As the present is a work of philosophy, not of theology, I might

pass over without answering the objections of infidelity, but the

occasion seems so well suited for the solution of some difficulties

brought by light and superficial thinkers, that I am unwilling to pass

them in silence. The nature of the work requires me to be brief in

this discussion, though the subject is too important to be entirely

omitted; the more so, as Catholic writers on philosophy have given

their explanations on these points in what they considered the most

seasonable place, and most frequently when treating of extension.

252. That the mystery of the Eucharist is a supernatural fact

incomprehensible to man, and inexplicable by human words, is confessed

by Catholics and acknowledged by the Church. We cannot, therefore, give

a philosophical reason to explain this secret; no one was ever so vain

as to attempt it. We can only examine whether the mystery is absurd

and intrinsically contradictory; for if it were, it would not be a

truth but an error, because divine omnipotence does not extend to what

is absurd. The question is, whether the fact, although beyond the laws

of nature, is intrinsically possible; for then it belongs to the field

of criticism. If the incredulous man admits God, he must admit his

omnipotence; the discussion must then be, not whether God can perform

this miracle, but whether he has performed it.

253. The objections brought against the Eucharist may be reduced to the

following: a body exists without the conditions to which other bodies

are subject; it produces none of the sensible impressions which we

receive from other bodies; and is in many places at the same time. To

answer these objections, let us first determine our ideas.

254. The doctrines explained in the theory of sensations in this

volume, show how false it is to say that the Eucharist is impossible.

Under the sacred species is a body which does not affect our senses;

here is a miracle, but not an impossible thing. I have shown that

there is no necessary relation between bodies and our sensibility. The

connection which now exists cannot be explained by any intrinsical

property of spirits and bodies; we must, therefore, recur to a higher

cause which freely established these relations. The same cause can

suspend them. From this point of view the question becomes this: Can

the power of God make a body which shall not produce the phenomena of

sensibility, and suspend the laws which he was free to establish? Thus

presented, the question cannot bear two answers. It must be answered in

the affirmative, or the omnipotence of God is denied.

255. Those who attempt to show the impossibility of our dogma, must

prove the following propositions:

I. Passive sensibility is so essential to bodies that they cannot lose

it without destroying the principle of contradiction.

II. The relations of our organs [to] objects are intrinsically

immutable.

III. The transmission of the impressions of the organ to the sensitive

faculties of the soul is equally essential, and can fail under no

supposition.

If they do not prove the truth of these three propositions, all the

objections founded on the phenomena of sensibility fall to the ground.

If one only is not proved, all the objections are solved; for it is

evident that the phenomena of sensibility may be altered by three

causes:

I. By the absence of the dispositions necessary to the body, that it

may be the object of sensibility.

II. By the interruption of the ordinary relations between our organs

and the body.

III. By the failure of the transmission of the impressions of the organ

to the sensitive faculties.

Consequently, if one of the first propositions is false, the doubter is

reduced to silence.

256. Whoever should attempt to prove these three propositions, not only

would fail, but the attempt would prove his ignorance of the phenomena

of sensibility, and that his philosophy on this point is the notions of

the vulgar. It is not necessary to be a philosopher, it is sufficient

to have acquired a very slight knowledge of philosophy to see that

such an attempt would suppose a complete ignorance of the history of

philosophy. At any rate, I need not insist on this point; for I have

treated these questions at length in the last two books of this volume.

257. The solution there given ought to suffice to answer satisfactorily

the objection founded on the particular state of a body without the

conditions of extension which we find in others. From the moment

that we suppose the correspondence of a body with our senses to be

suspended, as these are the only means by which we are informed of

what passes in the external world, it is impossible for us to affirm

that there is any absurdity in that of which we have no experience. We

perceive extension only by sensation, therefore we can say nothing in

relation to the extension of an object of which we have no sensation.

But although this answer should cut short all objections, I shall not

confine myself to this alone.

258. What is extension? In reality it is the sum of the relations of

the beings which compose the extended object. These relations, as I

have proved, are not intrinsically necessary: therefore God can alter

them. Thus this question comes to the same point as the preceding:

can the power of God suspend, alter, or entirely take away relations

which are not intrinsically necessary? Evidently it can. The difficulty

then is not as to what could have been, but as to what is. Again we

find ourselves out of the field of philosophy in that of facts, or the

examination of the motives of credibility.

259. The other objection founded on the impossibility of body being in

several places at the same time, though in appearance more difficult,

amounts to the same as the former. To be in a place, as we now

understand it, is to have a particular extension, with the ordinary

form and relations with respect to the extension of other bodies. If

we suppose a body with extension subject to other conditions, without

the ordinary relation to the extension of other bodies, we destroy the

supposition on which we base the impossibility of a body being at the

same time in several places. Therefore, as we have proved that the

omnipotence of God can alter and even take away these relations, there

is no contradiction in admitting the destruction of the results which

proceed from these relations.

260. This is why the distinction of the scholastics between two

classes of extension: _in ordine ad se, et in ordine ad locum_,

or quantitative and sacramental extension, though to the eyes of

a superficial philosophy it might appear to be an empty subtlety,

invented for the purpose of avoiding the difficulty, is nevertheless

a profound observation, confirmed by the analysis of the reality and

the phenomenon in the sensible order. I do not mean by this to say

that when this distinction was made in the schools, they understood

perfectly all the truth and philosophical nicety which it involves; nor

that the distinction was always accompanied by the critical analysis

which belongs to it. At present I abstract the merit of the men and

regard only the thing. The less philosophical intelligence we suppose

in those who used the distinction, the more admirable appears that

religion which inspires its defenders with fruitful thoughts which

the ages to come might unfold. The philosophical schools disputed

warmly on extension, on accidents, and on the sensitive faculties: the

Catholic dogma taught a truth which was contrary to all appearances,

it stimulated them to examine more profoundly the distance of the

phenomenon from the reality, the difference between the contingent

and the necessary; the mystery which the Church taught introduced

into philosophy questions which without it would probably never have

occurred to man's understanding.

261. Bacon expressed a profound truth when he said that a little

philosophy carried its possessor from religion, and a great deal of

philosophy leads him to it. A careful study of the objections brought

against Christianity, lays bare a truth confirmed by the history of

eighteen centuries; the most weighty objections against Catholicity,

instead of proving any thing against it, involve a proof which confirms

it. The secret for discovering this proof, is to go to the bottom of

the objection, and examine it under all its aspects. Original sin is a

mystery, but it explains the whole world; the Incarnation is a mystery,

but it explains the traditions of the human race; faith is full of

mysteries, but it satisfies one of the greatest necessities of reason;

the history of the creation is a mystery, but this mystery clears up

chaos, throws light on the world, and is the key to the history of

mankind; all Christianity is a collection of mysteries, but these

mysteries are connected by a secret union with all that is profound,

grand, sublime, or beautiful in heaven or earth; they are connected

with the individual, with the family, with society, with God, with the

understanding, with the heart, with languages, sciences, and art. The

investigator who rejects religion and even seeks means to oppose it,

finds it at the entrance as at the outlet of the mysterious ways of

life; at the cradle of the infant as in the shadow of the tomb; in time

as in eternity; explaining every thing by a word; listening unmoved to

the wanderings of ignorance and the sarcasms of unbelief, patiently

awaiting till the course of ages shall acknowledge its truth, which

existed before all ages.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

CONCLUSION AND SUMMING UP.

262. Before passing to another subject, let us fix our attention for a

few moments on the nature and origin of the idea of extension. We shall

thus collect the fruit of the preceding investigations, and prepare the

way for those which follow.

The scientific fruitfulness of this idea to our mind proves how

distant sensible impressions are from intellectual perception. We

cannot know whether this idea existed in our mind before the sensible

impression; if it did exist we were not conscious of it, and in this

respect it is affirming a gratuitous proposition to say that it is an

innate idea. What we can safely say, is, that there are two distinct

orders of internal phenomena, that sensation could not have produced

the idea, that this idea is immeasurably superior to the external

impression, or even the internal sensitive intuition, and that if it

did not already exist in the mind, it was not produced by sensation as

an effect is produced by its cause.

263. Here we make an important transition from the order of sensations,

to the order of ideas, and discover in our mind a new class of facts.

It matters little whether these facts exist before the impression,

or result from its presence. In the first case, we see in the mind

a deposit of germs which need only the warmth of life in order to

be developed; in the second, we find in the mind a fertility which

produces these germs. In either case we find a being of a privileged

nature, a sublime being which by a single leap rises above the region

of matter, and awakened by the external impression, arises to a new

life which this world cannot contain.

264. In this sense there are innate ideas; ideas which sensation could

not have produced. In this sense all general and necessary ideas are

innate; for sensation could not produce them. Sensation is never any

thing more than a phenomenon, a particular and contingent fact, and

consequently incapable of producing general ideas, or the ideas of the

necessary relations of being. Sight, or the imaginary representation

of a triangle, is a contingent phenomenon which tells us nothing of

the necessary relations of the sides and angles to each other. In

order to perceive these relations, this necessity, something else is

required. This something else, call it innate ideas, force, fecundity,

or activity of the mind, or any thing you please, exists, and could not

have been produced by sensation, but belongs to a higher order distinct

from sensible phenomena.

265. After such long investigations of the phenomena of sensation, we

at last find an idea; it is the idea of extension, the foundation of

all the mathematical sciences and of their application to the laws of

nature.

The human mind, in all its relations with the material world, seems to

have one great idea, that of extension, which, modified in infinite

ways, is the origin of all the sciences which relate to matter. The

whole material world rests on this idea, and all knowledge of material

objects proceeds from it. It is a pure idea in its necessary relations

and in its necessary branches. It is a light given to the lord of

creation that he may know and admire the prodigies of nature.

266. We find the same wonderful simplicity amidst so complicated a

multiplicity in another order of ideas. Hence we infer that the whole

edifice of the sciences and all human knowledge are founded on a small

number of ideas, perhaps on two alone. These ideas are not sensible

representations, they are the objects of pure intuitions; they cannot

be decomposed, but they may be applied to an infinite variety of

things; they are not explained by words, as a union including various

conceptions; by them a mind acts on another mind, not to teach it any

thing, but to make it concentrate its activity in order to note what

it contains within itself, and learn, in a certain measure, what it

already knows.

Try to explain extension, the idea by which we perceive this order

which we cannot express in words, but on which we found sensible

experience and geometrical science, and you can find no expression.

Will you define it to be "parts outside of parts?" But what are

_parts_, and what does _outside_ mean, if you have not the idea

of extension? Take any extended thing, make your mind concentrate

itself and exercise its activity in generalization. Is this triangle

a quadrilateral? No. Are they both extended? Yes. Is this surface a

solid? No. Are they both extended? Yes. Are all triangles different

from quadrilaterals? Yes. Have all surfaces and solids extension? Yes.

How do you pass from one fact to all the facts of the same kind, from

the contingent to the necessary? Have you explained what extension is?

No. Have you shown what there is common to all these different things?

No. All that you have done then is to arouse the activity of your mind,

and to make it direct its attention to the general idea of extension,

and the mind applies this idea to various things which are different,

yet have something in common, it applies the different modifications of

this idea to various things which have something in common, and finds

them different. You have not taught the truths of geometry to the mind,

but have awakened them in it, whether they already existed in it, or

the mind had the faculty of producing them.

267. Let us now collect the result of the investigations we have made.

I do not give an equal value to all the propositions which follow. I

have explained my opinion of each in its proper place, but I consider

it well to sum them all up here in order to assist the understanding

and help the memory.

