winds, to a sailing vessel navigating by the Red Sea, as compared with
the route by the Cape of Good Hope, we must, for vessels bound to or from
the most important commercial ports in India—the Presidencies of Madras
and Bengal, as also Ceylon, Singapore, Java, China, &c., suppose her
placed at a point a few degrees to the southward of Ceylon from or to
which she would have to proceed, whether navigating by the Cape of Good
Hope, or by the Red Sea route.
Now, it is well known, that from this position a vessel steering for the
coast of Africa towards Cape Guardafui (the southern extremity of the
Gulf of Aden), and thence to the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb (the entrance
of the Red Sea), would carry the wind a-beam, and could therefore make
her passage to or from the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, and the given point
to the southward of Ceylon, during the whole of the south-west monsoon.
As the north-east monsoon blows in an exactly opposite direction to the
south-west monsoon, and is much more moderate, a sailing vessel could
make good her course between the Red Sea and the same point south of
Ceylon, equally well as in the south-west monsoon, and therefore during
the whole year could effect this part of the passage with tolerable
certainty.
Vessels proceeding to or from Bombay would have to arrange their passages
to suit the monsoons. Sailing from England, or other places in Europe,
so as to have the south-west monsoon in their favour; and sailing from
Bombay for Europe so as to have the north-east monsoon in their favour.
It hence appears that the monsoons present no particular difficulties
in the voyage between India, &c. and the entrance of the Red Sea, more
than in the ordinary route by the Cape of Good Hope; but that, on the
contrary, for ships trading with the eastern and most important parts of
Hindostan, and to Ceylon, Malacca, Singapore, Java, China, &c. this part
of the voyage would be made with more certainty than an equal distance in
the Indian Ocean, of a voyage by the Cape of Good Hope route.
THE RED SEA PASSAGE.
The length of the Red Sea from the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb to Suez is
1200 miles, its medium breadth about 150 miles, and its direction nearly
N. N. W. and S. S. E.
Its coasts on either side are fringed with coral rocks, which render it
dangerous in navigating it to approach near its shores.
In the southern part of it, say from the latitude of Jidda to
Bab-el-Mandeb, being about one-half of its whole length, the southerly
monsoon predominates nearly two-thirds of the year, commencing in October
and ending in May or June. The northerly winds then set in, and continue
about four months, say June, July, August, and September.
Outside the Red Sea, in the Gulf of Aden, the wind generally prevails
from the eastward for six months, say, from October to May, and from the
westward during the other part of the year.
In the northern part of the sea, from Jidda to Suez, but more
particularly near to Suez, the prevailing winds for nine months of the
year are northerly, and in the months of June, July, and August, it is
very difficult for sailing vessels to beat up to Suez. In this part of
the Red Sea southerly breezes are at all times but of short duration.
The best time for vessels to sail from Suez for India, &c. is therefore
about the end of August, which will enable them to clear the Straits of
Bab-el-Mandeb in September, before the easterly winds commence in the
Gulf outside.
From all these facts it will appear,
1st. That the passage between India, &c., and the Gulf of Aden, may be
made with ordinary facility by sailing vessels.
2nd. That some delay would be experienced by sailing vessels in the Gulf
of Aden during certain portions of the year, whether bound to or from
India; and also by vessels _coming from India_, in the northern part of
the Red Sea, during the greater part of the year.
Against these difficulties in the Red Sea route must, however, be set off
the delays by calms and contrary winds, between the trades experienced by
vessels navigating by the Cape route. In order to ascertain how nearly
they may balance each other, and consequently whether a saving of time in
navigating by the Mediterranean and Red Sea, proportionate to the shorter
distance, as compared with the voyage round the Cape of Good Hope, might
be effected, I would beg leave to submit the following questions to the
consideration of experienced nautical men.
1st. Is the navigation by a sailing vessel, between England and Pelusium,
say 3000 miles, of equal facility as a similar distance from England on
the Cape route?
2nd. Is the navigation to or from the given point, to the southward of
Ceylon and Cape Guardafui, more certain than that of an equal distance
between the same point and the Cape of Good Hope?
3rd. Would the impediments in the navigation of the Red Sea and Gulf of
Aden, already pointed out, be greater or less than those experienced from
calms and contrary winds between the trades in navigating by the Cape of
Good Hope route? And, assuming that the answer to the second query should
be in favour of the Red Sea route, would that gain set off against the
difficulties of navigating the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and reduce the
latter to a par with the impediments between the trades just alluded to?
