THE SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED BY A TREATY
I. The Dominion of Canada voluntarily to divide itself into
different states, geographically arranged as its citizens
desire, in proportion to population, and each state to be
admitted as a full member of the American Union.
I approach this subject with the greatest diffidence, for,
plainly as I perceive its necessity, I mistrust my ability to
make clear to others the motives and causes which induce me to
believe that the consolidation of Canada into our Republic is an
indispensable condition to the establishment of a complete and
permanent brotherhood between the Anglo-Saxon people. Canada a
part of the United States by her free and voluntary act,
generously and freely seconded by England, and graciously
accepted by the United States, the Anglo-Saxon race _eo
instanti_ becomes a unit in sympathy, purpose, and progress.
With Canada a separate nation, as she is now, a real, lasting
_entente_ between the British Empire and the United States, is
impossible.
"'T is true 't is pity; and pity 't is 't is true."
{160}
At the first blush I am sure to encounter reluctance and
opposition on all sides--from the Canadians as well as the
English and Americans. I meet at the outset sentiment and pride,
two of the strongest and most invincible sentinels that guard
the approach to human reason and judgment. As Mr. Lecky says:
"The sentiment of nationality is one of the strongest and most
respectable by which human beings are actuated. No other has
produced a greater amount of heroism and self-sacrifice, and no
other, when it has been seriously outraged, leaves behind it
such enduring and such dangerous discontent."[1]
While the bond existing between England and Canada is
sentimental and as "light as air," it creates a union between
the two people "as strong as iron." Canada would never renounce
England's formal sovereignty without her fullest and freest
consent; and I believe England would exhaust the last drop of
her blood to prevent a forcible annexation. Canadian sentiment
and English pride stand ready to oppose the proposition. The
United States, on the other hand, does not seek or want Canada
to join the Union, and deep and strong opposition to such a
course may also be encountered here. On the mere face of the
question, therefore, annexation seems difficult and hard to
accomplish. It should not be forced. It cannot be bought.
Neither arms, money, nor commercial advantages can be of
themselves sufficient potent factors to accomplish this end. It
{161} must come voluntarily: it must spring from the hearts of
the people. It is well not to underestimate the difficulties of
the proposition, and with that view I have gone beneath the
surface in search of higher and nobler motives than those which
ordinarily impel individual or national action. In this way only
can sentiment be satisfied and pride placated. But it will be
argued by some, ice must be broken to reach annexation; if all
three parties interested must be converted to this view, why
not, if it is to come at all, leave it to the "fulness of time,"
or, in other words, to processes entirely natural. As it now
stands, say they, there is no impelling necessity, no heavy past
experience of evils to force us together, as in the case of
Scotland, and of our thirteen original States--no circumstances,
on the other hand, that directly favour it.
But I ask the Canadians, the English, and the Americans, in all
seriousness, When will the "fulness of time" occur? I assert
that the fulness of time has been reached, and that the natural
processes have matured. They have ripened over night as the
result of years being crowded into two events--the
Spanish-American and the Boer Wars. These wars show us our
weaknesses and our strength.
The Anglo-Saxons, to be impregnable, must be united. I shudder
to draw the reverse picture. Shall we wait until a dispute
occurs between us? Shall we fold our arms until a war breaks
out, and reveals through its lurid light our real relation to
{162} each other? Thucydides says: "In peace and prosperity both
states and individuals are actuated by higher motives, because
they do not fall under the dominion of _imperious
necessities_."[2] If we wait until our necessities tell us that
we belong to one family and should be confederated together, who
can divine the conditions and inequalities which will result?
Can we not now, therefore, look the situation fully and candidly
in the face, and decide calmly and dispassionately in what our
best interests consist?
I admit that the mere aggrandisement of the United States by the
extension of her territory; the benefit to Canada by opening the
door to material development and improved commercial privileges;
the release of England from the heavy and unprofitable
responsibility of defending Canada against attacks by the United
States,--these are influences which, though none are more
weighty and important, would not of themselves operate to
produce annexation. _They must be combined with others,
connected with the future welfare and progress of all the three
powers involved_. We must all see and realise that our future
onward march can only be successfully made together. Interest,
in other words, must be combined with sentiment. In the great
march towards civilisation we cannot take separate paths. The
Anglo-Saxons must go together.
I take it for granted, therefore, that we truly believe the
solidarity of the Anglo-Saxon races is the {163} great
desideratum of this century; and that although it may be more
important to England than to the United States or Canada to
hasten this result, yet all three are so bound up together that
in the end they are vitally interested in bringing about a
common understanding as quickly as circumstances will admit it.
The present relation which Canada and the United States and
England bear to each other confirms this last view. England is
the third party standing between Canada and the United States in
the negotiation. What is her position? What are her interests?
What position has she in the ultimate annexation of Canada? What
should she do--aid or oppose annexation? I shall endeavour to
answer these questions satisfactorily.
The present Dominion of Canada, consisting of the Provinces of
Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island,
Ontario, Manitoba, British Columbia, and the other unorganised
territories, was created by virtue of the Act of the Imperial
Parliament of Great Britain, entitled "The British North
American Act, 1867." This Statute practically constituted the
Dominion of Canada an independent nation, subject only to the
Imperial power of Great Britain as to its foreign relations.
Since its passage the English Government exercises no more
actual rule in the Dominion of Canada than it does in Chicago or
New York; in fact, Canada can even maintain formidable tariffs
to keep Great Britain out of her markets. I do not overlook the
fact that Canadian co-operation, {164} in men and money, may
always be relied upon by the mother country in the time of her
need, nor do I belittle the moral support which the Canadians
will extend to her when required. Canada is a pure and shining
jewel in her imperial crown.
Therefore she would undoubtedly make sacrifices in parting with
Canada. But she could not retain Canada by force against the
will of the latter; and she would not do so even if she could.
While it is also true that a formal English representation is
still kept up, the Dominion of Canada as a matter of fact,
through a Governor-General, is now bound to Great Britain,
notwithstanding the forms created by the Act of 1867, only by a
mere sentimental tie--a bond of sympathy recently, by the Boer
War, renewed and strengthened and now so strong that both Canada
and Great Britain would probably exhaust themselves in
endeavouring to maintain it if sought to be forcibly rent
asunder. Such is the ligament which binds these two powers.
Conquest _in such a case_, even in the event of war, is out of
the question. If the Canadians were subdued by the Americans,
God forbid that they should sink so low in the scale of
generosity and national manhood as to forcibly annex them to
their Government! And, if conquest will not avail, it requires
something more than logic and selfish argument to dissolve such
a tie. The particular sympathy which exists between Canada and
the British Empire must be balanced by the future vital
interests of the whole Anglo-Saxon people; and while mere
selfish interests might not {165} alone appeal to these three
nations to agree voluntarily to annexation, the ultimate
_safety, welfare, progress,_ and _unity_ of the whole
Anglo-Saxon race should affect them when everything else might
fail. Would the Canadians stand in the way of the accomplishment
of such a mighty result? Would not England under such
circumstances generously yield to a request of Canada for
consent to annexation?
I shall endeavour to traverse the whole field of the discussion,
and lay bare every view that can influence fair and honest
judgment. As a matter of fact, the position of England, as she
stands between Canada and the United States, is not an enviable
one. She is liable any minute to be involved in a war with the
latter power on account of the former, in whom she has not a
great material interest, and from whom her people receive very
little appreciable benefit. As a question of mere selfish
policy, therefore, England has everything to gain by the
annexation of Canada to the United States, and everything to
lose by continuing to be her _formal_ sovereign and her _actual_
champion. It is true, that under the present relations, if
unhappily a war should ever occur between England and the United
States, England might worry the United States through Canada,
but it is not too much to say that this worriment would be of
short duration. Any misunderstanding between Canada and the
United States, involving war, precipitates England in a bloody
and ruinous contest with the United States, without having the
slightest {166} material interest in the issue. She would gain
by being relieved of this immense burden of responsibility,
which exists without any adequate _quid pro quo_, or
corresponding advantage. What more trying position for England
than the necessity of championing quarrels not of her own
making, where both of the contending parties have claims upon
her forbearance, and in a sphere where her powers and resources
would have to be employed to the full, and then only wasted?
