Having specified what offices held by anyone prior to the rebellion come
within the meaning of the law, it is necessary next to set forth what
subsequent conduct fixes upon such person the offense of engaging in
rebellion. Two things must exist as to any person to disqualify him from
voting: First, the office held prior to the rebellion, and, afterwards,
participation in the rebellion.
14. An act to fix upon a person the offense of engaging in the rebellion
under this law must be an overt and voluntary act, done with the intent
of aiding or furthering the common unlawful purpose. A person forced
into the rebel service by conscription or under a paramount authority
which he could not safely disobey, and who would not have entered such
service if left to the free exercise of his own will, can not be held
to be disqualified from voting.
15. Mere acts of charity, where the intent is to relieve the wants of
the object of such charity, and not done in aid of the cause in which he
may have been engaged, do not disqualify; but organized contributions
of food and clothing for the general relief of persons engaged in the
rebellion, and not of a merely sanitary character, but contributed to
enable them to perform their unlawful object, may be classed with acts
which do disqualify.
Forced contributions to the rebel cause in the form of taxes or military
assessments, which a person was compelled to pay or contribute, do not
disqualify; but voluntary contributions to the rebel cause, even such
indirect contributions as arise from the voluntary loan of money to
rebel authorities or purchase of bonds or securities created to afford
the means of carrying on the rebellion, will work disqualification.
16. All those who in legislative or other official capacity were engaged
in the furtherance of the common unlawful purpose, where the duties of
the office necessarily had relation to the support of the rebellion,
such as members of the rebel conventions, congresses, and legislatures,
diplomatic agents of the rebel Confederacy, and other officials whose
offices were created for the purpose of more effectually carrying on
hostilities or whose duties appertained to the support of the rebel
cause, must be held to be disqualified.
But officers who during the rebellion discharged official duties not
incident to war, but only such duties as belong even to a state of peace
and were necessary to the preservation of order and the administration
of law, are not to be considered as thereby engaging in rebellion or as
disqualified. Disloyal sentiments, opinions, or sympathies would not
disqualify, but where a person has by speech or by writing incited
others to engage in rebellion he must come under the disqualification.