_Carlisle, November 14th, 1746._
[Sidenote: 26 Jan. 1747]
Copy of a Letter which served to cover the above to LADY
TERPERSE from Mr. PATRICK GORDON, Presbyterian preacher at
Rhynie.
[Sidenote: _fol._ 427.]
MADAM,--The inclosed came to me two or three days ago, and I intended
to have delivered it to you with my own hand. But as I cannot travel
so far for some days by reason of necessary business in my parish,
I thought proper, rather than delay it any longer, to transmit it
in this manner. My correspondent is a gentlewoman that lives in
the neighbourhood of Carlisle, who saw Terperse every day for some
time before his death, and says he died as became a truly penitent
Christian, to the conviction of all the clergy and others that
conversed with him. She writes me that one Wright, by orders from
Mr. Farquharson, provided a coffin for his body; that she gave such
grave-cloaths as are usual, put them on, and saw him buried in St.
Culbert's Churchyard. So that you and all your relations are very
much obliged to this gentlewoman. She [Sidenote: _fol._ 428.] desires
me further to acquaint you that he never received any letter from you
nor any remittance; and the letter I wrote, giving him an account of
you and your children did not reach Carlisle till after his death;
that she has his stock-buckle, buttons, and a book he left to his
son, Charles, which she is ready to send to Edinburgh to any person
you shall name there, which you may do by me when you please, for I
intend to write her soon. Terperse mentions some note or account in
his letter; but it did not come to my hand, nor does my correspondent
write anything about it. I am, Madam, your most humble servant,
(_Sic subscribitur_)
PAT. GORDON.
_Rhynic, January 26th, 1747._
Copy of a Letter, said to be written by
LORD GEORGE MURRAY or one of his friends, 1746.[192]
[192] This letter is printed in the _Lockhart Papers_, vol. ii. pp.
523-536.
[Sidenote: _fol._ 429.] In answer to what you write about the
Highland army having not behaved with their usual bravery, or that
some of their principal officers had not done their duty, which might
be the occasion of their late misfortune, I must inform you by all
I can learn, the men showed the utmost eagerness to come to action,
nor did I hear of any one officer but behaved well, so far as the
situation and circumstances would allow. The truth seems to be that
they were overpowered by a superiour force, and their field of battle
was ill-chosen, which gave the Duke of Cumberland great advantages,
especially in his canon and horse. Another misfortune they lay under
was a total want of provisions, so that they were reduced to the
hard necessity either of fighting an army a third stronger, or to
starve or disperse. As to what happened the day of the battle and the
preceding day, I shall let you know [Sidenote: _fol._ 430.] what I
could learn.
[Sidenote: 15 April.]
On the fifteenth, all those of the Highland army as were assembled
were drawn up in line of battle upon a moor south from Culloden,
facing eastwards. This was done early in the morning, as it was known
that the Duke of Cumberland was come to Nairn the night before; but
as he did not move before mid-day, it was judged he would not march
that day, it being his birthday; and as his troops had made no halt
from the time he left Aberdeen, it was reasonable to think he would
give them a day's rest. It was then proposed to make a night attack
upon the Duke of Cumberland's army in their camp, which, if it could
be done before one or two o'clock in the morning, might (though a
desperate attempt) have had a chance of succeeding. Several of the
officers listened to this, as they knew the Duke of Cumberland was
much superiour to the Highland army. The objection to it was that a
great many of the army had not as yet joined, particularly Keppoch,
the Master of Lovat, Cluny, Glengyle, the Mackenzies, and [Sidenote:
_fol._ 431.] many of the recruits of Glengary and other regiments,
which were all expected in two or three days, and some of them
sooner; that if they should fail in the attempt and be repulsed, it
would not be easy rallying the Highlanders in the dark; that if the
Duke of Cumberland was alarm'd by any of his patrollers, he might
have time to put his army in order in the camp (I suppose no spy
should give timely notice), and place his canon charged with cartouch
shot as he had a mind, and his horse might be all in readiness so
as to pursue, if the Highlanders had been beat off; and lastly, the
difficulty of making their retreat with perhaps a good many wounded
men, whom the Highlanders will never leave, be it possible to bring
them off. It is to be remarked that there was no intelligence of
the enemy's camp. Add to this, how fatiguing it would be to march
backwards and forwards twenty miles, and probably be obliged to fight
next day; nor could they make their retreat safe and not be attacked
before they joined the rest of the army.
