1806-1807.
New system of war--Winter quarters--The Emperor's Proclamation--
Necessity of marching to meet the Russians--Distress in the Hanse
Towns--Order for 50,000 cloaks--Seizure of Russian corn and timber--
Murat's entrance into Warsaw--Re-establishment of Poland--Duroc's
accident--M. de Talleyrand's carriage stopped by the mud--Napoleon's
power of rousing the spirit of his troops--His mode of dictating--
The Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin--His visits to Hamburg--The Duke of
Weimar--His letter and present--Journey of the Hereditary Prince of
Denmark to Paris--Batter, the English spy--Traveling clerks--Louis
Bonaparte and the Berlin decree--Creation of the Kingdom of Saxony--
Veneration of Germany for the King of Saxony--The Emperor's
uncertainty respecting Poland--Fetes and reviews at Warsaw--The
French Government at the Emperor's head quarters--Ministerial
portfolios sent to Warsaw.--Military preparations during the month
of January--Difference of our situation daring the campaigns of
Vienna and Prussia--News received and sent--Conduct of the Cabinet
of Austria similar to that of the Cabinet of Berlin--Battle of
Eylau--Unjust accusation against Bernadotte--Death of General
d'Hautpoult--Te Deum chanted by the Russians--Gardanne's mission to
Persia
Bonaparte was not only beyond all comparison the greatest captain of
modern times, but he may be said to have wrought a complete change in the
art of war. Before his time the most able generals regulated the
fighting season by the almanac. It was customary in Europe to brave the
cannon's mouth only from the first fine days of spring to the last fine
days of autumn; and the months of rain, snow, and frost were passed in
what were called winter quarters. Pichegru, in Holland, had set the
example of indifference to temperature. At Austerlitz, too, Bonaparte
had braved the severity of winter; this answered his purpose well, and he
adopted the same course in 1806. His military genius and activity seemed
to increase, and, proud of his troops, he determined to commence a winter
campaign in a climate more rigorous than any in which he had yet fought.
The men, chained to his destiny, were now required to brave the northern
blast, as they had formerly braved the vertical sun of Egypt. Napoleon,
who, above all generals, was remarkable for the choice of his fields of
battle, did not wish to wait tranquilly until the Russian army, which was
advancing towards Germany, should come to measure its strength with him
in the plains of conquered Prussia; he resolved to march to meet it, and
to reach it before it should arose the Vistula; but before he left Berlin
to explore and conqueror, Poland and the confines of Russia; he addressed
a proclamation to his troops, in which he stated all that had hitherto
been achieved by the French army, and at the same time announced his
future intentions. It was especially advisable that he should march
forward, for, had he waited until the Russians had passed the Vistula,
there could probably have been no winter campaign, and he would have been
obliged either to take up miserable winter quarters between the Vistula
and the Oder, or to recross the Oder to combat the enemy in Prussia.
Napoleon's military genius and indefatigable activity served him
admirably on this occasion, and the proclamation just alluded to, which
was dated from Berlin before his departure from Charlottenburg; proves
that he did not act fortuitously, as he frequently did, but that his
calculations were well-made.
--[Before leaving the capital of Prussia Bonaparte stole from the
monument, of Frederick the Great his sword and military orders. He
also plundered the galleries of Berlin and Potsdam of their best
pictures and statues, thus continuing the system he had began is
Italy. All those things he sent to Paris as trophies of victory and
glory.--Editor of as 1836 edition.]
A rapid and immense impulse given to great masses of men by the, will of
a single individual may produce transient lustre and dazzle the eyes of
the multitude; but when, at a distance from the theatre of glory, we flee
only the melancholy results which have been produced. The genius of
conquest can only be regarded as the genius of destruction. What a sad
picture was often presented to my eyes! I was continually doomed to hear
complaints of the general distress, and to execute orders which augmented
the immense sacrifices already made by the city of Hamburg. Thus, for
example, the Emperor desired me to furnish him with 50,000 cloaks which I
immediately did. I felt the importance of such an order with the
approach of winter, and in a climate--the rigour of which our troops had
not yet encountered. I also received orders to seize at Lubeck (Which
town, as I have already stated, had been alternately taken and retaken
try Blucher and Bernadotte) 400,000 lasts of corn,--[A last weighs 2000
kilogrammes]--and to send them to Magdeburg. This corn belonged to
Russia. Marshal Mortier, too, had seized some timber for building, which
also belonged to Russia; and which was estimated at 1,400,000 francs.
