evil of the French armies of those days, began to show itself, and
finally vented itself against the Marquis of Mantua, their general.
Pleading ill-health he resigned, to be succeeded by the Marquis of
Saluzzo. This led to the desertion of some Italian troops, insulted
at the treatment of their countryman. Thus, time was fighting for the
Spaniards; and when at last, recruited by the Orsini, whom he had
cleverly succeeded in conciliating, he felt strong enough to assume
the offensive, he met with but faint resistance. On the night of
December 28, the troops who guarded the river were overwhelmed and
the passage of the river effected. The French, surprised in their
scattered cantonments by the suddenness of the attack, were unable
to concentrate, and forced to retreat. In spite of numerous deeds
of valour, the retreat soon became a rout, and the remnants of the
army fell back in confusion on Gaëta. Here after one more struggle
they capitulated (January 1, 1504), on the condition that they should
retire unmolested, and that all prisoners in Spanish hands should be
released. The few remaining strongholds speedily surrendered, and the
Neapolitan kingdom was won for Ferdinand.
The victory of the Spaniards was due to their possession of Sicily,
whence they could draw support, and to the failure of the French to
retain the command of the sea, so that reinforcements could come
from Spain; to the exceptional inclemency of the winter, which seems
to have been more severely felt by the French than the Spaniards;
in great measure to the unpopularity of the French, the result of
their licence and overbearing conduct; largely to the quarrels of the
French generals; but, above all, to their inferiority when matched
against the ‘Great Captain.’ Cautious, where caution was necessary,
he refused to be drawn from his position till the right moment came;
but, when he saw his opportunity, struck with decision and rapidity.
Never despairing under the most gloomy circumstances, he was able
to communicate his fortitude, and impart his cheerfulness to his
soldiery. Gracious and conciliatory, he earned the love of his army,
yet knew how to be severe when discipline was threatened. A master
of diplomacy, as well as of war, he succeeded, as no other foreign
general had, in winning over enemies, and in settling the factions of
that most factious country, Italy. Courteous in manner, and splendid
in his style of life, he won the hearts of the giddy Neapolitans. Nor
was Gonzalvo de Cordova above learning from his foe. To the short
sword and buckler, the national weapons of the Spaniards, so effective
for attack at close quarters, he added the long German spear, whereby
their power of defence was materially increased. Indeed, he may be
said to have made the Spanish infantry, which, re-armed by him and
reduced to discipline, became for a time the most formidable force in
Europe.
§ 4. _Alexander VI. and Cæsar Borgia._
| Alexander VI. and the Romagna.
While the struggle between the French and Spaniards was being decided
in Naples, events of importance to Italy and Europe were happening in
the centre of the Peninsula. Need of French help in his designs on the
Romagna had been the motive of Alexander’s alliance with Louis XII.
at the date of the Milanese expedition. To the realisation of these
schemes he and his son now eagerly turned.
The Romagna, once the old Exarchate of Ravenna, a district of somewhat
indeterminate limits, lay on the eastern slopes of the Apennines,
stretching to the Adriatic on the east, while to the north it was
bounded by the territories of Venice, to the south by the march of
Ancona. This country is said to have been originally granted to the
Pope by Constantine. The gift was confirmed by Charles the Great, and
all claims to it were definitely surrendered by Rudolph of Hapsburg
in the thirteenth century. The Emperor, however, had granted but
an empty title. The country was in the hands of numerous families
who acknowledged indeed the nominal supremacy of Rome, but were
practically independent.[18]
The possession of these petty states had been long coveted by Milan,
Florence, and Venice. Venice indeed had already encroached on the
territory of Ferrara (1484), and under the new aspect of affairs
caused by the French invasion, the absorption of many of them by one
or other of these powers seemed inevitable. This Alexander hoped to
obviate by reasserting the papal supremacy, which had never been
formally denied, and by reducing the district to obedience.
The pretext for the overthrow of these principalities was that they
had not paid the yearly dues which they owed the Pope as his vicars,
and no sooner had the French entered Italy in the autumn of 1499, than
Cæsar proceeded to execute the papal decree of confiscation.
| The conquests of Cæsar in the Romagna. Nov.
| 1499-April 1501.
Louis XII., in pursuance of his promise, sent 300 lances under the
command of Ives d’Allègre, while 4000 Swiss infantry were hired as
mercenaries. With these forces Cæsar marched against Imola and Forli
(Nov. 9). The two cities did not make any resistance, but the castles
held out longer, especially that of Forli, which was defended by
the brave but masculine Caterina Sforza, and did not surrender till
January, 1500.
The return of Ludovico to Milan in February (cf. p. 38) necessitated
the recall of the French contingent, and Cæsar was forced to postpone
further hostilities until the ensuing September. Then, reinforced once
more by French assistance, and holding the title of Gonfalonier of the
Church, just bestowed upon him by his father, Cæsar speedily reduced
Pesaro and Rimini. Faenza, happy under the mild rule of the young
Astorre Manfredi, offered stout resistance, and did not fall till
April, 1501. In violation of the terms of capitulation the unfortunate
Astorre was sent to Rome, and in the following June was found drowned
in the Tiber. By whose order the deed was done, no one knew, but all
men not unnaturally suspected the hand of the Borgias.
| Cæsar created Duke of Romagna, April 1501. Admitted a
| member of the Venetian oligarchy.
| Louis XII. forbids Cæsar to attack Bologna and
| Florence.
Fortune now seemed to favour Cæsar. Created Duke of Romagna by
Alexander, he had been enrolled a member of the Venetian nobility by
that proud republic, which hoped thus to gain papal aid against the
Turk. He had in his pay the best of the Italian condottiers, and the
remaining cities of the Romagna were trembling. Dazzled by his rapid
successes, his views expanded. He now aspired not only to complete his
conquest of the Romagna, but to interfere in the affairs of Florence,
if not eventually to make himself master of all Tuscany. For a time,
however, his ambition was checked. Bologna and Florence were both
under French protection, and Louis ordered him to stay his hand. The
Pope became alarmed, and Cæsar was forced to content himself with a
sum of money paid by Florence, and an agreement to take him into her
service for three years. Leaving therefore his army to take Piombino,
which surrendered in September, he joined the French expedition
against Naples (July). In September he returned to find his sister
Lucrezia betrothed to Alfonso, the son of Ercole of Este.
| Lucrezia Borgia.
This beautiful woman[19] whose character has been the subject of
almost as much controversy as that of Mary Queen of Scots, and who has
been accused, probably unjustly, of the most unmentionable crimes,
seems rather to have been a person of colourless disposition who was
made the puppet of the schemes of her father and brother. She had
already been married twice. From her first husband, Giovanni Sforza,
Lord of Pesaro, she had been divorced to wed the Duke of Biseglia, an
illegitimate son of Alfonso II. of Naples (August 1498). At that date
the Pope desired an alliance with Naples, but two years afterwards the
papal policy had changed. The second invasion of Naples by Louis XII.
was about to take place, and the friendship of Naples was no longer
needed. Personal antipathies widened the breach, and in August 1500,
the Duke was murdered by Cæsar’s orders. Now, barely a year since the
foul deed, a new husband was found for this girl of twenty-one.
Alexander’s motives, as before, were political. The alliance of
Ferrara was valuable. It protected the Romagna from the North, and
threatened Bologna. The results were not so great as had been hoped,
but the marriage was a happier one than might have been expected;
and Lucrezia in her Ferrarese home found peace and a refuge from the
slander which had hitherto assailed her.
| Further successes of Cæsar.
Meanwhile the quarrel between France and Spain offered new
opportunities to Cæsar, since Louis needed papal support and was in
no position to thwart him overmuch. He had indeed to surrender Arezzo,
which had in June rebelled against Florence and called in Vitellozzo
Vitelli, one of Cæsar’s captains. But in January 1502, Fermo; in
June, Urbino; in July, Camerino had been occupied, while Pisa, which
still held out against Florence, offered to recognise him as its lord.
Finally in August, he obtained the leave of Louis to attack Bologna.
| The Conspiracy of Sinigaglia.
At this moment a revolt of his captains threatened to overwhelm him.
The rapid success of Cæsar had awakened the apprehensions of these
men. Once master of the Romagna, he would no longer need their help,
and might turn against them; indeed, his negotiations with Florence at
this time lead one to suspect that he had already made up his mind to
destroy them. The chief conspirators were Vitellozzo Vitelli of Città
di Castello, Oliverotto da Fermo, the Duke of Gravina and Paolo, both
Orsini, and Gian Paolo Baglioni of Perugia. These gained the adhesion
of Cardinal Orsini, Giovanni Bentivoglio of Bologna, and others. They
met at Magione (October 9, 1502), near Lake Thrasimene, where they
swore to be true to one another, and applied to Florence for aid. A
rebellion was stirred up in Urbino, from whence Cæsar’s troops were
driven, and another contingent of his was defeated at Fossombrone
(October 17).
A terrible retribution was, however, soon to fall upon the rebels.
Louis sent Cæsar aid. The opportune death of the wealthy Cardinal of
Modena, whether poisoned or no, enabled Alexander to appropriate his
possessions to Cæsar’s military needs. Florence feared the hostility
of Cæsar and would not help, and Venice, in spite of the exhortations
of Ferdinand to seize the opportunity of freeing Italy from the
tyrant, was too cautious to move.
| The Massacre of Sinigaglia. Dec. 31, 1502.