On the other hand the Prince was vastly bent for the night-attack,
[Sidenote: _fol._ 432.] and said he had men enow to beat the enemy,
whom he believed utterly dispirited, and would never stand a bold
and brisk attack. The Duke of Perth, Lord John Drummond, with
others, seemed to wish it; and Lord George Murray, Lochgary, with
many others, were induced to make a fair trial what could be done,
though they were very sensible of the danger should it miscary.
They observed with much concern the want of provisions. The men had
only got that day a biscuit each, and some not even that.[193] It
was feared it would prove worse next day, except they could take
provisions from the enemy; and they had reason to believe if the
men were allowed to disperse to shift for some meat (which many of
them would do if the army continued there all night), that it would
be very difficult to assemble them in the event of a sudden alarm,
which, considering the nearness of the enemy, might very reasonably
be supposed; and as they must have layen that night in the muirs near
Culloden, as they had done the night before, they knew many of them
would disperse [Sidenote: _fol._ 433.] without liberty to several
miles distance for provisions and quarters, and that it would be far
in the day before they could be assembled again; and as Keppoch came
up and joined the army that afternoon, they flattered themselves that
the men they had might do if they could have made the attack by one
or two in the morning, especially if they were undiscovered, as they
had great hopes they might. For having examined the different roads,
of which they had perfect intelligence from the MacIntoshes, who
lived in those very parts, they found they could keep upon a muir the
whole way so as to shun the houses, and be a considerable way from
the highroad that leads from Inverness to Nairn. They also considered
that in the event of making the attack, should they even be beat off
without the desired success, they might before daybreak get back the
length of Culcarick,[194] which was very strong ground, and from
thence by a hill they could retire the whole way on the south side
of the water of Nairn, till they were joined by their friends whom
[Sidenote: _fol._ 434.] they expected and by the stragglers. Nor did
they believe the enemy would follow them (suppose the Highlanders
were beat back) till it were good daylight, so as they could see
about them and send out reconnoitering parties to prevent their
falling into ambuscades and snares. And before all this could be
done, the Highland army might have reached Culcarick,[195] and the
hilly ground on the south side of the water above-mentioned, where
regular troops could not easily overtake them, and where their canon
and horse (in which their greatest superiority consisted) would have
been of little use. That they found the Prince was resolved to fight
the enemy without waiting for the succours that were soon expected,
and without retiring to any strong ground, or endeavouring to draw
the Duke of Cumberland's army farther from the sea, from whence he
got all his provisions, that was brought about in ships which sailed
along it as his army marched near the shore.
[193] See ff. 157, 659.
[194] So the copy had it, but I think it should be Culraick.--ROBERT
FORBES, A.M.
[195] Scored through and 'Culraick' substituted.--[ED.]
[Sidenote: 16 April.]
For these reasons the gentlemen and most others, if not [Sidenote:
_fol._ 435.] all, who were spoke to upon the subject, seemed to think
the night attack might be attempted. But most of them thought they
were in very bad circumstances at any rate, and no attempt could be
more desperate than their present situation. Lord George Murray,
about mid-day, desired Brigadier Stapleton and Colonel Ker to cross
the Water of Nairn near where the army was drawn up (not far from the
place where the battle was fought next day) to take a view of the
hill ground on the south side of the water, which to him appeared to
be steep and uneven, consequently much properer for Highlanders, for
the ground they were drawn up upon was a large plain muir; and though
in some places it was interspersed with bogues and deep ground, yet
for the most part it was a fair field, and good for horse. After two
or three hours, they returned and reported that the ground was rough
and rugged, mossy and soft, so that no horse could be of use there;
that the ascent from the water side was steep; and that there was
about two or three places in about three or [Sidenote: _fol._ 436.]
four miles where horse could cross, the banks being inaccessible.
