THE BEGINNING OF THE END
(_August 21st—September 6th, 1918_)
“_The Third Army has been ordered to press the enemy back towards Bapaume
without delay, and to make every effort to prevent the enemy from
destroying road and rail communications._” The Battle Instructions issued
to the 42nd Division on August 20th begin with the above words, and the
Division rejoiced that the signal was down at last for the Third Army
to join in the Great Allied offensive, and that General Byng’s attack
was planned to open before dawn on the morrow. The 4th Corps had three
Divisions in the front line, the 42nd, the New Zealanders, and the 37th,
from right to left. On the right of the 42nd was the 21st Division of the
5th Corps. The Division’s attack was planned on a two-brigade front, with
the 127th Brigade on the right, and the 125th on the left. There were
three objectives. The first was a line roughly parallel to the present
frontage of the Division and about a thousand yards to the east, and the
advance was made by fighting patrols, brigades being in echelon with the
left brigade leading. The second objective included some high ground on
the left flank, and mainly concerned the 125th Brigade; and the third,
and most important, objective was, on the left, Beauregard Dovecot, a
group of shell-shattered trunks—the remains of trees which formerly
surrounded the now obliterated Dovecot—on high ground where five roads
meet, and on the right a point within a few hundred yards of the village
of Miraumont, and looking down upon it.
The organization of the Division was now designed to secure effective
co-operation of all arms under the new conditions of open warfare. The
Division had done well in the stationary warfare of continuous lines of
trenches; it had shaped still better in the offensive-defensive method
of Defence in Depth in which it had been so thoroughly trained by its
present Commander; now it was to be tested by the novel experience of
open warfare. Infantry Brigade Groups were composed as follows—
Infantry Brigade.
Artillery Brigade.
Machine-Gun Company (one or more).
2 Sections Field Company, R.E.
Cavalry or Tanks when available.
These were all under the command of the Infantry Brigadier, the Artillery
Commander using the same headquarters where possible—a system that had
distinct advantages over the old system of using an Artillery liaison
officer.
At zero—4.55 a.m. on August 21—the guns opened. Four minutes later the
125th Brigade launched their attack, fighting patrols of the 5th L.F.
advancing, under a creeping barrage, which lifted at an average rate of
100 yards every four minutes, against Hill 140, a strong point better
known as _The Lozenge_. The opening moves were of a peculiarly delicate
nature as, owing to the paucity of guns, the whole of the artillery and
most of the machine-gun fire had to be concentrated first to form the
barrage for the 125th Brigade, in order to make sure of The Lozenge,
which was the key to the position, before being switched off, at the
appointed time, to make a barrage for the 127th Brigade, and again
switched to the left when the advance on the second objective was timed
to start, at two hours after zero. There was a heavy ground mist—sure
precursor of a hot day—and the ill-luck as regards weather conditions,
which for some years had attended British offensives, was absent at last.
But though the mist served as a screen, it increased the difficulties of
keeping touch.
The Lozenge was a nest of machine-guns, and there was sharp and savage
hand-to-hand fighting when the Bury men got in with the bayonet. They
were better and more confident than the enemy at this game, and Jerry
knew it; and when he found that he could not keep them from closing he
realized that the game would soon be up, and his number also—or else his
hands.
The guns switched over to the right, and at the appointed hour, 5.50
a.m., the 6th Manchesters on the right and the 7th on the left went over
the top, and the 127th Brigade’s first objective was also reached in good
time, the barrage again assisting most effectively. A very difficult
ravine had had to be crossed, with steep gradients down to and up from
the Beaucourt—Puisieux road. This broken ground was defended by nests of
machine-guns, but the friendly mist rendered their fire far less deadly
than usual, and the Manchesters were able to get to close quarters. Many
of the enemy were killed with the bayonet and a large number captured.
At 6.55 a.m. the 125th Brigade started for the second objective, and
soon overcame all opposition. The attacks had been made with vigour
and courage, but these qualities would have been unavailing had there
been any flaw in the organization, planning, and timing, or in the
co-operation between the artillery, machine-guns, aircraft and infantry.
There was none, and both first and second objectives were secured and
consolidated.
[Sidenote: _The Dovecot, August 21, 1918_]
But neither brigade was able to gain the final objective at its first
attempt, for the enemy was in great strength and, as he clearly regarded
the positions attacked as very important, he fought around the Dovecot
and in front of Miraumont with much courage and determination. Owing
to the mist touch had not been maintained between the 125th Brigade and
the New Zealanders. When the mist lifted, the company of the 7th L.F.,
to whom the capture of the Dovecot had been entrusted, found that they
were advancing upon an enemy battery, which opened fire at point-blank
range. An attempt was made to hold a shell-hole position, but the enemy
was in strong force, and a fierce counter-attack practically wiped out
the defenders. However, in the course of the afternoon a joint attack
by the two brigades drove the enemy from the entire line of the final
objective, the 7th L.F., assisted by two machine-gun sections, capturing
the Dovecot, while the Manchesters advanced along the top of the ridge,
clearing the enemy out of his dug-outs, and established themselves before
Miraumont. They repulsed a counter-attack in the afternoon, and later in
the day another, made by picked storm-troops, was also beaten off. The
capture of the high ground dominating the Ancre was a brilliant beginning
to a victorious advance which was destined to continue until the beaten
enemy sued for peace. Field guns, anti-tank guns, and a large number of
machine-guns and prisoners had been taken. With this considerable success
the day’s fighting ended. But not its labour, for the newly-won positions
had to be consolidated and all preparations made for the inevitable
counter-attacks, so work went on steadily throughout the night.