The confederates began to hesitate. They were unable to raise
any more troops, and were divided amongst themselves. Listening
therefore to the fair promises of Cæsar and the Pope, they made
their peace on October 28, abandoned the cause of Bologna, and, as
an earnest of their goodwill, marched against Sinigaglia. The town
surrendered, but the castle refused to yield to any one but the
Duke. Cæsar accordingly came to Sinigaglia (December 31), and,
beguiling his captains with gracious words, suddenly pounced upon
them. Oliverotto and Vitellozzo were strangled that night, the first
accusing Vitellozzo of tempting him to rebel; Vitellozzo imploring
Cæsar to obtain a plenary indulgence for him from the Pope. Paolo
Orsini and the Duke of Gravina were executed shortly after. Cardinal
Orsini was seized at Rome to die in prison, probably of poison.
| Further successes of Cæsar suddenly stopped by his
| illness, and the death of Alexander. Aug. 8, 1503.
The conspiracy put down, nothing seemed to stand in the way of the
papal ambition. Urbino was again reduced; Città di Castello and
Perugia submitted; most of the Orsini strongholds fell; and Alexander
was playing off Spain against France, in the hopes of gaining the
assistance of one or another in support of the still more magnificent
scheme of making Cæsar King of Tuscany, when father and son were
suddenly struck down by an illness, to which Alexander succumbed on
August 8. It was popularly believed that they had fallen victims to
a poisoned cup, which they had intended for one of the cardinals.
The story needs confirmation, but this and others of the kind are at
least an indication of the popular opinion, which thought no crime too
horrible, or too improbable, to be imputed to the Borgias.
| The election of Julius II. fatal to his cause. Nov. 1,
| 1503.
The fate of Cæsar now depended on the choice of the cardinals. If he
could secure the election of one who would support him, he might yet
hold his own. Of late Louis XII. had shown an inclination to desert
the Borgia alliance. Cæsar therefore from his sick-bed intrigued
to get one of the Spanish cardinals chosen, but in this he failed.
Louis had hoped to obtain the papal tiara for the Cardinal D’Amboise;
Giuliano della Rovere was determined to prevent the election of a
Spaniard, and hoped to succeed himself. Foiled in the first instance,
Giuliano concurred in the choice of an Italian cardinal, Piccolomini,
who, in memory of his famous uncle Pius II., took the name of Pius
III. But, in October, Pius died, and della Rovere, coming to terms
with Cæsar, secured the votes of the conclave by promises and bribes.
Machiavelli, who however exaggerates Cæsar’s influence in the College
of Cardinals, blames his shortsightedness, because, ‘if he could not
procure the election of his own nominee, he might have prevented
that of della Rovere.’ The new Pope, Julius II., had long been the
enemy of the Borgias. He had instigated Charles VIII. to invade
Italy, and urged him to summon a council to depose Alexander, and
although of late he had acquiesced in the inevitable, and affected
reconciliation, he was not the man to forget past injuries. Fear of
the designs of Venice on the Romagna caused him to support Cæsar for
a moment. But Julius was determined to win the Romagna for the Papacy,
not for the Borgia family, and no sooner did Cæsar attempt to act
independently than he ordered him to return to Rome (November 29).
Cæsar’s captains, however, refused to surrender the places which they
held without his consent, and Cæsar would not consent except at the
price of freedom. After long negotiation the agreement was concluded,
and Cæsar, free once more, set out for Naples to seek the aid of
Spain (April 1504).
| The end of Cæsar’s career.
Ferdinand was at first inclined to listen, till, convinced by the Pope
that Cæsar would only disturb the peace of Italy, he ordered his
arrest on May 26, 1504, as the Duke was on the point of sailing for
the Romagna. In violation of a safe-conduct given him by Gonzalvo, he
was shortly sent to Spain, where he remained a prisoner till November,
1506. Escaping at last, he found refuge with his brother-in-law, now
King of Navarre, to die in the succeeding March (1507), in a skirmish
with a rebel vassal of the King.
Thus, at the age of thirty-one, ended the career of the man whom
Machiavelli in his _Prince_ holds up as a pattern, in all but his
ill-fortune, to him who would attempt to form a united kingdom of
Italy. No doubt Cæsar had many of the qualities requisite for
success. Clever and versatile in conception, rapid and resolute in
action, and a master of diplomacy, he had in a high degree the quality
of ‘virtù,’ that compound of force and intellect, which we find
praised not only by Machiavelli, but by Commines and other writers of
the day, as the essential characteristic of the ruler.
We must, alas! allow that private morality is not always the
accompaniment of good statesmanship. Although Cæsar was absolutely
without scruple in his treatment of the petty princes of the Romagna,
it may be questioned whether the independence of these petty
principalities was worth preserving. Ruled by despots, no question of
political freedom was involved. With a few exceptions, such as that
of Urbino, they illustrated the evils without the advantages of the
larger tyrannies, and their history is one tangled tale of faction,
murder, and intrigue. The country too, it must be confessed, was well
governed under him, and his rule was not unpopular. But, when all is
said, we cannot believe that a kingdom founded by such cruelty, and
maintained by such villany and treachery, can really be a solid one.
That Machiavelli, dazzled by the temporary good fortune of Cæsar,
should boldly hold him up as a model to be copied, only makes one
realise the cynical despair of the Italians as to the possibility
of success in their country by any other means, and the depth of
degradation to which the people had fallen.[20] Nor, finally, do we
believe that the idea of thus founding a temporal dominion of the
Papacy was likely to succeed. Had Alexander lived longer, it might,
perhaps, have ended in the establishment of another petty kingdom in
Italy. But the state would have been founded in the interest of the
Borgia, not of the Papacy, and would have only added one more enemy
to the advance of the temporal dominion. If the papal authority in
the Romagna was to become a reality, it must be based on a firmer
foundation than that of papal nepotism. This Julius II. saw. Most of
the cities held or threatened by Cæsar fell at once into his hands,
with the exception of Rimini, Faenza, and Cesena, which were seized by
Venice, to be secured, however, by Julius in the war of the League of
Cambray. Meanwhile Perugia and Bologna were gained by Julius in 1506,
while the Duchy of Urbino fell to his nephew, Francesco della Rovere,
who was adopted by Guidobaldo, its late Duke. These territories
were incorporated into the papal dominions; the history of their
semi-independent princes came to an end, and Julius II., rather than
Alexander, established the papal dominion in the Romagna.
§ 5. _The League of Cambray._
The pretext for the invasion of Italy by France and Spain had been the
necessity of securing a base of operations for a crusade against the
Turk. This had been prevented by the quarrel of the robbers over their
spoil. They were now to prove by their attack on Venice--the only
power which had seriously attempted to check the Moslem advance--that
the idea, even if ever seriously entertained, had been definitely
abandoned.
| Jealousy against Venice, the result of her advance on
| the mainland.
The hostility with which that republic was viewed by the rest of
Italy dates from the beginning of the fifteenth century, when she
definitely began to aim at establishing a dominion on the Italian
mainland. A quarrel between Milan and the Carrara of Padua enabled her
to overthrow that family, to seize Padua, then, step by step, Vicenza
and Verona, and to advance to the Adige (1405). In 1427 and 1428, she
wrested Brescia and Bergamo from the hands of Filippo Maria Visconti,
Duke of Milan, and after his death secured Crema (1454). Meanwhile she
had acquired the district of Friuli from the Patriarch of Aquileia
(1420), and in 1441 had added Ravenna, hitherto an independent state
under the Polentani, to her conquests. In 1484, the peace of Bagnolo,
which closed the Ferrarese war, gave her Rovigo and the Polesine. In
1499, she gained Cremona and the Ghiara d’Adda from Louis XII., as
the price of her assistance against Ludovico. On the death of Cæsar
Borgia, she had occupied Faenza, Rimini, and Cesena; while in Apulia,
she held the four towns, Trani, Otranto, Gallipoli, Brindisi, which
she had acquired at the date of Charles VIII.’s expedition. Thus,
within the space of some hundred years, Venice had completely altered
her character. The island city had gained a large territory on the
mainland, which stretched to the neighbourhood of Milan, Florence, and
the Papal States. The change of policy has usually been attributed
to the advance of the Turk, which threatened her possessions in the
Ægean Sea, and on the coast of Greece. This no doubt was one of her
motives at a later date. But as her first advance on the mainland
occurred in 1405, some years before the Turk seriously menaced her, we
must look elsewhere for the primary cause. This is to be found in the
danger to be apprehended from the growing power of Milan. As long as
the plain of Lombardy and the approaches to the Alpine passes were in
the hands of petty princes, she could hope to purchase, or to extort,
an outlet for her commerce to the north; but, if these were to fall
into the hands of the powerful and aggressive Dukes of Milan, they
might be closed against her. An alternative route no doubt remained.
She might have threaded the Straits of Gibraltar and reached the north
of Europe by the Atlantic and the English Channel. But, though of late
a Flanders fleet had yearly sailed from Venice, this route was not
developed. It could, and probably would, have been closed by Spain.
Nor would such a policy have saved her from Milan, which, if she
became too powerful, might cut off her food supplies, surround her,
and drive her into the sea.
The attempt, then, to form a state in Lombardy appears to have been
inevitable; nor was it so selfish as her enemies declared it to be.
Her treatment of the cities under her rule was not only infinitely
superior to that of Milan, but compared most favourably with that
of Florence. She left them as much local autonomy as was compatible
with the maintenance of her supremacy; she did not tax them heavily.
It was the aim of Venice to secure the affection of her subjects,
and their loyalty in the days of her troubles, proved that she had
succeeded. With equal injustice the policy of Venice towards the Turk
has been denounced as faithless to the cause of Christianity. No
doubt, despairing of the aid of Europe, she was anxious to keep on
friendly terms with the Turk, and would, if possible, have avoided
war; but this policy was forced upon her by the refusal of European
states to sink their common jealousies and join heartily in a crusade.
