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EUROPE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 1494-1598
by
A. H. JOHNSON, M.A.
* * * * * *
_In Eight Volumes. Crown 8vo. With Maps, etc._
_Six Shillings net each Volume._
_The Complete Set £2, 8s. net._
PERIODS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY
General Editor--ARTHUR HASSALL, M.A.,
Student of Christ Church, Oxford.
The object of this series is to present in separate Volumes a
comprehensive and trustworthy account of the general development
of European History, and to deal fully and carefully with the more
prominent events in each century.
The Volumes embody the results of the latest investigations, and
contain references to and notes upon original and other sources of
information.
No such attempt to place the History of Europe in a comprehensive,
detailed, and readable form before the English Public has previously
been made, and the Series forms a valuable continuous History of
Mediæval and Modern Europe.
=Period I.--The Dark Ages.= 476-918.
By C. W. C. Oman, M.A., Chichele Professor of Modern History in
the University of Oxford. _6s. net._
=Period II.--The Empire and the Papacy.= 918-1273.
By T. F. Tout, M.A., Professor of Mediæval and Modern History
in the University of Manchester. _6s. net._
=Period III.--The Close of the Middle Ages.= 1273-1494.
By R. Lodge, M.A., LL.D., Professor of History at the
University of Edinburgh. _6s. net._
=Period IV.--Europe in the 16th Century.= 1494-1598.
By A. H. Johnson, M.A., Historical Lecturer to Merton, Trinity,
and University Colleges, Oxford. _6s. net._
=Period V.--The Ascendancy of France.= 1598-1715.
By H. O. Wakeman, M.A., late Fellow of All Souls’ College,
Oxford. _6s. net._
=Period VI.--The Balance of Power.= 1715-1789.
By A. Hassall, M.A., Student of Christ Church, Oxford. _6s.
net._
=Period VII.--Revolutionary Europe.= 1789-1815.
By H. Morse Stephens, M.A., Professor of History at the
University of California, Berkeley, California, U.S.A. _6s.
net._
=Period VIII.--Modern Europe.= 1815-1899.
By W. Alison Phillips, M.A., formerly Senior Scholar of St.
John’s College, Oxford. _6s. net._
THE DARK AGES, 476-918
By C. W. C. OMAN, M.A., Chichele Professor of Modern History
in the University of Oxford.
Forming Volume I. of Periods of European History.
‘A thorough master of his subject, and possessed of a gift
for clear expositions, he has supplied the student with a
most valuable and helpful book.’--_Spectator._
‘No better exponent of this era, so full of difficulties and
complications, could have been chosen.’--_Journal of
Education._
‘Mr. Oman has done his work well. His narrative is Clear and
interesting, and takes full account of recent
research.’--_English Historical Review._
‘This volume will be valued by all historical students as
supplying a real want in our historical literature, and
supplying it well.... His touch is sure and his insight
keen. For the accuracy of his facts his historical
reputation is a sufficient guarantee.’--_Times._
THE EMPIRE AND THE PAPACY, 918-1273
By T. F. TOUT, M.A., Professor of Mediæval and Modern History
in the University of Manchester.
Forming Volume II. of Periods of European History.
‘This admirable and impartial work.... A more trustworthy
historical treatise on the period and subject has not
hitherto appeared.’--_Morning Post._
‘One of the best of the many good historical textbooks which
have come out of our universities in recent
years.’--_Times._
‘Altogether Professor Tout has given us a most trustworthy
adjunct to the study of mediæval times, which all who may be
called upon to interpret those times to others may safely
recommend and themselves profit by.’--_English Historical
Review._
THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES, 1273-1494
By R. LODGE, M.A., LL.D., Professor of History at the
University of Edinburgh.
Forming Volume III. of Periods of European History.
‘The book is admirably written, it contains maps and
genealogical tables, an exhaustive index, and a bibliography
which students will value as an aid to the interpretation of
the whole period as well as a clue to any part of
it.’--_Standard._
‘We are exceedingly thankful for the Series, and as we have
already said, to Prof. Lodge. There is no longer any excuse
for English-speaking teachers to be wholly ignorant of the
history of Europe. The obligation lies on them to purchase
these volumes, and then read, mark, learn, and inwardly
digest them, so that they can supplement their teaching with
intelligible comment.’--_School World._
‘The book must be regarded as quite indispensable to all
English students of the late Middle Ages.’--_University
Correspondent._
‘Professor Lodge’s book has the supreme merit of clearness,
not less than that of conciseness.’--_Pall Mall Gazette._
‘A work of great value on one of the most difficult and at
the same time one of the most important periods of European
history. The book is a monument of skill and
labour.’--_Aberdeen Journal._
EUROPE IN THE 16TH CENTURY, 1494-1598
By A. H. Johnson, M.A., Historical Lecturer at Merton,
Trinity, and University Colleges, Oxford.
Forming Volume IV. of Periods of European History.
