The fundamental law of Norway to-day is the Eidsvold constitution (p. 579)

of April, 1814, revised, November 4 following, to comport with the

conditions of the union with Sweden. The original instrument was not

only democratic in tone, but doctrinaire. With little in the nature of

native institutions upon which to build, the framers laid hold of

features of the French, English, American, and other foreign systems,

in the effort to transplant to Norwegian soil a body of political

forms and usages calculated to produce a high order of popular

government. No inconsiderable portion of these forms and usages

survived the revision enforced by the failure to achieve national

independence. Of this portion, however, several proved impracticable,

and constitutional amendments after 1814 were numerous. Upon the

establishment of independence in 1905 the fundamental law was modified

further by the elimination from it of all reference to the former

Swedish affiliation. The constitution to-day comprises one hundred

twelve articles, of which forty-six deal with the executive branch of

the government, thirty-seven with citizenship and the legislative

power, six with the judiciary, and twenty-three with matters of a

miscellaneous character. The process of amendment is appreciably more

difficult than that by which changes may be introduced in the Swedish

instrument.[811] Proposed amendments may be presented in the Storthing

only during the first regular session following a national election,

and they may be adopted only at a regular session following the

ensuing election, and by a two-thirds vote. It is required,

furthermore, that such amendments "shall never contravene the

principles of the constitution, but shall relate only to such

modifications in particular provisions as will not change the spirit

of the instrument."[812]

[Footnote 811: See p. 589.]

[Footnote 812: Art. 112. Dodd, Modern

Constitutions, II., 143. An English version of the

Norwegian constitution is printed in Dodd, ibid.,

II., 123-143, and in H. L. Braekstad, The

Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway (London,

1905). The standard treatise on the Norwegian

system of government is T. H. Aschehoug, Norges

Nuvaerende Statsforfatning (2d ed., Christiania,

1891-1893); but a more available work is an earlier

one by the same author, Das Staatsrecht der

vereinigten Königreiche Schweden und Norwegen

(Freiburg, 1886), in Marquardsen's Handbuch. The

most recent and, on the whole the most useful,

treatise is B. Morgenstierne, Das Staatsrecht des

Königreichs Norwegen (Tübingen, 1911).]

*639. The Crown and the Council.*--The government of Norway, like (p. 580)

that of Sweden and of Denmark, is in form a limited hereditary

monarchy. The popular element in it is both legally and actually more

considerable than in the constitutional system of either of the sister

Scandinavian states; none the less, the principle of monarchy is

firmly entrenched, and, as has been pointed out, not even the overturn

of 1905 endangered it seriously. The constitution contains provisions

respecting the succession to the throne, the conduct of affairs during

a minority, and the establishment of a regency, which need not be

recounted here, but which are designed to meet every possible

contingency. In the event of the absolute default of a legal successor

the Storthing is empowered to elect.

Supreme executive authority is vested in the king, who must be an

adherent of the Lutheran Church, and who at his accession is required

to take oath in the presence of the Storthing to govern in conformity

with the constitution and laws. Associated with the king is a Council

of State, upon which, since the king may be neither censured nor

impeached, devolves responsibility for virtually all executive acts.

The Council consists of a minister of state, or premier, and at least

seven other members. All are appointed by the crown, and all must be

Norwegian citizens not less than thirty years of age and adherents of

the established Lutheran faith. The king may apportion the business of

state among the councillors as he desires. There are at present, in

addition to the ministry of state, eight ministerial portfolios, i.e.,

Foreign Affairs, Justice, Worship and Instruction, Agriculture,

Labor, Finance, Defense, and Commerce, Navigation and Industry. All

ministers are regularly members of the Storthing, though by the

constitution the crown is authorized for special reasons to add to the

Council members who possess no legislative seats. The heir to the

throne, if eighteen years of age, is entitled to a seat in the

Council, but without vote or responsibility.

*640. The Exercise of Executive Powers.*--Most of the powers which are

possessed by the king may be exercised by him only in conjunction with

the Council. Like the fundamental law of Sweden, that of Norway

stipulates that, while it shall be the duty of every member of the

Council to express his opinion freely, and of the king to give ear to

all such opinions, it "shall remain with the king to decide according

to his own judgment."[813] None the less, the acts of the crown are,

as a rule, those not only, legally, of the king _in_ council but,

actually, of the king _and_ council. With the exception of military

commands, all orders issued by the king must be countersigned by the

minister of state, and ministers may be impeached at any time by (p. 581)

the Odelsthing before the Rigsret, or Court of Impeachment; so that,

in effect, there is a close approach to the parliamentary system of

ministerial responsibility. Under these conditions, the crown appoints

all civil, ecclesiastical, and military officials; removes higher

officials (including the ministers) without previous judicial

sentence; pardons offenders after conviction; regulates religious

services, assemblies, and meetings; issues and repeals regulations

concerning commerce, customs, industry, and public order; and enforces

the laws of the realm. The king is commander-in-chief of the land and

naval forces, though these forces may not be increased or diminished,

or placed at the service of a foreign sovereign or state, without the

consent of the Storthing. And the king has the power to mobilize

troops, to commence war and conclude peace, to enter into and to

withdraw from alliances, and to send and to receive ambassadors.[814]

[Footnote 813: Art. 30. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,

II., 128.]

[Footnote 814: Arts. 16, 17, 20-26. Dodd, Modern

Constitutions, II., 125-127.]

IV. THE STORTHING--POLITICAL PARTIES

*641. Electoral System: the Franchise.*--Among the legislatures of

Europe that of Norway is unique. In structure it represents a curious

cross between the principles of unicameral and bicameral organization.

It comprises essentially a single body, which, however, for purely

legislative purposes is divided into two chambers, or sections, the

Lagthing and the Odelsthing. This division is made subsequent to the

election of the members, so that representatives are chosen simply to

the Storthing as a whole. The elections take place every third year.

There are forty-one urban, and eighty-two rural, districts, and every

district returns one member--a total of 123.

Formerly the franchise rested, as in Sweden, upon a property

qualification; but by a series of suffrage reforms within the past

decade and a half it has been brought about that in respect to

electoral privileges Norway is to-day the most democratic of European

countries. In 1898 the Liberal government of Steen procured the

enactment of a measure which long had occupied a leading place in the

programme of the radical elements. By it the parliamentary franchise

was conferred upon all male citizens of a minimum age of twenty-five

years who have resided at least five years in Norway and who have

suffered no judicial impairment of civil rights. The effect was to

double at a stroke the national electorate. In 1901 the same Government

carried an important bill by which the suffrage in municipal elections

was conferred upon male citizens without restriction (save that of age),

upon all unmarried women twenty-five years of age who pay taxes on (p. 582)

an annual income of not less than 300 kronor, and upon all married

women of similar age whose husbands are taxed in equivalent amounts.

During ensuing years there was widespread agitation in behalf of the

parliamentary franchise for women, and the Liberal party made this one

of the principal items in its programme. June 14, 1907, by a vote of

73 to 48, the Storthing rejected a proposal that women be given the

parliamentary franchise on the same terms as men, but by the decisive

majority of 96 to 25 it conferred the privilege upon all women who

were in possession of the municipal franchise under the law of 1901.

The rapidity with which woman's suffrage sentiment had developed is

indicated by the fact that as late as 1898 a proposal looking toward

the including of women in the parliamentary electorate had received in

the Storthing a total of but 33 votes. By the legislation of 1907

Norway became the first of European nations to confer upon women,

under any conditions, the privilege of voting for members of the

national legislative body and of sitting as members of that body. At

the elections of 1909, the first in which women participated, no

revolutionizing effects were observed. The electorate, however, was

increased by approximately 300,000, which was somewhat over half of

the kingdom's total female population of the requisite age.[815] April

30, 1910, the Constitutional Committee of the Storthing, by a majority

of four to three, recommended that parliamentary suffrage be extended

to women on equal terms with men, i.e., without reference to taxpaying

qualifications. The recommendation was rejected, but during the next

month the Odelsthing voted, 71 to 10, and the Lagthing, 24 to 7, to

apply the principle of it in municipal elections. Thus the municipal

electorate was enlarged by approximately 200,000, and the way was

prepared, as many believe, for the adoption eventually of the

Committee's original recommendation. Prior to an amendment of May 25,

1905, parliamentary elections were indirect. In the urban districts

one elector was chosen for every fifty voters, and in the rural

districts, one for every one hundred. Now, however, elections are

direct. Each petty political unit having a municipal government of its

own comprises a voting precinct. If at the first ballot no candidate

in the district receives a majority of all the votes cast, a second

ballot is taken, when a simple plurality is decisive. A noteworthy

feature of the system is the fact that voters who on account of

illness, military service, or other valid reason, are unable to appear

at the polls are permitted to transmit their votes in writing to the

proper election officials.

[Footnote 815: At the election of 1909 the total

number of parliamentary electors was 785,358. The

number of votes recorded, however, was but

487,193.]

*642. Qualifications, Sessions, and Organization.*--No one may be (p. 583)

chosen a member of the Storthing unless he or she is thirty years

of age, a resident of the kingdom of ten years' standing, and a

qualified voter in the election district in which he or she is chosen;

but a former member of the Council of State, if otherwise qualified,

may be elected to represent any district.[816] Under recent

legislation every member of the Storthing receives a salary of three

thousand kroner a year, in addition to travelling expenses. The

Storthing meets in regular session annually, without regard to summons

by the crown. The constitution fixed originally as the date of

convening the first week-day after October 10 of each year; but, May

28, 1907, the Storthing adopted an amendment whereby, beginning with

1908, the meeting time was changed to the first week-day after January

10. For sufficient reasons, an extraordinary session may be convoked

by the king at any time. The length of sessions is indeterminate,

except that an extraordinary session may be adjourned by the crown at

will, and no session, extraordinary or regular, may be prolonged

beyond two months without the king's consent. At its first regular

session following a general election the Storthing divides itself into

two chambers. A fourth of the membership is designated to constitute

the Lagthing, the remaining three-fourths comprise the Odelsthing; and

the division thus effected holds until the succeeding election. Each

chamber elects its own president, secretary, and other officers.

Sessions are public, and business may not be transacted unless at

least two-thirds of the members are present.

[Footnote 816: Arts. 59-64. Dodd, Modern

Constitutions, II., 134-135.]

*643. Powers and Procedure of the Storthing.*--The powers of the

Storthing, as enumerated in the constitution, include the enactment

and the repeal of laws; the levying of taxes, imposts, and duties; the

appropriating and the borrowing of money; the regulating of the

currency; the examining of treaties concluded with foreign powers; the

inspection of the records of the Council of State; the making of

provision for the auditing of the national accounts; and regulation of

the naturalization of foreigners.[817] All bills are required to be

presented first in the Odelsthing, by one of the members of the body,

or by the Government, through a councillor of state. Only in the event

that a measure passes the Odelsthing is it presented at all in the

Lagthing, for the sole function of the smaller chamber is to act as a

check upon the larger one. The Lagthing may either approve or reject a

bill which the Odelsthing submits, but may not amend it. A measure

rejected is returned, with reasons for the rejection. Three courses

are then open to the Odelsthing: to drop the measure, to submit it in

amended form, or to resubmit it unchanged. When a bill from the (p. 584)

Odelsthing has been twice presented to the Lagthing, and has been a

second time rejected, the two chambers are convened in joint session,

and in this consolidated body proposals are carried by a two-thirds

vote. All questions pertaining to the revision of the constitution are

required to be voted upon in this manner.

[Footnote 817: Art. 75. Ibid., II., 136.]

*644. The Veto Power.*--A bill passed by the Storthing is laid forthwith

before the king. If he approves it, the measure becomes law. If he

does not approve it, he returns it to the Odelsthing with a statement

of his reasons for disapproval. A measure which has been vetoed may

not again be submitted to the king by the same Storthing. The royal

veto, however, is not absolute. "If," says the constitution, "a

measure has been passed without change by three regular Storthings

convened after three separate successive elections, and separated from

each other by at least two intervening regular sessions, without any

conflicting action having in the meantime been taken in any session

between its first and last passage, and is then presented to the king

with the request that his majesty will not refuse his approval to a

measure which the Storthing, after the most mature deliberation,

considers beneficial, such measure shall become law even though the

king fails to approve it...."[818] In the days of the Swedish union

the precise conditions under which the royal veto might be exercised

were the subject of interminable controversy. In respect to ordinary

legislation the stipulations of the constitution were plain enough,

but in respect to measures which in essence comprised constitutional

amendments the silence of that instrument afforded room for wide

differences of opinion. An especially notable conflict was that which

took place in the early eighties respecting a proposal to admit the

Norwegian ministers to the Storthing with the privilege of

participation in the deliberations of that body. The measure was

passed by overwhelming majorities by three Storthings after three

successive general elections, and in accordance with the constitution,

under the Norwegian interpretation, it ought thereupon to have been

recognized as law. The king, however, not only refused to approve the

bill, but asserted firmly that his right to exercise an absolute veto

in constitutional questions was "above all doubt"; and when the

Storthing pronounced the measure law without the royal sanction, both

crown and Swedish ministry avowed that by them it would not be

recognized as valid. In the end (in 1884) the Storthing won, but the

issue was revived upon numerous occasions. Under the independent

monarchy of 1905 there has been no difficulty of the sort; nor, in

view of the eminently popular aspect of kingship in Norway to-day, (p. 585)

is such difficulty likely to arise.