They could not tell what sort of ground was at a greater distance,
but the country people informed them it was much like the other. Upon
this information Lord George Murray proposed that the other side of
the water should be the place for the army to be drawn up in line
of battle next day; but this was not agreed to. It was said it was
like shunning the enemy, being a mile further from the muir they
were then upon and at a greater distance from Inverness, which it
was resolved not to abandon, a great deal of baggage and ammunition
being left there. This was before the resolution was taken of making
the night attack. About seven at night an incident happened which
had liked to have stopt their designed attempt, and upon it many
were for giving it up as impracticable. The thing was this. Numbers
of men went off to all sides, especially towards Inverness, and when
the officers who were sent on horseback to bring them back came
[Sidenote: _fol._ 437.] up with them, they could by no persuasion
be induced to return again, giving for answer--they were starving;
and said to the officers they might shoot them if they pleased, but
they could not go back till they got meat. But the Prince continued
keen for the attack, and positive to attempt it, and said there was
not a moment to be lost; for as soon as the men should see the march
begun, not one of them would flinch. It was near eight at night when
they moved, which could not be sooner, otherwise they might have
been perceived at a considerable distance, and the enemy have got
account of their march. Lord George Murray was in the van. Lord John
Drummond in the centre, and the Duke of Perth towards the rear, where
also the Prince was, having Fitz-James's horse and others with him.
Proper directions were given for small parties possessing all the
roads, that intelligence might not be carried to the enemy. There
were about two officers and thirty men of the MacIntoshes in the
front as guides, and [Sidenote: _fol._ 438.] some of the same were in
the centre and rear, and in other parts, for hindering any of the men
from straggling. Before the van had gone a mile, which was as slow
as could be to give time to the line to follow, there was express
after express sent to stop them, for that the rear was far behind.
Upon this the van marched still slower, but in a short time there
came aide-de-camps and other officers to stop them, or at least make
them go slower; and of these messages I am assured there came near
an hundred before the front got near Culraick, which retarded them
to such a degree that the night was far spent: for from the place
the army began to march to Culraick was but six miles, and they had
still four long miles to Nairn. It was now about one o'clock in the
morning, when Lord John Drummond came up to the van and told there
were several far behind; and, if they did not stop or go slower, he
was afraid the rear would not get up. In a little [Sidenote: _fol._
439.] time the Duke of Perth came also to the front, and assured that
if there was not a halt the rear could not join. There was a stop
accordingly. Lochiel had been mostly in the van all night, and his
men were next the Athol men, who were in the front. These two bodies
made about twelve hundred men. There were also several other officers
that came up, there being a defile a little way behind occasioned
by a wall of the wood of Culraick, which also retarded the march of
those that were behind. The officers, talking of the different places
of making the attack, said it was better to make the attempt with
four thousand men before daybreak, as with double the number after
it was light. Mr. O'Sullivan now having come up to the front, and
it being now evident by the time the army had taken to march little
more than six miles it would be impossible to make the other part of
the road--which was about four miles--before it was clear day-light,
besides the [Sidenote: _fol._ 440.] time that must be spent in making
the disposition for the attack, as it could not be done by the army
in the line by their long march. Mr. O'Sullivan said he had just
then come from the Prince, who was very desirous the attack should
be made; but as Lord George Murray had the van, and could judge the
time, he left it to him whether to do it or not.
There were several volunteers present, who had walked all night in
the front, such as Mr. Hepburn, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Anderson, and others;
and as the Duke of Perth, Lord John Drummond, and other officers
seemed to be much difficulted what to resolve upon, Lord George
Murray desired the rest of the gentlemen to give their opinions, for
they were all deeply concerned in the consequence. It was agreed
upon all hands that it must be sun-rise before the army could reach
Nairn and form, so as to make an attempt upon the enemy's camp; for
one part was to have passed the water a mile above the town, to have
fallen upon them towards the sea-side. The [Sidenote: _fol._ 441.]
volunteers were all very keen to march. Some of them said that the
red-coats would be all drunk, as they surely had solemnised the Duke
of Cumberland's birth-day; and that, though it were day-light, they
would be in such confusion they would not withstand the Highlanders.
