CHAPTER X.

LORD CHELMSFORD'S POLICY—PROMPTNESS AND DECISION OF SIR GARNET

WOLSELEY—THE HUNT AND CAPTURE OF CETYWAYO—DEPARTURE FROM NATAL—THE

LAST OF THE ZULU KINGS A PRISONER IN THE CASTLE OF CAPE TOWN—GREAT

MEETING WITH ZULU CHIEFS—SIR GARNET WOLSELEY'S SPEECH—SETTLEMENT

OF THE COUNTRY—END OF THE WAR.

Before leaving the shores of South Africa, Lord Chelmsford took

occasion at Cape Town to make a public defence of his policy,

in which he denied that he had been guilty of hesitation and

vacillation. His mind was made up at a very early date, and he went

on unswervingly to Ulundi by the route he had originally resolved

upon. If the work were to be done over again he would adopt the

same plan of campaign. In marching upon Ulundi no calculation was

made for assistance from the coast column—only indirect support was

reckoned upon. After the crushing defeat at Ulundi no advantage

would have been gained by endeavouring to penetrate the difficult

country lying north of the king's kraal, even had the state of

supplies permitted it. "While, therefore, one portion of the

force retraced its steps towards the Blood river, escorting the

sick and wounded, and taking with it all the empty waggons, the

others moved _viâ_ Kwamagwasa to St. Paul's, and then completed the

chain of strongly entrenched posts extending east and west along

the centre of Zululand at intervals of about twenty miles. So far

one side of the question. On the other hand, men of unquestioned

ability and experience, correspondents for several of the leading

journals of the world, did not hesitate to blame Lord Chelmsford

severely. These men were on the spot, were qualified to form an

opinion, and it is absurd and unjust to imagine that political bias

of any sort guided their pens.

The _Times'_ correspondent complains of the want of a definite

plan, and speaks of orders having been countermanded, and of

general uncertainty. "What is wanted is a bolder determination."

On the 16th of June he writes, "We are wandering towards

Ulundi much as the children of Israel wandered towards Canaan,

without plans or even definite notions for the future. Plain,

common-sense plans suffice, if backed by energy, decision, and

determination." The _Telegraph's_ correspondent tells us that

Lord Chelmsford's intelligence department "has been singularly

defective throughout." The correspondent of the _Daily News_, Mr.

Archibald Forbes, thoroughly shared these opinions, and expresses

them with conspicuous power and ability. Indeed, it is almost

impossible for any one to study carefully the proceedings of

this protracted campaign, from the arrival of reinforcements in

March until the battle of Ulundi, and not come to conclusions by

no means complimentary to the general commanding-in-chief. It is

urged that carriers, such as those employed by Sir Garnet Wolseley

immediately after his arrival,[50] would have immensely facilitated

transport, and when we consider that 4000 British troops at Ulundi

defeated, in the open field, the concentrated power of Cetywayo—an

army of more than 20,000 men—it is hard to believe that a column

such as Wood's, properly reinforced and moving quickly, would not

have been able to finish the war.

[Sidenote: _Sir Garnet Wolseley._]

Sir Garnet Wolseley's proceedings were of the most prompt and

vigorous character. Disappointed in not being able to land at

Port Durnford, he had to return to D'Urban and proceed overland

to General Crealock's coast column. When near the coast, he was

gratified by receiving news of the battle of Ulundi, but was

subsequently disappointed at Lord Chelmsford's neglecting to take

full advantage of this victory. That officer almost immediately

resigned, and had an interview with Sir Garnet, whom he met at St.

Paul's. A Ulundi column was organized under Lieutenant-Colonel

Clarke, consisting of the 60th Regiment, Barrow's Mounted Infantry,

two troops of Lonsdale's Horse, and two troops of the Native

Contingent. This small movable column was ordered to operate

towards the upper waters of the White and Black Umvolosi; Oham,

with a burgher force, was to move from Luneberg. On the 21st of

July Sir Garnet had a satisfactory interview with the principal

Zulu chiefs. Dabulamanzi, the king's brother and one of the chief

leaders of his army, had surrendered at Fort Chelmsford (Crealock's

column) on the 11th of July, and numbers of minor chiefs, with

their people, came forward to declare their submission to the

British Government. Colonel Baker Russell was directed to operate

from Intabankawa, in the direction of the Black Umvolosi, lending

assistance to Oham, whose forces were situated in a more northerly

direction. Under Colonel Villiers it was arranged that the Swazis

should cross the Pongolo, accompanied by Political Agent Macleod.

As Sir Garnet considered that there were more troops in the command

than were necessary, the first division and cavalry brigade were

broken up. Generals Crealock and Marshall went home. The 1-13th,

1-24th, and 17th Lancers were ordered to leave, and several

colonial corps were disbanded. Brigadier-General Wood and Colonel

Buller required rest, and proceeded to England, while the Marines

who arrived by the _Jumna_, from Plymouth, were sent back before

even they reached Natal.

The chase of Cetywayo must always form an interesting episode

in British colonial history. No war in Zululand could be said

to be thoroughly at an end in which the despot whose will was

law throughout the entire country was left uncaptured. The task

of securing his person was a very difficult one. The king was

looked upon as sacred, and we shall see that the most unbounded

loyalty was manifested towards him. The country into which he

had retreated was broken and difficult, intersected by forests

and unprovided with roads. Above all, the people were thoroughly

hostile, and faithful unto death to the monarch who was pursued

to death by the hated white man. Nevertheless, the chase was

successful, and that it was so reflected immense credit upon those

engaged in it.

[Sidenote: _Hunting Cetywayo._]

[Sidenote: _Capture of the king's people._]

The force told off for the duty was organized at Ulundi. It was

placed under the command of Major Barrow, and comprised the King's

Dragoon Guards, the Mounted Infantry, Lonsdale's Horse, Captain

Norse's Mounted Contingent, Jantje's Horse under Captain Hayes,

together with a corps of Guides under Corporal Acutt. The hunt

lasted fourteen days, and commenced on a Tuesday afternoon with a

forced march of twenty-one hours, during the whole of which time

the men were in the saddle. In this manner Zonyamma's kraal was

reached, where it was supposed the king might be. The king had

left the day previously with thirty men. Two hours' rest, and away

over very hilly country. A terribly steep hill was descended,

and a kraal visited where Cetywayo had been that morning. The

river Mona was then crossed, and a steep hill ascended in order

to reach Umbopa's kraal, where the scent was entirely lost. Of

course, the Zulus knew where the king was, but nothing on earth

would induce them to tell. Umbopa (whose son was with Cetywayo)

was then made prisoner and taken to his son's kraal, at a distance

of five miles, where some of the king's slaughter oxen were found.

The kraal was deserted. Lord Gifford, second in command, was

then ordered to scour the country, and had a very exciting but

unsuccessful chase after a naked Zulu, who afterwards turned out

to be one of the king's servants, appointed to look out and give

warning of the approach of pursuers. Forty Zulus were got together

by Major Barrow, but neither promises nor threats had any effect

upon them. They were as loyal to their sable ruler as a faithful

Highlander to his chief, or a loyal Cavalier to his king. At

last it was accidentally mentioned that one of Cetywayo's own

servants was present. With great difficulty some information was

obtained from him, and a promise to put the British force on the

right track. At the dawn of day the dense black forests of the

Umvolosi were entered, and as they proceeded pots and calabashes,

evidently dropped in flight, were picked up. On—on until the river

was reached, but there, alas! the trail was completely wanting.

A few "koodoos" quietly grazing was the only sign of life. Lord

Gifford was then sent to Funwayo's kraal, eight miles distant, and

there information was obtained that some of the king's girls had

been seen passing that way. Five miles further on was Shemana's

kraal, where the same party were again heard of. Pushing through

thick bush and long grass, in which the small band under Lord

Gifford—only eleven in number—could very easily have been cut off,

they got at length to a kraal, where they again heard of the girls.

Thence, taking two men as guides, they proceeded further, taking

care to make for the open country, in order to intercept Cetywayo

in case he endeavoured to reach the Inkanhla forest. At last they

reached Umgitya's kraal, from whence they could overlook the bush

in which they supposed the king to be. Disappointment then met

them on every side, only relieved by the encounter with the two

girls who, in spite of emphatic denials, there was every reason

to believe were the property of the king. One of the king's own

servants was shortly afterwards captured, and inside his bundle

was found a valuable Martini-Henry rifle of excellent workmanship.