Venice, after all, was the only power which seriously attempted to
check the advance of the Moslem, and the coalition against her is
the best proof of the hollowness of the cry of a crusade on the part
of her spoilers. But though the advance on the mainland seems to
have been inevitable, and is capable of justification, it was none
the less a fatal step. Had it been possible for Venice to conquer
Milan, and to have secured the whole of Lombardy before the date of
the French invasion, she might some day have become the capital of
a united Italy, and the history of the Peninsula might have been a
happier one. But for this her resources were not sufficient, nor is
it likely that the European powers would have acquiesced. Failing
this, her vain attempts to find a strategic frontier only added to her
enemies, and earned her the name of the most selfish and grasping of
the Italian states; while in her endeavour to protect her commerce by
friendly treaties with the Turk, she added to her crimes the charge of
treachery towards the cause of Christendom.
| The real faults of Venetian policy.
The real fault of Venice has not been so often noted by historians.
Her interests imperatively demanded that the foreigner should be
excluded from Italy. As long as the Peninsula was left to itself,
she was strong enough to hold her own; but she was no match for the
more powerful kingdoms of the north. Her vacillation at the date
of the expedition of Charles VIII. she had in part redressed by
forming the League of Venice and driving him from Italy, although her
occupation at that date of the Apulian towns eventually earned her
the hostility of Ferdinand. The good work was, however, again undone
by her foolish alliance with Louis XII. in his war against Milan. By
this short-sighted policy she earned with some justice the accusation
of territorial greed; irritated Maximilian, who did not relish being
excluded from Lombardy; and established on her western frontier the
ever-grasping power of France. Thus, by the close of the fifteenth
century, Venice had incurred the enmity not only of the petty Italian
states, but of the chief powers of Western Europe.
| European combinations leading to the League of
| Cambray.
Maximilian desired to recover Friuli; Louis XII. wished to extend
the frontiers of the Milanese; Florence feared that Venice might
cross the Apennines; Ferdinand was determined to recover the cities
in Apulia. Above all, Pope Julius was bent on humbling the proud
republic. Her acquisitions in the Romagna interfered with his darling
scheme of establishing the papal rule in that district. Between France
in Milan, and Spain in Naples, Julius might hope to hold the balance,
and to establish the temporal dominion of the Papacy, but Venice, or
indeed any strong Italian power, would strenuously oppose it. In this
Julius only followed the traditional policy of his predecessors in the
papal chair, that of inveterate hostility to the growth of a strong
native state in Italy. Moreover, the independent attitude of the
republic in matters of church government, illustrated at this moment
by her refusal to allow him to nominate to the vacant bishopric of
Vicenza, angered the haughty prelate. ‘They wish to treat me as their
chaplain,’ he said, ‘let them beware lest I make them humble fishermen
as they once were.’
Under these circumstances the sole hope for Venice lay in the mutual
jealousies of her enemies. From these she had profited hitherto,
but when they ceased her day of reckoning would come. Hence it is
necessary to treat in some detail the relations of the European powers
at the opening of the sixteenth century.
At the close of the Neapolitan war, the alliance between the houses of
Hapsburg and Spain, based on the marriage of the Archduke Philip, son
of Maximilian, with Joanna, the daughter of Ferdinand of Aragon and
Isabella of Castile, threatened to break up. By the deaths in 1497,
and 1500, of John, the eldest son, and of Michael of Portugal, the
grandson of the Spanish monarchs, Joanna became the heiress of Castile
and Aragon,[21] and, in the event of Isabella’s death, would become
Queen of Castile to the exclusion of her father. This at once aroused
the jealousy of Ferdinand against her husband the archduke. The
temporary division of Castile and Aragon would arrest the unification
of the Peninsula; while the prospect of Spain eventually falling to
the Hapsburg was equally distasteful to him.
| Treaty of Lyons, April 5, 1503; and of Blois, Sept.
| 22, 1504.
Ferdinand had accordingly rejected the treaty of Lyons (April 1503),
concluded between Philip and Louis XII. for the settlement of the
Neapolitan quarrel. By that treaty, it had been agreed that the
kingdom of Naples should one day fall to Claude, the infant daughter
of Louis XII., who had already, in 1501, been betrothed to Charles,
the young son of the archduke. Philip, abandoned by his father-in-law,
clung all the closer to the French alliance, and was supported by his
father, Maximilian, who hoped by this marriage treaty to realise his
most magnificent dreams. In September 1504, at Blois, Louis XII.,
influenced by his wife, Anne of Brittany, promised Milan, Genoa,
Asti, Brittany, and Blois, as Claude’s dower, to which Burgundy was
to be added in the event of his own death without male heirs. In the
following year, Maximilian actually proposed, with the approval of the
French Queen, that the Salic Law should be repealed, in order that
Claude might succeed her father on the French throne.
| Second Treaty of Blois. Oct. 12, 1505.
Thus there seemed a prospect that the young Charles would some day
unite the kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, France, the Milanese, and the
kingdom of Naples, with the hereditary dominions of the House of
Hapsburg. Had this ever come about, the rest of Germany must have
submitted, and the descendants of the poverty-stricken Frederick III.
would have found themselves masters of an empire over most of the
Teutonic and Latin races of the continent. But the day dream was not
to last. In November 1504, Isabella died, and Ferdinand, determined
to retain his hold as regent of Castile, made haste to conciliate
Louis XII. At Blois, in October 1505, he agreed to marry Germaine de
Foix, the niece of the French king. To her the French claims on Naples
were to be resigned, which, however, were to revert to Louis XII. in
default of her having issue by Ferdinand. Ferdinand further promised
to Louis a sum of money, and an amnesty to the French party in Naples.
In the June of the following year, 1506, Ferdinand was indeed obliged
to surrender the regency of Castile to Philip and Joanna; but in
September the Archduke Philip died at Burgos; the unfortunate Joanna
was declared to show signs of madness,[22] and Ferdinand, by the help
of Cardinal Ximenes, secured, though with difficulty, the government
of Castile. Thus the quarrel between Louis XII. and Ferdinand was
temporarily accommodated, and Ferdinand was secure in Spain and in
Naples.
Meanwhile, in France the national hostility to a foreigner had been
aroused. The Estates-General at Tours (May 1506) prayed the King to
abandon the intended match between Claude and Charles, and to marry
her to Francis of Angoulême, the heir-presumptive to the crown, who
was ‘entirely a Frenchman.’ Maximilian, irritated at the failure of
his schemes, now broke with Louis. In 1507, he summoned the Diet to
Constance, and passionately demanded help of the empire. ‘The King of
France,’ he said, ‘wishes to rob the Germans of the Imperial crown,
the highest dignity of the world and the glory of our nation.’ In
return for a promise to reorganise the Imperial Chamber, he received
a contingent from the Diet; he also took a body of Swiss mercenaries
into his pay. Crossing the Brenner, he reached Trent in February,
1508, and there, with the consent of the papal legate, declared
himself Emperor-elect.
| The League of Cambray. Dec. 10, 1508.
But as usual the pretensions of Maximilian outran his abilities to
a ludicrous extent. The Venetians, fearing his designs on Friuli,
refused him free passage, and enforced their refusal by arms. His
attempt on Vicenza failed. The Duke of Gueldres, stirred up by Louis
XII., threatened the Netherlands, and the would-be ruler of Western
Europe was forced to accept the terms of the insolent republic and
retire. Burning to revenge himself, he pocketed his pride, and at
Cambray, December 1508, came to terms with Louis XII. Peace was made
with the Duke of Gueldres, and Maximilian promised, in return for
money, the investiture of Milan to Louis XII. and his descendants.
Their quarrels thus accommodated, the King and Emperor agreed to
partition the Venetian territory. All princes who had any claims
on Venetian lands were asked to aid in checking her intolerable
selfishness and greed by recovering their lost possessions. Ferdinand
and the Pope shortly joined, the latter with some misgivings, and only
after Venice had refused to restore to him Rimini and Faenza; a number
of petty Italian princes followed suit, and Venice found herself
face to face with one of the most shameful of coalitions in history.
Ferdinand, however, was engaged in wars against the Moors of Africa.
The penniless Maximilian was not ready for a fresh campaign; and the
French, and papal troops, assisted by the Duke of Ferrara and other
Italians, alone took the field.
| Battle of Agnadello or Vaila. May 14, 1509.
The wisest policy for Venice would probably have been, as Pitigliano
urged, to avoid pitched battles, and to play a waiting game. If the
war were prolonged, the robbers would be sure to quarrel. But rasher
counsels prevailed. Neglecting the movement of the papal troops in the
Romagna, the Venetians turned against the French and attempted to stop
their attack at the frontier. As the two armies were manœuvring
in the valley of the Adda, it came about that the rear-guard of the
Venetian army, under Bartolomeo d’Alviano, came within striking
distance of the French advanced guard. Alviano, a condottier with more
valour than discretion, thought it more honourable to be beaten than
to retreat, and at once ordered the attack. The Venetian army was a
curious medley of Italian condottiers and peasants, Greek light horse
from the Peloponnese and the Ægean isles, and half-savage archers
from Crete. Nevertheless it fought well, more especially the Italian
infantry, composed of peasants from the Lombard plain and the slopes
of the Alps and Apennines. But it was exposed to the attack of the
whole French army, aided by a large body of Swiss. The van, under the
Count of Pitigliano, whether from jealousy, or because it was too
far distant, did not co-operate; and, after a desperate struggle,
the Venetian army turned and fled, leaving Alviano a prisoner, and
most of their infantry dead on the field. As is often the case with
mercenaries, the defeated army soon became a mob. The cities refused
refuge to the fugitives, and opened their gates to the victors. The
French met with no opposition till they reached Peschiera, which they
took by assault.
At Venice meanwhile, the Senate were debating their future policy
amidst the wildest consternation. Deciding to bow to the storm and
to abandon their subject cities, they authorised them to surrender.