I. There is immediate certainty of our relations with beings distinct

from us.

II. There is certainty of the existence of an external world.

III. The external world in relation to us, is only an extended

being which affects us, and is subject to constant laws which we may

determine.

IV. We have the idea of extension.

V. The idea of extension is excited by sensations, but it is not

confounded with them.

VI. The idea of extension is the basis of all our cognitions of bodies.

VII. The idea of extension should not be confounded with the imaginary

representation of extension.

VIII. An extended space which is nothing real, is an absurdity.

IX. Space is nothing real distinguished from the extension of bodies.

X. Where there are no bodies, there are no distances.

XI. Motion is the change of the positions of bodies among themselves.

XII. There is not and cannot be vacuum of any kind.

XIII. The idea of space is the idea of extension in the abstract.

XIV. The imagination of an unlimited space is only an attempt of

the imagination to follow the understanding in the abstraction of

extension. It also arises from our habit of seeing through transparent

mediums, and moving in fluids whose resistance is not perceptible.

XV. As all that we know of bodies is, that they are extended and affect

us, whatever has these two conditions is to us a body.

XVI. But as we do not know the essence of bodies, we do not know

whether a body can exist without extension.

XVII. Neither do we know what modifications the extension of one body

may be subject to, with respect to others.

XVIII. The elements of which bodies are composed are unknown to us.

XIX. The approximation of some bodies to others, and the gravitation

which results from it, seem to be the necessary effect of their present

relations.

XX. The necessity of approximation does not suffice to explain the laws

of motion, or their beginning, or their continuation.

XXI. The idea of space is not an absolutely necessary condition of

sensation.

XXII. The idea of extension has a real objectiveness.

XXIII. The transition from the subjective to the objective in relation

to extension is a primitive fact of our nature.

XXIV. Therefore bodily phenomena have a real existence outside of us.

XXV. Therefore a real certainty, scientific as well as phenomenal,

arises from the testimony of the senses.

XXVI. Reason justifies the instinct of nature when it examines the

relation of subjectiveness with objectiveness in sensations.

XXVII. Geometry considers extension in the abstract; but with the

certainty that when the principle exists in the real order, the

consequences cannot fail to be produced, and that the consequences will

be more or less exact in proportion as the principle is more or less

exactly realized.

XXVIII. Notwithstanding our certainty of the existence of the external

world we do not know its essence.

XXIX. We do not know what this world is when seen by a pure spirit.

XXX. Sensible intuition, to which our geometry relates, does not

constitute the essence of scientific knowledge, and may be separated

from it.

XXXI. A change in the relations of corporeal beings among themselves,

and with our sensitive faculties, is not intrinsically impossible.

NOTES TO BOOK FIRST.

ON CHAPTER I.

(1) We must distinguish between certainty and truth: there are intimate

relations between them, yet they are very different things. Truth is

the conformity of the intellect with the object. Certainty is a firm

assent to a real or apparent truth.

Certainty is not truth, but it must at least have the illusion of

truth. We may be certain of what is false, but not unless we believe it

to be true.

There is no truth so long as there is no judgment; for without judgment

there is only perception, but no comparison of the idea with the thing;

and without comparison there can be neither conformity nor discrepancy.

If we conceive a mountain a thousand miles high, we conceive a thing

that does not exist; but we do not err so long as we do not assert the

existence of the mountain. If we affirm it, there is opposition between

our judgment and the reality: this constitutes error. The object of

the intellect is truth; therefore, we at least require the illusion

of truth in order to be certain: our intellect is weak; hence its

certainty is liable to error. The first is a law of the intellect, the

second a proof of its frailty.

Philosophy, or, rather, man, cannot rest content with appearances,

but demands reality; if any one be convinced that he has only the

appearance, or if he even doubt of it, he loses his certainty, for it

admits appearances only on condition of their being disguised.

ON CHAPTER II.

(2) Even Pyrrho did not doubt of every thing as some pretend; he

admitted sensations so far as passive, and resigned himself to the

consequences of these impressions, and yielded to the necessity of

conforming in practice to what they indicated. No one ever yet denied

appearances: it is reality that is disputed; some hold that man must be

content with saying _it appears_; others that he can go so far as to

say _it is_. It is useful to preserve this distinction, as it prevents

confusion of ideas in the history of philosophy, and conduces to render

clear the question of certainty. Thus of the three questions: is there

certainty? on what is it founded? how is it acquired? the first is

resolved alike by all the schools, so far as it relates to a fact of

our soul: by only admitting appearances, they admit the certainty of

them.

ON CHAPTER III.

(3) In order to form clear ideas of the development of the

understanding, and the other faculties of our soul, the reader may

refer to what we advanced in our work, entitled _The Criterion_, and

particularly to the chapters I., II., III., XII., XIII., XIV., XVIII.,

and XXII.

ON CHAPTER IV.

(4) We subjoin the passages from St. Thomas on the unity and

multiplicity of ideas, to which we referred in the text. We believe the

friends of solid and profound metaphysics will read them with great

pleasure.

"In omnibus enim substantiis intellectualibus, invenitur virtus

intellectiva per influentiam divini luminis. Quod quidem in primo

principio est unum et simplex, et quanto magis creaturæ intellectuales

distant a primo principio, tanto magis dividitur illud lumen, et

diversificatur, sicut accidit in lineis a centro egredientibus. Et inde

est quod Deus per suam essentiam omnia intelligit: superiores autem

intellectualium substantiarum, etsi per plures formas intelligant,

tamen intelligunt per pauciores et magis universales et virtuosiores ad

comprehensionem rerum propter efficaciam virtutis intellectivæ, quæ est

in eis. In inferioribus autem sunt formæ plures et minus universales,

et minus efficaces ad comprehensionem rerum, in quantum deficiunt a

virtute intellectiva superiorum. Si ergo inferiores substantiæ haberent

formas in illa universalitate, in qua habent superiores, quia non sunt

tantæ efficaciæ in intelligendo, non acciperent per eas perfectam

cognitionem de rebus, sed in quadam communitate, et confusione, quod

aliqualiter apparet in hominibus. Nam qui sunt debilioris intellectus,

per universales conceptiones magis intelligentium, non accipiunt

perfectam cognitionem, nisi eis singula in speciali explicentur. (P.

1^n, Q. 89^2, A. 1°.)

"Intellectus quanto est altior et perspicacior tanto ex uno potest

plura cognoscere. Et quia intellectus divinus est altissimus, per

unam simplicem essentiam suam omnia cognoscit; nec est ibi aliqua

pluralitas formarum idealium, nisi secundum diversos respectus divinæ

essentiæ ad res cognitas; sed in intellectu creato multiplicatur

secundum rem quod est unum secundum rem in mente divina, ut non

possit omnia per unum cognoscere; ita tamen quod quanto intellectus

creatus est altior, tanto pauciores habet formas ad plura cognoscenda

efficaces. Et hoc est quod Dio. dicit, 12, cœ. hier. quod superiores

ordines habent scientiam magis universalem in inferioribus. Et in

lib. de causis dicitur, quod intelligentiæ superiores habent formas

magis universales; hoc tamen observato, quod in infimis angelis sunt

formæ adhuc universales in tantum, quod per unam formam possunt

cognoscere omnia individua unius speciei: ita quod illa species sit

propria, uniuscujusque particularium secundum diversos respectus ejus

ad particularia, sicut essentia divina efficitur propria similitudo

singulorum secundum diversos respectus; sed intellectus humanus qui

est ultimus in ordine substantiarum intellectualium habet formas

in tantum particulatas quod non potest per unam speciem nisi unum

quid cognoscere. Et ideo similitudo speciei existens in intellectu

humano non sufficit ad cognoscenda plura singularia; et propter hoc

intellectui adjuncti sunt sensus quibus singularia accipiat. (Quodlib.

7, A. 3.)

"Respondeo dicendum, quod ex hoc sunt in rebus aliqua superiora, quod

sunt uni primo, quod est Deus, propinquiora et similiora. In Deo

autem tota plenitudo intellectualis cognitionis continetur in uno,

scilicet in essentia divina, per quam Deus omnia cognoscit. Quæ quidem

intelligibilis plentitudo, in intelligibilibus creaturis inferiori

modo et minus simpliciter invenitur. Unde oportet, quod ea quæ Deus

cognoscit per unam, inferiores intellectus cognoscant per multa; et

tanto amplius per plura, quanto amplius intellectus inferior fuit. Sic

igitur quanto angelus fuerit superior, tanto per pauciores species

universitatem intelligibilium apprehendere poterit, et ideo oportet

quod ejus formæ sint universaliores, quasi ad plura se extendentes

unaquæque eorum. Et de hoc, exemplum aliqualiter in nobis perspici

potest: sunt enim quidam, qui veritatem intelligibilem capere non

possunt; nisi eis particulatim per singula explicatur. Et hoc quidem ex

debilitate intellectus eorum contingit. Alii vero qui sunt fortioris

intellectus, ex paucis multo capere possunt." (P.1^a, Q. 55^a A. 3°.)

ON CHAPTER V.

(5) Here is the idea of Condillac's man-statue explained by himself:

"To gain this object we imagined a statue internally organized like

ourselves, and animated with a mind deprived of every sort of ideas. We

also supposed its exterior composed wholly of marble, to allow it the

use of none of its senses, and we reserved to ourselves the liberty to

open them at our pleasure to the different impressions of which they

are susceptible.

"We thought we ought to commence with _smell_, because of all the

senses this is the one which least contributes to cognitions of the

mind. Next we had to examine the others, and after having considered

them apart and together, we saw the statue become an animal able to

attend to its own preservation.

"The principle that determines the development of its faculties is

simple; even sensations contain it; for, all being of necessity either

agreeable or the contrary, the statue is interested in enjoying some

and shunning others. The reader will now be convinced that this

interest suffices to give occasion to the gradations of the will and

the understanding. Judgments, reflection, desires, passions, are only

sensations variously transformed. This is why it seemed to us useless

to suppose the soul to have received immediately from nature all the

sensations with which it is endowed. Nature has given us organs which

show us by pleasure or pain what we ought to seek or to avoid; but here

she stops, and leaves to experience the task of leading us to contract

habits, and finish the work she has commenced.

"This object is new, and shows all the simplicity of the ways of the

Author of nature. Is it not a thing worthy of our admiration thus to

see, from man's sensibility to pleasure or pain, spring up in him

ideas, desires, habits, and talents of various kinds?"--_Traite des

Sensations._ _Dessein de l'ouvrage._

What we admire in Condillac is not his system, but his candor; and

we wonder yet more that, for a time, he should have had numerous

followers of his so poor and superficial system. The author proposes

the difficulty, that as there is in our soul nothing but transformed

sensations, it is strange that brutes, which also have sensations,

should not be endowed with the same faculties as man. Can the reader

imagine what profound reason the French philosopher assigned? We doubt

it very much. It is a curious thought: "the organ of _touch_ is _less

perfect_ in brutes, and consequently it cannot be to them an occasional

cause of all the operations which we observe in ourselves." He did well

to adopt the motto: _nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo!_

ON CHAPTER VI.

(6) The works of the scholastics are worth reading on these points.

Treating of _the object of science_, they are at once exact and

profound. It is not easy to think of any thing concerning the

classification of truths not explained or indicated by them.

ON CHAPTER VII.

