is almost impossible to be carried out. The crossings of rivers are
attended, as is well known, with difficulties, even when there is only a
draught of water of 2 to 3 _met._: what would they be for a Canal which
is to be 8 _met._ deep? And even one of the most decided partisans of the
indirect track has not hesitated to declare frankly, considering this
immense obstacle, which alarms but does not discourage him: “that the
maintenance of such a depth presents difficulties which have never been
surmounted nor even attempted.” It is true that at first the help of the
barrage was reckoned upon in risking the crossing of the river; but this
barrage can only serve at the low waters during four or five months of
the year, at the time when the lands are irrigated to prepare for the
summer crops; the reserved waters of the Nile will never, even at their
_maximum_, be more than 4 to 4½ _met._, which is very far from 8 _met._
Above the barrage, at the point where the ships are to cross, the breadth
is 2000 _met._ and if a transverse channel were dug there, how could it
be prevented from filling with alluvium and mud? During the increase of
the waters, how could a current of five miles an hour, be crossed by
sailing vessels against the wind blowing from the east and south?
Against this formidable obstacle to the crossing which cannot be avoided,
an expedient not less surprising, and still more impracticable, has
been devised; the barrage is set aside, the employment of it being too
hazardous, and the Nile is to be crossed by a bridge Canal. But can we
form an idea of a Canal 8 _met._ deep crossing a river like the Nile
above the barrage? According to the very calculations of those who
propose such schemes, there would be required 1,213,147 _met. cub._ of
water _per diem_ to supply the upper basin, and as this enormous quantity
of water would have to be raised thirty _metres_ above the level of the
two Seas; the engines required for this purpose must represent 5620 horse
power by calculation, corresponding to 6000 horse power in those to be
provided; not to speak of the obstacles that such a colossal work would
oppose to the ordinary navigation, it would be an expense upon that point
only of 50 to 60,000,000 _francs_. And the bridge Canal after all these
sacrifices, would not be more firm or more durable than any construction
of that kind. And moreover for this super elevation of level there would
be required ten locks in addition to the fourteen already on the line.
2nd. The indirect Canal will be detrimental to the Canal works, so
necessary to Lower Egypt, and will partly interfere with that admirable
hydraulic system, which is at once the pride and the fertilization of
the country. It will be in vain to make circuits to avoid the branchings
of the network; as the termination is to be at the port of Alexandria,
it will be absolutely necessary to pass between the Mahmoudieh Canal and
Lake Mareotis; and then the flow of all the waters into the Lake which
is destined to receive them will be prevented. Passing through the Lake,
as the railway does, seas of mire will be met with, so much dreaded on
the Pelusiac coast. It has already been necessary to raise again and
again the embankment of the railway which was disappearing in the Lake,
and for three years it has been necessary to labour unceasingly at the
repairs which are continually required; what will it be when a dyke must
be constructed at least 6000 _metres_ in length, to heights of 7 to 8
_metres_, without knowing where to procure the necessary earth for these
embankments?
3rd. The indirect Canal cannot terminate in the port of Alexandria
without causing still greater confusion there than it causes in the Canal
works. In the first place the port of Alexandria is not _immutable_, as
has been supposed. It has not escaped the action of the ground swell,
which has choked it with sand to a good third of its extent. The part of
the port which has been selected is frequently agitated by the north-west
winds, and the surf is then so violent in rough weather, that even small
craft dare not approach it. The rock is found there at a small depth
below the sea, and as it would be necessary to extend the dykes of the
Canal to 250 _metres_ into the harbour, to obtain a draught of water
of 7 _met._, 50 to 8 _met._, the rock would have to be excavated under
the water. Add to this that in this direction all the grand magazines
and all the Government works would be encountered; there is not the
least free space between the railway and the Mahmoudieh canal. But let
us suppose all these difficulties overcome, there are others which
the Canal raises, and which it multiplies the more it is employed. The
port of Alexandria, the only military port of Egypt, is then besieged
by hundreds of merchant vessels, and by the sailors of the whole of
Europe. Let there be a contrary wind ever so slight, or some requisite
repairs to the locks, and that the movement is arrested, just fancy the
impediment, without taking into account the political dangers of such an
accumulation. Moreover it is not only at Alexandria that this intolerable
inconvenience would arise; it might happen, in consequence of accidents
easily to be foreseen but impossible to be prevented, that Egypt should
see all on a sudden 8 to 10,000 foreign sailors stationed on a point of
her territory, because the forty vessels at least which traverse it every
day have been forcibly detained at some part of the passage during twenty
or five and twenty days consecutively.