There arises out of these conditions a question of grave import,
whether any nation is justified, before its own people, in
assuming such a burdensome relation. I do not argue the point, I
merely ask the question--"Has England the right to spill the
blood of her people and spend their money; should she involve
the happiness and future of her citizens to maintain this purely
sentimental tie?" Quite apart from all this, it is reasonably
certain, judging from her conduct towards her other colonies,
that if Canada should desire to disrupt the formal relations
existing between herself and England, the latter power would
acquiesce upon a simple request.
I pass, then, to the relations between Canada and the United
States accruing out of England's position. In the event of a
dispute between England and the United States, Canada, although
perfectly disinterested in the quarrel, is liable to be drawn
into a war, because she happens to have a formal relation with
England, and acknowledges that power as sovereign. The first
shock of a war {167} between England and the United States would
be felt by Canada. Her condition is paradoxical; it creates a
dilemma; it evolves a situation most remarkable and striking.
England can be forced into a war because of her empty and hollow
sovereignty over Canada; Canada is subject to destruction
because she officially acknowledges England's sovereignty.
Either nation is liable to invasion and devastation, if not
ruin, because of formal ties. If the power of England were to
decline and wane,--which Heaven forbid!--what would be the
future of Canada? Isolated from England, where could she turn,
except to the one contiguous power of the United States, and
perhaps under circumstances far less pleasant than those which
would accompany a voluntary union. These are serious aspects of
the question. Standing alone, notwithstanding their importance,
these considerations might not be overpowering, but if the
situation described above can be dissipated by a free,
voluntary, honourable, and wholesome alliance, is it not for the
advantage of all that it be accomplished, thereby removing for
all time the serious consequences which may at any moment arise
from these formal and anomalous conditions? Remove the cause and
avoid the result.
But there are other views which must not be overlooked or
disregarded. Canada is a friendly neighbour of the United
States, but a fast-growing commercial rival. Separated as
adjoining owners are from each other, by a mere partition, a
division line, and capable of walking upon the other's {168}
territory at will, the results of this physical contiguity are
easily foretold. Jealousies, rivalries, encroachments upon each
other, and grievances fast piling up between them, are liable to
set the feelings and passions of their people afire by the most
insignificant discord or incident. But why cannot we live
together as Christian neighbours and friends, striving to reach
a common goal, and attending to our own affairs? So far as mere
physical area is concerned, there is undoubtedly room for two
Anglo-Saxon nations to exist separately and independently upon
this continent, working out their own destinies in their own
way, and not only undisturbed, but aided and encouraged by each
other. Moreover, as Canada is the weaker nation, the Americans
should treat her not only fairly, but generously. I think that
this spirit predominates among the greater portion of the people
of the United States to-day. I do not believe there are any
considerable number of Americans anxious to have Canada become a
member of their political household, except by her free and
unqualified consent. I know there are only a few who would think
of force or purchase to consummate that result. But, on the
other hand, there are many Canadians and Americans who would
welcome annexation if it could be brought about graciously and
naturally. If Canada and the United States could exist as
independent nations; if their political orbits (in other words
their laws of movement) were fixed externally apart; if by
commercial treaties they would open to each other free and
unrestricted {169} trade; if their citizens would intermingle
not as jealous rivals and strangers, but as fair competitors and
friends, their international existence would be ideal. As long
as we are separated, I insist that decency and good manners
should teach us to treat Canada as a friend and neighbour. We
should study the rights and duties of _meum et tuum_. And no
matter what eventually becomes of the proposition here
suggested, we should be generous and broad in our treatment of
her. But is it safe to expect all this? Is it human nature? Will
not self-interest and temporary advantage dominate our behaviour
when the critical moment comes? I appeal to the good sense and
judgment of the Anglo-Saxon people; I point to all history to
answer these questions. I interject no opinion of my own, except
so far as it is founded upon the actions of states and nations
situated similarly to the United States and Canada. What has
been the result? If mutual consent has not brought them
together, has not union been accomplished by force? It would
have been ideal for the original thirteen States to have existed
as independent nations, developing and extending themselves into
the highest stages of civilisation; but aside from the immediate
necessity which drove them into a federation, how long could
they have existed apart as independent states? The cities of
Greece remained separate and independent for ages, but they at
length succumbed, vainly striving to combine when combination
was too late. And what was their condition before this? Were
they not constantly at war {170} with each other? Are not some
of our most glowing illustrations of the efficiency and
soundness of confederate governments drawn from the history of
Grecian cities; and is not the language of Professor Freeman, in
speaking of these Greek cities, most strikingly and forcibly
applicable to Canada and the United States?
"But there is a far greater evil inherent in a system of
separate free cities, an evil which becomes only more intense as
they attain a higher degree of greatness and glory. (And I might
add commercial rivalry.) This is the constant state of war which
is almost sure to be the result. When each town is perfectly
independent and sovereign, acknowledging no superior upon earth,
multitudes of disputes, which in a great monarchy or a federal
republic, may be decided by peaceful tribunals, can be settled
by nothing but an appeal to the sword. The thousand causes which
involve large neighbouring states in warfare all exist, and all
are endowed with tenfold force in the case of independent city
commonwealths. Border disputes, commercial jealousies, wrongs
done to individual citizens, the mere vague dislike which turns
a neighbour into a natural enemy, all exist, and that in a form
condensed and intensified by the very minuteness of the scene on
which they have to act. A rival nation is, to all but the
inhabitants of a narrow strip of frontier, a mere matter of
hearsay: but a rival whose dwelling-place is within sight of the
city gates quickly grows into an enemy who can be seen and felt.
The highest point which human hatred can reach has commonly been
found in the local antipathies between neighbouring cities.[2]
. . . The greatest work that orator or diplomat ever achieved
was when Demosthenes induced the two cities to lay aside their
differences and join in one common struggle for the defence of
Greece against the Macedonian invader."[3]
{171}
Another authority develops the same views:
"Neighbouring nations are natural enemies of each other, unless
their common weakness forces them to league in a confederate
republic, and their constitution prevents the differences that
neighbourhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy
which disposes all States to aggrandise themselves at the
expense of their neighbours."
This sentence is quoted by Alexander Hamilton,[5]. in reference
to which the latter adds this significant remark: "This passage
at the same time points out the _evil_ and suggests the
_remedy_."
As long as we remain apart, are not tensions, discords, and
differences imminent? And at some unexpected moment will not a
fanatic, politician, or demagogue cast a brand into the fire of
discussion, and then will we not have war? As Canada grows in
her development, and increases in prosperity and population,
will not these dangers become more likely and pressing?[6] I
frankly and gladly admit that the chances of war between the
United States and England are becoming less probable every day.
The only existing bone of contention {172} which might create
war is Canada. There is no other question which cannot, and, I
hope, will not be settled by agreement, or arbitration. With
Canada annexed, and _a common citizenship established_, all
causes for differences would be removed, and we would
practically become one great nation, with one great purpose and
a single ambition--to civilise mankind.
The disadvantages and evils which result to the three nations
concerned from the present anomalous government of Canada are
apparent and susceptible of much more elaboration than I have
indulged in. I leave much to the imagination. Real harm may
ensue from opening up these matters with too much detail. On the
other hand, in searching for the advantages of union, we find
all the natural causes which tend to and justify the
consolidation of separate states present.
