon its indulgence. The Indian Secretary is like the aloe, that
blooms once in 100 years: he only troubles the House with speeches
of his own once in twelve months. There are several topics which the
House will expect me to say something about, and of these are two or
three topics of supreme interest and importance, for which I plead for
patience and comprehensive consideration. We are too apt to find that
Gentlemen both here and outside fix upon some incident of which they
read in the newspaper; they put it under a microscope; they indulge
in reflections upon it; and they regard that as taking an intelligent
interest in the affairs of India. If we could suppose that on some
occasion within the last three or four weeks a wrong turn had been
taken in judgment at Simla, or in the Cabinet, or in the India Office,
or that to-day in this House some wrong turn might be taken, what
disasters would follow, what titanic efforts to repair these
disasters, what devouring waste of national and Indian treasure, and
what a wreckage might follow! These are possible consequences that
misjudgment either here or in India might bring with it.
Sir, I believe I am not going too far when I say that this is almost,
if not quite, the first occasion upon which what is called the British
democracy in its full strength has been brought directly face to face
with the difficulties of Indian Government in all their intricacies,
all their complexities, all their subtleties, and above all in their
enormous magnitude. Last year when I had the honour of addressing the
House on the Indian Budget, I observed, as many have done before me,
that it is one of the most difficult experiments ever tried in human
history, whether you can carry on, what you will have to try to carry
on in India--personal government along with free speech and free right
of public meeting. This which last year was partially a speculative
question, has this year become more or less actual, and that is a
question which I shall by and by have to submit to the House. I want
to set out the case as frankly as I possibly can. I want, if I may
say so without presumption, to take the House into full confidence so
far--and let nobody quarrel with this provision--as public interests
allow. I will beg the House to remember that we do not only hear one
another; we are ourselves this afternoon overheard. Words that may be
spoken here, are overheard in the whole kingdom. They are overheard
thousands of miles away by a vast and complex community. They are
overheard by others who are doing the service and work of the Crown in
India. By those, too, who take part in the immense work of commercial
and non-official life in India. We are overheard by great Indian
princes who are outside British India. We are overheard by the dim
masses of Indians whom, in spite of all, we shall persist in regarding
as our friends. We are overheard by those whom, I am afraid, we must
reluctantly call our enemies. This is the reason why everybody who
speaks to-day, certainly including myself, must use language that is
well advised, language of reserve, and, as I say again, the fruit of
comprehensive consideration.
The Budget is a prosperity Budget. We have, however, to admit that
a black shadow falls across the prospect. The plague figures are
appalling. But do not let us get unreasonably dismayed, even about
these appalling figures. If we reviewed the plague figures up to last
December, we might have hoped that the horrible scourge was on the
wane. From 92,000 deaths in the year 1900, the figures went up to
1,100,000 in 1904, while in 1905 they exceeded 1,000,000. In 1906
a gleam of hope arose, and the mortality sank to something under
350,000. The combined efforts of Government and people had produced
that reduction; but, alas, since January, 1907, plague has again
flared up in districts that have been filled with its terror for a
decade; and for the first four months of this year the deaths amounted
to 642,000, which exceeded the record for the same period in any past
year. You must remember that we have to cover a very vast area. I do
not know that these figures would startle us if we took the area of
the whole of Europe. It was in 1896 that this plague first appeared in
India, and up to April, 1907, the total figure of the human beings who
have died is 5,250,000. But dealing with a population of 300,000,000,
this dire mortality, although enormous, is not at all comparable with
the results of the black death and other scourges, that spread over
Europe in earlier times, in proportion to the population. The plague
mortality in 1904 (the worst complete year) would only represent,
if evenly distributed, a death-rate of about 3 per 1,000. But it is
local, and particularly centres in the Punjab, the United Provinces,
and in Bombay. I do not think that anybody who has been concerned in
India--I do not care to what school of Indian thought he belongs--can
deny that measures for the extermination and mitigation of this
disease have occupied the most serious, constant, unflagging, zealous,
and energetic attention of the Indian Government. But the difficulties
we encounter are manifold, as many Members of the House are well
aware. It is possible that hon. Members may rise and say that we are
not enforcing with sufficient zeal proper sanitary rules; and, on the
other hand, I dare say that other hon. Members will get up to show
that the great difficulty in the way of sanitary rules being observed,
arises from the reluctance of the population to practise them. That
is perfectly natural and is well understood. They are a suspicious
population, and we all know that, when these new rules are forced
upon them, they constantly resent and resist them. A policy of severe
repression is worse than useless. I will not detain the House with
particulars of all the proceedings we have taken in dealing with
the plague. But I may say that we have instituted a long scientific
inquiry with the aid of the Royal Society and the Lister Institute.