To these conclusive reasons, it would not be difficult to add others; but
these must be sufficient to warn unbiassed minds against the indirect
passage.
The inconveniences, or rather the impossibilities of the indirect track,
become more striking when compared with the conditions of the direct
track and its incontestable advantages.
1st. To begin with, the direct track is only about one third the length
of the other. That would be 400 _kilometres_ long, and the direct track
is only 155, which would be reduced to 120, as will be seen. Near about
the middle of the Isthmus, the Bitter Lakes are met with, which give 18
_kilometres_ of navigation ready made, and not requiring a single turn
of the shovel, as the Viceroy’s engineers say, and 18 _kilometres_ in
addition are three parts excavated by nature itself; 120 _kilometres_
therefore remain, that is to say, 30 leagues at the most.
2nd. The direct track is the easiest. There are only two salient points
in the entire Isthmus that it is necessary to traverse by partly turning
them; one, the Serapeum, which, according to the levels checked in 1853,
is 16 _met._, 5950 high; and the other El Guisr, which is 11 _met._,
6300. With the depth of the Canal, this would make a cutting of 20 or at
most 24 _metres_ at some points. There is certainly nothing in such a
work to terrify our engineers.
3rd. The direct track is the most natural. The Isthmus is traversed
by a longitudinal depression, formed by the meeting of the two plains
descending with an imperceptible slope, the one from Egypt, the other
from the frontier hills of Asia. The Bitter Lakes, filled with the waters
of the Arabian Gulf by the action of the tides only, may easily form a
reservoir which, with a surface of 280,000,000 _square metres_ by a rise
of 2 _metres_ of moving waters, would not receive less than 560,000,000
_cubic metres_, for the service of the Canal, below the water line at the
level of the two Seas. Lake Timsah, situated at about an equal distance
from Suez and Pelusium, is like an inland port where ships can be
revictualled and repaired. Moreover, by another favour of nature, towards
Lake Timsah a second not less remarkable hollow abuts perpendicularly on
the longitudinal depression, it is that of the Wady-Tomilat (the fertile
Goshen of the Bible). This hollow still receives the overflowings of
the Nile for a great part of its length, and forms the natural track of
a communication starting from the river and joining, at the central
part of the Isthmus, the line of maritime navigation which would be
established between the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean.
4th. The direct track is the most useful. It serves at the same time the
interests of commerce in general and the political interests of Egypt and
the Ottoman Empire. It will require but little to maintain it, and as
there will be very few works of art, navigation will not be exposed to
those interruptions which it would have to dread on the indirect track.
To these evident advantages of the direct track, to these relative
facilities which had attracted the attention of the sovereigns of
Egypt, of Amrou and Mustapha III. for example (see Lebeau, _Histoire du
Bas-Empire_, tom. XII. p. 490, and the _Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur
les Turcs_, pts. III. and IV.), before attracting that of the nineteenth
century, there is but one objection, and it is this:—
It is impossible, they say, for large ships to approach Pelusium; and the
direct Canal is chimerical, because it cannot open into the Mediterranean.
This oft-repeated objection is but specious, and cannot stand before
an examination of the facts. The entrance to Pelusium is certainly a
difficult and costly work, but it is perfectly practicable, and engineers
have overcome very different obstacles with resources much inferior to
those now at their command.