Contiguity of territory, the same race of people; the same
language, literature, and laws; the same political and religious
tendencies; the dominating necessities of commerce;
self-protection, mutual interest, motives of peace and
good-will--in fine, all those elements necessary to insure a
prosperous and permanent political marriage. Almost every reason
which operated upon the minds of the citizens of the original
thirteen States to create the present federation is to be found
in the case of Canada. She is naturally related to the United
States; she is only artificially connected with England. In a
commercial and material sense, the advantages of her annexation
to the United States {173} are potent. She would move forward
with gigantic strides, opening, developing, and peopling her
vast country. In separate States of the American Union, the
Canadians would cultivate and guard their own destinies, just as
the present States of the Union now do. The free and
unrestricted admixture of the people of the different States of
the American Union has been one of the causes of her vast
progress. Break down the political paper barrier which now
exists between Canadians and Americans, open the door between
them so that each can pass in and out of the other's country,
establish a free communion of persons and goods, and Canada
would leap into a condition of progress and prosperity equal to
that of our most envied and successful States. American capital,
invention, and push would combine with Canadian ability, energy,
and resources to reach the highest stage of individual and
national development.
The road to great prosperity is now blocked by the mere form of
a different citizenship, although we are really one people. We
are standing idly looking at each other, relying upon forced,
strained, and unnatural efforts to build up commercial
relations, when we have it in our power, by the stroke of a pen,
as it were, to reach the goal of business, fortune, and success.
Cannot the Canadians learn an important lesson from a study of
the history of Scotland? I do not mean to assert that there is a
perfect historical parallel, but there are significant events
connected with that history which certainly bear upon this {174}
discussion. Causes which led to the merger into one of the
different Saxon kingdoms, gradually to the annexation of Wales,
and finally to the absorption of the Palatinates, had long been
working toward similar results in both England and Scotland. The
wisest statesmen in these two countries deplored those miseries
which, till they ceased to be divided, each inflicted on the
other. The Scots, though uncertain, intractable, and
passionately jealous of their national liberties, again and
again allowed the question to approach the edge of solution.[1]
In fact, the union of Scotland and England was agitated in
different forms for many hundred years before it was
accomplished, with the most lamentable consequences in the
interim, to say nothing of the policy of Edward I., and the
aspirations and efforts of Henry VIII. to achieve that result
after the marriage of his sister, Margaret, with James IV. of
Scotland. The supreme effort of King James I., in 1606, to
effect a union between the two kingdoms, when the matter was
brought before Parliament, and the extraordinary zeal shown by
Sir Francis Bacon in support thereof, are well known. "Swayed
merely by the vulgar motive of national antipathy," as Hume puts
it,[2] the attempt was defeated, and one hundred years elapsed
before the important event was consummated. Upon its final
accomplishment, Scotland gave up many rights and accepted a
representation inadequate and small in comparison to her
population, {175} much to the nation's chagrin and loss; but
everybody now admits that it was a wise and eminently necessary
step for her future prosperity. If it had not been
accomplished[9] there would have been a renewal of national wars
and border feuds, the cost of which the two kingdoms could never
have endured, and at a hazard of ultimate conquest, which, with
all her pride and bravery, the experience of the last generation
had shown to be no impossible result of the contest.
I wish, also, to recall the important fact, that Canada was
originally embraced in the plan of the American Republic, as
provided in the Articles of Confederation (XI.) as follows:
"Canada acceding to this Confederation, and joining in the
measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and
entitled to all the advantages of, this Union, but _no other
colony shall be admitted into the same unless such admission be
agreed to by nine States._"
The door was left wide open for her admission, but she did not
avail herself of the privilege to enter. Her actual reason for
not accepting an offer which placed her on a par with the most
prosperous colonies of England, I cannot satisfactorily
discover. I can guess, but speculation upon this point answers
no practical purpose. The anomalous fact is, however, recorded
that while the French Canadians were combating American
Independence, the French nation was aiding the Americans to
attain it. It is important to keep in sight that it {176} was
the opinion of the founders of our Government that
geographically, commercially, and naturally, Canada belonged to
the same sphere of political life in which they revolved. Indeed
it requires no strained or artificial argument to show that
Canada naturally belongs to the Union; just as naturally as the
Union belongs to Canada.
Goldwin Smith's remarks are pertinent in this connection[10]:
"Yet there is no reason why the union of the two sections of the
English-speaking people on this continent should not be as free,
as equal, and as honourable as the union of England and
Scotland. . . . When the Anglo-Saxons of England and those of
Scotland were reunited they had been many centuries apart; those
of the United States and Canada have been separated for one
century only. The Anglo-Saxons of England and Scotland had the
memory of many wars to estrange them. . . . That a union of
Canada with the American Commonwealth, like that into which
Scotland entered with England, would in itself be attended with
great advantages, cannot be questioned, whatever may be the
considerations on the other side, or the reasons for delay. It
would give to the inhabitants of the whole continent as complete
a security for peace and immunity from war taxation, as is
likely to be attained by any community or group of communities
on this side of the Millennium. Canadians, almost with one
voice, say, that it would greatly raise the value of property in
Canada; in other words, that it would bring with it a great
increase of prosperity."
From time to time, sporadic attempts have been made by Canadians
to force a sentiment in favour of annexation, but they have been
abortive. In 1847, the American flag was hoisted on the Town
Hall in Kingston, and in 1849 many prominent {177} men in
Montreal signed an annexation manifesto.[11] No widespread,
overwhelming feeling in its favour, however, has ever been
developed in Canada, or encouraged or countenanced by any
considerable number of citizens of the United States; in fact,
the latter have displayed a cold and almost unnatural
indifference to the movement, which, under the circumstances, is
remarkable. This apathy is largely due to the fact that the
subject has never been considered as a serious, vital issue. It
is now fully opened to us. That this annexation will come I have
no doubt. How, when, and under what circumstances, I will not
prophesy. I pray it may not come by force. If Canada does not
feel that she can enter into political communion with the
Americans upon terms of perfect equality, we have nothing to do
but fold our arms and accept the situation. The event ought to
come as a true and loving marriage, with a full volition on each
side, inspired by the double sentiment of mutual respect and
interest. There should not be a particle of force, or a
scintilla of commercial bribery about it. Until this moment
arrives we should be patient with each other. If sometimes we
must quarrel, remember that we pretend and proclaim ourselves to
be the most civilised and Christian people on the face of the
earth, and therefore ought to settle our disputes in a spirit of
broadness and equity, and agree with our adversary quickly.
Above and beyond this, let the Americans always {178} remember
that Canada is the weaker nation, and that true Anglo-Saxon
manhood requires that they should be generous to her, and give
her the benefit of all doubt. The more magnanimous they are, the
more tender in their treatment of Canada, the more quickly will
come the desired event--a complete and happy union. Nothing will
postpone its consummation so much as a narrow, bigoted policy
towards her.
I will not assert that I have much faith in immediate
annexation. I sincerely hope it may soon come. I fully believe
in its eventuality. In the meantime I simply bring the question
before Canadians, Americans, and Britons, but I cannot complete
this sentence by adding, "Let nature take its course." This
would mean that I thought events were not ripe; that the fruit
was green and immature. Such is not my opinion. I believe every
condition exists which makes the event feasible. I fear
postponement, because I am warned by history that men and
nations have never yet learned to control their passions at
times when they should be calm, just, and generous.
When one says, "Let nature take its course," he may also mean
that in the ordinary course of affairs arms and force may be
used, while the weapons should be those of love and agreement.
But a time may come when the Canadians and Americans, suddenly
imbued with a feeling of interest and sympathy, will voluntarily
move towards each other, and become unified through
circumstances which will make an ideal political marriage.
{179}
I recall that Lord Bacon advocated, in his own powerful and
masterly way, the union of Scotland and England more than one
hundred years before it was actually accomplished, and that
history, reason, and argument were then disregarded and cast
aside as so many straws.[12] But ideas survive. They cannot be
destroyed. And Bacon's views eventually prevailed.