Then we have very intelligent officers, who have done all they could
to trace the roots of the disease, and to discover if they could, any
means to prevent it. It is a curious thing that, while there appears
to be no immunity from this frightful scourge for the natives,
Europeans enjoy almost entire immunity from the disease. That is
difficult to understand or to explain.
Now as to opium, I know that a large number of Members in the House
are interested in it. Judging by the voluminous correspondence that I
receive, all the Churches and both political Parties are sincerely and
deeply interested in the question, and I was going to say that the
resolutions with which they have favoured me often use the expression
"righteousness before revenue." The motto is excellent, but its virtue
will be cheap and shabby, if you only satisfy your own righteousness
at the expense of other people's revenue.
Mr. LUPTON: We are quite ready to bear the expense.
Mr. MORLEY: My hon. friend says they are quite prepared to bear the
expense. I commend that observation cheerfully to the Chancellor of
the Exchequer. This question touches the consciences of the people of
the country. My hon. friend sometimes goes a little far; still, he
represents a considerable body of feeling. Last May, when the opium
question was raised in this House, something fell from me which
reached the Chinese Government, and the Chinese Government, on the
strength of that utterance of mine, made in the name of His Majesty's
Government, have persistently done their best to come to some sort
of arrangement and understanding with His Majesty's Government. In
September an Imperial decree was issued in China ordering the strict
prohibition of the consumption and cultivation of opium, with a view
to ultimate eradication in ten years. Communications were made to
the Foreign Secretary, and since then there has been a considerable
correspondence, some of which the House is, by Question and Answer,
acquainted with. The Chinese Government have been uniformly assured,
not only by my words spoken in May, but by the Foreign Secretary, that
the sympathy of this country was with the objects set forth in their
decree of September. Then a very important incident, as I regard
it, and one likely by-and-bye to prove distinctly fruitful, was the
application by the United States Government to our Government, as to
whether there should not be a joint inquiry into the opium traffic by
the United States and the other Powers concerned. The House knows,
by Question and Answer, that His Majesty's Government judge that
procedure by way of Commission rather than by way of Conference is the
right way to approach the question. But no one can doubt for a moment,
considering the honourable interest the United States have shown on
previous occasions, that some good result will come with time and
persistence.
I will not detain the House with the details, but certainly it is a
true satisfaction to know that a great deal of talk as to the Chinese
interest in the suppression of opium being fictitious is unreal. I was
much struck by a sentence written by the correspondent of _The Times_
at Peking recently. Everybody who knows him, is aware that he is not
a sentimentalist, and he used remarkable language. He said that
he viewed the development in China of the anti-opium movement as
encouraging; that the movement was certainly popular, and was
supported by the entire native Press; while a hopeful sign was that
the use of opium was fast becoming unfashionable, and would become
more so. A correspondence, so far as the Government of India is
concerned, is now in progress. Those of my hon. friends who think we
are lacking perhaps in energy and zeal I would refer to the language
used by Mr. Baker, the very able finance member of the Viceroy's
Council, because these words really define the position of the
Government of India--
"What the eventual outcome will be, it is impossible to foresee.
The practical difficulties which China has imposed on herself are
enormous, and may prove insuperable, but it is evident that the
gradual reduction and eventual extinction of the revenue that
India has derived from the trade, has been brought a stage nearer,
and it is necessary for us to be prepared for whatever may
happen."
He added that twenty years ago, or even less, the prospect of losing a
revenue of five and a half crores of rupees a year would have caused
great anxiety, and even now the loss to Indian finances would be
serious, and might necessitate recourse to increased taxation. But if,
as they had a clear right to expect, the transition was effected
with due regard to finance, and was spread over a term of years, the
consequence need not be regarded with apprehension.
When I approach military expenditure, and war and the dangers of
war, I think I ought to say a word about the visit of the Ameer of
Afghanistan, which excited so much attention, and kindled so lively an
interest in great parts, not only of our own dominions, but in Asia.