Subsequently, this prisoner confessed that he had left the king

only two or three days previously. A day's rest was then taken, and

while encamped, seven girls, a young man, and a boy were caught,

who reported that Cetywayo was captured, and that they had fled

from his place two days before. It then turned out that when the

pursuing party was encamped on the banks of the Black Umvolosi,

they were only within 300 yards of the king, some of whose people

ran away, thinking that his capture was certain. Next day they

commenced to scour the bush. There they had to sleep, while Zulu

beef and Zulu beer were their fare. Most of the party at this time

thought the game was up, but Lord Gifford was still full of hope.

Back they went, beating the bush on the way, to Umbopa's son's

place, where the kraal was burned and the cattle captured. The main

body was shortly afterwards reached, and there, at last, rather

precise information was obtained from a Zulu "by means of proper

persuasive measures." This man was to act as guide, but no sooner

had they entered the bush than he slipped off and escaped. Two

places which had evidently been prepared for the king were seen,

and the party had to return again to the kraals, which had now

become head-quarters.

Two of Oham's men came in professing their loyalty, and were

appointed spies, but a little boy revealed the fact that one of

them had been with the king down in the bush, and then, before all

the people, they were told that their double-dealing and humbug

were perfectly understood. Trails were followed, people were

examined, but all to no purpose; fealty to the king was paramount.

Neither the loss of their cattle, which were carried off, the

fear of death, nor the offer of bribes, immense in value to them,

were of any avail. Returning from one of their long exploring

expeditions, a woman was suddenly met in the bush, whose fright at

the sight of the white men and the guns was so great as to make her

confess the place where the king had slept two nights previously. A

party went off at dusk to this place, and captured three brothers,

who being questioned, under fear of death, declared that they knew

nothing, and that if killed they would die innocently. In the dark

forest, lit up by the moon and the bright glare of the bivouac

fire, the three men stood before their captors. It was a subject

worthy of the pencil of Salvator Rosa. Interrogatories, threats,

promises, all were useless, until at last the plan was adopted of

leading one of the brothers away blindfolded behind a bush, and

causing a rifle to be fired off in such a way as to induce the

others to believe that he was shot. At last, overcome by fear, one

of them told where the king had slept the night before, and where

he had seen him that morning. The other brother, being informed

that everything was known, confirmed the intelligence. Away went

Lord Gifford and his party, with these two men as guides, and at

daybreak the kraal was reached and found deserted. The direction

that Cetywayo had taken was then pointed out, and having been

followed to one of Umnyamna's kraals, it was then discovered

that the king was only five miles distant, and had halted for

the day. It was then absolutely necessary to surround the place

without being seen, particularly as his refuge was close by the

side of a forest, into which, upon the slightest alarm, he would

immediately escape. As it was known that the Dragoons had gone some

distance beyond this place, a note was sent by Lord Gifford to

Major Marter, telling him to watch the passes. The latter officer,

upon questioning the Zulu, ascertained where the king was, and

immediately made such dispositions as to render escape impossible.

The kraal was surrounded before Cetywayo had the slightest idea

that his pursuers were upon him. The men of the Natal Native

Contingent called upon him to surrender, but no notice was taken of

this summons. Upon Major Marter repeating it, the king came out.

The natives stretched out their hands towards him, but with dignity

the monarch of the Zulus waved them back, and surrendered to Major

Marter, accompanying his submission with a request that he might be

immediately shot. He was informed, in reply, that if no resistance

were made his person was perfectly safe. Then there was mounting

in hot haste, and, under the escort of Major Marter's party, the

king, with four of his women, were hurried away towards Ulundi.

From that place an ambulance with eight mules was sent out, on the

morning of the 29th of August, to proceed to the Black Umvolosi

river and convey him thence. The king complained of the jolting,

and walked a good deal of the way.

[Sidenote: _Cetywayo captured._]

[Sidenote: _Major Marter's narrative._]

The authority for the preceding account is Mr. Lysight, interpreter

with Lord Gifford's party. The following is the interesting

narrative of the capture given by Major Marter. That officer

left Colonel Clarke's column at the Black Umvolosi at daylight

on Wednesday the 27th, in consequence of news coming in from

General Colley that the king was making for the Ignome forest. He

had with him his squadron King's Dragoon Guards, one company of

Barton's natives under Captain Plesh, ten Mounted Irregulars under

Lieutenant Wingh, and young Oftenbro as interpreter, with four

scouts or guides. He sent his men on to threaten the inhabitants

of the kraals that unless they gave him information about the king

and helped to catch him, he had orders to burn their kraals, take

prisoners, capture cattle, and not allow them to cultivate any

land until he was caught. At last he got an indirect hint, after

sleeping out one night, from a Zulu whom he met, named Uzililo,

who stated that he had come from Umbopa's kraal, and had heard

that the "wind blew that way," pointing to where the king was

afterwards taken, but that the troops had better go "that way,"

pointing further to the north-east, so as to get there well. This

was enough for the major, and having also met Gifford's messenger

with the note to Captain Maurice, who was not near, and opened

it, in which it spoke of his being on the track again, and that

he expected to capture the king that night, he felt sure he was

also on the track and would try and assist at the capture. He went

on carefully up the hill, until near the top he came to a kraal,

when, in answer to a question for guides, two men started off

without speaking or answering any questions, and took their guests

to the top of the Ignome forest, at a place with precipitous edges

looking down nearly 1500 feet. They came to a small open space with

long grass, and here the guides put up their hands, and the party

was halted. From this point only Major Marter and his interpreter

proceeded on hands, knees, and stomach, imitating their guides,

until fifty yards further on they could look down and see a small

kraal of about twenty huts strongly stockaded, standing on a slight

rise in the centre, surrounded by forest-covered steep slopes on

three sides, and only open towards the south-west. This was the

place where the king was then, and a plan was quickly arranged to

surround it. The natives were stripped of all their clothes to the

skin, and taking only their rifles, assegais, and cartridges, were

to proceed down the left slope, and get round quietly in front and

across the opening, so as to be in time to co-operate with the

Dragoons, who were to dismount and lead their horses down, as best

they could, any place which was found at all accessible. The men

were all dismounted, and after a little search a place was found

where they could get into a little ravine and so work them very

carefully to the bottom. The major led, and left the top at 1.45,

reaching the bottom at 3 p.m., with the loss of two horses and

several men injured. They all say it was most horrible work, all

thick forest, with rocky boulders to jump down sometimes several

feet. However, "all's well that ends well," and the end was worth

the means; so, luckily, as there was a slight rise hiding them from

the kraal, which was only 600 yards distant, they managed to mount

again _en masse_, and then, directing Captain Gibbing's troops to

file off to the right, and Godsden's to the left, they charged at

the kraal full gallop, and surrounded it before the people inside

knew they were there. Fortunately, also, the natives first got

across the open, but at the same time others completely hemmed them

in. It was seen that all the men inside were armed; but they were

at once warned that if a shot was fired they would be fired into

all round, and the kraal burnt, so they unwillingly submitted.

Major Marter dismounted, and, followed by his interpreter and some

Dragoons, went in and demanded where the king was. Umkozana, the

last chief who remained with the king, pointed to a hut at the

other end, and they went there at once and told Cetywayo to come

out. He refused, asked them to come in to him, wanted to know the

rank of the officer in charge, and then requested them to shoot

him. After some useless parleying, and as it was foolish to lose

time, he was threatened that unless he came out they would burn the

kraal, and not until then did he come out. The first thing he said

was that they would never have caught him if they had not come down

the mountains, as he had spies on the flats, and thought it quite

impossible for any troops but Zulus to come down the precipices at

the back. He was told his life would be spared, but that he must go

along with them as a prisoner to the white chief at Ulundi. They

captured, besides the king and Umkozana, the headman of the kraal,

six men-servants and one boy, and five women and one girl; also

four Martini-Henry's, lots of cartridges, fourteen other guns, and

many relics of the 24th Regiment, with a lot of the king's cooking

and sleeping things. The king caused much intentional delay by

walking as slowly as he could.

