THE USE OF THE AUXILIA FOR WAR AND FRONTIER DEFENCE
A history of the art of war under the Roman Empire has not yet been
written, for the simple reason that we do not possess an account by a
good military historian of a single campaign between that of Thapsus
(46 B.C.) and that of Argentorate (357). Josephus does indeed give a
first-hand account of the Jewish war of 66-70, and took some trouble
over military details, but his subject limited him to siege operations
and street-fighting. The most valuable section in his work is a general
sketch of the Roman army and its organization, and a description of the
arrangement of troops on the march.[311] Tacitus, on the other hand,
who is forced by his subject to describe several campaigns, and remains
in consequence our chief authority, cared nothing for the technical
side of warfare, and does nothing more than record, as a rule correctly
enough, details which he found in his sources.[312]
With strategy we need not concern ourselves, since the subject lies
beyond the scope of this essay; but tactics require more consideration
on account of the special position assigned to the auxilia in battle
formation. From the scanty information given by our authorities it
appears that in any regular engagement fought during the first two
centuries the legionary infantry were still considered to be the chief
arm and employed to deal the decisive blow.[313] They occupied the
centre of the line, and the light troops and cavalry—that is to say,
the auxilia—were expected to do little more than protect them from a
flank attack. This formation was employed at Idistaviso in 16,[314]
against Tacfarinas in 18,[315] against Tiridates in 58,[316] against
Boudicca in 61,[317] and at the second battle of Bedriacum in 69.[318]
It is also prescribed by Arrian in his ‘Order of Battle against the
Alani’.[319] The only considerable exception is the battle of Issos
in 193, in which the legions on both sides formed the first line and
were supported by the archers, who shot over their heads. Dio, however,
expressly states that this formation was adopted because these armies
were fighting in a narrow space with the sea on one side and mountains
on the other, so that there was no need to detach a force to protect
their flanks.[320]
There were, however, cases, particularly in warfare against barbarians,
where the enemy would not meet the imperial forces in the open field,
but took up a defensive position on ground where legionaries could not
be employed with success. In these circumstances the auxilia formed the
first line and began the attack, and only if they were driven back and
pursued by the enemy did the legions come into action. The battle of
Mons Graupius, in 84, was conducted on these lines,[321] and similar
tactics seem often to have been employed by Trajan in Dacia.[322] In
general, however, the auxilia play a very secondary rôle; we do not
hear either of the cavalry being used to strike the decisive blow after
the manner of Alexander,[323] or of any such combination of archers and
heavy infantry as we find in mediaeval warfare.
The subject, however, is still obscure, and it is more satisfactory
to turn to the part played by the auxilia in frontier defence,
concerning which the archaeological research of the past twenty years
has established more certain conclusions. In the frontier policy of
the first two centuries we can trace two opposing tendencies at work,
each of which is reflected in the disposition of the troops and the
duties required of them. At the death of Augustus the Empire had as
yet reached hardly any of its natural boundaries, although by means of
the system of client kingdoms and ‘protected’ tribes it was asserting
its claims and intentions in much the same fashion as the powers of
modern Europe are doing in Africa to-day. The first century therefore
witnessed on almost every frontier a period of expansion of greater
or less duration, in which the sphere of direct administration was
gradually pushed forward until some physical or political obstacle
was reached which necessitated either a halt or a forward policy on
a much larger scale. Throughout this period military operations were
always imminent; in Britain, for example, between 50 and 85, the
garrison marched out almost every spring, either for a campaign or a
military demonstration. In winter, therefore, or in times of peace, the
frontier armies were so disposed as to be able to take the offensive
at a few days’ notice. The legions often lay in pairs, while many of
the auxiliary regiments, instead of being scattered over a wide area,
as was the case later, were concentrated at a few strategic points.
The extent to which this system was adopted varied, of course, with
local conditions, and a few regiments always occupied more isolated
positions, but as a whole the auxilia of a province were far more
easily mobilized than later when each regiment had its own _castellum_.
On the Rhine frontier Haltern and Hofheim furnish examples of these
large _hiberna_, dating from the beginning and the middle of the first
century respectively,[324] and we find the same system continued for
the defence of the Taunus district annexed by Domitian.[325] There is,
indeed, here a chain of forts on the frontier, but they are of small
size, with an average area of only 1½ acres. The bulk of the auxilia
lay some way behind the frontier, in forts which held some two or three
regiments apiece.[326] In Britain we have traces of a similar system
at the same date. The ‘Agricolan’ fort at Barr Hill is a frontier
post which would require some two centuries at most for its defence,
while the early fort at Newstead, which was probably occupied from
about 80 to 100 or later, could accommodate at least 1500 men.[327]
The essentially temporary nature of such _hiberna_ is emphasized by
the character of their defences, which usually consist simply of an
earth wall or palisade, little more elaborate in construction than the
_vallum_ which an army in the field was expected to throw up round its
camp after a day’s march.