Verona, Vicenza, and Padua forthwith sent their keys to Louis, and on
his chivalrous refusal to accept their submission, since they did not
fall to his share, they turned to Maximilian. In the Romagna, the Pope
occupied Ravenna, Rimini, and Faenza. The Duke of Ferrara entered the
Polesine; the Marquis of Mantua seized the territories of which Venice
had deprived him; and the Apulian towns surrendered to Ferdinand.
| Venice saved by the loyalty of her subject lands and
| the dissensions of her foes.
Venice had now lost all her acquisitions made during the fifteenth
century, and seemed doomed to be confined again to her lagoons; nay,
Maximilian even spoke of taking the city itself and dividing it into
four districts among the confederates. But the Emperor as usual
counted without his host. Neither Ferdinand nor Julius were willing
to press matters so far; they stayed their hand, while Louis, having
attained his object, withdrew to Milan, and then to France. In the
conquered territories, more especially in those claimed by Maximilian,
a reaction now took place in favour of the republic of St. Mark. The
nobles had easily deserted Venice, but now the lower classes in town
and country rose in her defence. The Senate regained courage. By a
majority of one vote it was decided to resume the offensive, and,
on July 17, Padua was re-taken. The law which forbade the Venetian
nobility to serve on the mainland was revoked, and one hundred and
seventy-six young nobles, headed by the sons of the Doge, Loredano,
marched to the defence of the recovered city. Maximilian at last
determined to come in person, and laid siege to Padua with a large
army composed not only of Germans, but of Spanish auxiliaries, and
reinforced by a French contingent. But the French and Germans were
not on the best of terms. The French knights, when ordered to storm
the breach on foot, demanded that they should be joined by the German
men-at-arms, and not be left to fight side by side with low-born
lansquenets, and the German knights refused to serve on foot at
all. At last Maximilian, passing as was his wont from overweening
confidence to blank despair, raised the siege, October 3, 1509, and
recrossed the Alps, to hear that Vicenza had also revolted, and
recalled the Venetian troops.
Unable to defeat the Venetians in open battle, or to take their
cities, Maximilian ordered their territories to be ravaged, and a
cruel war of pillage and of massacre went on in Friuli throughout
the winter of 1509-10. On one occasion, six thousand men, women, and
children were suffocated in a cave near Vicenza. Such cruelties could
only serve to convince the people of the superiority of the Venetian
rule.
Venice was now to be saved by the dissensions of her enemies. Julius
II. had hitherto been the most bitter of her foes, and had supported
the League not only by arms, but by excommunication. Yet he had always
declared that Venice had driven him to this step by her refusal to
recognise the just claims of the Papacy, spiritual and temporal. ‘But
for this,’ he had said, ‘we might have been united and found some way
to free Italy from the tyranny of the foreigner.’ Why should this not
now be done? The lands he claimed were in his possession, and Venice
was prepared to acknowledge his spiritual pretensions. Moreover,
the overwhelming predominance, which France had gained, might be
more dangerous to papal interests than the Venetian republic. Thus
by joining Venice there was an opportunity, not only of furthering
the papal cause, but also of realising that dream of every patriotic
Italian, the expulsion of the foreigner. Julius, however, did not
show his hand at once. It would be rash to do so until he could be
sure that Venice was strong enough to resist her foes; hence his long
refusal to listen to her prayers. When, at last, in February 1510, he
admitted the city to his peace, it was only on the severest terms.
Venice acknowledged the justice of the excommunication; renounced
her claims to tax her clergy, and to nominate to her bishoprics;
promised that clerics should be tried by ecclesiastical courts, and
declared the navigation of the Adriatic free to citizens of the Papal
States. The Council of Ten indeed entered a secret protest against
these concessions as having been extorted by force, and subsequently
repudiated them, but for the moment the Papacy had triumphed.
It was now the aim of Julius to drive the French and Germans from
Italy by the assistance of Venice, and of the Swiss, who had broken
with Louis. The Swiss alliance for the time failed him. Nevertheless
he met at first with transient success. The neutrality of Ferdinand
was secured by the investiture of Naples and Sicily, hitherto refused
by the Papacy (July 1510). Modena, belonging to the Duke of Ferrara,
and Mirandola, were conquered; the first by the nephew of the Pope,
the Duke of Urbino; the second by the warlike Julius himself, who,
rising from a bed of sickness, crossed the trenches on the ice, and
took the city by storm (January 1511). But here his success ended.
| The Holy League. Oct. 5, 1511.
On May 13, 1511, the French captured Bologna, aided by treachery
within the city, and in September, Louis summoned a general council
at Pisa, which had been at last reconquered by Florence two years
before. The council was a failure, for Europe was not prepared for
another schism. But it was evident that the French were not to be
easily driven from Milan. Julius, therefore, determined to be avenged
on France, now turned to Ferdinand. The wily Spaniard had long lost
interest in the League. Having regained the Apulian towns, he did
not care to see Venice further humbled, and dreaded the increase of
French power in Lombardy. Moreover, a quarrel in Italy would give him
a pretext for seizing Navarre, which he had long coveted. Ferdinand
accordingly gladly welcomed the offers of the Pope; and on October
5, 1511, the Holy League was formed between the Pope, Ferdinand, and
Venice. The ostensible object of the League was the protection of the
Church, the recovery of Bologna, and the restoration to Venice of her
territories. The real aim of the confederates was to drive the French
from Italy, while a further stipulation in the treaty, that the Pope
should confirm the Spaniards in any conquest made outside Italy,
pointed clearly to Navarre. The allies also gained the support of the
young Henry VIII. of England, who was anxious to revive his claims
to Guienne, and to strengthen his alliance with his father-in-law.
Against this formidable coalition, Louis was at first successful. The
French army was commanded by Gaston de Foix, the king’s nephew and
brother of Ferdinand’s wife. The young man--he was twenty-three, ‘a
great general without having served as a soldier’--who by the rapidity
of his movements earned in this campaign the title of the Thunderbolt
of Italy, first threw himself into Bologna (February 4), and forced
the army of the League, under Raymond de Cardona, viceroy of Naples,
to retire. Hearing of the revolt of Brescia, he hurried thither, took
the town by assault, mounting the ramparts with bare feet to improve
his hold on the steep slopes (February 18), and killed so many of the
defenders ‘that the horses could not put foot to the ground for the
corpses that covered it.’ Then, speeding back to Bologna, he forced
his enemies to retire, and, pressing on to Ravenna, attempted to take
the town by assault (April 19).
| Battle of Ravenna. Easter Day, 1512.
Cardona was anxious to avoid a pitched battle. Time, he knew, was on
his side, for Maximilian was on the point of joining the League; the
Swiss were preparing to pour down into the Milanese; and the projected
invasion of France by Henry VIII. would prevent Louis from sending
efficient reinforcements. He had accordingly retired to Faenza, but,
fearing that Ravenna would fall if not relieved, was forced to return.
Even then his tactics were defensive. His camp was protected on the
left flank by the river; in front, by some of the numerous ditches
which intersect the marshy country. Strengthening this further by his
artillery, and by waggons with scythe-like implements mounted on them,
he awaited the French attack.
The position of Cardona was indeed a strong one, but in numbers his
force was slightly inferior, and, if France was to win, the victory
must be won at once. Gaston, therefore, decided rightly to tempt
fortune once more, and on Easter Day at 8 A.M. he ordered the attack.
He had hoped to dislodge the enemy from their strong position by
means of his artillery, which had been brought to a condition of high
efficiency under the Duke of Ferrara. In this he was disappointed.
The fire of the Spaniards was nearly as effective as his own, and,
although the cavalry of the League suffered as severely as that of
the French, the Spanish infantry protected themselves by lying on the
ground, a movement which French ideas of military honour forbade.
After three hours’ furious cannonade, the impatience of the cavalry
of the League, and of the French and German infantry, could no longer
be restrained, and while the former charged the French cavalry, which
stood opposite to it, the latter attacked the Spanish foot. Thus
cavalry was opposed to cavalry, and infantry to infantry. In the
shock which followed, the French horse under Ives d’Allègre, after
half-an-hour’s struggle, carried all before them; but their foot, with
the German lansquenets, in spite of heroic efforts, found the position
too strong, and were already being driven back, when a detachment
of their horse, returning from the charge, took the infantry of the
League in flank. The French and German infantry now rallied, and
forcing their opponents back, finally drove them from their camp. The
battle was already won, when Gaston, attempting to check the retreat
of some two thousand Spanish footmen, rashly threw himself across
their path, followed by a handful of men-at-arms. Though unhorsed he
still fought on, ‘rivalling the feats of Roland at Roncesvalles,’ till
at last he fell pierced by wounds. Thus ended the most bloody battle
of the war, which had lasted from 8 A.M. to 4 P.M.
The graphic account, given by the biographer of Bayard, helps us best
to realise its peculiar character. The shock of the men-at-arms, the
thrust of pike and short sword, the arquebuses and ‘hacquebutes,’ or
mounted arquebuses, belong to the Middle Age, but the efficiency of
the guns reminds us that we are on the threshold of the sixteenth
century.
The victory lay with the French. Pedro Navarra, one of the best of
the Spanish generals, the young Marquis of Pescara, and the Cardinal
de Medici, legate of the Pope, soon to become Pope Leo X. himself,
were prisoners. ‘The Spanish loss was such that an hundred years
could not repair it,’ and Ravenna at once surrendered. Yet, never was
victory more dearly bought, or more useless. Though the Spanish troops
had suffered most, the losses amongst the officers were more severe
on the side of the French and Germans, and many a knight who had
distinguished himself in Italy had bit the dust. More serious still
was Gaston’s death. Had he lived, he might have pressed on to Rome,
and brought the Pope at once to terms. His death, however, caused
delay, and delay was ruinous. The cruelty of the French had made them
hated by the Italians; the richness of the booty, at Brescia and
Ravenna, demoralised the troops, and many returned to France.
| Maximilian and the Swiss join the Holy League.
| The French recross the Alps.