‘A singularly clear, thorough, and consistent account of the
great movements and great events of the time, and the volume
may be accepted as one of the best extant handbooks to a
period as complex as it is important.’--_Times._
‘In the present volume Mr. A. H. Johnson has made a useful
and unpretentious contribution to a Series of which it can
be said more truly than of most series that it supplies a
real want. Mr. Johnson is well known as one of the most
experienced and successful teachers of history at Oxford,
and the book has all the merits which the fact of being
written by a good teacher can give it. It is clear,
sensible, and accurate, and commendably free from fads or
bias.’--_Manchester Guardian._
‘There is certainly no other single book in English which
covers the ground so adequately.’--_University
Correspondent._
‘Mr. Johnson’s narrative is clear and accurate, and his
grasp of the history of his period wonderfully strong and
comprehensive.’--_Journal of Education._
THE ASCENDANCY OF FRANCE, 1598-1715
By H. O. Wakeman, M.A., Late Fellow of All Souls College,
Oxford.
Forming Volume V. of Periods of European History.
‘His story is no dry compendium, but a drama, each act and
scene of which has its individual interest.’--_Guardian._
‘Mr. Wakeman has produced an excellent sketch, both clear
and concise.’--_Oxford Magazine._
‘Mr. Wakeman’s book is a sound, able, and useful one, which
will alike give help to the student, and attract the
cultivated general reader.’--_Manchester Guardian._
‘A thoroughly scholarly and satisfactory monograph.’--_Leeds
Mercury._
THE BALANCE OF POWER, 1715-1789
By A. Hassall, M.A., Student of Christ Church, Oxford.
Forming Volume VI. of Periods of European History.
‘Although it contains more than 400 pages, we felt as we
read its last page that it was too short. It is not,
however, too short to prevent its author dealing adequately
with his subject according to the scheme of the whole
Series. There is little detail in it, and but little
theorising, and what it contains are clear statements of
masterly summaries.... We may cordially recommend this
interesting and well-written volume.’--_Birmingham Daily
Gazette._
‘Treated with much accuracy, patience, and
vigour.’--_Educational Times._
‘The author has struggled manfully with the difficulties of
his subject, and not without a distinct measure of success.
He has availed himself of the latest researches on the
period, and his narrative is well ordered and illustrated by
excellent maps and some useful appendices.’--_Manchester
Guardian._
REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE, 1789-1815
By H. Morse Stephens, M.A., Professor of History at the
University of California, U.S.A.
Forming Volume VII. of Periods of European History.
‘As a piece of literary workmanship can hardly be
surpassed.... The result is a boon to students, and a
serviceable book of reference for the general
reader.’--_Daily News._
‘Mr. Stephens has written a very valuable and meritorious
book, which ought to be widely used.’--_Manchester
Guardian._
‘An admirable, nay, a masterly work.’--_Academy._
‘To say that Mr. Morse Stephens has compiled the best
English textbook on the subject would be faint
praise.’--_Journal of Education._
‘We are happy to extend a hearty welcome to this much-needed
Series, which, if it throughout keeps on the same high level
of this volume, will fill up a painful gap in our accessible
historical literature.’--_Educational Times._
‘The volume contains one of the clearest accounts of the
French Revolution and the rise of the First Napoleon ever
written. In fact, it is the work of a real historian. The
style of the book is strong and picturesque.’--_Western
Morning News._
MODERN EUROPE, 1815-1899
By W. Alison Phillips, M.A., formerly Senior Scholar of St.
John’s College, Oxford.
Forming Volume VIII. of Periods of European History.
‘An exceedingly difficult task has been accomplished, we may
say without hesitation, to admiration. We have read the book
with the keenest and quite unflagging enjoyment, and we
welcome it as one of the very best histories that have been
written within the last few years.’--_Guardian._
‘It has achieved, with a remarkable success, the difficult
task of compressing into a compact space the long history of
a time of extraordinary complications and entanglements;
but--much more important--it has never lost vigour and
interest throughout the whole survey.... The completeness of
the book is really extraordinary.... The book is by far the
best and handiest account of the international politics of
the nineteenth century that we possess.... Should give Mr.
Alison Phillips distinct rank among historians of the
day.’--_Literature._
‘Altogether, the book offers a most luminous and quite
adequate treatment of its subject, and makes a worthy
conclusion of a Series that well deserves to be
popular.’--_Glasgow Herald._
‘He presents his materials with model clearness and
arrangement, and with a sound literary style, which will
make the book attractive to the general reader as well as
useful to the student.’--_Scotsman._
‘Mr. Phillips shows decided literary power in the handling
of a not too manageable period, and few readers with any
appreciation of the march of history, having once commenced
the book, will be content to lay it aside until the last
page is reached.’--_Manchester Guardian._
‘This thoughtful volume will give the intelligent reader
both profit and pleasure.’--_Spectator._
* * * * * *
EUROPE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 1494-1598
by
A. H. JOHNSON, M.A.
Historical Lecturer to Merton, Trinity and University Colleges, Oxford
PERIOD IV
Rivingtons
34 King Street, Covent Garden
London
1909
FIFTH EDITION
All rights reserved
PREFACE
The limits as to length imposed upon me by the Editor of the Series
forced me to adopt one of two alternatives. I had either to content
myself with a very slight sketch of the whole of European History
during the period, or I had to exercise some principle of selection.
Unwilling to do over again that which has already been well done by
Mr. Lodge in his _History of Modern Europe_, I have fallen back on the
second alternative, and confined myself to the greater Powers of
Western Europe.
