Al-Hakim had ten of the chief Christian clerks, including Fahd, arrested.

The first of these to be brought before him was Abu Najah, who was a

member of the Greek Church. Hakim urged him to become a Muslim, and

promised him rapid promotion and immediate rewards if he would do so. Abu

Najah asked that he might be allowed a day’s delay, and this was granted

him. He then went home and, gathering together his kinsmen and friends,

told them what had taken place, and assured them that he had asked for

this delay, not because he was in any doubt as to what he would do,

but in order to meet them and exhort them to remain steadfast in their

faith in the persecution which he fore-saw was about to fall upon the

church. He then entertained them all to a feast and next day presented

himself before the Khalif. Al-Hakim asked him if he had made his choice:

he replied that he had done so:—“And what is your intention?”—“It is to

remain firm in my religion.” Al-Hakim then tried promises and threats,

but without result. He then had him stripped and scourged until he had

received five hundred stripes, so that his flesh was torn and the blood

flowed freely. As the torturers stopped al-Hakim ordered them to continue

until the sufferer had received a thousand lashes. After three hundred

more Abu Najah cried out that he was in thirst and, as this was reported

to al-Hakim he ordered one of the men to give him a drink of water. But

when the water was offered Abu Najah said: “Take away his water. I have

no need of it, because Jesus Christ the true King has given me to drink,”

and then he died. When this was reported to Hakim he ordered the thousand

strokes to be completed on the dead body.

Of the other eight clerks remaining after Fahd and Abu Najah, four

remained firm and were executed, and four turned Muslim. Of these latter

one died during the night after making his profession of faith, the other

three remained conforming Muslims until the penal laws were relaxed in

the latter part of Hakim’s reign when they returned to the Christian

Church, the Khalif protecting them from the legal penalties to which this

exposed them.

Towards the end of 394 Hakim began collecting a large store of wood

on Mokattam, and this was completed in Rabiʿ I. 395. A rumour went

abroad that this was intended to provide a general holocaust of

non-Muslim clerks and civil officials, and a panic took place amongst

the Christians. On the 5th of that month a large number of clerks

assembled at the ar-Riahin and went in procession through the streets

with lamentations and cries for mercy, and finally assembled before

the palace imploring the Khalif’s mercy. At the palace they were met

by the Commander-in-Chief, Husayn b. Jawhar, who undertook to present

their petition to the Khalif. Next day they returned and Husayn gave

them letters of protection written out in three forms, one for Muslims,

another for Christians, and another for Jews (cf. Maq. i. 286, sq.).

Although it was the clerks employed in the public service who were

chiefly concerned in this, there were also merchants and private citizens

who had dealings with the court who joined in the appeal and received

letters of protection. Maqrizi has preserved a specimen of these letters

from which we gather that they were by way of licences of toleration

granted, in the case of Muslims, to those who had not become members of

the Fatimite sect. The example he gives reads: “In the name of God, etc.

This letter is from the servant of God and his wali Mansur Abu ʿAli the

Imam Hakim bi-amrillahi, Commander of the faithful, to the people of the

mosque of ʿAbdullah: You are amongst those who are in safety with the

security of God, the King, the evident Truth, and with the security of

our ancestor Muhammad, the seal of the prophets, and of our father ʿAli

the best of his heirs, and of the line of the prophets, and of the people

of the Mahdi our ancestor, may God be gracious to the Apostle and his

envoy, and to all others of them; and the security of the Commander of

the faithful is upon you yourselves, upon your kindred and property. Do

not fear for yourselves, let no hand be raised against you save for the

punishment of wrong-doing, or for a claim made and proved. Confidence

must be given to this, and one must count on the accurate fulfilment

of what is above, God willing. Written in the month of Jumada II. 395.

Praise be to God, may he be gracious to Muhammad the chief of the

apostles, to ʿAli the best of his successors, and to the Imams of the

house of the Mahdi, kinsmen of the prophet, and may abundant peace be

upon them” (Maq. i. 286). We note that Muhammad is described as “the seal

of the prophets” quite in the orthodox way which gives no indication of

the Fatimite teaching of a subsequent prophet of greater importance in

Abdullah b. Maymun. The general tone is distinctly Shiʿite, but Fatimid

only in the reference to the family of the Mahdi.

Was there any basis to the rumour that a general holocaust was intended?