(7) Let us not be thought to judge too severely of the forms adopted

by the German philosophers. It is well known how Madame de Staël

speaks of them; but happily we can cite in our favor a more competent

judge. Schelling, one of the chiefs of German philosophy, says: "The

Germans have so long philosophized among themselves, as to gradually

depart more and more, in their thoughts and their words, from what

is universally intelligible; and the degree of departure therefrom

has almost come at last to be the measure of philosophical ability.

Examples are not wanting to us. As families which separate from general

society, and live wholly among themselves, among other repulsive

singularities, come to use expressions intelligible only to themselves,

so is it with the Germans in philosophy; and after vain efforts to

spread the Kantian philosophy out of Germany, they renounced the

attempt to make themselves intelligible to other nations; they became

accustomed to regard themselves as the chosen people of philosophy,

forgetting that the primary end of philosophy,--an end often neglected,

but not the less to be sought for on that account,--is to gain

universal consent, by making themselves universally intelligible. This

is not to say that we must judge works of thought like exercises in

style; but all philosophy not intelligible to all civilized nations,

and accessible in every language, cannot, for this reason alone, be the

universal and true philosophy."--_Schelling's Judgment of V. Cousin,

and the state of French and German Philosophy in general._ 1834. p. 4.

Schelling flatters himself that German philosophy is about to take a

better course with respect to clearness, and adds: "The philosophical

writer who, for tens of years past, was unable to depart from the terms

and forms of the school, without loss of his scientific reputation, may

hereafter emancipate himself from this restraint. He will seek depth of

thought; and an absolute incapacity to express himself with clearness,

will no longer be regarded as the mark of talent and philosophical

inspiration." We have nothing to add to this passage; we would only

remind its author that: _mutato nomine, de te fabula narratur_.

ON CHAPTER VIII.

(8) The perusal of Schelling's work on Ideal Transcendentalism leaves

no doubt as to his view of this identity, which at bottom neither is

nor can be any thing else than pantheism; yet, for the sake of truth,

we will allow that Schelling seems to have modified his doctrine, or

to have feared its consequences, if we are to consider the indications

found in his discourse at the opening of his course of philosophy,

at Berlin, the 13th of November, 1841. We there find the following

passage, worthy of the attention of all thinking men: "The difficulties

and obstacles of all kinds, against which philosophy contends are

visible, and in vain would we attempt to dissemble them. Never was

there a more powerful reaction against philosophy on the part of real

and active life than at this present epoch; and this proves philosophy

to have penetrated even to the vital questions of society, those

concerning which no one can rest indifferent. So long as a philosophy

is only in the first stages of formation, taking the first steps in its

march, no one cares for it, except philosophers themselves; other men

await the last word of philosophy, since it is important to the general

public only in its results.

"We confess that we ought not to take as the practical result of a

solid and profoundly meditated philosophy whatever it may please any

body to designate as such: were it so, the world would be subjected

to doctrines the most repugnant to sound morality, even such as sap

its foundation. No! No one judges of philosophy by the practical

conclusions drawn by ignorance or presumption. Moreover, lest deception

on this point be possible, the public should reject a philosophy

which has such results, without examining or even judging it in its

principles; it should say that it cannot understand the depth of these

questions, or the artificial and intricate march of the arguments;

but without pausing here it should promptly decide that a philosophy

leading to such conclusions cannot be true in its principles. What the

Roman moralist said of the useful: _nihil utile nisi quod honestum_,

is equally applicable to the investigation of truth: _no philosophy

that respects itself will allow that it leads to irreligion_. Yet

actual philosophy is in such a state, that, however much it promises

a religious result, no one admits it; for deductions drawn from it

convert the dogmas of the Christian religion into a vain phantasmagory.

"As to this, some of its most faithful disciples are openly agreed; be

the suspicion well founded or not, its existence suffices, and this

opinion is established.

"But active life in the last result is always right; and so philosophy

is exposed to great risks. They who war on one philosophy are not far

from condemning all philosophy; they say in their heart, there is no

longer philosophy in the world. I myself am not exempt from these

condemnations, since _it is pretended that it is I, who first gave

impulse to this philosophy which is at present so badly judged of,

because of its religious results_.

"How shall I defend myself? Certainly I would never attack a philosophy

for its last results; but I would judge it in its first principles, as

every philosophical mind should. It is moreover well enough known that

I have shown myself little satisfied with the philosophy of which I

speak.

* * * * *

"The moral and spiritual worlds are so divided that any point of union

for an instant should be a motive of satisfaction. Besides to destroy,

is a very sad thing when there is nothing wherewith to replace the

thing destroyed. 'Do it better yourself,' we say to one who can do

nothing but criticize.

* * * * *

"I therefore consecrate myself entirely to the mission with which I

am charged; for you I will live; for you I will labor without ceasing

while there remains in me the breath of life, and while He permits

me, without whose permission not a hair can fall from our head, and

yet less a deeply felt word proceed from our mouth. He, without whose

inspiration not one lucid idea can shine on our mind, nor one thought

of truth and liberty illumine our soul."

This passage shows the embarrassment of the German philosopher's

position, and the irreligious consequences attached to his doctrines.

It is consoling to see him pay some homage to truth; but it is

afflicting to see him still pretend to save its inconsequence.

ON CHAPTER IX.

(9) In these latter days there have not been wanting some to count

the illustrious Malebranche among the partisans of pantheism. We

cannot conceive how M. Cousin could say; "Malebranche est avec

Spinoza le plus grand disciple de Descartes. Comme lui il a tiré des

principes de leur commun maître les conséquences que ces principes

renfermaient. Malebranche est à la lettre Spinoza chrétien."

(_Fragments Philosophiques._ T. 2^{me}. p. 167. Ed. 3^{ieme}.) We

repeat that we cannot conceive how any one, who had read ever so little

of the great metaphysician's works, should assert such a paradox. The

slightest glance at his writings suffices to show in them the most

lofty spiritualism united with profound respect for the dogmas of

our most holy religion. When we treat of the various philosophical

systems of the origin of ideas and the problem of the universe, we

shall have other occasions to vindicate the wise and pious author of

the _Investigation de la Verité_. Yet we were unwilling to pass by

the present occasion without doing him the justice to defend him from

imputations, which he would, were he living, repel as intolerable

calumnies. Who would have thought when he wrote those works, on every

page of which we find, God, the mind, the Christian religion, eternal

truth, and original sin, with frequent texts from the sacred Scriptures

and St. Augustine, that he would ever be ranked with Spinoza, with

the absurd epithet of _Christian Spinoza_? Such is at times the sad

lot of great men, thus to be held as chiefs of sects they abhorred.

Malebranche styled Spinoza, _l'impie de nos jours_, and M. Cousin dares

call Malebranche the _Christian_ Spinoza.

ON CHAPTER X.

(10) We are not ignorant of the difficulties to which Leibnitz's

systems are subject; but it is necessary to show that in this great

man's mind the erroneous doctrines of modern Germans had no place. "Et

c'est ainsi," he says, in his Monadologie (No. 38), "que la dernière

raison des choses doit être dans une substance necessaire, dans

laquelle le détail des changmens ne soit qu'eminemment, comme dans la

source, et c'est ce que nous appelons Dieu. Or cette substance étant

une raison suffisante de tout ce détail, lequel est aussi lié partout,

il n'y a qu'un Dieu, et ce Dieu suffit.

"On peut juger aussi que cette substance suprême qui est unique,

universelle, et necessaire, n'ayant rien hors d'elle qui en soit

indépendant, et étant une suite simple de l'être possible, doit être

incapable de limites et contenir tout autant de realité qu'il est

possible.

"D'où il s'ensuit, que Dieu est absolument parfait, la perfection

n'étant autre chose, que la grandeur de la realité positive prise

précisément en mettant à part les limites ou bornes dans les choses qui

en ont. Et là, où il n'y a point de bornes, c'est-à-dire, en Dieu, la

perfection est absolument infinie.

"Il s'ensuit aussi que les créatures ont leur perfections de

l'influence de Dieu, mais qu'elles ont leurs imperfections de leur

nature propre, incapable d'être sans bornes. Car c'est en cela qu'elles

sont distinguées de Dieu.

"Il est vrai aussi, qu'en Dieu est non seulement la source des

existences, mais encore celle des essences, en tant que réelles, ou de

ce qu'il y a de réel dans la possibilité."

In his dissertation on the Platonic philosophy he combats the

pantheistic tendencies of Valentine Weigel, in these words:

"Valentinum Weigelium, qui non tantum vitam beatam peculiari libero

per Deificationem explicat, sed et passim mortem et quietem hujusmodi

commendat, vellem cum aliis Quietistis suspicionem similis sententiæ

non dedisse. * * * Spinoza aliter eodem tendebat; ei una substantia

est, Deus; creaturæ ejus modificationes, et figuræ in cera continue per

motum nascentes et pereuntes. Ita ipsi, perinde ut Almerico, anima non

superest, nisi per suum _esse_ ideale in Deo ut ibi ab æterno fuit.

"Sed nihil in Platone animadverto, unde colligam, animos propriam

sibi substantiam non servare; quod etiam sane philosophanti extra

controversiam est, neque intelligi contraria potest sententia, nisi

Deum et animam corporea fingas, neque enim aliter ex Deo animas,

tanquam particulas divellas; sed talis de Deo atque anima notio,

aliunde absurda est." (Leibnitz. Epist. ad Hanschium de Philos. Platon.)

So far was Leibnitz from deeming the tendency to pantheism an elevated

philosophy, that, as we have just seen, he considered it the result

of a rude imagination. It is very remarkable that under an historical

as under a metaphysical aspect Leibnitz agrees with St. Thomas; both

express the same ideas in very similar words. The holy doctor asks if

the soul is made from the substance of God, and there takes occasion

to examine the origin of the error, and says: "Respondeo dicendum,

quod dicere animam esse de substantia Dei, manifestam improbabilitatem

continet. Ut enim ex dictis patet, anima humana est quandoque

intelligens in potentia, et scientiam quodammodo a rebus acquirit, et

habet diversas potentias; quæ omnia aliena sunt a Dei natura, qui est

actus purus, et nihil ab alio accipiens, et nullam in se diversitatem

habens, ut supra probatum est.

"Sed hic error principium habuisse videtur ex duabus positionibus

antiquorum. Primi enim, qui naturas rerum considerare inceperunt,

imaginationem transcendere non valentes, nihil præter corpora esse

posuerunt. Et ideo Deum dicebant esse quoddam corpus, quod aliorum

corporum judicabant esse principium. Et quia animam ponebant esse de

natura illius corporis, quod dicebant esse principium, ut dicitur

in primo de anima, per consequens sequebatur quod anima esset de

substantia Dei. Juxta quam positionem etiam Manichæi, Deum esse quamdam

lucem corpoream existimantes, quandam partem illius lucis animam esse

posuerunt corpori alligatam. Secundo vero processum fuit ad hoc quod

aliqui aliquid incorporeum esse apprehenderunt; non tamen a corpore

separatum, sed corporis formam. Unde et Varro dixit quod Deus est

anima, mundum intuitu, vel motu et ratione gubernans: ut Augu. narrat 7

de Civit. Dei. Sic igitur illius totalis animæ partem, aliqui posuerunt

animam hominis: sicut homo est pars totius mundi; non valentes

intellectu pertingere ad distinguendos spiritualium substantiarum

gradus, nisi secundum distinctiones corporum. Hæc autem sunt omnia

impossibilia, ut supra probatum est, unde manifeste falsum est animam

esse de substantia Dei." (P. 1^a, Q. 90^a, A. 1^o.)

