of April, 1814, revised, November 4 following, to comport with the
conditions of the union with Sweden. The original instrument was not
only democratic in tone, but doctrinaire. With little in the nature of
native institutions upon which to build, the framers laid hold of
features of the French, English, American, and other foreign systems,
in the effort to transplant to Norwegian soil a body of political
forms and usages calculated to produce a high order of popular
government. No inconsiderable portion of these forms and usages
survived the revision enforced by the failure to achieve national
independence. Of this portion, however, several proved impracticable,
and constitutional amendments after 1814 were numerous. Upon the
establishment of independence in 1905 the fundamental law was modified
further by the elimination from it of all reference to the former
Swedish affiliation. The constitution to-day comprises one hundred
twelve articles, of which forty-six deal with the executive branch of
the government, thirty-seven with citizenship and the legislative
power, six with the judiciary, and twenty-three with matters of a
miscellaneous character. The process of amendment is appreciably more
difficult than that by which changes may be introduced in the Swedish
instrument.[811] Proposed amendments may be presented in the Storthing
only during the first regular session following a national election,
and they may be adopted only at a regular session following the
ensuing election, and by a two-thirds vote. It is required,
furthermore, that such amendments "shall never contravene the
principles of the constitution, but shall relate only to such
modifications in particular provisions as will not change the spirit
of the instrument."[812]
[Footnote 811: See p. 589.]
[Footnote 812: Art. 112. Dodd, Modern
Constitutions, II., 143. An English version of the
Norwegian constitution is printed in Dodd, ibid.,
II., 123-143, and in H. L. Braekstad, The
Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway (London,
1905). The standard treatise on the Norwegian
system of government is T. H. Aschehoug, Norges
Nuvaerende Statsforfatning (2d ed., Christiania,
1891-1893); but a more available work is an earlier
one by the same author, Das Staatsrecht der
vereinigten Königreiche Schweden und Norwegen
(Freiburg, 1886), in Marquardsen's Handbuch. The
most recent and, on the whole the most useful,
treatise is B. Morgenstierne, Das Staatsrecht des
Königreichs Norwegen (Tübingen, 1911).]
*639. The Crown and the Council.*--The government of Norway, like (p. 580)
that of Sweden and of Denmark, is in form a limited hereditary
monarchy. The popular element in it is both legally and actually more
considerable than in the constitutional system of either of the sister
Scandinavian states; none the less, the principle of monarchy is
firmly entrenched, and, as has been pointed out, not even the overturn
of 1905 endangered it seriously. The constitution contains provisions
respecting the succession to the throne, the conduct of affairs during
a minority, and the establishment of a regency, which need not be
recounted here, but which are designed to meet every possible
contingency. In the event of the absolute default of a legal successor
the Storthing is empowered to elect.
Supreme executive authority is vested in the king, who must be an
adherent of the Lutheran Church, and who at his accession is required
to take oath in the presence of the Storthing to govern in conformity
with the constitution and laws. Associated with the king is a Council
of State, upon which, since the king may be neither censured nor
impeached, devolves responsibility for virtually all executive acts.
The Council consists of a minister of state, or premier, and at least
seven other members. All are appointed by the crown, and all must be
Norwegian citizens not less than thirty years of age and adherents of
the established Lutheran faith. The king may apportion the business of
state among the councillors as he desires. There are at present, in
addition to the ministry of state, eight ministerial portfolios, i.e.,
Foreign Affairs, Justice, Worship and Instruction, Agriculture,
Labor, Finance, Defense, and Commerce, Navigation and Industry. All
ministers are regularly members of the Storthing, though by the
constitution the crown is authorized for special reasons to add to the
Council members who possess no legislative seats. The heir to the
throne, if eighteen years of age, is entitled to a seat in the
Council, but without vote or responsibility.
*640. The Exercise of Executive Powers.*--Most of the powers which are
possessed by the king may be exercised by him only in conjunction with
the Council. Like the fundamental law of Sweden, that of Norway
stipulates that, while it shall be the duty of every member of the
Council to express his opinion freely, and of the king to give ear to
all such opinions, it "shall remain with the king to decide according
to his own judgment."[813] None the less, the acts of the crown are,
as a rule, those not only, legally, of the king _in_ council but,
actually, of the king _and_ council. With the exception of military
commands, all orders issued by the king must be countersigned by the
minister of state, and ministers may be impeached at any time by (p. 581)
the Odelsthing before the Rigsret, or Court of Impeachment; so that,
in effect, there is a close approach to the parliamentary system of
ministerial responsibility. Under these conditions, the crown appoints
all civil, ecclesiastical, and military officials; removes higher
officials (including the ministers) without previous judicial
sentence; pardons offenders after conviction; regulates religious
services, assemblies, and meetings; issues and repeals regulations
concerning commerce, customs, industry, and public order; and enforces
the laws of the realm. The king is commander-in-chief of the land and
naval forces, though these forces may not be increased or diminished,
or placed at the service of a foreign sovereign or state, without the
consent of the Storthing. And the king has the power to mobilize
troops, to commence war and conclude peace, to enter into and to
withdraw from alliances, and to send and to receive ambassadors.[814]
[Footnote 813: Art. 30. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,
II., 128.]
[Footnote 814: Arts. 16, 17, 20-26. Dodd, Modern
Constitutions, II., 125-127.]
IV. THE STORTHING--POLITICAL PARTIES
*641. Electoral System: the Franchise.*--Among the legislatures of
Europe that of Norway is unique. In structure it represents a curious
cross between the principles of unicameral and bicameral organization.
It comprises essentially a single body, which, however, for purely
legislative purposes is divided into two chambers, or sections, the
Lagthing and the Odelsthing. This division is made subsequent to the
election of the members, so that representatives are chosen simply to
the Storthing as a whole. The elections take place every third year.
There are forty-one urban, and eighty-two rural, districts, and every
district returns one member--a total of 123.
Formerly the franchise rested, as in Sweden, upon a property
qualification; but by a series of suffrage reforms within the past
decade and a half it has been brought about that in respect to
electoral privileges Norway is to-day the most democratic of European
countries. In 1898 the Liberal government of Steen procured the
enactment of a measure which long had occupied a leading place in the
programme of the radical elements. By it the parliamentary franchise
was conferred upon all male citizens of a minimum age of twenty-five
years who have resided at least five years in Norway and who have
suffered no judicial impairment of civil rights. The effect was to
double at a stroke the national electorate. In 1901 the same Government
carried an important bill by which the suffrage in municipal elections
was conferred upon male citizens without restriction (save that of age),
upon all unmarried women twenty-five years of age who pay taxes on (p. 582)
an annual income of not less than 300 kronor, and upon all married
women of similar age whose husbands are taxed in equivalent amounts.
During ensuing years there was widespread agitation in behalf of the
parliamentary franchise for women, and the Liberal party made this one
of the principal items in its programme. June 14, 1907, by a vote of
73 to 48, the Storthing rejected a proposal that women be given the
parliamentary franchise on the same terms as men, but by the decisive
majority of 96 to 25 it conferred the privilege upon all women who
were in possession of the municipal franchise under the law of 1901.
The rapidity with which woman's suffrage sentiment had developed is
indicated by the fact that as late as 1898 a proposal looking toward
the including of women in the parliamentary electorate had received in
the Storthing a total of but 33 votes. By the legislation of 1907
Norway became the first of European nations to confer upon women,
under any conditions, the privilege of voting for members of the
national legislative body and of sitting as members of that body. At
the elections of 1909, the first in which women participated, no
revolutionizing effects were observed. The electorate, however, was
increased by approximately 300,000, which was somewhat over half of
the kingdom's total female population of the requisite age.[815] April
30, 1910, the Constitutional Committee of the Storthing, by a majority
of four to three, recommended that parliamentary suffrage be extended
to women on equal terms with men, i.e., without reference to taxpaying
qualifications. The recommendation was rejected, but during the next
month the Odelsthing voted, 71 to 10, and the Lagthing, 24 to 7, to
apply the principle of it in municipal elections. Thus the municipal
electorate was enlarged by approximately 200,000, and the way was
prepared, as many believe, for the adoption eventually of the
Committee's original recommendation. Prior to an amendment of May 25,
1905, parliamentary elections were indirect. In the urban districts
one elector was chosen for every fifty voters, and in the rural
districts, one for every one hundred. Now, however, elections are
direct. Each petty political unit having a municipal government of its
own comprises a voting precinct. If at the first ballot no candidate
in the district receives a majority of all the votes cast, a second
ballot is taken, when a simple plurality is decisive. A noteworthy
feature of the system is the fact that voters who on account of
illness, military service, or other valid reason, are unable to appear
at the polls are permitted to transmit their votes in writing to the
proper election officials.
[Footnote 815: At the election of 1909 the total
number of parliamentary electors was 785,358. The
number of votes recorded, however, was but
487,193.]
*642. Qualifications, Sessions, and Organization.*--No one may be (p. 583)
chosen a member of the Storthing unless he or she is thirty years
of age, a resident of the kingdom of ten years' standing, and a
qualified voter in the election district in which he or she is chosen;
but a former member of the Council of State, if otherwise qualified,
may be elected to represent any district.[816] Under recent
legislation every member of the Storthing receives a salary of three
thousand kroner a year, in addition to travelling expenses. The
Storthing meets in regular session annually, without regard to summons
by the crown. The constitution fixed originally as the date of
convening the first week-day after October 10 of each year; but, May
28, 1907, the Storthing adopted an amendment whereby, beginning with
1908, the meeting time was changed to the first week-day after January
10. For sufficient reasons, an extraordinary session may be convoked
by the king at any time. The length of sessions is indeterminate,
except that an extraordinary session may be adjourned by the crown at
will, and no session, extraordinary or regular, may be prolonged
beyond two months without the king's consent. At its first regular
session following a general election the Storthing divides itself into
two chambers. A fourth of the membership is designated to constitute
the Lagthing, the remaining three-fourths comprise the Odelsthing; and
the division thus effected holds until the succeeding election. Each
chamber elects its own president, secretary, and other officers.
Sessions are public, and business may not be transacted unless at
least two-thirds of the members are present.
[Footnote 816: Arts. 59-64. Dodd, Modern
Constitutions, II., 134-135.]
*643. Powers and Procedure of the Storthing.*--The powers of the
Storthing, as enumerated in the constitution, include the enactment
and the repeal of laws; the levying of taxes, imposts, and duties; the
appropriating and the borrowing of money; the regulating of the
currency; the examining of treaties concluded with foreign powers; the
inspection of the records of the Council of State; the making of
provision for the auditing of the national accounts; and regulation of
the naturalization of foreigners.[817] All bills are required to be
presented first in the Odelsthing, by one of the members of the body,
or by the Government, through a councillor of state. Only in the event
that a measure passes the Odelsthing is it presented at all in the
Lagthing, for the sole function of the smaller chamber is to act as a
check upon the larger one. The Lagthing may either approve or reject a
bill which the Odelsthing submits, but may not amend it. A measure
rejected is returned, with reasons for the rejection. Three courses
are then open to the Odelsthing: to drop the measure, to submit it in
amended form, or to resubmit it unchanged. When a bill from the (p. 584)
Odelsthing has been twice presented to the Lagthing, and has been a
second time rejected, the two chambers are convened in joint session,
and in this consolidated body proposals are carried by a two-thirds
vote. All questions pertaining to the revision of the constitution are
required to be voted upon in this manner.
[Footnote 817: Art. 75. Ibid., II., 136.]
*644. The Veto Power.*--A bill passed by the Storthing is laid forthwith
before the king. If he approves it, the measure becomes law. If he
does not approve it, he returns it to the Odelsthing with a statement
of his reasons for disapproval. A measure which has been vetoed may
not again be submitted to the king by the same Storthing. The royal
veto, however, is not absolute. "If," says the constitution, "a
measure has been passed without change by three regular Storthings
convened after three separate successive elections, and separated from
each other by at least two intervening regular sessions, without any
conflicting action having in the meantime been taken in any session
between its first and last passage, and is then presented to the king
with the request that his majesty will not refuse his approval to a
measure which the Storthing, after the most mature deliberation,
considers beneficial, such measure shall become law even though the
king fails to approve it...."[818] In the days of the Swedish union
the precise conditions under which the royal veto might be exercised
were the subject of interminable controversy. In respect to ordinary
legislation the stipulations of the constitution were plain enough,
but in respect to measures which in essence comprised constitutional
amendments the silence of that instrument afforded room for wide
differences of opinion. An especially notable conflict was that which
took place in the early eighties respecting a proposal to admit the
Norwegian ministers to the Storthing with the privilege of
participation in the deliberations of that body. The measure was
passed by overwhelming majorities by three Storthings after three
successive general elections, and in accordance with the constitution,
under the Norwegian interpretation, it ought thereupon to have been
recognized as law. The king, however, not only refused to approve the
bill, but asserted firmly that his right to exercise an absolute veto
in constitutional questions was "above all doubt"; and when the
Storthing pronounced the measure law without the royal sanction, both
crown and Swedish ministry avowed that by them it would not be
recognized as valid. In the end (in 1884) the Storthing won, but the
issue was revived upon numerous occasions. Under the independent
monarchy of 1905 there has been no difficulty of the sort; nor, in
view of the eminently popular aspect of kingship in Norway to-day, (p. 585)
is such difficulty likely to arise.