[Illustration: SGT. E. SMITH, V.C., D.C.M., 1/5 BN. LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS.]
In the course of the battle of the 21st August there had been a general
high standard of courage and also many acts of heroism, some of which
passed unnoticed, while some were rewarded. The outstanding valour and
prowess of Lance-Sergeant Edward Smith, 5th L.F., at the capture of The
Lozenge and subsequently, received the recognition they deserved, the
Victoria Cross being awarded on the following grounds—
For conspicuous gallantry, leadership and personal example
during an attack on the 21st August and subsequent operations.
This N.C.O. while in command of a platoon personally took a
machine-gun post, rushing the garrison with his rifle and
bayonet. The enemy, on seeing his advance, scattered to throw
hand-grenades at him. Regardless of danger he shot and killed
at least six of the enemy. Having done this he ordered his men
to follow him, and mopped up two more machine-gun posts, again
killing and capturing some of the garrison himself. A little
later, seeing another platoon requiring assistance, he led his
men to them, took command of the situation, and captured the
objective, again killing many of the enemy himself. During
the enemy counter-attack on the 22nd August he led a section
forward and regained the line where it had been penetrated on
his platoon front. This N.C.O.’s personal example of bravery,
skill and initiative is worthy of the highest praise and
reward. His conduct throughout exemplified magnificent courage
and skill with his weapons, and in addition he displayed marked
tactical ability and command. All men around him were greatly
inspired by his leadership and example.
At 2.30 a.m. on August 22nd the enemy artillery opened fire, and for an
hour and a half the infantry along the whole of the divisional front
and the batteries around Serre were vigorously bombarded, mainly with
gas-shells. At 4.15 a.m. the expected counter-attack was delivered, and
was repulsed with very heavy loss to the enemy at all points except at
the Dovecot. The Germans debouching from Miraumont were shattered by
steady, well-aimed fire from rifles, Lewis-guns, and machine-guns. The
four guns of the section of “B” Company, M.G. Battalion, attached to
the 125th Brigade, had been taken forward in front of the infantry, and
these, assisted by flanking fire from “C” Company’s machine-guns, with
the 127th Brigade, completely broke up the attack on the right. On the
left, however, posts of the 7th L.F. at the Dovecot were overrun after
bitter fighting by overwhelming numbers, but the enemy was held on a line
which the battalion had consolidated the previous afternoon just west of
and overlooking the Dovecot. Two platoons of the 10th Manchesters (this
battalion having been placed under the orders of the 125th Brigade) gave
great assistance.
At 8.30 a.m. the enemy counter-attacked this new line and also the
positions on the left of the divisional front held by the New Zealand
Division. The attack was beaten back all along the line, and again the
machine-guns contributed conspicuously to the success. The four guns of
the forward section of “B” M.G. Company took the enemy waves in enfilade
and broke them up utterly, the section capturing a number of prisoners
and forcing more than 200 to surrender to the New Zealanders, who
expressed their appreciation of the good work and efficient assistance
rendered by the section. During this counter-attack a body of the enemy
got through a gap between the two brigades, and all of them were killed
or captured by a support section of the M.G. Battalion. Information
obtained from prisoners proved that the counter-attacks had been made
by four battalions of an entirely fresh enemy division—the 52nd German
Naval Division—brought down from Flanders. A third counter-attack was
made later in the day, but this, too, was beaten off, and in the evening
and throughout the night the troops worked hard to consolidate their new
positions, and prepared to follow up their successes. There was to be no
rest for them or for the enemy.
