CHAPTER IV

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

1297-1328

Edward I had failed to recognize the difference between the Scottish

barons and the Scottish people, to which we have referred in a former

chapter. To the Norman baron, who possessed lands in England and

Scotland alike, it mattered little that he had now but one liege lord

instead of two suzerains. To the people of Scotland, proud and

high-spirited, tenacious of their long traditions of independence,

resentful of the presence of foreigners, it could not but be hateful to

find their country governed by a foreign soldiery. The conduct of

Edward's officials, and especially of Cressingham and Ormsby, and the

cruelty of the English garrisons, served to strengthen this national

feeling, and it only remained for it to find a leader round whom it

might rally.[44] A leader arose in the person of Sir William Wallace, a

heroic and somewhat mysterious figure, who first attracted notice in

the autumn of 1296, and, by the spring of the following year, had

gathered round him a band of guerilla warriors, by whose help he was

able to make serious attacks upon the English garrisons of Lanark and

Scone (May, 1297). These exploits, of little importance in themselves,

sufficed to attract the popular feeling towards Wallace. The domestic

difficulties of Edward I rendered the time opportune for a rising, and,

despite the failure of an ill-conceived and badly-managed attempt on the

part of some of the more patriotic barons, which led to the submission

of Irvine, in 1297, the little army which Wallace had collected rapidly

grew in courage and in numbers, and its leader laid siege to the castle

of Dundee. He had now attained a position of such importance that Surrey

and Cressingham found it necessary to take strong measures against him,

and they assembled at Stirling, whither Wallace marched to meet them.

The battle of Stirling Bridge (or, more strictly, Cambuskenneth Bridge)

was fought on September 11th, 1297. Wallace, with his army of knights

and spearmen, took up his position on the Abbey Craig, with the Forth

between him and the English. Less than a mile from the Scottish camp was

a small bridge over the river, giving access to the Abbey of

Cambuskenneth. Surrey rashly attempted to cross this bridge, in the face

of the Scots, and Wallace, after a considerable number of the enemy had

been allowed to reach the northern bank, ordered an attack. The English

failed to keep the bridge, and their force became divided. Surrey was

unable to offer any assistance to his vanguard, and they fell an easy

prey to the Scots, while the English general, with the remnants of his

army, retreated to Berwick.

Stirling was the great military key of the country, commanding all the

passes from south to north, and the great defeat which the English had

sustained placed the country in the power of Wallace. Along with an

Andrew de Moray, of whose identity we know nothing, he undertook the

government of the country, corresponded in the name of Scotland with

Lübeck and Hamburg, and took the offensive against England in an

expedition which ravaged as far south as Hexham. To the great monastery

of Hexham he granted protection in the name of "the leaders of the army

of Scotland",[45] although he was not successful in restraining the

ferocity of his followers. The document in question is granted in the

name of John, King of Scotland, and in a charter dated March 1298,[46]

Wallace describes himself as Guardian of the Kingdom of Scotland, acting

for the exiled Balliol. In the following summer, Edward marched into

Scotland, and although his forces were in serious difficulties from want

of food, he went forward to meet Wallace, who held a strong position at

Falkirk. Wallace prepared to meet Edward by drawing up his spearmen in

four great "schiltrons" or divisions, with a reserve of cavalry. His

flanks were protected by archers, and he had also placed archers between

the divisions of spearmen. On the English side, Edward himself commanded

the centre, the Earls of Norfolk and Hereford the right, and the Bishop

of Durham the left. The Scottish defeat was the result of a combination

of archers and cavalry. The first attack of the English horse was

completely repulsed by the spearmen. "The front ranks", says Mr. Oman,

"knelt with their spear-butts fixed in the earth; the rear ranks

levelled their lances over their comrades' heads; the thick-set grove of

twelve-foot spears was far too dense for the cavalry to penetrate." But

Edward withdrew the cavalry and ordered the archers to send a shower of

arrows on the Scots. Wallace's cavalry made no attempt to interfere with

the archers; the Scottish bowmen were too few to retaliate; and, when

the English horse next charged, they found many weak points in the

schiltrons, and broke up the Scottish host.