[Footnote 818: Art. 79. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,
II., 137-138.]
*645. Political Parties: Liberals and Conservatives.*--Prior to the
accession of Oscar II., in 1872, the preponderating fact in the
political development of the kingdom was the gradual growth of
parliamentary power on the part of the representatives of the
peasantry. Between 1814 and 1830 the business of the Storthing was
conducted almost wholly by members of the upper and official classes,
but during the decade 1830-1840 the peasantry rose to the position of
a highly influential class in the public affairs of the nation. The
first of the so-called "peasant Storthings" was that of 1833. In it
the peasant representatives numbered forty-five, upwards of half of
the body. Under the leadership of Ole Ueland, who was a member of
every Storthing between 1833 and 1869, the peasant party made its
paramount issue, as a rule, the reduction of taxation and the practice
of economy in the national finances.
After 1870 the intensification of the Swedish-Norwegian question led
to the drawing afresh of party lines, and until the separation of
1905, the new grouping continued fairly stable. By the amalgamation of
the peasant party, led by Jaabaek, and the so-called "lawyers" party,
led by Johan Sverdrup, there came into being in the seventies a great
Liberal party (the Venstre, or Left) whose fundamental purpose was to
safeguard the liberties of Norway as against Swedish aggression. Until
1884 this party of nationalism was obliged to content itself with the
rôle of opposition. Governmental control was lodged as yet in the
Conservatives, whose attitude toward Sweden was distinctly
conciliatory. In 1880 the Conservative leader, Frederick Stang,
resigned the premiership, but his successor was another Conservative,
Selmer. At the elections of 1882 the Liberals obtained no fewer than
82 of the 114 seats in the Storthing. Still the Conservatives refused
to yield. In the meantime the Odelsthing had brought the entire
ministry to impeachment before the Rigsret for having advised the king
to interpose his veto to the measure giving ministers seats in
Parliament. Early in 1883 Selmer and seven of his colleagues were
sentenced to forfeiture of their offices, and the remaining three were
fined. March 11, 1884, the king announced his purpose to abide by the
decision of the court, distasteful to him as it was, and the Selmer
cabinet was requested to resign. An attempt to prolong yet further the
tenure of the Conservatives failed completely, and, June 23, 1884, the
king sent for Sverdrup and authorized the formation of the first
Liberal ministry in Norwegian history. The principal achievement of
the new government was the final enactment of the long-contested (p. 586)
measure according parliamentary seats to ministers. To this project
the king at last gave his consent.
*646. The Ministerial Succession to 1905.*--The Sverdrup ministry
endured almost exactly four years. In 1887 the party supporting it
split upon a question of ecclesiastical policy, and at the elections
of 1888 the Conservatives obtained fifty-one seats, while of the
sixty-three Liberals returned not more than twenty-six were really in
sympathy with Sverdrup. July 12, 1889, Sverdrup and his colleagues
resigned. Then followed a rapid succession of ministries, practically
every one of which met its fate, sooner or later, upon some question
pertaining to the Swedish union: (1) that of Emil Stang[819]
(Conservative), July 12, 1889, to March 5, 1891; (2) that of Johannes
Steen (Liberal), which lasted until April, 1893; (3) a second Stang
ministry, to February, 1895; and (4) the coalition ministry of
Professor Hagerup, to February, 1898. At the elections of 1897 the
Liberals won a signal victory, carrying seventy-nine of the one
hundred fourteen seats, and in February of the next year there was
established a second Steen ministry, under whose direction, as has
appeared, there was carried the law introducing manhood suffrage.
Steen retired in April, 1902, and another Liberal government, that of
Blehr, held office until October, 1903. At the elections of 1903 the
Conservatives and Moderates obtained sixty-three seats, the Liberals
fifty, and the Socialists four. A second Hagerup ministry filled the
period between October 23, 1903, and March 1, 1905, and upon its
retirement there was constituted, under circumstances which involved
temporarily the all but complete annihilation of party lines, a
coalition ministry under Christian Michelsen, at whose hands was
brought about immediately the separation from Sweden and the
constitutional readjustments of 1905.
[Footnote 819: Son of the earlier premier,
Frederick Stang.]
*647. Party History Since the Separation.*--Following the subsidence of
the excitement attending the separation the party alignments of
earlier days tended rapidly to reappear. The old issues, however, had
been disposed of, and in their place sprang up new ones, largely
social and economic in character. At the elections of 1906 the
subjects to which the Liberals gave most prominence were female
suffrage, old age pensions, and sickness and unemployment insurance.
The Michelsen government, which was essentially Conservative, issued a
moderate reform programme and, alleging that former party lines were
obsolete, called upon the citizens of all classes for support. The
elections were notable chiefly by reason of the fact that the Social
Democrats increased their quota in the Storthing to eleven. Despite
attacks of the more radical Left, the Michelsen cabinet stood firm (p. 587)
until October 28, 1907, when the premier, by reason of ill health, was
obliged to retire. Lövland, the minister of foreign affairs,
succeeded; but, March 14, 1908, on a vote of want of confidence, his
ministry was overthrown. A new cabinet was made up thereupon by the
Liberal leader, Gunnar Knudsen. At the elections of 1909--the first in
which women participated--this Liberal government lost the slender
majority which it had possessed, and January 27, 1910, it resigned.
Prior to the elections there were in the Storthing fifty-nine
Liberals, fifty-four Conservatives and Moderates, and ten Social
Democrats. Afterwards there were sixty-three Conservatives and
Moderates, forty-seven Liberals, eleven Social Democrats, and two
Independents. The popular vote of the Social Democrats was much in
excess of that at any former election, but it was so distributed that
the party realized from it but a single additional legislative seat.
Upon the resignation of Knudsen the premiership was offered to
Michelsen, whose health, however, precluded his accepting it. February
1, 1910, a Conservative-Moderate ministry was made up by Konow.
February 19, 1912, it was succeeded by another ministry of the same
type, under the premiership of the former president of the Storthing,
Bratlie. At the elections of November 12, 1912, the Government lost
heavily to the Liberals and to the Social Democrats. The socialist
quota now numbers twenty-three.[820]
[Footnote 820: A brief account of Norwegian
political parties to 1900 will be found in Lavisse
et Rambaud, Histoire Générale, XII., 266-274; to
1906, in Cambridge Modern History, XII., 280-290.
For additional references see pp. 578-579.]
V. THE JUDICIARY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
*648. The Courts.*--For the administration of civil justice the kingdom
of Norway is divided into 105 districts--eighty rural and twenty-five
urban--in each of which there is a court of first instance composed of
two justices chosen by the people. There are three higher tribunals,
each with a chief justice and two associates. At the top stands the
Höiesteret, or Supreme Court, consisting of a chief justice and six
associates. The decisions of the Supreme Court may be neither appealed
nor reviewed. For the trial of criminal cases, as regulated by law of
July 1, 1887, there exist two types of tribunals: (1) the Lagmandsret,
consisting of a president and ten jurors and (2) the Meddomsret,
consisting of a judge and two non-professional assistants chosen for
each case. There are in the kingdom four Lagdömmer, or jury districts,
each divided into circuits corresponding, as a rule, to the counties.
The jury courts take cognizance of the more serious cases. "No (p. 588)
one," the constitution stipulates, "shall be tried except in
accordance with law or punished except by virtue of a judicial
sentence; and examination by means of torture is forbidden."[821] The
members of the Lagthing, together with those of the Supreme Court,
comprise the Rigsret, or Court of Impeachment. This tribunal tries,
without appeal, cases involving charges of misconduct in office
brought by the Odelsthing against members of the Council of State, the
Supreme Court, or the Storthing.[822]
[Footnote 821: Art. 96. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,
II., 141.]
[Footnote 822: Arts. 86-87. Ibid., II., 139.]
*649. Local Government.*--For purposes of administration the kingdom is
divided into twenty regions--the cities of Christiania and Bergen and
eighteen _Amter_, or counties. At the head of each is an Amtmand, or
prefect, who is appointed by the crown. The principal local unit is
the _Herred_, or commune, of which there are upwards of seven hundred,
mostly rural parishes. As a rule, the government of the commune is
vested in a body of twelve to forty-eight representatives and a
Formaend, or council, elected by and from the representatives and
comprising one-fourth of their number. Every third year the
representatives choose from among the members of the council a
chairman and a deputy chairman; and, under the presidency of the
Amtmand, the chairmen of the rural communes within each county meet
yearly as an Amtsthing, or county diet, and adopt the budget of the
county. Since the municipal electoral law of 1910 members of the
communal councils are chosen on a basis of universal suffrage for both
men and women.
CHAPTER XXXII (p. 589)
THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN
I. THE CONSTITUTION--THE CROWN AND THE MINISTRY
*650. The Fundamental Laws.*--The constitution of the kingdom of Sweden
is one of the most elaborate instruments of its kind in existence. It
comprises a group of fundamental laws of which the most comprehensive
is the _regerings-formen_ of June 6, 1809, in 114 articles.[823]
Closely related are (1) the law of royal succession of September 26,
1810; (2) the law of July 16, 1812, on the liberty of the press; and
(3) the law of June 26, 1866, providing for a reorganization of the
legislative chambers. The organs and powers of government are defined
in much detail, but there is nothing equivalent to the bill of rights
which finds a place in most European constitutions. The process of
amendment is easy and minor amendments have been frequent. Amendments
may originate with either the crown or the legislative houses, and any
amendment which receives the assent of the crown is declared to be
adopted if, after having been proposed or approved by one Riksdag, it
is sanctioned by the succeeding one. Through the re-election of the
lower chamber, which must intervene between the two stages, the people
have some opportunity to participate in the amending process.[824]
[Footnote 823: See p. 572.]
[Footnote 824: Arts. 81-82. Dodd, Modern
Constitutions, II., 240. In 1908 the ex-premier
Staaff proposed that when the two chambers should
disagree upon questions concerning the constitution
and general laws resort should be had to a popular
referendum; but the suggestion was negatived by the
upper house unanimously and by the lower by a vote
of 115 to 78. The text of the Swedish constitution,
together with the supplementary fundamental laws of
the kingdom, is contained in W. Uppström, Sveriges
Grundlager och konstitutionela stadgar jemte
kommunallagarne samt Norges Grundlov (6th ed.,
Stockholm, 1903). An English version is printed in
Dodd, Modern Constitutions, II., 219-251, and a
French one in Dareste, Constitutions Modernes (3d
ed.), II., 46-114. The best brief treatise upon
Swedish constitutional history is P. Fahlbeck, La
constitution suédoise et le parlementarisme moderne
(Paris, 1905). The best description of the Swedish
government as it was a quarter of a century ago is
T. H. Aschehoug, Das Staatsrecht der vereinigten
königreiche Schweden und Norwegen (Freiburg, 1886),
in Marquardsen's Handbuch. The principal treatise
in Swedish is C. Naumann, Sveriges
statsförfatningsrätt (2d ed., Stockholm,
1879-1884).]
*651. The Crown and the Ministry.*--At the head of the state (p. 590)
stands the king. The monarchy is hereditary, and the crown is
transmitted in the male line in the order of primogeniture. It is
required that the king shall belong invariably to the Lutheran Church
and that at his accession he shall take an oath to maintain
scrupulously the laws of the land. With the king is associated a
Statsrad, or Council of State, appointed by the crown "from among
capable, experienced, honest persons of good reputation, who are
Swedes by birth, and who belong to the pure, evangelical faith."[825]
By constitutional requirement the Council is composed of eleven
members, one of whom is designated by the king as minister of state
and president of the council, or premier. Of the eleven eight are
heads of the departments, respectively, of Foreign Affairs, Justice,
Land Defense, Naval Defense, Home Affairs, Finance, Agriculture, and
Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs. The president and two other
members are ministers without portfolio.
[Footnote 825: Art. 4. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,
II., 220.]
*652. The Exercise of Executive Powers.*--The powers of the Swedish
executive are large. A few are exercised by the crown alone; some by
the crown in conjunction with a small specified number of ministers;
the majority by the crown and entire ministry conjointly. The king
acts independently as the commander-in-chief of the land and naval
forces of the kingdom. He may conclude treaties and alliances with
foreign powers, after having consulted the minister of state, the
minister of foreign affairs, and one other member of the Council. But
if he wishes to declare war or to conclude peace he must convene in
special session the full membership of the Council and must require of
each member separately his opinion. "The king may then," it is
stipulated, "make and execute such a decision as he considers for the
best interests of the country."[826] In other words, in such a matter
the king is obliged to consult, but not necessarily to be guided by,
his ministerial advisers.