In provinces whence archaeological evidence is not forthcoming,
inscriptions indicate the same system. From Spain, for instance, we
have an early inscription referring to an officer who held command over
four cohorts,[328] and a similar brigade of three cohorts appears at
Syene in Egypt in the reign of Trajan.[329] On the Danube frontier von
Domaszewski has concluded from the epigraphical evidence that Aquincum
and Arrabona each held two alae in the first century.[330]
This period of expansion may be considered to end with Trajan’s
annexation of Dacia and his failure a few years later to execute a
similar forward move on the Eastern frontier. With the accession
of Hadrian a new policy begins, which advertised by the elaborate
character of its defensive measures that the imperial government was
firmly determined to renounce all further schemes of aggression, a
determination which was adhered to until the power of decision lay no
longer in Roman hands. The outward signs of this new spirit were the
abandonment of the old _hiberna_, and the removal of their garrisons
to stone forts of a new type, each arranged to hold no more than a
single unit, which were placed at more or less regular intervals along
the frontier instead of behind it.[331] The auxilia, that is, were
transformed from a potential field army into a frontier police.
This policy of passive defence depended, of course, for its success
upon the extent to which the frontier could be made defensible.
Fortunately by this date it lay for the greater part of its length
along positions of great natural strength. The Rhine, Danube,
and Euphrates, when guarded by a continuous line of forts and
watch-towers,[332] and patrolled by flotillas of guard-boats, formed
a serious military obstacle to a raiding force, an obstacle even more
dangerous to its retreat than its advance. The desert frontiers of
Africa and Arabia were more easily defended, since the routes by which
a hostile force could advance were limited in number and the defence
could concentrate upon them, and the same of course holds true of the
southern frontier of Egypt.
There were, however, districts where such natural obstacles did not
exist, as in the case of the trans-Rhenane territory, which was divided
between Germania Superior and Raetia, and the northern frontier of
Britain, and here Hadrian had recourse to the expedient of erecting
artificial barriers, which he hoped would serve the same purpose.[333]
In the former case the frontier was defended by a palisade and ditch,
which were later supplemented by an earth mound in the German section
and replaced by a stone wall in Raetia.[334] On the British frontier,
between the Tyne and Solway, the existing remains are those of a stone
wall, although there are also traces of a wall of turf, which may have
been an earlier work.[335] A turf wall also defended the more advanced
line between the Firths of Clyde and Forth, which was occupied between
140 and 180.[336] The southern line in Britain in its most perfect form
was guarded by a stone wall seventy-three miles long. This wall was
between six and nine feet thick, and probably stood originally about
twelve feet high. In front of it, except where the precipitous nature
of the ground rendered such an additional defence unnecessary, ran
a wide ∨-shaped ditch. At intervals of about every Roman mile stood
a stone block-house, and between every block-house two towers. The
mile-castles contained barrack accommodation for about fifty men, and
reveal abundant traces of continuous occupation.[337] The garrison of
about eleven thousand men lay in stone forts of the ‘cohort’ size, the
majority of which are actually on the line of the wall, although a few,
which probably belonged originally to an earlier system of defence,
are a short distance behind it. The average interval between the forts
is some six miles, so that it was easily possible for each regiment
to man the adjacent towers and mile-castles and retain a considerable
force at head-quarters. In addition to the troops actually stationed on
the line of the wall, there were other regiments in outpost forts to
the north and in the forts which guarded the three roads leading south
to the legionary fortresses of Chester and York. The ends of the line
were also guarded against flank attacks from the sea by forts at South
Shields and on the Cumberland coast. If, then, we include all troops
within three days’ march of the wall, the total force available for
its defence probably exceeded twenty thousand men. Taking also into
our calculations the natural strength of the position, we may safely
say that this was the strongest and best guarded of all the frontier
barriers.
The trans-Rhenane frontier, which extends for over three hundred miles
from Rheinbrohl on the Rhine to Eining on the Danube, was defended by
the same methods, although in certain sections the forts were more
widely separated and the garrison was proportionately weaker. There
were also fewer troops within call immediately behind the frontier
line. Here also, between the cohort forts, stone ‘Zwischenkastelle’ and
‘Wachttürme’ furnished additional safeguards.[338]
This whole system of frontier defence has been much criticized, and
the limitations and possibilities of these artificial barriers must
be carefully determined.[339] To take the negative side first, they
could not, of course, be defended against unexpected attack, like the
walls of a town, unless the assailants were only a small raiding party
numbering some twenty or thirty men. On the other hand, in spite of
the parallel of the ‘Customs Hedge’ in India,[340] it seems unlikely
that fiscal considerations played any large part in determining the
government on their construction. They doubtless acted, when built, as
a check on smuggling, but the expense of their maintenance would have
been quite out of proportion to the value of the trade done with the
German or British tribes.