The 21st and 22nd of August were days of extreme heat. Considerable
movement had been made under a blazing sun, with heavy loads, over
ground that had been badly gassed, and as fighting and work upon the
new positions had been continuous for over forty hours there was a
certain amount of exhaustion, and also some suffering from the heat. But
there was none of the dejection and depression that usually accompany
exhaustion. Instead, there was the consciousness of achievement, of
triumph long deferred but now assured, and of buoyancy of spirit which
could control the physical weariness and carry the tired body on and
on to further and greater achievement. _Der Tag_—for years a subject of
jest—had dawned at last, and its glorious opportunities were not to be
thrown away because of a physical longing for rest and sleep. That the
War must end some day every one knew; that it would end in victory for
the Allies few of the soldiers doubted; but hope had been deferred so
long, and disappointments had been so many and so great, that _après
la guerre_ had become a joke, a half-cynical allusion to a period as
inevitable as death but much more remote. Now all was changed; the war
had taken on an entirely new complexion, and “next spring,” or even an
earlier date, was spoken of with confidence, for at last, and for the
first time, the Boche was on the run. His day was over and ours had
dawned. Though his numbers were still equal or superior to ours, though
his lines of defence were as formidable as the skill and ingenuity of
the greatest masters of defensive warfare could make them, and though
he would turn, snarling, and fight like a wolf at bay, our men had
complete confidence in their skill with rifle and bayonet, their grit,
and their will to conquer. They knew now that they were Jerry’s master.
There was an accumulation of old scores to wipe off, and though the
beaten individual Boche would generally be treated with contemptuous
good-humour, there remained the deep loathing of all the vile deeds
by which the title of “Hun” had been earned. Exhaustion and physical
distress were therefore thrust aside by the call for action.
[Sidenote: _Miraumont, August 22-24_]
At 2.30 a.m. on August 23 two companies of the 8th L.F. on the left
and two of the 10th Manchesters on the right attacked the Dovecot. The
enemy fought hard to retain his hold of this position, but the Salford
and Oldham men fought still harder, and the Dovecot was finally won.
Casualties were heavy on both sides. A number of prisoners were taken,
and also a complete Field Dressing Station. The New Zealanders on the
left advanced their right to conform; and their attack being successful
they passed beyond the line of the 125th Brigade, which then swung
forward its left flank until touch was restored and sent patrols down
into the Miraumont Valley. During the night the 125th Brigade was
relieved by the 126th (D Company, M.G. Battalion attached), which also
took over 500 yards of front from the New Zealand Division, who were thus
squeezed out by the 126th Brigade on their right and the 5th Division on
the left.
To exploit victories the following method was adopted—
(_a_) Strong patrols, usually one platoon, would make good the
ground by bounds. These patrols to be adequately supported.
(_b_) When patrols were definitely held up, and the enemy
located, the artillery would bombard points of resistance, and
patrols would advance under a creeping barrage.
(_c_) If the patrols were again held up, a set-piece attack
would be organized.
In making these attacks the enemy’s position would be turned from one or
both flanks. Machine-gun sections were to be pushed up behind patrols
close enough to give effective support by direct fire. At least one
section R.E. to be with the advance-guard, and also parties of Tunnelling
Companies, R.E., to locate and destroy road-mines and “booby-traps.” The
Pioneer Battalion would be available under the Divisional Commander’s
hand. The Commander of a higher formation must explain attack orders,
personally or through a Staff Officer, verbally to the Commander of a
lower formation, and wherever possible the objectives must be pointed out
_on the ground_ to the subordinate commanders who had to carry out the
operation. Briefly, the policy was to command the battle from horseback
and not by telephone from a dug-out.
The important village of Miraumont, situated to the south-east of the
Dovecot on both banks of the River Ancre, and strongly held by the enemy,
was the next objective. Its fall would force the Germans to abandon the
line of the Ancre, so a stiff resistance was expected. On the night of
the 23rd-24th August the 21st Division on the right had crossed the
Ancre further south and obtained a footing upon Thiepval Ridge. On the
morning of the 24th the British were above Miraumont on three sides,
and about midday the 126th and 127th Brigades fought their way round
the outskirts from the north and south respectively until they met on
the eastern side. The river was low and there was little difficulty in
finding fordable passages. To the south these were secured by patrols
of the 6th and 7th Manchesters, while the 5th East Lancashires and the
10th Manchesters turned the position from the north. The capture of
this place was a noteworthy example of well-planned and well-carried
out co-operation between the artillery and infantry of the Division.
Heavy guns pumped shells into the centre of the village; field-guns
smothered the outer circumference with shrapnel to keep down the
enemy machine-gun fire, while the two infantry brigades worked round
outside. When the two columns met on the farther side the guns ceased
fire, and at noon infantry patrols entered the town from all sides and
“mopped up.” Some snipers had to be disposed of, and there were a few
house-to-house chases, but the majority of those who had been unable to
withdraw before the completion of the encircling movement, were found
ready, and indeed anxious, to surrender to any one. A stretcher-bearer
of the 127th Brigade, who had fallen into German hands when searching
for wounded in the mist of the early morning, proudly conducted about
twenty of his now docile captors to meet the advancing patrols. A column
of about 300 Germans, waving white flags, marched east out of Miraumont
and surrendered. Many other prisoners, a complete battery of 5·9-inch
howitzers, some 4·2-inch guns, and many machine-guns were captured. Our
casualties were light in proportion to the success attained and to the
loss inflicted on the enemy. The stretcher-bearers carried the wounded
long distances over badly torn-up ground, in great heat, and under
artillery and machine-gun fire.