I am persuaded that we have reason to look back on that visit with
entire and complete satisfaction. His Majesty's Government, previously
to the visit of the Ameer instructed the Governor-General in Council
on no account to open any political questions with the Ameer. That was
really part of the conditions of the Ameer's visit; and the result
of that policy has been to place our relations with the Ameer on an
eminently satisfactory footing, a far better footing than would have
been arrived at by any formal premeditated convention. The Ameer
himself made a speech when he arrived at Kabul on his return, and I
am aware that in this speech I come to a question of what may seem
a Party or personal character, with which it is not in the least my
intention to deal. This is what the Ameer said on 10th April--
"The officers of the Government of India never said a word on
political matters, they kept their promise. But as to myself,
whenever and wherever I found an opportunity, I spoke indirectly
on several matters which concerned the interests of my country and
nation. The other side never took undue advantage of it, and
never discussed with me on those points which I mentioned. His
Excellency's invitation (Lord Minto's) to me was in such a proper
form, that I had no objection to accept it. The invitation which
he sent was worded in quite a different form from that of the
invitation which I received on the occasion of the Delhi Durbar.
In the circumstances I had determined to undergo all risks (at the
time of the Delhi Durbar) and, if necessary, to sacrifice all my
possessions and my own life, but not to accept such an invitation
as was sent to me for coming to join the Delhi Durbar."
These thing are far too serious for me or any of us to indulge in
controversy upon, but it is a satisfaction to be able to point out
to the House that the policy we instructed the Governor-General to
follow, has so far worked extremely well.
I will go back to the Army. Last year when I referred to this subject,
I told the House that it would be my object to remove any defects that
I and those who advise me might discover in the Army system, and more
especially, of course, in the schemes of Lord Kitchener. Since then,
with the assistance of two very important Committees, well qualified
by expert military knowledge, I came to the conclusion that an
improved equipment was required. Hon. Gentlemen may think that my
opinion alone would not be worth much; but, after all, civilians have
got to decide these questions, and, provided that they arm themselves
with the expert knowledge of military authorities, it is rightly their
voice that settles the matter. Certain changes were necessary in
the allocation of units in order to enable the troops to be better
trained, and therefore our final conclusion was that the special
military expenditure shown in the financial statement must go on for
some years more. But the House will see that we have arranged to cut
down the rate of the annual grant, and we have taken care--and this,
I think, ought to be set down to our credit--that every estimate for
every item included in the programme shall be submitted to vigilant
scrutiny here as well as in India. I have no prepossession in favour
of military expenditure, but the pressure of facts, the pressure of
the situation, the possibilities of contingencies that may arise, seem
obviously to make it impossible for any Government or any Minister to
acquiesce in the risks on the Indian frontier. We have to consider
not only our position with respect to foreign Powers on the Indian
frontier, but the exceedingly complex questions that arise in
connection with the turbulent border tribes. All these things make
it impossible--I say nothing about internal conditions--for any
Government or any Minister with a sense of responsibility to cancel
or to deal with the military programme in any high-handed or cavalier
way.
Next I come to what, I am sure, is first in the minds of most Members
of the House--the political and social condition of India. Lord Minto
became Viceroy, I think, in November, 1905, and the present Government
succeeded to power in the first week of December. Now much of the
criticism that I have seen on the attitude of His Majesty's Government
and the Viceroy, leaves out of account the fact that we did not come
quite into a haven of serenity and peace. Very fierce monsoons had
broken out on the Olympian heights at Simla, in the camps, and in the
Councils at Downing Street. This was the inheritance into which
we came--rather a formidable inheritance for which I do not, this
afternoon, attempt to distribute the responsibility. Still, when we
came into power, our policy was necessarily guided by the conditions
under which the case had been left. Our policy was to compose the
singular conditions of controversy and confusion by which we were
faced. In the famous Army case we happily succeeded. But in Eastern
Bengal, for a time, we did not succeed. When I see newspaper articles
beginning with the preamble that the problem of India is altogether
outside party questions, I well know from experience that this is too
often apt to be the forerunner of a regular party attack. It is said
that there has been supineness, vacillation and hesitation. I reply
boldly, there has been no supineness, no vacillation, no hesitation
from December, 1905, up to the present day.