[Footnote 826: Art. 13. Ibid., 223.]
In general, it may be affirmed that this is the principle which
underlies the organization of the Swedish executive. After having been
prepared by one or more of the ministers, projects are considered by
the king in council; but the right of ultimate decision rests with the
king. It is thus that appointments to all national offices are made,
titles of nobility are conferred, ordinances are promulgated, texts of
new laws are framed, and questions of peace and war are determined.
Nominally, the ministers are responsible to the Riksdag for all acts
of the Government. But the constitution plainly states that after
matters have been discussed in the Council "the king alone shall have
the power to decide."[827] If the king's decision is palpably (p. 591)
contrary to the constitution or the general laws, the ministers are
authorized to enter protest. But that is all that they may do. The
ministers have seats in the Riksdag, where they participate in debate
and, in the name of the crown, initiate legislation. But their
responsibility lies so much more directly to the king than to the
legislature that what is commonly understood as the parliamentary
system can hardly be said to exist in the kingdom.
[Footnote 827: Art. 9. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,
II., 221.]
II. THE RIKSDAG: ELECTORAL SYSTEM
*653. Establishment of the Bicameral System, 1866.*--Until past the
middle of the nineteenth century the Swedish Riksdag, or diet,
comprised still an assemblage of the four estates of the realm--the
nobles, the clergy, the burghers, and the peasants. Throughout several
decades a preponderating political question was that of substituting
for this essentially mediæval arrangement a modern bicameral
legislative system. In 1840 the Riksdag itself insisted upon a change,
but the king, Charles XIV., refused to give his assent. During the
reign of Oscar I. (1844-1859) several proposals were forthcoming, but
none met with acceptance. It was left to Charles XV. (1859-1872), in
collaboration with his able minister of justice, Baron Louis Gerhard
de Geer, to effect the much-needed reform. In January, 1863, the
Government submitted to the Estates a measure whereby there was to be
constituted a Riksdag of two chambers--an upper one, which should be
essentially an aristocratic senate, and a lower, whose members should
be elected triennially by the people. In 1865 all of the four estates
acted favorably upon the bill and, January 22, 1866, the measure was
promulgated by the crown as an integral part of the fundamental law of
the kingdom. September 1, 1866, there were held the first national
elections under the new system. Since 1866 the upper chamber has
represented principally the old estates of the nobles and clergy, and
the lower has comprised the combined representatives of the townsmen
and peasants. The one has been conservative, and even aristocratic;
the other, essentially democratic. But the reform has contributed
greatly to the breaking up of the ancient rigidity of the Swedish
constitution and has opened the way for a parliamentary leadership on
the part of the commons which was impossible so long as each of four
orders was in possession of an equal voice and vote in legislative
business.
*654. The Upper Chamber.*--The membership of both houses of the Riksdag
is wholly elective, that of the upper indirectly, and that of the (p. 592)
lower directly, by the people. The upper house consists of 150 members
chosen by ballot, after the principle of proportional representation,
for a term of six years by the twenty-five Landsthings, or provincial
representative assemblies, and by the corporations of five of the
larger towns--Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö, Norrköping, and Gäfle. These
electoral bodies are arranged in six groups, in one of which an
election takes place in September of every year. The franchise
arrangements under which they are themselves chosen are still
determined principally with reference to property or income, but they
are no longer so undemocratic as they were prior to the electoral
reform of 1909, and whereas the elections were previously indirect,
they are now direct. No person may be elected to the upper chamber who
is not of Swedish birth, who has not attained his thirty-fifth year,
and who during three years prior to his election has not owned taxable
property valued at 50,000 kroner or paid taxes on an annual income of
at least 3,000 kroner.[828] A member who at any time loses these
qualifications forthwith forfeits his seat. Members formerly received
no compensation, but under the reform measure of 1909 they, as
likewise members of the lower chamber, are accorded a salary of 1,200
kroner for each session of four months, and, in the event of an extra
session, 10 kroner a day, in addition to travelling expenses.
[Footnote 828: These amounts were substituted in
1909 for 80,000 and 4,000 respectively.]
*655. The Lower Chamber.*--As constituted by law of 1894, modified by
the reform act of 1909, the lower chamber consists of 230 members
chosen under a system of proportional representation in fifty-six
electoral districts, each of which returns from three to seven
deputies. The number of members to be chosen in each of the districts
is determined triennially, immediately preceding the balloting. Prior
to the franchise law of 1909 the suffrage was confined, through
property qualifications, within very narrow bounds. The electorate
comprised native Swedes twenty-five years of age or over who were
qualified as municipal voters and who possessed real property to the
taxed value of 1,000 kroner, or who paid taxes on an annual income of
at least 800 kroner, or who possessed a leasehold interest for at
least five years of a taxable value of 6,000 kroner. In 1902 it was
demonstrated by statistics that of the entire male population of the
kingdom over twenty-one years of age not more than thirty-four per
cent could meet these qualifications.
*656. Beginnings of the Movement for Electoral Reform.*--As early as
1895 insistent demand began to be made in many quarters for an
extension of the franchise, and in the Riksdag of 1896 Premier Boström
introduced a moderate measure looking toward that end and involving
the introduction of proportional representation. The bill, (p. 593)
however, was defeated. Agitation was continued, and in 1900 the
Liberals made electoral reform the principal item of their programme.
In 1901 there was passed a sweeping measure for the reorganization of
the army whereby were increased both the term of military service and
the taxes by which the military establishment was supported. Argument
to the effect that such an augmentation of public burdens ought to be
accompanied by an extension of public privileges was not lost upon the
members of the Conservative Government, and at the opening of the
Riksdag of 1902 the Speech from the Throne assigned first place in the
legislative calendar to a Suffrage Extension bill. March 12 the
measure was laid before the chambers. The provisions of the bill were,
in brief, (1) that every male citizen, already possessed of the
municipal franchise, who had completed his twenty-fifth year and was
not in arrears in respect to taxes or military service, should be
entitled to vote for a member of the lower national chamber; and (2)
that every voter who was married, or had been married, or had
completed his fortieth year, should be entitled to two votes. By
reason of its plural voting features the measure was not well
received, even though the plural vote was not made in any way
dependent upon property. It was opposed by the Liberals and the Social
Democrats, and members even of the Conservative Government which had
introduced it withheld from it their support. Amidst unusual public
perturbation the Liberals drew up a counter-proposal, which was
introduced in the lower chamber April 16. It contemplated not simply
one vote for all male citizens twenty-five years of age who possessed
the municipal franchise, but also a sweeping extension of the
municipal franchise itself. The upshot was the adoption by the Riksdag
of a proposal to the effect that the Government, after conducting a
thorough investigation of the entire subject, should submit, in 1904,
a new measure based upon universal suffrage from the age of
twenty-five.
*657. The Conservative Proposal of 1904.*--The issue was postponed, but
agitation, especially on the part of the Social Democrats, was
redoubled. February 9, 1904, the Government laid before the lower
chamber a new suffrage bill embodying the recommendations of a
commission appointed some months previously to conduct the
investigation which had been ordered. The principal provisions of the
measure were (1) that every male municipal taxpayer who had attained
his twenty-fifth year, and was not deficient in respect to his fiscal
or military obligations, should be entitled to one vote for a member
of the Chamber; and (2) that the 230 legislative seats should be
distributed among thirty-three electoral districts, and should be
filled by deputies chosen according to the principle of (p. 594)
proportional representation. The introduction of this measure became
the signal for the appearance of a multitude of projects dealing with
the subject, most of which discarded proportional representation but
imposed still fewer restrictions upon the franchise. In the upper
house the Government's proposal, modified somewhat to meet the demands
of the agrarian interests, was passed by a vote of 93 to 50; but in
the lower chamber the substance of it was rejected by the narrow
margin of 116 to 108.
In view of the continued support of the upper house and the meagerness
of the opposition majority in the lower, the Government, at the
opening of the Riksdag of 1905, submitted afresh its suffrage bill
without material modification. Again there was a deluge of
counter-proposals, the most important of which was that introduced
March 18 by Karl Staaff, in behalf of the Liberals, to the effect that
every citizen in good standing of the age of twenty-four should be
entitled to one vote, and that the Chamber should consist of 165 rural
and 65 urban members, chosen in single-member constituencies. May 3
and 4 the Government's bill was carried in the upper house by a vote
of 93 to 50, but lost in the lower by a vote of 114 to 109. Upon
Staaff's project the lower house was almost equally divided.
*658. The Proposal of the Staaff Government, 1906.*--Upon the
resignation of the Lundeberg cabinet, October 28, 1905, following the
Norwegian separation, a Liberal ministry was made up by Staaff, and
when, January 15, 1906, the Riksdag reassembled in regular session the
new Government was ready to push to a conclusion the electoral
controversy. February 24 Premier Staaff introduced an elaborate
measure comprising an amplification of that which had been brought
forward by him a year earlier. By stipulating that at the age of
twenty-four every man of good character should have one vote the
scheme proposed enormously to enlarge the quota of enfranchised
citizens, and by apportioning representatives among the town and
country districts in the ratio of 65 to 165 it promised to reduce
materially the existing over-representation of the towns. It excluded
from the franchise bankrupts, persons under guardianship, and
defaulters in respect to military service; it required for election at
the first ballot, though not at the second, an absolute majority; it
stipulated that a rearrangement of constituencies, in accordance with
population, should be made every nine years by the king. It gave no
place to the principle of proportional representation which had
appeared in the proposals of the Conservative ministries of 1904 and
1905; and while favorable mention was made of female suffrage, the
authors of the measure avowed the opinion that the injection of (p. 595)
that issue at the present moment would endanger the entire reform
programme. Amidst renewed public demonstrations the usual flood of
counter-projects, several stipulating female suffrage, made its
appearance. The upper chamber, dominated by the Conservatives, held
out for proportional representation, and, May 14, it negatived the
Staaff proposal by a vote of 125 to 18. The day following the bill was
passed in the lower chamber by a majority of 134 to 94, and a little
later proportional representation was rejected by 130 votes to 98.
*659. A Compromise Bill Adopted, 1907.*--Upon the Conservative
Government of Lindman which succeeded devolved the task of framing a
measure upon which the two chambers could unite. A new bill made its
appearance February 2, 1907. Its essential provisions were (1) that
the members of the lower chamber should be elected by manhood suffrage
(with the limitations specified in the Liberal programme of 1906) and
proportional representation; (2) that the number of electoral
districts should be fixed at fifty-six, each to return from three to
seven members; (3) that members of the upper chamber should be elected
by the provincial Landsthings and the municipal councils for six years
instead of nine as hitherto, and by proportional representation; and
(4) that the municipal suffrage, which forms the basis of the
elections to the Landsthing, should be democratized in such a manner
that, whereas previously a wealthy elector might cast a maximum of 100
votes in the towns and 5,000 in the rural districts,[829] henceforth
the maximum of votes which might be cast by any one elector should be
forty. By the Liberals and Social Democrats this measure was denounced
as inadequate, although on all sides it was admitted that the changes
introduced by it were so sweeping as to amount to a positive revision
of the constitution. The spokesmen of the Liberal Union reintroduced
the Staaff bill of 1906, and the Social Democrats brought forward a
new measure which accorded a prominent place to female suffrage.
February 8 the two chambers elected a joint committee to investigate
and report upon the Government's project. Various amendments were
added to the bill, e.g., one whereby members of the upper chamber
henceforth should receive an emolument for their services, and
eventually, May 14, the measure was brought to a vote. Despite the
apprehensions of the Government, it was carried. In the lower house
the vote was 128 to 98; in the upper, 110 to 29.
[Footnote 829: Under the prevailing system, each
elector in the towns had one vote for every 100
kroner income, subject to a limit of 100 votes;
each one in the country had ten votes for every 100
kroner income, subject to a limit of 5,000 votes.]
*660. Final Enactment, 1909: Woman's Suffrage.*--The measure (p. 596)
comprised a series of constitutional amendments, and, in accordance
with the requirements in such cases, it remained in abeyance until a
newly elected Riksdag (chosen in 1908 and assembled in 1909) should
have had an opportunity to take action upon it. In the Riksdag of 1908
ex-Premier Staaff introduced a measure granting female suffrage in
parliamentary elections and extending it in municipal elections. But
both chambers negatived this and every other proposal offered upon the
subject, preferring to support the Government in its purpose to keep
the issue of woman's suffrage in the background until the reforms of
1907 should have been carried to completion. Early in the session of
1909 the "preliminary resolution" of 1907 was given the final approval
of the chambers. The Liberals, being now interested principally in the
woman's suffrage propaganda, did not combat the measure, so that the
majorities for its adoption were overwhelming.