This opinion shewed abundance of courage, for these gentlemen
would have been in the first rank had there been any attack. But
the officers were of different sentiments, as severals of them
expressed.[196] Lochiel and his brother said they had been as much
for the night attack as anybody could be, and it was not their fault
that it had not been done; but blamed those in the rear that had
marched so slow, and retarded the rest of the army. Lord George
Murray was of the same way of thinking, and said, if they could have
made the attack, it was the best chance they had, especially if they
could have surprized the enemy. But to attack a camp that was near
double their number in day-light, when they would [Sidenote: _fol._
442.] be prepared to receive them, would be perfect madness.
[196] See ff. 158, 661, 1270.
By this time Mr. John Hay came up and told the line was joined.
He was told the resolution was taken to return. He began to argue
upon the point, but nobody minded him. This was the gentleman the
army blamed for the distress they were in for want of provisions,
he having had the superintendency of all these things from the time
of Mr. Murray's illness, who had always been extremely active in
whatsoever regarded the providing for the army. It was about two
o'clock in the morning (the halt being not above a quarter of an
hour) when they went back in two columns, the rear facing about, and
the van taking another way. At a little distance they had a view of
the fires of the Duke of Cumberland's camp; and, as they did not
shun passing near houses as they had done in advancing, they marched
very quick. Day-light began to [Sidenote: _fol._ 443.] appear about
an hour after. They got to Culloden pretty early, so that the men
had three or four hours' rest. They killed what cattle or sheep they
could find; but few of them had time to make anything ready before
the alarm came of the enemy's being upon their march and approaching.
The horse of the Prince's army had been all on such hard duty
for several days and nights before that none of them were fit for
patroling. At that time, Fitz-James's horse and several others had
gone to Inverness to refresh, so at first it was not known whether
it was an advanced party or the Duke of Cumberland's whole army.
However, the Highlanders got ready as quick as possible, and marched
through the parks of Culloden in battalions (just as they chanced
to be lying) to the muir on the south side, facing eastwards, and
about half a mile farther back than where they had been drawn up
the night before. Lord George Murray proposed once more to pass the
Water of Nairn, as being the strongest ground, and much the fitter
[Sidenote: _fol._ 444.] for Highlanders. Cluny, who was expected
every moment, was to come on that side; but it was not agreed upon
for the same reason given the day before. Lord George, speaking to
Mr. O'Sullivan, he told him that he was afraid the enemy would have
great advantage in that plain muir, both in their horse and canon.
But he, O'Sullivan, answered that he was sure horse could be of no
use, because there were several bogues and morasses; but the event
proved otherwise. Mr. O'Sullivan drew up the army in line of battle
(he being both adjutant and quarter-master-general), and having shown
every battalion their place, the right closed to some inclosures near
the Water of Nairn, and the left towards the parks of Culloden. I
cannot justly tell what order they were drawn up in. There had been
some disputes a day or two before about their rank, but nobody that
had any regard for the common cause would insist upon such things
upon that occasion. Those who had [Sidenote: _fol._ 445.] gone off
the night before and early that morning to Inverness and other
parts had now joined, and the Master of Lovat was come up with a
considerable recruit of his men. It was observed that upon the right
there were park walls, under cover of which so many of the enemy
could draw up and flank the Highlanders. Lord George Murray, who
commanded that wing, was very desirous to have advanced and thrown
them down; but as this would have broke the line, and the enemy
forming their line of battle near that place, it was judged by those
about him too dangerous to attempt.