[Sidenote: _Capture of Pys and Warlencourt_]
The capture of Miraumont was promptly followed up, and within a few
hours of its fall fighting patrols of the 126th Brigade had entered
Pys, a village more than a mile to the east, on the heels of the enemy.
The straggling village of Warlencourt—Eaucourt, about a mile and a
half farther east, was the next objective. The forward move began at
7.30 p.m., the two brigades moving along parallel lines, the 126th
Brigade to the north and in advance of the 127th Brigade. In spite of
the difficulties of a night advance through unknown country against
strong enemy forces, well furnished with machine-guns, the 5th East
Lancashires made steady progress, pushing the enemy rearguard in front
of them, following up warily but resolutely, and adding to their bag
of prisoners from time to time. On the outskirts of the village the
opposition increased in intensity, and the enemy line of resistance, 400
yards west of Warlencourt, was found too strong to be attacked without
artillery preparation. The troops on the right and left were already some
distance in the rear. An outpost line was put out, and both brigades took
up positions affording cover from the heavy machine-gun fire with which
the enemy swept the valley west of Warlencourt throughout the night. The
126th Brigade lay across the Loupart Wood road, north and north-east
of the village, and the 127th on the western outskirts. After dawn the
German fire slackened and patrols of the 7th Manchesters advanced. They
encountered opposition which weakened by degrees, and at 10 a.m. on
August 25 a company of the 7th entered Warlencourt and passed through
it. The advance was then stopped, as the north-eastward advance of the
63rd Division squeezed out the 42nd, which withdrew to concentrate in the
Miraumont—Pys area, where two days were passed in rest and recuperation.
The Corps Commander wired his congratulations to the Divisional Commander
on the successful issue of these operations, and asked him “to convey to
all troops under your command my thanks for their work during the past
three days and to congratulate them on their success, which could only
have been attained by great fighting capacity and endurance.”
The Divisional Artillery was quickly called upon to assist the 63rd
Division, which was in difficulties west of Le Barque and Thilloy, the
troops being mown down by numerous enemy machine-guns posted in a sunken
road between the two villages, and no amount of courage could prevail
against the storm of bullets. After hurried reconnaissance the 210th and
211th Brigades, R.F.A., were rushed to positions by Loupart Wood, which
was being heavily shelled at the time. A race between the two brigades
ensued, the batteries trotting and even galloping to the positions by
different routes. It was a perfect example of artillery manœuvre. At one
moment an empty grass plain; a moment later a plain covered with the
guns, wagons, and horses of eight batteries! The instant the trails were
dropped—before the horses had got clear of the positions—the S.O.S. went
up, and forty-eight guns were belching fire practically simultaneously.
Each division in turn was brought out of the line for a day or two
in order that the offensive might be carried on with renewed vigour.
Refreshing and necessary as the respite undoubtedly was, the troops,
stimulated by the victories of the past few days and by the prospect of
still greater successes, were glad to resume their vocation of “learning
Jerry” to make war. The 42nd Division relieved the 63rd on the night
of August 27-28 on a line running north and south of the village of Le
Barque, a short distance beyond Warlencourt, with the 126th Brigade now
on the right and the 127th on the left, each brigade having a frontage
of 1000 yards. The enemy held the village of Thilloy, about a thousand
yards east of this line, and two attacks by the 63rd Division had failed
to dislodge him. Patrols found the village and the brickfields to the
north held in force, and preparations were made to turn these positions
from north and south. In the early morning of the 29th the withdrawal of
the enemy from Bapaume, less than a mile to the north-east of the left
flank of the Division, was reported, and patrols of the 5th Manchesters,
finding that Thilloy was being evacuated in consequence, pushed through
the village. At 6.30 a.m. the 126th Brigade (with “A” and “D” Companies,
M.G. Battalion) was ordered to take over the divisional front with two
battalions in the front line, and advance on Riencourt-les-Bapaume, the
127th Brigade dropping back into close support. Strong fighting patrols
followed up the retiring enemy, but there was to be no “set-piece”
attack, except under preliminary bombardment and creeping barrage. The
8th Manchesters on the right came under sharp machine-gun fire from
Riencourt in front and from Beaulencourt on their right flank, and were
held up. By night-fall the leading companies of the 5th E. Lancs. on the
left had crossed the Bapaume—Peronne road and made good the high ground
by the reservoir half a mile north-west of Riencourt. A frontal attack on
the village from the west by companies of the 8th Manchesters failed, in
spite of the most gallant efforts of all ranks, long distance machine-gun
fire from Beaulencourt taking them in the flank and rear, and causing
heavy casualties.