The enactment of this piece of legislation constitutes a landmark in
Swedish political history. Through upwards of a decade the question of
franchise reform had overshadowed all other public issues and had
distracted attention from various pressing problems of state.
Denounced still by the extremists of both radical and conservative
groups, the new law was hailed by the mass of the nation with the most
evident satisfaction.[830] The question of woman's suffrage remains.
At the elections of 1908 the Liberal party emulated the Social
Democrats in the incorporation of this project in its programme, and,
April 21, 1909, the Constitutional Committee of the Riksdag
recommended the adoption of a measure whereby women should be accorded
the parliamentary suffrage and eligibility to sit as members of either
chamber. In May, 1911, the essentials of this recommendation were
accepted by the lower chamber by a vote of 120 to 92, but by the upper
they were rejected overwhelmingly. At the opening of the Riksdag of
1912 the Speech from the Throne announced the purpose of the
Government to introduce a measure for the enfranchisement of women,
and during the session the promise was redeemed by the bringing (p. 597)
forward of a bill in accordance with whose terms every Swede, without
distinction of sex, over twenty-four years of age and free from legal
disabilities, may vote for members of the lower chamber.
[Footnote 830: In the main, the scheme of
proportional representation adopted in Sweden is
similar to that in operation in Belgium (see pp.
542-545). Electors are expected to write at the
head of their ballot papers the name or motto of
their party. The papers bearing the same name or
emblem are then grouped together, the numbers in
each group are ascertained, and the seats available
are allotted to these groups in accordance with the
d'Hondt rule, irrespective of the number of votes
obtained by individual candidates. The candidate
receiving the largest number of votes is declared
elected. The papers on which his name appears are
then marked down to the value of one-half, the
relative position of the remaining candidates is
ascertained afresh, and the highest of these is
declared elected, and so on. Unlike the Belgian
system, the Swedish plan provides for the allotment
of but a single seat at a time. Humphreys,
Proportional Representation, 296-313.]
III. THE RIKSDAG IN OPERATION--POLITICAL PARTIES
*661. Organization and Procedure.*--By the Riksdag law of 1866 the king
is required to summon the chambers annually and empowered to convene
extraordinary sessions as occasion may demand. It is within the
competence of the king in council to dissolve either or both of the
chambers, but in such an event a general election must be ordered
forthwith, and the new Riksdag is required to be assembled within
three months after the dissolution.[831] The president and
vice-presidents of both houses are named by the crown; otherwise the
chambers are permitted to choose their officials and to manage their
affairs independently. It is specifically forbidden that either house,
or any committee, shall deliberate upon or decide any question in the
presence of the sovereign. The powers of the Riksdag cover the full
range of civil and criminal legislation; but no measure may become law
without the assent of the crown. In other words, the veto which the
king possesses is absolute. At the same time, the king is forbidden,
save with the consent of the Riksdag, to impose any tax, to contract
any loan, to dispose of crown property, to alienate any portion of the
kingdom, to change the arms or flag of the realm, to modify the
standard or weight of the coinage, or to introduce any alteration in
the national constitution. Measures may be proposed, not only by the
Government, but by members of either house. The relations between the
two houses are peculiarly close. At each regular session there are
constituted certain joint committees whose function is the preparation
and preliminary consideration of business for the attention of both
chambers. Most important among these committees is that on laws,
which, in the language of the constitution, "elaborates projects
submitted to it by the houses for the improvement of the civil,
criminal, municipal, and ecclesiastical laws."[832] Other such
committees are those on the constitution, on finance, on
appropriations, and on the national bank.
[Footnote 831: Art. 109. Dodd, Modern
Constitutions, II., 249.]
[Footnote 832: Art. 53. Ibid., II., 234.]
*662. Powers.*--The stipulations of the constitution which relate to
finance are precise. "The ancient right of the Swedish people to tax
themselves," it is affirmed, "shall be exercised by the Riksdag
alone."[833] The king is required at each regular session to lay (p. 598)
before the Riksdag a statement of the financial condition of the
country in all of its aspects, both income and expenses, assets and
debts. It is made the duty of the Riksdag to vote such supplies as the
treasury manifestly needs and to prescribe specifically the objects
for which the separate items of appropriation may be employed; also to
vote two separate amounts of adequate size to be used by the king in
emergency only, in the one instance in the event of war, in the other,
when "absolutely necessary for the defense of the country, or for
other important and urgent purposes."
[Footnote 833: Art. 57. Ibid., 234.]
Finally, the Riksdag is authorized and required to exercise a
supervisory vigilance in relation to the several branches of the
governmental system. One of the functions of the Constitutional
Committee is that of inspecting the records of the Council of State to
determine whether there has been any violation of the constitution or
of the general laws; and in the event of positive findings the
Committee may institute proceedings before the Riksrâtt, or Court of
Impeachment. At every regular session the Riksdag is required to
appoint a solicitor-general, ranking equally with the attorney-general
of the crown, with authority to attend the sessions of any of the
courts of the kingdom, to examine all judicial records, to present to
the Riksdag a full report upon the administration of justice
throughout the nation, and, if necessary, to bring charges of
impeachment against judicial officers. Every third year the Riksdag
appoints a special commission to determine whether all of the members
of the Supreme Court "deserve to be retained in their important
offices." Every third year, too, a commission of six is constituted
which, under the presidency of the solicitor-general, overhauls the
arrangements respecting the liberty of the press.[834]
[Footnote 834: Arts. 96-100. Dodd, Modern
Constitutions, II., 244-245.]
*663. Political Parties: Military and Tariff Questions.*--In Sweden, as
in European countries generally, the party alignment which lies at the
root of contemporary politics is that of Conservatives and Liberals.
Much of the time, however, within the past half-century party
demarcations have been vague and shifting, being determined largely in
successive periods by the rise and disappearance of various
preponderating public issues. The first great question upon which
party affiliations were shaped after the accession of Oscar II. in
1872 was that of national defense. The army and navy were recognized
at that time to be hopelessly antiquated, and the successive
Conservative ministries of the seventies were resolved upon greatly
increased expenditures in the interest of military and naval
rehabilitation. Against this programme was set squarely that of rigid
economy, urged by the strongly organized Landtmannapartiet, or (p. 599)
Agricultural party, representing the interests of the landed
proprietors, large and small, of the kingdom. The Landtmannapartiet
was founded in 1867, immediately following the reconstitution of the
Riksdag under the law of 1866, and through several decades it
comprised the dominating element in the lower chamber, in addition to
possessing at times no inconsiderable amount of influence in the upper
one. Throughout the period covered by the Conservative ministry of
Baron de Geer (1875-1880) and the Agricultural party's government
under Arvid Posse (1880-1883) there was an all but unbroken deadlock
between the upper chamber, dominated by the partisans of military
expenditure, and the lower, dominated equally by the advocates of
tax-reduction. It was not until 1885 that a ministry under Themptander
succeeded in procuring the enactment of a compromise measure
increasing the obligation of military service but remitting thirty per
cent of the land taxes. By this legislation the military and tax
issues were put in the way of eventual adjustment.
Already there had arisen a new issue, upon which party lines were
chiefly to be drawn during the later eighties and earlier nineties.
This was the question of the tariff. The continued distress of the
agrarian interests after 1880, arising in part from the competition of
foreign foodstuffs, suggested to the landed interests of Sweden that
the nation would do well to follow in the path already entered upon by
Germany. The consequence was the rise of a powerful protectionist
party, opposed by a free trade party with which were identified
especially the merchant classes. In 1886 the agrarians procured a
majority in the lower chamber, and by 1888 they were in control of
both branches. The free trade Themptander ministry was thereupon
replaced by the protectionist ministry of Bildt, under which, in 1888,
there were introduced protective duties on cereals, and later, in
1891-1892, on manufactured commodities. Step by step, the customs
policy developed by Sweden during the middle of the century was
reversed completely.
*664. Politics Since 1891.*--July 10, 1891, the Conservative Erik Gustaf
Boström, became premier, and thereafter, save for a brief interval
covered by the von Otter ministry (September, 1900, to July, 1902)
this able representative of the dominant agrarian interests continued
uninterruptedly at the helm until the Norwegian crisis in the spring
of 1905. With the elimination, however, of the tariff issue from the
field of active politics, Premier Boström adopted an attitude on
public questions which, on the whole, was essentially independent. In
the later nineties there arose two problems, neither entirely new,
which were destined long to occupy the attention of the Government
almost to the exclusion of all things else. One of these was the (p. 600)
readjustment with Norway. The other was the question of electoral
reform. The one affected considerably the fate of ministries, but did
not alter appreciably the alignment of parties; the other became the
issue upon which party activity largely turned through a number of
years. All parties from the outset professed to favor electoral
reform, but upon the nature and extent of such reform there was the
widest difference of sentiment and policy. During the course of the
contest upon this issue the Liberal party tended to become distinctly
more radical than it had been in the nineties; and it is worthy of
note that the rise of the Social Democrats to parliamentary importance
falls almost entirely within the period covered by the electoral
controversy. The first Social Democratic member of the Riksdag was
elected in 1896. From 1906 to 1911 the Conservative ministry of
Lindman, supported largely by the landholding elements of both
chambers, maintained steadily its position. At the elections of 1908
the Liberals realized some gains, and at those of 1911 both they and
the Social Democrats cut deeply into the Conservative majority. When,
in September, 1911, it appeared that the Liberals had procured 102
seats in the lower chamber, the Social Democrats 64, and the
Conservatives but 64, the Lindman government promptly resigned and a
new ministry was made up by the Liberal leader and ex-premier Staaff.
The invitation which was extended the Social Democrats to participate
in the forming of the ministry was declined. In October the upper
chamber was dissolved, for the first time in Swedish history, and at
the elections which were concluded November 30 the Liberals and Social
Democrats realized another distinct advance. Before the elections the
chamber contained 116 Conservatives, 30 Liberals, and 4 Social
Democrats; following them the quotas were, respectively, 87, 51, and
12.[835]
[Footnote 835: V. Pinot, Le parlementarisme
suédois, in _Revue Politique et Parlementaire_,
Sept. 10, 1912.]
IV. THE JUDICIARY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
*665. The Courts.*--In theory the judicial power in Sweden, being lodged
ultimately in the crown, is indistinguishable from the executive; in
practice, however, it is essentially independent. The constitution
regulates with some minuteness the character of the principal
tribunal, the _Högsta Domstolen_, or Supreme Court, but leaves the
organization of the inferior courts to be determined by the king and
the Riksdag. The Supreme Court consists of eighteen "councillors of
justice" appointed by the crown from among men of experience, honesty,
and known legal learning. The functions of the court are largely (p. 601)
appellate, but it is worthy of note that in the event that a request
is made of the king by the lower courts, or by officials, respecting
the proper interpretation of a law, the Supreme Court is authorized to
furnish such interpretation, provided the subject is a proper one for
the consideration of the courts. Cases of lesser importance may be
heard and decided in the Supreme Court by five, or even four, members,
when all are in agreement. In more important cases at least seven
judges must participate. When the king desires he may be present, and
when present he possesses two votes in all cases heard and decided.
When the question is one of legal interpretation he is entitled to two
votes, whether or not he actually attends the proceedings. All
decisions are rendered in the name of the king. The inferior tribunals
comprise 212 district courts, or courts of first instance, and three
higher courts of appeal (_hofrâtter_), situated at Stockholm,
Jönköping, and Kristianstad. In the 91 urban districts the court
consists of the burgomaster and at least two aldermen; in the 121
rural districts, of a judge and twelve elected and unpaid peasant
proprietors serving as jurymen. No person occupying judicial office
may be removed save after trial and judgment.
*666. Local Government.*--The kingdom is divided into twenty-five
administrative provinces or counties (_lân_).[836] The principal
executive official in each is a _landshöfding_, or prefect, who is
appointed by the crown and assisted by a varying number of bailiffs
and sub-officials. Each province has a Landsthing, or assembly, which
meets for a few days annually, in September, under the presidency of a
member designated by the crown. All members are elected directly by
the voters of the towns and rural districts, in accordance with the
principle of proportional representation, and under a body of
franchise regulations which, while much liberalized in 1909, still is
based essentially upon property-holding. The function of the
Landsthing is the enactment of provincial legislation and the general
supervision of provincial affairs. In a few of the larger
towns--Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö, Norrköping, and Gäfle--these
functions are vested in a separate municipal council. The conditions
under which purely local affairs are administered are regulated by the
communal laws of March 21, 1862. Each rural parish and each town
comprises a self-governing commune. Each has an assembly, composed of
all taxpayers, which passes ordinances, elects minor officials, and
decides petty questions of purely communal concern.
[Footnote 836: One of these comprises simply the
city of Stockholm.]