ON CHAPTER XI.

(11) We often find the intellect identified by the scholastics with

the thing known, even when they treat of created intellects; but this

identity is limited to the purely ideal order, and denotes only the

intimate union of the idea and the intellect. It is well known what

importance they attached to matters and forms; and this distinction

is also applied to the phenomena of intelligence. Although the idea

was considered as a thing distinct from the intellect, yet, as

the intellect is perfected by it, and placed in relation with the

thing represented, they said that the intellect was the same as the

thing known. We must thus explain passages in St. Thomas and other

scholastics, since, although their expressions, if considered in

isolation, would be inexact, they are not so, if regard be had to the

meaning which they attributed to them, and which clearly follows from

their fundamental principles. Thus St. Thomas (Quodlibet. 7 A. 2), to

prove that the created intellect cannot know many things at the same

time, says:

"Sed quod intellectus simul intelligat plura intelligibilia, primo

et principaliter, est impossibile. Cujus ratio est quia _intellectus

secundum actum est omnino, id est, perfecte res intellecta_: ut dicitur

in 3 de anima. _Quod quidem intelligendum est non quod essentia

intellectus fiat res intellecta_ vel species ejus; sed quia complete

informatur per speciem rei intellectæ, dum eam actu intelligit. Unde

intellectum simul plura intelligere primo, idem est ac si res una simul

esset plura. In rebus enim materiabilus videmus quod una res numero non

potest esse simul plura in actu, sed plura in potentia.

* * * * *

"Unde patet quod sicut una res materialis non potest esse simul plura

actu, ita unus intellectus non potest simul plura intelligere primo.

Et hoc est quod Alga, dicit, quod sicut unum corpus non potest simul

figurari pluribus figuris; ita unus intellectus non potest simul plura

intelligere. Nec potest dici quod intellectus informatur perfecte

simul pluribus speciebus intelligibilibus, sicut unum corpus simul

informatur figura et colore; quia figura et color non sunt formæ

unius generis, nec in eodem ordine accipiuntur quia non ordinantur ad

perficiendum in esse unius rationis; sed omnes formæ intelligibiles in

quantum hujusmodi, sunt unius generis, et in eodem ordine se habent ad

intellectum, in quantum perficiunt intellectum in hoc quod est esse

intellectum in actu. Unde plures species intelligibiles se habent sicut

figuræ plures, vel plures colores, qui simul in actu in eodem esse non

possunt secundum idem."

By the first passage, we see that the meaning of identity of the

intellect with the thing known, is the same as explained in the

beginning of this note; to wit, the intimate union of the idea

of intelligible species with the intellect, as the form with its

matter,--a form which perfects the intellect, makes it pass from

potentiality to actuality, and places it in relation with the thing

represented.

ON CHAPTER XII.

(12) The doctrine of immediate intelligibility is susceptible of still

further illustration; but as this cannot be clearly done without

examining at length the nature of ideas, which does not pertain to our

present treatise, we shall reserve it for its proper place.

ON CHAPTER XIII.

(13) Enough, perhaps, was not said in the text to enable all readers to

form clear and complete ideas of the representation of causality; but

this doctrine, as regards the first intelligence, is closely allied to

the questions on the foundation of the possibility even of non-existent

things,--questions which we cannot here investigate without reversing

the order of subjects.

ON CHAPTER XIV.

(14) The distinction of geometrical and non-geometrical orders of ideas

is of the utmost importance in ideology. We have given this distinction

in order that the examination of a truth fundamental among purely ideal

truths might not remain incomplete. But its explanation and foundation

will be given in our treatise on the of space and extension.

ON CHAPTER XV.

(15) The word _instinct_, when applied to the intellect, is clearly

taken in a different sense than it is when applied to irrational

animals. It has here no ignoble meaning; and this is in accordance with

the use made of it when divine things are spoken of. One meaning given

it by the dictionary is, "_impulse, or movement of the Holy Ghost, in

speaking of supernatural inspirations_." The Latin, _instinctus_, means

_inspiration_. Thus: "Sacro mens _instincta_ furore."

ON CHAPTER XVI.

(16) The confusion of ideas upon this point originates in that tendency

to unity of which we spoke in our Fourth Chapter. We first suppose

there must be one only principle, and we ask what it is; whereas,

before inquiring what it is, we should ascertain if there be one only,

as is supposed. We have already seen that Fichte's system rested on the

same supposition. Thus the cause of innocent disputes in the schools

may lead to more transcendental errors.

ON CHAPTER XVII.

(17) We have, we think, faithfully interpreted the thought of

Descartes, but lest there should be some doubt as to this, we subjoin

a notable passage from his answer to the objections collected by _Père

Mersenne_ from various philosophers and theologians, against the

Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Meditations.

"When we know that we are something that thinks, this first notion _is

taken from no syllogisms_; and when any one says: _I think, therefore

I am_, or exist, _he does not infer_ his existence from thought, as

_by the force of a syllogism_, but as a thing known by itself; _he

sees it by a simple inspection of the mind_; for if he deduced it from

a syllogism, he would have to know beforehand this major; whatever

thinks, is, or exists. On the contrary, this proposition is manifested

to him by his own sentiment that he cannot think without existing. It

is a property characteristic of our mind to form general propositions

from the knowledge of particular propositions." Descartes does not

always explain himself with this clearness; the objections of his

adversaries made him examine his doctrine more thoroughly, and this

contributed to clear up his ideas.

ON CHAPTER XVIII.

(18) To form an accurate estimate of Descartes' views, let us listen to

his own explanation of his system.

"As the senses sometimes deceive us, I wished to _suppose_ that nothing

of what they make us imagine appeared; as there are men who are

deceived, and make paralogisms even when reasoning upon the simplest

matters of geometry, I judged myself as liable to err as they are,

and I rejected as false all those reasons I had before held to be

demonstrations; and also considering that even the thoughts which we

have while awake may come to us while asleep, although no one of

them may be true, I resolved to _feign_ that all things which had

entered my mind contained no more truth than illusory dreams. But I

immediately observed that, while I wished to think that every thing

was false, it was necessary for me, who thought this, to be something;

and, noting that this truth: I think, therefore I am, was so firm and

secure, that the most extravagant suppositions could not shake it, I

judged that I might, without scruple, receive it as the first truth of

philosophy."--_Discours sur la Méthode._ P. 4^{ieme.}

We said that the doubt of Descartes was a _supposition_, a _fiction_,

and these are the very terms he himself uses. In his reply to the

objections of _Père Mersenne_, we find the following confirmatory

extract: "I have read with great satisfaction your observations upon my

treatise on philosophy, for they show your good-will towards me, your

piety towards God, and your zeal for the advance of his glory. I cannot

but rejoice that you have judged my arguments worthy of your criticism,

but also that you say nothing not easily answerable.

"In the first place, you remind me that I have rejected the ideas

of phantasms of bodies, _not truly, but only by a mere fiction_, in

order to conclude that I am something that thinks, fearing, perhaps,

that I should believe it followed from this that I am only something

that thinks; but I have already shown, in my Second Meditation, that

I agreed with this, and I said: 'But these things, which I _suppose_

not to be, because I do not know them, may not really be any thing

different from me who know them; of this I can say nothing, I have at

present nothing to do with it.'" * * * * * * *

We here see that Descartes did not deny his doubt to be a mere fiction;

he even says that he does nothing but apply a method, the necessity of

which all philosophers admit.

"I pray you," he continues, "to remember that with respect to matters

of the will, I have always made a broad distinction between the

contemplation of truth and the uses of life; as regards the latter, I

am so far from thinking that we must follow only things very clearly

known, that I believe we must not always consider even what is most

probable, but that we must, among things wholly unknown or uncertain,

sometimes choose one, and hold firmly to it, so long as we see no

reason for not doing so, just as if we had chosen it from evident and

certain motives, as I have already explained in the _Discours sur la

Méthode_; but when we treat only of the contemplation of truth, _who

ever doubted that it was necessary to suspend the judgment upon things

that are obscure or not distinctly known_?"

In what, then, consists Descartes' merit? In having _applied_ a

rule known to all, and employed by few, and in so doing at the very

time that prejudices in favor of the Aristotelian doctrine were the

strongest. Descartes plainly says so; his method of doubting is not

new, only the application of it was wanting; for, as regards its

fundamental principle, "who ever doubted that it was necessary to

suspend the judgment upon things that are obscure or not distinctly

known?"

Understanding Descartes' method in this sense, that is, taking the

doubt as a supposition, a mere fiction, it is not opposed to sound

religious and moral principles. The profound philosopher does not seem

to disdain to set his readers at rest upon this point; he ingenuously

shows, in commencing his investigations, that his religious belief was

safe. "Finally, as before undertaking to rebuild the house wherein one

lives, it is not enough to demolish the old one, and provide materials

and workmen, or to exercise one's self in architecture, and to

carefully trace the design of the new house; but it is also necessary

to have another house in which to live, while the new one is building;

so that my actions might not be unresolved, like my judgments, and

that I might, in the meantime, live as happily as possible, I made a

provision for myself; it consists of three or four maxims. The first

is, to observe the laws and customs of my country, _and constantly

to preserve the religion in which, by the grace of God, I have been

instructed from my infancy_. * * * * * * After having assured myself of

these maxims, and laid them aside with _the truths of faith which have

always been first in my belief_, I judged that I might freely reject

the rest of my opinions."--_Discours sur la Méthode_, P. 3^{ieme.}

ON CHAPTER XIX.

(19) With respect to the distinction between the testimony of

consciousness and that of evidence, as in the analysis of the

proposition: I think, therefore I am; there can be no doubt that

Descartes did not express himself with sufficient precision and

exactness. See, for example, this extract: "After this, I considered

in general what is necessary for a proposition to be true and certain;

for, although I had not yet met such a one, I nevertheless thought I

ought to know in what this certainty consisted; and observing that

in the proposition, I think, therefore I am, there is nothing to

assure me of its truth, except the clear perception that in order

to think I must be, I judged that I could take it to be a general

rule that things clearly and distinctly conceived are all true; only

there is some difficulty in ascertaining what things we do distinctly

conceive."--_Discours sur la Méthode._ Partie 4^{me}.

ON CHAPTER XX.

(20) The _apodictical_ certainty of which Kant speaks in the passage

cited, is the result of the intrinsic evidence of ideas, or, in other

words, it is what the schoolmen called metaphysical certainty.

ON CHAPTER XXI.

(21) Besides the questions on the principle of contradiction as the

only foundation of certainty, there are others as to its scientific

utility and importance. We shall, when we come to treat of the idea of

_being_ in general, examine these points at length; wherefore we will

now pass them by.

ON CHAPTER XXII.

(22) We see by a passage from the fourth part of the _Discourse on

Method_, by Descartes, cited in note xv., that besides the principle,

I think, therefore I am, he admitted the principle of the legitimacy

of evidence; for, asking what is necessary in order that a proposition

may be true and certain, he says, that having remarked that if he was

certain of the truth of this proposition (I think, therefore I am),

he was so only because he saw it to be so; he believed that he could

take it to be a general rule _that things known clearly and distinctly

are all true_. This shows two principles, closely connected, although

very unlike, to enter into Descartes' system. The first is the fact

of consciousness of thought; the second is the general rule of the

legitimacy of the criterion of evidence.