If I am called visionary; if my arguments are criticised as
unsound; if my suggestions are stamped as inconclusive; if my
results are laughed at, I shall find myself, or somebody else
will find me, in most select and distinguished company; and
certainly that will furnish some compensation for the time I am
spending on this subject.
All I can do now is to sow a few seeds in this reluctant soil,
and hope that at some time they may produce ripe and wholesome
fruit. If my efforts are barren, other toilers will come in the
same field of thought, and finally events, through one cause or
another, will shape themselves into mature results, thus
realising that which nature, destiny, self-interest, and
national glory demand; the inhabitants of this North American
continent will become one people, all Anglo-Saxon by birth or
adoption--united in one free and prosperous government.
II.--COMMON CITIZENSHIP
I have now reached the crucial point of my subject: the _common
citizenship_; the placing of all the {180} members of the
Anglo-Saxon race on a political equality; conferring upon, them
equal civic rights in the countries and colonies which they
govern, making an Englishman a citizen of the United States and
an American a citizen of England. By a single stroke of
parliamentary and constitutional legislation the individuals
composing the Anglo-Saxon race would enjoy common political
rights, and, in fact and deed, become members of the same
political family. This would resemble the important edict of
Antoninus Caracalla, which communicated to all the free
inhabitants of the Roman Empire, the name and privileges of
Roman citizens. Professor Mommsen[13] says:
"When a stranger was by resolution of the community adopted into
the circle of the burgesses, he might surrender his previous
citizenship, in which case he passed wholly into the new
community; but he might also combine his former citizenship with
that which had just been granted to him. Such was the primitive
custom, and such it always remained in Hellas, where in later
ages the same person not infrequently held the freedom of
several communities at the same time."
There would be no force or compunction in this common
citizenship. The volition to embrace temporarily or permanently
a citizenship in any other English-speaking country would rest
with each individual. The barrier raised by the naturalisation
laws would be removed, and the citizens of any English or
American country could pass to and fro as freely as a person can
move from one room to another, invested with full civic rights
wherever {181} they should happen to be. An Englishman under the
American flag would be an American; an American under the
English flag would be an Englishman. A citizen of Great Britain
visiting the United States would, upon landing, become _eo
instanti_ a citizen of the United States, _pro hac vice_,
pending the duration of his visit. He would become a citizen of
the United States with all the privileges and immunities of such
citizenship, and also a citizen of the individual State in which
he resides during his sojourn, subject, of course, to the
municipal laws and regulations of each State applicable to all
citizens in respect to length of residence and domicile; and,
_per contra_, a citizen of the United States visiting Great
Britain, Ireland, or Australia would, in like manner, and to the
same extent, become a citizen of England, Ireland, or Australia,
with all necessary sequences flowing from citizenship. Under
this rule, therefore, an Englishman visiting New York would have
the right to vote at a presidential or congressional election,
subject, of course, to the restrictions as to residence
applicable to all citizens of the United States, such as
residing in the State or Congressional district for a fixed
period of time anterior to the election.
In other words, without any actual or formal expatriation of his
own country on the one side, or preliminary probation,
quarantine, or naturalisation on the other, he would instantly,
upon landing in the United States, by force of law become a
citizen of the United States, subject to Federal and State
restrictions, applicable to all citizens in {182} general. The
proposition means, in effect, an abrogation of the
naturalisation laws of each country in favor of the Anglo-Saxon
people.
A citizen of Australia, visiting New York, would, upon landing,
become a citizen of the United States as long as he chose to
reside there; and a citizen of the United States visiting
Melbourne, would, in like manner, become a citizen of Australia
pending his sojourn in that country. This may be called common
or reciprocal citizenship. The Greeks termed it "Isopolity," of
which more hereafter.
I shall elaborate still further the effects of common
citizenship. For example, if this rule were adopted, a New York
lawyer would be entitled to practise law in England, as
solicitor or barrister, subject to the regulations laid down in
this respect for British subjects; it would entitle him to enter
Parliament, and, in fine, to enjoy the emoluments, ranks, and
honours of the highest English offices, except so far as he is
restrained by the Constitution of the United States, which would
necessarily be altered to conform to the principles of the
treaty in question.
On the other hand, a citizen of Dublin, _eo instanti_: upon
landing in New York, would be entitled to all the prerogatives
of American citizenship, and to all the offices and honours
which that relation may lead to, save that of President, which
can only be enjoyed by a native-born citizen of the United
States. But without an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, a citizen of Great Britain, temporarily enjoying
the rights of American {183} citizenship, as proposed, could not
immediately become a member of Congress, for by Subdivision 2 of
Section 2, Article I. of the Constitution of the United States,
it is provided that:
"No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained
the age of twenty-five years, and have been seven years a
citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected,
be an inhabitant of the State in which he shall be chosen";
and by Subdivision 3, of Section 3, of the same Article, it is
also declared that:
"No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the
age of thirty years and been nine years a citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of
that State for which he shall be chosen."
While the English Parliament, by a single act, could authorise a
treaty which would carry into effect all the propositions above
stated, to make the benefits of common citizenship reciprocal
and equal it would be necessary on our side to amend the
Constitution of the United States.
If the principle was acquiesced in, the lawyers would soon put
these suggestions into practical shape.
There are two classes of rights which would follow the
establishment of common citizenship, viz., civil and political.
The civil rights, _inter alia_, would be these:
1. An Isopolite would enjoy the same rights to real estate as a
native-born citizen, such as buying, {184} selling, trading in,
or disposing of the same by will; and the slender thread and
fragment of the alien laws still remaining in the United States,
so far as they apply to citizens whose respective Governments
are parties to the treaty, would necessarily disappear.
2. He would possess the same commercial rights and privileges of
business as a native-born citizen.
3. He would enjoy the same material rights and privileges and be
subject to the same limitations and duties as pertain to
native-born citizens.
His political rights, among others, would be:
1. He would be entitled to vote at all Federal elections.
2. The right to vote at all State, county, or municipal
elections, precisely the same as citizens of one of the States
of the United States.
But while enjoying the same rights, he would be under the same
disabilities, and be subject to the performance of the same
duties as a citizen of the United States, as, for instance, to
pay taxes, and to perform military or jury duty. If war should
unhappily arise between the two nations, it must be admitted
that all these rights would be rent asunder. _Inter armes silent
leges_. But would not common citizenship be a most effectual
barrier against war? And with Canada in the American Union,
would not war, or even ugly disputes, be remote possibilities?
The principle of common citizenship is not novel; on the
contrary, it is very ancient. Something {185} like it existed in
the Grecian states, which, in establishing a federal union among
themselves, interchanged civic rights comprehended by the Greek
word "Isopolity," There was also "Sympolity," which meant in
effect the protection which a larger or stronger State gave to a
smaller or weaker one,
In the "Byzantine Decree,"[14] it is _inter alia_ provided:
"It is resolved by the people of the Byzantium and Perin thus to
grant unto the Athenians the right of inter-marriage,
citizenship, purchase of land and houses, the first seat at the
games, first admission to the Council and People after the
Sacrifices, and exemption from all public services to such as
wish to reside in the City," and this because "they succoured us
. . . and rescued us from grievous perils and preserved our
hereditary constitution, our laws, and sepulchres,'"
"Isopolity," according to Niebuhr,[15] was a relation entered
into by treaty between _two perfectly equal and independent
cities_, mutually securing all those privileges to their
citizens which a resident alien could not exercise at all, or
only through the medium of a guardian; the rights of
intermarriage, of purchasing landed property, of making
contracts of every kind, of suing and being sued in person, of
being exempted from taxes where citizens were so; and also
partaking in sacrifices and festivals,
The _Cosmos_[16] is allowed to enter the senate {186} house of
the allied city that he may be able to propound the business of
his state there; and as a mark of honour he has a seat in the
popular assembly by the side of the magistracy, but without a
vote.