[Sidenote: _Cetywayo a prisoner._]

In entering Ulundi six of the Dragoon Guards rode in front,

followed by Natal Native Contingent men and one company of the 60th

Regiment; then two Dragoon Guards, between whom walked Cetywayo,

with another Dragoon close behind him. Natal Native Contingent,

eight men of Lonsdale's Horse, and another company of the 60th

Regiment followed. Sir Garnet Wolseley did not go out to meet the

last of the Zulu kings, as the prisoner had rejected and despised

every overture. He was treated, not as a captured king, but as

a mere fugitive from law and order. After a very short delay,

the party again started, ostensibly for Pietermaritzburg _viâ_

Rorke's Drift; but the march had not proceeded long, when an

express messenger galloped up from the general with an order to

proceed with all speed to Fort Durnford. When Cetywayo arrived at

Kwamagwaza, he said, "This is not the way to the Tugela," and knew

at once that he would have to cross the sea. He became melancholy

and abstracted. During the entire journey, he retained the quiet

dignity for which he is remarkable. At Port Durnford a surf-boat

was ready, into which the king and his party were placed and taken

to the steamer _Natal_, which was waiting.[51] The sea was rough,

and Cetywayo had to crawl on his hands and knees on board, while

one of his people, overcome by the terrors of the ocean, lay on his

back in the surf-boat, and made signs that he desired to be killed.

The gunboat _Forester_ escorted the _Natal_ to Simon's Bay, and

thence to Table Bay, where Cetywayo and his wives were landed, and

were lodged in the castle of Cape Town. Thus ended in a prison in

the metropolis of the Cape Colony the career of the last of the

Zulu kings and the autonomy of the nation. The greatest and most

powerful ruler of South Africa had defied Great Britain, and in his

defeat fell once and for ever all the hopes of domination so long

cherished among the native tribes of Southern Africa.

[Sidenote: _Cetywayo's personal appearance._]

In spite of his large proportions, Cetywayo is a handsome man,

of much dignity of aspect. His limbs are large, but symmetrical;

very broad chest, large and lustrous eyes, intelligent and not

unamiable countenance. With plenty of food and perfect safety, he

lost all inclination to be shot. Speaking of the war, he took all

the responsibility for the battle of Kambula, but declared that

Ulundi was fought against his wish, and in consequence of the

determination of his young men once more to try the arbitration of

the sword. Now that his power is broken, he laughs to scorn the

idea of any more fighting being possible against British rule.

A great meeting was called by the white "inkosi" (Sir Garnet) for

the 1st of September—the same day, six years ago, on which Cetywayo

was crowned. It was fitting that the anniversary of the day of

promises never fulfilled should be also a day of atonement. Two

hundred Zulus were seated a few paces from Sir Garnet's tent, and

although naturally great talkers, the silence of death prevailed.

Ranged in rows four deep, with the principal chiefs in front, they

listened with perfect attention to the words which decided the fate

of their country and of themselves. Two of the king's brothers and

the prime minister of the king were present. At half-past four,

Sir Garnet Wolseley left his tent, and, as he walked towards the

assembly, was greeted with uplifted hands and shouts of "Inkose."

Leaning upon the hilt of his sword, he calmly gazed for a few

moments upon the representatives of a conquered nation assembled

to hear its doom. Mr. Shepstone interpreted into Zulu sentence by

sentence as Sir Garnet Wolseley spoke, as follows:—

[Sidenote: _Sir Garnet Wolseley and the Zulus._]

"It is six years ago on this very day, the 1st of September, that

Cetywayo was crowned King of the Zulus, and only yesterday you

yourselves have seen him carried away a prisoner, never to return

again to Zululand. On the occasion of his coronation Cetywayo made

certain promises regarding laws to be observed in the future, which

promises he never fulfilled, and his country is now about to be

divided into different chieftainships, and I hope his fate will be

a warning to all of the chiefs not to follow in his footsteps, but

to act according to the commands and terms given by the English

Queen, who will most certainly punish any who do not do so. The

interests and welfare of the South African races are very dear to

the Queen, and she is anxious that the natives of this country

should thrive, as those in Natal have done up to the present time.

She will be lenient to faults arising from ignorance; but although

inclined, as I have said, to deal leniently when ignorance causes

them to commit faults, those who persistently go contrary to good

government and peace will assuredly be punished as Cetywayo has

been. As they are aware, she lives far away; but her power is very

great, and she is quite able to, and will, punish those who take

life or make wars contrary to her orders. Cetywayo took the lives

of his people for trivial offences, without giving them a chance

of defending themselves, or allowing them a fair trial. This must

cease. In future, trivial offences will be punishable by fines.

Cetywayo kept on foot a large and powerful army, and did not allow

his men to marry without his permission; in future, the young men

will be allowed to marry when and whom they like, provided always

they have sufficient for the support of a wife, and the consent of

the girl's parents. Disobedience of this law is to be punishable

by a fine inflicted by the headmen of the kraal. As Zululand is

almost entirely surrounded by country under the Queen of England's

rule, and not threatened in any way, there is no need of a larger

army; and in future no guns or ammunition will be allowed to be

imported, or to be in the hands of any Zulu. Nor will any stores be

permitted to be landed on the Zulu coast, in case, under the guise

of merchandise, arms should be brought into the country. The young

men are to be encouraged to labour, and are to be allowed to come

and leave when they like; for only by work can they become rich

and prosperous. Cetywayo encouraged witchcraft, and what is known

as 'smelling out.' That I look to the chiefs to put down, and an

end to such ridiculous and foolish practices arrived at. Cetywayo,

by this practice of witchcraft, caused many lives to be taken, and

neither life nor property was safe. And each chief must clearly

understand, before he signs his name to the treaty, that none of

his people must be taken without a fair trial before the chief

being granted, and the accused being allowed to call his witnesses.

In what I have said there is nothing new, though the young men may

have forgotten; but these laws and customs held good before Chaka's

ancient laws and usages introduced what is known as the military

system. I intend leaving an English officer here as Resident, to be

the eyes and ears of England, to watch over the people, to see the

laws observed, and that the chiefs rule with justice and equity. I

am aware there are still a considerable number of rifles and guns

of ours, as well as cattle scattered about the country, and those

chiefs who wish to stand well with the English Queen will lose no

time in bringing them in and delivering them up to the British

Resident.

[Sidenote: _General Crealock's column._]

"As they are well aware by their own rules of war and conquest,

Zululand now belongs to the Queen of England. She has, however,

already enough land in Africa, and so she has, through me as her

representative, appointed certain chiefs to rule over districts

which I shall presently name. The chiefs elected must remember

that this is an act of grace, and that what I am now doing in

partitioning the country to various chiefs is only what Cetywayo

has himself done in former times. They are well aware our laws,

religion, and customs are very different to theirs, and the Queen

has no wish to force ours upon them. As regards the laws and

customs they are to be ruled by, they are to be those good and

ancient ones in use before Chaka's time; but life and property is

to be protected, and no life to be forfeited without a fair trial.

As regards religion, there is no wish to force ours upon them, and

missionary enterprise will not be encouraged contrary to the wish

of the chief and people he proposes to reside amongst. The British

Government is very anxious to prevent white people settling in

the country, and no sale, transfer, or alienation of land will be

permitted or recognized. I consider this a very important point, as

in many instances land has been said by white people to have been

purchased by them from the Zulus, and given rise to very serious

complications. If, therefore, missionaries do come and wish to

reside among the people, all that can be permitted them to hold in

land must be a small patch for their house and garden, but none

whatever must be alienated from the Zulu people, to whom it really

belongs. Some of those I have intended to make chiefs, I am sorry

to see, are not here to-day; but some who are here to-day will now

sign a document, the purport of which I have now told you all; and

a duplicate of the treaty will be given to each chief to keep,

and a similar one retained by me. The boundaries of the various

chieftainships will be told them, and will be clearly defined

hereafter by officers sent round for that purpose."

The first division, or coast column, under General Crealock,

had not been opposed by the Zulus in the field. It established

a series of fortified posts along the south coast of Zululand,

opened a new base of supplies at Port Durnford, from which to feed

a force operating against Ulundi, destroyed the military kraal

of Emangwene and the king's old military kraal at Ondini, besides

clearing the coast district. By the 6th of July, all the great

Zulu chiefs, with their people, from the Tugela river to St. Lucia

Bay, had given in their submission. It was the coast column, under

Pearson, which gained the battle of Inyezane, and had gallantly

held Ekowe for three months; and it was the coast column, more

than any other, which had suffered from disease. Among General

Crealock's valedictory remarks are the following:—

"July 17, 1879.

"In notifying to the army in South Africa that Brigadier-General

Wood, V.C., C.B., and Lieutenant-Colonel Buller are about to leave

Zululand for England, Sir Garnet Wolseley desires to place on

record his high appreciation of the services they have rendered,

and that their military abilities and untiring energy have

materially tended to bring the war to an end. The success which

has attended the operations of the flying column is largely due to

General Wood's genius for war, to the admirable system which he

has established in his command, and to the zeal and energy with

which his ably conceived plans have been carried out by Colonel

Buller."

BRIGADIER-GENERAL WOOD'S ORDERS.