Nor is such a selection without some justification; for it is the
struggle for supremacy between these Powers which underlies the other
issues, affects every movement (even the religious ones), and gives
unity to this many-sided and involved period of the world’s history.
My readers will therefore find no reference to the affairs of England,
nor to those of the Kingdoms of Northern and Eastern Europe, except so
far as in their foreign policy they affect the course of that great
struggle.
My best thanks are due to Mr. Armstrong for help, more particularly in
points of Spanish History, and to Mr. Fletcher, who has revised the
proofs, and assisted with his kindly criticism.
Oxford, _May 1897_.
PREFACE TO FOURTH EDITION
I have only to thank my critics, and especially Mr.
Armstrong and Mr. Fotheringham, for many helpful
suggestions.
Oxford, _Jan. 1903_.
LIST OF MAPS
PAGE
1. Spain, 1494-1598, xvi
2. The Swiss Confederation, 119
3. Netherlands, 314
4. Portuguese and Spanish Discoveries, 473
5. Italy, 1494-1559, }
6. France, 1494-1598, } _at end of book_
7. Germany in 1547, }
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
Bibliography, x
Introduction, 1
I. The Italian Wars, 1494-1518,, 4
II. Internal History of France, Spain, and Germany,
1494-1519, 90
III. From the Election of Charles to the Battle of
Pavia, 129
IV. From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of
Crespi, 181
V. From the War of Schmalkalde to the Treaty of
Cateau Cambrésis, 220
VI. The Counter-Reformation and Calvinism, 261
VII. Philip and Spain, 277
VIII. The Revolt of the Netherlands, 315
IX. The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France, 387
Appendix I.--The French Constitution in the Fifteenth
and Sixteenth Centuries, 449
Appendix II.--Constitution of Florence in the Fifteenth
and Sixteenth Centuries, 458
Appendix III.--Venetian Constitution in the Fifteenth
and Sixteenth Centuries, 467
LIST OF POPES AND GENEALOGIES, 472
INDEX, 477
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE[1]
General--
_Cambridge Modern History_, vol. i.
Lavisse et Rambaud, _Histoire Générale_.
Creighton, _History of the Papacy during the Reformation_, c.
vii. to the end.
Philippson, _La Contre-Révolution religieuse_.
Ranke, _Fürsten und Völker von Süd-Europa im 16ten u. 17ten
Jahrhundert_.
_Zur Kritik neuerer Geschichtschreiber._
_Maps._--Spruner Menke, No. 8. Putzger, _Historischer School
Atlas_.
Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, No. 8.
_N.B._--The Clarendon Press Maps, with Notes, can be purchased
separately, the Spruner without Notes.
A chronological summary will be found in Hassall, _Handbook of
European History_.
France--
_Cambridge Modern History_, c. xii.
Martin, _Histoire de France_.
Michelet, _Histoire de France_.
Grant, _The French Monarchy_.
Gasquet, _Précis des Institutions Politiques et Sociales de
l’ancienne France_.
Chéruel, _Dictionnaire historique des Institutions, mœurs et
costumes de la France_.
Cherrier, _Histoire de Charles VIII._
Godefroy, Théod., _Histoire de Charles VIII. et Louis XII._ (a
collection of Chronicles).
Müntz, _La Renaissance en Italie et en France à l’Époque de
Charles VIII._
Philippe de Commines, _Mémoires_.
Lettenhove: Commines, _Lettres et négoc. avec un Commentaire_.
Memoirs given in Pétitot, Michaud et Poujoulat, especially
_Fleuranges_, _Bayard_, _Tavannes_, _Condé_, _La Noue_.
Mignet, _Rivalité de François Ier et de Charles Quint_.
De Thou, _Historiarum sui temporis libri_ cxxxviii. (translated
into French).
Ranke, _Französische Geschichte_ (translated _The Civil Wars in
France_).
Armstrong, _Civil Wars in France_.
Baird, _The Rise of the Huguenots_.
Forneron, _Les Ducs de Guise_.
Aumale, duc d’, _Histoire des Princes de Condé_.
Delaborde, _Coligny_.
Whitehead, _Coligny_.
Solden, _Geschichte des Protestantismus in Frankreich_.
Willert, _Henry IV._ (Heroes of Nations Series).
Mornay, Ph., du Plessis _Mémoires_.
_Maps._--Spruner Menke, No. 54.
Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, Nos. 57, 58.
Germany--
_Cambridge Modern History_, cc. ix. xvi. xvii. xviii. xix.
Nitzsch, _Geschichte des deutschen Volkes_.
Krönes, _Handbuch der Geschichte Österreichs_.
Ranke, _Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker_
(translated.)
Bezold, _Geschichte der deutschen Reformation_ (Onckens
Series).
Alman, _Kaiser Maximilian I._
Vehse, _Memoirs of the House of Austria_ (translated).
Hutten, Ulrich von, _Schriften_. Ed. Bocking.
Strauss, _Ulrich von Hutten_ (translated).
Geiger, _Renaissance und Humanismus in Italien und Deutschland_
(Onckens Series).
_Johann Reuchlin._
Erasmus, _Opera_. Ed. Le Clerc.
Froude, _Erasmus_.
Lamprecht, _Deutsche Geschichte_ (good for the Social and
Economic History).
Allgemeine deutsche Biographie.
