In answer to this. It was not doubted when the march was begun but
that there would be abundance of time. Their greatest precaution
was not to be discovered. The Highlanders had often made very quick
marches in the night-time. The French piquets I believe were in the
rear and were not so clever in marching, and the muir they went
through was more splashy than they expected, and they were obliged
to make some turns to shun houses, and there were two or three dykes
that took [Sidenote: _fol._ 451.] up a good deal of time to pass. The
guides though they knew the ground very well, yet were not judges
to tell what time it would take to march the ten miles, as they
were called, though by reason of the indirect road, must be more.
Notwithstanding of all this I am persuaded most of the army (had not
the van been frequently stopt and retarded by repeated orders and
messages) would have been at Nairn by two o'clock in the morning.
As for the number of men, though not half that of the enemy, they
might very probably have succeeded in the attempt had they made the
attack undiscovered. Nothing is more uncertain than the events of
war. Night attacks are most subject to disappointments. This march
and counter-march, to be sure, was, as things turned out, a great
disadvantage. It fatigued the men much, and a council of war might
have been obtained in which doubtless a resolution would have been
taken to chuse a more advantagious field of [Sidenote: _fol._ 452.]
battle and perhaps postpon'd fighting for a day till the succours
that were coming up with the utmost expedition should join. Councils
of war were seldom held and were out of request[199] from the time
the army marched into England. I remember but of two that were
held, the one at Brampton in regard of besieging Carlisle or going
to attack General Wade. The other was at Carlisle, where it was
resolved to march forwards. What happened at Derby was accidental by
most of the officers being at the Prince's quarters, and taking into
consideration their situation, they were all unanimous in advising
the Prince to retreat. I think there was but one council of war
called after they returned to Scotland, and that was near Crieff,
the [Sidenote: _fol._ 453.] day after the retreat from Stirling,
where there was some difference of opinion, but it was at last
agreed to march for Inverness in two separate bodies, the one the
Highland road, and the other by the coast, severals at first being
for the army all going one road. The day of the battle of Falkirk
the officers were called on the field where the army was drawn up
betwixt Bannockburn and the Torwood, and all agreed immediately to
march to the enemy; also the retreat from Stirling, it was advised by
many of the principal officers, particularly the clans. They drew up
the reasons and sign'd them at Falkirk three days before the retreat
was made, the chief of which was that a vast number of men had gone
off after the battle, and were not returned, and that the siege of
Stirling Castle was not advancing; they did not think it advisable to
fight in such circumstances.
[199] No wonder that councils of war were out of request, when the
Prince was always thwarted in them, and hardly got his will in
anything he proposed, though his opinion of things in the event
turned out to be the most eligible. Lord George Murray was at the
head of the opposition, having got the ascendant of the greater part
of the chiftains, and having insinuated himself into the good graces
of all the clans who were ever ready to embrace his schemes. Besides,
it was most unlucky that great jealousies and misunderstandings had
arisen betwixt Lord George Murray and the French officers. These
things are too notour to admit of any denial.--ROBERT FORBES, A.M.
[Sidenote: _fol._ 454.]
This letter has been much longer than I intended. But before I
conclude I must acquaint you that six weeks before the battle of
Culloden some officers proposed sending up meal to several parts of
the Highlands, and in particular to Badenoch, that in the event of
the Duke of Cumberland's army marching towards Inverness before the
army was gathered they might retreat for a few days till they could
assemble; or if a misfortune should happen by a defeat there might
be some provisions in these parts. But this was reckoned a timorous
advice and rejected as such, though I have reason to believe that
the opinion of mostly all the Highland officers was much the same.
There was no doubt the Highlanders could have avoided fighting till
they had found their advantages. In so doing they could have made a
summer campaign without running the risque of any misfortune. They
could have marched through the hills to places in Aberdeenshire,
Banffshire, [Sidenote: _fol._ 455.] the Merns, Angus, Perthshire,
or Argyleshire by ways that no regular troops could have followed
them; and if the regular troops had continued among the mountains
they must have been attended with great difficulties and expence.
Their convoys might have been cut off, and opportunities offered to
have attacked them with almost a certainty of success. And though
the Highlanders had neither money nor magazines they could not have
starved in that season of the year, so long as there were any sheep
or cattle to be had. They could also have separated into two or
three different bodies, got meal for some days' provision, met again
at a place appointed, and have attacked the enemy where was least
expected. They could have marched in three days what would have taken
regular troops five. Nay, had these taken the high roads (as often
they would have been obliged to do upon account of their [Sidenote:
_fol._ 456.] carriages) it would have taken them ten or twelve. In
short, they would have been so harrassed and fatigued, that they must
have been in the greatest distress and difficulties; and at the long
run probably been destroyed. At least, much might have been expected
by gaining of time. Perhaps such succours might have come from
France as would have made the Highlanders to have made an offensive
instead of a defensive war. This I saw was the opinion of many of the
officers who considered the consequences of losing a battle. They
knew well that few of the Highlanders would join heartily against
them, as long as they continued entire, but would upon a defeat.
There was one great objection to this, that the Irish officers, who
were all as brave men and zealous in the cause as possibly could be,
and many of the low-country men, could not endure the fatigue of a
Highland campaign. As to the common [Sidenote: _fol._ 457.] soldiers
that came from France there were not four hundred of them remaining.
They and their officers, even though a battle was lost, had but to
surrender and be made prisoners of war. It was very different with
the Scots, whose safety depended upon their not venturing a battle
without great probability of success. But any proposition to postpone
fighting was ill-received and was called discouraging the army.