Both armies being fully formed, the canonading began on both sides,
after which there was some small alteration made in the disposition
of the two armies by bringing troops from the second line to the
first, as both the ends advanced to out-flank one another. The
Highlanders were much galled by the enemy's canon and were turned so
impatient that they [Sidenote: _fol._ 446.] were like to break their
ranks. Upon which it was judged proper to attack, and orders were
given accordingly. The right wing advanced first as the whole line
did much at the same time. The left wing did not attack the enemy, at
least did not go in sword in hand, imagining they would be flanked by
a regiment of foot and some horse, which the enemy brought up at that
time from their second line or corps de reserve. When the right wing
were within pistol-shot of the enemy they received a most terrible
fire not only in front but also in flank by reason of those that were
posted near the stone walls, notwithstanding of which they went on
sword in hand, after giving their fire close to the enemy, and were
received by them with their spontoons and bayonets. The two regiments
of foot that were upon the enemy's left would have been cut to pieces
had they not been immediately supported by other two regiments from
their second line. As it was, these two regiments [Sidenote: _fol._
447.] (being Barrel's and that called Monroe's) had by their own
confession above two hundred men killed and wounded. Two regiments of
dragoons coming in upon the same side entirely broke that wing of the
Highlanders, and though three battalions of the right of the second
line were brought up and gave their fire very well, yet the ground
and everything else was so favourable for the enemy that nothing
could be done but a total route ensued.
I am positively informed that the Highland army did not consist
of above seven thousand fighting men,[197] and that the Duke of
Cumberland's must have been ten or twelve thousand. In the one army
there were not above an hundred and fifty horse, of which one half
was of the regiment of Fitz-James. In the other army they had eleven
or twelve hundred.
[197] See ff. 128, 1275.
When a misfortune happens people are apt to throw the blame upon
persons or causes, which frequently are either [Sidenote: _fol._
448.] the effect of malice or ignorance, without knowing the real
springs and motives. Severals are of opinion that the night attack
could have been made, but I am convinced of the contrary for the
following reasons. The Highland army, when they halted near Culraick,
were not above five thousand men. They had four miles to march, and
part of them were obliged to have made a considerable circumference
so that it would have been sun-rise before they could have made the
attack. The ground about Nairn where the enemy lay encamped was a
hard, dry soil, and plain muirs three miles round about except where
the sea intervened; the nearest strong and uneven ground being the
wood of Culraick. Let it be supposed the Highlanders had made an
attack in the broad day-light upon an enemy double their number in
their camp, who were well refreshed with a day and two nights' rest,
with plenty of all kinds of provisions, with their canon pointed
as they thought [Sidenote: _fol._ 449.] proper, their horse drawn
up to their wish in a fine plain, what must the consequence have
been? What would have been said of officers that led on men in such
circumstances and such a situation? Would it not have been certain
death and destruction of all those that made the attack? Would it not
have been said and justly said, Why go you on in such a desperate
attempt seeing it could not be done by surprize and undiscovered as
projected? Why not try the chance of a fair battle by returning and
being joined by the rest of the army as well as by those who had
withdrawn the night before, and a great many others who were hourly
expected; where also they might have canon and choice of the field of
battle? By this means there was a fair chance, by others there was
none.
As to the above-mentioned facts you may rely upon them. I saw the
Duke of Perth, the Duke of Athol, Lord John Drummond, Lord George
Murray, Lord Ogilvie, Colonel Stewart of Ardshiel, Colonel Roy
Stewart, Lord Nairn, and several others, at Ruthven of Badenoch on
the Friday two days [Sidenote: _fol._ 450.] after the battle, and
they all agreed on the same things.
[Sidenote: April.]
One thing I must take notice of, that from the beginning of the
whole affair there never had been the least dispute[198] or
misunderstanding among the officers. Some find fault that the night
march was undertaken seeing there was not a certainty of marching to
Nairn time enough to make the attack before day-light, as also that
they had too few men.
[198] I am afraid this is not fact, for disputes and canglings arose
even in the Abbey at Edinburgh, and I have heard some affirm, who
had an opportunity of knowing, that these were owing to the haughty,
restless, unaccountable temper of Lord George Murray, some of whose
blood-relations fail not to lay blame upon him. Witness likewise the
contest betwixt Keppoch and Lochiel about the right hand before they
went out to fight Cope, a particular account of which dispute I had
from Major MacDonald in the Castle of Edinburgh.