As the battle of Stirling had created the power of Wallace, so that of

Falkirk completely destroyed it. He almost immediately resigned his

office of guardian (mainly, according to tradition, because of the

jealousy with which the great barons regarded him), and took refuge in

France. Edward was still in the midst of difficulties, both foreign and

domestic, and he was unable to reduce the country. The Scots elected new

guardians, who regarded themselves as regents, not for Edward but for

Balliol. They included John Comyn and Robert Bruce, Earl of Carrick, the

future king. The guardians were successful in persuading both Philip IV

of France and Pope Boniface VIII to intervene in their favour, but

Edward disregarded the papal interference, and though he was too busy to

complete his conquest, he sent an army into Scotland in each of the

years 1300, 1301, and 1302. Military operations were almost entirely

confined to ravaging; but, in February 1302-3, Comyn completely defeated

at Rosslyn, near Edinburgh, an English army under Sir John Segrave and

Ralph de Manton, whom Edward had ordered to make a foray in Scotland

about the beginning of Lent. In the summer of 1303, the English king,

roused perhaps by this small success, and able to give his undivided

attention to Scotland, conducted an invasion on a larger scale. In

September, he traversed the country as far north as Elgin, and,

remaining in Scotland during the winter of 1303-4, he set to work in the

spring to reduce the castle of Stirling, which still held out against

him. When the garrison surrendered, in July, 1304, Scotland lay at

Edward's feet. Comyn had already submitted to the English king, and

Edward's personal vindictiveness was satisfied by the capture of Wallace

by Sir John Menteith, a Scotsman who had been acting in the English

interest. Wallace was taken to London, subjected to a mock trial,

tortured, and put to death with ignominy. On the 23rd August, 1305, his

head was placed on London Bridge, and portions of his body were sent to

Scotland. His memory served as an inspiration for the cause of freedom,

and it is held in just reverence to the present hour. If it is true that

he did not scruple to go beyond what we should regard as the limits of

honourable warfare, it must be remembered that he was fighting an enemy

who had also disregarded these limits, and much may be forgiven to brave

men who are resisting a gratuitous war of conquest. When he died, his

work seemed to have failed. But he had shown his countrymen how to

resist Edward, and he had given sufficient evidence of the strength of

national feeling, if only it could find a suitable leader. The English

had to learn the lesson which, five centuries later, Napoleon had to

learn in Spain, and Scotland cannot forget that Wallace was the first to

teach it.

It is not less pathetic to turn to Edward's scheme for the government of

Scotland. It bears the impress of a mind which was that of a statesman

and a lawyer as well as a soldier. It is impossible to deny a tribute of

admiration to its wisdom, or to question the probability of its success

in other circumstances. Had the course of events been more propitious

for Edward's great plan, Scotland and England might have been spared

much suffering. But Edward failed to realize that the Scots could no

longer regard him as the friend and ally to whose son they had willingly

agreed to marry their queen. He was now but a military conqueror in

temporary possession of their country, an enemy to be resisted by any

means. The new constitution was foredoomed to failure. Carrying out his

scheme of 1296, Edward created no vassal-king, but placed Scotland under

his own nephew, John of Brittany; he interfered as little as might be

with the customs and laws of the country; he placed over it eight

justiciars with sheriffs under them. In 1305, Edward's Parliament, which

met at London, was attended by Scottish representatives. The

incorporation of the country with its larger neighbour was complete, but

it involved as little change as was possible in the circumstances.