4th. Would not the nature of the coast of Egypt, at the embouchure of the
Canal in the Mediterranean, present considerable difficulty and danger
to sailing vessels approaching it for the purpose of seeking the Canal
entrance? The coast, it is well known, for a distance of upwards of 150
miles to the eastward, as well as to the westward of the Canal entrance,
is destitute of any sheltered anchorage, is exceedingly low, and not
easily discoverable until within a short distance of it, and very shallow
at a distance of two leagues from the shore. A good light on the pier
or breakwater might obviate some of the danger, but still it is to be
apprehended, that sailing vessels approaching this part of the coast,
with the wind strong from the north and north-west, and which is very
prevalent, would incur considerable risk of getting embayed and being
driven ashore.
If the result of this investigation should be such as to place the
difficulties and facilities of each route on a par, it will then follow
that a gain in time of from four to six weeks would be effected in
navigating to or from India, &c. by the proposed Canal, as compared with
the Cape of Good Hope route.
Before concluding this part of the subject, I think it well to advert to
another objection which may possibly be raised against the Canal passage,
namely, the difficulty of tracking a vessel of heavy burthen through
the Canal, from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, against a current of
three to four miles an hour, which would be the velocity of the stream
constantly flowing from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.
To this may be answered, that the same northerly winds which prevail
as already stated, for the greater part of the year, in the upper
or northern part of the Red Sea, also blow across the Isthmus, and
consequently the vessel would be for the most part able to stem the
current by using her sails. In default of this, a sufficient number of
dromedaries would track a vessel of almost any size, or posts placed
along the banks of the Canal for warping would effect the object on
occasions, which would be of but rare occurrence, of a failure of wind.
It is to be considered also, that as the beds of the Bitter Lakes and of
the Lake Timsah, would form two very extensive basins in the course of
the Canal, nearly half-way between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea,
these would become halting places or inland ports, and here steam tugs
would no doubt, among other accessories, be found, should the Canal ever
become a general channel of intercourse.
_From_ the Red Sea _to_ the Mediterranean the vessel would, of course, be
carried along by the stream.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AS TO THE POLITICAL, COMMERCIAL, AND MORAL BENEFITS
WHICH WOULD BE DERIVED FROM THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE UNDERTAKING.
In a political point of view, the facilities which the Canal passage,
combined with steam navigation, would afford to Great Britain, as
regards the government of her Indian empire and dependencies, are almost
incalculable.
From Malta troops could be placed in Bombay in _three weeks_; in Ceylon
and Madras in four weeks; and in Calcutta in five weeks. And by means
of the frequent intermediate coast communication in India, which the
extended and comprehensive plan of steam navigation anticipated to result
from the opening of the Canal passage would afford, troops and stores
could be rapidly moved from one station to another.
Let any military man compare this with the present mode of effecting
similar operations. The long sea voyage by the Cape of Good Hope, of four
or five months, in a sailing vessel;—the men worn out, and requiring
almost as many months more after debarkation, to recruit their health
and strength, so as to be fit for active duty;—the length of time,
and great fatigue, in moving between distant military stations;—and I
think he will admit, that India might, with the facility alluded to, be
efficiently governed with one-half the number of European troop which
is now required. The facility for despatching ships of war, and stores
of all kinds, to or from India, &c., need only be glanced at to be at
once appreciated. The stability of British power in India would be
thus increased, while the cost of maintaining it would be considerably
diminished.
To estimate the importance of the proposed communication in a commercial
point of view, it is necessary to take into consideration the extent
of the field of operations for commerce, which the vast and populous
regions of the East present. India contains 100,000,000 of subjects of
the British Crown, and there are 50,000,000 of adjacent tributaries and
allies; in all, 150,000,000 in the Peninsula of Hindostan, exclusive of
the island of Ceylon. Little has as yet been done to stimulate the people
to improve their resources and ameliorate their condition and habits; but
of late years more attention has been directed to these objects, and the
trade with British India has been rapidly on the increase.
China contains, it is estimated, not less than 350,000,000 of
inhabitants, said to be inclined to industry, and to be peculiarly
addicted to traffic. A timid and jealous system of government has for
ages hermetically sealed, as it were, this vast country and population
from intercourse with the rest of the world. British valour has now
removed the barrier, and opened this almost new world to European
commerce.
Let us suppose that the people of India and China should, from improved
intercourse, require to the extent of one shilling _per annum_, for
each individual, in value of British manufacture or produce. Even this
seemingly insignificant amount would produce an annual increase of
25,000,000 in our exports. The opening of the Canal route would tend
greatly to facilitate our intercourse with the 500,000,000 of people who
inhabit India and China, and hence its commercial importance must be
sufficiently obvious.
The application of steam power to the purposes of navigation, is
doubtless one of those mechanical discoveries destined to effect a
great moral revolution in the human mind throughout the world. The
printing press has contributed, in an immense degree, to the progress of
civilization, by furnishing a means for the spread of thought. But it
seems scarcely to admit of a question, that the power of steam, applied
to navigation, will exercise a more extensive, a more rapid, and a more
efficacious influence in accelerating the civilization of the world than
even the printing press.