PART IX.--THE IBERIAN STATES (p. 603)
CHAPTER XXXIII
THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN
I. THE BEGINNINGS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
*667. The Napoleonic Régime and the National Resistance.*--It was the
fortune of the kingdom of Spain, as it was that of the several Italian
states, to be made tributary to the dominion of Napoleon; and in
Spain, as in Italy, the first phase of the growth of constitutional
government fell within the period covered by the Corsican's
ascendancy. Starting with the purpose of punishing Portugal for her
refusal to break with Great Britain, Napoleon, during the years
1807-1808, worked out gradually an Iberian policy which comprehended
not only the subversion of the independent Portuguese monarchy but
also the reduction of Spain to the status of a subject kingdom. In
pursuance of this programme French troops began, in February, 1808,
the occupation of Spanish strongholds, including the capital. The aged
Bourbon king, Charles IV., was induced to renounce his throne and the
crown prince Ferdinand his claim to the succession, and, June 6,
Joseph Bonaparte, since 1806 king of Naples, was designated sovereign.
An assembly of ninety-one pliant Spanish notables, convened at Bayonne
in the guise of a junta, was influenced both to "petition" the Emperor
for Joseph's appointment and to ratify the _projet_ of a Napoleonic
constitution.
Napoleon's seizure of the crown of Spain was an act of sheer violence,
and from the outset Joseph was considered by his subjects a simple
usurper. The establishment of the new régime at Madrid became the
signal for a national uprising which not only compelled the Emperor
seriously to modify his immediate plans and to lead in person a
campaign of conquest, but contributed in the end to the collapse of
the entire Napoleonic fabric. Upon the restoration of some degree of
order there followed the introduction of a number of reforms--the
sweeping away of the last vestiges of feudalism, the abolition of the
tribunal of the Inquisition, the reduction of the number of monasteries
and convents by a third, and the repeal of all internal customs. (p. 604)
But the position occupied by the alien sovereign was never other than
precarious. At no time did he secure control over the whole of the
country, and during the successive stages of the Peninsular War of
1807-1814 his mastery of the situation diminished gradually to the
vanishing point. At the outset the principal directing agencies of the
opposition were the irregularly organized local juntas which sprang up
in the various provinces, but before the end of 1808 there was
constituted a central junta of thirty-four members, and in September,
1810, there was convened at Cadiz a general Cortes--not three estates,
as tradition demanded, but a single assembly of indirectly elected
deputies of the people.
*668. The Constitution of 1812.*--Professing allegiance to the captive
Ferdinand, the Cortes of 1810 addressed itself first of all to the
prosecution of the war and the maintenance of the national
independence, but after a year it proceeded to draw up a constitution
for a liberalized Bourbon monarchy. Save the fundamental decree upon
which rested nominally the government, of Joseph Bonaparte, this
constitution, promulgated March 19, 1812, was the first such
instrument in Spanish history. It was, of course, the first to emanate
from Spanish sources. Permeating it throughout were the radical
principles of the French constitution of 1791. It asserted
unreservedly the sovereignty of the people and proclaimed as
inviolable the principle of equality before the law. Executive
authority it intrusted to the king, but the monarch was left so scant
a measure of independence that not only might he never prorogue or
dissolve the Cortes, but not even might he marry or set foot outside
the kingdom without express permission. For the actual exercise of the
executive functions there were created seven departments, or
ministries, each presided over by a responsible official. The
fundamental powers of state were conferred upon a Cortes of one
chamber, whose members were to be elected for a term of two years by
indirect manhood suffrage. Various features of the French constitution
which experience had shown to be ill-advised were reproduced blindly
enough, among them the ineligibility of members of the legislative
body for re-election and the disqualification of ministers to sit as
members. The government of the towns was intrusted to the inhabitants;
that of the provinces, to a governor appointed by the central
authorities and an assembly of deputies popularly chosen for a term of
four years. As the starting point of Spanish constitutional
development the fundamental law of 1812 is of genuine interest. It is
not to be imagined, however, that the instrument reflects with any
degree of accuracy the political sentiment and ideals of the mass of
the Spanish people. On the contrary, it was the work of a slender (p. 605)
democratic minority, and it was never even submitted to the nation for
ratification. It was a product of revolution, and at no time was there
opportunity for its framers to put it completely into operation.[837]
[Footnote 837: For brief accounts of the Napoleonic
régime in Spain see Cambridge Modern History, IX.,
Chap. 11 (bibliography, pp. 851-853); Lavisse et
Rambaud, Histoire Générale, IX., Chap. 6; A.
Fournier, Life of Napoleon the First, 2 vols., (new
ed. New York, 1911), II., Chaps. 14-15; J. H. Rose,
Life of Napoleon I. (London, 1902), Chap. 28; M. A.
S. Hume, Modern Spain, 1788-1898 (London, 1899),
Chaps. 2-4; and H. B. Clarke, Modern Spain,
1815-1898 (Cambridge, 1906), Chap. 1. Of the
numerous histories of the Peninsular War the most
celebrated is W. Napier, History of the War in the
Peninsula and the South of France, 1807-1814, 10
vols. (London, 1828).]
*669. The Restoration and the Reign of Ferdinand VII.*--Upon the fall of
Napoleon the legitimate sovereign, under the name of Ferdinand VII.,
was established forthwith upon the Spanish throne. At one time he had
professed a purpose to perpetuate the new constitution, but even
before his return to Madrid he pronounced both the constitution and
the various decrees of the Cortes "null and of no effect," and when
the Cortes undertook to press its claims to recognition it found
itself powerless. In the restoration of absolutism the king was
supported not only by the army, the nobility, and the Church, but also
by the mass of the people. For constitutional government there was
plainly little demand, and if Ferdinand had been possessed of even the
most ordinary qualities of character and statesmanship, he might
probably have ruled successfully in a perfectly despotic manner
throughout the remainder of his life. As it was, the reaction was
accompanied by such glaring excesses that the spirit of revolution was
kept alive, and scarcely a twelvemonth passed in the course of which
there were not menacing uprisings. In January, 1820, a revolt of
unusual seriousness began in a mutiny at Cadiz on the part of the
soldiers who were being gathered for service in America. The revolt
spread and, to save himself, the king revived the constitution of 1812
and pledged himself to a scrupulous observance of its stipulations.
The movement, however, was doomed to prompt and seemingly complete
failure. The liberals were disunited, and the two years during which
the king was virtually a prisoner in their hands comprised a period of
sheer anarchy. The powers of the Holy Alliance, moreover, in congress
at Verona (1822), adopted a programme of intervention, in execution of
which, in April, 1823, the French government sent an army across the
Pyrenees under the command of the Duke of Angoulême. A six months'
campaign, culminating in the capture of Cadiz, whither the Cortes had
carried the king, served effectively to crush the revolution and to
reinstate the sovereign completely in the position which he had (p. 606)
occupied prior to 1820. Then followed a fresh period of repression, in
the course of which the constitution of 1812 was again set aside, and
throughout the remaining decade of the reign the government of the
kingdom was both despotic and utterly unprogressive.[838]
[Footnote 838: On the period covered by Ferdinand's
reign see Cambridge Modern History, X., Chap. 7
(bibliography, pp. 808-811); Lavisse et Rambaud,
Histoire Générale, X., Chap. 6; Clarke, Modern
Spain, Chaps. 2-4, and Hume, Modern Spain,
1788-1898, Chaps. 5-6. Extended works which touch
upon the constitutional aspects of the period
include: H. Gmelin, Studien zur Spanischen
Verfassungsgeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts
(Stuttgart, 1905); G. Diercks, Geschichte Spaniens
(Berlin, 1895); A. Borrego, Historia de las Cortes
de España durante el siglo XIX. (Madrid, 1885); and
M. Calvo y Martin, Regimem parlamentario de España
en el siglo XIX. (Madrid, 1883). A valuable essay
is P. Bancada, El sentido social de la revolucion
de 1820, in _Revista Contemporânea_ (August,
1903).]
II. POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1833-1876
*670. Maria Christina and the Estatuto Real of 1834.*--Ferdinand VII.
died September 29, 1833, leaving no son. Regularly since the
establishment of the Bourbon dynasty the succession in Spain had been
governed by the principle of the Salic Law, imported originally from
France. But, to the end that the inheritance might fall to a daughter
rather than to his brother, Don Carlos, Ferdinand had promulgated, in
1830, a Pragmatic Sanction whereby the Salic principle was set aside.
Don Carlos and his supporters refused absolutely to admit the validity
of this act, but Ferdinand was succeeded by his three-year-old
daughter, Isabella, and the government was placed in the hands of the
queen-mother, Maria Christina of Naples, as regent.[839] Her
administration of affairs lasted until 1840. From the constitutional
point of view the period was important solely because, under stress of
circumstances, the regent was driven to adopt a distinctly liberal
policy, and, in time, to promulgate a new constitutional instrument.
Don Carlos, supported by the nobility, the clergy, and other
reactionary elements, kept up a guerilla war by which the tenure of
the "Christinos" was endangered continuously. The regent was herself a
thoroughgoing absolutist, but her sole hope lay in the support of (p. 607)
the liberals, and to retain that it was necessary for her to make
large concessions. The upshot was that in April, 1834, she issued a
royal statute (_Estatuto Real_), whereby there was established a new
type of Cortes, comprising two chambers instead of one. The upper
house, or Estamento de Proceres, was essentially a senate; the lower,
or Estamento de Procuradores, was a chamber of deputies. Members of
the Procuradores were to be elected by taxpayers for a term of three
years. Upon the Cortes was conferred power of taxation and of
legislation; but the Government alone might propose laws, and the
Cortes, like its ancient predecessor, was allowed no initiative save
that of petitioning the Government to submit measures upon particular
subjects. A minimum of one legislative session annually was
stipulated; but the sovereign was left free otherwise to convoke and
to dissolve the chambers at will. Ministers were recognized to be
responsible solely to the crown.
[Footnote 839: In the mediæval states of Spain
there was no discrimination against female
succession. The Spanish Salic Law was enacted by a
decree of Philip V. in 1713, at the close of the
War of the Spanish Succession. Its original object
was to prevent the union of the crowns of France
and Spain. In view of the change which had come in
the international situation, Charles IV., supported
by the Cortes, in 1789 abrogated the act of 1713
and re-established the law of _Siete Partidas_
which permitted the succession of women. This
measure was recorded in the archives, but was not
published at the time; so that what Ferdinand VII.
did was simply to publish, May 19, 1830, at the
instigation of the Queen, this _pragmatica_, or
law, of 1789. The birth of Isabella occurred the
following October 10.]
*671. The Constitution of 1837.*--Toward the establishment of
constitutional government the Statute of 1834 marked some, albeit
small, advance. The Moderados, or moderate liberals, were disposed to
accept it as the largest concession that, for the present, could be
expected. But the Progressistas, or progressives, insisted upon a
revival of the more democratic constitution of 1812, and in 1836 the
regent was compelled by a widespread military revolt to sign a decree
pledging the Government to this policy. A constituent Cortes was
convoked and the outcome was the promulgation of the constitution of
June 17, 1837, based upon the instrument of 1812, but in respect to
liberalism standing midway between that instrument and the Statute of
1834. Like the constitution of 1812, that of 1837 affirmed the
sovereignty of the nation and the responsibility of ministers to the
legislative body. On the other hand, the Cortes was to consist, as
under the Statute, of two houses, a Senate and a Congress. The members
of the one were to be appointed for life by the crown; those of the
other were to be elected by the people for three years. In a number of
respects the instrument of 1837 resembled the recently adopted
constitution of Belgium, even as the Statute of 1834 had resembled the
French Charter of 1814. In the words of a Spanish historian, the
document of 1837 had the two-fold importance of "assuring the
constitutional principle, which thenceforth was never denied, and of
ending the sentiment of idolatry for the constitution of 1812."[840]
[Footnote 840: R. Altamira, in Cambridge Modern
History, X., 238.]
*672. The Constitution of 1845.*--October 12, 1840, the regent Maria
Christina was forced by the intensity of civil discord to abdicate and
to withdraw to France. Her successor was General Espartero, leader of
the Progressistas and the first of a long line of military men to
whom it has fallen at various times to direct the governmental (p. 608)
affairs of the Spanish nation. November 8, 1843, the princess Isabella
although yet but thirteen years old, was declared of age and, under
the name of Isabella II., was proclaimed sovereign. Her reign,
covering the ensuing twenty years, comprised distinctly an era of
stagnation and veiled absolutism. Nominally the constitution of 1837
continued in operation until 1845. At that time it was replaced by a
revised and less liberal instrument, drawn up by the Moderados with
the assistance of an ordinary Cortes. The duration of the Cortes was
extended from three to four years, severer restrictions upon the press
were established, supervision of the local authorities was still
further centralized, and the requirement that the sovereign might not
marry without the consent of the Cortez was rescinded. In the course
of a revolutionary movement in 1854 there was convoked a constituent
Cortes, dominated by Moderates and Progressives. The constitution
which this body framed, comprising essentially a revival of the
instrument of 1837, was never, however, put in operation. In the end,
by a royal decree of 1856, the constitution of 1845 was amended and
re-established. Save for some illiberal amendments of 1857,[841] which
were repealed in 1864, this instrument of 1845 continued in operation
until 1868. Throughout the period, however, constitutionalism was
hardly more than a fiction.[842]
[Footnote 841: One established conditions under
which senatorial seats might be made hereditary.]