The Parliament of 1305 was attended by Robert Bruce, Earl of Carrick,

who attended not as a representative of Scotland, but as an English

lord. Bruce was the grandson of the Robert Bruce of Annandale who had

been promised the crown by Alexander II, and who had been one of the

claimants of 1290. His grandfather had done homage to Edward, and Bruce

himself had been generally on the English side, and had fought against

Wallace at Falkirk. When John Balliol had decided to rebel, he had

transferred the lands of Annandale from the Bruces to the Comyns, and

they had been restored by Edward I after Balliol's submission. From 1299

to 1303, Bruce had been associated with Comyn in the guardianship of the

kingdom, but, like Comyn, had submitted to Edward. Nobody in Scotland

could now think of a restoration of Balliol, and if there was to be a

Scottish king at all, it must obviously be either Comyn or Bruce. The

claim of John Comyn the younger was much stronger than that of his

father had been. The elder Comyn had claimed on account of his descent

from Donald Bane, the brother and successor of Malcolm Canmore; but the

younger Comyn had an additional claim in right of his mother, who was a

sister of John Balliol. Between Bruce and Comyn there was a

long-standing feud. In 1299, at a meeting of the Great Council of

Scotland at Peebles, Comyn had attacked Bruce, and they could only be

separated by the use of violence. On the 10th February, 1305-6, Bruce

and the Comyn met in the church of the convent of the Minorite Friars at

Dumfries. Tradition tells that they met to adjust their conflicting

claims, with a view to establishing the independence of the country in

the person of one or other of the rivals; that a dispute arose in which

they came to blows; and that Bruce, after inflicting a severe wound upon

his enemy, left the church. "I doubt I have slain the Red Comyn," he

said to his followers. "Doubt?" was the reply of Sir Roger Fitzpatrick,

"I'll mak siccar." The actual circumstances of the affair are unknown to

us; but Bruce may fairly be relieved of the suspicion of any

premeditation, because it is most unlikely that he would have needlessly

chosen to offend the Church by committing a murder within sanctuary. The

real interest attaching to the circumstances lies in the tradition that

the object of the meeting was to organize a resistance against Edward I.

Whether this was so or not, there can be no doubt that the result of the

conference compelled the Bruce to place himself at the head of the

national cause. A Norman baron, born in England, he was by no means the

natural leader for whose appearance men looked, and there was a grave

chance of his failing to arouse the national sentiment. But the murder

of one claimant to the Scottish throne at the hands of the only other

possible candidate, who thus placed himself in the position of undoubted

heir, could scarcely have been forgiven by Edward I, even if the Comyn

had not, for the past two years, proved a faithful servant of the

English king. There was no alternative, and, on the 27th March, 1306,

Robert, Earl of Carrick and Lord of Annandale, was crowned King of the

Scots at Scone. The ancient royal crown of the Scottish kings had been

removed by Balliol in 1296, and had fallen into the hands of Edward, but

the Countess of Buchan placed on the Bruce's head a hastily made coronet

of gold.

It was far from an auspicious beginning. It is difficult to give Bruce

credit for much patriotic feeling, although, as we have seen, he had

been one of the guardians who had maintained a semblance of

independence. The death of the Comyn had thrown against him the whole

influence of the Church; he was excommunicate, and it was no sin to slay

him. The powerful family, whose head had been cut off by his hand, had

vowed revenge, and its great influence was on the side of the English.

It is no small tribute to the force of the sentiment of nationality that

the Scots rallied round such a leader, and it must be remembered that,

from whatever reason the Bruce adopted the national cause, he proved in

every respect worthy of a great occasion, and as time passed, he came to

deserve the place he occupies as the hero of the epic of a nation's

freedom.