Meanwhile our troops continued to advance with such rapidity that before
the end of November Murat arrived at Warsaw, at the head of the advanced
guard of the Grand Army, of which, he had the command. The Emperor's
headquarters, were then at Posen, and, he received deputations from all
parts soliciting the re-establishment and independence of the Kingdom of
Poland.
Rapp informed me that after receiving the deputation from Warsaw the
Emperor said to him, "I love the Poles; their enthusiastic character
pleases me; I should like to make them independent, but that is a
difficult matter. Austria, Russia, and Prussia have all had a slice of
the cake; when the match is once kindled who knows where, the
conflagration may stop? My first duty, is towards France, which I must
not sacrifice to Poland; we must refer this matter to the sovereign of
all things--Time, he will presently show us what we must do." Had
Sulkowsky lived Napoleon might have recollected what he had said to him
in Egypt, and, in all probability he would have raised up a power, the
dismemberment of which; towards the close of the last century, began to
overturn the political equilibrium which had subsisted in Europe since
the peace of Westphalia in 1648.
It was at the headquarters at Posen that Duroc rejoined the Emperor after
his mission to the King of Prussia. His carriage overturned on the way,
and he had the misfortune to break his collar-bone. All the letters I
received were nothing but a succession of complaints on the bad state of
the roads. Our troops were absolutely fighting in mud, and it was with
extreme difficulty that the artillery and caissons of the army could be
moved along. M. de Talleyrand had been summoned to headquarters by the
Emperor, in the expectation of treating for peace, and I was informed
that his carriage stuck in the mud and he was detained on his journey for
twelve hours. A soldier having asked one of the persons in M. de
Talleyrand's suite who the traveller was, was informed that he was the
Minister for Foreign Affairs. "Ah! bah!" said the soldier, "why does he
come with his diplomacy to such a devil of a country as this?"
The Emperor entered Warsaw on the 1st of January 1807. Most of the
reports which he had received previous to his entrance had concurred in
describing the dissatisfaction of the troops, who for some time had had
to contend with bad roads, bad weather, and all aorta of privations.'
Bonaparte said to the generals who informed him that the enthusiasm of
his troops had been succeeded by dejection and discontent, "Does their
spirit fail them when they come in sight of the enemy?"--"No, Sire."--
"I knew it; my troops are always the same." Then turning to Rapp he
said, "I must rouse them;" and he dictated the following proclamation:
SOLDIERS--It is a year this very hour since you were on the field of
Austerlitz, where the Russian battalions fled in disorder, or
surrendered up their arms to their conquerors. Next day proposals,
of peace were talked of; but they were deceptive. No sooner had the
Russians escaped, by perhaps, blamable generosity from the disasters
of the third coalition than they contrived a fourth. But the ally
on whose tactics they founded their principal hope was no more. His
capital, his fortresses; his magazines; his arsenals, 280 flags, and
700 field-pieces have fallen into our power. The Oder, the Wartha,
the deserts of Poland, and the inclemency of the season have not for
a moment retarded your progress. You have braved all; surmounted
all; every obstacle has fled at your approach. The Russians have in
vain endeavoured to defend the capital of ancient and illustrious
Poland. The French eagle hovers over the Vistula. The brave and
unfortunate Poles, on beholding you, fancied they saw the legions of
Sobieski, returning from their memorable expedition.
Soldiers, we will not lay down our arms until a general peace has
secured the power of our allies and restored to us our colonies and
our freedom of trade. We have gained on the Elbe and the Oder,
Pondicherry, our Indian establishments, the Cape of Good Hope, and
the Spanish colonies. Why should the Russians have the right of
opposing destiny and thwarting our just designs? They and we are
still the soldiers who fought at Austerlitz.