[Sidenote: _General Wood's farewell._]

"The Brigadier-General proposes, weather permitting, to leave for

Pietermaritzburg to-morrow. In saying good-bye to the soldiers of

all ranks, he wishes to express his warm gratitude for the support

he has invariably received. The Brigadier-General has gained the

commendation of his superiors for the successful operations of

the flying column; he feels that the credit he has so obtained

has been gained by the courage and untiring devotion to duty of

his fellow-soldiers, and he will never forget his comrades of the

flying column."

It is right to quote the following orders respecting two

distinguished officers of the war:—

"The troops and Naval Brigade forming the first division must be

content with the conviction that their gallantry in the earlier

part of this war has probably diminished the opposition of the

Zulus in this country.

"You must be content with the honest conviction that your hard

work and energy, under very great difficulties, and with your

ranks thinned day by day with sickness and fever, has successfully

carried out the task set you by Lord Chelmsford to perform; and,

thanks to the valuable assistance and co-operation of Commodore

Richards and the Naval Brigade, you have established the

landing-place opened at Port Durnford, which will enable further

operations towards the capital to be carried out with facility

should they become necessary.

"Soldiers and sailors of the first division, I thank you all for

your good conduct, your hard works; and sympathize with you in

the loss of so many comrades whose lives have been sacrificed to

this climate, so deadly to man and beast. We have all had great

difficulties to overcome.

"I wish you all a hearty 'good-bye;' I wish you success and

prosperity wherever your duty to her Majesty may lead you."[52]

[Sidenote: _Zululand and the new chiefs._]

It would be uninteresting to go into details with respect to the

movements of the columns under Colonels Villiers and Baker Russell.

Mahabolin and other Magulisin chiefs surrendered, Manyonyoba asked

terms of the commanding officer at Luneberg, and the various

scattered embers left after the great war conflagration were

soon extinguished in the north. In September Zululand was most

thoroughly conquered. On the 1st of September, John Dunn, Umgayna,

Usibilo, Umcitsobu, Somkelu, and Gonzi signed the terms upon which

they accepted chieftainship; Oham and others were proclaimed at a

later date. The principal undertakings and conditions were that

the chiefs should respect the boundaries assigned; abolish the

military system; allow all men to marry and work as they will;

prohibit importation of arms; take no life without fair trial;

discontinue witchcraft; surrender fugitive criminals from British

territory; make no war without the sanction of Government; prevent

sale or alienation of land; arbitration to be appealed to in case

of disputes with British subjects. The succession to chieftainships

to be dependent on approval of our Government.

The following is an exact summary of the terms and conditions

signed in duplicate by all the newly appointed chiefs in Zululand

at Ulundi, September 1, 1879. The prelude and ending are verbatim;

terms and conditions summarized:—

I recognize the victory of British arms over the Zulu nation and

the full right and title of her Majesty Queen Victoria, Queen of

England and Empress of India, to deal as she may think fit with

the Zulu chiefs and the people, and with the Zulu country; and I

agree and hereby signify my agreement to accept from General Sir

Garnet Joseph Wolseley, G.C.M.G. and K.C.B., as the representative

of her Majesty Queen Victoria, the chieftainship of a territory

of Zululand, to be known hereafter as——, subject to the following

terms, conditions, and limitations:—

Terms, conditions, and limitations laid down by General Sir Garnet

Joseph Wolseley, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., and assented to by me——, as the

terms, conditions, and limitations subject to which I agree to

accept the chieftainship of the aforesaid territory.

1. To observe and respect whatever boundaries shall be assigned to

my territory by the British Government through the Resident of the

division in which his territory is situated.

2. Not to permit the existence of the Zulu military system or the

existence of any military system or organisation whatsoever within

my territory; to proclaim and make it a rule that all men shall be

allowed to marry when they choose and as they choose, according

to the good and ancient customs of his people known and followed

in the days preceding the establishment by Chaka of the military

system, and to allow and encourage all men living within his

territory to go and come freely for peaceful purposes, and to work

in Natal or in the Transvaal or elsewhere for themselves or for

hire.

[Sidenote: _Sir Garnet Wolseley's conditions._]

3. Not to import or allow to be imported into his territory by any

person, for any object whatsoever, firearms, or other goods of any

description, and ammunition from any port, inland or sea-coast,

and to confiscate all such goods or arms, etc., as come in, fining

the owners or possessors of them with heavy fine or such other

punishment as may be allowed.

4. Not to allow life to be taken on any pretence without trial

before the council of chiefsmen, allowing fair and impartial

examination of witnesses in the chiefs presence, and further not

to permit of witchcraft or witch-doctors, or "smelling out."

5. To surrender all fugitives demanded by British Government

flying from the laws, and to prevent their coming into Zululand,

and if in, to exert himself and his people to catch them.

6. Not to make war on any other chiefs without the sanction of the

British Government through the Resident of the district.

7. The succession to the chieftainship to be decided by ancient

laws and customs, and nominations of successors to be submitted

for approval of Government.

8. Not to sell or alienate the land.

9. To permit all people now in the district to remain upon

recognition of his power, and any wishing to leave to be allowed

to do so.

10. In all cases of dispute in which British subjects are

concerned, to appeal and decide by decision of British Resident,

and in other cases not to punish until approved of by Resident.

11. In all cases not included in the above, or in any doubt or

uncertainty, to govern and decide in accordance with ancient laws.

These terms, conditions, and limitations I engage, and I hereby

solemnly pledge my faith, to abide by and respect in letter or in

spirit without qualification or reserve.

Signed at Ulundi on the 1st day of September, 1879.

Chief——his X mark.

Induna——Do.

General commanding her Majesty's forces in South Africa, and High

Commissioner for South-Eastern Africa.

Signed by John Shepstone as witness of the correct interpretation

by him and thorough knowledge of the contents of the document the

chief has signed.

On the 12th of September Major-General Clifford was able to notify

that Colonels Villiers' and Russell's columns were in course

of being broken up, after they had thoroughly patrolled the

Makulusi district and found all quiet. Oham had returned to his

own territory, accompanied by Wheelwright, who was appointed to

act as Resident in Zululand. Mongodhla had been driven from his

caves and his cattle captured, while his brother had surrendered

at Luneburg. Two companies of the 24th Regiment, ordered to encamp

at Isandhlwana, removed the last vestiges of the camp, buried any

bodies remaining above ground, and erected cairns of stones over

the graves of the troops who fell there. More than 5000 guns had

been taken, or surrendered by Zulus. Sir Garnet Wolseley did his

work thoroughly. Troops were despatched against Sekukuni, and

Sir Garnet himself proceeded to the Transvaal, in order to subdue

discontent among the inhabitants, and establish a settled system of

government. It is not necessary to follow him there.

[Sidenote: _John Dunn._]

With the conclusion of the Zulu war this book must terminate.

As regards the political adjustment of affairs in Zululand, the

directions of the Home Government, were no doubt, implicitly

obeyed. The country was made self-supporting in a military point

of view, and the chiefs, with their tribes, were so disposed as

to form a barrier against hostile aggression. John Dunn, who was

a Christian renegade, living as a Zulu in polygamic life, but

whose influence was supreme throughout the country, was placed as

chief over South-Eastern Zululand. One of his first steps was the

prohibition of all missionaries in the country in which he holds

sway. Over Sirayo's country near the border, extending to the foot

of the Drakenberg, the chief Hlubi was appointed, about whose tried

fidelity and loyalty there can be no question. Oham occupies the

region between the Pongolo and the Black Umvolosi. Mnyame, the late

king's prime minister, is established near him, and, it is to be

hoped, will not hatch plots for the establishment of Oham on the

throne of his brother. "Zululand for the Zulus" has been the motto

for this arrangement, but hopeless heathenism has been riveted

as chains upon the people. Missionary enterprise is discouraged

and even forbidden, while all the evils of tribal rule are

virtually perpetuated. It has been said with some fancy, but great

exactitude, that the new dispensation realizes the description of

the country given by Tennyson in "Locksley Hall"—

"Never comes the trader, never floats an European flag,

Slides the bird o'er lustrous woodland, swings the trailer from the crag.

* * * * * *

There methinks would be enjoyment more than in this march of mind.

* * * * * *

The passions cramped no longer shall have scope and breathing-space."

Savage women shall be taken to rear dusky races. Polygamy receives

approval. Missionaries are forbidden; and, strange to say, all this

is really done in consequence of the efforts of the Exeter Hall

zealots, who have denounced Sir Bartle Frere and the colonists from

the beginning, lauded the heathens, and strenuously objected to any

assumption of their territory. The toleration of heathenism is both

a blunder and a crime, which, if not stopped in time, must result

in disastrous consequences.