Zeller, _Histoire d’Allemagne: La Réformation_.
Ranke, _Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation_ (part
translated).
Janssen, _Geschichte des deutschen Volkes seit dem Ausgange des
Mittelalters_ (in course of translation).
Beard, _The Hibbert Lectures_, 1803.
Köstlin, _Martin Luther_.
Maurenbrecher, _Studien u. Skizzen zur Reformationszeit_.
_Geschichte der katholischen Reform_.
_Karl V. und die deutschen Protestanten_.
Armstrong, _Charles V._
Baumgarten, _Geschichte Karls V._
Garchard, _Life of Charles_, in _Biographie Nationale_, vol.
iii.
Mignet, _Rivalité de François Ier et de Charles Quint_.
Sir Stirling Maxwell, _Cloister life of Charles V._
Lanz, _Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V._
_Staatspapiere zur Geschichte des Kaisers Karl V._
Bradford, _Correspondence of Charles V._
Garchard, _Correspondance de Charles Quint et d’Adrien VI._
Brandenburg, _Moritz von Sachsen_.
Ranke, _Zur deutschen Geschichte vom Religionsfrieden bis zum
dreißigjährigen Krieg_.
Wolf, G., _Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der
Gegenreformation_.
Köstlin, _Martin Luther_.
Kampschutte, _Calvin_.
_Maps._--Spruner Menke, Nos. 43, 73, 74.
Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, Nos. 37, 38, 39, 47.
Bohemia--
Palacky, _Geschichte von Böhmen_.
_Map._--Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, No. 46.
Switzerland--
Dierauer, _Geschichte der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft_.
Coolidge, _Article in Encyclopædia Brit_.
_Map._--Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, No. 44.
Italy--
Cf. _Cambridge Modern History_, cc. iv, v, vi, vii, viii, xvi,
xvii, xviii, xix.
Gregorovius, _Geschichte der Stadt Rom_, vols. vii. viii.
(translated).
Creighton, _Popes of the Reformation_.
Ranke, _Die römischen Päpste_ (translated).
Pastor, _Geschichte der Päpste_ (translated).
Sismondi, _Histoire des Républiques italiennes du moyen âge_.
Brown, H. F., _Kalendar of Venetian State Papers_.
_Venice_.
Romanin, _Storia documentata di Venezia_.
Perrens, _Histoire de Florence_.
Guicciardini, _Storia d’Italia_.
_Considerazione intorno ai Discorsi di Machiavelli_:
opere inedite, vol. i.
_Storia Fiorentina_: opere inedite, vol. iii.
Guido Capponi, _Storia della repubblica di Firenza_.
Capponi, G. A., _Storia del Reame di Napoli_.
Jovius, _Vitæ illustrium virorum: Elogia virorum illustrium:
Historia sui temporis_.
_Burcardas Diarium._ Ed. Thuasne, 1883-1885.
_Giustiniani Dispacci._ Ed. Villari.
Albèri, _La relazione degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato
durante il Secolo_ xvi.
Da Porto, _Lettere Storiche_.
Sanuto, I _Diarii_.
Symonds, _The Renaissance in Italy_.
Zeller, _Italie et la Renaissance_.
Burckhardt, _Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien_
(translated).
Geiger, _Humanismus und Renaissance in Italien und Deutschland_
(Onckens Series).
Yriarte, _Venise_.
_César Borgia._
_La vie d’un Patricien de Venise._
Burd, _Machiavelli: Il Principe_ (with Biographical and other
Notes).
Machiavelli, _Storia Fiorentina_ (French translation, Perier,
1842).
_Legazioni e Commissarii_, vol. iii. of _Opere
Discorsi_.
Morley, _Machiavelli_ (Romanes Lecture).
Villari, _Niccolò Machiavelli_ (translated).
_La Storia di G. Savonarola_ (translated).
Ranke, _Savonarola u. die florentinische Republik_.
Sarpi Paolo, _Istoria del Concilio Tridentino_ (translated into
French by Courrayer).
_Maps._--Spruner Menke, No. 27.
Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, Nos. 68, 69.
Spain and Netherlands--
_Cambridge Modern History_, cc. xi. xiii.
Schäfer und Schirrmaker, _Geschichte von Spanien_.
Lafuente, _Historia general de España_.
Prescott, _Ferdinand and Isabella_.
_Philip II._
Forneron, _Histoire de Philippe II._
Hume, _Spain_.
_Philip of Spain_ (Foreign Statesmen Series).
Philippson, _West Europa im Zeitalter von Philip II._
Bergenroth, _Calendar of Spanish State Papers_.
Ranke, _Die Osmanen und die spanische Monarchie im 16ten und
17ten Jahrhundert_ (translated).
Lettenhove, _Histoire de Flandre_.
Harrison, _William the Silent_ (Foreign Statesmen Series).
Miss Putnam, _History of the People of the Netherlands_
(translated from Dutch of Blok).
_William the Silent._
Guillaume Le Taciturne. _Correspondance._ Ed. Gachard.
Motley, _The United Netherlands_.
_Maps._--Spruner Menke, No. 19.
Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, Nos. 61, 62, 52.
The Ottomans--
_Cambridge Modern History_, c. iii.
La Jonquière, _Histoire de l’Empire ottoman_.