Rapp thus describes the entrance of the French into Warsaw, and adds a
few anecdotes connected with that event:
"At length we entered the Polish capital. The King of Naples had
preceded us, and had driven the Russians from the city. Napoleon
was received with enthusiasm. The Poles thought that the moment of
their regeneration had arrived, and that their wishes were
fulfilled. It would be difficult to describe the joy thus evinced,
and the respect with which they treated us. The French troops,
however, were not quite so well pleased; they manifested the
greatest repugnance to crossing the Vistula. The idea of want and
bad weather had inspired them with the greatest aversion to Poland,
and they were inexhaustible, in their jokes on the country."
When Bonaparte dictated his proclamations--and how many have I not
written from his dictation!--he was for the moment inspired, and he
evinced all the excitement which distinguishes the Italian improvisatori.
To follow him it was necessary to write with inconceivable rapidity. When
I have read over to him what he has dictated I have often known him to
smile triumphantly at the effect which he expected any particular phrase
would produce. In general his proclamations turned on three distinct
points--(1) Praising his soldiers for what they had done; (2) pointing
out to them what they had yet to do; and (3) abusing his enemies. The
proclamation to which I have just now alluded was circulated profusely
through Germany, and it is impossible to conceive the effect it produced.
on the whole army. The corps stationed in the rear burned too pass, by
forced marches, the space which still separated them from headquarters;
and those who were nearer the Emperor forgot their fatigues and
privations and were only anxious to encounter the enemy. They frequently
could not understand what Napoleon said in these proclamations; but no
matter for that, they would have followed him cheerfully barefooted and
without provisions. Such was the enthusiasm, or rather the fanaticism,
which Napoleon could inspire among his troops when he thought proper to
rouse them, as he termed it.
When, on a former occasion, I spoke of the Duke of, Mecklenburg-Schwerin
and his family, I forgot a circumstance respecting my intercourse with
him which now occurs to my memory. When, on his expulsion from his
States, after the battle of Jena, he took refuge in Altona, he requested,
through the medium of his Minister at Hamburg, Count von Plessen, that I
would give him permission occasionally to visit that city. This
permission I granted without hesitation; but the Duke observed no
precaution in his visits, and I made some friendly observations to him on
the subject. I knew the object of his visits. It was a secret
connection in Hamburg; but in consequence of my observations he removed
the lady to Altona, and assured me that he adopted that determination to
avoid committing me. He afterwards came very seldom to Hamburg; but as
we were on the best understanding with Denmark I frequently saw his
daughter, and son-in-law, who used to visit me at a house I had in
Holstein, near Altona.
There I likewise saw, almost every day, the Duke of Weimar, an excellent
old man. I had the advantage of being on such terms of intimacy with him
that my house was in some measure his. He also had lost his States. I
was so happy as to contribute to their restitution, for my situation
enabled me to exercise some influence on the political indulgences or
severities of the Government. I entertained a sincere regard for the
Duke of Weimar, and I greatly regretted his departure. No sooner had he
arrived in Berlin than he wrote me a letter of, thanks, to which he added
the present of a diamond, in token of his grateful remembrance of me.
The Duke of Mecklenburg was not so fortunate as the Duke of Weimar, in
spite of his alliance with the reigning family of Denmark. He was
obliged to remain at Altona until the July following, for his States were
restored only by the Treaty of Tilsit. As soon as it was known that the
Emperor had returns to Paris the Duke's son, the Hereditary Prince,
visited me in Hamburg, and asked me whether I thought he could present
himself to the Emperor, for the purpose of expressing his own and his
father's gratitude. He was a very well-educated young man. He set out,
accompanied by M. Oertzen and Baron von Brandstaten. Some time
afterwards I saw his name in the Moniteur, in one of the lists of
presentations to Napoleon, the collection of which, during the Empire,
might be regarded as a general register of the nobility of Europe.
It is commonly said that we may accustom ourselves to anything, but to me
this remark is subject to an exception; for, in spite of the necessity to
which I was reduced of employing spies, I never could surmount the
disgust I felt at them, especially when I saw men destined to fill a
respectable rank in society degrade themselves to that infamous
profession. It is impossible to conceive the artifices to which these
men resort to gain the confidence of those whom they wish to betray. Of
this the following example just now occurs to my mind.
One of those wretches who are employed in certain circumstances, and by
all parties, came to offer his services to me. His name was Butler, and
he had been sent from England to the Continent as a spy upon the French
Government. He immediately came to me, complaining of pretended enemies
and unjust treatment. He told me he had the greatest wish to serve the
Emperor, and that he would make any sacrifice to prove his fidelity.