Five hundred millions of human beings inhabiting Hindostan and China
remain to this day enslaved by debasing superstitions, and sunk in mental
darkness and delusion. What a field is here opening to the Christian
philanthropist! To aid in the removal of ignorance and superstition
by the diffusion of useful knowledge, and an enlightened religion; to
plant industry and the arts where indolence and barbarism have hitherto
prevailed, are noble efforts, tending no less to elevate those who engage
in them, than the object of their exertions. The opening of the proposed
communication would obviously subserve the promotion of such objects, and
therefore can scarcely fail to excite an interest in the mind of every
sincere well-wisher to his fellow creatures.
The preceding statement and observations will, I trust, be sufficient
to show that the object of which they treat is, at least, of sufficient
importance to warrant an effort being made to ascertain, in the manner
suggested, whether it be practicable or not, and if found practicable,
whether, and in what manner, the Pacha of Egypt would be disposed to
concur or co-operate in it. If the information and suggestions therein
given should lead to such a result, the chief object of their publication
will be attained.
APPENDIX.
No. VIII.
OPINION OF CAPTAIN JAMES VETCH, R.E.
OPINION OF CAPTAIN JAMES VETCH, R.E.[7]
A good deal is alleged by those trading from Britain to the East Indies
against the policy of any part of the British nation lending patronage to
such an undertaking, which, it is presumed, would benefit the countries
bordering the Mediterranean more than our own; though, if the canal in
question would be the means of most materially shortening the distance
between the two most important portions of the British Empire, little
doubt can be entertained of the benefit conferred on the extensive
commerce of the two countries, even though some other nations would
receive a greater proportional advantage in the accomplishment of the
measure; and though the commerce of other nations might increase in a
greater ratio than the British, still all would participate in facilities
to be obtained; and in the case of war arising, it is but too obvious,
that the power possessing a naval superiority has the means of closing
such a channel of commerce to its enemies, by stationing cruisers at each
extremity. So much may be urged with a view of removing the prejudice
of British interests against the measure; but it will readily be
believed, that if the British fail to patronize the undertaking, other
nations and powers will do so shortly: and it is therefore manifest, if
British subjects were chiefly concerned in advancing the capital, and in
executing and managing this great work, it would be vastly more for the
benefit of Britain, than if any other nation or Government lent their
resources. But undertake it who may, it is most probable, that both the
funds and the energies of execution will come from this country; and it
is too probable, that if the measure is executed by any other parties
than British, the work will be upon a cheaper and less effective plan of
navigation, permitting only small craft to navigate, unfit for British
commerce in the East, though sufficient for the small traders in the
Mediterranean, who would consequently, in such a case, reap the entire
benefit. I am decidedly of opinion, that British capital and British
energy would alone execute the work in a truly useful and permanent
style. But the measure is daily becoming so much more obvious as one of
practical facility, that it cannot long be postponed in some shape or
another.
The conclusions may now be recapitulated in general terms:—
1st. That a ship canal between the two Seas, which contemplates an
extended commerce between the countries of Europe and the Indian Ocean,
should be free from the effects of all fluctuating causes, arising from
inundations or floods, &c.
2nd. That it should be a measure irrespective of the commerce of Egypt
and the Nile, or rather that it could not combine these objects in the
same measure, with any good results; though it would be the means of
greatly improving the commerce of Egypt by accessory measures.
3rd. That the mean fall from the level of the Red Sea to that of the
Mediterranean (say thirty feet) is sufficient to keep the artificial
channel clean, if the fall be properly economised; and also that it would
be able to preserve its mouth in the Bay of Pelusium in a navigable state
at all seasons.
4th. That a navigation of still water with locks could not be long
maintained with advantage, under all the circumstances of the case.
5th. That a broad and deep stream like that of the Dardanelles could not
be produced by natural operations, assisted slightly by art; but that the
attempt would be pregnant with mischief in some quarters, and result in
disappointment.
6th. That a direct and perfectly controllable channel, of a uniform
size and shape and incline, would be the safest and most appropriate
undertaking of which the circumstances permit, and under the imperfect
information we possess.
It must, however, be confessed, that no definitive opinion can be given,
or very satisfactory estimates assumed, until a new and detailed survey,
having the express objects in view, is completed, comprehending the
necessary levellings and borings and maritime surveys of the ports at the
termini of the Canal.
With respect to the land survey, were all the necessary persons and means
duly prepared to commence operations in the beginning of October, it is
probable the investigation might be completed in the beginning of the
following May, and a true solution given to this great geographical,
commercial, and engineering question.