Finlay, _History of Greece_.
Hammer-Purgstall, _Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches_.
Ranke, _Die Osmanen und die spanische Monarchie im 16ten und
17ten Jahrhundert_ (translated).
_Maps._--Spruner Menke, No. 89.
Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, No. 82.
Discovery--
_Cambridge Modern History_, cc. i. ii.
Bancroft, _The Pacific States of North America_.
Beazley, _The Dawn of Modern Geography_.
_John Sebastian Cabot_ (Builders of Great Britain
Series).
Danvers, _The Portuguese in India_.
Fiske, _The Discovery of America_.
Harrisse, _Christophe Colomb_.
_John Cabot._
_The Discovery of North America._
Markham, Sir C. R., _Life of Christopher Columbus_.
_History of Peru._
Kretchmer, _Die Entdeckung Amerikas_.
Payne, _History of the New World called America_.
Peschel, _Geschichte des Zeitalters der Entdeckungen_.
Prescott, _History of Conquest of Mexico_.
_History of Conquest of Peru._
Winsor, _Narrative and Critical History of America_.
_Maps._--Spruner Menke, No. 20.
Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, No. 85.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] This list may be supplemented by reference to the following
Bibliographies:--
I. _The Cambridge Modern History_, of which vol. i. has already
appeared.
II. Armstrong, _Charles V._
III. Monod, _Bibliographie de l’Histoire de France_.
IV. Dahlmann-Waitz, _Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte_.
V. Förster, _Kritischer Wegweiser durch die neuere deutsche
historische Litteratur_.
VI. Pirenne, _Bibliographie de l’histoire de Belgique_.
VII. Lavisse et Rambaud, _Histoire Générale_.
[Illustration: SPAIN, 1494-1598]
INTRODUCTION
| True meaning of the division of History into Periods.
| Importance of closing years of the fifteenth century.
| Break-up of mediæval idea of a World-Church.
| Rise of Individualism.
The division of history into periods may be very misleading if its
true purport be not understood. One age can no more be isolated from
the universal course of history than one generation from another. The
ideas, the principles, the aims of man change indeed, but change
slowly, and in their very change are the outcome of the past. The old
generation melts into the new, as the night melts into the day. None
the less, just as the night differs from the day, although it is
impossible to say when the dawn begins, and when the day, so does the
Modern differ from that which has been termed the Middle age. This
once granted, the importance of the later years of the fifteenth
century may be easily grasped. The mediæval conception of the
great World-Church under Pope and Emperor had by this time lost all
practical power. The authority of the Emperor was confined to Germany,
and was even there disputed, and, if the Papacy still retained its
pretensions, they no longer had their old weight. Not only had they
been resisted by the various powers of Europe in turn, they had even
been severely criticised by two General Councils. Already the man was
born who was to take the lead in the final overthrow of the unity
of the Western Church. Meanwhile, the older society was breaking
up: the links which in binding a man to his lord, his fields, his
trade, or his town, bound him to his fellows, and his livelihood
to him, were falling to pieces, and the ‘individual’ of modern
life was emerging. To this change many things contributed. The
movement of the Renaissance emancipated men from the somewhat narrow
limits of mediævalism; it opened to them the knowledge of the
ancients, and gave them a glimpse of the worlds of thought beyond, of
which the New World about to be discovered to the west seemed but a
type. The economic revolution had a like effect. The break-up of the
older organisation of trades under the system of close guilds, was
accompanied by the rise of modern competition. In life, as in thought,
the individual was asserting himself.
| Growth of nationalities.
| The rivalries of the nations lead to foreign wars.
| The triumph of monarchy.
| Rise of the theory of the Balance of Power and of
| Diplomacy.
Amidst the clashing of rival interests which this revolution
necessitated, a new principle of unity--that of nationality--arose.
This conception, due to an appreciation of the identity of interest
based on such things as common language, common religion, natural
boundaries, common hopes and fears, was, if a less attractive one than
that of the Holy Roman Empire, at least more capable of realisation,
and alone seemed able to control the spirit of individualism from
running riot. It was in France, Spain, and England that this new
spirit of nationality had been most successful: but, if Germany was
no more than a loose confederation of princes, the Hapsburgs had
already laid the foundation of a monarchy of their own, while the
Pope was becoming more and more the prince of a temporal kingdom
in Italy. The first result of this triumph of nationality was
not surprising. When once a people have realised the identity of
their interests, they are apt to be aggressive. This now occurred.
England indeed, isolated from the Continent and absorbed in domestic
questions, did not take much part as yet; but the others began to
look abroad, and Italy, where alone no political unity existed,
offered fair hopes of spoil. No sooner had France made the first
move in pursuit of her claims on Naples than their cupidity was
aroused, and Western Europe was involved in a series of wars which
continued, with but little intermission, until the Peace of Vervins,
1598. The circumstances of the age gave to this struggle its peculiar
character. National consolidation had been accompanied by the
triumph of the monarchical principle, after its long struggle with
aristocracy--a struggle which of late had not been confined to the
temporal sphere, but had been illustrated also within the Church by
the conflict between the Papacy and the General Councils. It followed
that the dynastic interests of the reigning families predominated.