APPENDIX.

CAPE COLONISTS _VERSUS_ NATIVES.

(_Articles published in the P.E. Telegraph._)

I.

It is an axiom that history repeats itself, and historical studies,

therefore, become particularly useful in a political crisis like

the present, when the policy of Sir Bartle Frere towards the native

tribes of South Africa has been condemned by the Home Government.

In all parts of the world a tragedy is enacted when barbarism and

civilization come into contact. It was so with the Puritans, whose

pioneers landed in North America from the _Mayflower_; it is so

with the Dutch and the natives of Java, with the British and the

Maoris, with the French and the people of New Caledonia. Wherever,

throughout the world, colonization takes place among savages

there must be war, or there can be no safety or progress. When

the Dutch formed a settlement on the shores of Table Bay in 1652,

it was neither their interest nor their wish to fight, but it was

perfectly impossible to avoid it. Although a mere place of call for

outward and homeward-bound ships was required, yet it soon became

apparent that not merely as a sequence of successful defence, but

as a means of protection, it was requisite to annex conquered

territory. The Hottentots were the first enemies of Europeans in

South Africa, and the Kafirs—themselves aggressors—were the second.

The latter people were robbers by profession, and an organized

system of plunder continually harassed the border farmers of the

colony.

The first act of the present tragedy of Kafir war waged against

Great Britain took place in 1811, when constant depredations on

the part of the Kafirs made it necessary either to repel the

enemy or to abandon the country. The latter system of tactics was

not then in vogue among the countrymen of Nelson and Wellington,

therefore a large force under Colonel Graham was despatched to the

front. Landdrost Stockenstrom, who accompanied this force, rode

up to a party of the natives and urgently endeavoured to secure

peace. In reply he was stabbed to death, and fourteen of the men

who accompanied him were likewise murdered. Of course the Kafirs

were chastised, but the snake was only scotched, not killed, and

in 1816 the colonial frontier farmers were so plundered by the

natives that they were forced to state to Government that they

would have to abandon their farms unless effectively protected.

As a result, Lord Charles Somerset held a solemn conference with

Gaika and other great chiefs in April, 1817, which was followed

by a solemn treaty of peace. Those solemn farces must have been

sources of immense amusement to the savages. Gaika gave pledges

with the utmost readiness—there was no difficulty whatever. Honesty

and justice were in future to prevail; the people of the kraal to

which stolen cattle were traced should always be held responsible,

and reparation was always to be made _instanter_. Presents were

lavished upon the "Paramount" Chief, and then (in the words of

the Rev. Mr. Williams) "Gaika fled instantly to the other side

of the Kat river like a thief," plundering was soon vigorously

recommenced, and the idea of restitution became almost as great a

joke as the treaty of peace. In 1818 the chief T'Slambie positively

refused to restore cattle traced to his kraal. Afterwards, to

gain time, he promised, and then, of course, broke his promise.

War was once more forced upon the authorities, and this time the

contest was a serious one. While military operations were going on

in Kafirland, the confederate chiefs got behind our forces, drove

in the small military posts, and ravaged the frontier districts.

Incited to fanaticism by the witch-doctor Mokanna, or Lynx, 9000

savages impetuously attacked the head-quarters of the military

at Graham's Town, and it was only by means of desperate fighting

that the town was saved. Soon afterwards another solemn treaty

was made, in which it was agreed that all Kafirs should evacuate

the country between the Great Fish and Keiskamma rivers, and that

this territory should remain neutral and unoccupied. The usual

sequence occurred, the treaty was laughed at and violated by our

enemies at the earliest possible moment. Downing Street invariably

looked upon the Kafirs in the light of honourable belligerents,

and the unfortunate colonists as grasping, unscrupulous men. An

outrageous divorce was constituted between truth and justice on the

one side, and so-called philanthropy on the other, and the people

of the Cape Colony had to suffer the heavy and bitter penalties

of this extraordinary ignorance and fatuity. The course of events

from first to last has been very simple. It must be borne in mind

that the South African Kafir wars constitute _one_ tragedy in

various acts, with intervals of unequal duration. The war with

Cetywayo is identical in principle with those waged with Gaika,

T'Slambie, Dingaan, Kreli, and Sandilli. By immense exertions the

tide of savagery has been periodically rolled back, and if wise

counsel had been followed, the war of 1835 would have been final;

but Downing Street intervened, and it is to the disastrous fatuous

policy then adopted that we owe the wars of 1846 and 1852. It

is to this intervention, and to this policy, that we desire in

this article, and in others that are to follow, specially to draw

attention, because the part taken by Sir Benjamin D'Urban in 1836

is now filled by Sir Bartle Frere in 1879; and the character of

Lord Glenelg, who declared that "the Kafirs had ample justification

in the late war," seems likely to be attempted by the gentleman who

is at present her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the

Colonies.—_April 22, 1879._

II.

The Kafir war of 1835 was exceedingly disastrous to the colonists.

Shortly after it had commenced Colonel Smith (afterwards Sir

Harry Smith) wrote: "Already are 7000 persons dependent upon the

Government for the necessaries of life. The land is filled with

the lamentations of the widows and the fatherless. The indelible

impressions already made upon myself by the horrors of an irruption

of savages upon a scattered population, almost exclusively engaged

in the peaceful occupation of husbandry, are such as make me look

on those I have witnessed in a service of thirty years as trifles

to what I have now witnessed." The Kafirs were on this occasion,

as on every other, the aggressors, and plunder was the principal

motive of the war. Fifteen years previously Great Britain had taken

the responsibility of settling 5000 of her subjects in the frontier

districts of the Cape Colony, and then defence and protection

became both the duty and the interest of the home country. With

great exertions and after immense loss the war was brought to a

close. As a glorious trophy of the war no fewer than 15,000 Fingoes

were literally saved from cruel captivity. The Moses who led them

out of their house of bondage was Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and it was

this wise and enlightened Governor who annexed the province of

Queen Adelaide, and determined that the liberated people should be

placed in this territory, so as to form "the best barrier against

the entrance of the Kafirs into the great Fish River jungle." This

extensive bush was the "quadrilateral" of the Kafirs, and it was

only acquired by the best blood of the British and colonial troops.

During the whole period of the war of 1835 a very small section of

colonists had endeavoured to poison the minds of our Downing Street

rulers. Their arguments were based on several fictions, including

affirmations about violence on the part of colonists having begot

violence on the part of Kafirs, and that the great body of Kafirs

had never offended us. They even went so far as to make use of

glaring untruths respecting Hintza not having been engaged in the

war, and misled Lord Glenelg so much respecting the particulars

of that chief's death as to induce his lordship to make use of

expressions which he was afterwards compelled to retract. A steady

fire of prejudice, fed by pre-conceived ideas, constantly existed

at home in favour of the Kafir tribes—and indeed all savages—which

required very little effort to turn into a consuming fire of anger

and indignation. These little efforts were sedulously made and

constantly continued in South Africa with the most disastrous

results. A number of well-meaning and prejudiced men, who can be

styled the Exeter Hall party, declaimed with virulence against

the colonists, and unfortunately Lord Glenelg was enrolled among

their number. This nobleman evidently considered that humanitarian

efforts were due to savages only, not to colonists, and through

his contemptible folly became the means of inflicting the most

severe injuries upon both. Sir Benjamin D'Urban, who was completely

master of the situation, and had proved himself an honest and wise

administrator, was entirely ignored, his policy was stigmatized in

the most insulting manner, and the sentimental ideas of theorists

made to take its place. In a despatch, dated 28th December,

1835, the Secretary of State entirely exculpates the Kafirs and

censures both Sir Benjamin D'Urban and the colonists. He says:

"In the conduct which was pursued towards the Kafir nation by the

colonists, and the public authorities of the colony, through a long

series of years, the Kafirs had ample justification of the late

war; they had a perfect right to hazard the experiment, however

hopeless, of extorting by force that redress which they could not

expect otherwise to obtain; and the claim of sovereignty over

the new province, bounded by the Keiskamma and the Kei, must be

renounced. It rests upon a conquest resulting from a war in which,

as far as I am at present able to judge, the original justice is

on the side of the conquered, not of the conquering party." The

governor is severely reproved for styling the Kafirs "irreclaimable

savages," and the Wesleyan missionaries are also censured. As a

sequence the whole country between the Fish and Buffalo rivers

had to be handed over to the Kafirs, although that portion of

this territory which extended between the Fish and Keiskamma

rivers had been ceded by Gaika to the colony so far back as the

year 1819, and was therefore not conquered in the recent war. The

extraordinary fatuity of this course, judged from a military point

of view, is evident from the description of the boundary furnished

by Major Charters, military secretary to Sir George Napier. This

able officer says: "The line of frontier is all in favour of the

Kafirs; a dense jungle—the medium breadth is about five miles—torn

and intersected by deep ravines, a great part impenetrable except

to Kafirs and wild beasts, occupies about one hundred miles of

frontier, following the sinuosities of the Great Fish river. The

whole British army would be insufficient to guard it." In fact,

this country comprised what, by analogy, may be styled the Kafir

quadrilateral, or combination of almost impregnable fortresses.