The persons who enjoyed "Isopolity" were called "Isopolites."
This idea of Isopolity existed in some essential features among
the Romans, for "between the Romans and Latins, and between the
Romans and Caerites there existed this arrangement: that any
citizen of the one state who wished to settle in the other,
might, forthwith, be able to exercise there the rights of a
citizen."[17]
The other relation, known as "Sympolity," subsisted between Rome
and its _municipia_: it was the connection of one place with
another on a footing of inequality; the citizens of the
subordinate state had not the same rights as those of the chief
state, their advantage consisting in the close alliance with a
powerful head, for protection, but they had no share in the
election of magistrates (_civitas sine suffragio_), and the
relation was altogether one-sided. Isopolite states, on the
other hand, generally stood to each other in a relation of
perfect equality, and were quite independent in their
transactions with foreign countries.[18]
The Greeks learned the lesson too late in their national
experience of the evils of _political isolation {187} where
nature intended there should be no isolation_. The one idea in
which that wonderful people were deficient was political unity.
Each city was a separate entity and proud of being such. The
dividing causes were many and strong. Isopolity and the like
were indications of an underlying sense of a better principle.
The great Pericles caused a law to be passed restricting the
citizenship to those only whose parents were both Athenian--a
law which afterwards he sought to have repealed so far as to
exempt a son of his own.[19]
When foreigners became frequent in Athens, a public vote of the
people was necessary, in each instance, to bestow citizenship.
If that could not be obtained, some form of evasion of the law
was resorted to.[20]
The policy of the Greeks in the above respects was in direct
contrast to that of the Romans. When their dominion became
assured, the latter welcomed into their bosom all allies and
conquered peoples. The Greeks, it is true, when it was too late,
driven by necessity, formed the Achaian League, which would have
been real and efficacious, had not the power of Macedonia,
against which it was first directed, proved too strong for the
liberties of their country.
These pages of classic history have not escaped the attention of
modern scholars and publicists, and I am not alone in seeking to
apply ancient examples to existing conditions.
{188}
Professor Freeman[21] uttered a hope in 1885 that some day
_common citizenship_ would be established between the
English-speaking nations.
"I have often dreamed that something like the Greek συμπολιτεία
a power in the citizens in each country of taking up the
citizenship of the other at pleasure, might not be beyond hope,
but I have never ventured even to dream of more than that. It is
our bad luck at present that there are only two independent
English nations, two English nations which parted in anger, and
neither of which has quite got over the unpleasant circumstances
of parting."
And the same proposition of a common citizenship was advocated
by Professor Dicey in 1897.[22] He stated that his
"aim is to establish the possibility and advocate the policy of
instituting a common citizenship for all Englishmen and
Americans. My proposal is summarily this: That England and the
United States should, by concurrent and appropriate legislation,
create such a common citizenship, or, to put the matter in a
more concrete and therefore in a more intelligible form, that an
act of the Imperial Parliament should make every citizen of the
United States, during the continuance of peace between England
and America, a British subject, and that simultaneously an Act
of Congress should make every British subject, during the
continuance of such peace, a citizen of the United States."[23]
Mr. Bryce also suggested the same course[24]: "There are things
which may be done at once to cement {189} and perpetuate the
good relations which happily prevail . . . _such as the
recognition of a common citizenship, securing to the citizens of
each in the country of the other certain rights not enjoyed by
other foreigners_."
While common citizenship would not affect in the least the
political form or substance of the government of either country,
the result of its adoption would practically make the
English-speaking people, so far as the outside world is
concerned, one nation, inspired by one great, noble purpose. And
the ebb and flow of citizens from one country to the other could
not fail to be beneficial in its influence upon the internal and
external policy of each.
It will have been observed that in what I have heretofore said I
have carefully eschewed the use of the word "alliance," This
word conveys the impression of a written or defined compact
between separate nations for an offensive or defensive purpose,
as, for example, the "Triple Alliance," the "Franco-Russian
Alliance." I wish to exclude utterly such an idea and keep it
altogether out of view. Nothing is more distasteful to my
feelings or farther from my thoughts than an alliance of the
Anglo-Saxon race to browbeat or bully the world. While the
suggestions I make must necessarily be carried into effect by a
preliminary treaty, and while incidentally the contracting
parties will be benefited, its great object is to establish and
maintain universal peace. It seeks to unite the people.
If Canada becomes a part of the United States, {190} the
Canadians can possess all the rights of English citizenship when
they chose to seek them by visiting any of the countries
embraced in the British Empire--a privilege which they do not
now enjoy. And _vice versa_, Englishmen can become citizens of
any of the Canadian Provinces by simply landing on their soil.
Englishmen and Canadians are now, inconsistently enough,
political strangers to each other, but by an instantaneous
operation of law they can, by their own volition, become
fellow-citizens.
And will not the alleged grievances of the Irish roll away and
disappear, like the burdens of Christian, in the Slough of
Despond, before common citizenship? Will not the whole
Anglo-Saxon race be practically united for the propagation of
peace and civilisation? Will not the effect of common
citizenship be to establish and enforce common rules of liberty
and equality if, and where, they do not now already exist?
Maintaining intact the peculiar governments which they now
individually enjoy, will not the citizens of each feel that they
are henceforth all interested in the welfare and glory of the
whole race, and in the development of a common purpose? Will not
a generous rivalry stimulate each to outdo the other in the
breadth and liberality of their laws?
I shall say a word, in this connection, on the general subject
of naturalisation laws, the abrogation of which I recommend in
favour of our own kinsmen. A most superficial inspection of the
history of the world will show that every nation has {191}
guarded from motives of pride, jealousy, or fear, the privilege
of citizenship. The general policy has been to confine it to
those born and bred on the soil, and not to permit the outside
world, or foreigners, to become members of the State. Exceptions
were necessarily made to this universal rule, but they were
rare. A nation, in respect to citizenship, was looked upon as a
family, and strangers were not admitted to the fold. These
observations are not simply applicable to ancient States, but
the same rule existed, and exists, in modern governments.
It is a fact worthy to be chronicled to its credit, that the
United States was the first nation to throw open its doors to
foreigners, and invite all persons to become members of its
political family. Our ancestors settled in North America to
establish and perpetuate civil and religious liberty, and all
who were in search of these blessings and new homes were
welcomed to its hospitable shores. Instead of being jealous of
our citizenship, we were delighted to welcome all classes to our
country, and to confer upon them full and equal civic rights. We
wanted company, and our newly arrived guests shared to the full
in everything we could consistently give in property and
citizenship.
Behold the results! They are seen to-day in our social life.
Wherever we have a place, a foreigner can find a cheery and
sincere welcome. This custom, coeval with our national birth,
has grown and developed until the Americans are acclaimed the
most hospitable people on the face of the earth. {192} None are
equal to them as hosts. After our independence, there was an
apprehension that foreigners might come here, and, with evil
intent, propagate principles contrary to our political tenets.
Accordingly, in the Constitution, Congress was given the power
to make uniform naturalisation laws. Under this authority, the
first Naturalisation Act was passed early in the nineteenth
century. A quarantine was established to enable the foreigner to
acquire our language and to become accustomed to our Government.
Having passed the necessary probation, the naturalised foreigner
is admitted to the fullest rank of citizenship, and there is no
office or honour closed to him save one--the Presidency of the
United States. Compare our policy, in this respect, with that of
other nations, to see whether my eulogy is deserved.
We come, now, to solve the problem of a common citizenship for
every member of the Anglo-Saxon race. Who but the American
people can make such a proposition? Who but we are entitled to
lead in such a movement? Where should such an invitation come
from, but from the United States of America, and to whom should
it be extended but to the members of our own family--to
Englishmen, Irishmen, Scotchmen, and Australians?