I must say a single word about one episode, and it is with sincere
regret I refer to it. It is called the Fuller episode. I have had the
pleasure of many conversations with Sir Bampfylde Fuller since his
return, and I recognise to the full his abilities, his good faith, and
the dignity and self-control with which, during all this period of
controversy, he has never for one moment attempted to defend himself,
or to plunge into any sort of contest with the Viceroy or His
Majesty's Government.[1] Conduct of that kind deserves our fullest
recognition. I recognise to the full his gifts and his experience, but
I am sure that if he were in this House, he would hardly quarrel with
me for saying that those gifts were not altogether well adapted to the
situation he had to face.
[Footnote 1: An unhappy lapse took place at a later date.]
What was the case? The Lieutenant-Governor suggested a certain course.
The Government of India thought it was a mistake, and told him so. The
Lieutenant-Governor thereupon said, "Very well, then I'm afraid I
must resign." There was nothing in all that except what was perfectly
honourable to Sir Bampfylde Fuller. But does anybody here take up this
position, that if a Lieutenant-Governor says, "If I cannot have my own
way I will resign," then the Government of India are bound to refuse
to accept that resignation? All I can say is, and I do not care who
the man may be, that if any gentleman in the Indian service says
he will resign unless he can have his own way, then so far as I
am concerned in the matter, his resignation shall be promptly and
definitely accepted. It is said to-day that Sir Bampfylde Fuller
recommended certain measures about education, and that the Government
have now adopted them. But the circumstances are completely changed.
What was thought by Lord Minto and his Council to be a rash and
inexpedient course in those days, is not thought so now that the
circumstances have changed. I will only mention one point. There was
a statement the other day in a very important newspaper that the
condition of anti-British feeling in Eastern Bengal had gained in
virulence since Sir Bampfylde Fuller's resignation. This, the Viceroy
assures me, is an absolute perversion of the facts. The whole
atmosphere has changed for the better. When I say that Lord Minto was
justified in the course he took, I say it without any prejudice to
Sir Bampfylde Fuller, or the slightest wish to injure his future
prospects.
Now I come to the subject of the disorders. I am extremely sorry to
say that some disorder has broken out in the Punjab. I think I may
assume that the House is aware of the general circumstances from
Answers to Questions. Under the Regulation of 1818 (which is still
alive), coercive measures were adopted. Here I would like to examine,
so far as I can, the action taken to preserve the public interests. It
would be quite wrong, in dealing with the unrest in the Punjab, not to
mention the circumstances that provided the fuel for the agitation.
There were ravages by the plague, and these ravages have been cruel.
The seasons have not been favourable. A third cause was an Act then on
the stocks, which was believed to be injurious to the condition of a
large body of men. Those conditions affecting the Colonisation Act
were greatly misrepresented. An Indian member of the Punjab Council
pointed out how impolitic he thought it was; and, as I told the House
about a week ago, the Viceroy, declining to be frightened by the
foolish charge of pandering to agitation and so forth, refused assent
to that proposal. But in the meantime the proposal of the colonisation
law had become a weapon in the hands of the preachers of sedition. I
suspect that the Member for East Nottingham will presently get up and
say that this mischief connected with the Colonisation Act accounted
for the disturbance. But I call attention to this fact, in order that
the House may understand whether or not the Colonisation Act was the
main cause of the disturbance. The authorities believe that it was
not. There were twenty-eight meetings known to have been held by the
leading agitators in the Punjab between 1st March, and 1st May. Of
these five only related, even ostensibly, to agricultural grievances;
the remaining twenty-three were all purely political. The figures seem
to dispose of the contention that agrarian questions are at the root
of the present unrest in the Punjab. On the contrary, it rather
looks as if there was a deliberate heating of the public atmosphere
preparatory to the agrarian meeting at Rawalpindi on the 21st April,
which gave rise to the troubles. The Lieutenant-Governor visited
twenty-seven out of twenty-nine districts. He said the situation
was serious, and it was growing worse. In this agitation special
attention, it is stated, has been paid to the Sikhs, who, as the House
is aware, are among the best soldiers in India, and in the case of
Lyallpur, to the military pensioners. Special efforts have been made
to secure their attendance at meetings to enlist their sympathies
and to inflame their passions. So far the active agitation has been
virtually confined to the districts in which the Sikh element is
predominant. Printed invitations and leaflets have been principally
addressed to villages held by Sikhs; and at a public meeting at
Ferozepore, at which disaffection was openly preached, the men of the
Sikh regiments stationed there were specially invited to attend, and
several hundreds of them acted upon the invitation. The Sikhs were
told that it was by their aid, and owing to their willingness to
shoot down their fellow countrymen in the Mutiny, that the Englishmen
retained their hold upon India. And then a particularly odious line of
appeal was adopted. It was asked, "How is it that the plague attacks
the Indians and not the Europeans?" "The Government," said these men,
"have mysterious means of spreading the plague; the Government spreads
the plague by poisoning the streams and wells." In some villages the
inhabitants have actually ceased to use the wells. I was informed only
the other day by an officer, who was in the Punjab at that moment,
that when visiting the settlements, he found the villagers disturbed
in mind on this point. He said to his men: "Open up your kits, and let
them see whether these horrible pills are in them." The men did as
they were ordered, but the suspicion was so great that people insisted
upon the glasses of the telescopes being unscrewed, in order to be
quite sure that there was no pill behind them.