The first purpose which they served was to furnish a screen behind
which patrols could march in comparative safety, both by day and
night, and keep the whole line under constant surveillance. Thus the
passing of a hostile force could be instantly reported by messenger
or signal[341] to the nearest _castella_, whence detachments could at
once start in pursuit. Secondly, whereas the defenders nearly always
had a mounted force close at hand drawn either from the _alae_ or the
numerous _cohortes equitatae_, the raiders would probably be unmounted,
since their start would be lost if they delayed to fill up the ditch
and make a gap in the barrier large enough for their horses.[342]
This barrier, too, had to be crossed again in retreat, and presented
a very serious obstacle to a force encumbered with booty. Indeed, the
defenders might reserve the great part of their forces for this moment,
as is recommended by Byzantine military writers describing similar
conditions.[343]
This sketch of the methods of defence employed applies more
particularly to the German and Raetian frontiers. In Britain, more
particularly on the southern line, it is probable that a more serious
defence was intended. In the first place, the massive stone wall, on
which the defenders could stand, was obviously stronger than anything
on the trans-Rhenane section.[344] Secondly, we have noted that the
garrison was stronger than in Germany, and could be more easily
reinforced. Moreover, even after the final abandonment of Scotland,
forts were still held in front of the southern line. Netherby on the
Esk, and Habitancium (Risingham) and Bremenium (High Rochester) on
Dere Street, were occupied by _cohortes miliariae equitatae_ well
into the third century, and at the last two forts we find a _numerus
exploratorum_ attached to the regular auxilia.[345] These strong
outposts would have been able to check or harass the enemy’s advance
and give warning to the garrison of the wall of any impending attack.
All these suppositions, however, both as regards Germany and Britain,
are based upon the assumption that a raid would be the sole subject
of the attacking force, and that it would not be too numerous to be
dealt with by the garrisons of three or four _castella_. To a more
serious invasion the resistance offered was much less effective. The
legions, it is true, still remained in reserve, but they formed the
only concentrated force at the disposal of the defending general, for
the majority of the auxilia, scattered as they were along the entire
length of the frontier, could not be quickly concentrated, and a
provincial garrison can rarely have taken the field at anything like
its full strength. The system also created serious difficulties when
it became necessary to send troops from one province to the aid of
another. Three regiments, for example, could not easily be sent from
Germany to Pannonia, because each of them constituted an essential link
in the chain of frontier defence. It became the practice, therefore,
to form out of detachments drawn from several regiments a composite
_vexillatio_ in which efficiency must have been greatly diminished
by lack of _esprit de corps_. A cavalry _vexillatio_ of this type
commanded by a certain Lollianus, probably during the Parthian war of
Trajan, was drawn from no less than five _alae_ and fourteen _cohortes
equitatae_.[346]
In defence of the system it would probably have been urged that on
every frontier the hostile forces were equally dispersed and far less
easily concentrated, and that a combination of the Celtic or Teutonic
tribes would be heard of long before it was ready for action. The
existence of the league which attacked and for a time broke through
the Danube frontier in the reign of Marcus was certainly known to the
imperial government, and the local governors succeeded in delaying the
crisis until the return of the _vexillationes_ which had been sent to
the eastern frontier, with whose aid they hoped to be able to cope with
the situation.[347] Their calculations were upset by the havoc wrought
in the army by the plague which these troops brought with them. Even
so the danger was eventually surmounted, and the frontiers were on the
whole successfully maintained for nearly a century more.
