And neither is the good the friend of the good, nor the evil of the
evil, nor the good of the evil;--these alternatives are excluded by the
previous argument; and therefore, if there be such a thing as friendship
or love at all, we must infer that what is neither good nor evil must
be the friend, either of the good, or of that which is neither good nor
evil, for nothing can be the friend of the bad.
True.
But neither can like be the friend of like, as we were just now saying.
True.
And if so, that which is neither good nor evil can have no friend which
is neither good nor evil.
Clearly not.
Then the good alone is the friend of that only which is neither good nor
evil.
That may be assumed to be certain.
And does not this seem to put us in the right way? Just remark, that the
body which is in health requires neither medical nor any other aid,
but is well enough; and the healthy man has no love of the physician,
because he is in health.
He has none.
But the sick loves him, because he is sick?
Certainly.
And sickness is an evil, and the art of medicine a good and useful
thing?
Yes.
But the human body, regarded as a body, is neither good nor evil?
True.
And the body is compelled by reason of disease to court and make friends
of the art of medicine?
Yes.
Then that which is neither good nor evil becomes the friend of good, by
reason of the presence of evil?
So we may infer.
And clearly this must have happened before that which was neither good
nor evil had become altogether corrupted with the element of evil--if
itself had become evil it would not still desire and love the good; for,
as we were saying, the evil cannot be the friend of the good.
Impossible.
Further, I must observe that some substances are assimilated when others
are present with them; and there are some which are not assimilated:
take, for example, the case of an ointment or colour which is put on
another substance.
Very good.
In such a case, is the substance which is anointed the same as the
colour or ointment?
What do you mean? he said.
This is what I mean: Suppose that I were to cover your auburn locks with
white lead, would they be really white, or would they only appear to be
white?
They would only appear to be white, he replied.
And yet whiteness would be present in them?
True.
But that would not make them at all the more white, notwithstanding the
presence of white in them--they would not be white any more than black?
No.
But when old age infuses whiteness into them, then they become
assimilated, and are white by the presence of white.
Certainly.
Now I want to know whether in all cases a substance is assimilated
by the presence of another substance; or must the presence be after a
peculiar sort?
The latter, he said.
Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil,
but not as yet evil, and that has happened before now?
Yes.
And when anything is in the presence of evil, not being as yet evil,
the presence of good arouses the desire of good in that thing; but the
presence of evil, which makes a thing evil, takes away the desire and
friendship of the good; for that which was once both good and evil has
now become evil only, and the good was supposed to have no friendship
with the evil?
None.
And therefore we say that those who are already wise, whether Gods or
men, are no longer lovers of wisdom; nor can they be lovers of wisdom
who are ignorant to the extent of being evil, for no evil or ignorant
person is a lover of wisdom. There remain those who have the misfortune
to be ignorant, but are not yet hardened in their ignorance, or void of
understanding, and do not as yet fancy that they know what they do
not know: and therefore those who are the lovers of wisdom are as yet
neither good nor bad. But the bad do not love wisdom any more than the
good; for, as we have already seen, neither is unlike the friend of
unlike, nor like of like. You remember that?
Yes, they both said.
And so, Lysis and Menexenus, we have discovered the nature of
friendship--there can be no doubt of it: Friendship is the love which
by reason of the presence of evil the neither good nor evil has of the
good, either in the soul, or in the body, or anywhere.
They both agreed and entirely assented, and for a moment I rejoiced and
was satisfied like a huntsman just holding fast his prey. But then
a most unaccountable suspicion came across me, and I felt that
the conclusion was untrue. I was pained, and said, Alas! Lysis and
Menexenus, I am afraid that we have been grasping at a shadow only.
Why do you say so? said Menexenus.
I am afraid, I said, that the argument about friendship is false:
arguments, like men, are often pretenders.
How do you mean? he asked.
Well, I said; look at the matter in this way: a friend is the friend of
some one; is he not?
Certainly he is.
And has he a motive and object in being a friend, or has he no motive
and object?
He has a motive and object.
And is the object which makes him a friend, dear to him, or neither dear
nor hateful to him?