In the early hours of the 30th August patrols of the 5th E. Lancs.
engaged the enemy in the outskirts north of the village. The German
positions were, however, very strongly held, and their numerous
machine-guns excellently posted and handled, and little progress could
be made. Prisoners taken later stated that orders had been given that
Riencourt must be held at all costs. Captain Dick, with two platoons of
“A” Company, worked his way down a trench leading south-east towards
an enemy position, until he could get dead ground almost up to the
position. Making good use of this, he rushed the ridge, and the enemy
bolted, giving easy targets at short range. He then led his two platoons
against another position with such speed that only three of his men could
keep up, but they proved too much for the nerves of the Germans, who
fired wildly and missed. Captain Dick killed the officer, his three men
wounded others, and the hands of the remaining forty-five went up. For
this he was awarded the D.S.O. The battalion dug in, and the artillery
shelled the ridge immediately north of the village, but patrols sent
out to discover the result of the bombardment reported that the enemy
machine-gun positions were still held too strongly to give any chance of
getting to close quarters.
[Sidenote: _Riencourt, August 30-31_]
In the afternoon the 10th Manchesters were ordered to move into position
for a night attack upon Riencourt. Crossing the Bapaume—Peronne road
they were heavily shelled, and an enemy observation plane kept in touch
only a few hundred feet above them. Machine-gun bullets raised spurts
and dust all around or glanced off the stones, and several road-mines
exploded close to where they passed, sending up great columns of earth.
It was Oldham Wakes Friday, and the men talked of bygone wakes and of
the people at home, and made grim jests in contrasting past and present.
“A” Company, on the left, worked round to the north-east and lay out
in a fold of the ground until the barrage should lift. “D” Company, on
the right, had to get through a lot of wire, and, being held up for a
time, suffered rather severely. H.E. and shrapnel rained upon the German
positions so thickly that it seemed as though they must be obliterated,
but as soon as the two companies launched their attack, on the lifting of
the barrage, they were met by a hail of shrapnel and machine-gun bullets.
Bending their heads to the storm the first wave went steadily forward and
at dusk forced their way into the village, where dumps of smoke-shells,
trench-mortar shells and Very lights, left behind in the March retreat,
exploded from time to time. Enemy infantry and machine-gunners fought
courageously, taking up one position after another, as they were forced
back. But the second wave pushed through the centre of the village, and
getting on the flank killed or captured the crews of the machine-guns.
As the Germans were bringing up considerable reinforcements from
Villers-au-Flos, “C” Company was rushed forward, the three companies
were linked up, and the enemy driven off with heavy loss. Soon after
dawn “B” Company was moved up from reserve and the line advanced 300
yards on the left flank. The enemy brought up more machine-guns and even
a light field-gun which fired at point-blank range, and made desperate
efforts to recover the lost ground, but fighting patrols dealt with them,
and Riencourt and its outskirts were finally won. Two field-guns were
taken, and one of these was promptly turned against its former owners by
gunners of the 210th Brigade. The capture of Riencourt was a brilliant
affair, carried to a successful issue against great odds by the clever
handling of the companies engaged and the dash and keenness of the
infantry and machine-gunners. The Divisional Commander was prompt to show
his appreciation in a telegram to the Battalion Commander. During the
Riencourt operations there were numerous instances of individual daring,
initiative, and resource. After the capture of the village, Captain J.
A. C. Taylor, D.S.O., whose leadership of “A” Company, 10th Manchesters,
contributed greatly to success, led a Lewis-gun section against the enemy
on his flank, and drove them out of a trench and sunken road, killing
a large number and capturing three prisoners and a machine-gun. After
this he led an attack against a machine-gun post, which he captured.
Lance-Sergeant H. Harrison, 8th Manchesters, on his own initiative went
through an intense artillery barrage and heavy machine-gun fire in
daylight and dressed the wounded who had been left behind close to the
enemy’s position, when the 8th Manchesters were ordered to withdraw on
the night of August 29-30. At night he returned with stretcher-bearers
and collected all the wounded in the area. For this he was awarded a
bar to the Military Medal which he had gained in March for a similar
bit of work. A more humorous incident was that of the 10th Manchester
stretcher-bearer who brought in a number of prisoners whom he had cowed
with an empty beer-bottle—his only weapon. A group of about twenty
Germans, who had been holding a post some distance east of the village,
had evidently heard of the good times enjoyed by prisoners in England,
so instead of retiring to fight again another day, they waited to be
gathered in. Somehow they were ignored by mopping-up patrols, and were no
doubt hurt by this lack of consideration. While debating on their next
step a British contact ’plane appeared, and on its approach they waved
handkerchiefs attached to rifles, and walked complacently into their cage.
Their brilliant success in this and other night attacks led the 10th
Manchesters to adopt the nickname of “The Night-jars.” The Divisional
Commander’s predilection for night attacks was completely vindicated on
each such occasion, and casualties were much fewer than would have been
the case in daylight attacks, even under the best artillery barrage. But
thoroughly trained, confident, and trustworthy troops are necessary for
success in night attacks, and the General’s confidence in his officers
and men was always justified.