The real motive of his change of party was, as it is with all such men,
merely the hope of a higher reward. Most extraordinary were the schemes
he adopted to prevent his old employers from suspecting that he was
serving new ones. To me he continually repeated how happy he was to be
revenged on his enemies in London. He asked me to allow him to go to
Paris to be examined by the Minister of Police. The better to keep up
the deception he requested that on his arrival in Paris he might be
confined in the Temple, and that there might be inserted in the French
journals an announcement in the following terms:
"John Butler, commonly called Count Butler, has just been arrested
and sent to Paris under a good escort by the French Minister at
Hamburg."
At the expiration of a few weeks Butler, having received his
instruction's, set out for London, but by way of precaution he said it
would be well to publish in the journals another announcement; which was
as follows:
"John Butler, who has been arrested in Hamburg as an English agent,
and conveyed to Paris, is ordered to quit France and the territories
occupied by the French armies and their allies, and not to appear
there again until the general peace."
In England Butler enjoyed the honours of French prosecution. He was
regarded as a victim who deserved all the confidence of the enemies of
France. He furnished Fouche with a considerable amount of information,
and he was fortunate enough to escape being hanged.
Notwithstanding the pretended necessity of employing secret agents,
Bonaparte was unwilling that, even under that pretext, too many
communications should be established between France and England: Fouche,
nevertheless, actively directed the evolutions of his secret army. Ever
ready to seize on anything that could give importance to the police and
encourage the suspicions of the Emperor, Fouche wrote to me that the
government had received certain--information that many Frenchmen
traveling for commercial houses in France were at Manchester purchasing
articles of English manufacture. This was true; but how was it to be
prevented? These traveling clerks passed through Holland, where they
easily procured a passage to England.
Louis Bonaparte, conceiving that the King of Holland ought to sacrifice
the interests of his new subjects to the wishes of his brother, was at
first very lenient as to the disastrous Continental system. But at this
Napoleon soon manifested his displeasure, and about the end of the year
1806 Louis was reduced to the necessity of ordering the strict observance
of the blockade. The facility with which the travelers of French
commercial houses passed from Holland to England gave rise to other
alarms on the part of the French Government. It was said that since
Frenchmen could so easily pass from the Continent to Great Britain, the
agents of the English Cabinet might, by the same means, find their way to
the Continent. Accordingly the consuls were directed to keep a watchful
eye, not only upon individuals who evidently came from England, but upon
those who might by any possibility come from that country. This plan was
all very well, but how was it to be put into execution ? . . . The
Continent was, nevertheless, inundated with articles of English
manufacture, for this simple reason, that, however powerful may be the
will of a sovereign, it is still less powerful and less lasting than the
wants of a people. The Continental system reminded me of the law created
by an ancient legislator, who, for a crime which he conceived could not
possibly be committed, condemned the person who should be guilty of it to
throw a bull over Mount Taurus.
It is not my present design to trace a picture of the state of Europe at
the close of 1806. I will merely throw together a few facts which came to
my knowledge at the time, and which I find in my correspondence. I have
already mentioned that the Emperor arrived at Warsaw on the 1st of
January. During his stay at Posen he had, by virtue of a treaty
concluded with the Elector of Saxony, founded a new kingdom, and
consequently extended his power in Germany, by the annexation of the new
Kingdom of Saxony to the Confederation of the Rhine. By the terms of
this treaty Saxony, so justly famed for her cavalry, was to furnish the
Emperor with a contingent of 20,000 men and horses.
It was quite a new spectacle to the Princes of Germany, all accustomed to
old habits of etiquette, to see an upstart sovereign treat them as
subjects, and even oblige them to consider themselves as such. Those
famous Saxons, who had made Charlemagne tremble, threw themselves on the
protection of the Emperor; and the alliance of the head of the House of
Saxony was not a matter of indifference to Napoleon, for the new King
was, on account of his age, his tastes, and his character, more revered
than any other German Prince.