[Footnote 818: Art. 79. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,

II., 137-138.]

*645. Political Parties: Liberals and Conservatives.*--Prior to the

accession of Oscar II., in 1872, the preponderating fact in the

political development of the kingdom was the gradual growth of

parliamentary power on the part of the representatives of the

peasantry. Between 1814 and 1830 the business of the Storthing was

conducted almost wholly by members of the upper and official classes,

but during the decade 1830-1840 the peasantry rose to the position of

a highly influential class in the public affairs of the nation. The

first of the so-called "peasant Storthings" was that of 1833. In it

the peasant representatives numbered forty-five, upwards of half of

the body. Under the leadership of Ole Ueland, who was a member of

every Storthing between 1833 and 1869, the peasant party made its

paramount issue, as a rule, the reduction of taxation and the practice

of economy in the national finances.

After 1870 the intensification of the Swedish-Norwegian question led

to the drawing afresh of party lines, and until the separation of

1905, the new grouping continued fairly stable. By the amalgamation of

the peasant party, led by Jaabaek, and the so-called "lawyers" party,

led by Johan Sverdrup, there came into being in the seventies a great

Liberal party (the Venstre, or Left) whose fundamental purpose was to

safeguard the liberties of Norway as against Swedish aggression. Until

1884 this party of nationalism was obliged to content itself with the

rôle of opposition. Governmental control was lodged as yet in the

Conservatives, whose attitude toward Sweden was distinctly

conciliatory. In 1880 the Conservative leader, Frederick Stang,

resigned the premiership, but his successor was another Conservative,

Selmer. At the elections of 1882 the Liberals obtained no fewer than

82 of the 114 seats in the Storthing. Still the Conservatives refused

to yield. In the meantime the Odelsthing had brought the entire

ministry to impeachment before the Rigsret for having advised the king

to interpose his veto to the measure giving ministers seats in

Parliament. Early in 1883 Selmer and seven of his colleagues were

sentenced to forfeiture of their offices, and the remaining three were

fined. March 11, 1884, the king announced his purpose to abide by the

decision of the court, distasteful to him as it was, and the Selmer

cabinet was requested to resign. An attempt to prolong yet further the

tenure of the Conservatives failed completely, and, June 23, 1884, the

king sent for Sverdrup and authorized the formation of the first

Liberal ministry in Norwegian history. The principal achievement of

the new government was the final enactment of the long-contested (p. 586)

measure according parliamentary seats to ministers. To this project

the king at last gave his consent.

*646. The Ministerial Succession to 1905.*--The Sverdrup ministry

endured almost exactly four years. In 1887 the party supporting it

split upon a question of ecclesiastical policy, and at the elections

of 1888 the Conservatives obtained fifty-one seats, while of the

sixty-three Liberals returned not more than twenty-six were really in

sympathy with Sverdrup. July 12, 1889, Sverdrup and his colleagues

resigned. Then followed a rapid succession of ministries, practically

every one of which met its fate, sooner or later, upon some question

pertaining to the Swedish union: (1) that of Emil Stang[819]

(Conservative), July 12, 1889, to March 5, 1891; (2) that of Johannes

Steen (Liberal), which lasted until April, 1893; (3) a second Stang

ministry, to February, 1895; and (4) the coalition ministry of

Professor Hagerup, to February, 1898. At the elections of 1897 the

Liberals won a signal victory, carrying seventy-nine of the one

hundred fourteen seats, and in February of the next year there was

established a second Steen ministry, under whose direction, as has

appeared, there was carried the law introducing manhood suffrage.

Steen retired in April, 1902, and another Liberal government, that of

Blehr, held office until October, 1903. At the elections of 1903 the

Conservatives and Moderates obtained sixty-three seats, the Liberals

fifty, and the Socialists four. A second Hagerup ministry filled the

period between October 23, 1903, and March 1, 1905, and upon its

retirement there was constituted, under circumstances which involved

temporarily the all but complete annihilation of party lines, a

coalition ministry under Christian Michelsen, at whose hands was

brought about immediately the separation from Sweden and the

constitutional readjustments of 1905.

[Footnote 819: Son of the earlier premier,

Frederick Stang.]

*647. Party History Since the Separation.*--Following the subsidence of

the excitement attending the separation the party alignments of

earlier days tended rapidly to reappear. The old issues, however, had

been disposed of, and in their place sprang up new ones, largely

social and economic in character. At the elections of 1906 the

subjects to which the Liberals gave most prominence were female

suffrage, old age pensions, and sickness and unemployment insurance.

The Michelsen government, which was essentially Conservative, issued a

moderate reform programme and, alleging that former party lines were

obsolete, called upon the citizens of all classes for support. The

elections were notable chiefly by reason of the fact that the Social

Democrats increased their quota in the Storthing to eleven. Despite

attacks of the more radical Left, the Michelsen cabinet stood firm (p. 587)

until October 28, 1907, when the premier, by reason of ill health, was

obliged to retire. Lövland, the minister of foreign affairs,

succeeded; but, March 14, 1908, on a vote of want of confidence, his

ministry was overthrown. A new cabinet was made up thereupon by the

Liberal leader, Gunnar Knudsen. At the elections of 1909--the first in

which women participated--this Liberal government lost the slender

majority which it had possessed, and January 27, 1910, it resigned.

Prior to the elections there were in the Storthing fifty-nine

Liberals, fifty-four Conservatives and Moderates, and ten Social

Democrats. Afterwards there were sixty-three Conservatives and

Moderates, forty-seven Liberals, eleven Social Democrats, and two

Independents. The popular vote of the Social Democrats was much in

excess of that at any former election, but it was so distributed that

the party realized from it but a single additional legislative seat.

Upon the resignation of Knudsen the premiership was offered to

Michelsen, whose health, however, precluded his accepting it. February

1, 1910, a Conservative-Moderate ministry was made up by Konow.

February 19, 1912, it was succeeded by another ministry of the same

type, under the premiership of the former president of the Storthing,

Bratlie. At the elections of November 12, 1912, the Government lost

heavily to the Liberals and to the Social Democrats. The socialist

quota now numbers twenty-three.[820]

[Footnote 820: A brief account of Norwegian

political parties to 1900 will be found in Lavisse

et Rambaud, Histoire Générale, XII., 266-274; to

1906, in Cambridge Modern History, XII., 280-290.

For additional references see pp. 578-579.]

V. THE JUDICIARY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

*648. The Courts.*--For the administration of civil justice the kingdom

of Norway is divided into 105 districts--eighty rural and twenty-five

urban--in each of which there is a court of first instance composed of

two justices chosen by the people. There are three higher tribunals,

each with a chief justice and two associates. At the top stands the

Höiesteret, or Supreme Court, consisting of a chief justice and six

associates. The decisions of the Supreme Court may be neither appealed

nor reviewed. For the trial of criminal cases, as regulated by law of

July 1, 1887, there exist two types of tribunals: (1) the Lagmandsret,

consisting of a president and ten jurors and (2) the Meddomsret,

consisting of a judge and two non-professional assistants chosen for

each case. There are in the kingdom four Lagdömmer, or jury districts,

each divided into circuits corresponding, as a rule, to the counties.

The jury courts take cognizance of the more serious cases. "No (p. 588)

one," the constitution stipulates, "shall be tried except in

accordance with law or punished except by virtue of a judicial

sentence; and examination by means of torture is forbidden."[821] The

members of the Lagthing, together with those of the Supreme Court,

comprise the Rigsret, or Court of Impeachment. This tribunal tries,

without appeal, cases involving charges of misconduct in office

brought by the Odelsthing against members of the Council of State, the

Supreme Court, or the Storthing.[822]

[Footnote 821: Art. 96. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,

II., 141.]

[Footnote 822: Arts. 86-87. Ibid., II., 139.]

*649. Local Government.*--For purposes of administration the kingdom is

divided into twenty regions--the cities of Christiania and Bergen and

eighteen _Amter_, or counties. At the head of each is an Amtmand, or

prefect, who is appointed by the crown. The principal local unit is

the _Herred_, or commune, of which there are upwards of seven hundred,

mostly rural parishes. As a rule, the government of the commune is

vested in a body of twelve to forty-eight representatives and a

Formaend, or council, elected by and from the representatives and

comprising one-fourth of their number. Every third year the

representatives choose from among the members of the council a

chairman and a deputy chairman; and, under the presidency of the

Amtmand, the chairmen of the rural communes within each county meet

yearly as an Amtsthing, or county diet, and adopt the budget of the

county. Since the municipal electoral law of 1910 members of the

communal councils are chosen on a basis of universal suffrage for both

men and women.

CHAPTER XXXII (p. 589)

THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN

I. THE CONSTITUTION--THE CROWN AND THE MINISTRY

*650. The Fundamental Laws.*--The constitution of the kingdom of Sweden

is one of the most elaborate instruments of its kind in existence. It

comprises a group of fundamental laws of which the most comprehensive

is the _regerings-formen_ of June 6, 1809, in 114 articles.[823]

Closely related are (1) the law of royal succession of September 26,

1810; (2) the law of July 16, 1812, on the liberty of the press; and

(3) the law of June 26, 1866, providing for a reorganization of the

legislative chambers. The organs and powers of government are defined

in much detail, but there is nothing equivalent to the bill of rights

which finds a place in most European constitutions. The process of

amendment is easy and minor amendments have been frequent. Amendments

may originate with either the crown or the legislative houses, and any

amendment which receives the assent of the crown is declared to be

adopted if, after having been proposed or approved by one Riksdag, it

is sanctioned by the succeeding one. Through the re-election of the

lower chamber, which must intervene between the two stages, the people

have some opportunity to participate in the amending process.[824]

[Footnote 823: See p. 572.]

[Footnote 824: Arts. 81-82. Dodd, Modern

Constitutions, II., 240. In 1908 the ex-premier

Staaff proposed that when the two chambers should

disagree upon questions concerning the constitution

and general laws resort should be had to a popular

referendum; but the suggestion was negatived by the

upper house unanimously and by the lower by a vote

of 115 to 78. The text of the Swedish constitution,

together with the supplementary fundamental laws of

the kingdom, is contained in W. Uppström, Sveriges

Grundlager och konstitutionela stadgar jemte

kommunallagarne samt Norges Grundlov (6th ed.,

Stockholm, 1903). An English version is printed in

Dodd, Modern Constitutions, II., 219-251, and a

French one in Dareste, Constitutions Modernes (3d

ed.), II., 46-114. The best brief treatise upon

Swedish constitutional history is P. Fahlbeck, La

constitution suédoise et le parlementarisme moderne

(Paris, 1905). The best description of the Swedish

government as it was a quarter of a century ago is

T. H. Aschehoug, Das Staatsrecht der vereinigten

königreiche Schweden und Norwegen (Freiburg, 1886),

in Marquardsen's Handbuch. The principal treatise

in Swedish is C. Naumann, Sveriges

statsförfatningsrätt (2d ed., Stockholm,

1879-1884).]

*651. The Crown and the Ministry.*--At the head of the state (p. 590)

stands the king. The monarchy is hereditary, and the crown is

transmitted in the male line in the order of primogeniture. It is

required that the king shall belong invariably to the Lutheran Church

and that at his accession he shall take an oath to maintain

scrupulously the laws of the land. With the king is associated a

Statsrad, or Council of State, appointed by the crown "from among

capable, experienced, honest persons of good reputation, who are

Swedes by birth, and who belong to the pure, evangelical faith."[825]

By constitutional requirement the Council is composed of eleven

members, one of whom is designated by the king as minister of state

and president of the council, or premier. Of the eleven eight are

heads of the departments, respectively, of Foreign Affairs, Justice,

Land Defense, Naval Defense, Home Affairs, Finance, Agriculture, and

Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs. The president and two other

members are ministers without portfolio.

[Footnote 825: Art. 4. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,

II., 220.]

*652. The Exercise of Executive Powers.*--The powers of the Swedish

executive are large. A few are exercised by the crown alone; some by

the crown in conjunction with a small specified number of ministers;

the majority by the crown and entire ministry conjointly. The king

acts independently as the commander-in-chief of the land and naval

forces of the kingdom. He may conclude treaties and alliances with

foreign powers, after having consulted the minister of state, the

minister of foreign affairs, and one other member of the Council. But

if he wishes to declare war or to conclude peace he must convene in

special session the full membership of the Council and must require of

each member separately his opinion. "The king may then," it is

stipulated, "make and execute such a decision as he considers for the

best interests of the country."[826] In other words, in such a matter

the king is obliged to consult, but not necessarily to be guided by,

his ministerial advisers.