The 8th Manchesters and the 5th E. Lancs. were relieved during the night
of the 30th-31st by the 127th Brigade, and they went into Divisional
Reserve at Pys, the 125th Brigade becoming support brigade in Thilloy.
The relief by the 6th Manchesters was carried out under difficult
circumstances, as the battle raged inside and around Riencourt, and the
position was obscure. The battalion to be relieved could not supply
guides, so Lieut.-Colonel T. Batherwick, M.C., commanding the 6th
Manchesters, made an exhaustive personal reconnaissance amid heavy bursts
of shell and machine-gun fire, and returned to lead in two companies.
He then made a second personal reconnaissance under similar conditions
before taking in the remainder of the battalion. For this and for his
part in the success at Miraumont the D.S.O. was awarded. After the relief
of the two battalions had been completed the 10th Manchesters remained
for a day or two in the front line, attached to the 127th Brigade. After
the capture of Riencourt there was no further fighting of any importance
on August 31, the rest of the day being spent in consolidating the
positions taken up around the village.
[Sidenote: _Villers-au-Flos, September 2_]
On September 1 the 127th Brigade, by pushing out to the left, got
into touch with the New Zealanders on the high ground north-east of
Riencourt. The situation was unsatisfactory on the right, as this flank
was much exposed to the enemy in Beaulencourt, which still held out
against the 5th Corps. The next objective was Villers-au-Flos, about
a mile south-east of Riencourt, and the attack on this thickly-wooded
and strongly-held position was made by the 5th Manchesters on the right
and the 6th Manchesters on the left at 5.15 a.m. on September 2, after
eight minutes’ bombardment. The two battalions and a company of the 7th
Manchesters attached to the 5th went forward in fine style in the face
of a very stiff resistance, under a creeping barrage which lifted 100
yards every three minutes. Very stiff fighting took place the moment
the advance began, for the barrage, though heavy and accurate, was not
sufficient to overcome opposition, and the infantry had to provide
additional covering-fire to enable detachments to advance without losing
the barrage. The accuracy and quickness of fire of the Stokes gunners
attached to each of the leading battalions destroyed a machine-gun nest
and two German trench-mortars which had caused numerous casualties. On
the left good progress was made, but on the right the 5th Manchesters
had a harder task, their right flank being swept by the fire of a number
of machine-gun posts, but this was overcome by a noteworthy instance of
co-operation. An aviator, seeing that the infantry were in difficulties,
flew over the German posts and attacked them with machine-gun fire, and
at the same time a battery of 18-pounders was withdrawn from the barrage
and switched on the machine-gun nests, while trench-mortars, machine-guns
and neighbouring infantry, on their own initiative, brought their full
available volume of fire to bear. This proved too much for the Germans,
a number of whom surrendered, and the 5th and 7th Manchesters went
forward. Stiff fighting continued, for the enemy made skilful use of the
cover of ruined houses, hedges, and bushes, but once at close quarters
the Manchesters made short work of the Germans, who suffered heavily.
The Stokes gunners, after using up all their bombs, fixed bayonets and
joined heartily in the hand-to-hand fighting. They were gallantly led by
Lieutenant R. H. Welch, commanding the 127th Light T.M. Battery, who was
awarded the D.S.O. Light carriages had been improvised for the 6-inch
mortars, and these vied with the Stokes mortars in close support of the
infantry. They had to be man-handled across rough ground, but in spite
of the weight of mortars and heavy ammunition they were brought into
action in forward positions in astonishingly quick time. Two fighting
tanks had been detailed to take part in the attack. One broke down,
but the other passed through the village with the infantry and gave
very valuable assistance by destroying machine-gun posts. A supply tank
delivered small-arm ammunition and drinking water close behind the front
line. Before noon Villers-au-Flos had been thoroughly mopped up, and the
127th Brigade was consolidating its new positions beyond the village.
Three hundred prisoners, a battery of 77 mm. guns, eighteen machine-guns
and much material had been captured, and the enemy’s loss in killed and
wounded was very great.
In a Special Order of the Day Brigadier-General Henley congratulated the
127th Brigade on “adding a new anniversary to those which your gallantry
has already made famous.... Yesterday, after three months of unbroken
fighting in trenches and in the open, and in face of stubborn resistance
by Huns more than equal in numbers, you stormed and took Villers-au-Flos
with the utmost dash and determination—a feat which would have been
notable if performed by battalions at full strength and fresh from a
period of rest. When Manchester hears of this new proof of your prowess,
she may well be as proud of her sons as I am of commanding such soldiers.”