But the full consequences of this system cannot be perceived without
some consideration of the changes which it brought about in the
conditions of military life and their effect upon the general morale
and condition of the troops. A very important point to notice is their
immobility. Already in the first century there was, except for the
officers, no regular system of transfers, and only an important change
in the military situation caused troops to be sent from one province
to another. In fact such changes were frequent, and considerable
transfers took place, particularly during the Flavian period and the
wars of Trajan. From the accession of Hadrian onwards, however, such
movements cease almost entirely. During the following hundred and
twenty years hardly a legion changed its position and the auxiliary
regiments remained almost equally stationary.[348] We can trace
regiments which remained literally for centuries in the same province
and for the greater part of the time were in the same _castellum_. Of
the twenty-one cohorts and alae which are mentioned by the _Notitia
Dignitatum_ as forming part of the garrison of Britain, fifteen are
shown by the evidence of diplomata to have been in the province long
before the end of the reign of Hadrian; and two more, which occur in
a diploma of 146, are probably only not mentioned earlier because
they were creations of that emperor and had consequently no veterans
ready for discharge until after his death.[349] Similarly the Cohors
V Lucensium et Callaecorum was in Pannonia at least from 60 to 198,
the Cohors I Hemesenorum from 138/46 to 240, and the Ala III Augusta
Thracum from 148 to 268/71.[350] The best instance, however, is that
of the Cohors II Ituraeorum Felix. This regiment is placed by the
_Notitia_ in Egypt, and other evidence shows it to have been in the
province in 147, 136, 98, 83, and probably 39.[351] As this section of
the _Notitia_ seems to date, at the earliest, from the beginning of the
fifth century the regiment was probably quartered in the same province
for at least three hundred and twenty years.[352]
Evidence of continued stay in one _castellum_ is naturally more
difficult to find, but the way in which the names Ulpius, Aelius,
and Aurelius follow one another on a series of inscriptions of the
Ala I Ulpia Contariorum from Arrabona in Pannonia Superior suggests
that the regiment remained there throughout the second century, and
the title Antoniniana shows that it had not moved before the reign of
Severus Antoninus.[353] At the fort of Veczel in Dacia the Cohors II
Flavia Commagenorum has left inscriptions dating from the reigns of
Hadrian, Marcus, Septimius Severus, Severus Alexander, and Philip,
which cover practically the whole period during which the province
was in existence.[354] In Britain a remarkable series of dedications
from Amboglanna (Birdoswald), which has already been referred to, shows
that the Cohors I Aelia Dacorum was stationed there from about 211 to
271.[355]
Had the practice of employing a secondary title derived from the name
of the reigning emperor commenced before the third century it would
probably be easy to prove stays of much longer duration. The figures
given above must certainly be taken as a minimum. A second-century
auxiliary could thus make himself at home in his quarters in the
practical certainty that, with the exception of a few temporary
absences as member of a _vexillatio_, he would spend the whole of his
twenty-five years of service patrolling the frontier on each side of
his _castellum_.
In considering the life which the frontier guards would lead under
these conditions we must remember that the character of the auxiliary
soldier in the second century had changed considerably since the force
was first organized by Augustus. In the early first century enrolment
in the Roman service had little effect on the levies of wild tribesmen
who composed the greater part of the auxilia at this period. They might
be organized in Roman fashion, but the military qualities which they
displayed and their whole manner of fighting were inherited from their
ancestors. _Promptam ad pericula nec minus cantuum et armorum tumultu
trucem_ is Tacitus’s description of a cohort of Sugambri employed in
Thrace in the reign of Tiberius, and in like fashion the German cohorts
of Caecina’s army shouted their war-songs and rattled their shields
beneath the walls of Cremona.[356] In the second century all this was
changed: the progress of Romanization had raised the majority of the
provincials, even in the frontier districts, to a level of culture
which placed them far above their ancestors of three generations
back, although they might still seem barbarous to a cultured Greek
or Italian.[357] In the conditions of the service there was nothing
to prevent the auxilia from participating in this general advance,
and the soldiers who spent the best years of their lives in these
little frontier stations gathered around them all the amenities of
provincial life which would have been found in any country town in the
neighbourhood. On the sheltered side of the fort a civil settlement,
technically known as the _canabae_, quickly sprang up, and soon
contained as many inhabitants as the fort itself, if not more. It was
here that the soldiers placed their wives and children, that retired
veterans settled near their old comrades, and traders erected their
shops. A bath-house or two and a few small shrines, particularly those
dedicated to the popular military cults of Mithras, ‘the Unconquered
Comrade,’ and Juppiter Dolichenus satisfied the highest material and
spiritual needs.[358]
At the fort of the Saalburg, where such a settlement has been