It is well in the first place that it should be known that the level of
the two Seas, excepting the difference of the tides, which are pretty
high at the south in the Red Sea, and almost nothing at the north in
the Mediterranean, is perceptibly the same. The commission of 1799
had found for the Arabian Gulf an elevation of 9 _met._ 90; but its
labours, performed in the midst of all the dangers and disturbances
of war, had not been verified, and the genius of Laplace resting upon
accurate theoretical views, had formally denied the possibility of such
a depression within a distance of scarcely thirty leagues. Afterwards,
towards 1840, some English officers had proved by the barometer and the
boiling water process that there was no difference of level; and in
1843, Prince Metternich, having been informed of these labours, sent
instructions to Egypt to induce Mehemet Ali to interest himself in
the grand undertaking of the cutting of the Isthmus: his dispatch is
still in the Archives of the Austrian Consulate at Alexandria. In 1847
a commission of French engineers, sent out by M. Paulin Talabot under
the direction of the learned M. Bourdaloue, and assisted by Egyptian
engineers directed by M. Linant, chief engineer to the Viceroy, put
the fact beyond all question, and M. Paulin Talabot had the honour of
stating it in a memorial that has become famous. Our Academy of Sciences
bestirred itself for the honour of the ancient Egyptian commission.
M. Sabatier, Consul general of France, asked the Viceroy for a fresh
verification, which M. Linant was charged to undertake in 1853, and which
confirmed, saying an insignificant variation, the labours of 1847.
So that the considerable super-elevation of the Red Sea cannot be
reckoned on for facilitating the approaches from the Mediterranean at the
other extremity of the Canal; there is only the difference of the tides.
As a depth of 7 _met._ 50 to 8 _met._ is not found before Pelusium or
Tineh, but at a distance of 6000 _met._ into the sea, it is assumed that
it is practically impossible to prolong the jetty of the Canal to that
distance, because the waters are but _liquid mud_, and that _clouds of
earth_ would interfere with the progress of the vessels and the solidity
of the works.
This is a complete mistake.
Because Herodotus has said, that the Delta is a present from the Nile,
his inaccurate assertion has been repeated without verifying it, and his
metaphor has passed for an incontestable truth. But it is an absolute
fact, and it is only necessary to ask those who have been at Pelusium,
that the water there is as limpid as at Alexandria or Jaffa. The banks of
_travelling mud_ seen by Admiral Sir Sidney Smith have no more reality
than the _present from the Nile_, and for the twenty years that these
coasts have been traversed in every direction by steam boats, no one has
ever met again with those muddy banks. The truth is, that the waters of
the Nile, which, at the time of the inundation are distinguished for
more than ten leagues into the sea, carry far out into the Mediterranean
and deposit in its depths, the masses of earthy matter which they hold
in suspension (near 1/8000) which do not reappear on the coasts but in
imperceptible quantities; the truth is, that a handful of sand may be
taken up from the sea beach, at Pelusium, without finding the least
particle of mud. The Viceroy’s engineers have proved that the coast,
from El-Arish to Tripoli, is pure sand, and the soundings taken along
the shore give the same result. Far from the Nile forming accretions at
Pelusium, it is an axiom now admitted by science that the muddy or sandy
deposits observed at the mouths of rivers are entirely owing to matters
brought by the tide. The rivers have no part therein; and the excellent
observations made by most able hydrographers at the bay of Mount St.
Michael, at the mouths of the Scheld, the Meuse, the Rhine, the Yssel,
have superabundantly proved it. The accumulations of sand at Pelusium and
Suez, like the whole Isthmus, have been formed by the maritime deposits
of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The thorough investigation of the
motion of the waves has demonstrated that the bars of rivers are due
to the ground swell alone. The Nile, therefore, has no influence upon
the approaches to Pelusium, as Herodotus supposed, and as is still the
common opinion; and this is so true, that for 20 _kilometres_ above its
mouth there are accretions of mud, while below there is nothing but sand.
Finally the accumulations of sand are more considerable in proportion as
the waters of the river are less abundant.