From the moment of Napoleon's arrival at Warsaw until the commencement of
hostilities against the Russians he was continually solicited to
reestablish the throne of Poland, and to restore its chivalrous
independence to the ancient empire of the Jagellons. A person who was at
that time in Warsaw told me that the Emperor was in the greatest
uncertainty as to what he should do respecting Poland. He was entreated
to reestablish that ancient and heroic kingdom; but he came to no
decision, preferring, according to custom, to submit to events, that he
might appear to command them. At Warsaw, indeed, the Emperor passed a
great part of his time in fetes and reviews, which, however, did not
prevent him from watching, with his eagle eye, every department of the
public service, both interior and exterior. He himself was in the capital
of Poland, but his vast influence was present everywhere. I heard Duroc
say, when we were conversing together about the campaign of Tilsit, that
Napoleon's activity and intelligence were never more conspicuously
developed.
One very remarkable feature of the imperial wars was, that, with the
exception of the interior police, of which Fouche was the soul, the whole
government of France was at the headquarters of the Emperor. At Warsaw
Napoleon's attention was not only occupied with the affairs of his army,
but he directed the whole machinery of the French Government just the
same as if he had been in Paris. Daily estafettes, and frequently the
useless auditors of the Council of State, brought him reports more or
less correct, and curious disclosures which were frequently the invention
of the police. The portfolios of the Ministers arrived every week, with
the exception of those of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the
Minister of the War Department; the former had first stopped at Mayence
with the Empress, but had been called on to Warsaw; and the latter,
Clarke, was, for the misfortune of Berlin, governor of that city. This
state of things lasted during the ten months of the Emperor's absence
from Paris. Louis XIV. said, "I am myself the State." Napoleon did not
say this; but, in fact, under his reign the Government of France was
always at his headquarters. This circumstance had well-nigh proved fatal
to him, on the occasion of the extraordinary conspiracy of Malet, with
some points of which I alone, perhaps, am thoroughly acquainted. The
Emperor employed the month of January in military preparations for the
approaching attack of the Russians, but at the same time he did not
neglect the business of the cabinet: with him nothing was suffered to
linger in arrear.
While Napoleon was at Warsaw a battle was not the only thing to be
thought about; affairs were much more complicated than during the
campaign of Vienna. It was necessary, on the one hand, to observe
Prussia, which was occupied; and on the other to anticipate the Russians,
whose movements indicated that they were inclined to strike the first
blow. In the preceding campaign Austria, before the taking of Vienna,
was engaged alone. The case was different now: Austria had had only
soldiers; and Prussia, as Blucher declared to me, was beginning to have
citizens. There was no difficulty in returning from Vienna, but a great
deal in returning from Warsaw, in case of failure, notwithstanding the
creation of the Kingdom of Saxony, and the provisional government given
to Prussia, and to the other States of Germany which we had conquered.
None of these considerations escaped the penetration of Napoleon: nothing
was omitted in the notes, letters, and official correspondence which came
to me from all quarters. Receiving, as I did, accurate information from
my own correspondents of all that was passing in Germany, it often
happened that I transmitted to the Government the same news which it
transmitted to me, not supposing that I previously knew it. Thus, for
example, I thought I was apprising the Government of the arming of
Austria, of which I received information from headquarters a few days
after.
During the Prussian campaign Austria played precisely the same waiting
game which Prussia had played clueing the campaign of Austria. As
Prussia had, before the battle of Austerlitz, awaited the success or
defeat of the French to decide whether she should remain neutral or
declare herself against France, so Austria, doubtless supposing that
Russia would be more fortunate as the ally of Prussia than she had been
as her ally, assembled a corps of 40,000 men in Bohemia. That corps was
called an army of observation; but the nature of these armies of
observation is well known; they belong to the class of armed
neutralities, like the ingenious invention of sanitary cordons. The fact
is, that the 40,000 men assembled in Bohemia were destined to aid and
assist the Russians in case they should be successful (and who can blame
the Austrian Government for wishing to wash away the shame of the Treaty
of Presburg?). Napoleon had not a moment to lose, but this activity
required no spur; he had hastened the battle of Austerlitz to anticipate
Prussia, and he now found it necessary to anticipate Russia in order to
keep Austria in a state of indecision.