The New Zealanders on the left and the 21st Division on the right
had also made good progress, but the 42nd Division had again gone
farther forward than either, and in consequence the 127th Brigade was
in a pronounced salient, exposed to enfilade fire on both flanks. The
machine-gun sections which had advanced with the battalions applied
themselves with zest to keep down the enemy’s fire, and they dealt
with it very effectively. In the early afternoon the New Zealanders
on the left made a further attack and came up into line with the 6th
Manchesters, thus easing the situation on that flank. In the evening
the 5th and 6th Manchesters were relieved by the 7th Manchesters and
8th Lancashire Fusiliers. At night the heavy and field artillery
shelled Barastre and Haplincourt Wood in preparation for the morrow’s
advance upon those places. In the early hours of September 3, however,
patrols of the 8th L.F. and the 7th Manchesters found that the enemy
had retired and that Barastre and Haplincourt Wood were empty. The
fighting at Villers-au-Flos had evidently hit the enemy hard, and the
Division made haste to exploit its success. The 125th Brigade was ordered
to “leap-frog” through the 127th, and this was completed at 10 a.m.,
the 8th L.F. finding the advance-guard. It was a most exhilarating
advance, reminding one of a Field Day on Salisbury Plain, and a new
thrill was provided when a troop of the Scots Greys passed through and
exchanged greetings with the infantry. Warfare had become more and more
open recently, but this was the real genuine article. Cavalry going
into action on horseback was a pleasant and cheering sight, and its
significance was realized. The foot-sloggers grinned and waved their
hands, wishing them the best of luck. The battalions in the rear were
also witnessing sights, perhaps not so striking in their appeal to
the eye, but hardly less significant of the change that had come over
the scene. The whole British Army seemed on the move, and the roads
were packed with transport. There were field artillery drawn by teams
of mules, 6-inch howitzers bouncing along behind motor-lorries, dumps
in process of removal, tanks, busses, field-kitchens, cable-wagons,
observation-balloons attached to motor-cars with the observer at a height
of 100 feet, and every variety of vehicle hastening in the wake of the
retreating foe. The railways had been entirely destroyed, and much damage
had been done to the roads, especially at the cross-roads. The traffic
was constantly checked, or if possible diverted, while huge craters
were filled in, but all difficulties were overcome, and the transport,
and supply services got through Barastre without a halt, and at 1 p.m.
the village of Bus, three miles beyond Villers-au-Flos, was entered. By
6 p.m. Ytres, the day’s final objective, had been gained, and now the
Division was on familiar ground. On the left touch had been maintained
throughout with the New Zealanders, who had made equally rapid progress,
but the division on the right had met with greater opposition, and was
1000 yards behind.
[Illustration: RIENCOURT-LES-BAPAUME.]
[Illustration: VILLERS-AU-FLOS.]
[Illustration: TRESCAULT ROAD, LEADING THROUGH HAVRINCOURT WOOD.]
[Illustration: A SLEEPER TRACK THROUGH HAVRINCOURT WOOD.]
[Illustration: TRESCAULT WATER POINT.]
[Sidenote: _Bus, Ytres, Neuville-Bourjonval_]
With Metz-en-Couture as the objective the advance was resumed at 7 a.m.
on September 4, the 5th L.F. leading. The night had been remarkable
for the intensity of the enemy’s gas bombardment, and this continued
throughout the day. Ytres, Bus, and indeed most of the positions in the
divisional area were drenched with gas, and box-respirators had to be
worn for hours at a time. In addition to the bombardment the troops were
bombed by successive flights of enemy aircraft. Fighting patrols crossed
the Canal du Nord without much opposition, but considerable resistance
was met with at Neuville-Bourjonval, and the advance-guard was checked
in the outskirts of this village. The division on the right had been
held up at the Canal, which they could not cross, and until they could
accomplish this it would be useless to incur heavy losses in capturing
the village while the Division’s right flank was in the air. In the
evening four strong patrols were sent out under a barrage to make good
the village and the trench system beyond, and the two northern patrols
penetrated the enemy’s trenches and took prisoners. On the morning of
the 5th the village was cleared, but the enemy still held a trench
system to the east. This was attacked in the afternoon by a company
of the 7th L.F., in conjunction with an attack on the left by the New
Zealand Division, and all guns of “B” Company, M.G. Battalion, assisted
in placing a box-barrage round the objective. The attack was brilliantly
successful, the trench system being captured and more than 100 prisoners
taken, with very slight loss to the company. On the night of September
5-6 the Division, less the artillery which remained in the line, was
relieved by the New Zealanders, and moved back to the Pys—Thilloy area,
with D.H.Q. in a German ammunition dump at Riencourt. The Divisional
Artillery had some strenuous days with the New Zealanders, the casualties
at Metz-en-Couture being heavy. Some of the batteries fired 5000 rounds,
and one battery nearly 6000, in a day.