The monarchs, no doubt, represented the passions and aspirations of
their subjects. Nevertheless, their policy was deeply coloured by
their personal and family rivalries, and hence the wars were more
prolonged than otherwise they might have been. To this also must
in part be attributed the shifting combinations of alliances and
counter-alliances, which change with the variety and rapidity of
a kaleidoscope, and which make the period, so far as its wars are
concerned, one of the most confused in history. In the struggle which
ensued, the Romance and the Teutonic nations came into close though
hostile contact; the theory of the Balance of Power became a guiding
principle of politics; and diplomacy found its birth.
| Political issues affected by the Reformation. The
| beginning of Modern Europe.
Before many years were passed, the unity of the Church of the West was
broken by the Reformation. It was inevitable that the religious and
the political questions should become involved. The struggle for
supremacy in Europe, the internal politics of the several kingdoms,
were deeply affected by the religious issues. The web of European
complications became more confused than ever, and, if the interest of
the period before us is thus enhanced, its difficulty is certainly
increased. Into it all the problems of the Middle Age became absorbed,
and out of it Modern Europe was to arise.
CHAPTER I
THE ITALIAN WARS, 1494-1518
Political condition of France--Regency of Anne of Beaujeu--The
Italian Expedition--Political Condition of Italy--Charles attacks
Naples--League of Venice--Battle of Fornovo--Retreat and Death of
Charles VIII.--Savonarola--Home Policy of Louis XII.--Louis
attacks Milan--Treaty of Granada and attack on Naples--Quarrel
between Louis and Ferdinand--Battles of Seminara, Cerignola, and
Garigliano--French driven from Naples--Alexander VI. and Cæsar
Borgia--League of Cambray--Battle of Agnadello--The Holy
League--Battle of Ravenna--French driven from Italy--Medici
restored to Florence, and Maximilian Sforza to Milan--Conquest of
Spanish Navarre--Break-up of Holy League--Louis XII. succeeded by
Francis I.--Battle of Marignano--Concordat of Bologna--Treaties
of Noyon and London--Causes of decline of Venice.
§ 1. _The Expedition of Charles VIII._
At the date of the Italian expedition, Charles VIII. had been eleven
years on the throne of France. The monarchy to which he succeeded was,
perhaps, less controlled by constitutional checks than any other in
Europe. The crown had earned popularity as the leader in the struggle
against the English--a struggle which had created the French nation;
and as the patron of the middle classes against the feudal nobles. The
Estates-General, the deliberative assembly of the kingdom, had never
succeeded in vindicating its claims. The class divisions which divided
it, as they did the people, had prevented united action. The third
estate did not adequately represent the middle classes; the knights of
the shire, those valuable representatives of the country districts,
who had formed the backbone of the English House of Commons, did
not exist. With these defects, the Estates-General had failed to
secure the command of the purse, or to control the legislation and
administration of the country. All power accordingly lay with the
Royal Council, a body of royal nominees who issued ordinances and
levied taxes at their will, so long as they did not entrench on the
privileges of the nobility to be free from all direct taxation beyond
their feudal dues.
True, the ‘Parlement’ of Paris, the supreme judicial court of the
realm, tried to exercise a power of veto by insisting on its right of
registering, and therefore of refusing to register, the royal edicts.
The King, however, could easily overcome this opposition by holding a
‘Lit de Justice,’--that is, by summoning the members of the Parlement
before the Great Council, and ordering them to register; and under
a strong King, at least, the Parlement became the humble instrument
rather than the opponent of the crown.[2]
| Charles VIII. under the guardianship of Anne of
| Beaujeu, 1483-1492. Her successful policy.
As Charles was in his fourteenth year on the death of his father Louis
XI. in 1483, a regency was not necessary according to the ordinance
of Charles V. (1374). But Louis XI., conscious of the way in which he
had from policy or from cynicism[3] neglected his son’s education,
had intrusted him to the guardianship of his daughter Anne, wife of
the Sire de Beaujeu, who, on the death of his elder brother in 1488,
became Duke of Bourbon.
Of Anne Louis XI. had said ‘she is the least foolish woman in France.’
But her conduct during the earlier years of Charles’ reign belied his
further remark that ‘of wise women he knew none.’ She had, in the
interests of centralisation at least, though perhaps to the permanent
loss of her country, successfully evaded the claims made by the
States-General of 1484 to share in the government. She had defeated
the repeated attempts of the nobility headed by Louis of Orleans,
the heir-presumptive, to oust her from power, and to restore feudal
licence--a movement which had been supported by Francis II. Duke of
Brittany, by Maximilian, then King of the Romans, by Richard III., and
subsequently by Henry VII. of England.
On the death of Francis, Duke of Brittany (1488), she had interfered
in the affairs of the duchy and won by arms the hand of Anne, the
Bretonne heiress, for the young King. By the marriage-contract the
autonomy of Brittany was indeed acknowledged, but it was agreed
that the duchy should fall to the survivor, and the Duchess Anne
bound herself, in the event of her husband dying before her without
children, to marry the next possessor of the French throne. Thus the
way was prepared for the final incorporation into the monarchy of the
last great semi-independent feudatory state, so long a thorn in the
side of France.
This brilliant triumph of diplomacy aroused all the enemies of France.