Maximilian had come to terms with the League just before the battle,
but too late to prevent his lansquenets from taking part and rendering
most efficient help to the French. Now, in hopes of securing the
Milanese for himself, or for his grandson Charles, he recalled his
troops and openly broke with France. Deprived of their support, the
French could hardly keep the field. It was, however, at the hands
of the Swiss that they were to be driven across the Alps. In the
previous wars, these mercenary mountaineers had been of the greatest
service to Louis; but the cantons had been alienated by his refusal to
increase the subsidy, and still more by his stopping their trade with
the Milanese, whence they drew their corn and wine and oil. A strong
anti-French party accordingly arose in Switzerland, headed by Mathias
Schinner, Bishop of the Valais, the implacable enemy of France, and,
in May 1512, a Swiss army poured down on Milan. La Palice, who, on the
death of Gaston, had succeeded to the command, felt too weak to resist
them with an army deprived of the German contingent, and demoralised
by its excesses. He accordingly withdrew to Pavia. Trivulzio, the
governor of Milan, followed him, and shortly afterwards the French
recrossed the Mont Cenis. With the exception of the castle of Milan,
and a few others, their conquests rapidly melted away. Genoa drove
out the French and elected Giano Fregoso as its doge. All the Romagna
returned to the obedience of the Pope. The Duke of Ferrara indeed
held out, but lost Reggio. Bologna was regained, and even Parma and
Piacenza seized, while Julius claimed all the territory south of the
Po.
| The Medici restored to Florence. Sept. 1, 1512.
In August 1512, representatives of the League met in congress at
Mantua. Florence first demanded their attention. Since the death
of Savonarola, the position of that republic had been most weak.
The constitution established in 1494 had not worked well. It was
too oligarchical to be popular, while the partisans of the exiled
Medici did all they could to discredit it. In 1502, to strengthen the
executive, the office of Gonfalonier had been made a life appointment,
and Piero Soderini had been elected; in 1506, at the suggestion of
Machiavelli, a militia had been formed. But these measures did not
mend matters much. The long struggle to regain Pisa, which was only
ended in 1509, exhausted the revenues of the state, and the intrigues
of the Medici grew more active. Clinging to the French alliance, the
city had refused the offers of the League; yet, in the pursuit of a
policy of feeble neutrality, had given no help to Louis XII., when
help might have saved him. Her turn was now to come. The confederates
demanded that Soderini should retire from office, and that the Medici
should be allowed to return as private citizens. The Florentines
agreed to admit the Medici, but, over-confident in their new-formed
militia, declined to depose Soderini. Accordingly, on August 12, 1512,
Raymond de Cardona attacked the town of Prato, which lay a few miles
to the north of Florence. The militia, although far more numerous
than their enemies, did not justify the confidence which had been
placed in them, and fled as soon as a breach was made; possibly there
was treachery within the walls. In any case, the Spaniards entered
the town without further opposition, and put it to the sack with
such brutality that the memories of it are said to have disturbed
the last moments of Giovanni, the future Pope, Leo X. This cruelty
at least did its work. Soderini, an amiable though weak man, whose
‘silly soul’ the indignant epitaph of Machiavelli sentences to the
limbo of infants, at once resigned rather than expose Florence to
further woes; and, on September 1, the Cardinal Giovanni entered
Florence. The Medici[23] returned nominally as private citizens, but
the constitution of 1494 was swept away, and the government, restored
as it had been under Lorenzo, was completely under their control.
Although the revolution was effected with moderation, the partisans of
the old government naturally lost office. Machiavelli, who had been
secretary to the Council of Ten (Dieci di Libertà e Pace), and who
had taken an active part in the diplomacy of the republic, was driven
from public life, and devoted himself to writing _The Prince_, and
_The Discourses_,[24] the former of which treatises has given him such
an unenviable notoriety. The city under its new rulers abandoned the
French alliance and joined the League.
| Milan granted to Maximilian Sforza. Dec. 29, 1512.
The confederates then turned to the question of Milan. Maximilian
was eager to secure this for his grandson Charles. But he was not
acceptable to the Pope, the Venetians, or the Swiss, or even to
Ferdinand. All dreaded the addition of the Milanese to the vast
possessions present and reversionary of the young prince. Finally,
it was agreed to recall Maximilian, the son of Ludovico il Moro, who
had since his father’s fall been brought up in the imperial court.
On the 29th of December, Maximilian received the keys from the Swiss
and entered the city. In return, ‘their puppet duke’ ceded to the
confederates the Val Maggia, Locarno, and Lugano; and to their allies,
the Rhætian League (later the canton of the Grisons), Chiavenna,
Bormio, and the Valtelline. This, added to the Val Leventina, acquired
1440, and to Bellinzona, granted by Louis XII. in 1503, gave the
Swiss, and their allies, complete command over four of the most
important passes of the Alps, the St. Gothard, the Splugen, the
Maloia, and the Bernina, and extended their territory to the Italian
lakes of Como, Lugano, and Maggiore.[25] Thus at the close of the year
1512, the Medici and the Sforza found themselves again in power as
they had been at the invasion of Charles VIII.
| Ferdinand conquers Spanish Navarre. July 1513.
Meanwhile France had been threatened by a joint attack on Guienne--on
the part of Ferdinand and Henry VIII. The English indeed landed
at Bayonne, but fortunately for Louis, the attention of Ferdinand
was called off to Navarre. That kingdom, which sat astride of the
Pyrenees, was at this moment under the rule of Catherine de Foix and
her husband, the Frenchman, John d’Albret. But her title had always
been disputed by the younger line, represented by Gaston de Foix,
the nephew of Louis XII. On his death at the battle of Ravenna, his
claims passed to his sister Germaine, wife of Ferdinand, and these
Ferdinand now proceeded to press. Catherine, the reigning queen,
no longer afraid of France, sought the alliance of Louis XII. This
gave Ferdinand the pretext he sought. He demanded a passage through
Navarre for his attack on France, and on being refused, invaded the
little kingdom. He was supported by a powerful faction, headed by the
Beaumonts. The timid John fled. ‘Wert thou queen and I king, the realm
would not be thus lost,’ said Catherine, but was forced to follow her
cowardly husband, and, by the end of July, Ferdinand occupied all
the territory on the Spanish side of the mountains. That portion of
the country which lay on the French slope of the Pyrenees, continued
an independent kingdom, to be absorbed into France in the sixteenth
century, by the accession of Henry of Navarre to the French crown. The
English, irritated at Ferdinand’s failure to co-operate with them,
and attacked by disease, due to the hot climate, the incessant rain,
and the heavy wine of the South in which they indulged too freely,
withdrew from Bayonne, and France was relieved from immediate danger
on that side.
| Break-up of the Holy League.
| Death of Julius II. Feb. 20, 1513.
At the beginning of the year 1513, it was pretty evident that the Holy
League would not last. The Venetians, finding that the Emperor was
coveting the share of their territory originally meted out to him by
the League of Cambray, were looking again to France. At this moment,
Julius II., one of the chief movers in that League, passed away. The
objects of this ‘fiery personality’ had been: first to conquer the
Romagna, and establish the papal dominion there on a sound footing;
secondly, if possible, to free Italy from the foreigner. Of these,
the first had been the dominant aim, and he had attained it. ‘For
good or for ill, Julius is the founder of the Papal States.’ We may
deplore the secularising influence of the temporal dominion on the
spiritual character of the Papacy, but at least the scheme of Julius
is infinitely preferable to that of Alexander VI. Alexander had tried
to establish his family; Julius won territories for the Papal See.
But in gaining this, his primary aim, he sacrificed his second. By
the League of Cambray, he finally destroyed the political life of
Italy, and called the foreigner to his aid; and, when, in the Holy
League, he attempted to undo the work, and to drive the French, the
chief instruments of his previous policy, across the Alps, he found
that he could only do so at the price of changing masters. In his
last days, indeed, he hoped to reconcile Maximilian by some small
concessions, and then, with the help of the Venetians and the Swiss,
to drive the Spaniards from the peninsula. But the dream was an idle
one. Julius had riveted the chains of Italian slavery, and done much
to advance the power of that formidable Austro-Spanish House which
was shortly to become so dangerous a menace to Europe, and to control
the destinies of Italy till our own day. None the less, the name of
Pope Julius will always live as the founder of the Papal States, as
the last representative of that great semi-political, semi-religious
Church, whose claims to universal supremacy over western Christendom
were on the point of being overthrown; as the patron of Bramante,
Michael Angelo, and Raphael, the authors of those supreme efforts of
Renaissance art, the Cathedral of St. Peter,[26] and the frescoes of
the Sistine Chapel, and of the Vatican.
| Election of Leo X. March 11, 1513.
Of all the schemes of Julius II., few had more influence on the
immediate history of Italy and of the Papacy than the restoration
of the Medici to Florence. He had been led to it by the obstinate
adherence of the republic to Louis XII. But the policy was a mistaken
one. The republic was weak and could not have had much influence,
whereas, under the Medici, allied as they were with Spain, Florence
was likely to become formidable again. Julius, however, could hardly
have foreseen that a family, which had only just been restored from
exile, would furnish his successor on the papal throne; for the
election of the young Cardinal Giovanni de’ Medici--he was only
thirty-eight--surprised every one.
Giovanni, the second son of Lorenzo the Magnificent, appointed a
cardinal before he was a man, had indeed shown himself a capable
politician by the leading part he had taken in the restoration of
his family to Florence. He was not, however, otherwise noteworthy,
and his election was due mainly to the desire of the young cardinals
for some rest after the political activity of the pontificates of
Alexander VI. and Julius II. This they hoped to gain by the election
of the pleasure-loving Medici, who represented the Renaissance in its
shallower aspects, loved magnificence, and dallied with literature and
art; but had no serious purpose in life beyond a desire to establish
his family at Florence, and, for the rest, to be ever on the winning
side.
| Treaty of Mechlin. April 5, 1513.