It is also to be remarked that there is here some confusion of ideas,

which we have already pointed out. It is not exact to say that the

principle, I think, therefore I am, is evident: the evidence relates to

the _consequence_; but there is, properly speaking, no evidence of the

act of thought, excepting consciousness. Evidence is a criterion, but

not the only one.

ON CHAPTER XXIII.

(23) What we have said of the second proposition of this chapter is

independent of the mode in which the soul and body exercise their

mutual influence. These questions belong elsewhere. This influence is,

in every system, a fact attested by experience; and this is all that is

needed for what we propose to establish here.

ON CHAPTER XXIV.

(24) For the better understanding of what we have said in this chapter

on evidence, it will be well to consider what will be advanced in

chapters XXVI. to XXXI., inclusive.

ON CHAPTER XXV.

(25) What has been said in this chapter shows the truth of what we said

in the twenty-fourth chapter, upon the connection of the different

criteria, and the necessity of not confining one's self to an exclusive

philosophy. Consciousness serves as the basis of the other criteria,

as an indispensable fact; but if we deny the others, we also deny

consciousness.

ON CHAPTERS XXVI., XXVII., AND XXVIII.

(26) Dugald Stewart in his _Elements of the Philosophy of the

Human Mind_, (P. II., C. II., Section 3, §2,) cites a passage from

a dissertation printed at Berlin in 1764, which does not appear

so unreasonable as he pretends. We subjoin it, because the German

philosopher's opinion seems to us the same that we gave in the text.

"Omnes mathematicorum propositiones sunt identicæ et representantur hac

formula, A=A. Sunt veritates identicæ, sub varia forma expressæ, imo

ipsum quod dicitur contradictionis principium vario modo enuntiatum

et involutum; si quidem omnes hujus generis propositiones revera in

eo continentur. Secundum nostram autem intelligendi facultatem ea est

propositionum differentia, quod quædam longa ratiociniorum serie,

alia autem breviore via, ad primum omnium principiorum reducantur, et

in illud resolvantur. Sic. v. g. propositio 2+2=4 statim huc cedit:

1+1+1+1=1+1+1+1; id est, idem est idem; et, proprie loquendo, hoc modo

enuntiari debet,--si contingat adesse vel existere quatuor entia, tum

existunt quatuor entia; nam de existentia non agunt geometræ, sed

ea hypothetice tantum subintelligitur. Inde summa oritur certitudo

ratiocinia perspicienti; observat nempe idearum identitatem; et hæc est

evidentia assensum immediate cogens, quam mathematicam aut geometricam

vocamus. Mathesi tamen sua natura priva non est et propria; oritur

etenim ex identitatis perceptione, quæ locum habere potest, etiamsi

ideæ non repræsentent extensum."

ON CHAPTERS XXX AND XXXI.

(27) We have shown that Dugald Stewart had perhaps in view Vico's

doctrine; but without wishing to bring against him the charge he

brought against his master, Reid, that of resuscitating the doctrines

of the Jesuit Buffier, we would, in order that the reader may judge

with full knowledge of the cause, subjoin a remarkable extract from

the Scotch philosopher, which will show coincidence between some of

his doctrines and those of the Neapolitan. Had Stewart read Vico,

we are inclined to believe that he would not have complained of

the _confusion_ with which various ancient and modern authors have

explained this doctrine.

"The peculiarity of that species of evidence which is called

demonstrative, and which so remarkably distinguishes our mathematical

conclusions from those to which we are led in other branches of

science, is a fact which must have arrested the attention of every

person who possesses the slightest acquaintance with the elements of

geometry. And yet, I am doubtful if a satisfactory account has hitherto

been given of the circumstance in which it arises. Mr. Locke tells us,

that 'what constitutes a demonstration is intuitive evidence of every

step;' and I readily grant, that if in a single step such evidence

should fail, the other parts of the demonstration would be of no value.

It does not, however, seem to me that it is on this consideration that

the demonstrative evidence of the conclusion depends, not even when

we add to it another which is much insisted on by Dr. Reid,--that

'in demonstrative evidence our first principles must be intuitively

certain.' The inaccuracy of this remark I formerly pointed out when

treating of the evidence of axioms; on which occasion I also observed,

that the first principles of our reasonings in mathematics are not

axioms, but definitions. It is in this last circumstance (I mean the

peculiarity of reasoning from definitions) that the true theory of

mathematical demonstration is to be found; and I shall accordingly

endeavor to explain it at considerable length, and to state some of the

more important consequences to which it leads.

"That I may not, however, have the appearance of claiming, in behalf

of the following discussion, an undue share of originality, it is

necessary for me to remark that the leading idea which it contains has

been repeatedly started, and even to a certain length prosecuted, by

different writers, ancient as well as modern; but that, in all of them,

it has been so blended with collateral considerations, although foreign

to the point in question, as to divert the attention both of writer and

reader, from that single principle on which the solution of the problem

hinges. * * * * * * *

"It was already remarked, in the first chapter of this part, that

whereas, in all other sciences, the propositions which we attempt

to establish, express facts real or supposed,--in mathematics, the

propositions which we demonstrate only assert a connection between

certain suppositions and certain consequences. Our reasonings,

therefore, in mathematics, are directed to an object essentially

different from what we have in view, in any other employment of our

intellectual faculties;--not to ascertain truths with respect to

actual existences, but to trace the logical filiation of consequences

which follow from an assumed hypothesis. If, from this hypothesis,

we reason with correctness, nothing, it is manifest, can be wanting

to complete the evidence of the result; as this result only asserts

a necessary connection between the supposition and the conclusion.

In the other sciences, admitting that every ambiguity of language

were removed, and that every step of our deductions were rigorously

accurate, our conclusions would still be attended with more or less of

uncertainty, being ultimately founded on principles which may, or may

not, correspond exactly with the fact." (_Elements of the Philosophy of

the Human Mind._ P. II., C. II., S. 3, § 1.)

This is exactly Vico's doctrine of the cause of the difference in the

degrees of evidence and certainty; although he makes a general system,

in order to explain the problem of intelligence, what the Scotchman

only assigns as a fact to show the reason of mathematical evidence.

Père Buffier (Trait. des prem. Vérités, P. I., C. II.) explains the

same thing with great clearness.

We have said that, considering the indefatigable laboriousness which

distinguishes the Germans, it would not be strange if they had read the

scholastics. In confirmation of this, we notice that Leibnitz urgently

recommends the reading of them, and the more modern Germans are not

likely to forget the advice of so able an author.

Among various passages of Leibnitz, we select the following extract,

because it seems to us rather curious: "Truth is more spread than one

would believe; but it is often colored, also often covered over, and

even weakened, mutilated, and corrupted by additions which spoil it,

or render it less useful. By observing the traces of truth in the

ancients, or, to speak more generally, in all who have preceded us,

we dig gold from dirt, and draw the diamond from its mine, light from

darkness, and this would really be _perennis quædam Philosophia_.

"It may even be said that some progress would be observable in

knowledge. The Orientals have great and beautiful ideas of the

Divinity; the Greeks added reasoning and a form of science; the Fathers

of the Church rejected whatever was bad in Greek philosophy; but the

scholastics labored to usefully employ whatever was acceptable in

Pagan philosophy. I have frequently said: _aurum latere in stercore

illo scholastico barbariei_, and I wish we could find some one versed

in the Irish and Spanish philosophy, to cull from it what is good; I am

sure he would find his labor repaid by many and beautiful truths. There

was once a Swiss who _mathematized_ scholastically; his works are but

little known; although, from what I have seen of them, I should judge

them to be profound and worthy of consideration." (Lettre 3^{ieme} à M.

Remond de Montmort.)

Thus speaks Leibnitz, one of the most eminent men of modern times, and

of whom Fontenelle said: "He led the van in all the sciences." See,

then, if he was wrong in recommending the study of those authors to all

desirous of acquiring a profound knowledge of philosophy. This study,

setting aside its intrinsic utility, is of great advantage in judging,

with knowledge of the cause, a school, which, whatever its worth,

occupies a page in the history of the human mind.

ON CHAPTER XXXII.

(28)The author to whom I allude (317) is Fenelon, who, under the name

of common sense, includes also the criterion of evidence, as may be

seen by this extract: "What is common sense? Does it not consist in

the first notions which all men have of the same things? This common

sense, which always and everywhere is the same, which precedes all

examination, and even holds it in ridicule on certain questions, in

which one laughs instead of examining; which renders man unable to

doubt, no matter how great his efforts may be; this sense which belongs

to all men, which only waits to be consulted in order to discover

itself and show us the _evidence_ or the absurdity of the question, _is

not this what I call my ideas_? Here, then, are these general ideas

or notions which I cannot contradict or examine, but according to

which I examine and judge every thing, so that, instead of replying, I

laugh when any thing is proposed clearly in opposition to what these

_immutable ideas_ represent."--_Existence de Dieu_, P. II., v. 33.

There is no doubt that Fenelon speaks of evidence in this extract,

since, besides using this very term, he refers to immutable ideas; by

common sense he understands the general ideas by which we judge of all

things, or in other words, the ideas from which evidence proceeds.

NOTE TO BOOK SECOND.

ON CHAPTER II.

(29) The immateriality of the souls of brutes is not a discovery of

modern philosophy, the scholastics maintained it, and carried their

ideas on this subject so far as to assert that no vital principle can

be a body. In this sense they taught that even the principle of life,

or the soul of plants, was something superior to the body. St. Thomas

(P. I., Q. LXXV., A. I.) asks, in general, if the soul is a body:

"Utrum anima sit corpus," and answers as follows:

"Respondeo dicendum, quod ad inquirendum de natura animæ, oportet

præsupponere, _quod anima dicitur esse primum principium vitæ_, in iis

quæ apud nos vivunt. Animata enim viventia dicimus, res vero inanimatas

vita carentes; vita autem maxime manifestatur duplici opere, scilicet

cognitionis, et motus. Horum autem principium antiqui philosophi

imaginationem transcendere non valentes, aliquod corpus ponebant,

sola corpora res esse dicentes, et quod non est corpus, nihil esse,

et secundum hoc, animam aliquod corpus esse dicebant. Hujus autem

opinionis falsitas, licet multipliciter ostendi possit, tamen uno

utemur, quo etiam communius et certius patet animam corpus non esse.

Manifestum est enim, quod non quodcumque vitalis operationis principium

est anima; sic enim oculus esset anima, cum sit quoddam principium

visionis, et idem esset dicendum de aliis animæ instrumentis: sed

primum principium vitæ dicimus esse animam. Quamvis autem aliquod

corpus possit esse quoddam principium vitæ, sicut cor est principium

vitæ in animali; tamen non potest esse primum principium vitæ aliquod

corpus. Manifestum est enim, quod esse principium vitæ, vel vivens, non

convenit corpori ex hoc quod est corpus, alioquin omne corpus esset

vivens, aut principium vitæ, convenit igitur alicui corpori quod sit

vivens, vel etiam principium vitæ, per hoc quod est tale corpus. Quod

autem est actu tale, habet hoc ab aliquo principio, quod dicitur actus

ejus. _Anima igitur quæ est primum principium vitæ, non est corpus, sed

corporis actus_, sicut calor qui est principium calefactionis, non est

corpus, sed quidam corporis actus."

Notwithstanding this doctrine, it might still be doubted whether matter

does not enter as a component element in the soul, although the soul

itself is not corporeal, and, therefore, the holy doctor (Ib., A.