carefully explored, an area of something like seventy-five acres was
covered with buildings and gardens. Shrines dedicated to the Mater Deum
and to Silvanus and Diana have been found, as well as those of Mithras
and Juppiter Dolichenus, and two others remain as yet unidentified. On
the outskirts, here as elsewhere, lay the cemetery with its inscribed
sepulchral monuments, the chief source of our information on so many
points of military life.[359] On the British wall no _canabae_ have
been so carefully explored as those on the German limes, which is
the more to be regretted since the buildings are usually in a better
state of preservation; but it is still possible to see near the fort
at Borcovicium (Housesteads) the terraces on which a scanty crop was
raised, while the remains of buildings extend down the hill from the
fort at the top to a small Mithraeum in the valley.[360] At Cilurnum
an elaborate bath-house was erected for the use of the soldiers of the
Ala II Asturum on the banks of the Tyne, and further excavation would
doubtless show that it did not stand alone. Where excavations have not
taken place the existence of these and other buildings is testified
to by inscriptions. At a fort on the Lower Rhine we even find the
_praefectus_ repairing at his own cost the regimental clock.[361]
The married quarters mentioned above require a few words of
explanation. Numerous critics of the Roman army have assumed not only
that celibacy is a valuable military ideal, but that it was actually
attained until Severus issued his famous edict permitting soldiers
to marry while still on active service.[362] Previous to this it is
assumed that they had no relations with women but those of the least
binding description. Seeck, indeed, has carefully explained that the
‘children of the camp’ could not have been reckoned upon as a valuable
source for recruits, because the rate of mortality is notoriously
higher among illegitimate than legitimate children.[363] This theory
is sufficiently refuted by the fact that, as we have seen, nearly
fifty per cent. of the recruits for the Legio III Augusta in Africa
were giving _castris_ as their birthplace long before the reign of
Severus.[364] A recently discovered edict of Domitian has shown
further that such unions were sufficiently permanent to be officially
recognized by the government during a soldier’s period of service,
although only legalized at his discharge.[365] The effect of Severus’s
edict was merely to anticipate this act and give legal sanction to
existing and perfectly well understood social conditions. Practically
the change was probably of small importance, since it seems fairly
clear that married quarters were not allowed inside the fort walls
after this edict any more than before it, nor were married men allowed
to remain permanently outside. Cagnat has shown that the arrangement of
the internal buildings of the legionary fortress at Lambaesis, which
are proved by epigraphical evidence to have been still existing in the
third century, is entirely opposed to such a supposition, and to the
general theory, which has often been advanced, that from the time of
Severus onwards such a fortress became merely a club-house and exercise
ground for the greater part of the troops.[366] These arguments are
concerned only with the legionaries, but they are worth introducing
because the erroneous views here discussed have often been made to
apply to the army as a whole. In the case of the auxilia, indeed,
there was never any justification for their acceptance. The evidence
of the diplomata was always sufficient to show that even in the first
century the auxiliary soldiers, like the legionaries, formed family
ties during their period of service which were officially recognized
on their discharge.[367] The same picture is given by early sepulchral
inscriptions, of which the following, from the Pannonian fort of
Teutoburgium, may serve as an example:
‘Ti(berio) Cl(audio) Britti f(ilio) Valerio, dec(urioni) alae II
Aravacorum, domo Hispano, annor(um) L, stip(endiorum) XXX, et
Cl(audiae) Ianuariae coniugi eius et Cl(audiae) Hispanillae filiae
vivis ex testamento Flaccus dec(urio) frater et Hispanilla filia
heredes faciundum curaverunt.’[368]
This tendency towards matrimony was naturally intensified by the
more settled life of the second-century auxiliary. The systematic
investigation of the cemetery attached to one of these permanent
garrisons reveals as orderly a family life as could be found in
any country town of the peaceful inland provinces. The following
inscriptions, which are drawn from different parts of the Empire, are
but few among many which might be advanced to support this contention.
xiii. 6270. From Borbetomagus in Germania Superior:
‘Faustinio Faustino Sennauci Florionis fil(io) mil(iti)
coh(ortis) I F(laviae) D(amascenorum), ped(iti) sing(ulari)
cos(consularis), Gemellinia Faustina mate(r) et Faustinia
Potentina sor(or) her(edes) secundum volumt(atem) testamenti
pos(uerunt). Vixit ann(is) [XX]V, decidit in flore iuvent(utis).
Faciendum curaverunt.’
iii. 10257. Teutoburgium in Pannonia Inferior:
‘M. Ulp(ius) Super dec(urio) alae Praetoriae c(ivium)
R(omanorum), ex s(ingulari) c(onsularis), ann(orum) XXXII,
stip(endiorum) XVI h(ic) s(itus) e(st). M. Ulp(ius) Similis
sesq(uiplicarius) alae I c(ivium) R(omanorum) frater, et Ulpia
Siscia soror, fratri pientissimo iuventutiq(ue) eius,’ &c.
iii. 10609. From Pannonia Inferior: exact provenance unknown:
‘D(is) [M(anibus)] Ael(io) Victorino ann(orum) XXX,
stip(endiorum) XIII, dupl(icario) al‹a›e I T(hracum)
v(eteranorum), et Ael(io) Liciniano an(norum) XII, filis
pient(issimis) Ael(ia) Flaviana infelic(issima) mat(er) et sibi
v(iva) p(osuit).’