[Footnote 826: Art. 13. Ibid., 223.]

In general, it may be affirmed that this is the principle which

underlies the organization of the Swedish executive. After having been

prepared by one or more of the ministers, projects are considered by

the king in council; but the right of ultimate decision rests with the

king. It is thus that appointments to all national offices are made,

titles of nobility are conferred, ordinances are promulgated, texts of

new laws are framed, and questions of peace and war are determined.

Nominally, the ministers are responsible to the Riksdag for all acts

of the Government. But the constitution plainly states that after

matters have been discussed in the Council "the king alone shall have

the power to decide."[827] If the king's decision is palpably (p. 591)

contrary to the constitution or the general laws, the ministers are

authorized to enter protest. But that is all that they may do. The

ministers have seats in the Riksdag, where they participate in debate

and, in the name of the crown, initiate legislation. But their

responsibility lies so much more directly to the king than to the

legislature that what is commonly understood as the parliamentary

system can hardly be said to exist in the kingdom.

[Footnote 827: Art. 9. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,

II., 221.]

II. THE RIKSDAG: ELECTORAL SYSTEM

*653. Establishment of the Bicameral System, 1866.*--Until past the

middle of the nineteenth century the Swedish Riksdag, or diet,

comprised still an assemblage of the four estates of the realm--the

nobles, the clergy, the burghers, and the peasants. Throughout several

decades a preponderating political question was that of substituting

for this essentially mediæval arrangement a modern bicameral

legislative system. In 1840 the Riksdag itself insisted upon a change,

but the king, Charles XIV., refused to give his assent. During the

reign of Oscar I. (1844-1859) several proposals were forthcoming, but

none met with acceptance. It was left to Charles XV. (1859-1872), in

collaboration with his able minister of justice, Baron Louis Gerhard

de Geer, to effect the much-needed reform. In January, 1863, the

Government submitted to the Estates a measure whereby there was to be

constituted a Riksdag of two chambers--an upper one, which should be

essentially an aristocratic senate, and a lower, whose members should

be elected triennially by the people. In 1865 all of the four estates

acted favorably upon the bill and, January 22, 1866, the measure was

promulgated by the crown as an integral part of the fundamental law of

the kingdom. September 1, 1866, there were held the first national

elections under the new system. Since 1866 the upper chamber has

represented principally the old estates of the nobles and clergy, and

the lower has comprised the combined representatives of the townsmen

and peasants. The one has been conservative, and even aristocratic;

the other, essentially democratic. But the reform has contributed

greatly to the breaking up of the ancient rigidity of the Swedish

constitution and has opened the way for a parliamentary leadership on

the part of the commons which was impossible so long as each of four

orders was in possession of an equal voice and vote in legislative

business.

*654. The Upper Chamber.*--The membership of both houses of the Riksdag

is wholly elective, that of the upper indirectly, and that of the (p. 592)

lower directly, by the people. The upper house consists of 150 members

chosen by ballot, after the principle of proportional representation,

for a term of six years by the twenty-five Landsthings, or provincial

representative assemblies, and by the corporations of five of the

larger towns--Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö, Norrköping, and Gäfle. These

electoral bodies are arranged in six groups, in one of which an

election takes place in September of every year. The franchise

arrangements under which they are themselves chosen are still

determined principally with reference to property or income, but they

are no longer so undemocratic as they were prior to the electoral

reform of 1909, and whereas the elections were previously indirect,

they are now direct. No person may be elected to the upper chamber who

is not of Swedish birth, who has not attained his thirty-fifth year,

and who during three years prior to his election has not owned taxable

property valued at 50,000 kroner or paid taxes on an annual income of

at least 3,000 kroner.[828] A member who at any time loses these

qualifications forthwith forfeits his seat. Members formerly received

no compensation, but under the reform measure of 1909 they, as

likewise members of the lower chamber, are accorded a salary of 1,200

kroner for each session of four months, and, in the event of an extra

session, 10 kroner a day, in addition to travelling expenses.

[Footnote 828: These amounts were substituted in

1909 for 80,000 and 4,000 respectively.]

*655. The Lower Chamber.*--As constituted by law of 1894, modified by

the reform act of 1909, the lower chamber consists of 230 members

chosen under a system of proportional representation in fifty-six

electoral districts, each of which returns from three to seven

deputies. The number of members to be chosen in each of the districts

is determined triennially, immediately preceding the balloting. Prior

to the franchise law of 1909 the suffrage was confined, through

property qualifications, within very narrow bounds. The electorate

comprised native Swedes twenty-five years of age or over who were

qualified as municipal voters and who possessed real property to the

taxed value of 1,000 kroner, or who paid taxes on an annual income of

at least 800 kroner, or who possessed a leasehold interest for at

least five years of a taxable value of 6,000 kroner. In 1902 it was

demonstrated by statistics that of the entire male population of the

kingdom over twenty-one years of age not more than thirty-four per

cent could meet these qualifications.

*656. Beginnings of the Movement for Electoral Reform.*--As early as

1895 insistent demand began to be made in many quarters for an

extension of the franchise, and in the Riksdag of 1896 Premier Boström

introduced a moderate measure looking toward that end and involving

the introduction of proportional representation. The bill, (p. 593)

however, was defeated. Agitation was continued, and in 1900 the

Liberals made electoral reform the principal item of their programme.

In 1901 there was passed a sweeping measure for the reorganization of

the army whereby were increased both the term of military service and

the taxes by which the military establishment was supported. Argument

to the effect that such an augmentation of public burdens ought to be

accompanied by an extension of public privileges was not lost upon the

members of the Conservative Government, and at the opening of the

Riksdag of 1902 the Speech from the Throne assigned first place in the

legislative calendar to a Suffrage Extension bill. March 12 the

measure was laid before the chambers. The provisions of the bill were,

in brief, (1) that every male citizen, already possessed of the

municipal franchise, who had completed his twenty-fifth year and was

not in arrears in respect to taxes or military service, should be

entitled to vote for a member of the lower national chamber; and (2)

that every voter who was married, or had been married, or had

completed his fortieth year, should be entitled to two votes. By

reason of its plural voting features the measure was not well

received, even though the plural vote was not made in any way

dependent upon property. It was opposed by the Liberals and the Social

Democrats, and members even of the Conservative Government which had

introduced it withheld from it their support. Amidst unusual public

perturbation the Liberals drew up a counter-proposal, which was

introduced in the lower chamber April 16. It contemplated not simply

one vote for all male citizens twenty-five years of age who possessed

the municipal franchise, but also a sweeping extension of the

municipal franchise itself. The upshot was the adoption by the Riksdag

of a proposal to the effect that the Government, after conducting a

thorough investigation of the entire subject, should submit, in 1904,

a new measure based upon universal suffrage from the age of

twenty-five.

*657. The Conservative Proposal of 1904.*--The issue was postponed, but

agitation, especially on the part of the Social Democrats, was

redoubled. February 9, 1904, the Government laid before the lower

chamber a new suffrage bill embodying the recommendations of a

commission appointed some months previously to conduct the

investigation which had been ordered. The principal provisions of the

measure were (1) that every male municipal taxpayer who had attained

his twenty-fifth year, and was not deficient in respect to his fiscal

or military obligations, should be entitled to one vote for a member

of the Chamber; and (2) that the 230 legislative seats should be

distributed among thirty-three electoral districts, and should be

filled by deputies chosen according to the principle of (p. 594)

proportional representation. The introduction of this measure became

the signal for the appearance of a multitude of projects dealing with

the subject, most of which discarded proportional representation but

imposed still fewer restrictions upon the franchise. In the upper

house the Government's proposal, modified somewhat to meet the demands

of the agrarian interests, was passed by a vote of 93 to 50; but in

the lower chamber the substance of it was rejected by the narrow

margin of 116 to 108.

In view of the continued support of the upper house and the meagerness

of the opposition majority in the lower, the Government, at the

opening of the Riksdag of 1905, submitted afresh its suffrage bill

without material modification. Again there was a deluge of

counter-proposals, the most important of which was that introduced

March 18 by Karl Staaff, in behalf of the Liberals, to the effect that

every citizen in good standing of the age of twenty-four should be

entitled to one vote, and that the Chamber should consist of 165 rural

and 65 urban members, chosen in single-member constituencies. May 3

and 4 the Government's bill was carried in the upper house by a vote

of 93 to 50, but lost in the lower by a vote of 114 to 109. Upon

Staaff's project the lower house was almost equally divided.

*658. The Proposal of the Staaff Government, 1906.*--Upon the

resignation of the Lundeberg cabinet, October 28, 1905, following the

Norwegian separation, a Liberal ministry was made up by Staaff, and

when, January 15, 1906, the Riksdag reassembled in regular session the

new Government was ready to push to a conclusion the electoral

controversy. February 24 Premier Staaff introduced an elaborate

measure comprising an amplification of that which had been brought

forward by him a year earlier. By stipulating that at the age of

twenty-four every man of good character should have one vote the

scheme proposed enormously to enlarge the quota of enfranchised

citizens, and by apportioning representatives among the town and

country districts in the ratio of 65 to 165 it promised to reduce

materially the existing over-representation of the towns. It excluded

from the franchise bankrupts, persons under guardianship, and

defaulters in respect to military service; it required for election at

the first ballot, though not at the second, an absolute majority; it

stipulated that a rearrangement of constituencies, in accordance with

population, should be made every nine years by the king. It gave no

place to the principle of proportional representation which had

appeared in the proposals of the Conservative ministries of 1904 and

1905; and while favorable mention was made of female suffrage, the

authors of the measure avowed the opinion that the injection of (p. 595)

that issue at the present moment would endanger the entire reform

programme. Amidst renewed public demonstrations the usual flood of

counter-projects, several stipulating female suffrage, made its

appearance. The upper chamber, dominated by the Conservatives, held

out for proportional representation, and, May 14, it negatived the

Staaff proposal by a vote of 125 to 18. The day following the bill was

passed in the lower chamber by a majority of 134 to 94, and a little

later proportional representation was rejected by 130 votes to 98.

*659. A Compromise Bill Adopted, 1907.*--Upon the Conservative

Government of Lindman which succeeded devolved the task of framing a

measure upon which the two chambers could unite. A new bill made its

appearance February 2, 1907. Its essential provisions were (1) that

the members of the lower chamber should be elected by manhood suffrage

(with the limitations specified in the Liberal programme of 1906) and

proportional representation; (2) that the number of electoral

districts should be fixed at fifty-six, each to return from three to

seven members; (3) that members of the upper chamber should be elected

by the provincial Landsthings and the municipal councils for six years

instead of nine as hitherto, and by proportional representation; and

(4) that the municipal suffrage, which forms the basis of the

elections to the Landsthing, should be democratized in such a manner

that, whereas previously a wealthy elector might cast a maximum of 100

votes in the towns and 5,000 in the rural districts,[829] henceforth

the maximum of votes which might be cast by any one elector should be

forty. By the Liberals and Social Democrats this measure was denounced

as inadequate, although on all sides it was admitted that the changes

introduced by it were so sweeping as to amount to a positive revision

of the constitution. The spokesmen of the Liberal Union reintroduced

the Staaff bill of 1906, and the Social Democrats brought forward a

new measure which accorded a prominent place to female suffrage.

February 8 the two chambers elected a joint committee to investigate

and report upon the Government's project. Various amendments were

added to the bill, e.g., one whereby members of the upper chamber

henceforth should receive an emolument for their services, and

eventually, May 14, the measure was brought to a vote. Despite the

apprehensions of the Government, it was carried. In the lower house

the vote was 128 to 98; in the upper, 110 to 29.

[Footnote 829: Under the prevailing system, each

elector in the towns had one vote for every 100

kroner income, subject to a limit of 100 votes;

each one in the country had ten votes for every 100

kroner income, subject to a limit of 5,000 votes.]

*660. Final Enactment, 1909: Woman's Suffrage.*--The measure (p. 596)

comprised a series of constitutional amendments, and, in accordance

with the requirements in such cases, it remained in abeyance until a

newly elected Riksdag (chosen in 1908 and assembled in 1909) should

have had an opportunity to take action upon it. In the Riksdag of 1908

ex-Premier Staaff introduced a measure granting female suffrage in

parliamentary elections and extending it in municipal elections. But

both chambers negatived this and every other proposal offered upon the

subject, preferring to support the Government in its purpose to keep

the issue of woman's suffrage in the background until the reforms of

1907 should have been carried to completion. Early in the session of

1909 the "preliminary resolution" of 1907 was given the final approval

of the chambers. The Liberals, being now interested principally in the

woman's suffrage propaganda, did not combat the measure, so that the

majorities for its adoption were overwhelming.