As mankind multiply and make progress in arts and civilization, new
wants arise, and the ingenuity and industry of man is taxed to discover
new sources of wealth, maintenance, and occupation: and we find, under
the dispensations of an all-wise Providence, that at suitable seasons
resources are unveiled which have been long provided but concealed until
the fit occasion presents itself. Amongst the numerous administrations
of the same wise and merciful design, it is not unreasonable to believe
that the completion of navigable channels across the Isthmuses of Suez
and Darien are enterprises amongst the events designed to minister to the
growing wants and improvement of the human race.
* * * * *
In the preceding pages an endeavour has been made to show the superiority
of a direct communication between the two Seas (which would provide for
the speedy passage of large ships at all seasons), over a communication
partly through the medium of the Nile, which would be interrupted in the
dry season, and prove tedious at all times; and it now remains to say a
few words on the comparative value of railways.
Railways, under present circumstances, would expedite the transmission
of passengers by the steam ships across the Desert, and might be useful
in the transmission of light and valuable goods between the Nile and
the Red Sea; but it must be greatly doubted if a sufficient traffic
could thereby arise to pay the construction and maintenance of eighty
miles of railway between Cairo and Suez. On the other hand, were it
contemplated to construct a railway between the bay of Tineh and Suez,
the cost, including the improvement of the harbours at either terminus,
would nearly equal the expense of the proposed Canal; but the _means_
of keeping the terminal harbours deep and clean would be foregone from
want of means of scourage; and to the expense of the railway would have
to be added the expense of unloading and reloading the cargoes of each
shipment; so that it is manifest that a railway direct between the two
Seas could stand no competition with the proposed Canal, which, besides
its value as a commercial channel, would facilitate the steam navigation
with India in the highest degree, by permitting the steamers to make a
continuous voyage; and by permitting supplies of coals being sent direct
to Suez and Aden, &c., the detention of steamers at Suez and Alexandria
would be avoided, four or five days would be gained in the transmission
of passengers and mails, and the expenditure in the price of coals would
be much reduced.
The Author again acknowledges his obligations to the able statements of
Mr. Maclaren’s paper of 1825, connected with this subject, and now quotes
that author’s opinions and those of the writer in the Foreign Quarterly
Review of 1836, as to the feasibility of the proposed measure:—
“Yet it is certain that the project must not only have been practicable
but easy, since it was accomplished in early times by men who were
unprovided with many of those resources which modern art supplies. In
fact, when the ground is explored the supposed difficulties vanish,
and we discover that Nature has furnished such singular and unexpected
facilities for establishing a water communication between the two Seas,
that she has left little for man to do to complete her work.”—MACLAREN,
_Jamieson’s Journal_, 1825, p. 274.
“Were European civilization and a regular Government permanently
re-established in Egypt, the undertaking would be found not only
practicable but easy; so great, in fact, are the facilities which the
ground presents, that though the Canal (taking the magnitude of its
section into account) would certainly be the largest that exists, the
expense would be considerably less than that of some small works of the
same kind executed in the west of Europe.”—_Ibid._ p. 290.
“There is little doubt that if the French had remained in Egypt, and
especially with Napoleon at the head of the Government, they would have
carried their project (of canals) into effect. The expense, compared with
the magnificent result, is so trifling, that the wonder is that it has
not been carried into effect before now, either by a company having the
support of Mahommed Pacha, or by the Pacha on his own account.”—_Foreign
Quarterly Review_, 1836, p. 362.
“A glance at the map which accompanies the Topographical Survey of the
French engineers is quite sufficient to demonstrate with what facility
and at what moderate expense a ship’s canal might be constructed from the
Red Sea to the Mediterranean.”—_Ibid._ p. 368.
APPENDIX.
No. IX.
ARTICLE FROM THE MONITEUR.
FROM THE MONITEUR,
(THE OFFICIAL PAPER OF FRANCE,)
6th July, 1855.
THE CUTTING OF THE ISTHMUS OF SUEZ.
This undertaking, one of the grandest and most useful of the age, has for
some time attracted a considerable share of public attention. There is
but one opinion as to its immense results, but the question of the track
has been a subject of discussion, which, in the absence of authentic
documents and an exact knowledge of the localities, may mislead public
opinion.
Two tracks have been proposed: one _direct_, which is to unite the two
Seas by a Canal in a straight line from Suez to Pelusium; the other
_indirect_, which, starting from Suez, joins the Nile below Cairo, and
terminates at the port of Alexandria.
In the eyes of all who are acquainted with Egypt the direct track alone
appears practicable, the indirect track however has recently found its
advocates in some European journals; the following particulars, collected
on the spot, will enlighten public opinion upon this point.
In the first place there is a difference of length between the two
tracks, which is not unimportant. The direct track being the shortest,
would certainly not, of itself, be sufficient to give it the preference,
especially if the other were both most economical and most advantageous;
but it appears that besides having the advantage of being much shorter,
the direct track also has the recommendations of being more economical,
more advantageous, and more easy of execution.