The sixteen days from August 21st to September 5th had been a period of
continuous victory in which every unit shared. The ease with which the
troops shook out into open warfare after a long period in the trenches
was remarkable, advanced artillery sections and often advanced batteries
moving in close support of the infantry. The shooting of the artillery
and the accuracy of their barrages earned the praise and the thanks of
the infantry, and the gunner can hardly wish for a greater reward. The
continual night work involved in bringing up the very large supplies of
gun ammunition required in modern battles was most wearing for drivers
and lorries, but the guns were fed. Light trench-mortars were frequently
used in close support of advanced infantry, and when the ammunition
was expended the men acted as infantry with marked success. The M.G.
Battalion was consistently good. At critical moments officers and N.C.O.s
showed admirable resource and initiative, and the guns were handled with
skill and daring. The system of pack transport, to which great attention
had been paid during training, enabled gunners, where their fire would
prove a deciding factor, to take up positions in advance of the infantry.
The water-supply was the chief problem of the R.E., and the exceptional
experience of the C.R.E., Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Riddick, with water
difficulties in Gallipoli and Sinai proved invaluable to the
Division.[19] This part of France had little surface water. There was
none between the Ancre at Miraumont and the Canal du Nord at Ytres,
and the shafts of village wells had been blown in by the enemy. By the
capture of Miraumont control of the sources of the Ancre was obtained,
and the engineers of the 42nd and New Zealand Divisions at once got
to work on the erection of dozens of horse-troughs and a number of
water-cart filling-points. During the advance beyond Miraumont all
water had to be carried forward in Garford lorries to some improvised
water-point as near the firing-line as possible. At this point canvas
tanks of 2300 or 9000 gallons capacity were erected, and the lorries
were at work at all hours of the day and night to keep the tanks filled.
Lift-and-force pumps were then installed, and by their means the
battalion water-carts were supplied. Credit is due to Lieut.-Colonel
R. J. Slaughter, D.S.O., and the “Q” department for their excellent
organization, upon which the advance depended. Artillery horses had to be
watered at the occasional foul village ponds until damaged wells could be
re-opened, a difficult task which the R.E. accomplished by working day
and night. The need for water was so urgent that at times the Garford
lorries had to be hurried forward along by-roads before the tunnellers
and sappers had completed road reconnaissance, and one of these was blown
to pieces by a road-mine, and its drivers killed.
The Signal Company established Visual Stations as far forward as
possible, and also supplemented electrical communications by using
wireless, pigeons, and Mounted Orderlies. The destruction of roads in
the line of advance, and the multitude of shell-holes which pitted the
face of the country, made conditions exceptionally difficult for the
R.A.S.C., but supplies never failed, thanks to the energy and skill with
which the 7th N.F. Pioneers repaired and re-made the roads, and to the
expert work of the sappers and tunnellers who unearthed innumerable
booby-traps on roads and in dug-outs. Supply tanks gave invaluable aid in
bringing up trench mortars, water and ammunition of all kinds. The work
of the R.A.M.C. was carried out skilfully and with creditable smoothness,
casualties being treated and evacuated with a degree of comfort that
could hardly have been expected under the conditions of constant
movement, the Field Ambulances keeping up with the infantry, and setting
up Aid Posts wherever they could find suitable shelter. Stretcher-bearers
went through shell and machine-gun fire calmly and deliberately in the
performance of their duties. Officers and men from the highest to the
lowest, had complete confidence in one another.[20]
[Sidenote: _Captures and Casualties_]
In short, it was efficiency in all branches that enabled the Division to
advance a distance of fifteen and a half miles in sixteen days, against
a strong and desperate foe, across country which gave every advantage to
the defence, and in that short period to capture the towns and villages
of Miraumont, Pys, Warlencourt, Thilloy, Ligny-Thilloy, Riencourt,
Villers-au-Flos, Bus, Barastre, Ytres, and Neuville-Bourjonval. One
thousand two hundred and sixty-one prisoners passed through the
Divisional Cages and Dressing Stations, 24 guns of all calibres up to
8-inch, 50 heavy and more than 100 light machine guns, 16 trench-mortars,
and a large quantity of material of war were taken. The casualties of
the Division were: 20 officers and 233 other ranks killed, 49 officers
and 1256 other ranks wounded, but the loss inflicted upon the enemy was
calculated at four times that number. It was a magnificent record which
well deserved the Divisional Commander’s Special Order of the Day, of
September 6, 1918—
“In March of this year I had the honour of congratulating you
on the valour and good work displayed by all ranks of all arms
and services in a defensive battle. To-day I am proud to find
that my confidence in you to live up to the Divisional Motto in
an offensive battle has been more than fulfilled.
“In seventeen days continuous fighting you have accounted
for, at the very lowest computation, more than a whole enemy
division.
“Officers, N.C.O.s and men of the East Lancashire Division, I
congratulate you on your valiant deeds, and in the name of our
King and Country, I thank you for the good work you have done.
“As to the future, I remain confident that, if possible, even
better work will be done, and the enemy will have further cause
to regret meeting the East Lancashire Division.”
The Division was no less proud of its Commander, and its confidence in
him was unbounded.
[Illustration]