[Footnote 842: Cambridge Modern History, X., Chap.
7; XI., Chap. 20; Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire
Générale, X., Chap. 6; XI., Chap. 9; Hume, Modern
Spain, Chaps. 7-12; Clarke, Modern Spain, Chaps.
5-11; Mariano, La Regencia de D. Baldomero
Espartero (Madrid, 1870); J. Perez de Guzman, Las
Cortes y los Gobiernos del reinado de Da Isabel
II., in _La España Moderna_, 1903.]
*673. The Constitution of 1869: King Amadeo.*--By a revolt which began
in September, 1868, the queen was compelled to flee from the country,
and, eventually, June 25, 1869, to abdicate. A provisional government
effected arrangements for the election of a Cortes by manhood
suffrage, and this Cortes, convened at the capital, February 11, 1869,
addressed itself first of all to the task of drafting a new national
constitution. A considerable number of members advocated the
establishment of a republic; but for so radical an innovation there
was clearly no general demand, and in the end the proposition was
rejected by a vote of 214 to 71. June 1 a constitution was adopted
which, however, marked a large advance in the direction of liberalism.
It contained substantial guarantees of freedom of speech, freedom of
the press, liberty of religion, and the right of petition and of
public assembly, and in unequivocal terms the sovereignty of the
people was affirmed afresh. A Cortes of two houses was provided (p. 609)
for, the members of the Senate to be chosen indirectly by the people
through electoral colleges and the provincial assemblies, those of the
Congress to be elected by manhood suffrage, the only qualification for
voting being the attainment of the age of twenty-five years and
possession of ordinary civil rights.
Pending the selection of a sovereign, a regency was established under
Marshal Serrano. Among the several dignitaries who were
considered--Alfonso (son of the deposed Isabella) the Duke of
Montpensier, Ferdinand of Savoy (brother of King Victor Emmanuel of
Italy), King Luiz of Portugal, Ferdinand of Saxony, Leopold of
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, and Prince Amadeo, duke of Aosta, second son
of Victor Emmanuel--favor settled eventually upon the last named, who
was elected November 19, 1870, by a vote of 191 to 120. At the end of
1870 the new sovereign arrived in Spain, and February 2, 1871, he took
oath to uphold the recently established constitution. From the outset,
however, his position was one of extreme difficulty. He was opposed by
those who desired a republic, by the Carlists, by the adherents of the
former crown prince Alfonso, and by the clergy; and as a foreigner he
was regarded with indifference, if not antipathy, by patriotic
Spaniards generally. February 10, 1873, wearied by the turbulence in
which he was engulfed, he resigned his powers into the hands of the
Cortes, and by that body his abdication was forthwith accepted. It is
a sufficient commentary upon the political character of the reign to
observe that within the twenty-four months which it covered there were
no fewer than six ministerial crises and three general elections.
*674. The Republic (1873-1875): Monarchy Restored.*--The breakdown of
the elective monarchy, following thus closely the overthrow of
absolutism, cleared the way for the triumph of the republicans. The
monarchist parties, confronted suddenly by an unanticipated situation,
were able to agree upon no plan of action, and the upshot was that, by
a vote of 258 to 32, the Cortes declared for a republic and decreed
that the drafting of a republican constitution should be undertaken by
a specially elected convention. Although it was true, as Castelar
asserted, that the monarchy had perished from natural causes, that the
republic was the inevitable product of existing circumstance, and that
the transition from the one to the other was effected without
bloodshed, it was apparent from the outset that republicanism had not,
after all, struck root deeply. A constitution was drawn up, but it was
at no time really put into operation. The supporters of the new régime
were far from agreed as to the kind of republic, federal or (p. 610)
centralized, that should be established;[843] the republican leaders
were mutually jealous and prone to profitless theorizing; the nation
was lacking in the experience which is a prerequisite of
self-government.[844] At home the republic was opposed by the
monarchists of the various groups, by the clergy, and by the extreme
particularists, and abroad it won the recognition of not one nation
save the United States. The presidency of Figueras lasted four months;
that of Pi y Margall, six weeks; that of Salmeron, a similar period;
that of Castelar, about four months (September 7, 1873, to January 3,
1874). Castelar, however, was rather a dictator than a president, and
so was his Conservative successor Serrano. By the beginning of 1874 it
was admitted universally that the only escape from the anomalous
situation in which the nation found itself lay in a restoration of the
legitimist monarchy, in the person of Don Alfonso, son of Isabella II.
The collapse of the republic was as swift and as noiseless as had been
its establishment. The principal agency in it was the army, which, in
December, 1874, declared definitely for Alfonso, after he had pledged
himself to a grant of amnesty and the maintenance of constitutional
government. December 31 a regency ministry under the presidency of
Cánovas was announced, and the new reign began with the landing of the
young sovereign at Barcelona, January 10, 1875. Between the premature
and ineffective republicanism of the past year, on the one hand, and
the absolutism of a Carlist government, on the other, the
constitutional monarchy of Alfonso XII. seemed a logical, and to the
mass of the Spanish people, an eminently satisfactory, compromise.[845]
[Footnote 843: Castelar favored a consolidated and
radical republic; Serrano, a consolidated and
conservative republic; Pi y Margall, a federal
republic, on the pattern of the United States;
Pavia, a republic which should be predominantly
military.]
[Footnote 844: In this connection may be mentioned
a remark of General Prim, one of the leading
spirits in the provisional government of 1868. When
asked why at that time he did not establish a
republic his reply was: "It would have been a
republic without republicans." There was no less a
dearth of real republicans in 1873-1874.]
[Footnote 845: On the revolutionary and republican
periods see Cambridge Modern History XI., Chap. 20
(bibliography, pp. 945-949); Lavisse et Rambaud,
Histoire Générale, XII., Chap. 9; Hume, Modern
Spain, Chap. 10; V. Cherbuliez, L'Espagne
politique, 1868-1873 (Paris, 1874); W. Lauser,
Geschichte Spaniens von dem Sturz Isabellas,
1868-1875 (Leipzig, 1877); E. H. Strobel, The
Spanish Revolution, 1868-1875 (London, 1898); E.
Rodriguez Solis, Historia del partido republicano
español (Madrid, 1893); Pi y Margall, Amadeo de
Saboya (Madrid, 1884); H. R. Whitehouse, Amadeus,
King of Spain (New York, 1897). A significant work
is E. Castelar, Historia del movimiento republicano
en Europa (Madrid, 1873-1874). Special works
dealing with the restoration include A. Houghton,
Les origines de la restauration des Bourbons en
Espagne (Paris, 1890); Diez de Tejada, Historia de
la restauracion (Madrid, 1879).]
III. THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION (p. 611)
*675. The Constitution Adopted.*--The year following the
re-establishment of the monarchy was consumed largely in the
suppression of the Carlists and the reorganization of the government.
During this period Cánovas, at the head of a strong Conservative and
Clerical ministry, ruled virtually as a dictator, and sooner or later
most vestiges of the republic were swept away, while the nation was
won over solidly to the new order. At the election of the first Cortes
of the Restoration, January 22, 1876, the principle of manhood
suffrage was continued in operation, though so docile did the
electorate prove that Cánovas was able to secure, in both chambers, a
heavy majority which was ready to vote at the Government's behest a
franchise system of a much less liberal type. The first important task
of this Cortes was the consideration and adoption of a new national
constitution. As to the sort of constitution most desirable there was,
as ever, wide difference of opinion. The Conservatives favored a
revival of the instrument of 1845. The Liberals much preferred a
restoration of that of 1869. A commission of thirty-nine, designated
May 20, 1875, by a junta convened by Cánovas, had evolved with some
difficulty an instrument which combined various features of both of
these earlier documents, and by the Cortes of 1876 this proposed
constitution was at length accorded definite, though by no means
unanimous, assent (June 30). This instrument was put forthwith into
operation, and it has remained to this day, substantially without
alteration, the fundamental law of Spain. Based essentially upon the
constitution of 1845, it none the less exhibits at many points the
influence of the liberal principles which underlay the instrument of
1869.
*676. Contents: Guarantees of Individual Liberty.*--In scope the
constitution is comprehensive. Its text falls into thirteen "titles"
and eighty-nine articles. Like the constitution of Italy, it contains
no provision for its own amendment; but in Spain, as also in Italy,
the distinction between constituent and legislative powers is not
sharply drawn and a simple act of the legislative body is in practice
adequate to modify the working constitution of the kingdom. Among the
thirteen titles one of the most elaborate is that in which are defined
the rights and privileges of Spanish subjects and of aliens resident
in Spain.[846] Among rights specifically guaranteed are those of
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, peaceful assemblage, the
formation of associations, petition, unrestrained choice of professions,
and eligibility to public offices and employments, "according to (p. 612)
merit and capacity." Immunities guaranteed include exemption from
arrest, "except in the cases and in the manner prescribed by law";
exemption from imprisonment, except upon order of a competent judicial
official; freedom from molestation on account of religious opinions,
provided due respect for "Christian morality" be shown;[847] and
exemption from search of papers and effects and from confiscation of
property, save by authority legally competent. It is forbidden that
either the military or the civil authorities shall impose any penalty
other than such as shall have been established previously by law.
Certain guarantees, i.e., those respecting arrest, imprisonment,
search, freedom of domicile, freedom of speech and press, assemblage,
and associations, may, under provision of the constitution, be
suspended throughout the kingdom or in any portion thereof, but only
when demanded by the security of the state, and then only temporarily
and by means of a specific law. In no case may any other guarantee
which is named in the constitution be withdrawn, even temporarily.
When the Cortes is not in session the Government may suspend, through
the medium of a royal decree, any one of the guarantees which the
Cortes itself is authorized to suspend, but at the earliest
opportunity such a decree must be submitted to the Cortes for
ratification. It need hardly be pointed out that the opportunity for
the evasion of constitutionalism which is created by this power of
suspension is enormous, and anyone at all familiar with the history of
public affairs in Spain would be able to cite numerous occasions upon
which, upon pretexts more or less plausible, the guarantees of the
fundamental law have been set at naught.[848]
[Footnote 846: No. 1. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,
II., 199-203.]
[Footnote 847: By Article II Roman Catholicism is
declared to be the religion of the state. "The
nation," it is stipulated further, "binds itself to
maintain this religion and its ministers." Dodd,
Modern Constitutions, II., 201.]
[Footnote 848: An official text of the constitution
of 1876 is published by the Spanish Government
under the title Constitución politica de la
monarchia Española y leyes complementarias (4th
ed., Madrid, 1901). The texts of all of the Spanish
constitutions of the nineteenth century are printed
in the first volume of Muro y Martinez,
Constituciones de España y de las demas naciones de
Europa, con la historia general de España (Madrid,
1881); also in the first volume--Constituciones y
reglamentos (Madrid, 1906)--of a collection
projected by the Spanish Government under the title
of Publicaciones Parlamentarias. English versions
of the instrument of 1876 appear in British and
Foreign State Papers, LXVII. (1875-1876), 118 ff.,
and Dodd, Modern Constitutions, II., 199-216. An
excellent brief treatise on Spanish constitutional
development is H. Gmelin, Studien zur spanischen
Verfassungsgeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts
(Stuttgart, 1905); on Spanish constitutional law,
M. Torres Campos, Das Staatsrecht des Königreichs
Spanien (Freiburg, 1889), in Marquardsen's
Handbuch; on Spanish administrative law, V.
Santamaria de Paredes, Curso de derecho
administrativo (5th ed., Madrid, 1898); and on the
comparative aspects of Spanish institutions, R. de
Oloriz, La Constitución española comparada con las
de Inglaterra, Estados-Unidos, Francia y Alemania
(Valencia, 1904). More extended works of importance
include V. Santamaria de Paredes, Curso de derecho
politico (6th ed., Madrid, 1898), and A. Posada,
Tratado de derecho administrativo (Madrid,
1897-1898). A monumental collection of laws
relating to Spanish administrative affairs is M.
Martinez Alcubilla, Diccionario de la
administración Española, Peninsular y Ultramarina
(5th ed., 1892-1894), to which is added annually an
appendix containing texts of the most recent laws
and decrees. Special treatises of importance are M.
M. Calvo, Regimen parlamentario en España (Madrid,
1883); J. Costa, Oligarquia y Caciquismo como la
forma actual del Gobierno en España (Madrid, 1903);
and Y. Guytot, L'évolution politique et sociale de
l'Espagne (Paris, 1899). Mention may be made of R.
Fraoso, Las constituciones de España, in _Revista
de España_, June-July, 1880.]