The enactment of this piece of legislation constitutes a landmark in

Swedish political history. Through upwards of a decade the question of

franchise reform had overshadowed all other public issues and had

distracted attention from various pressing problems of state.

Denounced still by the extremists of both radical and conservative

groups, the new law was hailed by the mass of the nation with the most

evident satisfaction.[830] The question of woman's suffrage remains.

At the elections of 1908 the Liberal party emulated the Social

Democrats in the incorporation of this project in its programme, and,

April 21, 1909, the Constitutional Committee of the Riksdag

recommended the adoption of a measure whereby women should be accorded

the parliamentary suffrage and eligibility to sit as members of either

chamber. In May, 1911, the essentials of this recommendation were

accepted by the lower chamber by a vote of 120 to 92, but by the upper

they were rejected overwhelmingly. At the opening of the Riksdag of

1912 the Speech from the Throne announced the purpose of the

Government to introduce a measure for the enfranchisement of women,

and during the session the promise was redeemed by the bringing (p. 597)

forward of a bill in accordance with whose terms every Swede, without

distinction of sex, over twenty-four years of age and free from legal

disabilities, may vote for members of the lower chamber.

[Footnote 830: In the main, the scheme of

proportional representation adopted in Sweden is

similar to that in operation in Belgium (see pp.

542-545). Electors are expected to write at the

head of their ballot papers the name or motto of

their party. The papers bearing the same name or

emblem are then grouped together, the numbers in

each group are ascertained, and the seats available

are allotted to these groups in accordance with the

d'Hondt rule, irrespective of the number of votes

obtained by individual candidates. The candidate

receiving the largest number of votes is declared

elected. The papers on which his name appears are

then marked down to the value of one-half, the

relative position of the remaining candidates is

ascertained afresh, and the highest of these is

declared elected, and so on. Unlike the Belgian

system, the Swedish plan provides for the allotment

of but a single seat at a time. Humphreys,

Proportional Representation, 296-313.]

III. THE RIKSDAG IN OPERATION--POLITICAL PARTIES

*661. Organization and Procedure.*--By the Riksdag law of 1866 the king

is required to summon the chambers annually and empowered to convene

extraordinary sessions as occasion may demand. It is within the

competence of the king in council to dissolve either or both of the

chambers, but in such an event a general election must be ordered

forthwith, and the new Riksdag is required to be assembled within

three months after the dissolution.[831] The president and

vice-presidents of both houses are named by the crown; otherwise the

chambers are permitted to choose their officials and to manage their

affairs independently. It is specifically forbidden that either house,

or any committee, shall deliberate upon or decide any question in the

presence of the sovereign. The powers of the Riksdag cover the full

range of civil and criminal legislation; but no measure may become law

without the assent of the crown. In other words, the veto which the

king possesses is absolute. At the same time, the king is forbidden,

save with the consent of the Riksdag, to impose any tax, to contract

any loan, to dispose of crown property, to alienate any portion of the

kingdom, to change the arms or flag of the realm, to modify the

standard or weight of the coinage, or to introduce any alteration in

the national constitution. Measures may be proposed, not only by the

Government, but by members of either house. The relations between the

two houses are peculiarly close. At each regular session there are

constituted certain joint committees whose function is the preparation

and preliminary consideration of business for the attention of both

chambers. Most important among these committees is that on laws,

which, in the language of the constitution, "elaborates projects

submitted to it by the houses for the improvement of the civil,

criminal, municipal, and ecclesiastical laws."[832] Other such

committees are those on the constitution, on finance, on

appropriations, and on the national bank.

[Footnote 831: Art. 109. Dodd, Modern

Constitutions, II., 249.]

[Footnote 832: Art. 53. Ibid., II., 234.]

*662. Powers.*--The stipulations of the constitution which relate to

finance are precise. "The ancient right of the Swedish people to tax

themselves," it is affirmed, "shall be exercised by the Riksdag

alone."[833] The king is required at each regular session to lay (p. 598)

before the Riksdag a statement of the financial condition of the

country in all of its aspects, both income and expenses, assets and

debts. It is made the duty of the Riksdag to vote such supplies as the

treasury manifestly needs and to prescribe specifically the objects

for which the separate items of appropriation may be employed; also to

vote two separate amounts of adequate size to be used by the king in

emergency only, in the one instance in the event of war, in the other,

when "absolutely necessary for the defense of the country, or for

other important and urgent purposes."

[Footnote 833: Art. 57. Ibid., 234.]

Finally, the Riksdag is authorized and required to exercise a

supervisory vigilance in relation to the several branches of the

governmental system. One of the functions of the Constitutional

Committee is that of inspecting the records of the Council of State to

determine whether there has been any violation of the constitution or

of the general laws; and in the event of positive findings the

Committee may institute proceedings before the Riksrâtt, or Court of

Impeachment. At every regular session the Riksdag is required to

appoint a solicitor-general, ranking equally with the attorney-general

of the crown, with authority to attend the sessions of any of the

courts of the kingdom, to examine all judicial records, to present to

the Riksdag a full report upon the administration of justice

throughout the nation, and, if necessary, to bring charges of

impeachment against judicial officers. Every third year the Riksdag

appoints a special commission to determine whether all of the members

of the Supreme Court "deserve to be retained in their important

offices." Every third year, too, a commission of six is constituted

which, under the presidency of the solicitor-general, overhauls the

arrangements respecting the liberty of the press.[834]

[Footnote 834: Arts. 96-100. Dodd, Modern

Constitutions, II., 244-245.]

*663. Political Parties: Military and Tariff Questions.*--In Sweden, as

in European countries generally, the party alignment which lies at the

root of contemporary politics is that of Conservatives and Liberals.

Much of the time, however, within the past half-century party

demarcations have been vague and shifting, being determined largely in

successive periods by the rise and disappearance of various

preponderating public issues. The first great question upon which

party affiliations were shaped after the accession of Oscar II. in

1872 was that of national defense. The army and navy were recognized

at that time to be hopelessly antiquated, and the successive

Conservative ministries of the seventies were resolved upon greatly

increased expenditures in the interest of military and naval

rehabilitation. Against this programme was set squarely that of rigid

economy, urged by the strongly organized Landtmannapartiet, or (p. 599)

Agricultural party, representing the interests of the landed

proprietors, large and small, of the kingdom. The Landtmannapartiet

was founded in 1867, immediately following the reconstitution of the

Riksdag under the law of 1866, and through several decades it

comprised the dominating element in the lower chamber, in addition to

possessing at times no inconsiderable amount of influence in the upper

one. Throughout the period covered by the Conservative ministry of

Baron de Geer (1875-1880) and the Agricultural party's government

under Arvid Posse (1880-1883) there was an all but unbroken deadlock

between the upper chamber, dominated by the partisans of military

expenditure, and the lower, dominated equally by the advocates of

tax-reduction. It was not until 1885 that a ministry under Themptander

succeeded in procuring the enactment of a compromise measure

increasing the obligation of military service but remitting thirty per

cent of the land taxes. By this legislation the military and tax

issues were put in the way of eventual adjustment.

Already there had arisen a new issue, upon which party lines were

chiefly to be drawn during the later eighties and earlier nineties.

This was the question of the tariff. The continued distress of the

agrarian interests after 1880, arising in part from the competition of

foreign foodstuffs, suggested to the landed interests of Sweden that

the nation would do well to follow in the path already entered upon by

Germany. The consequence was the rise of a powerful protectionist

party, opposed by a free trade party with which were identified

especially the merchant classes. In 1886 the agrarians procured a

majority in the lower chamber, and by 1888 they were in control of

both branches. The free trade Themptander ministry was thereupon

replaced by the protectionist ministry of Bildt, under which, in 1888,

there were introduced protective duties on cereals, and later, in

1891-1892, on manufactured commodities. Step by step, the customs

policy developed by Sweden during the middle of the century was

reversed completely.

*664. Politics Since 1891.*--July 10, 1891, the Conservative Erik Gustaf

Boström, became premier, and thereafter, save for a brief interval

covered by the von Otter ministry (September, 1900, to July, 1902)

this able representative of the dominant agrarian interests continued

uninterruptedly at the helm until the Norwegian crisis in the spring

of 1905. With the elimination, however, of the tariff issue from the

field of active politics, Premier Boström adopted an attitude on

public questions which, on the whole, was essentially independent. In

the later nineties there arose two problems, neither entirely new,

which were destined long to occupy the attention of the Government

almost to the exclusion of all things else. One of these was the (p. 600)

readjustment with Norway. The other was the question of electoral

reform. The one affected considerably the fate of ministries, but did

not alter appreciably the alignment of parties; the other became the

issue upon which party activity largely turned through a number of

years. All parties from the outset professed to favor electoral

reform, but upon the nature and extent of such reform there was the

widest difference of sentiment and policy. During the course of the

contest upon this issue the Liberal party tended to become distinctly

more radical than it had been in the nineties; and it is worthy of

note that the rise of the Social Democrats to parliamentary importance

falls almost entirely within the period covered by the electoral

controversy. The first Social Democratic member of the Riksdag was

elected in 1896. From 1906 to 1911 the Conservative ministry of

Lindman, supported largely by the landholding elements of both

chambers, maintained steadily its position. At the elections of 1908

the Liberals realized some gains, and at those of 1911 both they and

the Social Democrats cut deeply into the Conservative majority. When,

in September, 1911, it appeared that the Liberals had procured 102

seats in the lower chamber, the Social Democrats 64, and the

Conservatives but 64, the Lindman government promptly resigned and a

new ministry was made up by the Liberal leader and ex-premier Staaff.

The invitation which was extended the Social Democrats to participate

in the forming of the ministry was declined. In October the upper

chamber was dissolved, for the first time in Swedish history, and at

the elections which were concluded November 30 the Liberals and Social

Democrats realized another distinct advance. Before the elections the

chamber contained 116 Conservatives, 30 Liberals, and 4 Social

Democrats; following them the quotas were, respectively, 87, 51, and

12.[835]

[Footnote 835: V. Pinot, Le parlementarisme

suédois, in _Revue Politique et Parlementaire_,

Sept. 10, 1912.]

IV. THE JUDICIARY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

*665. The Courts.*--In theory the judicial power in Sweden, being lodged

ultimately in the crown, is indistinguishable from the executive; in

practice, however, it is essentially independent. The constitution

regulates with some minuteness the character of the principal

tribunal, the _Högsta Domstolen_, or Supreme Court, but leaves the

organization of the inferior courts to be determined by the king and

the Riksdag. The Supreme Court consists of eighteen "councillors of

justice" appointed by the crown from among men of experience, honesty,

and known legal learning. The functions of the court are largely (p. 601)

appellate, but it is worthy of note that in the event that a request

is made of the king by the lower courts, or by officials, respecting

the proper interpretation of a law, the Supreme Court is authorized to

furnish such interpretation, provided the subject is a proper one for

the consideration of the courts. Cases of lesser importance may be

heard and decided in the Supreme Court by five, or even four, members,

when all are in agreement. In more important cases at least seven

judges must participate. When the king desires he may be present, and

when present he possesses two votes in all cases heard and decided.

When the question is one of legal interpretation he is entitled to two

votes, whether or not he actually attends the proceedings. All

decisions are rendered in the name of the king. The inferior tribunals

comprise 212 district courts, or courts of first instance, and three

higher courts of appeal (_hofrâtter_), situated at Stockholm,

Jönköping, and Kristianstad. In the 91 urban districts the court

consists of the burgomaster and at least two aldermen; in the 121

rural districts, of a judge and twelve elected and unpaid peasant

proprietors serving as jurymen. No person occupying judicial office

may be removed save after trial and judgment.

*666. Local Government.*--The kingdom is divided into twenty-five

administrative provinces or counties (_lân_).[836] The principal

executive official in each is a _landshöfding_, or prefect, who is

appointed by the crown and assisted by a varying number of bailiffs

and sub-officials. Each province has a Landsthing, or assembly, which

meets for a few days annually, in September, under the presidency of a

member designated by the crown. All members are elected directly by

the voters of the towns and rural districts, in accordance with the

principle of proportional representation, and under a body of

franchise regulations which, while much liberalized in 1909, still is

based essentially upon property-holding. The function of the

Landsthing is the enactment of provincial legislation and the general

supervision of provincial affairs. In a few of the larger

towns--Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö, Norrköping, and Gäfle--these

functions are vested in a separate municipal council. The conditions

under which purely local affairs are administered are regulated by the

communal laws of March 21, 1862. Each rural parish and each town

comprises a self-governing commune. Each has an assembly, composed of

all taxpayers, which passes ordinances, elects minor officials, and

decides petty questions of purely communal concern.

[Footnote 836: One of these comprises simply the

city of Stockholm.]