_I. G. R. R._ i. 1350. From Talmis in Egypt:
τὸ προσκύνημα Γαίου Ἀ[ννέ]ου ἱπέως χώρτης αʹ Θηβ(αίων) ἱππικῆς
τύρμης Ὀππίου, καὶ Οὐαλερᾶτος ἰατροῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, καὶ Ἀρρίου
υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, καὶ Κασσία[ς], καὶ Οὐαλ[ερί]ας, καὶ Ἐπαφρῦτος [καὶ]
…ρᾶτος τοῦ ἵππου [αὐτοῦ].[369]
These examples alone show how far from reality are Seeck’s licentious
mercenaries and their neglected bastards. In fact the suggestion of
many critics that celibacy is a valuable military ideal, which was
attained, at any rate partially, until the relaxation of discipline by
Septimius Severus, proceeds upon false lines. In a short service army,
like those of modern European states, in which the whole time of the
men is necessarily occupied in learning their military duties, such
an ideal is practical enough. In the Roman Empire the adoption of a
professional army with a service of twenty-five years put it beyond the
power of any government to enforce such monastic conditions, and the
facts of the situation were, as we have seen, never misunderstood by
the imperial authorities.
This is, of course, far from saying that the resulting state of things
was all that could be desired. The long service system is, on this
account, open to serious objections in principle, and these objections
are intensified when we consider the lines on which this system
developed. The second-century auxiliary, encouraged by the settled
conditions of his service to form matrimonial ties, with his wife and
children comfortably settled just outside the fort walls, is perhaps
a more satisfactory spectacle from the moral than the military point
of view. Military service in the same regiment had not yet become
actually hereditary, because the enfranchised son of the auxiliary was
advanced a step in the social scale and enabled to take service in
the legions. When, however, in 212 the Constitutio Antoniniana swept
away a distinction which had long ceased to have any real basis in a
difference of race or culture, this obstacle was removed.[370] Two
sepulchral inscriptions of the Cohors I Hemesenorum, so often referred
to, illustrate this change. The first is erected to a veteran of this
cohort and to two sons and a grandson who had taken service in the
neighbouring legions I and II Adiutrix, while in the second we find the
son of a veteran from the latter legion who has taken service in the
auxiliary cohort.[371]
It has already been noticed that the system of frontier defence
organized by Hadrian made it difficult either to concentrate rapidly
the garrison of a province at one point, or to send reinforcements
from one province to another. The more settled the auxiliary regiments
became, and the more local ties they formed, the more difficult did
it become to order any dislocation of troops on a large scale.[372]
In fact when Severus Alexander granted to the frontier garrisons any
adjoining territory which had been captured from the enemy, insisting
at the same time that their heirs could only inherit it on condition
of military service, this act was the natural culmination of a long
process of development which had transformed what had once been the
finest field army in the world into a rural militia.[373] Unfortunately
just as this development was completed and the result stamped with the
seal of official approval, the emperors of the third century found
themselves faced by new military dangers of a type with which the old
system was least fitted to cope.
Footnotes:
[311] Josephus, _Bell. Iud._ iii. 5.
[312] He was not, however, an ‘unmilitary historian’ in the sense
that, for instance, Ephoros was. Ephoros made elaborate accounts of
military operations an important feature of his work, although he was
quite lacking in military knowledge (Polybius, xii. 25); Tacitus never
pretends to concern himself with more than the moral and social aspects
of war. The same attitude may be observed both in Dio and Herodian (ii.
15, 6). This attitude was perfectly justifiable, since there existed,
as we learn from this passage in Herodian and from Lucian (_De Hist.
Conscrib._), a technical literature which would probably satisfy our
needs. That we do not possess it is the fault, not of Tacitus and Dio,
but of the Middle Ages.
[313] This was still the case at Argentorate in 357; cf. Ammianus, xvi.
12.
[314] Tac. _Ann._ ii. 16.
[315] Tac. _Ann._ ii. 52 ‘Legio medio, leves cohortes duaeque alae in
cornibus locantur’.
[316] Tac. _Ann._ xiii. 38 ‘Socias cohortes et auxilia regum pro
cornibus, medio sextam legionem constituit’. The defensive formation
described in xiii. 40 is slightly different, since the legions in the
centre formed a square.
[317] Tac. _Ann._ xiv. 34 ‘Igitur legionarius frequens ordinibus, levis
circum armatura, conglobatus pro cornibus eques adstitit’.
[318] Tac. _Hist._ iii. 21 ‘Cohortes auxiliorum in cornibus, latera ac
terga equite circumdata’.
[319] The legionaries were to occupy the centre, the auxiliary infantry
high ground on the wings, the cavalry to wait in the rear.
[320] Dio, lxxiv. 7.
[321] Tac. _Agr._ 35 ‘Legiones pro vallo stetere, ingens victoriae
decus citra Romanum sanguinem bellandi, et auxilium, si pellerentur’.
It was not necessary for Tacitus to invent this not very creditable
excuse. The tactics are those adopted with equal success against a
Highland army by the Duke of Cumberland at the battle of Culloden in
1746. The same idea of checking the impetus of a Celtic charge by
successive obstacles has often been suggested as the reason for the
seven ditches which protect the exposed side of the fort at Whitley
Castle, and the _lilia_ at Rough Castle on the Antonine Wall.