British and colonial blood had to be poured out as water in the

wars of 1845 and 1852 to recapture this country; but fanaticism

and prejudice are always impervious to argument. "Their blood be

upon us and upon our children" is a sentence often repeated in

history, so when the Waterloo veteran and gallant British soldier,

Sir Benjamin D'Urban, was dismissed for doing his duty, Lord

Glenelg defiantly wrote, "You announce to me the abandonment of the

province of Adelaide and cast on me the responsibility of all the

consequent disasters you predict. I am perfectly ready to take upon

myself the sole and exclusive responsibility on this occasion."

It is difficult to find language sufficiently strong to stigmatize

the base perfidy and fatuous incompetency of the Glenelg policy.

A colony is acquired and its people exchange allegiance for

protection; later on 5000 British emigrants are placed in its

frontier districts. The savages in and beyond the borders of this

country are numerically far superior to our own subjects, and

systematically send in plundering bands who devastate the country

and impoverish the farmers. It is these savages who make war, and

in defence it is at last absolutely necessary either to repel the

invaders or to abandon the country. The case, let it be remembered,

is not one of emigrants seizing a country and then applying for

protection. It is the British Government which established its

sovereignty first and sent its emigrants afterwards. With immense

exertion, and at the cost of much blood and treasure, the savage

tide is pushed back—and then Lord Glenelg deliberately makes it

flow again over the conquered country, perfidiously becomes the

ally and friend of the savages and creates a cruel necessity—no

other than that of doing the work over again in the bloody wars

of 1845 and 1852. There is scarcely anything in history to form a

parallel to this gross injustice and perfidy. Yet at the present

moment a large party of fanatical "philanthropists" in England are

crying out for a repetition of the same policy in Natal. The tide

will be pushed back to Cetywayo's kraal, but we must abandon the

country after we conquer it. The Zulu King made the war, and it

is as purely one of righteous self-defence as any ever waged in

the world; yet we are told that the colonists provoked it and are

responsible for it! Sir Bartle Frere is to be converted into Sir

Benjamin D'Urban! and a new edition of the Glenelg policy must be

adopted by her Majesty's Government!—_April 25, 1879._

III.

Lord Glenelg emphatically stated that the Kafirs had perfect

justification for the war of 1835, and this affirmation was the

foundation of his entire policy. He identified himself with the

pseudo-philanthropists who looked upon the white inhabitants of

the Eastern districts as usurpers and persecutors. The ideas of

1836 remain substantially the ideas of 1879, the only difference

being that the _venue_ is changed and that the tide of savagery

has been pushed further eastward. The settlers of 1820 were placed

by the British Government on the frontier of the Cape Colony, and

on their part and that of their descendants there was certainly no

usurpation, while it positively seems to be the result of monomania

to speak of their having persecuted the Kafirs. The incontestable

facts of history prove exactly the opposite: it was the Kafirs that

harassed and persecuted them. A comparatively small, struggling,

and sparsely settled community was persistently tormented and

impoverished by most cruel thefts and constant aggressions, which

at last culminated in wars of defence most disastrous to the

farmers and the principal portion of the settlers. The stock,

dwellings, etc., of the poor border population destroyed in the

war of 1835 alone were valued at upwards of £280,000! This was

a cruel, terrible infliction on those poor settlers, but it was

not considered enough by the Exeter Hall party. Christianity

was blasphemed by a policy of the grossest injustice adopted in

its name. Those who were bound by every tie of justice—putting

aside charity—to defend their own countrymen turned against them

most virulently, and did everything in their power to cause the

re-enactment of the bloody scenes in which British settlers in this

distant land had suffered so much.

In Mr. Godlonton's "Case for the Colonists" there is abundant

proof of the facts already adduced. The Kafirs were the aggressors

and the colonists the sufferers. Gross injustice, faithlessness,

rapine, and fraud—or in other words, _savagery_—had to be

grappled with, repelled, and conquered in the Cape Colony, and

the pseudo-philanthropists of England, headed by Lord Glenelg,

did everything in their power to aid and assist the latter cause.

Perhaps the most clear proof of the error of the British policy

on which we are now animadverting may be found in the evidence of

one of Lord Glenelg's chosen men and champions. Sir George Napier

was sent out specially to reverse the policy of Sir Benjamin

D'Urban. In answer to a Port Elizabeth address, he said, "I

_decidedly_ tell you that I accepted the government of this colony

in the conviction that the former system, as regarded our Kafir

neighbours, was erroneous; and I am come out here, agreeing in,

and determined to support, the system of policy pursued by the

Lieutenant-Governor of these districts (Captain Stockenstrom) in

accordance with the instructions which his Honour and myself have

received from her Majesty's Secretary of State (Lord Glenelg)."

Nothing can be clearer than this, or more decided; but when Sir

George Napier learnt the facts of the case, the mist of prejudice

dropped from his eyes. Most fortunately, this officer was an honest

man, and dared to give his testimony in favour of the truth in

spite of his employers in England. He found that the policy he

had been directed to carry out "shocked one's natural sense of

justice" (these are his own words), and that he had been completely

duped and deceived. Referring to the aggressions of the Kafirs,

Sir George Napier says, "It would not be just to pass over the

fact that while much loss has been sustained by the colonists,

as stated in the official returns, I am not aware, except in one

instance—and that one of no importance—that any aggression has

been committed by the border colonists against the persons or

property of the neighbouring tribes." It was at Port Elizabeth,

and in the month of October, 1840, that Sir George Napier forcibly

admitted that the Glenelg treaties "seem to shock our sense of

natural justice, and to be unsupported by any considerations of

sound policy." Speaking subsequently to a gathering of the Slambie

and Congo tribes of Kafirs at Fort Peddie, his Excellency said,

"You have sustained no bad treatment on the part of the colonists,

and I now appeal to you whether the colonists have not kept their

part of the treaties ever since they were made? I ask if there

has been a single act of injustice of which you have any reason

to complain on the part of the Government and the colonists?

You will answer, None. I therefore appeal to you for justice

towards the colonists." In fact, Sir George Napier was forced to

thoroughly change his opinions, and it is unnecessary to multiply

proofs of this well-known fact. Would to God that Sir Michael

Hicks-Beach, or even Sir Charles Dilke, could come out to South

Africa and report to the Home Government so as to avert the awful

catastrophe of surrendering conquered Zululand to Cetywayo! This

would be a suicide greater in extent and more terrible even in its

consequences than the surrender of the province of Queen Adelaide

by Lord Glenelg. But surely if the world had been searched no more

reliable man than Sir Bartle Frere could have been chosen. He is

a most upright, wise, and experienced administrator; the friend

of her Majesty the Queen, and himself distinguished for all the

qualities which make men respected and trusted. He belongs to the

"Aborigines' Protection Society," and is in all respects above

suspicion, yet his most positive assurances weigh lightly in the

balance against the monomania existing among certain classes in

Europe, that savages must be right and colonists invariably wrong.

It is a bitter reflection that Zulu savagery finds its best allies

among the very people from whom we spring, and that the most deadly

enemies of the white people of South Africa are literally "those of

their own household."

One of the most able newspapers in South Africa echoes the

sentiments of Lord Glenelg, Dr. Philip, and Bishop Colenso. It

declares against annexation, and also against interference with

the usages of the native chiefs. It is said that to rule the Zulus

through their chiefs is the policy of her Majesty's Ministers.

The extraordinary admission is added that "order will be found

better than caprice and the law better than individual notions of

right." Surely we must admit that the rule of chiefs is purely

a rule of absolute caprice, and that the history of Cetywayo's

government specially proves it. The will of the monarch is the

law of the land, and bloody sacrifices constantly connected with

witchcraft are purely the effects of cruel and avaricious caprice.