Such a thing seems almost incredible, but there are certain signs which

point in its favour. Soon after the appeal made to the Khalif in Rabiʿ

I. he made a huge bonfire of all the wood collected, and for this there

was no obvious purpose, and it is certain that he had developed a

tendency to use burning as a form of punishment. We are not prepared to

say, therefore, that the rumours circulated about the store of wood on

Mokattam were entirely baseless.

Al-Hakim was particularly severe upon the inferior servants of the court,

and especially on the runners or footmen, many of whom were put to death

whilst others obtained letters of protection. This may have been an

instance of religious intolerance, or simply a case of the capricious

cruelty which now began to appear in Hakim’s conduct and contributed so

much to the theory that he was suffering from a disordered mind.

In 395 the old penal laws dating from the year 36 were re-enforced

against Christians and Jews. Both were required to wear a distinctive

dress, the Christians to have turbans of black or dark blue, a custom

which the Christians seem to have adopted voluntarily in the first place,

and which the Coptic clergy retain to the present day, the Jews to wear

yellow turbans: the women of both religions were forbidden to wear the

waist sash which was a characteristic part of female attire, and the men

were required to adopt it. At the same time it was forbidden to sell

slaves to Christians or Jews.

The citizens of Fustat, sorely tried by the scarcity and dearness of

food resulting from the bad Niles, groaned in secret over the caprices

and severities of their ruler, but did not yet venture to express their

dissatisfaction openly. It was otherwise with the free Arab tribes

settled in the country, and in 395 the B. Qorra in Lower Egypt broke

out in open rebellion. Al-Hakim had no great trouble in punishing

these rebels but his severity in doing so, although it checked the

movement, only left them ready to take up arms again on a more promising

opportunity, and for this they had not long to wait.

A serious revolt took place in North Africa in 396, which before long

seemed to threaten the very existence of the Fatimid Khalifate. In its

first inception this revolt connected with far off Spain. There the

Umayyads had been reigning since 138, but were now in their decline.

The supreme power at this time had passed into the hands of the Wazir

Mansur ibn Abi ʿAmir, who treated the Khalif of Cordova very much in the

same way as Kafur had treated the later Ikhshids, but, more cruel and

unscrupulous, was steadily getting rid of every one who stood in the way

of his ambition. Many of the Umayyad kindred were put to death, whilst

others left the country. Amongst these latter was one commonly known as

Abu Raqwa, “the man with the leather bottle,” because he carried a bottle

like that used by the travelling darwishes. As a darwish he journeyed

to Egypt, thence to Mecca, Yemen, and Syria, everywhere observing the

possibilities of forming a party to support the claims of the Umayyad

family and the evidences of discontent and probabilities of stirring up

civil strife. In all his wanderings, however, he met with no success: the

Umayyads had long passed out of the main current of Islamic life, and it

did not seem that their name could anywhere be used as a rallying cry

for the dissatisfied; there was no religious attachment to the Umayyads

like there was to the ʿAlids. At last he came back to Egypt at the time

when the B. Qorra were smarting under the severe chastisement they had

received from Hakim, and this seemed to him to offer some promise.

Passing westwards he took refuge amongst the Berber tribe of Zanata where

he obtained great esteem for his piety, acting as Imam in the services

of the mosque and teaching the Qurʾan to the children. It is perhaps as

well to note that “Imam” in this connection means no more than customary

leader in prayer; it has nothing in common with the “Imam” as understood

by the Shiʿites, save that both imply the general idea of religious

teacher. At length he managed to get a following, and proclaimed himself

as Emir under the title of “he who is sent by the order of God” and “he

who has victory over the enemies of God,” both titles common enough

amongst the Shiʿites but strange as applied to an Umayyad. His supporters

were chiefly drawn from the Zanata, but before long he was joined also by

other Berber tribes and by the B. Qorra.