Setting aside from the question the hypothetical assertions, it remains
therefore incontestable that the only difficulty at Pelusium, is the
length of the jetties in the sea. Pelusium, with its ruins, is at the
same point where Strabo saw it, where the Egyptian commission saw it,
which found the twenty stadia of the Greek geographer between the shore
and the town quite correct. But are jetties of a league and a half into
the sea possible, or are they indeed a work that cannot be executed? The
answer to this question is easy: a hundred years ago, the Hollanders,
not so rich and not so skillful as we are now, although quite as bold,
erected at the Cape, in the bay of the Lion, at a depth of 16 _met._, in
spite of the most frightful tempests, a dyke of 8000 _metres_, that is, a
work of at least four times the extent of that required for the entrance
of the Canal at Pelusium.
As for the harbour of Suez, the work there would be comparatively
trifling because it is sheltered from all the winds, excepting that from
the south-east, and ships keep the sea there very well, as is proved
by the English Magazine corvette, moored there for two years, without
sustaining any damage.
What is to be deduced from these observations?—That it is possible to
make a canal 100 _metres_ wide from Suez to Pelusium, with a draught of
water of 8 _met._, below low water in the Mediterranean, with parapets,
towing path, &c. and available for the passage of screw and paddle
frigates, and vessels of 1000 to 1500 tons burthen, and that this canal,
following the straight line between the two Seas is the only practicable
one, as it will be one of the grandest and most useful works ever
performed by man.
To conclude, this track is the only one that the prince who now rules in
Egypt will allow. Well informed himself in nautical arts and sciences,
the inheritor of the policy of Mehemet Ali, which he approves while he
practises, he has declared in dictating his own terms for the firman of
concession, that he would have the shortest and least expensive track,
and one that would be available for the largest ships. It is not in
the scheme of an inland canal that the real junction of the two Seas
consists; the indirect canal cuts through Egypt, and not the Isthmus;
its extent is not only tripled, but the cost of execution and maintenance
are enormous, and the existence of a canal constructed upon these
conditions would be always uncertain and precarious while the direct
track, which unites so many advantages, has none of these drawbacks.
HÔTE.
FOOTNOTES
[1] I think it to the purpose to insert here a letter, which I addressed
to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Her Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador, on my
leaving Constantinople:—
_Pera_, 28th February, 1855.
“There are questions which require to be boldly met in
order to be well resolved, as there are wounds which must
be opened in order to be healed. The frankness with which
you received my first remarks upon a subject, the gravity
of which I do not affect to disguise, encourages me to
submit to your consideration a point of view from which
it appears to me advisable to contemplate the question
of the Isthmus of Suez. The great influence which your
character and your long experience naturally give you the
right to exercise in the decisions of your Government on
all Eastern questions, makes me especially anxious to
neglect no opportunity of enabling Your Excellency to
form an opinion from a perfect acquaintance with the case.
The results already obtained from the intimate alliance
of France and England, testify sufficiently to the
advantages that the European balance and civilization
in general derive from that union of the two peoples.
The future and the welfare of all the nations of the
universe are therefore concerned in maintaining intact,
in preserving from any attack, a state of things, which,
to the everlasting honour of the Governments that have
brought it about, can alone, with time, ensure the
blessings of progress and of peace to the human race.
Thence the necessity of getting rid, beforehand, of all
causes of rupture, or even of coolness, between the
two peoples; thence, consequently, the paramount duty
of anticipating amongst future contingencies, those
circumstances calculated to awake ancient feelings of
antagonism, and to raise, in the bosom of either nation,
those emotions against the violence of which, the wisdom
of Governments is powerless to struggle. The motives for
hostile rivalry are tending successively to give place to
that generous emulation which gives birth to great things.
Looking at the situation of affairs in a general way,
it is scarcely to be perceived upon what ground and
upon what occasion, those struggles, which so long
desolated the world, could be renewed. Is it financial
and commercial interests that could cause division
between the two peoples? Why, British capital thrown
into all the undertakings of France, and the immense
developement of international commerce, have established
ties between them which become closer every day. Is it
political interests and questions of principle? Why, the
two nations have but one common aim, one same ambition:
the triumph of right over might, of civilization
over barbarism. Is it, finally, a sordid jealousy of
territorial extension? Why, they acknowledge, at the
present time, that the globe is vast enough to offer to
the spirit of adventure that animates their respective
populations, countries to make available, human beings to
withdraw from the state of barbarism; and, moreover, from
the moment that their flags wave together, the conquests
of the one profit by the activity of the other.
