CHAPTER V

PEACE WITHOUT HONOUR

The war was brought to a virtual termination by the

surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown on October 19, 1781.

The definitive articles of peace were signed at Versailles

on September 3, 1783. During the two years that intervened

between these events, the lot of the Loyalists was one

of gloomy uncertainty. They found it hard to believe that

the British government would abandon them to the mercy

of their enemies; and yet the temper of the revolutionists

toward them continued such that there seemed little hope

of concession or conciliation. Success had not taught

the rebels the grace of forgiveness. At the capitulation

of Yorktown, Washington had refused to treat with the

Loyalists in Cornwallis's army on the same terms as with

the British regulars; and Cornwallis had been compelled

to smuggle his Loyalist levies out of Yorktown on the

ship that carried the news of his surrender to New York.

As late as 1782 fresh confiscation laws had been passed

in Georgia and the Carolinas; and in New York a law had

been passed cancelling all debts due to Loyalists, on

condition that one-fortieth of the debt was paid into

the state treasury. These were straws which showed the

way the wind was blowing.

In the negotiations leading up to the Peace of Versailles

there were no clauses so long and bitterly discussed as

those relating to the Loyalists. The British commissioners

stood out at first for the principle of complete amnesty

to them and restitution of all they had lost; and it is

noteworthy that the French minister added his plea to

theirs. But Benjamin Franklin and his colleagues refused

to agree to this formula. They took the ground that they,

as the representatives merely of the Continental Congress,

had not the right to bind the individual states in such

a matter. The argument was a quibble. Their real reason

was that they were well aware that public opinion in

America would not support them in such a concession. A

few enlightened men in America, such as John Adams,

favoured a policy of compensation to the Loyalists, 'how

little soever they deserve it, nay, how much soever they

deserve the contrary'; but the attitude of the great

majority of the Americans had been clearly demonstrated

by a resolution passed in the legislature of Virginia on

December 17, 1782, to the effect that all demands for

the restitution of confiscated property were wholly

inadmissible. Even some of the Loyalists had begun to

realize that a revolution which had touched property was

bound to be permanent, and that the American commissioners

could no more give back to them their confiscated lands

than Charles II was able to give back to his father's

cavaliers the estates they had lost in the Civil War.

The American commissioners agreed, finally, that no future

confiscations should take place, that imprisoned Loyalists

should be released, that no further persecutions should

be permitted, and that creditors on either side should

'meet with no lawful impediment' to the recovery of all

good debts in sterling money. But with regard to the

British demand for restitution, all they could be induced

to sign was a promise that Congress would 'earnestly

recommend to the legislatures of the respective states'

a policy of amnesty and restitution.

In making this last recommendation, it is difficult not

to convict the American commissioners of something very

like hypocrisy. There seems to be no doubt that they knew

the recommendation would not be complied with; and little

or no attempt was made by them to persuade the states to

comply with it. In after years the clause was represented

by the Americans as a mere form of words, necessary to

bring the negotiations to an end, and to save the face

of the British government. To this day it has remained,

except in one or two states, a dead letter. On the other

hand it is impossible not to convict the British

commissioners of a betrayal of the Loyalists. 'Never,'

said Lord North in the House of Commons, 'never was the

honour, the humanity, the principles, the policy of a

nation so grossly abused, as in the desertion of those

men who are now exposed to every punishment that desertion

and poverty can inflict, because they were not rebels.'

'In ancient or in modern history,' said Lord Loughborough

in the House of Lords, 'there cannot be found an instance

of so shameful a desertion of men who have sacrificed

all to their duty and to their reliance upon our faith.'

It seems probable that the British commissioners could

have obtained, on paper at any rate, better terms for

the Loyalists. It is very doubtful if the Americans would

have gone to war again over such a question. In 1783 the

position of Great Britain was relatively not weaker, but

stronger, than in 1781, when hostilities had ceased. The

attitude of the French minister, and the state of the

French finances, made it unlikely that France would lend

her support to further hostilities. And there is no doubt

that the American states were even more sorely in need

of peace than was Great Britain.

When the terms of peace were announced, great was the

bitterness among the Loyalists. One of them protested in

_Rivington's Gazette_ that 'even robbers, murderers, and

rebels are faithful to their fellows and never betray

each other,' and another sang,

'Tis an honour to serve the bravest of nations,

And be left to be hanged in their capitulations.

If the terms of the peace had been observed, the plight

of the Loyalists would have been bad enough. But as it

was, the outcome proved even worse. Every clause in the

treaty relating to the Loyalists was broken over and over

again. There was no sign of an abatement of the popular

feeling against them; indeed, in some places, the spirit

of persecution seemed to blaze out anew. One of Washington's

bitterest sayings was uttered at this time, when he said

of the Loyalists that 'he could see nothing better for

them than to commit suicide.' Loyalist creditors found

it impossible to recover their debts in America, while

they were themselves sued in the British courts by their

American creditors, and their property was still being

confiscated by the American legislatures. The legislature

of New York publicly declined to reverse its policy of

confiscation, on the ground that Great Britain had offered

no compensation for the property which her friends had

destroyed. Loyalists who ventured to return home under

the treaty of peace were insulted, tarred and feathered,

whipped, and even ham-strung. All over the country there

were formed local committees or associations with the

object of preventing renewed intercourse with the Loyalists

and the restitution of Loyalist property. 'The proceedings

of these people,' wrote Sir Guy Carleton, 'are not to be

attributed to politics alone--it serves as a pretence,

and under that cloak they act more boldly, but avarice

and a desire of rapine are the great incentives.'

The Loyalists were even denied civil rights in most of

the states. In 1784 an act was passed in New York declaring

that all who had held office under the British, or helped

to fit out vessels of war, or who had served as privates

or officers in the British Army, or who had left the

state, were guilty of 'misprision of treason,' and were

disqualified from both the franchise and public office.

There was in fact hardly a state in 1785 where the Loyalist

was allowed to vote. In New York Loyalist lawyers were

not allowed to practise until April 1786, and then only

on condition of taking an 'oath of abjuration and

allegiance.' In the same state, Loyalists were subjected

to such invidious special taxation that in 1785 one of

them confessed that 'those in New York whose estates have

not been confiscated are so loaded with taxes and other

grievances that there is nothing left but to sell out

and move into the protection of the British government.'

It was clear that something would have to be done by the

British government for the Loyalists' relief. 'It is

utterly impossible,' wrote Sir Guy Carleton to Lord North,

'to leave exposed to the rage and violence of these people

[the Americans] men of character whose only offence has

been their attachment to the King's service.' Accordingly

the British government made amends for its betrayal of

the Loyalists by taking them under its wing. It arranged

for the transportation of all those who wished to leave

the revolted states; it offered them homes in the provinces

of Nova Scotia and Quebec; it granted half-pay to the

officers after their regiments were reduced; and it

appointed a royal commission to provide compensation for

the losses sustained.

The United Empire Loyalists: A Chronicle of the Great Migration [1914 ed.] · 第 5 / 13 章