5) asks if the soul is composed of matter and form; and here he is

speaking of the soul in general as the principle of life, and not of

the intellectual soul alone. He answers in the negative, as follows:

"Respondeo dicendum, quod _anima non habet materiam_, et hoc potest

considerari dupliciter. _Primo quidem, ex ratione animæ in communi_,

est enim de ratione animæ, quod sit forma alicujus corporis. Aut

igitur est forma secundum se totam, aut secundum aliquam partem sui.

Si secundum se totam, impossibile est quod pars ejus sit materia, si

dicatur materia aliquid ejus in potentia tantum, quia forma, in quantum

forma, est actus. Id autem quod est in potentia tantum, non potest esse

pars actus, cum potentia repugnet actui, utpote contra actum divisa. Si

autem sit forma secundum aliquam partem sui, illam partem dicemus esse

animam, et illam materiam cujus primo est actus, dicemus esse primum

animatum. Secundo specialiter ex ratione humanæ animæ, in quantum est

intellectiva."

Although these passages are clear enough, there is another where it is

expressly asserted that the souls of perfect animals are absolutely

indivisible, so that division can be predicated of them neither _per

se_ nor _per accidens_. He asks, (Q. LXXVI., art. 8,) if the soul in

general is in any part of the body; and he answers, yes: distinguishing

between essential and quantitative totality:

"Sed forma, quæ requirit diversitatem in partibus, sicut est anima, _et

præcipue animalium perfectorum_, non equaliter se habet ad totum et

ad partes; unde _non dividitur per accidens, scilicet per divisionem

quantitatis_. Sic ergo totalitas quantitativa, non potest attribui

animæ, nec per se, nec per accidens. Sed totalitas secunda, quæ

attenditur secundum rationis et essentiæ perfectionem, proprie et per

se, convenit formis."

It seems, however, that this doctrine of St. Thomas met with

opposition, from some persons who could not conceive how the soul of

brutes could be inextensive, as they regarded this as the exclusive

property of the intellectual soul. Cardinal Gaetano, in his comments

on St. Thomas, undertakes his defence. He shows that he understood the

doctrine of St. Thomas concerning the indivisibility of the souls of

brutes, in its strictest sense. He gives the objection in the following

words:

"Dubium secundo est circa candem totalitatem quoniam S. Thomas a

communi opinione discordare videtur hoc in loco, eo quod ponat _præter

animam intellectivam_, aliquam aliam formam in materia _inextensam,

scilicet animam sensitivam animalium perfectorum_, cum tamen vix

possit sustineri, quod anima intellectiva de foris veniens, informet

secundum esse, et sit inextensa."

Instead of more or less plausible interpretations of the text in order

to solve the objection, the learned commentator boldly maintains the

indivisibility of the souls of brutes, and treats almost with contempt

those who think differently:

"Ad secundum dubium dicitur, quod doctrina hic tradita, _est quidem

contra modernorum communem phantasiam, sed non contra philosophicas

rationes, parum est autem de horum aucthoritate curandum_. Cum autem

dicitur, quod sine ratione hoc est dictum, respondetur quod ratio

insinuata est a posteriori, quia scilicet diversam totaliter habet

habitudinem ad totum et partem ipsa forma ex propria ratione. Si enim

habet totaliter diversam habitudinem ad totum et ad partes, _hoc

provenit ex indivisibilitate formæ_. Quia si divideretur forma ad

divisionem totius, jam pars formæ proportionaretur parti corporis, et

cum pars quantitativa formæ sit tota essentia formæ, ergo ipsa forma

secundum rationem suæ essentiæ non habet totaliter diversam habitudinem

ad totum et ad partes: sed utrumque, scilicet tam totum quam partem

respicit, ut proportionatum perfectible. Et confirmari potest ista

ratio, quia forma extensa ex vi solius divisionis, non desinit esse

secundum illam partem quam habet in parte decisa: imo quæ quodammodo

erat per modum potentiæ, perficitur, et fit actu seorsum, ut patet

in formis naturalibus, ergo a destructione consequentis, si ex sola

divisione pars decisa non potest retinere eandem speciem, _ergo non

erat extensa et divisibilis ad divisionem subjecti_. * *

* * * * * * * *

_Non est ergo sine ratione dictum, quod animæ aliquæ præter

intellectivam sunt tantæ perfectionis quod sunt inextensæ, tam per se

quam per accidens_: quamquam potentiæ omnes earum sint extensæ per

accidens: qualitates enim, sunt corporis partibus accommodatæ."

NOTES TO BOOK THIRD.

ON CHAPTER X.

(30) Leibnitz and Clarke had a very interesting dispute on space,

from which I shall extract a few passages. Leibnitz wrote a letter to

the Princess of Wales, in which he repeated the expression of Newton,

that space was the organ which God uses in his sensations of things.

Leibnitz argued against this opinion, that if God, in order to perceive

things, needs any medium, they do not depend entirely on him, and are

not produced by him.

_Clarke Answered_:

"M. le chevalier Newton ne dit pas que l'espace est l'organe dont Dieu

se sert pour apercevoir les choses; il ne dit pas non plus que Dieu

ait besoin d'aucun moyen pour les apercevoir. Au contraire, il dit

que Dieu, étant présent partout, aperçoit les choses par sa présence

immédiate, dans tout l'espace où elles sont, sans l'intervention ou

le secours d'aucun organe ou d'aucun moyen. Pour rendre cela plus

intelligible, il l'éclaircit par une comparaison. Il dit que comme

l'âme, étant immédiatement présente aux images qui se forment dans le

cerveau par le moyen des organes des sens, voit ces images comme si

elles étaient les choses mêmes qu'elles représentent; de même Dieu voit

tout par sa présence immédiate, étant actuellement présent aux choses

mêmes, à toutes les choses qui sont dans l'univers, comme l'âme est

présente à toutes les images qui se forment dans le cerveau. M. Newton

considère le cerveau et les organes des sens comme le moyen par lequel

ces images sont formées, et non comme le moyen par lequel l'âme voit ou

aperçoit ces images lorsqu'elles sont ainsi formées. Et dans l'univers

il ne considère pas les choses comme si elles étaient des images

formées par un certain moyen ou par des organes, mais comme des choses

réelles que Dieu lui-même a formées et qu'il voit dans tous les lieux

où elles sont sans l'intervention d'aucun moyen. C'est tout ce que M.

Newton a voulu dire par la comparaison dont il s'est servi lorsqu'il

suppose que l'espace infini est, pour ainsi dire, le _sensorium_ de

l'Etre qui est présent partout."

_Leibnitz Replied_:

"Il se trouve expressément dans l'appendice de l'_Optique_ de M. Newton

que l'espace est le _sensorium_ de Dieu. Or le mot _sensorium_ a

toujours signifié l'organe de la sensation. Permis à lui et à ses amis

de s'expliquer maintenant tout autrement, je ne m'y oppose pas.

"On suppose que la présence de l'âme suffit pour qu'elle s'aperçoive

de se qui se passe dans le cerveau; mais c'est justement ce que le P.

Malebranche et toute l'école cartésienne nient et ont raison de nier.

Il faut toute autre chose que la seule présence pour qu'une chose

représente ce qui se passe dans l'autre. Il faut pour cela quelque

communication explicable, quelque manière d'influence. L'espace, selon

M. Newton, est intimement présent au corps qu'il contient, et qui est

commensuré avec lui; s'ensuit-il pour cela que l'espace s'aperçoive de

ce qui se passe dans le corps, et qu'il s'en souvienne après que le

corps en sera sorti? Outre que l'âme étant indivisible, sa présence

immédiate, qu'on pourrait s'imaginer dans le corps, ne serait que dans

un point. Comment donc s'apercevrait-elle de ce qui se fait hors de

ce point? Je prétends d'être le premier qui ait montré comment l'âme

s'aperçoit de ce qui se passe dans le corps.

"La raison pourquoi Dieu s'aperçoit de tout n'est pas sa simple

présence, mais encore son opération; c'est parce qu'il conserve les

choses par une action qui produit continuellement ce qu'il y a de bonté

et de perfection en elles. Mais les âmes n'ayant point d'influence

immédiate sur les corps, ni les corps sur les âmes, leur correspondance

mutuelle ne saurait être expliquée par la présence."

_Clarke Answered_:

"Le mot de _sensorium_ ne signifie pas proprement l'organe, mais le

lieu de la sensation. L'œil, l'oreille, etc., sont des organes, mais

ce ne sont pas des _sensoria_. D'ailleurs M. le chevalier Newton ne

dit pas que l'espace est un _sensorium_, mais qu'il est (par voie de

comparaison) _pour ainsi dire_ le _sensorium_, etc.

"On n'a jamais supposé que la présence de l'âme suffit pour la

perception; on a dit seulement que cette présence est nécessaire afin

que l'âme aperçoive. Si l'âme n'était pas présente aux images des

choses qui sont aperçues, elle ne pourrait pas les apercevoir; mais sa

présence ne suffit pas, à moins qu'elle ne soit aussi une substance

vivante. Les substances inanimées, quoique présentes, n'aperçoivent

rien; et une substance vivante n'est capable de perception que dans

le lieu où elle est présente; soit aux choses mêmes, comme Dieu est

présent à tout l'univers; soit aux images des choses, comme l'âme leur

est présente dans son _sensorium_. Il est impossible qu'une chose

agisse ou que quelque sujet agisse sur elle dans un lieu où elle n'est

pas présente, comme il est impossible qu'elle soit dans un lieu où elle

n'est pas. Quoique l'âme soit indivisible, il ne s'ensuit pas qu'elle

n'est présente que dans un seul point. L'espace fini ou infini es

absolument indivisible, même par la pensée; car on ne peut s'imaginer

que ses parties se séparent l'une de l'autre sans s'imaginer qu'elles

sortent, pour ainsi dire, hors d'elle-mêmes; et cependant l'espace

n'est pas un simple point.

"Dieu n'aperçoit pas les choses par sa simple présence, ni parce qu'il

agit sur elles, mais parce qu'il est non-seulement partout, mais encore

un être vivant et intelligent. On doit dire la même chose de l'âme,

dans sa petite sphère, ce n'est point par sa simple présence, mais

parce qu'elle est une substance vivante, qu'elle aperçoit les images

auxquelles elle est présente, et qu'elle ne saurait apercevoir sans

leur être présente."

_Reply of Leibnitz._

"Ces messieurs soutiennent donc que l'_espace_ est un _être réel

absolu_; mais cela les mène à de grandes difficultés, car il paraît que

cet être doit être éternel et infini. C'est pourquoi il y en a qui out

cru que c'était Dieu lui-même, ou bien son attribut, son immensité.

Mais comme il a des parties, ce n'est pas une chose qui puisse convenir

à Dieu.

"Pour moi, j'ai marqué plus d'une fois que je tenais l'espace pour

quelque chose de _purement relatif_, comme le temps, pour un _ordre

des coexistences_, comme le temps est un _ordre de successions_. Car

l'espace marque, en terms de possibilité, un ordre des choses qui

existent en même temps, en tant qu'elles existent ensemble, sans entrer

dans leurs manières d'exister. Et lorsqu'on voit plusieurs choses

ensemble, on s'aperçoit de cet ordre des choses entre elles.

"Pour réfuter l'imagination de ceux qui prennent l'espace pour une

substance, ou du moins pour quelque être absolu, j'ai plusieurs

démonstrations; mais je ne veux me servir à présent que de celle dont

on me fournit ici l'occasion. Je dis donc que si l'espace était un

être absolu, il arriverait quelque chose dont il serait impossible

qu'il y eût une raison suffisante, ce qui est contre notre axiome.