But though, by the death of Julius II., the Holy League was robbed
of its most earnest member, the change of Popes did not for the
moment improve the prospects of peace. On the one hand France and
Venice, united by common interest, formed an alliance; on the other,
the young Henry VIII. of England and his ambitious minister Wolsey,
anxious to win a place in European counsels, pined for a new league
of partition against France. This was signed at Mechlin, in April,
between Maximilian, Henry VIII., Leo. X., and Ferdinand; although the
last named was at the same moment making a secret treaty with the
French King.
| Battle of Novara. June 6, 1513.
Threatened thus on all sides, France seemed likely to be overwhelmed.
In Italy, her attempt to reconquer the Milanese, by the aid of the
Venetians, was foiled by the disastrous battle of Novara. Here the
Swiss, who looked upon Maximilian Sforza as their _protégé_, without
cavalry or artillery, decisively defeated a French army three times as
numerous as themselves, and well provided with both guns and horse.
| Battle of Guinnegate. Aug. 16.
| Flodden. Sept. 9.
Meanwhile Henry VIII., with the needy Maximilian in his pay, invaded
France; laid siege to Terouenne; put a French relieving force to
flight at Guinnegate with such ease, as to earn for the combat the
name of ‘the Battle of the Spurs’; and took Terouenne and Tournay. In
September, the Swiss actually invaded France and extorted a treaty
from Louis XII. In the same month, James IV. of Scotland, as he sought
to make a diversion in favour of his French ally, lost the flower of
the Scottish nobility, and his own life, on the field of Flodden.
| France once more saved by dissensions of her foes.
| Ferdinand, the Pope, and Henry VIII. are reconciled to
| France.
It looked as if France, the country which at first had gained most
from the partition of Venice, was likely to be partitioned herself.
But, as ever, the mutual jealousies of the European powers prevented
any lasting combination. Neither Ferdinand nor Leo X. wished to see
France too weak. Leo thought that his own interests and those of his
family would be best secured by balancing the powers of Spain and
France in Italy, and hoped to secure French assistance for his scheme
of establishing Giuliano his brother in Naples. He accordingly became
reconciled to the French King, and pardoned the French cardinals,
who had taken part in the schismatic council of Pisa (November,
1513). Ferdinand was above all things anxious to prevent the undue
aggrandisement of the House of Hapsburg. He had already made a secret
treaty with Louis, and he now intrigued to detach the Emperor from
the English alliance. Henry was determined not to be thus left in
the lurch. He was irritated at the treachery of Ferdinand, and the
incurable shiftiness of Maximilian, ‘the man of few pence,’ who would
do anything to gain a little money, and accordingly made his own peace
with Louis (August, 1514). It was agreed that his sister Mary, who had
just been betrothed to Charles, the grandson of Maximilian, should
marry the French King. The disparity in their ages was serious. The
bridegroom was a widower of fifty-two, and Mary was but sixteen. But
the scruples of the maiden were overcome by the promise that, if she
would this time sacrifice herself to her brother’s interests, she
should next time follow her own inclinations; and peace was concluded
between France and England. Thus France escaped from her danger, and
England, under the guidance of Wolsey, had secured for herself an
influential position in Europe.
Of the folly of Louis’ Italian policy, there cannot be a doubt.
His three capital errors are thus described by Machiavelli: ‘He
increased the power of the Church; he called the Spaniards into
Italy, a foreigner as puissant as himself; he ruined the power of the
Venetians, his best allies.’
The mutual jealousies of the other powers, indeed, saved France itself
from dismemberment. But her resources were terribly strained; Spain
had seized half of Navarre; Tournay had been lost to England; and the
attempt to hold Italy had only proved the truth of the adage that
‘Italy is the grave of the French.’
| Louis XII. succeeded by Francis I. Jan. 1515.
Had Louis lived, Europe might possibly have had peace. But the
unfortunate man succumbed in three months in his attempt to play the
bridegroom, ‘dining at eight when he was accustomed to dine at midday,
and retiring to bed at midnight when he was wont to sleep at six,’
and was succeeded by his ambitious cousin, Francis of Angoulême, who
had, in 1514, married the king’s daughter, Claude, heiress through her
mother to the Duchy of Brittany.
| Francis determines to invade Italy. His treaties with
| Venice, England, and Charles.
The young king, now in his twenty-first year, is thus described by
Sir Robert Wingfield, the ambassador of Henry VIII. at the court of
Maximilian: ‘He is mighty insatiable, always reading or talking of
such enterprises as whet and inflame himself and his hearers. His
common saying is, that his trust is, that by his valour and industry
the things which have been lost and lettyn by his ignoble predecessors
shall be recovered, and that the monarchy of Christendom shall
rest under the banner of France as it was wont to do.’ Encouraged
by his mother, Louise of Savoy, who was bent on the exaltation of
her ‘Cæsar,’ he was no sooner on the throne than he resolved to
plunge into Italy and wipe out the disgrace of Novara. In the spring
and summer, he renewed the treaties with Henry VIII. and Venice,
and concluded an alliance with the young Charles, who, although
only fifteen, had just been called to assume the government of
the Netherlands, and who, under the guidance of Croy, the Lord of
Chièvres, had adopted a conciliatory attitude towards France. Francis
also hoped to gain the support of Leo X. In February, he sanctioned
the marriage of Giuliano de’ Medici, the brother of the Pope, with
Philiberta of Savoy, sister of his mother Louise, and held out hopes
of some day establishing him in Naples.
| Counter-League against France.
| Francis crosses the Alps, Aug. 1515. Victory of
| Marignano, Sept. 13.
The fickle Pontiff, however, was as usual playing double, and in
the same month joined the counter-league against France, which was
composed of the Emperor, Ferdinand, Florence, the Duke of Milan,
and the Swiss. Had the allies been united it might have gone ill
for Francis, but they were bent on their own interests, and divided
their forces. Francis, finding that the outlet of the passes of
the Mont Cenis and Mont Genèvre were guarded by the Swiss, pushed
his way across the Alps by the Col de l’Argentière, a new and
difficult route, and reached Saluzzo unmolested. He then surprised
Prospero Colonna, who commanded the Milanese forces at Villafranca,
and completely turned the position of the Swiss at Susa. The Swiss
dropped back on Milan, and the French advanced to Marignano, a place
between Piacenza and Milan. Here, late on a September afternoon,
they were attacked by the Swiss. The intrepid mountaineers had been
stirred by the eloquence of Mathias Schinner, the Cardinal of Sion,
the life-long enemy of the French. With only a few Milanese cavalry
to support them, and scarcely any guns, they trusted to the weight of
their famous phalanx, and push of pike. The French they despised as
‘hares in armour.’ Disencumbered of their caps, and with bare feet to
give themselves firmer footing, they dashed upon the enemy, hoping to
repeat the exploit of Novara. But they underrated their opponents,
who were led by the flower of French chivalry, the Constable of
Bourbon, La Palice, the Chevalier Bayard, Robert de la Marck, the
son of the ‘devil of the Ardennes,’ himself dubbed ‘L’Aventureur,’
and the Milanese, Trivulzio, who had fought in seventeen pitched
battles. Pedro Navarra, the Spanish general of artillery, was also
there. He had been made prisoner at the battle of Ravenna, and since
the niggardly Ferdinand had refused to pay his ransom, he had taken
service with the French.
The struggle which ensued was declared by Trivulzio to be a battle of
giants, compared with which, all that he had ever been engaged in were
but child’s-play. When darkness came upon the combatants, they lay
down to sleep ‘within cast of a tennis ball of each other.’ With the
dawn the combat was renewed, and continued till midday. The Swiss had
divided their forces in an attempt on the rear-guard, when d’Alviano
attacked them in the rear with the Venetian contingents. This decided
the matter, and Francis, knighted on the battlefield by the Chevalier
Bayard, remained the master of the field. Yet though defeated, the
Swiss retreated in good order, bearing their wounded with them.
| Results of the victory.
The battle of Marignano gave Milan to the French. Maximilian Sforza
abdicated his dukedom, which he had held for three years, and died
some years after, a pensioner in France. By his victory, Francis
shattered the military prestige of the Swiss, who had of late deemed
themselves invincible, commanded the destinies of Lombardy, and
‘tamed and corrected princes.’ Never again did these mercenaries
exercise an independent influence in Italy. Thus Francis had attained
at one stroke the pinnacle of military glory, and, had he pressed
his advantage, might have reduced the Pope and regained the kingdom
of Naples. But for this he was not prepared, and, contrary to
expectation, the battle for a moment promoted the cause of peace.
Leo, eager to join the winning cause, hastened to come to terms. He
ceded Parma and Piacenza, while Francis promised to support Lorenzo
in Florence, and to sanction the papal attack on the Duchy of Urbino,
whence Francesco della Rovere, the Duke, was driven. A short time
afterwards, Francis gave Lorenzo a wife connected with the royal
family, Madeleine de la Tour d’Auvergne.
| The Concordat of Bologna. Aug. 1516.