The first blow in the renewed struggle was struck at Methven, near

Perth, where, on the 19th June, 1306, the Earl of Pembroke inflicted a

defeat upon King Robert. The Lowlands were now almost entirely lost to

him; he sent his wife[47] and child to Kildrummie Castle in

Aberdeenshire, whence they fled to the sanctuary of St. Duthac, near

Tain. In August, Bruce was defeated at Dalry, by Alexander of Lorn, a

relative of the Comyn. In September, Kildrummie Castle fell, and Nigel

Bruce, King Robert's brother, fell into the hands of the English and was

put to death at Berwick. To complete the tale of catastrophes, the

Bruce's wife and daughter, two of his sisters, and other two of his

brothers, along with the Countess of Buchan, came into the power of the

English king. Edward placed some of the ladies in cages, and put to

death Sir Thomas Bruce and Alexander Bruce, Dean of Glasgow (February,

1306-7). Meanwhile, King Robert had found it impossible to maintain

himself even in his own lands of Carrick, and he withdrew to the island

of Rathlin, where he wintered. Undeterred by this long series of

calamities, he took the field in the spring of 1307, and now, for the

first time, fortune favoured him. On the 10th May, he defeated the

English, under Pembroke, at Loudon Hill, in Ayrshire. He had been joined

by his brother Edward and by the Lord James of Douglas (the "Black

Douglas"), and the news of his success, slight as it was, helped to

increase at once the spirit and the numbers of his followers. His

position, however, was one of extreme difficulty; he was still only a

king in name, and, in reality, the leader of a guerilla warfare. Edward

was marching northwards at the head of a large army, determined to crush

his audacious subject. But Fate had decreed that the Hammer of the Scots

was never again to set foot in Scotland. At Burgh-on-Sand, near

Carlisle, within sight of his unconquered conquest, the great Edward

breathed his last. His death was the turning-point in the struggle. The

reign of Edward II in England is a most important factor in the

explanation of Bruce's success.

With the death of Edward I the whole aspect of the contest changes. The

English were no longer conducting a great struggle for a statesmanlike

ideal, as they had been under Edward I--however impossible he himself

had made its attainment. There is no longer any sign of conscious

purpose either in their method or in their aims. The nature of the

warfare at once changed; Edward II, despite his father's wish that his

bones should be carried at the head of the army till Scotland was

subdued, contented himself with a fruitless march into Ayrshire, and

then returned to give his father a magnificent burial in Westminster

Abbey. King Robert was left to fight his Scottish enemies without their

English allies. These Scottish enemies may be divided into two

classes--the Anglo-Norman nobles who had supported the English cause

more or less consistently, and the personal enemies of the Bruce, who

increased in numbers after the murder of Comyn. Among the great families

thus alienated from the cause of Scotland were the Highlanders of Argyll

and the Isles, some of the men of Badenach, and certain Galloway clans.

But that this opposition was personal, and not racial, is shown by the

fact that, from the first, some of these Highlanders were loyal to

Bruce, _e.g._ Sir Nigel Campbell and Angus Og. We shall see, further,

that after the first jealousies caused by Comyn's death and Bruce's

success had passed away, the men of Argyll and the Isles took a more

prominent part on the Scottish side. In December, 1307, Bruce routed

John Comyn, the successor of his old rival, at Slains, on the

Aberdeenshire coast, and in the following May, when Comyn had obtained

some slight English assistance, he inflicted a final defeat upon him at

Inverurie. The power of the Comyns in their hereditary earldom of Buchan

had now been suppressed, and King Robert turned his attention to their

allies in the south. In the autumn of 1308, he himself defeated

Alexander of Lorn and subdued the district of Argyll, his brother Edward

reduced Galloway to subjection, and Douglas, along with Randolph, Earl

of Moray, was successful in Tweeddale. Thus, within three years from the

death of Comyn, Bruce had broken the power of the great families, whose

enmity against him had been aroused by that event. One year later the

other great misfortune, which had been brought upon him by the same

cause, was removed by an act which is important evidence at once of the

strength of the anti-English feeling in the country, and of the

confidence which Bruce had inspired. On the 24th February, 1309-10, the

clergy of Scotland met at Dundee and made a solemn declaration[48] of

fealty to King Robert as their lawful king. Scotland was thus united in

its struggle for independence under King Robert I.