IV. THE CROWN AND THE MINISTRY (p. 613)
*677. The Rules of Succession.*--Executive power in the kingdom is
vested solely in the crown, although in practice it devolves to a
large degree upon the council of ministers. Kingship is hereditary,
and in regulation of the succession the constitution lays down the
general principle that an elder line shall always be preferred to
younger ones; in the same line, the nearer degree of kinship to the
more remote; in the same degree of kinship, the male to the female; in
the same sex, the older to the younger person. By the original
constitution Alfonso XII. was declared to be the legitimate sovereign,
and provision was made that if the line of legitimate descendants of
Alfonso should be extinguished, his sisters should succeed in the
established order; then his aunt (the sister of his mother Isabella
II.) and her legitimate descendants; and, finally, the descendants of
his uncles, the brothers of Ferdinand VII.[849] It will be recalled
that the Pragmatic Sanction of 1830 abolished in Spain the Salic
principle and restored the ancient right of females to inherit. Spain
is, indeed, one of the few European states in which this right exists.
At the same time, as has been pointed out, when the degree of kinship
is identical, preference is accorded the male. Thus it came about that
the present sovereign, Alfonso XIII., the posthumous son of Alfonso
XII., took precedence over his two sisters, both of whom were older
than he, and the elder of whom, Maria de las Mercedes, actually was
queen from the death of her father, November 25, 1885, until the birth
of her brother, May 17, 1886.[850]
[Footnote 849: Arts. 59-61. Dodd, Modern
Constitutions, II., 211.]
[Footnote 850: She was, however, but a child five
years of age.]
*678. Regencies.*--Any member of the royal family who may be incapable
of governing, or who by his conduct may have forfeited his claim to the
good-will of the nation, may be excluded from the succession by (p. 614)
law. Disputes concerning rights or facts involved in the succession
are to be adjusted by law, and in event that all of the family lines
mentioned in the constitution should be extinguished it would become
the duty of the Cortes to make such disposal of the crown as might be
adjudged "most suitable to the nation."[851] Both the sovereign and
the heir presumptive are forbidden to marry any person who by law is
excluded from the succession. They are, indeed, forbidden to contract
a marriage at all until after the Cortes shall have examined and
approved the stipulations involved. The age of majority of the
sovereign is fixed at sixteen years. When the king is a minor, his
father or his mother, or, in default of a living parent, the relative
who stands next in the order of succession, is constituted regent,
provided always that such person be a Spaniard at least twenty years
of age and not by law excluded from the succession. Should there be no
one upon whom the regency may lawfully devolve, it is the duty of the
Cortes to appoint a regency of one, three, or five persons. If, at any
time, in the judgment of the Cortes, the sovereign becomes
incapacitated to rule, a regency is required to be vested in the crown
prince, provided he be sixteen years of age. In default of a qualified
crown prince the regency devolves upon the queen; and in default of
both son and queen, upon a person determined in accordance with the
rules already mentioned.
[Footnote 851: Art. 62. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,
II., 212.]
*679. Powers of the Crown.*--The powers of the crown are of the sort
common among continental monarchies. By the constitution they are
thrown into two groups, i.e., those which may be exercised freely and
independently and those which may be exercised only upon the
authorization of a special law. Enumeration of the first group begins
with the sweeping statement that "the power of executing the laws is
vested in the king, and his authority extends to everything which
conduces to the preservation of public order at home and the security
of the state abroad, in conformity with the constitution and the
laws."[852] Powers specifically named include the approval and
promulgation of the laws; the issuing of decrees, regulations, and
instructions designed to facilitate the execution of the laws; the
appointment and dismissal of ministers and of civil officials
generally; command of the army and navy and direction of the land and
naval forces; the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace;[853]
the conduct of diplomatic and commercial relations with foreign
states; the pardoning of offenders; the control of the coinage; (p. 615)
and the conferring of honors and distinctions of every kind. Of powers
which the sovereign may exercise only in pursuance of authority
specially conferred by law there are five, as follows: alienation,
cession, or exchange of any portion of Spanish territory; incorporation
of new territory; admission of foreign troops into the kingdom;
ratification of all treaties which are binding individually upon
Spaniards, and of treaties of offensive alliance which stipulate the
payment of subsidies to any foreign power, or which relate especially
to commerce; and abdication of the crown in favor of the
heir-presumptive.
[Footnote 852: Art. 50. Ibid., II., 210.]
[Footnote 853: It is required that subsequent to a
declaration of war or the conclusion of peace the
king shall submit to the Cortes a report
accompanied by pertinent documents.]
*680. The Ministry: Organization and Functions.*--In Spain, as in
constitutional states generally, the powers appertaining to the
executive are exercised in the main by the ministers. Concerning the
ministry the constitution has little to say. It, in truth, assumes,
rather than makes specific provision for, the ministry's existence. It
confers upon the crown the power freely to appoint and to dismiss
ministers; it stipulates that ministers may be senators or deputies
and may participate in the proceedings of both legislative chambers,
but may vote only in the chambers to which they belong; and, most
important of all, it enjoins that ministers shall be responsible, and
that no order of the king may be executed unless countersigned by a
minister, who thereby assumes personal responsibility for it. This
principle of ministerial responsibility, which found its first
expression in Spain in the constitution of 1812, is enforced nowadays
sufficiently, at least, to ensure the nation, through the Cortes, some
actual control over the policies and measures of the executive. Of
ministries there are at present nine, as follows: Foreign Affairs;
Justice; Finance; War; Marine; Interior; Public Instruction and Fine
Arts; Commerce; and Public Works. At the head of the ministerial
council is a president, or premier, who, under royal approval, selects
his colleagues, but ordinarily assumes himself no portfolio. It is the
function of the ministers not only to serve as the heads of executive
departments and to explain and defend in the legislative chambers the
acts of the government, but, in their collective capacity, to
formulate measures for presentation to the Cortes and, especially, to
submit every year for examination and discussion a general budget,
accompanied by a scheme of taxation or other proposed means of meeting
prospective expenditures. In each chamber there is reserved for the
ministers of the crown a front bench to the right of the presiding
official. The practice of interpellation exists, although ministries
rarely retire by reason of a vote of censure arising therefrom. But any
minister may be impeached by the Congress before the Senate. In Spain,
as in France and Italy, the parliamentary system is nominally in (p. 616)
operation; but, as in the countries mentioned, the multiplicity and
instability of party groups render the workings of the system totally
different from what they are in Great Britain. Ministries are
invariably composite rather than homogeneous in political complexion,
with the consequence that they are unable to present a solid front or
long to retain their hold upon the nation's confidence.
V. THE CORTES
*681. The Senate: Composition.*--The legislative powers of the kingdom
are vested in "the Cortes, together with the king." The Cortes
consists of two co-ordinate chambers, the Senate and the Congress of
Deputies. In the composition of the Senate the prescriptive,
appointive, and elective principles are curiously intertwined, the
chamber containing one group of men who are members in their own
right, another who are appointed by the crown and sit for life, and a
third who are elected by the corporations of the state and by the
large taxpayers. In number the first two categories jointly may not
exceed 180; the third is fixed definitely at that figure. In point of
fact the life senators nominated by the crown number 100, while the
quota of prescriptive members varies considerably. This last-mentioned
group comprises grown sons of the sovereign and of the heir-presumptive;
the admirals of the navy and the captains-general of the army; the
patriarch of the Indies and the archbishops; the presidents of the
Council of State, the Supreme Court, the Court of Accounts, and the
Supreme Councils of War and Marine, after two years of service; and
grandees of Spain[854] in their own right, who are not subjects of
another power and who have a proved yearly income of 60,000 pesetas
($12,000) derived from real property of their own, or from rights
legally equivalent to real property.[855]
[Footnote 854: The rank of grandee (_grande_) is a
dignity conferred by the sovereign, either for life
or as an hereditary honor.]
[Footnote 855: Art. 21. Dodd, Modern Constitutions,
II., 204].
*682. Appointment and Election of Senators.*--Appointment of senators by
the crown is made by special decree, in which must be stated the
grounds upon which each appointment is based. In the selection of
appointees the sovereign is not entirely free, but since the constitution
designates no fewer than twelve classes from which appointments may be
made, the range of choice is large. Among the categories enumerated
are the presidents of the legislative chambers; deputies who have been
members of as many as three congresses, or who have served during as
many as eight sessions; ministers of the crown; bishops; grandees;
lieutenant-generals of the army and vice-admirals of the navy, of (p. 617)
two years' standing; ambassadors, after two years of active service,
and ministers plenipotentiary, after four years; presidents and
directors of the half-dozen royal academies, and persons who in point
of seniority belong within the first half of the list of members of
these respective bodies; head professors in the universities, who have
held this rank and have performed the duties pertaining to it through
a period of four years; and a variety of other administrative,
judicial, and professional functionaries. Persons belonging to any one
of these groups, however, are eligible for appointment only in the
event that they enjoy an annual income of 7,500 pesetas ($1,500),
derived from property of their own or from salaries of permanent
employments, or from pensions or retirement allowances. In addition to
the classes mentioned persons are eligible who for two years have
possessed an annual income of 20,000 pesetas, or who have paid into
the public treasury a direct tax of 4,000 pesetas, provided that in
addition they possess titles of nobility, or have been members of the
Cortes, provincial deputies, or mayors in capitals of provinces or in
towns of more than 20,000 inhabitants. Appointments are made regularly
for life.
The conditions under which the quota of 180 elected senators are
chosen were defined by a statute of February 8, 1877. One senator is
chosen by the clergy in each of the nine archbishoprics; one by each
of the six royal academies; one by each of the ten universities; five
by the economic societies; and the remaining 150 by electoral colleges
in the several provinces. The electoral college is composed of members
of the provincial deputations and of representatives chosen from among
the municipal councillors and largest taxpayers of the towns and
municipal districts. But no one may become a senator by election who
would be ineligible, under the conditions above mentioned, to be
appointed to a seat by the crown. And it is required in all cases that
to become a senator one must be a Spaniard, must have attained the age
of thirty-five, must have the free management of his property, and
must not have been subjected to criminal proceedings, nor have been
deprived of the exercise of his political rights. The term of elected
senators is ten years. One-half of the number is renewed every five
years; but upon a dissolution of the elected portion of the chamber by
the crown, the quota is renewed integrally.[856]
[Footnote 856: Arts. 20-26. Dodd, Modern
Constitutions, II., 203-206.]
*683. The Congress of Deputies: Composition and Election.*--The lower
legislative chamber is composed of deputies chosen directly by the
inhabitants of the several electoral districts into which the kingdom
is divided. From the adoption of the present constitution until 1890
the franchise was restricted severely by property qualifications. (p. 618)
A reform bill which became law June 29, 1890, however, re-established
in effect the scheme of manhood suffrage which had been in operation
during the revolutionary epoch 1869-1875. Under the provisions of a
law of August 8, 1907, by which the electoral system was further
regulated, the franchise is conferred upon all male Spaniards who have
attained the age of twenty-five, who have resided in their electoral
district not less than two years, and who have not been deprived
judicially of their civil rights.[857] Except, indeed, in the case of
certain judicial officials and of persons more than seventy years of
age, the exercise of the voting privilege is, as in Belgium and in
some of the Austrian provinces, compulsory. The constitution requires
that there shall be at least one deputy for every 50,000 inhabitants.
The total membership of the Congress is at present 406. In the
majority of districts but a single deputy is chosen, but in
twenty-eight of the larger ones two or more are elected by _scrutin de
liste_, with provision for the representation of minorities. In
districts in which two or three deputies are to be chosen, each
elector votes for one fewer than the number to be elected; in
districts where from four to seven are to be chosen, the elector votes
for two fewer than the total number; and where the aggregate number is
eight to ten, or more than ten, he votes for three or four fewer,
respectively. Any Spaniard who is qualified for the exercise of the
suffrage is eligible for election, and for indefinite re-election, as
a deputy, save that no member of the clergy may be chosen. The term of
membership is five years, though by reason of not infrequent
dissolutions the period of service is actually briefer. As is true
also of senators, deputies receive no pay for their services.[858]
[Footnote 857: There is the customary regulation
that soldiers and sailors in active service may not
vote.]
[Footnote 858: J. Vila Serra, Manual de elecciones
de Diputados a Cortes (Valencia, 1907); J. Lon y
Albareda, Nueva ley electoral de 8 de Agosto de
1907, comentada (Madrid, 1907); M. Vivanco y L. San
Martin, La reforma electoral (Madrid, 1907).]