PART IX.--THE IBERIAN STATES (p. 603)

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN

I. THE BEGINNINGS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM

*667. The Napoleonic Régime and the National Resistance.*--It was the

fortune of the kingdom of Spain, as it was that of the several Italian

states, to be made tributary to the dominion of Napoleon; and in

Spain, as in Italy, the first phase of the growth of constitutional

government fell within the period covered by the Corsican's

ascendancy. Starting with the purpose of punishing Portugal for her

refusal to break with Great Britain, Napoleon, during the years

1807-1808, worked out gradually an Iberian policy which comprehended

not only the subversion of the independent Portuguese monarchy but

also the reduction of Spain to the status of a subject kingdom. In

pursuance of this programme French troops began, in February, 1808,

the occupation of Spanish strongholds, including the capital. The aged

Bourbon king, Charles IV., was induced to renounce his throne and the

crown prince Ferdinand his claim to the succession, and, June 6,

Joseph Bonaparte, since 1806 king of Naples, was designated sovereign.

An assembly of ninety-one pliant Spanish notables, convened at Bayonne

in the guise of a junta, was influenced both to "petition" the Emperor

for Joseph's appointment and to ratify the _projet_ of a Napoleonic

constitution.

Napoleon's seizure of the crown of Spain was an act of sheer violence,

and from the outset Joseph was considered by his subjects a simple

usurper. The establishment of the new régime at Madrid became the

signal for a national uprising which not only compelled the Emperor

seriously to modify his immediate plans and to lead in person a

campaign of conquest, but contributed in the end to the collapse of

the entire Napoleonic fabric. Upon the restoration of some degree of

order there followed the introduction of a number of reforms--the

sweeping away of the last vestiges of feudalism, the abolition of the

tribunal of the Inquisition, the reduction of the number of monasteries

and convents by a third, and the repeal of all internal customs. (p. 604)

But the position occupied by the alien sovereign was never other than

precarious. At no time did he secure control over the whole of the

country, and during the successive stages of the Peninsular War of

1807-1814 his mastery of the situation diminished gradually to the

vanishing point. At the outset the principal directing agencies of the

opposition were the irregularly organized local juntas which sprang up

in the various provinces, but before the end of 1808 there was

constituted a central junta of thirty-four members, and in September,

1810, there was convened at Cadiz a general Cortes--not three estates,

as tradition demanded, but a single assembly of indirectly elected

deputies of the people.

*668. The Constitution of 1812.*--Professing allegiance to the captive

Ferdinand, the Cortes of 1810 addressed itself first of all to the

prosecution of the war and the maintenance of the national

independence, but after a year it proceeded to draw up a constitution

for a liberalized Bourbon monarchy. Save the fundamental decree upon

which rested nominally the government, of Joseph Bonaparte, this

constitution, promulgated March 19, 1812, was the first such

instrument in Spanish history. It was, of course, the first to emanate

from Spanish sources. Permeating it throughout were the radical

principles of the French constitution of 1791. It asserted

unreservedly the sovereignty of the people and proclaimed as

inviolable the principle of equality before the law. Executive

authority it intrusted to the king, but the monarch was left so scant

a measure of independence that not only might he never prorogue or

dissolve the Cortes, but not even might he marry or set foot outside

the kingdom without express permission. For the actual exercise of the

executive functions there were created seven departments, or

ministries, each presided over by a responsible official. The

fundamental powers of state were conferred upon a Cortes of one

chamber, whose members were to be elected for a term of two years by

indirect manhood suffrage. Various features of the French constitution

which experience had shown to be ill-advised were reproduced blindly

enough, among them the ineligibility of members of the legislative

body for re-election and the disqualification of ministers to sit as

members. The government of the towns was intrusted to the inhabitants;

that of the provinces, to a governor appointed by the central

authorities and an assembly of deputies popularly chosen for a term of

four years. As the starting point of Spanish constitutional

development the fundamental law of 1812 is of genuine interest. It is

not to be imagined, however, that the instrument reflects with any

degree of accuracy the political sentiment and ideals of the mass of

the Spanish people. On the contrary, it was the work of a slender (p. 605)

democratic minority, and it was never even submitted to the nation for

ratification. It was a product of revolution, and at no time was there

opportunity for its framers to put it completely into operation.[837]

[Footnote 837: For brief accounts of the Napoleonic

régime in Spain see Cambridge Modern History, IX.,

Chap. 11 (bibliography, pp. 851-853); Lavisse et

Rambaud, Histoire Générale, IX., Chap. 6; A.

Fournier, Life of Napoleon the First, 2 vols., (new

ed. New York, 1911), II., Chaps. 14-15; J. H. Rose,

Life of Napoleon I. (London, 1902), Chap. 28; M. A.

S. Hume, Modern Spain, 1788-1898 (London, 1899),

Chaps. 2-4; and H. B. Clarke, Modern Spain,

1815-1898 (Cambridge, 1906), Chap. 1. Of the

numerous histories of the Peninsular War the most

celebrated is W. Napier, History of the War in the

Peninsula and the South of France, 1807-1814, 10

vols. (London, 1828).]

*669. The Restoration and the Reign of Ferdinand VII.*--Upon the fall of

Napoleon the legitimate sovereign, under the name of Ferdinand VII.,

was established forthwith upon the Spanish throne. At one time he had

professed a purpose to perpetuate the new constitution, but even

before his return to Madrid he pronounced both the constitution and

the various decrees of the Cortes "null and of no effect," and when

the Cortes undertook to press its claims to recognition it found

itself powerless. In the restoration of absolutism the king was

supported not only by the army, the nobility, and the Church, but also

by the mass of the people. For constitutional government there was

plainly little demand, and if Ferdinand had been possessed of even the

most ordinary qualities of character and statesmanship, he might

probably have ruled successfully in a perfectly despotic manner

throughout the remainder of his life. As it was, the reaction was

accompanied by such glaring excesses that the spirit of revolution was

kept alive, and scarcely a twelvemonth passed in the course of which

there were not menacing uprisings. In January, 1820, a revolt of

unusual seriousness began in a mutiny at Cadiz on the part of the

soldiers who were being gathered for service in America. The revolt

spread and, to save himself, the king revived the constitution of 1812

and pledged himself to a scrupulous observance of its stipulations.

The movement, however, was doomed to prompt and seemingly complete

failure. The liberals were disunited, and the two years during which

the king was virtually a prisoner in their hands comprised a period of

sheer anarchy. The powers of the Holy Alliance, moreover, in congress

at Verona (1822), adopted a programme of intervention, in execution of

which, in April, 1823, the French government sent an army across the

Pyrenees under the command of the Duke of Angoulême. A six months'

campaign, culminating in the capture of Cadiz, whither the Cortes had

carried the king, served effectively to crush the revolution and to

reinstate the sovereign completely in the position which he had (p. 606)

occupied prior to 1820. Then followed a fresh period of repression, in

the course of which the constitution of 1812 was again set aside, and

throughout the remaining decade of the reign the government of the

kingdom was both despotic and utterly unprogressive.[838]

[Footnote 838: On the period covered by Ferdinand's

reign see Cambridge Modern History, X., Chap. 7

(bibliography, pp. 808-811); Lavisse et Rambaud,

Histoire Générale, X., Chap. 6; Clarke, Modern

Spain, Chaps. 2-4, and Hume, Modern Spain,

1788-1898, Chaps. 5-6. Extended works which touch

upon the constitutional aspects of the period

include: H. Gmelin, Studien zur Spanischen

Verfassungsgeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts

(Stuttgart, 1905); G. Diercks, Geschichte Spaniens

(Berlin, 1895); A. Borrego, Historia de las Cortes

de España durante el siglo XIX. (Madrid, 1885); and

M. Calvo y Martin, Regimem parlamentario de España

en el siglo XIX. (Madrid, 1883). A valuable essay

is P. Bancada, El sentido social de la revolucion

de 1820, in _Revista Contemporânea_ (August,

1903).]

II. POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1833-1876

*670. Maria Christina and the Estatuto Real of 1834.*--Ferdinand VII.

died September 29, 1833, leaving no son. Regularly since the

establishment of the Bourbon dynasty the succession in Spain had been

governed by the principle of the Salic Law, imported originally from

France. But, to the end that the inheritance might fall to a daughter

rather than to his brother, Don Carlos, Ferdinand had promulgated, in

1830, a Pragmatic Sanction whereby the Salic principle was set aside.

Don Carlos and his supporters refused absolutely to admit the validity

of this act, but Ferdinand was succeeded by his three-year-old

daughter, Isabella, and the government was placed in the hands of the

queen-mother, Maria Christina of Naples, as regent.[839] Her

administration of affairs lasted until 1840. From the constitutional

point of view the period was important solely because, under stress of

circumstances, the regent was driven to adopt a distinctly liberal

policy, and, in time, to promulgate a new constitutional instrument.

Don Carlos, supported by the nobility, the clergy, and other

reactionary elements, kept up a guerilla war by which the tenure of

the "Christinos" was endangered continuously. The regent was herself a

thoroughgoing absolutist, but her sole hope lay in the support of (p. 607)

the liberals, and to retain that it was necessary for her to make

large concessions. The upshot was that in April, 1834, she issued a

royal statute (_Estatuto Real_), whereby there was established a new

type of Cortes, comprising two chambers instead of one. The upper

house, or Estamento de Proceres, was essentially a senate; the lower,

or Estamento de Procuradores, was a chamber of deputies. Members of

the Procuradores were to be elected by taxpayers for a term of three

years. Upon the Cortes was conferred power of taxation and of

legislation; but the Government alone might propose laws, and the

Cortes, like its ancient predecessor, was allowed no initiative save

that of petitioning the Government to submit measures upon particular

subjects. A minimum of one legislative session annually was

stipulated; but the sovereign was left free otherwise to convoke and

to dissolve the chambers at will. Ministers were recognized to be

responsible solely to the crown.

[Footnote 839: In the mediæval states of Spain

there was no discrimination against female

succession. The Spanish Salic Law was enacted by a

decree of Philip V. in 1713, at the close of the

War of the Spanish Succession. Its original object

was to prevent the union of the crowns of France

and Spain. In view of the change which had come in

the international situation, Charles IV., supported

by the Cortes, in 1789 abrogated the act of 1713

and re-established the law of _Siete Partidas_

which permitted the succession of women. This

measure was recorded in the archives, but was not

published at the time; so that what Ferdinand VII.

did was simply to publish, May 19, 1830, at the

instigation of the Queen, this _pragmatica_, or

law, of 1789. The birth of Isabella occurred the

following October 10.]

*671. The Constitution of 1837.*--Toward the establishment of

constitutional government the Statute of 1834 marked some, albeit

small, advance. The Moderados, or moderate liberals, were disposed to

accept it as the largest concession that, for the present, could be

expected. But the Progressistas, or progressives, insisted upon a

revival of the more democratic constitution of 1812, and in 1836 the

regent was compelled by a widespread military revolt to sign a decree

pledging the Government to this policy. A constituent Cortes was

convoked and the outcome was the promulgation of the constitution of

June 17, 1837, based upon the instrument of 1812, but in respect to

liberalism standing midway between that instrument and the Statute of

1834. Like the constitution of 1812, that of 1837 affirmed the

sovereignty of the nation and the responsibility of ministers to the

legislative body. On the other hand, the Cortes was to consist, as

under the Statute, of two houses, a Senate and a Congress. The members

of the one were to be appointed for life by the crown; those of the

other were to be elected by the people for three years. In a number of

respects the instrument of 1837 resembled the recently adopted

constitution of Belgium, even as the Statute of 1834 had resembled the

French Charter of 1814. In the words of a Spanish historian, the

document of 1837 had the two-fold importance of "assuring the

constitutional principle, which thenceforth was never denied, and of

ending the sentiment of idolatry for the constitution of 1812."[840]

[Footnote 840: R. Altamira, in Cambridge Modern

History, X., 238.]

*672. The Constitution of 1845.*--October 12, 1840, the regent Maria

Christina was forced by the intensity of civil discord to abdicate and

to withdraw to France. Her successor was General Espartero, leader of

the Progressistas and the first of a long line of military men to

whom it has fallen at various times to direct the governmental (p. 608)

affairs of the Spanish nation. November 8, 1843, the princess Isabella

although yet but thirteen years old, was declared of age and, under

the name of Isabella II., was proclaimed sovereign. Her reign,

covering the ensuing twenty years, comprised distinctly an era of

stagnation and veiled absolutism. Nominally the constitution of 1837

continued in operation until 1845. At that time it was replaced by a

revised and less liberal instrument, drawn up by the Moderados with

the assistance of an ordinary Cortes. The duration of the Cortes was

extended from three to four years, severer restrictions upon the press

were established, supervision of the local authorities was still

further centralized, and the requirement that the sovereign might not

marry without the consent of the Cortez was rescinded. In the course

of a revolutionary movement in 1854 there was convoked a constituent

Cortes, dominated by Moderates and Progressives. The constitution

which this body framed, comprising essentially a revival of the

instrument of 1837, was never, however, put in operation. In the end,

by a royal decree of 1856, the constitution of 1845 was amended and

re-established. Save for some illiberal amendments of 1857,[841] which

were repealed in 1864, this instrument of 1845 continued in operation

until 1868. Throughout the period, however, constitutionalism was

hardly more than a fiction.[842]

[Footnote 841: One established conditions under

which senatorial seats might be made hereditary.]