It now remained to attack the English garrisons who held the castles of

Scotland. An invasion conducted by Edward II in 1310 proved fruitless,

and the English king returned home to enter on a long quarrel with the

Lords Ordainers, and to see his favourite, Gaveston, first exiled and

then put to death. While the attention of the rulers of England was thus

occupied, Bruce, for the first time since Wallace's inroad of 1297,

carried the war into the enemy's country, invading the north of England

both in 1311 and in 1312. Meanwhile the strongholds of the country were

passing out of the English power. Linlithgow was recovered in 1311;

Perth in January, 1312-13; and Roxburgh a month later. The romantic

capture of the castle of Edinburgh, by Randolph, Earl of Moray, in

March, 1313, is one of the classical stories of Scottish history, and

in the summer of the same year, King Robert restored the Scottish rule

in the Isle of Man. In November, 1313, only Stirling Castle remained in

English hands, and Edward Bruce rashly agreed to raise the siege on

condition that the garrison should surrender if they were not relieved

by June 24th, 1314. Edward II determined to make a heroic effort to

maintain this last vestige of English conquest, and his attempt to do so

has become irrevocably associated with the Field of Bannockburn.

In his preparations for the great struggle, which was to determine the

fate of Scotland, the Bruce carefully avoided the errors which had led

to Wallace's defeat at Falkirk. He selected a position which was

covered, on one side by the Bannock Burn and a morass, and, on the other

side, by the New Park or Forest. His front was protected by the stream

and by the famous series of "pottes", or holes, covered over so as to

deceive the English cavalry. The choice of this narrow position not only

prevented the possibility of a flank attack, but also forced the great

army of Edward II into a small space, where its numbers became a

positive disadvantage. King Robert arranged his infantry in four

divisions; in front were three schiltrons of pikemen, under Randolph,

Edward Bruce, and Sir James Douglas, and Bruce himself commanded the

reserve, which was composed of Highlanders from Argyll and the Islands

and of the men of Carrick.[49] Sir Robert Keith, the Marischal, was in

charge of a small body of cavalry, which did good service by driving

back, at a critical moment, such archers as made their way through the

forest. The English army was in ten divisions, but the limited area in

which they had to fight interfered with their arrangement. As at

Falkirk, the English cavalry made a gallant but useless charge against

the schiltrons, but it was not possible again to save the day by means

of archers, for the archers had no room to deploy, and could only make

vain efforts to shoot over the heads of the horsemen. Bruce strengthened

the Scots with his reserve, and then ensued a general action along the

whole line. The van of the English army was now thoroughly demoralized,

and their comrades in the rear could not, in these narrow limits, press

forward to render any assistance. King Robert's camp-followers, at this

juncture, rushed down a hill behind the Scottish army, and they appeared

to the English as a fresh force come to assist the enemy. The result was

the loss of all sense of discipline: King Edward's magnificent host fled

in complete rout and with great slaughter, and the cause of Scottish

freedom was won.

The victory of Bannockburn did not end the war, for the English refused

to acknowledge the hard-won independence of Scotland, and fighting

continued till the year 1327. The Scots not only invaded England, but

adopted the policy of fighting England in Ireland, and English reprisals

in Scotland were uniformly unsuccessful. Bruce invaded England in 1315;

in the same year, his brother Edward landed with a Scottish army at

Carrickfergus, in the hope of obtaining a throne for himself. He was

crowned King of Ireland in May, 1316, and during that and the following

year, King Robert was personally in Ireland, giving assistance to his

brother. But, in 1318, Edward Bruce was defeated and slain near Dundalk,

and, with his death, this phase of the Bruce's English policy

disappears. A few months before the death of Edward Bruce, King Robert

had captured the border town of Berwick-on-Tweed, which had been held by

the English since 1298. In 1319, Edward II sent an English army to

besiege Berwick, and the Scots replied by an invasion of England in the

course of which Douglas and Randolph defeated the English at

Mitton-on-Swale in Yorkshire. The English were led by the Archbishop of

York, and so many clerks were killed that the battle acquired the name

of the Chapter of Mitton. The war lingered on for three years more. The

year 1322 saw an invasion of England by King Robert and a

counter-invasion of Scotland by Edward II, who destroyed the Abbey of

Dryburgh on his return march. This expedition was, as usual, fruitless,

for the Scots adopted their usual tactics of leaving the country waste

and desolate, and the English army could obtain no food. In October of

the same year King Robert made a further inroad into Yorkshire, and won

a small victory at Biland Abbey. At last, in March, 1323, a truce was

made for thirteen years, but as Edward II persisted in declining to

acknowledge the independence of Scotland, it was obvious that peace

could not be long maintained.