Having thus settled their political affairs, Pope and King proceeded,
by the concordat of Bologna, to share between them the liberties
of the Gallican Church. The traditional privileges of the Church
of France had been confirmed and extended by Charles VII. in the
Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges (1439). By it, the free election to
bishoprics and abbacies had been secured to the chapters; the papal
claims to first-fruits had been rejected, as well as the right to
nominate to benefices by way of ‘reservations’ and ‘expectancies’;
appeals to Rome had been restricted, and the superiority of General
Councils over the Pope had been declared. The independence thus gained
by the Church of France had been distasteful, not only to the Pope,
but to Louis XI. himself, who had attempted, though unsuccessfully,
to repeal the Pragmatic Sanction. Now Francis had his opportunity,
and was met half-way by Leo X. The Concordat of Bologna restrained
indeed the appeals to Rome, and declared papal ‘reservations’ and
‘expectative graces’ abolished. But it restored the first-fruits to
the Pope, omitted the assertion of the superiority of General Councils
over the Pope, and gave to the King the right of nomination to
bishoprics and archbishoprics, subject only to the papal confirmation
and institution. A few years later, the King gained the same privilege
with regard to the abbots of French monasteries. This serious attack
on the constitutional liberties of the Church of France met with
resolute opposition from the ‘Parlement’ and the University of Paris.
But the ‘Parlement,’ after an ineffectual resistance, was forced
to register it _de expressimo mandato regis_, the University was
overawed by royal threats, and the Concordat became the law of France.
Henceforth the French Church became the servant of King and Pope. The
power, which the crown obtained by control of these nominations, may
be estimated by remembering that in France at that time there existed
ten archbishoprics, eighty-three bishoprics, and five hundred and
twenty-seven abbacies. This right of nomination was almost exclusively
exercised in favour of men of noble birth. Hence the mischievous
distinction between the higher clergy who were nobles, and, for the
most part, courtiers, and the _curés_, who were not. Under these
circumstances, the position of the Church formed a counterpart to
the social condition of the country, with its sharp and disastrous
division between the noble and the _roturier_. On the other hand, the
right of veto enjoyed by the Pope on the royal nominations caused the
higher clergy and the aspirants for office to look to him. Thus the
Church of France, once the most independent of the European churches,
became one of the most servile and ultramontane, whilst its rulers
lost all touch with the middle classes.
| Death of Ferdinand the Catholic, Jan. 23, 1516.
| Charles, King of Spain.
Meanwhile, the triumph of Francis materially influenced the policy
of Ferdinand. Since the death of the Archduke Philip, the King of
Spain had been jealous of his grandson Charles. He feared lest he
might reclaim the regency of Castile, and disliked the prospect of
his eventually joining Austria, the Netherlands, and Spain under one
rule. His hostility even led him to entertain serious thoughts of
dividing his inheritance on his death between Charles and his brother
Ferdinand. Now, fearing that France might become too powerful, he
changed his will and bequeathed all to Charles. In January, 1516, the
wily old diplomatist, who had so adroitly schemed to establish his
undivided authority in Spain, and to balance the powers of Europe,
died, and Charles found himself, at the age of sixteen, the ruler of
Spain, the Netherlands, the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, and the New
World.
| Charles makes Peace of Noyon with Francis, Aug. 13,
| 1516, which Maximilian accepts.
It was now the aim of Wolsey, who had gained his cardinal’s hat in
the previous year, to oppose the predominant power of France by an
alliance between Charles, Maximilian, the Pope, and the Swiss. But Leo
for the present preferred the French alliance, and Charles was not yet
prepared for a struggle with Francis. His position was by no means
secure; his succession in Spain was disliked by many of the Spaniards;
the Netherlands lay exposed to the attacks of the Duke of Gueldres,
and of Robert de la Marck, the Lord of Bouillon, both ever glad of a
pretext for war. Finally, with all his titles, he was sadly in need
of money. He was therefore in no position to contest the possession
of Milan, and, following the advice of Chièvres, he concluded the
Peace of Noyon with the victor of Marignano (August 13, 1516). Charles
was betrothed to Louise, the infant daughter of Francis; the French
retained Milan, but surrendered all claims to Naples; Charles promised
to restore Spanish Navarre to the line of Albret; Venice agreed to
offer 200,000 ducats to Maximilian for Brescia and Verona, but in the
event of his refusing, the two Kings might adopt what policy they
liked with regard to Venetian affairs.
| Henry VIII. makes Treaty of London, Oct. 1518. Europe
| for the moment at Peace.
The Peace of Noyon was a blow to Wolsey. In vain did he try to form an
alliance with Maximilian, the Venetians, and the Swiss. The Emperor
was ever ready with fantastic projects calculated to deceive the
simple Sir Robert Wingfield, Henry’s representative at his court,
who was an ambassador of the old generation, and did not fathom the
wiles of the new diplomacy. But Richard Pace, Wolsey’s special agent,
warned his master against the credulity of the good knight, whom
he humorously describes as ‘Summer will be green,’ and against the
shiftiness and money greed of Maximilian. Eventually, in December,
Maximilian accepted the terms of the treaty of Noyon, and surrendered
Brescia and Verona to Venice. Nor was Wolsey more successful with
the Swiss. In November, in return for gold, they made a ‘perpetual
peace’ with the French at Friburg. England seemed to be isolated once
more. But the desire of Francis to recover Tournay, which had been
seized by Henry VIII. in 1513, gave Wolsey an advantage, and by the
Treaty of London (October, 1518), Henry surrendered that town. The
alliance between the two countries was confirmed by the usual marriage
arrangements. The English princess Mary, a child of two, was betrothed
to the dauphin, who was not yet one year old. Thus England had at
least saved herself from isolation, and Europe was at peace.
The Pope, when he dissolved the Lateran Council in the March of the
preceding year, had declared that schism had been ended, that the
necessary reforms in the Church had been accomplished, and that he
had good hopes that Europe, now at peace, might unite against the
Turk. The powers of Europe openly professed their intention so to do;
indulgences were promised, and papal collectors attempted to raise
money. Yet Europe was on the threshold of a renewed struggle between
the Houses of Hapsburg and of Valois, which was to last with some
slight pauses for another eighty years; and already Luther had affixed
his famous ‘Theses’ to the church door at Wittenberg, which were to
lead to a schism such as Rome had never dreamt of.
| Effect of the Wars of the League of Cambray on the
| decline of Venice.
| Real causes of the decline of Venice.
| The old routes of commerce altered by discovery of
| route round the Cape.
The series of treaties just mentioned may be said to have closed
the desultory war which had commenced with the League of Cambray.
It is often said that the League ruined Venice, yet we find that
she still retained almost all her dominions on the mainland, with
the exception of the Apulian towns and a few districts surrendered
to the Pope, and that the Adda still remained her boundary on the
west. The long war had no doubt severely strained her resources and
her exhausted finances, but these might have been restored. We must
therefore look elsewhere for the causes of the decline of Venice. In
the first place, the condition of politics had changed. The great
monarchical states of Europe, more especially France and Spain, had
become consolidated. Venice could no longer hope to compete with them;
her resources on the mainland were not sufficient to cope with the
armies which these powerful nations could put into the field; and in
any case she must have contented herself with a subordinate position.
We must also remember the strain of the Turkish wars. Europe, ever
ready to accuse Venice of treachery to the cause of Christendom,
turned deaf ears to her earnest entreaties for assistance. Thus Venice
was left almost alone to face the Turk. During the struggle, which
continued with some few intermissions throughout the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, Venice slowly lost ground. She had to surrender
Cyprus in 1571, and Candia in 1669, after a desperate defence of
four-and-twenty years. The expenses of these wars, added to those
she had just incurred, would have been difficult to meet, even if
her trade had been left to her. But even this was slipping away. Her
wealth had depended chiefly on her commerce with the East and on
her carrying-trade between East and West. The old routes of Eastern
commerce had been mainly three. First, from Central Asia to the Black
Sea, and thence to the Mediterranean; secondly, by the Persian Gulf
and the Euphrates Valley, to the Levant; and lastly, to Cairo and
Alexandria from the Red Sea. Thence goods were shipped in Venetian
galleys to Venice, and were sent over the Alps, generally by the
Brenner Pass, to the Inn, the Danube, the Maine, and the Rhine, and
thence to Bruges, or were conveyed round by sea in the ‘Flanders
galleys.’ But at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Eastern
routes to Venice became closed. The Turks, after their conquest of
Constantinople, in 1453, cut off her trade with the Levant, while the
advance of the Portuguese on India destroyed the trade through Egypt.
| Discoveries of the Portuguese.
The Genoese had been the pioneers of exploration on the western
coast of Africa. They had rediscovered the Canaries and the island
of Madeira, which had been known to the Carthaginians. But their
attention had been directed to the Mediterranean, their strength
exhausted in struggles with their Venetian rivals, and in the
fourteenth century the Portuguese had reoccupied these islands. The
great period of Portuguese discovery dates from the time of Prince
Henry the Navigator (1394-1460). This son of John I. of Portugal built
an observatory at Sagres, on Cape St. Vincent, the extreme south-west
promontory of Europe, and devoted himself to the scientific study of
geography, and to the encouragement of discovery. Other motives were
not wanting; the desire to avenge himself on the Moors, the hereditary
foes of his country, and greed for gold dust, and the profits of the
slave-trade, in which the Prince was the first to engage. In one
expedition no less than two hundred and sixteen negro slaves were
brought to Portugal, of whom one-fifth were assigned to Henry as his
share; ‘of which,’ says the chronicler, ‘he had great joy because of
their salvation, who otherwise would have been destined to perdition.’
Under his influence, the Portuguese planted colonies at Porto Santo
and Madeira, discovered the Azores, and the Cape de Verde Islands, and
began to creep down the western coast of Africa. In 1442, Prince Henry
obtained from Pope Martin V. a grant of all kingdoms and lordships
from Cape Bojador to India. The hopes of reaching India spurred him
on. In 1479, Ferdinand of Spain, still occupied at home with the Moors
of Granada, agreed not to interfere with the exclusive right of the
Portuguese to traffic and discovery on the western coast of Africa,
while claiming the Canary Islands. The agreement was confirmed by
the bull of Alexander VI., which gave to Portugal all newly found
lands east of a line one hundred--subsequently, in 1494, extended by
treaty to three hundred and seventy--leagues west of the Cape de Verde
Islands.
| Defeat of Egyptian fleet by Portuguese at Diu. Feb.
| 1509.