See the emergency and the risk. Suppose a single native regiment had
sided with the rioters. It would have been absurd for us, knowing we
had got a weapon there at our hands by law--not an exceptional law,
but a standing law--and in the face of the risk of a conflagration,
not to use that weapon; and I for one have no apology whatever to
offer for using it. Nobody appreciates more intensely than I do the
danger, the mischief, and a thousand times in history the iniquity of
what is called "reason of State." I know all about that. It is full of
mischief and full of danger; but so is sedition, and we should have
incurred criminal responsibility if we had opposed the resort to this
law.
I do not wish to detain the House with the story of events in Eastern
Bengal and Assam. They are of a different character from those in the
Punjab, and in consequence of these disturbances the Government of
India, with my approval, have issued an Ordinance, which I am sure the
House is familiar with, under the authority and in the terms of an Act
of Parliament. The course of events in Eastern Bengal appears to have
been mainly this--first, attempts to impose the boycott on Mahomedans
by force; secondly, complaints by Hindus if the local officials stop
them, and by Mahomedans if they do not try to stop them; thirdly,
retaliation by Mahomedans; fourthly, complaints by Hindus that the
local officials do not protect them from this retaliation; fifthly,
general lawlessness of the lower classes on both sides, encouraged by
the spectacle of the fighting among the higher classes; sixthly, more
complaints against the officials. The result of the Ordinance has been
that down to May 29th it had not been necessary to take action in any
one of these districts.
I noticed an ironical look on the part of the right hon. Gentleman
when I referred with perfect freedom to my assent to the resort to the
weapon we had in the law against sedition. I have had communications
from friends of mine that, in this assent, I am outraging the
principles of a lifetime. I should be ashamed if I detained the House
more than two minutes on anything so small as the consistency of my
political life. That can very well take care of itself. I began by
saying that this is the first time that British democracy in its full
strength, as represented in this House, is face to face with the
enormous difficulties of Indian Government. Some of my hon. friends
look even more in sorrow than in anger upon this alleged backsliding
of mine. Last year I told the House that India for a long time to
come, so far as my imagination could reach, would be the theatre
of absolute and personal government, and that raised some doubts.
Reference has been made to my having resisted the Irish Crimes Act, as
if there were a scandalous inconsistency between opposing the policy
of that Act, and imposing this policy on the natives of India. That
inconsistency can only be established by anyone who takes up the
position that Ireland, a part of the United Kingdom, is exactly on the
same footing as these 300,000,000 people--composite, heterogeneous,
with different histories, of different races, different faiths. Does
anybody contend that any political principle whatever is capable
of application in every sort of circumstances without reference to
conditions--in every place, and at every time? I, at all events, have
never taken that view, and I would like to remind my hon. friends that
in such ideas as I have about political principles, the leader of my
generation was Mr. Mill. Mill was a great and benignant lamp of wisdom
and humanity, and it was at that lamp I and others kindled our modest
rushlights. What did Mill say about the government of India? Remember
he was not merely that abject and despicable being, a philosopher. He
was a man practised in government, and in what government? Why, he was
responsible, experienced, and intimately concerned in the government
of India. What did he say? If there is anybody who can be quoted as
having been a champion of representative government it is Mill; and in
his book, which, I take it, is still the classic book on that subject,
this is what he says--
"Government by the dominant country is as legitimate as any other,
if it is the one which, in the existing state of civilization of
the subject people, most facilitates their transition to a higher
state of civilization."