At the head of a considerable army of the usual undisciplined Berber

type Abu Raqwa advanced eastwards and took Barqa where he was careful to

prevent all pillage and violence, and thus proclaimed that he was not

a mere leader of tribes on the war path, but aimed at establishing an

orderly government. At the fall of Barqa Hakim saw that the rebellion

had to be taken seriously, and sent out an army under the command of

Inal. This Egyptian force had to cross a considerable stretch of desert

before it could reach Barqa, and Abu Raqwa sent a rapidly moving body of

cavalry across the route to fill in the wells, and then waited at the

end furthest from Egypt. At length Inal’s force appeared, exhausted and

thirsty from its desert march, and the engagement which followed left

the advantage with Abu Raqwa. Before the action commenced a number of

the Katama tribesmen serving with the Egyptians deserted and joined the

enemy, induced to do so by disgust with the conduct and now notorious

cruelties of Hakim. When they presented themselves before Abu Raqwa their

first act was to intercede with him on behalf of their fellow tribesmen

still serving in the Fatimid army, and as he promised them a favourable

reception they called out to them and they deserted also. After this Abu

Raqwa joined battle and inflicted a serious defeat on Inal. The news of

this disaster caused great alarm in Cairo; there was an immediate rise

in the prices of provisions, and preparations were made for another

expedition to North Africa.

After his success Abu Raqwa made his residence at Barqa and seemed

disposed to establish a kingdom in Ifrikiya. Before long, however, he

received letters from several leading men in Egypt, including Husayn b.

Jawhar who was Hakim’s Commander-in-Chief, begging him to invade Egypt

and assuring him of a welcome and substantial support. This, more than

anything else, shows to what an extent the strange conduct of Hakim

had now alienated his subjects and even those who, like Husayn, were

his chief ministers and were, or had been, his personal friends. If

we suppose that, by this time, Hakim had given unmistakable signs of

disordered intellect we shall find in that a reasonable explanation

of the desire for some one to come and deliver the country from what

threatened to be a serious danger.

In response to this invitation Abu Raqwa started his advance into Egypt.

The news of his undertaking threw the country into great alarm. The

Druze books describe Hakim himself as completely unmoved, but other

writers speak of him as seriously frightened and even planning to retire

to Syria if all came to the worst. Meanwhile he sent to Syria for the

Hamdanid armies, and put the general Fadi b. Salih in command of the

native forces. With these Syrians and such other levies as he could raise

Fadl went out and encamped at Gizeh, waiting for the invaders. At their

arrival Fadl did not give battle, but manoeuvred so as to evade them,

and by his position at Gizeh prevented them from being able to make a

crossing of the river as that would have exposed them to his attack

whilst going across. Meanwhile he managed to open up correspondence

with some of the subordinate officers, amongst them with a certain

captain of the B. Qorra named Mahdi, who agreed to keep him informed of

all Abu Raqwa’s plans. After some delay the invaders advanced direct

upon the Fatimid general who was unable to evade the movement, and so

an engagement was forced near Kum Sharik. It was not decisive, but it

was very severe, and caused Fadl to determine not to give battle again

if he could possibly avoid doing so. Owing to his severe losses he was

compelled to retire, but still lay between Abu Raqwa and the river so as

to be able to make a flank attack if the Berbers tried to cross.

Abu Raqwa and his men, however, were perfectly confident that success

was assured, and made plans for their future policy as conquerors. They

decided to settle in Egypt and rule that country and the adjacent North

Africa, leaving Syria to the Arabs. This scheme repeated the old plan of

a purely Berber state in Africa with the Arabs excluded and sent back to

their own country. Fadl received full information as to these projects.

But there was treachery in his own army also: the Arab leaders brought

from Syria had been tampered with by Abu Raqwa’s agents who tried to

persuade them that they were making a mistake in fighting for the Fatimid

state, and that it would be more satisfactory to divide its territories

between them, the Africans under Abu Raqwa taking Egypt, the Asiatic

Arabs taking Syria. It was agreed therefore that Abu Raqwa should make

a night attack on Fadl’s army and, as soon as the attack commenced, the

Syrian leaders were to march their men over to the enemy and thus an easy

victory would be assured. But Fadl was fully informed of this plan, and

the evening before the projected attack he invited the Arab leaders to

dine with him. When the dinner was over and the guests wished to retire

he detained them and, on one pretext or another, kept them near him until

the enemy attacked. Even then he still detained them and sent orders to

the Syrians to engage their opponents, and the Syrians, ignorant of the

private plans of their leaders, did so. The followers of Abu Raqwa were

surprised at the unexpected resistance and were finally driven off.