[Footnote 842: Cambridge Modern History, X., Chap.

7; XI., Chap. 20; Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire

Générale, X., Chap. 6; XI., Chap. 9; Hume, Modern

Spain, Chaps. 7-12; Clarke, Modern Spain, Chaps.

5-11; Mariano, La Regencia de D. Baldomero

Espartero (Madrid, 1870); J. Perez de Guzman, Las

Cortes y los Gobiernos del reinado de Da Isabel

II., in _La España Moderna_, 1903.]

*673. The Constitution of 1869: King Amadeo.*--By a revolt which began

in September, 1868, the queen was compelled to flee from the country,

and, eventually, June 25, 1869, to abdicate. A provisional government

effected arrangements for the election of a Cortes by manhood

suffrage, and this Cortes, convened at the capital, February 11, 1869,

addressed itself first of all to the task of drafting a new national

constitution. A considerable number of members advocated the

establishment of a republic; but for so radical an innovation there

was clearly no general demand, and in the end the proposition was

rejected by a vote of 214 to 71. June 1 a constitution was adopted

which, however, marked a large advance in the direction of liberalism.

It contained substantial guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of

the press, liberty of religion, and the right of petition and of

public assembly, and in unequivocal terms the sovereignty of the

people was affirmed afresh. A Cortes of two houses was provided (p. 609)

for, the members of the Senate to be chosen indirectly by the people

through electoral colleges and the provincial assemblies, those of the

Congress to be elected by manhood suffrage, the only qualification for

voting being the attainment of the age of twenty-five years and

possession of ordinary civil rights.

Pending the selection of a sovereign, a regency was established under

Marshal Serrano. Among the several dignitaries who were

considered--Alfonso (son of the deposed Isabella) the Duke of

Montpensier, Ferdinand of Savoy (brother of King Victor Emmanuel of

Italy), King Luiz of Portugal, Ferdinand of Saxony, Leopold of

Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, and Prince Amadeo, duke of Aosta, second son

of Victor Emmanuel--favor settled eventually upon the last named, who

was elected November 19, 1870, by a vote of 191 to 120. At the end of

1870 the new sovereign arrived in Spain, and February 2, 1871, he took

oath to uphold the recently established constitution. From the outset,

however, his position was one of extreme difficulty. He was opposed by

those who desired a republic, by the Carlists, by the adherents of the

former crown prince Alfonso, and by the clergy; and as a foreigner he

was regarded with indifference, if not antipathy, by patriotic

Spaniards generally. February 10, 1873, wearied by the turbulence in

which he was engulfed, he resigned his powers into the hands of the

Cortes, and by that body his abdication was forthwith accepted. It is

a sufficient commentary upon the political character of the reign to

observe that within the twenty-four months which it covered there were

no fewer than six ministerial crises and three general elections.

*674. The Republic (1873-1875): Monarchy Restored.*--The breakdown of

the elective monarchy, following thus closely the overthrow of

absolutism, cleared the way for the triumph of the republicans. The

monarchist parties, confronted suddenly by an unanticipated situation,

were able to agree upon no plan of action, and the upshot was that, by

a vote of 258 to 32, the Cortes declared for a republic and decreed

that the drafting of a republican constitution should be undertaken by

a specially elected convention. Although it was true, as Castelar

asserted, that the monarchy had perished from natural causes, that the

republic was the inevitable product of existing circumstance, and that

the transition from the one to the other was effected without

bloodshed, it was apparent from the outset that republicanism had not,

after all, struck root deeply. A constitution was drawn up, but it was

at no time really put into operation. The supporters of the new régime

were far from agreed as to the kind of republic, federal or (p. 610)

centralized, that should be established;[843] the republican leaders

were mutually jealous and prone to profitless theorizing; the nation

was lacking in the experience which is a prerequisite of

self-government.[844] At home the republic was opposed by the

monarchists of the various groups, by the clergy, and by the extreme

particularists, and abroad it won the recognition of not one nation

save the United States. The presidency of Figueras lasted four months;

that of Pi y Margall, six weeks; that of Salmeron, a similar period;

that of Castelar, about four months (September 7, 1873, to January 3,

1874). Castelar, however, was rather a dictator than a president, and

so was his Conservative successor Serrano. By the beginning of 1874 it

was admitted universally that the only escape from the anomalous

situation in which the nation found itself lay in a restoration of the

legitimist monarchy, in the person of Don Alfonso, son of Isabella II.

The collapse of the republic was as swift and as noiseless as had been

its establishment. The principal agency in it was the army, which, in

December, 1874, declared definitely for Alfonso, after he had pledged

himself to a grant of amnesty and the maintenance of constitutional

government. December 31 a regency ministry under the presidency of

Cánovas was announced, and the new reign began with the landing of the

young sovereign at Barcelona, January 10, 1875. Between the premature

and ineffective republicanism of the past year, on the one hand, and

the absolutism of a Carlist government, on the other, the

constitutional monarchy of Alfonso XII. seemed a logical, and to the

mass of the Spanish people, an eminently satisfactory, compromise.[845]

[Footnote 843: Castelar favored a consolidated and

radical republic; Serrano, a consolidated and

conservative republic; Pi y Margall, a federal

republic, on the pattern of the United States;

Pavia, a republic which should be predominantly

military.]

[Footnote 844: In this connection may be mentioned

a remark of General Prim, one of the leading

spirits in the provisional government of 1868. When

asked why at that time he did not establish a

republic his reply was: "It would have been a

republic without republicans." There was no less a

dearth of real republicans in 1873-1874.]

[Footnote 845: On the revolutionary and republican

periods see Cambridge Modern History XI., Chap. 20

(bibliography, pp. 945-949); Lavisse et Rambaud,

Histoire Générale, XII., Chap. 9; Hume, Modern

Spain, Chap. 10; V. Cherbuliez, L'Espagne

politique, 1868-1873 (Paris, 1874); W. Lauser,

Geschichte Spaniens von dem Sturz Isabellas,

1868-1875 (Leipzig, 1877); E. H. Strobel, The

Spanish Revolution, 1868-1875 (London, 1898); E.

Rodriguez Solis, Historia del partido republicano

español (Madrid, 1893); Pi y Margall, Amadeo de

Saboya (Madrid, 1884); H. R. Whitehouse, Amadeus,

King of Spain (New York, 1897). A significant work

is E. Castelar, Historia del movimiento republicano

en Europa (Madrid, 1873-1874). Special works

dealing with the restoration include A. Houghton,

Les origines de la restauration des Bourbons en

Espagne (Paris, 1890); Diez de Tejada, Historia de

la restauracion (Madrid, 1879).]

III. THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION (p. 611)

*675. The Constitution Adopted.*--The year following the

re-establishment of the monarchy was consumed largely in the

suppression of the Carlists and the reorganization of the government.

During this period Cánovas, at the head of a strong Conservative and

Clerical ministry, ruled virtually as a dictator, and sooner or later

most vestiges of the republic were swept away, while the nation was

won over solidly to the new order. At the election of the first Cortes

of the Restoration, January 22, 1876, the principle of manhood

suffrage was continued in operation, though so docile did the

electorate prove that Cánovas was able to secure, in both chambers, a

heavy majority which was ready to vote at the Government's behest a

franchise system of a much less liberal type. The first important task

of this Cortes was the consideration and adoption of a new national

constitution. As to the sort of constitution most desirable there was,

as ever, wide difference of opinion. The Conservatives favored a

revival of the instrument of 1845. The Liberals much preferred a

restoration of that of 1869. A commission of thirty-nine, designated

May 20, 1875, by a junta convened by Cánovas, had evolved with some

difficulty an instrument which combined various features of both of

these earlier documents, and by the Cortes of 1876 this proposed

constitution was at length accorded definite, though by no means

unanimous, assent (June 30). This instrument was put forthwith into

operation, and it has remained to this day, substantially without

alteration, the fundamental law of Spain. Based essentially upon the

constitution of 1845, it none the less exhibits at many points the

influence of the liberal principles which underlay the instrument of

1869.

*676. Contents: Guarantees of Individual Liberty.*--In scope the

constitution is comprehensive. Its text falls into thirteen "titles"

and eighty-nine articles. Like the constitution of Italy, it contains

no provision for its own amendment; but in Spain, as also in Italy,

the distinction between constituent and legislative powers is not

sharply drawn and a simple act of the legislative body is in practice

adequate to modify the working constitution of the kingdom. Among the

thirteen titles one of the most elaborate is that in which are defined

the rights and privileges of Spanish subjects and of aliens resident

in Spain.[846] Among rights specifically guaranteed are those of

freedom of speech, freedom of the press, peaceful assemblage, the

formation of associations, petition, unrestrained choice of professions,

and eligibility to public offices and employments, "according to (p. 612)

merit and capacity." Immunities guaranteed include exemption from

arrest, "except in the cases and in the manner prescribed by law";

exemption from imprisonment, except upon order of a competent judicial

official; freedom from molestation on account of religious opinions,

provided due respect for "Christian morality" be shown;[847] and

exemption from search of papers and effects and from confiscation of

property, save by authority legally competent. It is forbidden that

either the military or the civil authorities shall impose any penalty

other than such as shall have been established previously by law.

Certain guarantees, i.e., those respecting arrest, imprisonment,

search, freedom of domicile, freedom of speech and press, assemblage,

and associations, may, under provision of the constitution, be

suspended throughout the kingdom or in any portion thereof, but only

when demanded by the security of the state, and then only temporarily

and by means of a specific law. In no case may any other guarantee

which is named in the constitution be withdrawn, even temporarily.

When the Cortes is not in session the Government may suspend, through

the medium of a royal decree, any one of the guarantees which the

Cortes itself is authorized to suspend, but at the earliest

opportunity such a decree must be submitted to the Cortes for

ratification. It need hardly be pointed out that the opportunity for

the evasion of constitutionalism which is created by this power of

suspension is enormous, and anyone at all familiar with the history of

public affairs in Spain would be able to cite numerous occasions upon

which, upon pretexts more or less plausible, the guarantees of the

fundamental law have been set at naught.[848]

[Footnote 846: No. 1. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,

II., 199-203.]

[Footnote 847: By Article II Roman Catholicism is

declared to be the religion of the state. "The

nation," it is stipulated further, "binds itself to

maintain this religion and its ministers." Dodd,

Modern Constitutions, II., 201.]

[Footnote 848: An official text of the constitution

of 1876 is published by the Spanish Government

under the title Constitución politica de la

monarchia Española y leyes complementarias (4th

ed., Madrid, 1901). The texts of all of the Spanish

constitutions of the nineteenth century are printed

in the first volume of Muro y Martinez,

Constituciones de España y de las demas naciones de

Europa, con la historia general de España (Madrid,

1881); also in the first volume--Constituciones y

reglamentos (Madrid, 1906)--of a collection

projected by the Spanish Government under the title

of Publicaciones Parlamentarias. English versions

of the instrument of 1876 appear in British and

Foreign State Papers, LXVII. (1875-1876), 118 ff.,

and Dodd, Modern Constitutions, II., 199-216. An

excellent brief treatise on Spanish constitutional

development is H. Gmelin, Studien zur spanischen

Verfassungsgeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts

(Stuttgart, 1905); on Spanish constitutional law,

M. Torres Campos, Das Staatsrecht des Königreichs

Spanien (Freiburg, 1889), in Marquardsen's

Handbuch; on Spanish administrative law, V.

Santamaria de Paredes, Curso de derecho

administrativo (5th ed., Madrid, 1898); and on the

comparative aspects of Spanish institutions, R. de

Oloriz, La Constitución española comparada con las

de Inglaterra, Estados-Unidos, Francia y Alemania

(Valencia, 1904). More extended works of importance

include V. Santamaria de Paredes, Curso de derecho

politico (6th ed., Madrid, 1898), and A. Posada,

Tratado de derecho administrativo (Madrid,

1897-1898). A monumental collection of laws

relating to Spanish administrative affairs is M.

Martinez Alcubilla, Diccionario de la

administración Española, Peninsular y Ultramarina

(5th ed., 1892-1894), to which is added annually an

appendix containing texts of the most recent laws

and decrees. Special treatises of importance are M.

M. Calvo, Regimen parlamentario en España (Madrid,

1883); J. Costa, Oligarquia y Caciquismo como la

forma actual del Gobierno en España (Madrid, 1903);

and Y. Guytot, L'évolution politique et sociale de

l'Espagne (Paris, 1899). Mention may be made of R.