Then he says this--
"The ruling country ought to be able to do for its subjects
all that could be done by a succession of absolute monarchs,
guaranteed by irresistible force against the precariousness of
tenure attendant on barbarous despotisms, and qualified by their
genius to anticipate all that experience has taught to the more
advanced nations. If we do not attempt to realize this ideal we
are guilty of a dereliction of the highest moral trust that can
devolve upon a nation."
I will now ask the attention of the House for a moment while I examine
a group of communications from officers of the Indian Government, and
if the House will allow me I will tell them what to my mind is the
result of all these communications as to the general feeling in India.
That, after all, is what most concerns us. For this unrest in the
Punjab and Bengal sooner or later--and sooner, rather than later, I
hope--will pass away. What is the situation of India generally in the
view of these experienced officers at this moment? Even now when we
are passing through all the stress and anxiety, it is a mistake not to
look at things rather largely. They all admit that there is a fall in
the influence of European officers over the population. They all, or
nearly all, admit that there is estrangement--I ought to say, perhaps,
refrigeration--between officers and people. There is less sympathy
between the Government and the people. For the last few years--and
this is a very important point--the doctrine of administrative
efficiency has been pressed too hard. The wheels of the huge machine
have been driven too fast. Our administration--so shrewd observers
and very experienced observers assure me--would be a great deal more
popular if it was a trifle less efficient, a trifle more elastic
generally. We ought not to put mechanical efficiency at the head of
our ideas. I am leading up to a practical point. The district officers
representing British rule to the majority of the people of India, are
overloaded with work in their official relations, and I know there are
highly experienced gentlemen who say that a little of the looseness of
earlier days is better fitted than the regular system of latter days,
to win and to keep personal influence, and that we are in danger of
creating a pure bureaucracy. Honourable, faithful, and industrious the
servants of the State in India are and will be, but if the present
system is persisted in, there is a risk of its becoming rather
mechanical, perhaps I might even say rather soulless; and attention to
this is urgently demanded. Perfectly efficient administration, I need
not tell the House, has a tendency to lead to over-centralisation. It
is inevitable. The tendency in India is to override local authority,
and to force administration to run in official grooves. For my own
part I would spare no pains to improve our relations with native
Governments, and more and more these relations may become of potential
value to the Government of India. I would use my best endeavours to
make these States independent in matters of administration. Yet all
evidence tends to show we are rather making administration less
personal, though evidence also tends to show that the Indian people
are peculiarly responsive to sympathy and personal influence. Do not
let us waste ourselves in controversy, here or elsewhere, or in mere
anger; let us try to draw to our side the men who now influence the
people. We have every good reason to believe that most of the people
of India are on our side. I do not say for a moment that they like us.
It does not come easy, in west or east, to like foreign rule. But in
their hearts they know that their solid interest is bound up with the
law and order that we preserve.
There is a Motion on the Paper for an inquiry by means of a
Parliamentary Committee or Royal Commission into the causes at the
root of the dissatisfaction. Now, I have often thought, while at
the India Office, whether it would be a good thing to have the
old-fashioned parliamentary inquiry by committee or commission. I have
considered this, I have discussed it with others; and I have come
to the conclusion that such inquiry would not produce any of the
advantages such as were gained in the old days of old committees, and
certainly would be attended by many drawbacks. But I have determined,
after consulting with the Viceroy, that considerable advantage might
be gained by a Royal Commission to examine, with the experience we
have gained over many years, into this great mischief--for all the
people in India who have any responsibility know that it is a great
mischief--of over-centralisation. It seemed a great mischief to so
acute a man as Sir Henry Maine, who, after many years' experience,
wrote expressing agreement with what Mr. Bright said just before or
just after the Mutiny, that the centralised government of India was
too much power for any one man to work. Now, when two men, singularly
unlike in temperament and training, agreed as to the evil of
centralisation on this large scale, it compels reflection. I will not
undertake at the present time to refer to the Commission the large
questions that were spoken of by Maine and Bright, but I think that
much might be gained by an inquiry on the spot into the working of
centralisation of government in India, and how in the opinions of
trained men here and in India, the mischief might be alleviated. That,
however, is not a question before us now.
You often hear people talk of the educated section of the people of
India as a mere handful, an infinitesimal fraction. So they are,
in numbers; but it is fatally idle to say that this infinitesimal
fraction does not count. This educated section is making and will make
all the difference. That they would sharply criticise the British
system of government has been long known. It was inevitable. There
need be no surprise in the fact that they want a share in political
influence, and want a share in the emoluments of administration. Their
means--many of them--are scanty; they have little to lose and much to
gain from far-reaching changes. They see that the British hand works
the State machine surely and smoothly, and they think, having no fear
of race animosities, that their hand could work the machine as surely
and as smoothly as the British hand.
