I do not wonder at that, I said. But perhaps, if I put the matter in
another way, you will be able to follow me, and my own meaning will be
clearer to myself. The sick man, as I was just now saying, is the friend
of the physician--is he not?
Yes.
And he is the friend of the physician because of disease, and for the
sake of health?
Yes.
And disease is an evil?
Certainly.
And what of health? I said. Is that good or evil, or neither?
Good, he replied.
And we were saying, I believe, that the body being neither good nor
evil, because of disease, that is to say because of evil, is the friend
of medicine, and medicine is a good: and medicine has entered into this
friendship for the sake of health, and health is a good.
True.
And is health a friend, or not a friend?
A friend.
And disease is an enemy?
Yes.
Then that which is neither good nor evil is the friend of the good
because of the evil and hateful, and for the sake of the good and the
friend?
Clearly.
Then the friend is a friend for the sake of the friend, and because of
the enemy?
That is to be inferred.
Then at this point, my boys, let us take heed, and be on our guard
against deceptions. I will not again repeat that the friend is the
friend of the friend, and the like of the like, which has been declared
by us to be an impossibility; but, in order that this new statement may
not delude us, let us attentively examine another point, which I will
proceed to explain: Medicine, as we were saying, is a friend, or dear to
us for the sake of health?
Yes.
And health is also dear?
Certainly.
And if dear, then dear for the sake of something?
Yes.
And surely this object must also be dear, as is implied in our previous
admissions?
Yes.
And that something dear involves something else dear?
Yes.
But then, proceeding in this way, shall we not arrive at some first
principle of friendship or dearness which is not capable of being
referred to any other, for the sake of which, as we maintain, all other
things are dear, and, having there arrived, we shall stop?
True.
My fear is that all those other things, which, as we say, are dear for
the sake of another, are illusions and deceptions only, but where that
first principle is, there is the true ideal of friendship. Let me put
the matter thus: Suppose the case of a great treasure (this may be a
son, who is more precious to his father than all his other treasures);
would not the father, who values his son above all things, value other
things also for the sake of his son? I mean, for instance, if he knew
that his son had drunk hemlock, and the father thought that wine would
save him, he would value the wine?
He would.
And also the vessel which contains the wine?
Certainly.
But does he therefore value the three measures of wine, or the earthen
vessel which contains them, equally with his son? Is not this rather
the true state of the case? All his anxiety has regard not to the means
which are provided for the sake of an object, but to the object for the
sake of which they are provided. And although we may often say that gold
and silver are highly valued by us, that is not the truth; for there is
a further object, whatever it may be, which we value most of all, and
for the sake of which gold and all our other possessions are acquired by
us. Am I not right?
Yes, certainly.
And may not the same be said of the friend? That which is only dear to
us for the sake of something else is improperly said to be dear, but
the truly dear is that in which all these so-called dear friendships
terminate.
That, he said, appears to be true.
And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the
sake of any other or further dear.
True.
Then we have done with the notion that friendship has any further
object. May we then infer that the good is the friend?