[322] They are particularly noticeable in the battle shown on
Cichorius, _Die Traiansäule_, Pl. 45, and to judge from the column, the
auxilia did more than their usual share of fighting in this war.
[323] In spite of the boasting of Antonius Primus, the achievements of
the Pannonian cavalry in 69 were limited to a reckless advance followed
by a disorderly retreat. Cf. Tac. _Hist._ iii. 2 with iii. 16. In the
second century, however, we find heavy cavalry, _contarii_, who must
have been intended for shock tactics.
[324] For Haltern see Schuchhardt, _Führer durch die Ausgrabungen von
Haltern_. It is, however, perhaps incorrect to limit the garrison to
auxiliaries: for Hofheim cf. Ritterling, _Das frührömische Lager bei
Hofheim_, 1912. It was occupied from about 40 to 60.
[325] See Pelham, _Essays in Roman History_, p. 191.
[326] e.g. Friedberg has an area of (roughly) 10 acres, Okarben of 14,
Heddernheim of 13, and Kesselstadt of 35. A cohort of 500 infantry was
usually allowed about 5 acres.
[327] See Macdonald, _The Roman forts at Barr Hill_, pp. 11-15; Curle,
_A Roman Frontier-post_, pp. 29, 349.
[328] xi. 6344 ‘P. Cornelio P. f. Sab(atina) Cicatriculae prim(o)
pil(o) bis, praefect(o) equit(um), praef(ecto) clas(sis), praef(ecto)
cohortium quattuor civium Romanor(um) in Hispania, trib(uno) mil(itum)’.
[329] iii. 14147².
[330] _W. D. Z._ xxi. 186, where this theory of the first-century
frontier system is further developed.
[331] See Pelham, _op. cit._, p. 199. The forts on the North British
frontier range in area from 2½ to 5½ acres, the largest
(Amboglanna) being designed to hold a _cohors miliaria peditata_. The
German forts seem to have been on a rather larger scale, and ran up
to 15 acres, which is the area allowed at Aalen to an _ala miliaria_.
It is not meant, of course, that forts of this type did not exist in
the first century, but it was not until the reign of Hadrian that the
dispersion of the auxilia in separate units was adopted as a general
policy.
[332] Cf. iii. 3385 ‘(Commodus) ripam omnem burgis a solo extructis
item praesidis per loca opportuna ad clandestinos latrunculorum
transitus oppositis munivit’. This is from the Danube frontier.
[333] _Historia Augusta, Vita Hadriani_, 12 ‘In plurimis locis in
quibus barbari non fluminibus sed limitibus dividuntur, stipitibus
magnis in modum muralis saepis funditus iactis atque conexis barbaros
separavit’.
[334] The best recent account of this frontier in English is Pelham’s
essay, ‘The Roman Frontier in Germany,’ in the work already cited.
[335] Recent researches have, however, made it very doubtful whether a
turf wall ever preceded the stone wall along the whole line.
[336] For this wall see the admirable account by Dr. George Macdonald,
_The Roman Wall in Scotland_, Glasgow, 1911.
[337] The best description of the internal arrangements of a
mile-castle is given by Mr. F. G. Simpson, in the _Transactions of
the Cumberland and Westmoreland Archaeological Society_, vol. xi, New
Series.
[338] The German Limes-Commission has not yet published its report on
these works and the course of the frontier line in general. On the
Walldürn-Welzheim section, which was built by Pius, the towers are at
intervals of from 250 to 400 metres. Pelham, _op. cit._, p. 204.
[339] The view with which I find myself in most agreement is that of
Delbrück, _Geschichte der Kriegskunst_, ii. 155-60.
[340] See Pelham, _op. cit._, p. 201 and appendix.
[341] The torches which project from the upper stories of the
block-houses represented on the Trajan column have often been noted as
indicating some method of fire-signalling.
[342] The palisade was not, of course, a board fence which could be
torn down in a few minutes. It was made of oak-trees split in halves
and bedded in a ditch four and a half feet deep. See Pelham, _op.
cit._, p. 200. Some idea of its appearance can be gathered from the
representation at the beginning of the reliefs on the Marcus column.
[343] Oman, _Art of War in the Middle Ages_, p. 209. He quotes
Nicephorus Περὶ παραδρομῆς πολέμου.
[344] The stone wall on the Raetian frontier is of very inferior
construction.
[345] The garrisons were: at Netherby, the Cohors I Aelia Hispanorum
M. E., vii. 954, 963, 964, 965; at Bremenium, the Cohors I Fida
Vardullorum M. E. and exploratores, vii. 1030, 1043; at Habitancium,
the Cohors I Vangionum M. E., exploratores and Raeti Gaesati 1002,
1003. The latest inscription at Netherby dates from the reign of
Severus Alexander; at Bremenium, the most advanced of the Dere Street
forts, from the reign of Gordian III.