And now I come to my last point. Last autumn the Governor-General
appointed a Committee of the Executive Council to consider the
development of the administrative machinery, and at the end of March
last he publicly informed his Legislative Council that he had sent
home a despatch to the Secretary of State proposing suggestions for
a move in advance. The Viceroy with a liberal and courageous mind
entered deliberately on the path of improvement. The public in India
were aware of it. They waited, and are now waiting the result with
the liveliest interest and curiosity. Meanwhile the riots happened
in Rawalpindi, in Lahore. After these riots broke out, what was the
course we ought to take? Some in this country lean to the opinion--and
it is excusable--that riots ought to suspend all suggestions and talk
of reform. Sir, His Majesty's Government considered this view, and in
the end they took, very determinedly, the opposite view. They held
that such a withdrawal would, of course, have been construed as a
triumph for the party of sedition. They held that, to draw back on
account of local and sporadic disturbances, however serious, anxious,
and troublesome they might be, would have been a really grave
humiliation. To hesitate to make a beginning with our own policy of
improving the administrative machinery of the Indian Government, would
have been taken as a sign of nervousness, trepidation, and fear; and
fear, that is always unworthy in any Government, is in the Indian
Government, not only unworthy, but extremely dangerous. I hope the
House concurs with His Majesty's Government.
In answer to a Question the other day, I warned one or two of my
hon. friends that, in resisting the employment of powers to suppress
disturbances, under the Regulation of 1818 or by any other lawful
weapon we could find, they were promoting the success of that
disorder, which would be fatal to the very projects with which they
sympathise. The despatch from India reached us in due course. It was
considered by the Council of India and by His Majesty's Government,
and our reply was sent about a fortnight ago. Someone will ask--Are
you going to lay these two despatches on the Table to-day? I hope the
House will not take it amiss if I say that at this stage--perhaps at
all stages--it would be wholly disadvantageous to lay the despatches
on the Table. We are in the middle of the discussion to-day, and it
would break up steady continuity if we had a premature discussion
_coram populo_. Everyone will understand that discussions of this kind
must be very delicate, and it is of the utmost importance that they
should be conducted with entire freedom. But, to employ a word that
I do not often use, I might adumbrate the proposals. This is how
the case stands. The despatch reached His Majesty's Government, who
considered it. We then set out our views upon the points raised in
the despatch. The Government of India will now frame what is called a
Resolution. That draft Resolution, when framed by them in conformity
with the instructions of His Majesty's Government, will in due course
be sent here. We shall consider that draft, and then it will be my
duty to present it to this House if legislation is necessary, as it
will be; and it will be published in India to be discussed there by
all those concerned....
The main proposal is the acceptance of the general principle of
a substantial enlargement of Legislative Councils, both the
Governor-General's Legislative Council and the Provincial Legislative
Councils. Details of this reform have to be further discussed in
consultation with the local Governments in India, but so far it is
thought best in India that an official majority must be maintained.
Again, in the discussion of the Budget in the Viceroy's Council the
subjects are to be grouped and explained severally by the members of
Council in charge of the Departments, and longer time is to be
allowed for this detailed discussion and for general debate. One more
suggestion. The Secretary of State has the privilege of recommending
to the Crown members of the Council of India. I think that the time
has now come when the Secretary of State may safely, wisely, and
justly recommend at any rate one Indian member. I will not discuss the
question now. I may have to argue it in Parliament at a later stage,
but I think it is right to say what is my intention, realising as we
all do how few opportunities the governing bodies have of hearing the
voice of Indians.
I believe I have defended myself from ignoring the principle that
there is a difference between the Western European and the Indian
Asiatic. There is vital difference, and it is infatuation to ignore
it. But there is another vital fact--namely, that the Indian Asiatic
is a man with very vivid susceptibilities of all kinds, and with
living traditions of a civilisation of his own; and we are bound to
treat him with the same kind of respect and kindness and sympathy that
we should expect to be treated with ourselves. Only the other day I
saw a letter from General Gordon to a friend of mine. He wrote--
"To govern men, there is but one way, and it is eternal truth. Get
into their skins. Try to realize their feelings. That is the true
secret of government."