The entire history of South Africa shows the folly and cruelty of

the policy advocated by the enemies of Sir Bartle Frere. No careful

student of Cape history can fail to see that the Glenelg plan of

non-annexation was most disastrous, while it was only when the

power of the Gaika and Gcaleka chiefs had been finally taken from

them—and not till then—that the people of this country, whites as

well as blacks, could hope to be finally released from the fearful

curse of recurring thefts, bloodshed, and wars. In fact history

teaches plainly that to secure peace, prosperity, and happiness to

all the people of Southern Africa it is absolutely necessary: (1.)

To secure territorial guarantees, such as those justly acquired in

a war of defence by Sir Benjamin D'Urban. (2.) To create a firmly

knit and strong confederation of colonies and states in which

the Queen and just laws shall be supreme, to the exclusion of

witchcraft and the caprice of chiefs.

Incidentally, we may be permitted to illustrate what is really

meant by this "rule of chiefs." Every one knows that diabolical

and wholesale slaughter is a characteristic of the rule of all

Zulu potentates. Dingaan, Panda, Cetywayo, are all alike in this

particular. It is the system as much as the men that we have to

blame. Perhaps there is no more distinguishing proof of constant

cold-blooded and revolting cruelty arising directly and constantly

from the rule of chiefs than in the administration of the laws of

witchcraft. One example out of hundreds is sufficient. Missionaries

from time to time publish most revolting cases, but they are all

of the same type, and merely as a sample we refer our readers to

the one alluded to by Mr. Godlonton, at page 99 of his "Case for

the Colonists." The son of a chief was sick, and a man of property

was immediately selected for torture and death, simply because the

witch-doctor said that it was under his evil influence that the

sick man was suffering. He begged and prayed for instant death,

but of course that boon is never granted. First of all the victim

was held to the ground, and several men pierced his body all over

with Kafir needles, two or three inches deep. The victim bore this

with extraordinary resolution, and his tormentors became tired,

complaining of the pain it gave their hands, and of the needles

or skewers bending. By this time a fire was kindled, into which

large square stones were placed to heat. His wife having first

been cruelly beaten and ill-treated, the victim was brought to the

fire, laid on his back, with his feet and hands tied to pegs driven

into the ground. When the stones became as hot as possible, they

were placed upon his groin, stomach, and chest. Then the scorching

and broiling of the body went on, the stones occasionally slipping

off, and being immediately replaced and held on by sticks. These

awful tortures lasted from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m., when the unfortunate

victim of the benefit of the rule of the chiefs in South Africa

breathed his last. We are asked to perpetuate this system, and to

surrender any conquered country in Zululand, so that savagery may

still continue without interruption, and we may reap in Zululand

from the policy of 1879 the fruits obtained in 1845 and 1852 from

the Glenelg policy of 1836.—_April 29, 1879._

IV.

The great question of Sir Bartle Frere's native and Zulu policy is

easily narrowed. His Excellency believes in abolishing the power of

chiefs, and in obtaining after defensive war adequate territorial

guarantees. The opposite policy has, undoubtedly, caused the wars

of 1845, 1852, and 1877. The relinquishment of the province of

Queen Adelaide by Lord Glenelg necessitated its reconquest, and the

system of endeavouring to rule through the medium of chiefs has

resulted in disastrous failure. A chief is necessarily antagonistic

to civilization: all his power, influence, and means are obtained

from savagery, and it is this latter system it is his interest to

foster and to continue. But for the astuteness and ability of Sir

George Grey Kreli would undoubtedly have thrown us into a serious

war in 1857. This great chief ordered cattle to be slaughtered in

such a manner as to prove that he had even determined to "burn

his ships." Emissaries were despatched to Moshesh, to Taku, and

to the Tambookies. A witch-doctor was used as a tool in the usual

manner, so as to stir up the people by means of superstition,

and the system, whose continuance is advocated by a party, only

failed because of the checkmate movements of the Governor.

Subsequently, it was purely the continuance of the system of the

chiefs that led us into the war of 1877. If their power had been

abolished, as it should have been, great calamities would have

been averted from their own people and from the Cape Colony. A

careful honest study of colonial history is all that is necessary

to prove to demonstration that weak half-measures with Kafirs

are as irrational and absurd as they are cruel. When we conquer

we are bound to take away entirely the pernicious powers of the

chiefs, as well as to retain such land guarantees as are really

necessary for future safety. Those who advocate this sound, wise

policy are real philanthropists, substituting justice and sound

ideas for theoretical ideas, founded for the most part upon that

worst description of ignorance which is founded upon prejudice and

pre-conceived ideas.

One argument brought forward against Confederation is based upon

the lowest possible motives. It is the pockets, not the heads or

hearts, to which this earnest appeal is made. One great Government

in South Africa with provincial administrations will really be too

expensive! Besides, an objection is taken to the removal of the

liability under which the British Government labours at present.

Let the Home country continue to lose its best blood and treasure

rather than we should lose our money. A great strong Confederation

would put an end to Kafir wars by putting an end to the possibility

of their success, but lest we should have to pay a few more taxes

the British ratepayers' purses and the British soldiers' bodies

must continue to bleed. This infamous policy is not worthy of the

Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. We have attained our majority

as children of the Empire, and we must be prepared to resume our

own responsibilities. These, unquestionably, include self-defence,

and to make that efficient the fable of the bundle of sticks must

be exemplified in the close union of all our states and colonies.

Nothing is more clear than the fact that all South Africa is like a

draughtboard—the blacks are on one side, the whites on the other.

There is no separating the interests of either combatants, so

that when Cetywayo fights against Natal, he fights against this

colony as well as against the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.

But real economy is always attended by a sound and statesmanlike

system of Government. There would be no recurrence of native wars

under Confederation, and this alone would be a source of great

economy and great prosperity. South Africa, not Downing Street,

would conduct its own native policy, and there would be then no

fear of the recurrence of such a policy as that of Lord Glenelg.

At present we are not safe, and the sooner such a period of

incertitude and danger is terminated the better for the taxpayers

here and in England. Are the people of this country not able to

govern themselves in a Confederation? The history of the separate

states and colonies proves the contrary. If we are able we ought to

be willing, as such a union means against the natives invincible

strength, and consequently both peace and economy. Above all things

we ought to relieve ourselves from the curse of being perpetually

exposed to the meddling and muddling of our native policy. Fatuous

incompetency, such as that of Lord Glenelg, is quite enough to ruin

half a dozen colonies, and we really can never be quite sure that

it will not be renewed.

A reference to Sir Bartle Frere's instructions proves very clearly

that his Excellency had incomparably more power than any previous

Governor-General or High Commissioner, and in acting as he did

under _carte blanche_ authority, in no way exceeded his powers. He

had to choose between allowing the Zulu despot to make war when he

wished and in what manner he chose, or in checkmating him by early

action. The latter policy has been adopted with Cetywayo as it was

with Kreli, and in spite of a temporary check will be the means of

effectively protecting the interests both of the British colonists

and the British crown. England never had a more faithful or

conscientious officer than Sir Bartle Frere, and a time will come

when on the page of history his name, with those of Sir Benjamin

D'Urban and Sir George Grey, will be blazoned as the greatest and

most enlightened statesmen who ever ruled in Southern Africa.

"After me, the Deluge," would have been a convenient and very

safe motto for each of these men, but they scorned the wretched

time-serving policy of shunting off the evil day from themselves so

as to allow its calamities to accumulate into terrible magnitude

and burst with awful force upon their successors. But the principal

defence of Sir Bartle Frere's action and policy is to be found in

his despatches, and to them we earnestly beg careful and impartial

attention.

The people of the Cape Colony and Natal are composed of many races

and of many creeds, but with the most insignificant exceptions they

all declare in the most emphatic manner in favour of the policy of

Sir Bartle Frere.

"Saxon and Celt and Dane are we,

But all of us Danes in our welcome of thee."

From Capetown to the Tugela river and from L'Agulhas to the Orange

river one universal shout of sympathy and approval goes forth

to England. Resolutions, earnestly and emphatically declaring

that the High Commissioner is right, are sent to the foot of

the Queen's throne from Capetown, Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown,

Graaff-Reinet, Pietermaritzburg, D'Urban, and hosts of smaller

places. The newspaper press, with very few exceptions, constantly

and vigorously declares aloud the public sentiments. Surely all

this is a powerful argument. The people of South Africa, whose

lives, property, and character are at stake, may be trusted to

take such a lively interest in the entire subject as to understand

it thoroughly. Their interests and those of the United Kingdom

are thoroughly identical in this matter, and the sky does not so

change the mind even in this portion of the British Empire as to

pervert entirely the moral nature of so many of her Majesty's loyal

subjects.