Maximilian had a double affront to avenge. He himself had been married
by proxy to Anne of Brittany, while Charles VIII. had at the Treaty of
Arras, 1482, plighted his troth to Margaret, Maximilian’s daughter.
Thus, by Charles’ marriage with the Breton Duchess, both the Emperor
and his daughter were jilted. Stung by this twofold insult, Maximilian
forthwith laid claim to Margaret’s dower, Artois and Franche-Comté,
and tried to enforce his claims by arms. Henry VII. attempted to
prevent the union of Brittany with France, and Ferdinand of Aragon
seized the opportunity to reclaim Roussillon, which had been ceded to
Louis XI.
The claim of Maximilian to the dower of his daughter was a just one
and could scarce be denied. But the cession of Roussillon should have
been resisted at all hazards, while the interference of Henry VII.
might have been answered by a resolute attempt to regain Calais and
drive the English finally from the kingdom. Whether France was strong
enough for so bold a stroke may perhaps be doubted, but at least her
policy should have been devoted to the strengthening of her frontiers
and the consolidation of the kingdom.
| Charles bent on the Italian expedition makes peace
| with his enemies.
Unfortunately at this moment Charles had become infatuated with
the idea of the Italian expedition. Being now old enough to act
independently of his sister, he hurriedly yielded to the demands of
his enemies. Henry VII. was bought off by the Treaty of Étaples,
November 1492. Cerdagne and Roussillon were ceded to Ferdinand by the
Treaty of Barcelona, January 1493, and by the Treaty of Senlis, May
1493, the princess Margaret was restored to her father with Artois and
Franche-Comté. Having thus evaded his difficulties near home, Charles
hurried on his preparations for the Italian campaign.
| Condition of Italy in 1494.
After the fall of the Roman Empire, Italy had rapidly lost all
national cohesion. In spite of fruitless attempts which were made
now and again to establish a united kingdom in the Peninsula, the
principle of disintegration had finally triumphed. The Emperors of
the West indeed had claimed supremacy, but, since the close of the
thirteenth century, this had ceased to be a reality, and on the ruins
of those claims, amidst numerous smaller states, five had risen to
special prominence.
| Milan.
In the centre of the plain of Lombardy stood Milan, which at the close
of the thirteenth century had fallen to the Visconti. That cruel but
capable family, while they destroyed the liberties, extended the
dominion of the republic, and absorbed most of the smaller states
of the plain which escaped the rule of Venice. The territory, which
on the extinction of the male line of the Visconti was seized by
the Condottiere, Francesco Sforza (1450), stretched from the river
Adda, where it marched with the Venetian lands, to the Sesia, where
it met Piedmont then under the Duke of Savoy, and the Marquisate of
Montferrat. In 1476, the son of Francesco, Galeazzo Maria, had paid
the penalty of his tyranny, lust, and cruelty at the hands of three
Milanese nobles who, if tyrannicide may ever be defended, are worthy
of the name of patriots. He left a widow Bona of Savoy, who ruled
in the name of her infant son Gian Galeazzo, aided by her husband’s
wisest counsellor, Francesco Simonetta. Three years later, 1479,
Ludovico ‘Il Moro,’ uncle of the young Gian, overthrew her rule,
caused Simonetta to be executed, and assumed the regency. Ludovico,
though ambitious, unscrupulous, and a lover of intrigue, was not
wantonly cruel as many of his predecessors had been, and, if his rule
was a despotic one, he was a liberal patron of the arts and kept his
dominions contented and at peace.
| Venice.
To the east of the Duchy of Milan stood the republic of Venice. Once
a democracy, she had by the close of the thirteenth century become
a commercial oligarchy. At the close of the fifteenth century, not
only did the Great Council monopolise the electoral functions of the
state, but the Doge himself had become little more than an ornamental
figure-head.[4] Venice originally had concerned herself little with
the politics of the mainland. Entrenched behind her lagoons, she had
turned her attention to the Mediterranean and the East, from whence
came her commerce, the source of her wealth. At the commencement of
the fifteenth century, however, she had turned her eye westward to
form a territory on the mainland.[5] In this venture she had indeed
met with great success, and, besides her possessions on the east of
the Adriatic, in the Morea, and the Ægean Sea, she now ruled a large
territory north of the Po, which stretched westwards to the Adda and
northwards to the spurs of the Alps. But this policy had drawn her
into the troubled tangle of Italian politics, and aroused the jealousy
of the Italian states. Still Venice was formidable. By the treaty of
1479, she had surrendered indeed Scutari, Negropont, and most of her
possessions in the Morea, but had retained her commercial privileges,
and secured a temporary peace with the Turk. In 1488, she annexed, by
a fiction of remarkable ingenuity, the island of Cyprus.
The rule of her aristocracy was far less corrupt and far more
consistent than that of other Italian states. The stability of her
Government and her immunity from those revolutions to which the other
states of Italy were ever subject excited the envy of her neighbours.
The leniency and wisdom with which she governed her dependencies
secured her the loyalty of her subjects. Her riches were still great;
her patronage of art magnificent; and if the tone of private morality
was low, it was not lower than in the rest of Italy.
| Mantua and Ferrara.
To the south and south-west of Venice lay the two independent
territories of Mantua and of Ferrara. Of these Mantua, situated amid
the marshy flats of the Mincio, belonged to the warrior family of the
Gonzagas, while Ferrara, commanding the mouths of the Po, was ruled by
the ancient house of Este.
| Florence.