That is not only a great ethical, but a great political law, and we
shall reap a sour and sorry harvest if it is forgotten. It would be
folly to pretend to any dogmatic assurance--and I certainly do not--as
to the course of the future in India. But for to-day anybody who takes
part in the rule of India, whether as a Minister or as a Member of
the House of Commons, participating in the discussion on affairs in
India--anyone who wants to take a fruitful part in such discussions,
if he does his duty will found himself on the assumption that the
British rule will continue, ought to continue, and must continue.
There is, I know, a school,--I do not think it has representatives in
this House--who say that we might wisely walk out of India, and that
the Indians would manage their own affairs better than we can manage
affairs for them. Anybody who pictures to himself the anarchy, the
bloody chaos, that would follow from any such deplorable step, must
shrink from that sinister decision. We, at all events--Ministers and
Members of this House--are bound to take a completely different view.
The Government, and the House in all its parties and groups, is
determined that we ought to face all these mischiefs and difficulties
and dangers of which I have been speaking with a clear purpose. We
know that we are not doing it for our own interest alone, or our own
fame in the history of the civilised world alone, but for the interest
of the millions committed to us. We ought to face it with sympathy,
with kindness, with firmness, with a love of justice, and, whether the
weather be fair or foul, in a valiant and manful spirit.
II
TO CONSTITUENTS
(ARBROATH. OCTOBER 21, 1907)
It is an enormous satisfaction to me to find myself here once more,
the first time since the polling, and since the splendid majority that
these burghs were good enough to give me. I value very much what the
Provost has said, when he told you that I have never, though I have
had pretty heavy burdens, neglected the local business of Arbroath and
the other burghs. The Provost truly said that I hold an important and
responsible office under the Crown; and I hope that fact will be the
excuse, if excuse be needed, for my confining myself to-night to a
single topic. When I spoke to a friend of mine in London the other day
he said, "What are you going to speak about?", and I told him. He is a
very experienced man and he said, "It is a most unattractive subject,
India." At any rate, this is the last place where any apology is
needed for speaking about India, because it is you who are responsible
for my being the Indian Minister. If your 2,500 majority had been
2,500 the other way, I should have been no longer the Indian Minister.
There is something that strikes the imagination, something that
awakens a feeling of the bonds of mankind, in the thought that you
here and in the other burghs--(shipmen, artificers, craftsmen, and
shopkeepers living here)--are brought through me, and through your
responsibility in electing me, into contact with all these hundreds
of millions across the seas. Therefore it is that I will not make any
apology to you for my choice of a subject to-night. Let me say
this, not only to you gentlemen here, but to all British
constituencies--that it is well you should have patience enough to
listen to a speech about India; because it is no secret to anybody who
understands, that if the Government were to make a certain kind of bad
blunder in India--which I do not at all expect them to make--there
would be short work for a long time to come, with many of those
schemes, upon which you have set your heart. Do not dream, if any
mishap of a certain kind were to come to pass in India that you can
go on with that programme of social reforms, all costing money and
absorbing attention, in the spirit in which you are now about to
pursue it.
I am not particularly fond of talking of myself, but there is one
single personal word that I would like to say, and my constituency is
the only place in which I should not be ashamed to say that word. You,
after all, are concerned in the consistency of your representative.
Now I think a public man who spends overmuch time in vindicating
his consistency, makes a mistake. I will confess to you in friendly
confidence, that I have winced when I read of lifelong friends of
mine saying that I have, in certain Indian transactions, shelved the
principles of a lifetime. One of your countrymen said that, like the
Python--that fabulous animal who had the largest swallow that any
creature ever enjoyed--I have swallowed all my principles. I am a
little disappointed at such clatter as this. When a man has laboured
for more years than I care to count, for Liberal principles and
Liberal causes, and thinks he may possibly have accumulated a little
credit in the bank of public opinion--and in the opinion of his party
and his friends--it is a most extraordinary and unwelcome surprise to
him, when he draws a very small cheque indeed upon that capital, to
find the cheque returned with the uncomfortable and ill-omened words,
"No effects." I am not going to defend myself. A long time ago a
journalistic colleague, who was a little uneasy at some line I took
upon this question or that, comforted himself by saying. "Well, well,
the ship (speaking of me) swings on the tide, but the anchor holds."
Yes, gentlemen, I am no Pharisee, but I do believe that my anchor
holds, and your cheers show that you believe it too.