At the first glance, then, nothing is perceived in the
general state of affairs that could impair our cordial
relations with England.
If, however, we look closer, an eventuality presents
itself which, causing the most enlightened and most
moderate cabinets to partake in popular prejudices and
passions, is capable of reviving old antipathies, and
of compromising, with the alliance, the benefits to be
derived from it.
There is, in fact, a point of the globe with the free
passage of which the political and commercial power of
Great Britain is bound up, a point, the possession of
which France had, on her part, aspired to in former
times. This point is Egypt, the direct route from Europe
to India, Egypt bathed once and again with French blood.
It is superfluous to define the motives which would
not allow England to see Egypt in the possession of a
rival nation without opposing it by the most energetic
resistance; but what should also be taken into serious
consideration, is, that with less positive interests,
France under the dominion of her glorious traditions,
under the impression of other feelings more instinctive
than rational, and therefore more powerful over the
impressionable spirit of her inhabitants, would not, in
her turn, leave to England the peaceable sovereignty of
Egypt. It is clear that, so long as the route to India is
open and certain, that the state of the country ensures
the facility and promptitude of the communications,
England will not set about creating the most grave
difficulties by appropriating a territory which, in her
eyes, has no other value than as a means of transit.
It is likewise evident that France—whose policy, for
the last fifty years, has been to contribute to the
prosperity of Egypt, both by her counsels and by the
concourse of a great number of Frenchmen distinguished
in the sciences, in administrative capacity, in all the
arts of peace or war—will not seek to realize, in this
direction, the projects of another epoch, so long as
England does not interfere.
But let one of those crises occur which have so often
shaken the East, let a circumstance arise wherein England
should find herself under the rigorous necessity of
taking a position in Egypt to prevent another power from
forestalling her, and tell us then if it is possible that
the alliance could survive the complications which such
an event would occasion. And why should England consider
herself obliged to become mistress of Egypt, even at
the risk of breaking her alliance with France? For this
single reason, that Egypt is the shortest and most direct
route from England to her Eastern possessions; that
this route must be constantly open to her; and that,
in whatever concerns this mighty interest, she could
never temporise. Thus, from the position given to her
by nature, Egypt might still become the subject of a
conflict between France and Great Britain; so that this
chance of rupture would disappear if, by a providential
event, the geographical conditions of the ancient world
were changed, and, that the commercial route to India,
instead of passing through the heart of Egypt, were
removed to its confines, and, being opened to all the
world, could never be exposed to the chance of its
becoming the exclusive privilege of any one.
Well! this event, which must have been the design of
Providence, is now within the reach of man. It may be
brought about by human skill. It is to be realized by the
cutting of the Isthmus of Suez, an undertaking to which
nature opposes no obstacle, and wherein English capital,
as well as that of other countries, will certainly take
part.
Let the Isthmus be cut through, let the waves of the
Mediterranean mingle with those of the Indian Ocean,
let the Railroad be continued and completed, and Egypt,
in acquiring an increased importance as a productive
country, as a country of internal commerce, as a general
storehouse and common transit, loses its dangerous
pre-eminence as an uncertain and contested passage of
communication.
The possession of its territory being no longer an object
of interest to England, ceases to be a possible bone of
contention between that power and France, the union of
the two peoples is for the future unalterable, and the
world is preserved from the calamities which a rupture
between them would produce. This result affords such
securities for the future, that it is sufficient to
point them out, to attract to the undertaking destined
to produce it, the sympathy and the encouragement of the
Statesmen whose efforts are directed to the settlement
of the Anglo-French alliance upon an immoveable basis.
You, my Lord, are one of those Statesmen, and you have
too large a share in questions of high policy, to which
I am a stranger, for me not to entertain the wish to
communicate to you my aspirations.
FERD. DE LESSEPS.”
[2] These very sensible observations are taken from a correspondence
which appeared in the “Times” of the 13th June last.
[3] The other two were Mr. Stephenson for England, and M. Négrelli for
Austria.