Fraoso, Las constituciones de España, in _Revista

de España_, June-July, 1880.]

IV. THE CROWN AND THE MINISTRY (p. 613)

*677. The Rules of Succession.*--Executive power in the kingdom is

vested solely in the crown, although in practice it devolves to a

large degree upon the council of ministers. Kingship is hereditary,

and in regulation of the succession the constitution lays down the

general principle that an elder line shall always be preferred to

younger ones; in the same line, the nearer degree of kinship to the

more remote; in the same degree of kinship, the male to the female; in

the same sex, the older to the younger person. By the original

constitution Alfonso XII. was declared to be the legitimate sovereign,

and provision was made that if the line of legitimate descendants of

Alfonso should be extinguished, his sisters should succeed in the

established order; then his aunt (the sister of his mother Isabella

II.) and her legitimate descendants; and, finally, the descendants of

his uncles, the brothers of Ferdinand VII.[849] It will be recalled

that the Pragmatic Sanction of 1830 abolished in Spain the Salic

principle and restored the ancient right of females to inherit. Spain

is, indeed, one of the few European states in which this right exists.

At the same time, as has been pointed out, when the degree of kinship

is identical, preference is accorded the male. Thus it came about that

the present sovereign, Alfonso XIII., the posthumous son of Alfonso

XII., took precedence over his two sisters, both of whom were older

than he, and the elder of whom, Maria de las Mercedes, actually was

queen from the death of her father, November 25, 1885, until the birth

of her brother, May 17, 1886.[850]

[Footnote 849: Arts. 59-61. Dodd, Modern

Constitutions, II., 211.]

[Footnote 850: She was, however, but a child five

years of age.]

*678. Regencies.*--Any member of the royal family who may be incapable

of governing, or who by his conduct may have forfeited his claim to the

good-will of the nation, may be excluded from the succession by (p. 614)

law. Disputes concerning rights or facts involved in the succession

are to be adjusted by law, and in event that all of the family lines

mentioned in the constitution should be extinguished it would become

the duty of the Cortes to make such disposal of the crown as might be

adjudged "most suitable to the nation."[851] Both the sovereign and

the heir presumptive are forbidden to marry any person who by law is

excluded from the succession. They are, indeed, forbidden to contract

a marriage at all until after the Cortes shall have examined and

approved the stipulations involved. The age of majority of the

sovereign is fixed at sixteen years. When the king is a minor, his

father or his mother, or, in default of a living parent, the relative

who stands next in the order of succession, is constituted regent,

provided always that such person be a Spaniard at least twenty years

of age and not by law excluded from the succession. Should there be no

one upon whom the regency may lawfully devolve, it is the duty of the

Cortes to appoint a regency of one, three, or five persons. If, at any

time, in the judgment of the Cortes, the sovereign becomes

incapacitated to rule, a regency is required to be vested in the crown

prince, provided he be sixteen years of age. In default of a qualified

crown prince the regency devolves upon the queen; and in default of

both son and queen, upon a person determined in accordance with the

rules already mentioned.

[Footnote 851: Art. 62. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,

II., 212.]

*679. Powers of the Crown.*--The powers of the crown are of the sort

common among continental monarchies. By the constitution they are

thrown into two groups, i.e., those which may be exercised freely and

independently and those which may be exercised only upon the

authorization of a special law. Enumeration of the first group begins

with the sweeping statement that "the power of executing the laws is

vested in the king, and his authority extends to everything which

conduces to the preservation of public order at home and the security

of the state abroad, in conformity with the constitution and the

laws."[852] Powers specifically named include the approval and

promulgation of the laws; the issuing of decrees, regulations, and

instructions designed to facilitate the execution of the laws; the

appointment and dismissal of ministers and of civil officials

generally; command of the army and navy and direction of the land and

naval forces; the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace;[853]

the conduct of diplomatic and commercial relations with foreign

states; the pardoning of offenders; the control of the coinage; (p. 615)

and the conferring of honors and distinctions of every kind. Of powers

which the sovereign may exercise only in pursuance of authority

specially conferred by law there are five, as follows: alienation,

cession, or exchange of any portion of Spanish territory; incorporation

of new territory; admission of foreign troops into the kingdom;

ratification of all treaties which are binding individually upon

Spaniards, and of treaties of offensive alliance which stipulate the

payment of subsidies to any foreign power, or which relate especially

to commerce; and abdication of the crown in favor of the

heir-presumptive.

[Footnote 852: Art. 50. Ibid., II., 210.]

[Footnote 853: It is required that subsequent to a

declaration of war or the conclusion of peace the

king shall submit to the Cortes a report

accompanied by pertinent documents.]

*680. The Ministry: Organization and Functions.*--In Spain, as in

constitutional states generally, the powers appertaining to the

executive are exercised in the main by the ministers. Concerning the

ministry the constitution has little to say. It, in truth, assumes,

rather than makes specific provision for, the ministry's existence. It

confers upon the crown the power freely to appoint and to dismiss

ministers; it stipulates that ministers may be senators or deputies

and may participate in the proceedings of both legislative chambers,

but may vote only in the chambers to which they belong; and, most

important of all, it enjoins that ministers shall be responsible, and

that no order of the king may be executed unless countersigned by a

minister, who thereby assumes personal responsibility for it. This

principle of ministerial responsibility, which found its first

expression in Spain in the constitution of 1812, is enforced nowadays

sufficiently, at least, to ensure the nation, through the Cortes, some

actual control over the policies and measures of the executive. Of

ministries there are at present nine, as follows: Foreign Affairs;

Justice; Finance; War; Marine; Interior; Public Instruction and Fine

Arts; Commerce; and Public Works. At the head of the ministerial

council is a president, or premier, who, under royal approval, selects

his colleagues, but ordinarily assumes himself no portfolio. It is the

function of the ministers not only to serve as the heads of executive

departments and to explain and defend in the legislative chambers the

acts of the government, but, in their collective capacity, to

formulate measures for presentation to the Cortes and, especially, to

submit every year for examination and discussion a general budget,

accompanied by a scheme of taxation or other proposed means of meeting

prospective expenditures. In each chamber there is reserved for the

ministers of the crown a front bench to the right of the presiding

official. The practice of interpellation exists, although ministries

rarely retire by reason of a vote of censure arising therefrom. But any

minister may be impeached by the Congress before the Senate. In Spain,

as in France and Italy, the parliamentary system is nominally in (p. 616)

operation; but, as in the countries mentioned, the multiplicity and

instability of party groups render the workings of the system totally

different from what they are in Great Britain. Ministries are

invariably composite rather than homogeneous in political complexion,

with the consequence that they are unable to present a solid front or

long to retain their hold upon the nation's confidence.

V. THE CORTES

*681. The Senate: Composition.*--The legislative powers of the kingdom

are vested in "the Cortes, together with the king." The Cortes

consists of two co-ordinate chambers, the Senate and the Congress of

Deputies. In the composition of the Senate the prescriptive,

appointive, and elective principles are curiously intertwined, the

chamber containing one group of men who are members in their own

right, another who are appointed by the crown and sit for life, and a

third who are elected by the corporations of the state and by the

large taxpayers. In number the first two categories jointly may not

exceed 180; the third is fixed definitely at that figure. In point of

fact the life senators nominated by the crown number 100, while the

quota of prescriptive members varies considerably. This last-mentioned

group comprises grown sons of the sovereign and of the heir-presumptive;

the admirals of the navy and the captains-general of the army; the

patriarch of the Indies and the archbishops; the presidents of the

Council of State, the Supreme Court, the Court of Accounts, and the

Supreme Councils of War and Marine, after two years of service; and

grandees of Spain[854] in their own right, who are not subjects of

another power and who have a proved yearly income of 60,000 pesetas

($12,000) derived from real property of their own, or from rights

legally equivalent to real property.[855]

[Footnote 854: The rank of grandee (_grande_) is a

dignity conferred by the sovereign, either for life

or as an hereditary honor.]

[Footnote 855: Art. 21. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,

II., 204].

*682. Appointment and Election of Senators.*--Appointment of senators by

the crown is made by special decree, in which must be stated the

grounds upon which each appointment is based. In the selection of

appointees the sovereign is not entirely free, but since the constitution

designates no fewer than twelve classes from which appointments may be

made, the range of choice is large. Among the categories enumerated

are the presidents of the legislative chambers; deputies who have been

members of as many as three congresses, or who have served during as

many as eight sessions; ministers of the crown; bishops; grandees;

lieutenant-generals of the army and vice-admirals of the navy, of (p. 617)

two years' standing; ambassadors, after two years of active service,

and ministers plenipotentiary, after four years; presidents and

directors of the half-dozen royal academies, and persons who in point

of seniority belong within the first half of the list of members of

these respective bodies; head professors in the universities, who have

held this rank and have performed the duties pertaining to it through

a period of four years; and a variety of other administrative,

judicial, and professional functionaries. Persons belonging to any one

of these groups, however, are eligible for appointment only in the

event that they enjoy an annual income of 7,500 pesetas ($1,500),

derived from property of their own or from salaries of permanent

employments, or from pensions or retirement allowances. In addition to

the classes mentioned persons are eligible who for two years have

possessed an annual income of 20,000 pesetas, or who have paid into

the public treasury a direct tax of 4,000 pesetas, provided that in

addition they possess titles of nobility, or have been members of the

Cortes, provincial deputies, or mayors in capitals of provinces or in

towns of more than 20,000 inhabitants. Appointments are made regularly

for life.

The conditions under which the quota of 180 elected senators are

chosen were defined by a statute of February 8, 1877. One senator is

chosen by the clergy in each of the nine archbishoprics; one by each

of the six royal academies; one by each of the ten universities; five

by the economic societies; and the remaining 150 by electoral colleges

in the several provinces. The electoral college is composed of members

of the provincial deputations and of representatives chosen from among

the municipal councillors and largest taxpayers of the towns and

municipal districts. But no one may become a senator by election who

would be ineligible, under the conditions above mentioned, to be

appointed to a seat by the crown. And it is required in all cases that

to become a senator one must be a Spaniard, must have attained the age

of thirty-five, must have the free management of his property, and

must not have been subjected to criminal proceedings, nor have been

deprived of the exercise of his political rights. The term of elected

senators is ten years. One-half of the number is renewed every five

years; but upon a dissolution of the elected portion of the chamber by

the crown, the quota is renewed integrally.[856]

[Footnote 856: Arts. 20-26. Dodd, Modern

Constitutions, II., 203-206.]

*683. The Congress of Deputies: Composition and Election.*--The lower

legislative chamber is composed of deputies chosen directly by the

inhabitants of the several electoral districts into which the kingdom

is divided. From the adoption of the present constitution until 1890

the franchise was restricted severely by property qualifications. (p. 618)

A reform bill which became law June 29, 1890, however, re-established

in effect the scheme of manhood suffrage which had been in operation

during the revolutionary epoch 1869-1875. Under the provisions of a

law of August 8, 1907, by which the electoral system was further

regulated, the franchise is conferred upon all male Spaniards who have

attained the age of twenty-five, who have resided in their electoral

district not less than two years, and who have not been deprived

judicially of their civil rights.[857] Except, indeed, in the case of

certain judicial officials and of persons more than seventy years of

age, the exercise of the voting privilege is, as in Belgium and in

some of the Austrian provinces, compulsory. The constitution requires

that there shall be at least one deputy for every 50,000 inhabitants.

The total membership of the Congress is at present 406. In the

majority of districts but a single deputy is chosen, but in

twenty-eight of the larger ones two or more are elected by _scrutin de

liste_, with provision for the representation of minorities. In

districts in which two or three deputies are to be chosen, each

elector votes for one fewer than the number to be elected; in

districts where from four to seven are to be chosen, the elector votes

for two fewer than the total number; and where the aggregate number is

eight to ten, or more than ten, he votes for three or four fewer,

respectively. Any Spaniard who is qualified for the exercise of the

suffrage is eligible for election, and for indefinite re-election, as

a deputy, save that no member of the clergy may be chosen. The term of

membership is five years, though by reason of not infrequent

dissolutions the period of service is actually briefer. As is true

also of senators, deputies receive no pay for their services.[858]

[Footnote 857: There is the customary regulation

that soldiers and sailors in active service may not

vote.]

[Footnote 858: J. Vila Serra, Manual de elecciones

de Diputados a Cortes (Valencia, 1907); J. Lon y

Albareda, Nueva ley electoral de 8 de Agosto de

1907, comentada (Madrid, 1907); M. Vivanco y L. San

Martin, La reforma electoral (Madrid, 1907).]