[346] iii. 600. See Appendix.
[347] Cf. _Historia Augusta, Vita Marci_, 12 ‘Dum Parthicum bellum
geritur, natum est Marcomannicum, quod diu eorum, qui aderant, arte
suspensum est’.
[348] The only changes which we know of are that Legio V Macedonica
was transferred from Moesia Inferior to Dacia in the reign of Marcus
and that Legio III Augusta was sent by Gordian III as a punishment
from Africa to the Rhine, whence, however, it returned in 253. Cagnat,
_L’Armée romaine d’Afrique_, pp. 156-61.
[349] The date of this section of the _Notitia_ is disputed, but it can
hardly be earlier than the end of the third century. The diplomata are
xxix (98), xxxii (103), xxxiv (105), xliii (124), lv (_ante_ 138), lvii
(146).
[350] Cf. D. ii and iii. 3664, D. lviii and iii. 3331, and D. lx and
iii. 11333. These regiments may of course have been temporarily absent,
but the evidence is fairly continuous in each case. The Cohors V
Lucensium et Callaecorum, for example, appears on diplomata for 60, 84,
85, 133, 138/48, 148, 149 and 154.
[351] _I. G. R. R._ i. 1348, ib. 1363, iii. 14147², D. xv, iii. 14147¹.
In the last, which dates from 39, the number of the cohort is not
given, and possibly another in the same series is meant.
[352] For the date of the Egyptian section of the _Notitia_ see my
article, _The Garrison of Egypt_, in the account of the excavations at
Karanóg by the Eckley B. Cox Junior Expedition to Nubia published by
the University Museum, Philadelphia.
[353] iii. 4379 (3 Ulpii, 2 Aelii), 4360 (Aelius), 4369, 4370
(Aurelii), 11081.
[354] iii. 1371, 1372, 1374, 1379; _A. E._ 1903. 66.
[355] vii. 818 (Severus Antoninus), 819 (Gordian III), 820 (Postumus),
823 (Tetricus). Another inscription (808) dates from the reign of
Maximin.
[356] Tac. _Ann._ iv. 47; id. _Hist._ ii. 22.
[357] Cf. Dio’s remarks on the impression made by the provincial
legionaries in Rome in the reign of Septimius Severus, lxxiv. 2. The
following sketch applies only to the troops on the Western frontiers,
concerning whose life we have considerable evidence. The locally raised
troops in the East started as a rule at a higher level of culture,
but possibly a similar advance was made by Trajan’s regiments of
Paphlagonians, Galatians, and Arabians, although here Hellenization,
not Romanization, was of course the goal.
[358] For the importance of Mithras in the army, cf. Cumont, _Les
Mystères de Mithra_. Toutain, _Les Cultes païens dans l’Empire romain_,
cc. ii and iv, gives a classified list of the inscriptions of Mithra
and Dolichenus.
[359] H. Jacobi, _Führer durch das Römerkastell Saalburg_, 1908, gives
a summary of the latest results.
[360] Excavations so far have been confined to the fort itself, in
which the buildings were in an exceedingly good state of preservation,
and the Mithraeum.
[361] xiii. 7800 ‘Petronius Athenodorus prae(fectus) coh(ortis) I
Fl(aviae) horologium ab horis intermissum et vetustate colabsum suis
inpendis restituit’. The date is 218.
[362] Herodian iii. 8, 5.
[363] _Rheinisches Museum_, xlviii. 616 ff.
[364] viii. 18067.
[365] _A. E._ 1910. 75.
[366] Cagnat, _L’Armée romaine d’Afrique_, pp. 380-3 and 505-7.
[367] e.g. D. iii (64), a wife, son, and daughter; D. xcviii (105), a
wife, son, and two daughters; D. xxxvii (110), three sons. See above,
p. 32.
[368] iii. 3271. The approximate date of the inscription is
sufficiently indicated by the names employed.
[369] This very comprehensive dedication comes from the shrine of
Mandoulis, the source of many military inscriptions.
[370] The possibility that cives had already been admitted into the
auxiliary regiments before this date has already been discussed. See
above, p. 33.
[371] iii. 10316 and _A. E._ 1910. 144.
[372] The campaigns between Severus and his rivals (193-7)
were fought out by vexillations; hence at the end of the war we find
all the regiments on both sides, so far as they can be traced, in their
old quarters.
[373] _Historia Augusta, Vita Alex. Sev._ 58 ‘Sola, quae de
hostibus capta sunt, limitaneis ducibus et militibus donavit, ita ut
eorum essent, si heredes eorum militarent, nec umquam ad privatos
pertinerent, dicens attentius eos militaturos, si etiam sua rura
defenderent’. The theory of the self-sufficiency of each provincial
garrison could not be more clearly expressed.