The Emperor, therefore, left Warsaw about the end of January, and
immediately gave orders for engaging the Russian army in the beginning of
February; but, in spite of his desire of commencing the attack, he was
anticipated. On the 8th of February, at seven in the morning, he was
attacked by the Russians, who advanced during a terrible storm of snow,
which fell in large flakes. They approached Preussich-Eylau, where the
Emperor was, and the Imperial Guard stopped the Russian column. Nearly
the whole French army was engaged in that battle-one of the most
sanguinary ever fought in Europe. The corps commanded by Bernadotte was
not engaged, in the contest; it had been stationed on the left at
Mohrungen, whence it menaced Dantzic. The issue of the battle would have
been very different had the four, divisions of infantry and the two of
cavalry composing Bernadotte's corps arrived in time; but unfortunately
the officer instructed to convey orders to Bernadotte to march without
delay on Preussich-Eylau was taken by a body of Cossacks; Bernadotte,
therefore, did not arrive. Bonaparte, who always liked to throw blame on
some one if things did not turn out exactly as he wished, attributed the
doubtful success of the day to the absence of Bernadotte; in this he was
right; but to make his absence a reproach to that Marshal was a gross
injustice. Bernadotte was accused of not having been willing to march on
Preussich-Eylau, though, as it was alleged, General d'Hautpoult had
informed him of the necessity of his presence. But how can that fact be
ascertained, since General d'Hautpoult was killed on that same day? Who
can assure us that that General had been able to communicate with the
Marshal?
Those who knew Bonaparte, his cunning, and the artful advantage he would
sometimes take of words which he attributed to the dead, will easily
solve the enigma. The battle of Eylau was terrible. Night came on-
Bernadotte's corps was instantly, but in vain, expected; and after a
great loss the French army had the melancholy honour of passing the night
on the field of battle. Bernadotte at length arrived, but too late. He
met the enemy, who were retreating without the fear of being molested
towards Konigsberg, the only capital remaining to Prussia. The King of
Prussia was then at Memel, a small port on the Baltic, thirty leagues
from Konigsberg.
After the battle of Eylau both sides remained stationary, and several
days elapsed without anything remarkable taking place. The offers of
peace made by the Emperor, with very little earnestness it is true, were
disdainfully rejected, as if a victory disputed with Napoleon was to be
regarded as a triumph. The battle of Eylau seemed to turn the heads of
the Russians, who chanted Te Deum on the occasion. But while the Emperor
was making preparations to advance, his diplomacy was taking effect in a
distant quarter, and raising up against Russia an old and formidable
enemy. Turkey declared war against her. This was a powerful diversion,
and obliged Russia to strip her western frontiers to secure a line of
defence on the south.
Some time after General Gardanne set out on the famous embassy to Persia;
for which the way had been paved by the success of the mission of my
friend, Amedee Jaubert. This embassy was not merely one of those pompous
legations such as Charlemagne, Louis XIV., and Louis XVI. received from
the Empress Irene, the King of Siam, and Tippoo Saib. It was connected
with ideas which Bonaparte had conceived at the very dawn of his power.
It was, indeed, the light from the East which fast enabled him to see his
greatness in perspective; and that light never ceased to fix his
attention and dazzle his imagination. I know well that Gardanne's
embassy was at first conceived on a much grander scale than that on which
it was executed. Napoleon had resolved to send to the Shah of Persia
4000 infantry, commanded by chosen and experienced officers, 10,000
muskets, and 50 pieces, of cannon; and I also know that orders were given
for the execution of this design. The avowed object of the Emperor was
to enable the Shah of Persia to make an important diversion, with 80,000
men, in, the eastern provinces of Russia. But there was likewise
another, an old and constant object, which was always, uppermost in
Napoleon's mind, namely the wish to strike at England in the very heart
of her Asiatic possessions. Such vas the principal motive of Gardanne's
mission, but circumstances did not permit the Emperor, to, give, it, all
the importance he desired. He contented himself with sending a few
officers of engineers and artillery, to Persia, who, on their arrival,
were astonished at the number of English they found there.
ETEXT EDITOR'S BOOKMARKS:
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Cause of war between the United States and England
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Demand everything, that you may obtain nothing
Submit to events, that he might appear to command them
Tendency to sell the skin of the bear before killing him
When a man has so much money he cannot have got it honestly