Voici comment je le prouve. L'espace est quelque chose d'uniforme

absolument; et sans les choses y placées, un point de l'espace ne

diffère absolument en rien d'un autre point de l'espace. Or il suit de

cela (supposé que l'espace soit quelque chose en lui-même outre l'ordre

des corps entre eux) qu'il est impossible qu'il y ait une raison

pourquoi Dieu, gardant les mêmes situations des corps entre eux, ait

placé les corps dans l'espace ainsi et non autrement; et pourquoi tout

n'a pas été pris à rebours (par exemple), par un échange de l'orient

et de l'occident. Mais si l'espace n'est autre chose que cet ordre ou

rapport, et n'est rien du tout sans les corps, que la possibilité,

d'en mettre, ces deux états, l'un tel qu'il est, l'autre supposé à

rebours, ne différeraient point entre eux. Leur différence ne se trouve

donc que dans notre supposition chimérique de la réalité de l'espace en

lui-même. Mais dans la vérité, l'un serait justement la même chose que

l'autre, comme ils sont absolument indiscernables; et par conséquent il

n'y a pas lieu de demander la raison de la préférence de l'un à l'autre.

"Il en est de même du temps. Supposé que quelqu'un demande pourquoi

Dieu n'a pas tout créé un an plus tôt, et que ce même personnage

veuille inférer de là que Dieu a fait quelque chose dont il n'est

pas possible qu'il y ait une raison pourquoi il a fait ainsi plutôt

qu'autrement: on lui répondrait que son illation serait vraie, si le

temps était quelque chose, hors des choses temporelles; car il serait

impossible qu'il y eût des raisons pourquoi les choses eussent été

appliquées plutôt à de tels instants qu'à d'autres, leur succession

demeurant la même. Mais cela même prouve que les instants hors des

choses ne sont rien, et qu'ils ne consistent que dans leur ordre

successif; lequel demeurant le même, l'un des deux états, comme celui

de l'anticipation imaginée, ne différait en rien, et ne saurait être

discerné de l'autre qui est maintenant....

"Il sera difficile de nous faire accroire que, dans l'usage ordinaire,

_sensorium_ ne signifie pas l'organe de la sensation....

"La simple présence d'une substance même animée ne suffit pas pour

la perception; un aveugle et même un distrait ne voit point. Il faut

expliquer comment l'âme s'aperçoit de ce qui est hors d'elle.

"Dieu n'est pas présent aux choses par situation, mais par essence; sa

présence se manifeste par son opération immédiate. La présence de l'âme

est toute d'une autre nature. Dire qu'elle est diffuse par le corps,

c'est la rendre étendue et divisible; dire qu'elle est tout entière en

chaque partie de quelque corps, c'est la rendre divisible d'elle-même.

L'attacher à un point, la répandre par plusieurs points, tout cela ne

sont qu'expressions abusives, _Idola Tribus_."

_Clarke's Answer_:

"Il est indubitable que rien n'existe sans qu'il y ait une _raison

suffisante_ de son existence, et que rien n'existe d'une certaine

manière plutôt que d'une autre, sans qu'il y ait aussi une _raison

suffisante_ de cette manière d'exister. Mais à l'égard des choses

qui sont indifférentes en elles-mêmes, la _simple volonté_ est une

raison suffisante pour leur donner l'existence, ou pour les faire

exister d'une certaine manière; et cette volonté n'a pas besoin d'être

déterminée per une cause étrangère....

"L'espace n'est pas une substance, un être éternel et infini, mais une

propriété ou une suite de l'existence d'un être infini et éternel.

L'espace infini est l'immensité mais l'immensité n'est pas Dieu;[60]

donc l'espace infini n'est pas Dieu. Ce que l'on dit ici de l'espace

n'est point une difficulté. L'espace infini est absolument et

essentiellement indivisible, et c'est une contradiction dans les termes

que de supposer qu'il soit divisé; car il faudrait qu'il y eût un

espace entre les parties que l'on suppose divisés; ce qui est supposer

que l'espace est divisé et non divisé en même temps.[61] ...

[60] In this proposition Clarke is either inexact and obscure, or else

he falls into a serious error. The immensity of God is God himself.

Every attribute of God is God.

[61] Here Clarke confounds _divisibility_ with _separability_. See

chapters X. and XI. of this book.

"Il ne s'agit pas de savoir ce que Goclenius[62] entend par le mot de

_sensorium_, mais en quel sens M. le chevalier Newton s'est servi de

ce mot dans son livre. Si _Goclenius_ croit que l'œil, l'oreille, ou

quelque autre organe des sens est le _sensorium_, il se trompe. Mais

quand un auteur emploie un terme d'art et qu'il déclare en quel sens il

s'en sert, à quoi bon rechercher de quelle manière d'autres écrivains

ont entendu ce même terme? _Scapula_ traduit le mot dont il s'agit ici,

_domicilium_, c'est-à-dire le lieu ou l'âme réside."

[62] Goclenius is the author of a philosophical dictionary quoted by

Leibnitz.

_Reply of Leibnitz:_

"Si l'espace infini est l'immensité, l'espace fini sera l'opposé de

l'immensité, c'est-à-dire la mensurabilité ou l'étendue bornée. Or

l'étendue doit être l'affection d'un étendu. Mais si cet espace est

vide, il sera un attribut sans sujet, une étendue d'aucun étendu. C'est

pourquoi, en faisant de l'espace une propriété, l'on tombe dans mon

sentiment, qui le fait un ordre des choses et non pas quelque chose

d'absolu.

"Si l'espace est une réalité absolue, bien loin d'être une propriété ou

accidentalité opposée à la substance, il sera plus subsistant que les

substances. Dieu ne le saurait détruire, ni même changer en rien. Il

est non-seulement immense dans le tout, mais encore immuable et éternel

en chaque partie. Il y aura une infinité de choses éternelles hors de

Dieu.

"Dire que l'espace infini est sans parties, c'est dire que les espaces

finis ne le composent point, et que l'espace infini pourrait subsister

quand tous les espaces finis seraient réduits à rien. Ce serait comme

si l'on disait, dans la supposition cartésienne, d'un univers étendu

sans bornes, que cet univers pourrait subsister quand tous les corps

qui le composent seraient réduits à rien ...

"Je serais bien aise de voir le passage d'un philosophe qui prenne

_sensorium_ autrement que _Goclenius_.

"Si _Scapula_ dit que _sensorium_ est la place où l'entendement réside,

il entendra l'organe de la sensation interne; ainsi il ne s'éloignera

point de Goclenius.

"_Sensorium_ a toujours été l'organe de la sensation. La glande pinéale

serait, selon Descartes, le _sensorium_ dans le sens qu'on rapporte de

_Scapula_.

"Il n'y a guère d'expression moins convenable sur se sujet que celle

qui donne à Dieu un _sensorium_: il semble qu'elle le fait l'âme du

monde. Et on aurait bien de la peine à donner à l'usage que M. _Newton_

fait de ce mot un sens qui le puisse justifier."

_Clarke's Answer:_

"On revient encore ici à l'usage du mot de _sensorium_, quoique M.

Newton se soit servi d'un correctif lorsqu'il a employé ce mot. Il

n'est pas nécessaire de rien ajouter à ce que j'ai dit sur cela ...

"L'espace destitué de corps est une propriété d'une substance

immatérielle; l'espace n'est pas borné par les corps, mais il existe

également dans les corps et hors des corps. L'espace n'est pas renfermé

entre les corps; mais les corps étant dans l'espace immense sont

eux-mêmes bornés par leurs propres dimensions.

"L'espace vide n'est pas un attribut sans sujet; car par cet espace

nous n'entendons pas un espace où il n'y a rien, mais un espace sans

corps. Dieu est certainement présent dans tout l'espace vide, et

peut-être qu'il y a aussi dans cet espace plusieurs autres substances

qui ne sont pas matérielles, et qui par conséquent ne peuvent être

tangibles ni aperçues par aucun de nos sens.

"L'espace n'est pas une substance, mais un attribut; et si c'est un

attribut d'un être nécessaire, il doit (comme tous les autres attributs

d'un être nécessaire) exister plus nécessairement que les substances

mêmes, qui ne sont pas nécessaires. L'espace est immense, immuable

et éternel; et l'on doit dire la même chose de la durée. Mais il ne

s'ensuit pas de là qu'il n'y ait rien d'éternel hors de Dieu, car

l'espace et la durée ne sont pas hors de Dieu, ce sont des suites

immédiates et nécessaires de son existence, sans lesquelles il ne

serait point éternel et présent partout.

"Les infinis ne sont composés de finis que comme les finis sont

composés d'infinitésimes; j'ai fait voir ci-dessus en quel sens on peut

dire que l'espace a des parties ou qu'il n'en a pas. Les parties dans

le sens que l'on donne à ce mot, lorsqu'on l'applique au corps, sont

séparables, composées, désunies, indépendantes les unes des autres et

capables de mouvement. Mais quoique l'imagination puisse en quelque

manière concevoir des parties dans l'espace infini, cependant, comme

ces parties, improprement ainsi dites, sont essentiellement immobiles

et inséparables les unes des autres, il s'ensuit que cet espace est

essentiellement simple et absolument indivisible."[63]

[63] Here Clarke falls again into the confusion we have spoken of, and

making _divisibility_ the same thing as _separability_, he asserts

contradictory propositions.

_Reply of Leibnitz:_

"Comme j'avais objecté que l'espace pris pour quelque chose de réel

et d'absolu, sans les corps, serait une chose éternelle, impassible,

indépendante de Dieu, on a tâché d'éluder cette difficulté en disant

que l'espace est une propriété de Dieu. J'ai opposé à cela, dans mon

écrit précédent, que la propriété de Dieu est l'immensité; mais que

l'espace, qui est souvent commensuré avec les corps, et l'immensité de

Dieu, n'est pas la même chose.

"J'ai encore objecté que, si l'espace est une propriété, et si l'espace

infini est l'immensité de Dieu, l'espace fini sera l'étendue ou la

mensurabilité de quelque chose finie. Ainsi l'espace occupé par un

corps sera l'étendue de ce corps, chose absurde, puisqu'un corps peut

changer d'espace, mais qu'il ne peut point quitter son étendue.

"J'ai encore demandé: si l'espace est une propriété, de quelle chose

sera donc la propriété, un espace vuide borné, tel qu'on s'imagine dans

le récipient épuisé air? Il ne paraît point raisonnable de dire que cet

espace vuide, rond ou quarré, soit une propriété de Dieu. Sera-ce donc

peut-être la propriété de quelques substances immatérielles, étendues,

imaginaires, qu'on se figure (se semble) dans les espaces imaginaires?

"Si l'espace est la propriété ou l'affection de la substance qui est

dans l'espace, le même espace sera tantôt l'affection d'un corps,

tantôt d'un autre corps, tantôt d'une substance immatérielle, tantôt,

peut-être, de Dieu, quand il est vuide de toute autre substance

matérielle ou immatérielle. Mais voilà une étrange propriété ou

affection, qui passe de sujet en sujet. Les sujets quitteront ainsi

leurs accidents comme un habit, afin que d'autres sujets s'en puissent

revêtir. Après cela comment distinguera-t-on les accidents et les

substances?