Political events connected with the Zulu war form incomparably the

most powerful argument that has yet been adduced in favour of South

African Confederation. We really cannot afford any further Glenelg

experiments, and so soon as we can knit ourselves together in a

powerful dominion we are by no means apprehensive of the expense

of fighting our own battles. In the first place we would take care

that there would be no chiefs to fight with, and that witchcraft,

tyranny, and other abominations should finally cease. The natives

would have to learn the habits of industry and peace, and would be

induced to substitute spades and ploughs for guns and ammunition.

A just, firm policy of this character, would form a basis for

Christianity, peace, and civilization, whereas the senseless and

fatuous plans of so-called philanthropists are as destructive to

the natives as they are injurious to the colonists and to the

British Empire of which they form a part.

It would be fortunate for South Africa if fair play were as much

the practice as it is the boast of Englishmen. There are many men

at home full of the same sentiments of righteous indignation as

those which animated Sir George Napier previous to his arrival

in South Africa. How few are there like that Governor, who will

consider it their duty to make themselves conversant with the

subject, and then be guided by their conscientious convictions.

The cause at issue is simply savagery _versus_ civilization, and

before a verdict is given the entire evidence and arguments ought

to be attentively heard and carefully considered. Colonists do not

desire war, but an end of all war. They are most anxious to save,

not to destroy, the savages, and the wise statesmanship of such men

as Sir Benjamin D'Urban, Sir George Grey, and Sir Bartle Frere is

_absolutely necessary_ for this purpose.—_May 2, 1879._

IMPORTANT DESPATCH FROM SIR BARTLE FRERE.

The following despatch from Sir Bartle Frere, dated

Pietermaritzburg, February 12, has been issued as a parliamentary

paper:—

"Sir,—In my despatch of January 24th last, I only partially

answered your despatch of December 18th. I was, in fact,

interrupted while writing by the intelligence of our disaster

at the headquarter camp on the 22nd, and was obliged to close

my unfinished despatch to be in time for the mail. The very

serious check which we received on the 22nd does not, however,

seem to me to call for any modification in the opinions I had

already ventured to lay before her Majesty's Government; on the

contrary, it seems to confirm most strongly the arguments I had

already advanced in my despatch of the 24th, to show that it was

impossible, with any regard to the safety of these colonies, to

defer placing in the hands of the general commanding her Majesty's

forces the enforcement of the demands made on Cetywayo. Deeply

as, in common with every subject of her Majesty, I deplore the

disastrous check we have received, it is impossible to shut one's

eyes to the fact that it was, in all human probability, mainly

due to disregard of the general's orders that so great a disaster

occurred; whilst every circumstance accompanying or following the

events of that day proves what an insecure position we occupied

both here and in the Transvaal with such a neighbour along so

many hundred miles of undefended frontier. As a consequence of

the crippling of Colonel Glyn's and Colonel Durnford's columns,

and the shock which has been given to the colonial forces,

Europeans as well as natives, the columns of Colonel Pearson

and Colonel Wood have been obliged to suspend their advance

and await reinforcements, which can only be looked for to the

extent required from more distant parts of South Africa and from

England. It has become painfully evident that the Zulu king has

an army at his command, which could almost any day unexpectedly

invade Natal, and, owing to the great extent of frontier and

utter helplessness of the undisciplined hordes of Natal natives

to offer effectual resistance, the Zulus might march at will

through the country, devastating and murdering, without a chance

of being checked, so long as they abstained from attacking the

entrenched posts of her Majesty's troops, which are from fifty to

a hundred miles apart. The capital and all the principal towns

are at this moment in 'laager,' prepared for attack, which, even

if successfully resisted, would leave two-thirds of them in

ashes, and the country around thoroughly desolated. From every

part of South Africa outside the colony, where the native races

predominate, come the same reports of uneasiness and of intended

rising of the native race against the white man; whilst the

majority of the Transvaal European population is in a state of

avowed readiness to take any opportunity of shaking off the yoke

of the English Government. It may be said that these are only the

stronger reasons why hostilities should not have been commenced

with the Zulu king. But I submit that every circumstance which has

lately occurred shows how impossible it is to defer hostilities

for more than a few weeks at the utmost, possibly till the harvest

now ripening was gathered, and till the Tugela was fordable. The

feeling which has just burst out, both among native tribes and

in the Transvaal, was there already, and in the Transvaal, at

all events, its expression could not have been deferred by any

postponement of hostilities with the Zulus. But what possible

chance was there that Cetywayo himself would for any length of

time have remained quiescent within his own borders? He had not

acknowledged officially, and in the usual form, the award of the

disputed territory in his favour, nor had he condescended even

to discuss the terms of the High Commissioner's messages to him.

Had Lord Chelmsford's large force been kept permanently on his

frontier, he might possibly have refrained from action as long

as this force remained. But its permanent retention was not,

as Cetywayo knew, probable, and the removal of the force would

assuredly have led to a renewal of the encroachments and the

violations of the territory which he had directed or acquiesced

in during the preceding year and a half; the slightest accident

might have led to a collision taking us at a disadvantage, and

what he had the power to do in a colony so little prepared for

self-defence may be judged from what he has done since her

Majesty's troops crossed the border. It seems to me vain, I had

almost said criminal, to shut our eyes to the fact that there

has grown up, by our sufferance, alongside this colony, a very

powerful military organization, directed by an irresponsible,

bloodthirsty, and treacherous despot, and that as long as this

organization exists and is so directed it is impossible for

peaceful subjects of her Majesty to feel security of life or

property within fifty miles of his border. The existence of this

military organization makes that of a peaceful English community

in his neighbourhood impossible, and unless Cetywayo's power of

murder and plunder be restrained, this colony can only continue

to exist as an armed camp. Again, it may be said that before

attempting to coerce Cetywayo the presence of a large force in

the field should have been secured. To this I can only answer

that though a larger force might undoubtedly have lessened the

chance of successful opposition, there was no reason whatever

at the time to suppose that the force at our disposal was too

small for the task attempted. I will not dwell on what might have

been the case had orders been obeyed, and had things happened

otherwise than they did happen. I stand on the broad fact that I

sought information in every possible quarter, and had, and have,

no reason whatever to suppose that there was anything rash in the

undertaking. I know of no one who is supposed to know the Zulus

whose advice had not been as fully heard as I could obtain it.

Of the three persons who, among unofficial as well as official

authorities, are supposed best to know the Zulus, their feelings

and probable intentions, one expressed to me his own belief in

the ultimate acceptance of the terms offered without fighting;

another considered we had, in our military calculations, greatly

over-estimated the Zulu power; and a third, who had perhaps better

means of judging than any one else, whilst agreeing that the

Zulu power had been much overrated, was convinced that the Zulu

people themselves would bring their tyrant to reason, and that,

after a single action or two, the military system of the Zulus

would collapse. It is a singular coincidence that the latter

opinion was expressed to me on the 22nd, at the very time that

our camp at Isandala was in possession of the Zulus. Looking back

on the past in the light of what has happened, I cannot think

the work was rashly undertaken. But even if I could have hoped

that further reinforcements could be expected within a reasonable

time in answer to a call for them, there was no time to wait. No

one who had carefully studied the events of the last two years,

and knew the ways of these barbarians, could reasonably have

expected the Zulus to remain quiet, and it was clear that, even

if they deferred action, there were elements of strife elsewhere

which could not be evaded or delayed. As I have said before, and

in other communications, the die for peace or for war had been

cast more than two years ago. It was a simple question whether

we should steadily bring our differences to an issue on a clear

and unmistakable demand for our right to live at peace with our

neighbours, or whether we should await the convenience of the Zulu

king, and be taken at disadvantage when he saw his opportunity.

It seems to me that this same principle of self-preservation and

self-defence should be steadfastly adhered to in all our future

proceedings. It may be quite possible to patch up a peace with

this or that tribe, which shall for the time be more or less

satisfactory to some of the interests in this or in a neighbouring

colony. But I submit that her Majesty's Government should not

permit peace to be made till her Majesty's unquestioned supremacy

has been established and recognized by all Zulu tribes who now

acknowledge Cetywayo between this and the Portuguese territory

around Delagoa Bay. This I firmly believe to be the only guarantee

for peace, security, good government, and progressive civilization

throughout her Majesty's possessions and all neighbouring

territories in South Africa; and without such security I feel

assured that this colony of Natal can never be a safe residence

for peace-loving and civilized men of European descent.

"H. B. E. FRERE,

Governor and High Commissioner."

LONDON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET AND

CHARING CROSS.

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