What are the objections to a curtailment, or an abolition, of
the naturalisation laws, so far as the English-speaking people
are concerned? This is practically all that is meant by common
citizenship. Is it essential, or necessary, to the maintenance
of any principle or policy of our Government, or of {193}
national safety, _that there should be a probation of five
years, before an Irishman, or an Englishman, could become a
citizen of the Republic of the United States of America_? I
propound the same question to the English in favour of the
Americans.
What was the object sought to be accomplished by the
naturalisation laws? To establish and compel a probation while
the immigrating foreigner was learning to speak our language,
and becoming familiarised with the form of our Government. In
these enlightened days, when almost every member of the
Anglo-Saxon race can speak, read, and write English, is this
limit of five years any longer efficacious or necessary? In the
early days of our Republic, as can be seen by a perusal of the
debates in the Constitutional Convention, much anxiety was felt
and expressed upon the subject of admitting foreigners to
citizenship. It was thought they would bring into our midst and
propagate political ideas quite foreign and antagonistic to the
principles of a republic, and hence were adopted the
restrictions of seven and nine years in the Constitution,
relating to the election of foreigners to the House of
Representatives and to the Senate. But these influences are now
effectually guarded against by virtue of the overwhelming
domination of American-born subjects; and it is very doubtful
whether any of the reasons which led to the adoption of a five
years' residence preliminary to citizenship now exist. _Cessat
ratione cessat lex_. Open wide our doors to the Anglo-Saxon
race, whether they come from England, {194} Ireland, Australia,
or New Zealand. Welcome them not as aliens, but as political
brothers and fellow-citizens.
I do not overlook the fact that there is an existing, not to say
a strong, sentiment in the United States against foreign
immigration. This feeling is based upon the necessity of
protecting American labour. It is thought by some that the
country, great and capacious as it is, is already overcrowded,
and that, for a few years at least, until further development of
its resources are made, and new fields of business, commerce,
agriculture, and labour are opened, immigration should be
curtailed, suspended, or even prohibited. If this objection had
any relevancy to the present discussion, it is squarely answered
by the fact that it has never been used to prevent the inflow of
the _English-speaking people_. The sentiment against further
immigration, or restricted immigration, is not, if I understand
the subject correctly, aimed against those immigrants who come
from English-speaking countries. No one, so far as I can learn,
has raised his voice against this class of immigrants becoming
citizens of the United States under proper conditions. The
objection is especially directed against the Chinese, who might,
if any encouragement were given them, no matter how slight,
overrun the country and soon swamp the labouring classes--an
eventuality which should be guarded against. In this respect it
is unnecessary to advocate the removal of any of the barriers
which now exist.
{195}
I admit, also, that the same feeling, but in a milder form,
exists against a class of foreigners who do not speak the
English language. But as to the English-speaking races, if the
citizens of the United States are admitted to a common
citizenship in Great Britain and her colonies, I cannot conceive
why we on this side should hesitate to grant a reciprocal
privilege. Do we not all instinctively feel the difference?
Mongolians and foreigners of other nationalities in the one
case; English, Americans, Scotch, and Irish in the other--nature
draws the line for us.
Again, if Canada becomes an integral part of our Republican
system, her vast and comparatively unexplored soil will at once
be opened to the energy and activity of American skill, genius,
and labour, and superfluous immigrants to the United States
would be welcomed there, and soon absorbed in her vast
territory. On the whole, I do not think the United States or
Canada, perhaps the two nations more particularly interested in
the subject, could suffer any disadvantage by removing, at a
single stroke, all barriers which now prevent the citizens of
England, Scotland, and Ireland, and all the other
English-speaking colonies, from becoming citizens, _pro hac
vice_, of these countries, instantly upon the adoption of a
common citizenship law. After all, as I have said, the whole
question resolves itself into a conditional or limited
curtailment of the naturalisation laws. These have never been
uniform; but have been fluctuating and capricious--adapted to
meet existing conditions.
{196}
The laxity which has existed in the enforcement of these
naturalisation laws is notorious, and has enabled all
individuals so disposed to become members of our Republic by
open evasion. The applications for citizenship now mainly come
from the non-English-speaking people. The number of
English-speaking immigrants is growing less every year, and
Ireland and England will soon be drained. It is time this human
current should be turned. There should be an ebb and flow
between the English-speaking countries.
Another objection may be that the inauguration of common
citizenship would open the door to fraudulent voting, by
bringing hordes of people to this country on the eve of
national, state, or municipal elections, to corrupt our ballot.
There is, however, no force in this objection, because under the
rules applicable to citizens of the United States, a voter must
reside in the State where he casts his vote at least one year,
and in the election district for a period ranging from thirty
days to four months previous to the election. It is not probable
that any political party or organisation could control a
sufficient amount of money or exercise a strong enough influence
upon immigrants by "colonisation," to control a question of
national, state, or municipal importance. It is, moreover, a
sword that cuts both ways, and affects all the countries
involved, because what could be done in New York would be
equally easy in London, Dublin, or in any of the colonies where
an election might be held.
{197}
But strenuous objection might be urged by foreigners to the
doctrine of a common citizenship embracing only the citizens and
subjects of the English-speaking countries. Is it just and right
to discriminate against non-English-speaking nations--against
Russians, Germans, French, Italians, Spanish, and Austrians, who
have contributed so largely to our population and to the
development of our national resources? The obvious answer is,
that we cannot consult foreigners, or foreign nations, in
shaping the policy of our Government. It does not become them to
say what the British Empire or the United States shall do in the
establishment of relations with each other. These foreigners are
attracted to _our_ shores by the allurements of our political
institutions and the prospects of fortune and success. Welcome
and receive them all under proper restrictions; but let them
have nothing to do with our Government until they become
citizens thereof.
In the next place, it does not lie in the mouth of any foreign
nation to object to any treaty which the United States and Great
Britain may choose to make. When nations enter into treaties,
there is no principle of international or natural law, or
justice, which requires the contracting parties to consult
foreign nations as to the terms and conditions of the contract.
Each nation is a free agent, possessing absolute liberty and
power to enter into any alliance which is deemed to be for its
best interests, security, or progress, subject only to an
arraignment before the high bar of a general {198} public
opinion where treaties and alliances are discussed upon the
broad principles of truth and justice. It would no more lie in
the mouth of Austria, Germany, or Italy, to find fault with a
treaty made between Great Britain and the United States,
adopting a common citizenship, as explained above, than it would
be tolerated that Great Britain or the United States should
object to the triple alliance which was made between Austria,
Italy, and Germany, by Bismarck at the conclusion of the
Franco-Prussian War for their mutual protection and support.
When nations are entering into alliances they do not call into
their councils foreign powers not directly concerned in the
compact. But I do not rest the discussion upon any narrow or
technical basis.
A treaty between Great Britain and the United States upon the
lines heretofore indicated, is absolutely sustainable in the
forum of conscience and justice, and it is an ample answer to
any criticism which might be made of it, by a foreign power, to
show that the basis of the treaty is self-preservation and
interest, quite irrespective of that other unanswerable ground
in international discussion, viz., that the aim and object of
the treaty is the maintenance of universal peace.
Lastly, if there was any real and substantial objection to such
a treaty on the ground that foreigners were excepted from the
privileges of common citizenship, it might be provided that all
such could immediately become English-American citizens, when
they declared their intention to {199} establish a permanent
home in either Great Britain, the United States, Canada,
Australia, or any of the colonies embraced in the treaty, _and
were able to speak, read, and write the English language_. To
this extent our naturalisation laws might be modified in favour
of foreigners.
As one of the aims of this alliance would be to offer a home and
citizenship to all persons who desired to embrace an
English-American Nationality, there could be no objection to
opening wide the doors to a class of immigrants such as those
just referred to. This exception would be politic, and agreeable
to one of the ultimate designs and motives of the treaty, viz.,
the propagation of the English language, as it would both
operate as an incentive to induce foreigners to study and
acquire the same, and fit themselves for eventual
English-American citizenship. If the immigrants did not bring
themselves within these conditions, there would seem to be no
reason why the old laws of naturalisation should not be kept in
full force.