Meanwhile Hakim succeeded in raising reinforcements of 4,000 horsemen,

which he tried to send across the river to Fadl. Abu Raqwa heard of this

and determined to intercept them, setting out so quickly that Mahdi was

unable to send a message to Fadl until he was already on the way. When

the message reached Fadl it was too late, he could no longer get into a

position to protect the new force from the fierce onset of the Berbers,

and about a thousand of them were slain. The news of this misfortune,

which Fadl contrived to conceal from his men for a time, caused great

alarm in the city: the people were seized with panic, they feared an

immediate assault, they were too much alarmed to remain in their houses

and camped for the night in the streets.

Even yet the way to the river was not clear, for a considerable force

remained ready to attack the Berbers if they tried to get down to the

ford, and Abu Raqwa found it impossible to get to grips with them. So the

Berbers were moved nearer and took up their position before the pyramids.

Fadl followed at a distance. Then Abu Raqwa thought that he could force

an engagement by leading him into an ambush. He passed on, therefore,

towards the Fayyum, and at a place called Sabkha stationed a body of men

in concealment and sent another company back towards Fadl. This body made

a perfunctory attack and then turned to flight so as to draw the pursuers

to the place of ambush. Unfortunately the whole plan had not been clearly

explained to the men beforehand, and when those in ambush saw the others

in flight they thought there had been a real defeat and, coming out of

concealment, joined their retreat. This change in the arranged programme

threw Abu Raqwa’s men into confusion, and Fadl profiting by the disorder

fell upon them and inflicted a severe defeat. This took place on the 3rd

of Dhu l-Hijja in 396. As a result Fadl was able to send to Cairo 6,000

heads of enemy slain and 100 prisoners.

This severe engagement was decisive, although Abu Raqwa himself

escaped and fled, first to Upper Egypt, then to Nubia. Here he went

to Hisnaljebel where the Nubian king lay ill, and pretended to be an

ambassador sent by the Khalif Hakim. Owing to the king’s illness he

was not able to see him and thus, ostensibly waiting for an interview,

he was able to live for some time in security. Fadl had followed close

behind to the Nubian frontier and managed to find out where he was. As

soon as he knew this he sent a messenger to the governor of the palace

informing him of the facts, and the governor had Abu Raqwa kept under

close observation. In due course the king died and his son ordered the

fugitive to be conducted across the frontier, and so he was taken across

and conducted to Fadl’s camp. The Fatimid general received him with

every courtesy and, fully supposing that Fadl’s conduct represented

the attitude of the Khalif the prisoner, as he was in spite of polite

treatment, wrote a letter to al-Hakim appealing to his generosity and

begging that he might be pardoned for his rebellion with protestations of

penitence.

The letter was duly sent and Fadl marched down towards Cairo with his

prisoner who was still treated with every consideration. When they had

passed Gizeh and were about to enter Fustat, on Saturday the 27th Jumada

II. 397, orders were received by Fadl from the Khalif that Abu Raqwa was

to enter the city riding on a camel, wearing Abzari’s turban, and with

Abzari and his monkey mounted behind. Abzari’s turban was one of many

gaudy colours which it was customary for those condemned to death to

wear on their final parade to the place of execution, and the monkey was

specially trained to strike with a whip across the face of a criminal set

in front of him. For this performance Abzari was to receive 500 pieces of

gold and ten pieces of cloth.

Thus Abu Raqwa entered Fustat in the midst of the army, preceded by

fifteen elephants. The whole city was adorned as for a public holiday,

and the population lined the streets to see Abu Raqwa paraded until he

was brought to a balcony where al-Hakim was seated. The Khalif then

pronounced on him the sentence that he was to be conducted to a piece of

elevated ground before the mosque of Raydan and there beheaded. But when

they reached the place of execution and the camel knelt for Abu Raqwa to

dismount it was found that he was already dead. The body was stretched

out, and the head cut off and carried to the Khalif.

This success raised Fadl’s reputation, and for a time al-Hakim showed

great appreciation of his services. When the general fell ill the Khalif

visited him several times, and when he recovered he presented him with

gifts of large estates. Two years later, however, Fadl was put to death.