*684. Sessions and Status of the Chambers.*--The Cortes, consisting thus
of the Senate and the Congress of Deputies, is required by the
constitution to be convened by the crown in regular session at least
once each year. Extraordinary sessions may be held, and upon the death
or incapacitation of the sovereign the chambers must be assembled
forthwith. To the crown belongs the power not only to convene, but
also to suspend and to terminate the sessions, and to dissolve,
simultaneously or separately, the Congress and the elective portion of
the Senate. In the event, however, of a dissolution, the sovereign is
obliged to convene the newly constituted Cortes within the space of
three months. Except when it devolves upon the Senate to exercise (p. 619)
its purely judicial functions, neither of the chambers may be
assembled without the other. In no case may the two chambers sit as a
single assembly, or deliberate in the presence of the sovereign. Each
body is authorized to judge the qualifications of its members and to
frame and adopt its own rules of procedure. The Senate elects its
secretaries, but its president and vice-president are designated, for
each session, and from the senators themselves, by the crown. The
Congress, on the other hand, elects from its membership all of its own
officials. Sessions of both chambers are public, though "when secrecy
is necessary" the doors may be closed. A majority of the members
constitutes a quorum, and measures are passed by a majority vote. No
senator or deputy may be held to account by legal process for any
opinion uttered or for any vote cast within the chamber to which he
belongs; and, save when taken in the commission of an offense, a
member is entitled to all of the safeguards against arrest and
judicial proceedings which are extended customarily to members of
legislative bodies in constitutional states.[859]
[Footnote 859: It is to be observed that these
guarantees are not quite absolute. During the
crisis of 1904 the Maura government required the
Congress to suspend the legislative immunity of no
fewer than 140 members, and for the first time
since 1834 deputies were handed over to the courts
to be tried for offenses of a purely political
character.]
*685. Functions and Powers of the Cortes.*--The function of the Cortes
is primarily legislative. Each chamber shares with the crown the right
to initiate measures, and no proposal can become law until it has
received the sanction of the two houses. Rejection of a bill by either
chamber, or by the crown, precludes the possibility of a reappearance
of the project during the continuance of the session. Measures
relating to taxation and to the public credit must be presented, in
the first instance, in the Congress of Deputies, and it is made the
specific obligation of the Government every year to lay before that
body for examination and approval a budget of revenues and
expenditures. Only upon authority of law may the Government alienate
property belonging to the state, or borrow money on the public credit.
Under Spanish constitutional theory the Cortes is the agent of the
sovereign nation. It is authorized, therefore, not only to discharge
the usual functions of legislation but also to do three other things
of fundamental importance. In the first place, it receives from the
sovereign, from the heir-apparent, and from the regent or regency of
the kingdom, the oath of fidelity to the constitution and the laws. In
the second place, under provisions contained within the constitution,
it elects the regent or regency and appoints a guardian for a (p. 620)
minor sovereign. Finally, to maintain the responsibility of ministers
to the lower chamber, and, through it, to the nation, the Congress is
authorized to impeach, and the Senate to try, at any time any member
of the Government.[860]
[Footnote 860: Arts. 32-47. Dodd, Modern
Constitutions, II., 207-209. On the Cortes may be
consulted, in addition to the constitutional
treatises mentioned on pp. 612-613, A. Borrego,
Historia de las Cortes de Españo durante el siglo
XIX. (Madrid, 1885), and A. Pons y Umbert,
Organizaciôn y funcionamento de las Cortes segun
las constituciones españolas y reglamentacion de
dicho cuerpo colegislador (Madrid, 1906).]
VI. POLITICAL PARTIES
*686. Party Groups After 1869.*--Since the dawn of constitutionalism
political life in Spain has comprised much of the time a sheer game
between the "ins" and the "outs", in which issues have counted for
little and the schemings of the caciques, or professional wire-pullers
and bosses, have counted for well-nigh everything. For the exercise of
independent popular judgment upon fundamental political questions
aptitude has been meager and opportunity rare. Political parties there
have been, and still are, and certain of them have exhibited distinct
power of survival. Yet it must be observed that even the stablest of
them are essentially the creatures of the political leaders and that
at no time have they exhibited the broadly national rootage of
political parties in other states of western Europe.
Party cleavages in Spain had their beginning early in the nineteenth
century, but for the origins of the groups which share in an important
manner nowadays in the politics of the kingdom it is not necessary to
return to a period more remote than that of the revolution of 1868.
Subsequent to the expulsion of Queen Isabella at least four groups
were thrown into more or less sharp relief. One was the Carlists,
supporters of the claims of Don Carlos and, in respect to political
principle, avowed absolutists. A second comprised the Republicans, led
by Castelar, whose demand for the establishment of a republic,
rejected in 1869, carried the day upon the breakdown of the Amadeo
monarchy four years later. Between the Carlists, on the one hand, and
the Republicans, on the other, stood the mass of the political
leaders, and, so far as may be judged, of the nation also. All were
agreed upon the general principle of constitutional monarchy. But upon
the precise nature of the government which had been established and of
the public policy which ought to be pursued there was, and could be,
little agreement. The consequence was a sharp-cut cleavage, by which
there were set off in opposition to each other two large parties,
the Conservatives and the Liberals; and, save for the brief (p. 621)
ascendancy of the Republicans in 1873-1874, it is these two parties
which have shared between them the government of the kingdom from the
establishment of the limited monarchy in 1869 to the present day. Both
of these leading parties have been pledged continuously to maintain
the constitution and all of the popular privileges--freedom of speech,
liberty of the press, safety of property, the right of establishing
associations, and the like--guaranteed by that instrument. Upon the
_methods_ by which these things shall be maintained the parties
originally divided and still are disagreed. Fundamentally, the policy
of the Liberals is to commit the guardianship of public privileges to
the courts of justice, while that of the Conservatives is to retain it
rather in the hands of the ministerial and administrative authorities.
In the normal course of development the Liberal party has tended to
draw to itself those liberal elements generally which are satisfied to
rely upon legal means for the realization of their purposes, e.g.,
the free-traders, the labor forces, and many of the socialists.
Similarly the Conservative party has attracted a considerable
proportion of the reactionaries, especially the Ultramontanes, by whom
special stress is placed upon the maintenance of peace with the
Vatican, and many representatives of the old Moderate party which was
swept out of existence by the overturn of 1868.
*687. Liberals and Conservatives: Cánovas and Sagasta.*--The first
public act of Alfonso XII., following his proclamation as king,
December 29, 1874, was to call to his side in the capacity of premier
Cánovas del Castillo, by whom was formed a strong Conservative
ministry. Consequent upon the convocation of the Cortes of 1876 and
the adoption of the new constitution of that year, the various groups
of Liberals were drawn into a fairly compact opposition party,
supporting the Alfonsist dynasty and the new constitutional régime,
but proposing to labor, by peaceful means, for the restoration of as
many as possible of the more liberal features of the constitution of
1869. It is of interest to observe that the party, in its earlier
years, was encouraged by Cánovas, on the theory that there would be
provided by it a natural and harmless outlet for inevitable
ebullitions of the liberal spirit. Under the able leadership of
Sagasta the development of the party was rapid, and in 1881 Cánovas
determined to give the country a taste of Liberal rule. Following a
collusive "defeat" the premier retired, whereupon Sagasta was
designated premier and a Liberal ministry was established which held
office somewhat more than two years. By the Republicans and other
radical forces the ministry of Sagasta was harassed unsparingly, just
as had been that of Cánovas, and the actual working policies of (p. 622)
the two differed in scarcely any particular. Within the Liberal ranks,
indeed, a "dynastic Left" became so troublesome that Sagasta, after
two years, yielded office to the leader of the disaffected elements,
Posada Herrera. The only effect of the experiment was to demonstrate
that between the Conservatives led by Cánovas and the Liberals led by
Sagasta there was no room for a third party.
In 1885 Cánovas returned to power, but for only a brief interval, for
upon the establishment of the regency of Queen Christina, following
the death of Alfonso XII., November 25, 1885, Sagasta was called upon
to form the first of a series of ministries over which he presided
continuously through the ensuing five years. In the memorable Pact of
El Pardo it had been agreed between the Liberal and Conservative
leaders that each would assist the other in the defense of the dynasty
and of the constitution, and although Sagasta had avowed the intention
of reintroducing certain principles of the constitution of 1869 he was
pledged to proceed in a cautious manner and a conciliatory spirit. The
elections of 1884 yielded a substantial Conservative majority in both
chambers of the Cortes. None the less the Conservatives accorded the
Liberal government their support, until by the elections of 1886 the
Liberals themselves acquired control of the two houses. Throughout
three years Castelar and the more moderate Republicans co-operated
actively with the Government in the re-introduction of jury trial, the
revival of liberty of the press, and a number of other liberal
measures; but the Government was annoyed continually by attacks and
intrigues participated in by both the less conciliatory Republicans
and the Carlists. The crowning achievement of the Sagasta ministry was
the carrying through of the manhood suffrage act of June 29, 1890.
Within a month after the promulgation of the suffrage law the regent
gave Sagasta to understand that the time had arrived for a change of
leaders. The Cánovas ministry which was thereupon established endured
two and a half years, and was given distinction principally by its
introduction, in 1892, of the thoroughgoing protectionist régime which
prevails in Spain to-day. The Conservatives falling into discord,
Cánovas resigned, December 8, 1892; and at the elections of the
following year the Conservatives carried only one hundred seats in the
Chamber. During the period from December, 1892, to March, 1895,
Sagasta was again at the helm.
*688. The American War and Ministerial Changes, 1895-1902.*--Between
1895 and 1901 there was a rapid succession of ministries, virtually
all of which were both made and unmade by situations arising from (p. 623)
the war in Cuba and the subsequent contest with the United States. In
the hope of averting American intervention a new Cánovas government,
established in 1895, brought forward a measure for the introduction of
home rule in Cuba, but while the bill was pending, Cánovas was
assassinated, August 9, 1897, and the proposition failed. The new
Conservative cabinet of General Azcarraga soon retired, and although
the Sagasta government which succeeded recalled General Weyler from
Cuba and inaugurated a policy of conciliation, the situation had got
beyond control and war with the United States ensued. By the
succession of Spanish defeats the popularity of the Liberal régime was
strained to the breaking point, and at the close of the war Sagasta's
ministry gave place to a ministry formed by the new Conservative
leader Silvela. The elections of April 16, 1899, yielded the
Silvelists a majority and the ministry, reconstituted September 28 of
the same year, retained power until March 6, 1901. At that date the
Liberals gained the upper hand once more; and, with two brief
intervals, Sagasta remained in office until December 3, 1902. Within
scarcely more than a month after his final retirement, the great
Liberal leader passed away.
*689. Parties Since the Death of Sagasta.*--A second Silvela ministry,
established December 6, 1902, brought the Conservatives again into
power. This ministry, which lasted but a few months, was followed
successively by four other Conservative governments, as follows: that
of Villaverde, May, 1903, to December, 1903; that of Antonio Maura y
Montanes, December, 1903, to December, 1904; the second of General
Azcarraga, December, 1904, to January, 1905; and the second of
Villaverde, from January, 1905, to June, 1905. Of these the most
virile was that of Maura, a former Liberal, whose spirit of
conciliation and progressiveness entitled him to be considered one of
the few real statesmen of Spain in the present generation.
Following the death of Sagasta the Liberals passed through a period of
demoralization, but under the leadership of Montero Rios they
gradually recovered, and in June, 1905, the government of Villaverde
was succeeded by one presided over by Rios. At the elections of
September 10, 1905, the Ministerialists secured 227 seats and the
Conservatives of all groups but 126 (the remainder being scattered);
but discord arose and, November 29 following, the cabinet of Rios
resigned. Upon the great ecclesiastical questions of the day--civil
marriage, the law of associations, and the secularization of
education--both parties, but especially the Liberals, were disrupted
completely, and during the period of but little more than a year between
the retirement of Rios and the return to power of Maura, January 24,
1907, no fewer than five ministries sought successively to grapple (p. 624)
with the situation. Under Maura a measure of stability was restored.
The premier, although a Catholic, was moderately anti-clerical. His
principal purpose was to maintain order and to elevate the plane of
politics by a reform of the local government. At the elections of
April 21, 1907, the Conservatives won a victory so decisive that in
the Congress they secured a majority of 88 seats over all other groups
combined.[861] The fall of the Maura ministry, October 21, 1909, came
in consequence largely of the Moroccan crisis, but more immediately
by reason of embarrassment incident to the execution of the
anarchist-philosopher Señor Ferrer. The Liberal ministry of Moret,
constituted October 22, 1909, lacked substantial parliamentary support
and was short-lived. February 9, 1910, there was established under
Canalejas, leader of the democratic group, a cabinet representative of
various Liberal and Radical elements and made up almost wholly of men
new to ministerial office.[862]
[Footnote 861: The exact distribution of seats was
as follows: Conservatives, 256; Liberals, 66;
Solidarists, 53; Republicans, 32; Democrats, 9;
Independents, 8.]
[Footnote 862: November 12, 1912, Premier Canalejas
was assassinated. He was succeeded by the president
of the Congress of Deputies, Alvaro de Romanones,
under whom the Liberal ministry was continued in
office.]