*684. Sessions and Status of the Chambers.*--The Cortes, consisting thus

of the Senate and the Congress of Deputies, is required by the

constitution to be convened by the crown in regular session at least

once each year. Extraordinary sessions may be held, and upon the death

or incapacitation of the sovereign the chambers must be assembled

forthwith. To the crown belongs the power not only to convene, but

also to suspend and to terminate the sessions, and to dissolve,

simultaneously or separately, the Congress and the elective portion of

the Senate. In the event, however, of a dissolution, the sovereign is

obliged to convene the newly constituted Cortes within the space of

three months. Except when it devolves upon the Senate to exercise (p. 619)

its purely judicial functions, neither of the chambers may be

assembled without the other. In no case may the two chambers sit as a

single assembly, or deliberate in the presence of the sovereign. Each

body is authorized to judge the qualifications of its members and to

frame and adopt its own rules of procedure. The Senate elects its

secretaries, but its president and vice-president are designated, for

each session, and from the senators themselves, by the crown. The

Congress, on the other hand, elects from its membership all of its own

officials. Sessions of both chambers are public, though "when secrecy

is necessary" the doors may be closed. A majority of the members

constitutes a quorum, and measures are passed by a majority vote. No

senator or deputy may be held to account by legal process for any

opinion uttered or for any vote cast within the chamber to which he

belongs; and, save when taken in the commission of an offense, a

member is entitled to all of the safeguards against arrest and

judicial proceedings which are extended customarily to members of

legislative bodies in constitutional states.[859]

[Footnote 859: It is to be observed that these

guarantees are not quite absolute. During the

crisis of 1904 the Maura government required the

Congress to suspend the legislative immunity of no

fewer than 140 members, and for the first time

since 1834 deputies were handed over to the courts

to be tried for offenses of a purely political

character.]

*685. Functions and Powers of the Cortes.*--The function of the Cortes

is primarily legislative. Each chamber shares with the crown the right

to initiate measures, and no proposal can become law until it has

received the sanction of the two houses. Rejection of a bill by either

chamber, or by the crown, precludes the possibility of a reappearance

of the project during the continuance of the session. Measures

relating to taxation and to the public credit must be presented, in

the first instance, in the Congress of Deputies, and it is made the

specific obligation of the Government every year to lay before that

body for examination and approval a budget of revenues and

expenditures. Only upon authority of law may the Government alienate

property belonging to the state, or borrow money on the public credit.

Under Spanish constitutional theory the Cortes is the agent of the

sovereign nation. It is authorized, therefore, not only to discharge

the usual functions of legislation but also to do three other things

of fundamental importance. In the first place, it receives from the

sovereign, from the heir-apparent, and from the regent or regency of

the kingdom, the oath of fidelity to the constitution and the laws. In

the second place, under provisions contained within the constitution,

it elects the regent or regency and appoints a guardian for a (p. 620)

minor sovereign. Finally, to maintain the responsibility of ministers

to the lower chamber, and, through it, to the nation, the Congress is

authorized to impeach, and the Senate to try, at any time any member

of the Government.[860]

[Footnote 860: Arts. 32-47. Dodd, Modern

Constitutions, II., 207-209. On the Cortes may be

consulted, in addition to the constitutional

treatises mentioned on pp. 612-613, A. Borrego,

Historia de las Cortes de Españo durante el siglo

XIX. (Madrid, 1885), and A. Pons y Umbert,

Organizaciôn y funcionamento de las Cortes segun

las constituciones españolas y reglamentacion de

dicho cuerpo colegislador (Madrid, 1906).]

VI. POLITICAL PARTIES

*686. Party Groups After 1869.*--Since the dawn of constitutionalism

political life in Spain has comprised much of the time a sheer game

between the "ins" and the "outs", in which issues have counted for

little and the schemings of the caciques, or professional wire-pullers

and bosses, have counted for well-nigh everything. For the exercise of

independent popular judgment upon fundamental political questions

aptitude has been meager and opportunity rare. Political parties there

have been, and still are, and certain of them have exhibited distinct

power of survival. Yet it must be observed that even the stablest of

them are essentially the creatures of the political leaders and that

at no time have they exhibited the broadly national rootage of

political parties in other states of western Europe.

Party cleavages in Spain had their beginning early in the nineteenth

century, but for the origins of the groups which share in an important

manner nowadays in the politics of the kingdom it is not necessary to

return to a period more remote than that of the revolution of 1868.

Subsequent to the expulsion of Queen Isabella at least four groups

were thrown into more or less sharp relief. One was the Carlists,

supporters of the claims of Don Carlos and, in respect to political

principle, avowed absolutists. A second comprised the Republicans, led

by Castelar, whose demand for the establishment of a republic,

rejected in 1869, carried the day upon the breakdown of the Amadeo

monarchy four years later. Between the Carlists, on the one hand, and

the Republicans, on the other, stood the mass of the political

leaders, and, so far as may be judged, of the nation also. All were

agreed upon the general principle of constitutional monarchy. But upon

the precise nature of the government which had been established and of

the public policy which ought to be pursued there was, and could be,

little agreement. The consequence was a sharp-cut cleavage, by which

there were set off in opposition to each other two large parties,

the Conservatives and the Liberals; and, save for the brief (p. 621)

ascendancy of the Republicans in 1873-1874, it is these two parties

which have shared between them the government of the kingdom from the

establishment of the limited monarchy in 1869 to the present day. Both

of these leading parties have been pledged continuously to maintain

the constitution and all of the popular privileges--freedom of speech,

liberty of the press, safety of property, the right of establishing

associations, and the like--guaranteed by that instrument. Upon the

_methods_ by which these things shall be maintained the parties

originally divided and still are disagreed. Fundamentally, the policy

of the Liberals is to commit the guardianship of public privileges to

the courts of justice, while that of the Conservatives is to retain it

rather in the hands of the ministerial and administrative authorities.

In the normal course of development the Liberal party has tended to

draw to itself those liberal elements generally which are satisfied to

rely upon legal means for the realization of their purposes, e.g.,

the free-traders, the labor forces, and many of the socialists.

Similarly the Conservative party has attracted a considerable

proportion of the reactionaries, especially the Ultramontanes, by whom

special stress is placed upon the maintenance of peace with the

Vatican, and many representatives of the old Moderate party which was

swept out of existence by the overturn of 1868.

*687. Liberals and Conservatives: Cánovas and Sagasta.*--The first

public act of Alfonso XII., following his proclamation as king,

December 29, 1874, was to call to his side in the capacity of premier

Cánovas del Castillo, by whom was formed a strong Conservative

ministry. Consequent upon the convocation of the Cortes of 1876 and

the adoption of the new constitution of that year, the various groups

of Liberals were drawn into a fairly compact opposition party,

supporting the Alfonsist dynasty and the new constitutional régime,

but proposing to labor, by peaceful means, for the restoration of as

many as possible of the more liberal features of the constitution of

1869. It is of interest to observe that the party, in its earlier

years, was encouraged by Cánovas, on the theory that there would be

provided by it a natural and harmless outlet for inevitable

ebullitions of the liberal spirit. Under the able leadership of

Sagasta the development of the party was rapid, and in 1881 Cánovas

determined to give the country a taste of Liberal rule. Following a

collusive "defeat" the premier retired, whereupon Sagasta was

designated premier and a Liberal ministry was established which held

office somewhat more than two years. By the Republicans and other

radical forces the ministry of Sagasta was harassed unsparingly, just

as had been that of Cánovas, and the actual working policies of (p. 622)

the two differed in scarcely any particular. Within the Liberal ranks,

indeed, a "dynastic Left" became so troublesome that Sagasta, after

two years, yielded office to the leader of the disaffected elements,

Posada Herrera. The only effect of the experiment was to demonstrate

that between the Conservatives led by Cánovas and the Liberals led by

Sagasta there was no room for a third party.

In 1885 Cánovas returned to power, but for only a brief interval, for

upon the establishment of the regency of Queen Christina, following

the death of Alfonso XII., November 25, 1885, Sagasta was called upon

to form the first of a series of ministries over which he presided

continuously through the ensuing five years. In the memorable Pact of

El Pardo it had been agreed between the Liberal and Conservative

leaders that each would assist the other in the defense of the dynasty

and of the constitution, and although Sagasta had avowed the intention

of reintroducing certain principles of the constitution of 1869 he was

pledged to proceed in a cautious manner and a conciliatory spirit. The

elections of 1884 yielded a substantial Conservative majority in both

chambers of the Cortes. None the less the Conservatives accorded the

Liberal government their support, until by the elections of 1886 the

Liberals themselves acquired control of the two houses. Throughout

three years Castelar and the more moderate Republicans co-operated

actively with the Government in the re-introduction of jury trial, the

revival of liberty of the press, and a number of other liberal

measures; but the Government was annoyed continually by attacks and

intrigues participated in by both the less conciliatory Republicans

and the Carlists. The crowning achievement of the Sagasta ministry was

the carrying through of the manhood suffrage act of June 29, 1890.

Within a month after the promulgation of the suffrage law the regent

gave Sagasta to understand that the time had arrived for a change of

leaders. The Cánovas ministry which was thereupon established endured

two and a half years, and was given distinction principally by its

introduction, in 1892, of the thoroughgoing protectionist régime which

prevails in Spain to-day. The Conservatives falling into discord,

Cánovas resigned, December 8, 1892; and at the elections of the

following year the Conservatives carried only one hundred seats in the

Chamber. During the period from December, 1892, to March, 1895,

Sagasta was again at the helm.

*688. The American War and Ministerial Changes, 1895-1902.*--Between

1895 and 1901 there was a rapid succession of ministries, virtually

all of which were both made and unmade by situations arising from (p. 623)

the war in Cuba and the subsequent contest with the United States. In

the hope of averting American intervention a new Cánovas government,

established in 1895, brought forward a measure for the introduction of

home rule in Cuba, but while the bill was pending, Cánovas was

assassinated, August 9, 1897, and the proposition failed. The new

Conservative cabinet of General Azcarraga soon retired, and although

the Sagasta government which succeeded recalled General Weyler from

Cuba and inaugurated a policy of conciliation, the situation had got

beyond control and war with the United States ensued. By the

succession of Spanish defeats the popularity of the Liberal régime was

strained to the breaking point, and at the close of the war Sagasta's

ministry gave place to a ministry formed by the new Conservative

leader Silvela. The elections of April 16, 1899, yielded the

Silvelists a majority and the ministry, reconstituted September 28 of

the same year, retained power until March 6, 1901. At that date the

Liberals gained the upper hand once more; and, with two brief

intervals, Sagasta remained in office until December 3, 1902. Within

scarcely more than a month after his final retirement, the great

Liberal leader passed away.

*689. Parties Since the Death of Sagasta.*--A second Silvela ministry,

established December 6, 1902, brought the Conservatives again into

power. This ministry, which lasted but a few months, was followed

successively by four other Conservative governments, as follows: that

of Villaverde, May, 1903, to December, 1903; that of Antonio Maura y

Montanes, December, 1903, to December, 1904; the second of General

Azcarraga, December, 1904, to January, 1905; and the second of

Villaverde, from January, 1905, to June, 1905. Of these the most

virile was that of Maura, a former Liberal, whose spirit of

conciliation and progressiveness entitled him to be considered one of

the few real statesmen of Spain in the present generation.

Following the death of Sagasta the Liberals passed through a period of

demoralization, but under the leadership of Montero Rios they

gradually recovered, and in June, 1905, the government of Villaverde

was succeeded by one presided over by Rios. At the elections of

September 10, 1905, the Ministerialists secured 227 seats and the

Conservatives of all groups but 126 (the remainder being scattered);

but discord arose and, November 29 following, the cabinet of Rios

resigned. Upon the great ecclesiastical questions of the day--civil

marriage, the law of associations, and the secularization of

education--both parties, but especially the Liberals, were disrupted

completely, and during the period of but little more than a year between

the retirement of Rios and the return to power of Maura, January 24,

1907, no fewer than five ministries sought successively to grapple (p. 624)

with the situation. Under Maura a measure of stability was restored.

The premier, although a Catholic, was moderately anti-clerical. His

principal purpose was to maintain order and to elevate the plane of

politics by a reform of the local government. At the elections of

April 21, 1907, the Conservatives won a victory so decisive that in

the Congress they secured a majority of 88 seats over all other groups

combined.[861] The fall of the Maura ministry, October 21, 1909, came

in consequence largely of the Moroccan crisis, but more immediately

by reason of embarrassment incident to the execution of the

anarchist-philosopher Señor Ferrer. The Liberal ministry of Moret,

constituted October 22, 1909, lacked substantial parliamentary support

and was short-lived. February 9, 1910, there was established under

Canalejas, leader of the democratic group, a cabinet representative of

various Liberal and Radical elements and made up almost wholly of men

new to ministerial office.[862]

[Footnote 861: The exact distribution of seats was

as follows: Conservatives, 256; Liberals, 66;

Solidarists, 53; Republicans, 32; Democrats, 9;

Independents, 8.]

[Footnote 862: November 12, 1912, Premier Canalejas

was assassinated. He was succeeded by the president

of the Congress of Deputies, Alvaro de Romanones,

under whom the Liberal ministry was continued in

office.]

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