Severus of Ashmunayn relates an anecdote about al-Hakim which is commonly

supposed to refer to Fadl, but it is not certain that it does so refer,

and many things related by Severus seem to be open to question. According

to this anecdote a certain favourite, who may have been Fadl or may not,

once entered al-Hakim’s presence and found him with a comely child whom

he had bought for 100 pieces of gold. He had just cut the child’s throat,

and had opened the body and taken out the liver and entrails which he was

cutting up as the visitor entered. At the sight the onlooker could not

repress an involuntary movement of repulsion and hastily withdrew. He

knew quite well that his discovery and expression of disapproval meant

his execution, and at once went home, put his affairs in order, and

waited for his summons. Before long a messenger from the palace arrived,

and the minister who had seen too much was led away and put to death.

Whether Fadl was the hero of this anecdote, or whether the story has any

basis at all, remains uncertain, but it is known that he was executed by

the Khalif’s orders.

Abu Raqwa’s rebellion certainly makes an important turning-point in

Hakim’s reign. After it he made certain concessions to prevailing Muslim

opinion, that is to say he relaxed some of his Shiʿite prejudices and

left off some of the practices, such as the cursing of the early Khalifs,

which were most offensive to his orthodox subjects, but at the same

time he increased in severity towards the Christians and Jews who were

generally hated as forming the greater part of the civil officials and

tax-collectors.

As might be expected the rebellion was followed by several changes in

the personnel of the court. The Commander-in-Chief, Husayn b. Jawhar,

was deprived of his office on the 10th of Shaban 398, ordered to remain

in his house, and forbidden to take part in the public processions

which accompanied the Khalif on his visits to the principal mosques:

but shortly afterwards he was pardoned and ordered to resume his place

in these functions. As we have seen, it was Husayn who took part in the

invitation to Abu Raqwa. Whether this was known at the time to the Khalif

or not does not appear, but it is very probable that he had reasons for

suspecting his fidelity. The office of Commander-in-Chief was given to

Salih Rudbari b. ʿAli.

On the 16th of Rejeb 398 the Chief Qadi and Daʿi ʿAbdu l-ʿAziz also

was deprived of office, perhaps here again there was reason to suspect

correspondence with the enemy, and his place given to Malik b. Saʿid

al-Faraqi. About three years later, as we shall see, both Husayn and

ʿAbdu l-ʿAziz were so much alarmed that they fled the country, but

afterwards returned and were put to death in 401. A change was made also

in the important governorship of Damascus to which ʿAli b. Falah was

appointed in 398.

We may trace a connection between the anxiety caused by Abu Raqwa’s

revolt, complicated by growing dissatisfaction amongst the people, with

Hakim’s abandonment of his more aggressive Shiʿite attitude and partial

return to Sunni practice. In 397 he ordered all the inscriptions reviling

the early Khalifs to be effaced, and all persons who cursed them were

punished by flogging and paraded through the streets in disgrace (Maq.

ii. 286, Ibn Khall. iii. 450). This year (397) he sent a white veil to

cover the “House of God” at Mecca, white being more or less the official

colour of the Fatimids. Perhaps this more orthodox attitude should be

connected with his severer treatment of the Christians which dates from

398, and both were bids for popularity.

The year 398 had a particularly bad Nile, the river rising only sixteen

yards and sixteen fingers of the seventeenth yard, with the result that

there was a great rise in prices and consequent hardship. Complaint

was made to the Khalif that the dearness of corn was largely caused

by dealers hoarding supplies so as to force an increase, and al-Hakim

announced that he would ride through the city himself and make enquiry,

and would behead anyone he found with a hoard of corn. Next day he

rode from his palace and passed through Fustat and out to the mosque

of Rashida, his attendants entering houses and searching for stores of

corn. None, however, were found, and the result of this was that popular

feeling was pacified and the idea that the scarcity was artificially

produced removed. In 399 the Nile suffered an unexpected check and there

was increased anxiety. Twice the Khalif conducted public prayers for a

good Nile. Several taxes were remitted, but bread became so dear that it

could be obtained only with the greatest difficulty. On the 4th of the

Egyptian month of Tot (circ. 1st September) the canal was opened, but the

river had then risen only 15 yards. On the 9th of Muharram, the middle of

Tot, the waters began to go down, the total rise having reached only 16

yards: as a result food became even dearer and the famine was followed by

plague.

It was no doubt as an act of mourning that Hakim issued orders forbidding

the holding of pleasure parties, excursions, or concerts on the river or

its banks.

A Short History of the Fatimid Khalifate · 第 13 / 23 段