Eight years before this bull, Bartholomew Diaz rounded the Cape,
to which he gave the name of Stormy, but which his more sanguine
sovereign, John II. of Portugal, called the Cape of Good Hope. In
1498, Vasco da Gama, again sailing round the Cape, crossed the Eastern
Ocean, and set foot on the Malabar coast at Calicut. Shortly after,
Emmanuel, King of Portugal (1495-1521), assumed the title of ‘Lord
of the navigation, conquest, and commerce of Æthiopia, Persia,
Arabia, and India,’ and sent Almeyda to India with the title of
viceroy, although he did not yet possess a foot of territory there.
The Portuguese now pushed steadily up the western coast of India,
defeated the princes who opposed them, and began to monopolise the
trade. In 1505, the first Portuguese ships appeared at Antwerp,
offering eastern wares at a cheaper rate than they could be got at
Bruges, the market for the goods which came overland from Venice. This
advance seriously threatened the Venetian trade through Egypt, then
chiefly in the hands of Arabian and Moorish merchants. Accordingly,
in 1509, the Sultan of Cairo, in answer to an appeal from some of the
petty princes of the Malabar coast, despatched an expedition from
Suez against the Portuguese, which the Venetians, conscious that
their interests were involved, assisted. But in February 1509, three
months before the battle of Agnadello, the expedition was defeated by
Almeyda in the harbour of Diu. His successor Albuquerque fixed the
centre of the Portuguese rule at Goa, and occupied Ormuz, an important
port on the Persian Gulf. Henceforth the advance of the Portuguese
was unchecked. By the close of the sixteenth century not only did
they control the commerce of the coasts of Africa, Arabia, and the
western coast of India, but they had planted themselves at Ceylon and
in Bengal, had opened up a trade with China and Japan, and, above all,
had occupied the true ‘Spice Islands’ which cluster round Borneo and
Celebes (1546).
Thus the same spring witnessed the fall of the Venetian military
power in the battle of Agnadello, and the destruction of their trade
with the East. The caravans no longer came to Cairo. The eastern
goods were shipped round the Cape. The mediæval trade-routes were
revolutionised, and the carrying trade passed from the Venetians to
the Portuguese, shortly to be followed by the Dutch and English, while
Antwerp took the place of Bruges as the ‘entrepôt’ in the North.
Finally, the conquest of Egypt by Selim I. (1516) destroyed what
remained of the Egyptian trade. This loss of commerce prevented Venice
from recovering from her financial straits, and was the chief cause of
her decline.
The effect on the internal politics of the city was also fatal. The
nobility, who had hitherto enriched themselves by trade, either took
to banking, which could not last without the aliment of commerce, or
invested their savings in land, and became an idle class. Poverty
increased, and the aristocracy of Venice was weakened by internal
feuds. The rich monopolised the administration, while the less
fortunate, with a majority in the Great Council, were ever attempting
to overthrow their power by agitation, or by intrigues and plots,
often with foreigners. Thus Venice, which had long been the admiration
of Europe for the stability of her government, and the honour and
patriotism of her nobility, became the victim of selfishness,
corruption, and conspiracy. It is this which explains the growing
power of ‘The Ten.’ This executive committee, an excrescence on the
original constitution, first organised for temporary objects in
1310, assumed more and more the character of a committee of public
safety, and with the three inquisitors, created in 1539 to deal more
efficiently with treason, gave to the government a character of
mystery, suspicion, and cruelty, hitherto unknown. A loss of moral
tone accompanied this decline. As the wealth of the state decreased,
the extravagance, both public and private, grew. At no date were the
public pageants so magnificent, or the private luxury so unbridled. In
more vital questions of morality, though Venice had never maintained
a high standard, even for Italy, she now fell lower, and private
crime went almost unpunished. It would be absurd to attribute this
degradation entirely to the loss of her prestige and power, but
that it was increased thereby no one can doubt. Yet Venice still
survived. Protected by her impregnable position, and served by her
clever diplomatists, who resided at every court and carefully steered
the country through the mazes of European intrigue, she continued
the Queen of the Lagoons, if no longer of the Mediterranean, ‘The
admiredst citie of the world’ for her buildings, her blue lagoons, and
azure skies.
In the domain of art she had something still to give the world.
The sixteenth century is the age of Titian (1477-1576), Tintoret
(1512-1594), and Paolo Veronese (1532-1588), in whose works painting
reached its climax of technique, of elaborate and harmonious grouping,
and of gorgeous, if somewhat sensuous, colour; while to the Aldine
Press we owe some of the earliest triumphs of the art of printing.
In her struggle with the Papacy, in the later decades of the sixteenth
and the first of the seventeenth centuries, Venice showed the world
once more, as she had in days gone by, that though she accepted her
religion from Rome, she was determined and powerful enough to maintain
her independence in matters of church government.
Finally, in her long contests with the Turk, notably in the wars of
Cyprus (1570-1571), and of Candia (1645-1669), she displayed a heroism
which recalled the greatness of her past, and which, but for the
abominable selfishness of Europe, might have checked the advance of
that Power which could conquer, but knew not how to rule, or to
develop the resources of subject lands.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] Cf. Appendix i.
[3] ‘If he knows these five Latin words, _Qui nescit dissimulare
nescit regnare_, it will suffice,’ Louis XI. had said of his
son.
[4] Cf. Appendix iii.
[5] On this cf. p. 57.
[6] Cf. Appendix ii.
[7] Cf. Machiavelli, _Discorsi_, Book i. c. 12.
[8] Cf. Savonarola ‘on the Contempt of the World,’ given in Villari,
_Life of Savonarola_, vol. ii. App. and his Sermons, _passim_.
[9] For the question as to the true account of the interview, cf.
Creighton, _The Papacy_, Appendix vii.
[10] Savonarola, however, was no enemy to literature and art. Cf.
Villari ii. 133.
[11] The ‘taille’ was a tax levied on land and income. It was first
imposed by the Estates of Orleans, 1439. The nobles, clergy, the
officials of the sovereign courts, and other royal officials
were exempt. It therefore fell exclusively on the lower classes.
Cf. Appendix I., p. 456.
[12] Three other sons of Galeazzo Sforza, one legitimate, the
other two illegitimate, were also taken prisoners and died in
captivity.
[13] For the fate of the other children of Federigo, cf. Sismondi,
_Hist. des Rep. Italiennes_, ix. 295.
[14]
Ferdinand of Aragon = Isabella of Castile
+1516 | +1504
|
+---------------+------------------------+----------------+
| | | |
John = Margaret | | |
+1497 _d._ of | | |
Maximilian | | |
| | |
Joanna = Archduke Philip | |
+1555 | _s._ of Maximilian | |
| +1506 | |
| Mary = Emanuel |
| of Portugal |
| +1521 |
| |
Charles V. Catherine
(1) betrothed
to Prince
Arthur.
(2) Married
Henry VIII.
[15] For the position of these districts, see Map of Italy.
[16] Cf. especially, Le Combat singulier entre Bayard et Don Alonzo,
and Le Combat des treize contre treize, _La tresjoyeuse Histoire
des gestes du bon Chevalier_, c. xxii.-xxiii. Ed. Petitot, vol.
15.
[17] His son John d’Albret, king of Navarre in right of his wife, had
allied himself with Ferdinand, fearing the claims on Navarre of
the younger branch, then represented by Gaston de Foix, nephew
of Louis XII.
[18] The most important of these petty states in Alexander’s time
were the Duchy of Ferrara in the hands of Ercole, Marquis of Este.
Bologna, „ Giovanni Bentivoglio.
Imola and Forli, „ Caterina Sforza, niece of Ludovico
il Moro, and widow of Girolamo
Riario, nephew of Sixtus IV.
Rimini, „ Pandolfo Malatesta.
Faenza, „ Astorre Manfredi.
Pesaro, „ Giovanni Sforza, distant cousin of
Ludovico and first husband of
Lucrezia Borgia.
Camerino, „ Giulio Cæsare Varano.
Duchy of Urbino, „ Guidobaldo di Montefeltro.
Sinigaglia, „ Francesco Maria della Rovere, a
boy.
A few such as Ancona were still republics, but were weak and obscure.
[19] The best account of Lucrezia Borgia is to be found in
Gregorovius’ _Cæsar Borgia_, a work which has been translated
into French.
[20] For a review of Cæsar’s character, and of Machiavelli’s treatment of
him, cf. Creighton, vol. iv. 64; Burd, _Machiavelli_, introduction,
pp. 22, 28; Villari, _Machiavelli_, ii. 154; Symonds’ _Age of the
Despots_, p. 275.
[21]
Ferdinand of Aragon = Isabella of Castile
|
+-----------------------+-----+-------+
| | |
John Emanuel of Portugal = Isabella Joanna = Archduke Philip
+1497 | +1493
|
Michael
+1500
[22] On the question of Joanna’s madness, cf. authorities at page
104, note.
[23] The leaders of the Medici at this time were as follows:--
1. Giuliano, Duke of Nemours, and Cardinal Giovanni,
subsequently Leo X., both sons of Lorenzo.
2. Giulio, nephew of Lorenzo, subsequently Cardinal and then
Pope Clement VII.
3. Lorenzo, Duke of Urbino, son of Piero, grandson of Lorenzo.
[24] On the purpose of the _Prince_, cf. Burd, _Il Principe_,
Introduction. _Cambridge Modern History_, c. 6.
[25] Chiavenna, Bormio, and the Valtelline, were held till 1797. The
others since 1803 have formed the Swiss canton of Ticino.
[26] Bramante began St. Peter’s under Julius II., Michael Angelo
added the dome under Leo. X.