During the fourteen years which followed his victory of Bannockburn,

King Robert was consolidating his kingdom. He had obtained recognition

even in the Western Highlands and Islands, and the sentiment of the

whole nation had gathered around him. The force of this sentiment is

apparent in connection with ecclesiastical difficulties. When Pope John

XXII attempted to make peace in 1317 and refused to acknowledge the

Bruce as king, the papal envoys were driven from the kingdom. For this

the country was placed under the papal ban, and when, in 1324, the pope

offered both to acknowledge King Robert and to remove the

excommunication, on condition that Berwick should be restored to the

English, the Scots refused to comply with his condition. A small

rebellion in 1320 had been firmly repressed by king and Parliament. The

birth of a son to King Robert, on the 5th March, 1323-24, had given

security to the dynasty, and, at the great Parliament which met at

Cambuskenneth in 1326, at which Scottish burghs were, for the first

time, represented, the clergy, the barons, and the people took an oath

of allegiance to the little Prince David, and, should his heirs fail, to

Robert, the son of Bruce's daughter, Marjorie, and her husband, Robert,

the High Steward of Scotland. The same Parliament put the financial

position of the monarch on a satisfactory footing by granting him a

tenth penny of all rents.

The deposition and murder of Edward II created a situation of which the

King of Scots could not fail to take advantage. The truce was broken in

the summer of 1327 by an expedition into England, conducted by Douglas

and Randolph, and the hardiness of the Scottish soldiery surprised the

English and warned them that it was impossible to prolong the contest in

the present condition of the two countries. The regents for the young

Edward III resolved to come to terms with Bruce. The treaty of

Northampton, dated 17th March, 1327-28, is still preserved in Edinburgh.

It acknowledged the complete independence of Scotland and the royal

dignity of King Robert. It promised the restoration of all the symbols

of Scottish independence which Edward I had removed, and it arranged a

marriage between Prince David, the heir to the Scottish throne, and

Joanna, the sister of the young king of England. A marriage ceremony

between the two children was solemnized in the following May, but the

Stone of Fate was never removed from Westminster, owing, it is said, to

the opposition of the abbot. The succession of James VI to the throne of

England, nearly three centuries later, was accepted as the fulfilment of

the prophecy attached to the Coronation Stone, "Lapis ille grandis":

"Ni fallat fatam, Scoti, quocunque locatum,

Invenient lapidem, regnare tenentur ibidem".

Thus closed the portion of Scottish history which is known as the War of

Independence. The condemnation of the policy of Edward I lies simply in

its results. He found the two nations at peace and living together in

amity; he left them at war and each inspired with a bitter hatred of the

other. A policy which aimed at the unification of the island and at

preventing Scotland from proving a source of danger to England, and

which resulted in a warfare covering, almost continuously, more than two

hundred and fifty years, and which, after the lapse of four centuries,

left the policy of Scotland a serious difficulty to English ministers,

can scarcely receive credit for practical sagacity, however wise its

aim. It created for England a relentless and irritating (if not always a

dangerous) enemy, invariably ready to take advantage of English

difficulties. England had to fight Scotland in France and in Ireland,

and Edward IV and Henry VII found the King of Scots the ally of the

House of Lancaster, and the protector of Perkin Warbeck. Only the

accident of the Reformation rendered it possible to disengage Scotland

from its alliance with France, and to bring about a union with England.

Till the emergence of the religious question the English party in

Scotland consisted of traitors and mercenaries, and their efforts to

strengthen English influence form the most discreditable pages of

Scottish history.