The effect and result of a common citizenship in the
English-speaking countries would be great and far reaching.
To-day, the assertion, "I am an American," or, "I am an
Englishman," is a passport securing safety and respect of person
and property everywhere within the four quarters of the globe.
How incomparably greater, more forcible, and striking the
assertion would be, if a common citizenship were established
such as I have above suggested! How talismanic such an
utterance! In his oration against Verres, with what force and
pride did {200} Cicero dwell upon the magical power and effect
of the words, "I am a Roman citizen"[25]
Men of no means, he said, holding no office or station in public
or private life, poor or friendless, at sea, or in places where
they were neither known to men among whom they had arrived, or
able to find people to vouch for them, by uttering the mere
phrase "I am a Roman," received protection from the laws, and
shared the rights of hospitality to an extent not common to the
citizens of other nations.
Besides, common citizenship would tend to restore the office of
a citizen to its high and elevated sphere. It would produce
"fitness," which, after all, is the quality to be sought for in
the true citizen. While in times of war or dispute, the pride of
country is fully aroused and exercises a marked influence upon
its citizens, yet in the intervals of peace the real duties of
citizenship are overlooked or disregarded. Shall we recall what
these duties are, and the nature of the office of a citizen? _In
most respects_ this _office_ is the _highest_ that exists in any
civilised government. Why? Because the government is established
for his benefit. All the officers of the government are the
agents of the citizens. The government is made for man, not man
for the government, as Mr. Webster said. Public officers are
trustees for the citizens, who are the _cestuis que
trustent_--the beneficiaries. An individual born in a country
becomes, so to speak, a citizen thereof by operation of law.
There is no ceremony of investiture-no {201} signing of a
constitution--no oath--nothing to acquaint him with his duties,
or to impress upon him the full measure of his responsibility.
He becomes a citizen so naturally and imperceptibly that he
often belittles the office, or fails to see its importance, or
to understand the full measure and magnitude of his rights and
duties. In a representative government the citizen surrenders
his office to a representative and is removed far from the
scenes of official action. He only participates in the
government of the state, and in the making of laws, by proxy. In
this respect the difference between a true democracy and a
federated republic or constitutional monarchy is manifest. In
the former, the citizens all actively participate in the making
of laws; in the latter they are generally absent when
legislation is enacted, and only appear by their representative.
In a true democracy each citizen must take an active interest in
every question that arises, because he is present and
participating in all political discussions; in a federal
republic, he knows very little of what is transpiring, for he
has transferred his duties to a representative. In the former
case the importance and responsibilities of citizenship are
vividly impressed upon the democrat; in the latter these duties
are unknown or neglected, and the burden thrown upon the proxy.
The closer citizens are brought to legislation, the better
government there will be. Do we not notice the distinction
between our national and municipal politics? In the former
sphere the citizens study, know, and act upon {202} political
questions. In the cities they do neither; and public interests
are placed in the hands of professional politicians who act
often from base and sordid motives. Common citizenship will tend
to elevate and enlighten all the citizens, and the healthful
influences resulting therefrom will gradually permeate into the
manners, morals, and legislation of all the countries involved.
III.--TO ESTABLISH FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL INTERCOURSE AND
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED, TO THE SAME EXTENT AS
THAT WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT STATES CONSTITUTING THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
It would be quite useless to create common citizenship, it would
be a vain endeavour to form a lasting union between the
English-speaking people, unless free and unrestricted commercial
relations were established between them. Every port which they
own or control must always be wide open to the citizens of each
nation. The same liberal commercial relations must be permitted
between the United States and the British Empire as now exist
under the Constitution between the citizens of different States
of the Union.
Montesquieu says that commerce is a cure for the most
destructive prejudices, and that peace is the natural result of
trade.
We can behold its successful and beneficent effect upon the
States of our American Union. We witness the disastrous
influence of restricted {203} trade relations between Canada and
the United States.
These two examples cover the whole field of discussion and
render elaboration useless. Each American State has grown and
thrived under the principle of free commerce. It regulates
production and sale, and confines the inhabitants of each
section to the cultivation or manufacture of those articles
which surrounding conditions justify; it limits and attaches
them to that industry which is most congenial and profitable. To
the restless, discontented, unlucky, or unfortunate classes--of
which there are always plenty--there is the chance to go
elsewhere, a door always open through which they can pass into
another State under the same citizenship, where different
pursuits are followed more in keeping with their tastes and
knowledge. A floating population, drifting from one place to
another with perfect freedom and security, will finally settle
in some locality where they can make use of whatever knowledge
they possess, with a direct benefit to themselves and the place
where they ultimately settle.
Lord Bacon saw the importance of commercial freedom in welding
the bonds between England and Scotland, using the argument with
skill and force in his advocacy for union between them:
"Thirdly, for so much as the principal degree to union is
communion and participation of mutual commodities and benefits,
it appeared to us to follow next in order that the commerce
between both nations be set open and free, so as the commodities
and provisions of either may pass and flow to {204} and fro
without any stops or obstructions into the veins of the whole
body, for the better sustentation and comfort of all the parts,
with caution, nevertheless, that the vital nourishment be not so
drawn into one part as it may endanger a consumption and
withering of the other."[26]
And it was in the spirit of this advice that the union was, long
afterwards, formed. It was the offer of free trade tendered by
the Godolphin administration which finally overcame the national
prejudices of the Scottish people. The results, after a brief
period of adjustment to new conditions, amply justified the
wisdom of the forecast: it is not necessary that I should again
state them. To those who recall the former relations of the two
countries as they had existed for centuries, they will appear
among the most marvellous recorded in history.
It will not be necessary here to cite authorities. I am not
dealing with an open question. The value of commerce, which,
unless it is free, ceases to be commerce, in regulating the
intercourse between nations, in promoting peace, in carrying
forward the work of civilisation, has been recognised by every
thinker and every philanthropist in every age since the world
emerged from pure barbarism.
It was the full realisation of this truth and necessity that
drove the thirteen original States into forming a federative
union, quite as much as political reasons. The same causes
operated upon the Canadians in their federative union, and they
must be predominant features in the formation of the {205}
political ligament which binds the English-speaking peoples in a
perpetual league.
There are two unmistakable and substantial benefits which result
from commercial reciprocity: first, joint business interests
represented by men of both countries have a direct tendency to
mutual understandings in the individuals; second, in the
governments, as giving them objects of common protection and
support.
How quickly these benefits will be realised in the union of the
English-speaking peoples must be most obvious to all of us in
the light of our present and past history.
IV.--GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (I) TO COIN GOLD,
SILVER, NICKEL AND COPPER MONEY, NOT DISPLAYING THE SAME DEVICES
OR MOTTOES, BUT POSSESSING AN EQUAL MONEY VALUE, AND
INTERCHANGEABLE EVERYWHERE WITHIN THE LIMITS COVERED BY THE
TREATY, AND (2) TO ESTABLISH A UNIFORM STANDARD OF WEIGHTS AND
MEASURES
_I. The same Gold, Silver, Nickel and Copper Money_
The influence of a uniform standard of money upon a people in
uniting them is most obvious. In fact, I know of no stronger
element to educate a people in political and commercial sympathy
than the use of interchangeable coins, possessing an equal money
value, and circulating freely among them--money, bearing the
same name for each denomination, with different national designs
on the obverse side, but perhaps similar characters and figures
could be used on the reverse side.
{206}
The adoption of coins of the same value among all the
Anglo-Saxon peoples would be perhaps next in importance to
language and literature in binding them firmly together.