"Que si les espaces bornés qui y sont, et si l'espace infini est la

propriété de Dieu, il faut (chose étrange) que la propriété de Dieu

soit composée des affections des créatures; car tous les espaces finis,

pris ensemble, composent l'espace infini.

"Que si l'on nie que l'espace borné soit une affection des choses

bornées, il ne sera pas raisonnable non plus que l'espace infini soit

l'affection ou la propriété d'une chose infinie. J'avais insinué toutes

ces difficultés dans mon écrit précédent, mais il ne paraît point qu'on

ait tâché d'y satisfaire.

"J'ai encore d'autres raisons contre l'étrange imagination que l'espace

est une propriété de Dieu. Si cela est, l'espace entre dans l'essence

de Dieu. Or l'espace a des parties; donc il y aurait des parties dans

l'essence de Dieu, _spectatum admissi_.

"De plus des espaces sont tantôt vuides, tantôt remplis; donc il y aura

dans l'essence de Dieu des parties tantôt vuides, tantôt remplies,

et par conséquent sujettes à un changement perpétuel. Les corps

remplissant l'espace rempliraient une partie de l'essence de Dieu, et y

seraient commensurés; et, dans la supposition du vuide, une partie de

l'essence sera dans le récipient. Ce dieu à parties ressemblera fort au

dieu stoïcien, qui était l'univers entier, considéré comme un animal

divin.

"Si l'espace infini est l'immensité de Dieu, le temps infini sera

l'éternité de Dieu; il faudra donc dire que ce qui est dans l'espace

est dans l'immensité de Dieu, et par conséquent dans son essence; et

que ce qui est dans le temps est dans l'éternité de Dieu. Phrases

étranges, et qui font bien connaître qu'on abuse des termes.

"En voici encore une autre instance. L'immensité de Dieu fait que Dieu

est dans tous les espaces. Mais si Dieu est dans l'espace, comment

peut-on dire que l'espace est en Dieu, ou qu'il est sa propriété?

On a bien ouï dire que la propriété soit dans le sujet; mais on n'a

jamais ouï dire que le sujet soit dans la propriété. De même, Dieu

existe en chaque temps, comment donc le temps est-il dans Dieu, et

comment peut-il être une propriété de Dieu? Ce sont des _alloglossies

perpétuelles_....

"Comme j'avais objecté que l'espace a des parties, on cherche un autre

échappatoire en s'éloignant du sens reçu des termes, et soutenant

que l'espace n'a point de parties; parce que ses parties ne sont

point séparables et ne sauraient être éloignées les unes des autres

par discerption. Mais il suffit que l'espace ait des parties, soit

que ces parties soient séparables ou non; et on les peut assigner

dans l'espace, soit par les corps qui y sont, soit par les lignes ou

surfaces qu'on peut mener....

"On s'excuse de n'avoir point dit que l'espace est le _sensorium_ de

Dieu, mais seulement _comme_ son _sensorium_. Il semble que l'un est

aussi peu convenable et aussi peu intelligible que l'autre....

"Si Dieu sent ce qui ce passe dans le monde, par le moyen d'un

_sensorium_, il semble que les choses agissent sur lui, et qu'ainsi

il est comme on conçoit l'_âme du monde_. On m'impute de répéter les

objections, sans prendre connaissance des réponses; mais je ne vois

point qu'on ait satisfait à cette difficulté; on ferait mieux de

renoncer tout à fait à ce _sensorium_ prétendu."

For the rest of this interesting discussion, I refer the reader to the

works of Leibnitz. These extracts may serve to show what importance

eminent philosophers attributed to the questions on space.

ON CHAPTER XVII.

(31) In order that the reader may form a perfect conception of Kant's

opinion of space, and judge for himself whether there is or not the

contradiction which we have intimated, I extract a few passages from

his works.

"The transcendental conception of phenomena[64] in space is a critical

observation that, in general _nothing_ perceived in space _is any thing

in itself_; that space is, moreover, a form of things, and would belong

to them if considered in themselves; but that objects in themselves are

wholly unknown to us, and those things which we call _external objects,

are only the pure representations of our sensibility_, whose form is

space, and whose true correlative, that is to say, the thing in itself,

is for this reason wholly unknown, and will always remain so; for

experience can tell us nothing of it.

[64] Kant defines phenomenon, "the indeterminate object of an empirical

intuition." He calls empirical intuition, "that which relates to an

object by means of sensation." He understands by sensation, "the

effect of an object on the representative faculty, in so far as we are

affected by it."--_Transcend. Æsthet._ I.

* * * * * * * *

"It is altogether certain, and not merely possible or probable, that

space and time, as the necessary conditions of all experience, both

internal and external, are purely subjective conditions of all our

intuitions. It is therefore equally certain that _all objects in

relation with space and time, are only simple phenomena and not things

in themselves_, if considered according to the manner in which they

are given us. Much may be said _a priori_ of the form of objects, but

nothing of the thing in itself, which serves as the ground of these

phenomena."--_Transc. Æsth._ I.

This doctrine of Kant's brought upon him the charge of idealism, and

drew from the German philosopher explanations which some look upon as a

manifest contradiction.

Here is how Kant defends himself from idealism: "When I say that in

space and time the intuitions of external objects, and of the mind,

represent these two things as they affect our senses, _I do not mean

to say that objects are a pure appearance_; for in the phenomenon,

the objects, and even the properties which we attribute to them, are

always considered as something really given; but that as this quality

of being given depends only on the manner of perception of the subject

in its relation with the object given, this object as phenomenon, is

different from what it is as object in itself. _I do not say that

bodies merely seem_ to be external, or that my soul _merely seems_ to

have been given me in consciousness. When I assert that the qualities

of space and time (in conformity to which I place the body and the

soul as the condition of their existence) exist only in my mode of

intuition, and not in the objects themselves, I should do wrong to

convert into a mere appearance what I must take for a phenomenon;

but this does not occur, if my principle of the ideality of all our

sensible intuitions is admitted. On the contrary, if an objective

reality is given to all these forms of sensible representations,

every thing is inevitably converted into a pure appearance; for,

if space and time are considered as qualities which, as to their

possibility, must be found in the things themselves, and we reflect

on the absurdities which follow, since two infinite things, which can

neither be substances, nor any thing inherent in a substance, but which

are still something existent, and even the necessary condition of the

existence of all things would still subsist, though all the rest were

annihilated, we cannot blame Berkeley for reducing bodies to a mere

appearance."--_Ibid._ 2d Edition.

In the _Transcendental Logic_ there is also a reputation of idealism.

There Kant establishes this theorem:

"The mere consciousness of my own existence, empirically determined,

proves the existence of objects outside of me in space."

It is not possible for me to give here the doctrines of Kant's

_Transcendental Logic_; it is enough to have given his remarks on the

reality of objects; others call them retractations or contradictions,

and give various causes for them, which, however, do not belong to the

field of philosophy.

ON CHAPTER XIX.

(32) The scholastics always carefully separated the sensible order

from the intelligible. Kant was not the first to discover the

limits which divide the intelligible from the sensible, things in

themselves as objects of the understanding, _noumena_, as he calls

them, from things as represented in sensible intuition, _phenomena_.

The scholastics were so far from regarding sensible representations

as sufficient for intelligence, that they denied that they were

intelligible. The intellect might know sensible things, but it was

necessary for it to abstract them from material conditions. On account

of its limitation, it required the intuition of objects in sensible

representation, _conversio ad phantasmata_; but these intuitions were

not the intellectual act, they were only its necessary conditions.

Hence proceeded the theory of the _intellectus agens_, which some have

laughed at, because they did not understand it. This hypothesis has

strong reasons in its favor, whatever may be its intrinsic value, if,

setting aside the form in which it is expressed, we attend only to its

ideological profoundness.

In reading some passages in Kant's _Transcendental Logic_ on

phenomena and noumena, on the necessity of sensible intuition in pure

conceptions, and the distinction of the intuition from the conception,

and on the sensible and intelligible worlds corresponding to the

sensitive and intellective faculties, we might suppose that the German

philosopher had read the scholastics. True, he departed from their

doctrines, but what of that? The authors from whom we learn the most,

are not always those whose opinions we follow.

In the treatise on ideas, I shall have occasion to explain my opinion

on this point; for the present I shall only make a few extracts from

St. Thomas, the most illustrious representative of the scholastic

philosophy. The reader will find that he clearly explains our necessity

of sensible representations, (_phantasmata_,) and the line which

divides these representations from the purely intellectual order.

"(Pars 1, Q. LXXIX., art. 3.) Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas

rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia, _formæ autem in materia

existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu_; sequebatur, quod naturæ, seu

formæ rerum sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles

actu. Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod

ens actu: sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportet

igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quæ faceret

intelligibilia in actu per abstractionem specierum a _conditionibus

materialibus_. Et hæc est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem.

"(P. 1, Q. LXXIX., art. 4). Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est,

quod supra animam intellectivam humanam, necesse est ponere aliquem

superiorem intellectum, a quo anima virtutem intelligendi obtineat.

* * * * * * * *

"Nihil autem est perfectius in inferioribus rebus anima humana.

Unde oportet dicere, quod in ipsa sit aliqua virtus derivata a

superiori intellectu, per quam possit _phantasmata illustrare_. Et

hoc experimento cognoscimus, dum percipimus _nos abstrahere formas

universales a conditionibus particularibus, quod est facere actu

intelligibilia_.

"(P. 1. Q., LXXXIV., art. 1.) Hoc autem necessarium non est: quia

etiam in ipsis sensibilibus videmus, quod forma alio modo est in uno

sensibilium, quam in altero; puta cum in uno est albedo intensior, in

alio remissior, ut cum in uno est albedo cum dulcedine, in alio sine

dulcedine. Et per hunc etiam modum, forma sensibilis alio modo est in

re, quæ est extra animam, et alio modo in sensu, qui suspicit formas

sensibilium absque materia, sicut colorem auri sine auro. Et similiter

intellectus species corporum, quæ sunt materiales et mobiles, recipit

immaterialiter, et immobiliter, secundum modum suum, nam receptum est

in recipiente per modum recipientis. Dicendum est ergo, quod anima per

intellectum cognoscit corpora, _cognitione immateriali, universali et

necessaria_.

"(P. I, Q. LXXXIV., art. 6.) Et ideo ad causandam intellectualem

operationem secundum Aristotelem non sufficit sola impressio

sensibilium corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilius, quia agens est

honorabilius patiente, ut ipse dicit. Non autem quod intellectualis

operatio causetur ex sola impressione aliquarum rerum superiorum,

ut Plato posuit, sed illud superius, et nobilius agens, quod vocat

intellectum agentem, de quo jam supra diximus quod _facit phantasmata

a sensibus accepta intelligibilia in actu_, per modum abstractionis

cuiusdam. Secundum hoc ergo, ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis

operatio a sensu causatur. Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare

intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu

per intellectum agentem, non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio

sit totalis, et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis

quodammodo est materia causæ."

END OF VOL. I.

* * * * *

Transcriber's note:

Obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected.

Hyphenation has been standardised.

Variations in spelling, punctuation and accents are as in the original.

Repetition of the titles of Books 2 and 3 has been removed.

Footnotes, identified thus [1], are placed at the end of paragraph.

References to the "Notes on Chapters" are identified thus (1) at the end

of the chapter as in the original.

Page 433, para 154, "There is no need of attributing to the inligent

spirit...." Inligent corrected to intelligent.

Page 486, "II. The relations of our organs [to] objects are

intrinsically immutable." The to has been added.