We are not here dealing with the domestic history of Scotland; but it is

impossible to avoid a reference to the subject of the influence of the

Scottish victory upon the Scots themselves. It has been argued that

Bannockburn was, for Scotland, a national misfortune, and that Bruce's

defeat would have been for the real welfare of the country. There are,

of course, two stand-points from which we may approach the question. The

apologist of Bannockburn might lay stress on the different effects of

conquest and a hard-won independence upon the national character, and

might fairly point to various national characteristics which have been,

perhaps, of some value to civilization, and which could hardly have been

fostered in a condition of servitude. On the other hand, there arises a

question as to material prosperity. It must be remembered that we are

not here discussing the effect of a peaceful and amicable union, such as

Edward first proposed, but of a successful war of conquest; and in this

connection it is only with thankfulness and gratitude to Wallace and to

Bruce that the Scotsman can regard the parallel case of Ireland, which,

from a century before the time of Edward I, had been annexed by

conquest. The story we have just related goes to create a reasonable

probability that the fate of Scotland could not have been different;

but, further, leaving all such problems of the "might have been", we may

submit that the misery of Scotland in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and

sixteenth centuries has been much exaggerated. It is true that the

borders were in a condition of perpetual feud, and that minorities and

intrigues gravely hampered the progress of the country. But, more

especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there are not

wanting indications of prosperity. The chapter of Scottish history which

tells of the growth of burghs has yet to be written. The construction of

magnificent cathedrals and religious houses, and the rise of three

universities, must not be left out of account. Gifts to the infant

universities, the records of which we possess, prove that for humble

folk the tenure of property was comparatively secure, and that there was

a large amount of comfort among the people. Under James IV, trade and

commerce prospered, and the Scottish navy rivalled that of the Tudors.

The century in which Scottish prosperity received its most severe blows

immediately succeeded the Union of the Crowns. If for three hundred

years the civilizing influence of England can scarcely be traced in the

history of Scottish progress, that of France was predominant, and

Scotland cannot entirely regret the fact. Scotland, from the date of

Bannockburn to that of Pinkie, will not suffer from a comparison with

the England which underwent the strain of the long French wars, the

civil broils of Lancaster and York, and the oppression of the Tudors.

Moreover, there is one further consideration which should not be

overlooked. The postponement of an English union till the seventeenth

century enabled Scotland to work out its own reformation of religion in

the way best adapted to the national needs, and it is difficult to

estimate, from the material stand-point alone, the importance of this

factor in the national progress. The inspiration and the education which

the Scottish Church has given to the Scottish people has found one

result in the impulse it has afforded to the growth of material

prosperity, and it is not easy to regret that Scotland, at the date of

the Reformation, was free to work out its own ecclesiastical destiny.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 44: There is no indication of any racial division in the

attitude of the Scots. Some Highlanders, from various personal causes,

are found on the English side at the beginning of the War of

Independence; but Mr. Lang has shown that of the descendants of Somerled

of Argyll, the ancestor of the Lords of the Isles, only one fought

against Wallace, while the Celts of Moray and Badenach and the Highland

districts of Aberdeenshire, joined his standard. The behaviour of the

Highland chiefs is similar to that of the Lowland barons. If there is

any racial feeling at all, it is not Celtic _v._ Saxon, but Scandinavian

_v._ Scottish, and it is connected with the recent conquest of the

Isles. But even of this there is little trace, and the behaviour of the

Islesmen is, on the whole, marvellously loyal.]

[Footnote 45: Hemingburgh, ii, 141-147.]

[Footnote 46: _Diplomata Scotiæ_, xliii, xliv.]

[Footnote 47: Bruce had married, 1st, Isabella, daughter of the 10th

Earl of Mar, by whom he had a daughter, Marjorie, and 2nd, in 1302,

Elizabeth de Burgh, daughter of the Earl of Ulster.]

[Footnote 48: Nat. MSS. ii. 12, No. XVII. The original is preserved in

the Register House.]

[Footnote 49: Pinkerton suggests that King Robert adopted this

arrangement because he was unable to trust the Highlanders, but this is

unlikely, as their leader, Angus Og, had been consistently faithful to

him throughout.]

An Outline of the Relations between England and Scotland (500-1707) · 第 4 / 11 章