An element conspicuously noticed in the nationalisation or
unification of different nations or tribes is a common
money-system. Mommsen[27] in speaking of the unification of
Italy by Rome, says:
"Lastly, Rome, as head of the Romano-Italian confederacy, not
only entered into the Hellenistic state-system, but also
conformed to the Hellenic system of moneys and coins. Up to this
time the different communities of northern and central Italy,
with few exceptions, had struck only a copper currency; the
south Italian towns again universally had a currency of silver,
and there were as many legal standards and systems of coinage as
there were sovereign communities in Italy. In 485 all these
local mints were restricted to the issuing of small coin; a
general standard of currency applicable to all Italy was
introduced and the coining of the currency was centralised in
Rome; Capua alone continued to retain its own silver coinage
struck in the name of Rome, but after a different standard."
I do not make any definite suggestion as to the size, design, or
names of the different species of coins. This is not the place
for such details.
Canada has already made an important step in this direction. She
has freely followed the United States of America in her silver
coins, which, with the exception of the inscriptions, are
practically the same as those issued by our own Government--she
has her half-dollars, twenty-five-, ten-, and five-cent
pieces.[27]
{207}
_II.--To establish a uniform standard of Weights and Measures_
Quite apart from the plan heretofore outlined, it is highly
important as an element of mutual commercial benefit that the
English-speaking people should establish among themselves a
uniform standard of weights and measures. It would facilitate
and make easy commercial freedom, and guarantee to our race that
an _entente_, if established, would be built upon sound
foundations. It would likewise impress upon foreign nations the
strength of our compact. Once we have adopted a common monetary
system, supplemented it with a uniform standard of weights and
measures, and carried into effect the other suggestions
heretofore advocated, the union of the English-speaking people
is a _fait accompli_. Thus the two richest and most powerful
nations of the world would be knit together by all the elements
of sentiment and selfishness, and their moral force and
influence would be predominating.
V.--IN CASE OF ANY DISPUTE HEREAFTER OCCURRING BETWEEN GREAT
BRITAIN, OR ANY OF HER COLONIES, AND THE UNITED STATES, THE SAME
TO BE REFERRED TO A SUPREME COURT OF ARBITRATION TO BE CREATED
AND ORGANISED UPON SUBSTANTIALLY THE FOLLOWING LINES:
_(a)_ All disputes between the signatories to be referred to,
and settled by, this tribunal.
_(b)_ The court to be composed of twelve arbitrators, as
follows: Six to be selected by England and the same number by
the United States.
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The King of England to appoint the Chancellor of England, a
member of the House of Lords, a member of the House of Commons,
a banker, a merchant, and the president or chairman of the
leading industrial or labour organisation of the empire. The
President of the United States to choose a judge of the Supreme
Court of the United States, a member of the United States
Senate, a member of the House of Representatives, a banker, a
merchant, and the president or chairman of the leading
industrial or labour organisation of the United States.
_(c)_ The first meeting of the arbitrators to be held, say,
within ninety days after their appointment.
_(d)_ At their first meeting, without regard to whether any
quarrel or dispute has arisen to be submitted to them, to select
an umpire, who shall cast the final vote in case of a tie.
By selecting an umpire in the beginning, the Arbitration Court
is fully organised and always ready to act. After a dispute has
arisen the choice of an umpire becomes most delicate and
difficult and sometimes insuperable.
[1] _History of England in the Eighteenth Century_, vol. ii., p.
50.
[2] _Thucydides_ (Jowett), 2nd ed., vol. i., p. 242.
[3] Freeman, _History of Federal Government in Greece and
Italy_, 2d ed., p. 42 _et seq._
[4] _Ibid_., p. 43.
[5] From "Principes des Negociacions," par l'Abbé de Mably, the
_Federalist_, No. VI., Lodge's Ed., p. 32.
[6] As illustrating these views I quote from an interview
published in the _New York Herald_ of Sunday, June 15, 1902,
with Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Prime Minister of Canada, before
leaving for London, to attend the coronation ceremonies and the
conference of Colonial Premiers, as follows: "The most important
question just now, as affecting the relations and friendly
feeling existing between Canada and the United States, is the
Alaska boundary question. This situation is full of danger, and
all that is required to precipitate a disgraceful conflict is
the discovery of gold in the disputed territory." This
difficulty has happily been arranged by treaty and the question
left to six arbitrators, but at the present writing Canada
newspapers are urging strenuous objections against two of the
American arbitrators.
[7] Froude's _History of England_, vol. vii.. p. 101.
[8] Hume's _History of England_, vol. iv., p. 251.
[9] See Hallam's _Const. Hist. of England_, vol. iii., p. 325.
[10] _Canada and the Canadian Question_, p. 267 _et seq._
[11] "Commercial Relations between Canada and the United
States," by Robert McConnell, _Canadian Magazine_, January,
1889.
[12] "Tracts Relating to Scotland," Lord Bacon's _Works_, vol.
v., edited by Basil Montagu.
[13] _History of Rome_, vol. i., p. 88, Dickens's edition, 1894.
[14] Fully set forth in Demosthenes's Oration on the Crown,
Bohn's _Classical Library_, p. 39.
[15] _History of Rome_, vol. ii., p. 51.
[16] _Ibid._, p. 52.
[17] Niebuhr's Lecture on the History of Rome, vol. i., p. 125.
[18] Niebuhr's Lectures on Ethnography and Geography, vol. i.,
p. 141.
[19] _Vide_ Plutarch's, _Pericles_.
[20] Grote, vol. iv., p. 186.
[21] Freeman's _Greater Greece and Greater Britain_, Appendix,
p. 142.
[22] _Contemporary Review_, April, 1897.
[23] This learned author subsequently lamented (_Atlantic
Monthly_, October, 1898), that his proposal "fell flat. It was
inopportune. It excited no attention in England, though it
brought me a few friendly letters from the United States. But
the tone of my correspondence was not encouraging."
[24] _Atlantic Monthly_, July, 1898.
[25] _Cicero's Orations_, vol. i., Bohn's Ed., p. 534 _et seq._
[26] Certificate prepared by Lord Bacon upon the proposed union
of England and Scotland.--Lord Bacon's _Works_, vol. v., p. 43.
[26] Vol. ii., p. 87.
[27] See also in this connection extracts from _A History of
Currency in the British Colonies_, by Robert Chalmers, B.A., of
Oriel College and of her Majesty's Treasury.
{209}
CONCLUSION
THE STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION UPON THE QUESTION OF ANGLO-SAXON
ALLIANCE
BEFORE the Spanish-American War a discussion of the subjects
embraced in this book would have been premature. Professor
Dicey, appealing through a magazine article, in April, 1897
(hereafter quoted), for a "common citizenship" for all
Englishmen and Americans, was compelled to acknowledge a year
later that his proposal "fell flat," and that for his
disinterested efforts he received a few friendly but
discouraging letters!
The times have changed, and the buds of great political and
international questions, which have hung so long upon the trees
of history, green and immature, have suddenly ripened.
The Spanish War peeped "through the blanket of the dark" and
luminously lit up the American nation to the gaze of an
astonished world. The problem which agitates the powers and the
press of continental Europe is the future of the so-called
"Anglo-Saxon" race, and the necessity and possibility of
combining the nations of the world against it.
{210}
The immature subject of an English-American alliance, which a
few years ago could not awaken the interest of the people of the
two nations, and was looked upon as an impracticable theory of
visionary men, is now become momentous by reason of grim facts.
The courage and boldness which a writer must possess to open to
public gaze new and untrodden fields of thought are no longer
indispensable qualities to the present task. All that is now
required is a substantial and satisfactory method of
accomplishing the desired end.
It is interesting, if not essential, to explore the state of
public opinion upon this subject. How far has public thought
progressed in this direction? What view is entertained of it by
the four great organs of public opinion of the two nations: the
Press, the Pulpit, the Bar, the Stage?