Nestling under the Apennines, Florence held the watershed of the Arno
with her dependent cities of Volterra, Arezzo, Cortona, Pistoja, and
Pisa. To the north-west and to the south of her lay the independent
states of Lucca and Siena, long her deadly enemies.
Nominally a republic based on a system of trade-guilds, Florence was
practically in the hands of the Medici, who, while they left the
outward form of the constitution intact, kept the government in the
hands of their partisans. From time to time a packed ‘Parliament’
of the citizens elected committees or Balías, under whose control
the Signory and other officials were selected. Finally, in 1480,
a college of seventy, practically nominated by Lorenzo, took for
a time the place of the Balías. This college not only nominated
the Signory, but elected the _Consiglio Maggiore_, the legislative
body of the republic, and thus became master of the city. A clever
manipulation of the taxes, by which they struck at the rich, gained
the Medici the support of the lower classes, while the confusion of
the public treasury with the finances of their banking-house gave them
the final control of the administration.[6] The rule of the Medici
was a far more temperate one than that of the Sforza of Milan. Their
power was the result of real political genius. By that alone they had
succeeded in controlling the most restless, the most acute, and the
most brilliant people the world had yet seen since the days of the
Athenians. In Florence was concentrated the essence of Italian art and
literature, and with it, alas, much of that immorality and licence
which stains the glory of the Renaissance. Unfortunately, at this
crisis of her history, Lorenzo the Magnificent, the type of a Medicean
prince, died (April 1492), and, under the incapable rule of his son
Piero, the authority of the family was being rapidly undermined.
| The Papal States.
Encircling the territories of Siena and Florence on the south and the
east, and stretching across the centre of Italy from sea to sea, stood
the Papal States, formed of the Patrimony of St. Peter, the Campagna,
the Duchy of Spoleto, the March of Ancona and the Romagna.
Of these territories all, except the two first, while acknowledging
the suzerainty of the Pope, were practically independent, and in
the Patrimony and in the Campagna, the powerful families of the
Orsini and the Colonna were ever setting his authority at defiance.
It had been of late the policy of the Popes to enforce their rule
in these districts and to organise a strong temporal dominion, a
policy definitely begun by Sixtus IV. (1471-1484). They are probably
right who maintain that by this means alone could the Papacy hope to
survive. The mediæval conception of the Holy Roman Empire had gone
beyond recall. The idea of a united Christendom under one faith was
no longer a reality. Largely, though by no means entirely, through
its own deficiencies, the Papacy had lost its moral hold on Europe,
and the attempt of Nicolas V. (1447-1455) and Pius II. (1458-1464)
to regain the intellectual leadership of Europe had met with scant
success. During the period of the captivity of Avignon (1309-1377),
and the great Schism (1378-1417), the power of the larger Italian
states, and the lust for further extension, had grown. Under these
circumstances, if the Papacy was to save itself from falling as low
as it had fallen in the tenth century, when it was the puppet of the
neighbouring nobles, it must needs follow suit, and form a strong
and united dominion. Yet the necessity cost it dear. Sucked into the
vortex of political intrigue, the Papacy prostituted its spiritual
powers for these secular objects and shocked the conscience of Europe.
Unfortunately the Popes who ascended the papal throne at this moment
were men of low principle. Sixtus IV. (1471-1484) was venal, and
sacrificed everything for the advancement of his nephews. Innocent
VIII. (1484-1492), hopelessly corrupt and indolent, was the first
Pope who openly acknowledged his children; while of Rodrigo Borgia,
who ruled as Pope Alexander VI. from 1492 to 1503, it is difficult
to speak with moderation. To enumerate the charges which have been
brought against him would exhaust the crimes of the decalogue. Even
if we dismiss those charges on which the evidence is not conclusive,
it cannot be denied that Alexander was profligate beyond ordinary
profligacy, contemptuous of the ordinary conventionalities of decency,
avaricious and cruel, and in statesmanship absolutely without scruple.
The desire of the Popes to form a temporal dominion was also injurious
to Italy.[7] Not strong enough to unite the Peninsula under their
own sway, they were determined to prevent its union under any other
hands. In this attempt to reconcile their interests as head of the
Church with those of a temporal prince, they were ever ready to barter
away their country’s liberties. They had more than once before this
summoned the foreigner to their aid, and, if they were not responsible
for the first invasion of the French, they went far to make the
foreign dominion permanent.
The extremity of the Peninsula formed the kingdom of Naples, now in
the hands of Ferrante I. (1458-1494), illegitimate son of Alfonso
the Magnanimous, of Aragon; while Sicily and Sardinia belonged, with
Aragon, to the legitimate branch represented just now by Ferdinand
the Catholic (1479-1516). Always the most disturbed of the Italian
states, Naples had in 1485 been the scene of a baronial revolt against
the tyranny of Ferrante. The King, indeed, by cunning and ability had
triumphed, but his faithlessness and inhuman cruelties had made him
most unpopular, and his rule most insecure. He died in January 1494,
to be succeeded by his son Alfonso II. (1494-1495), who, according to
the French chronicler Commines, though not so dangerous, was a worse
man than his father, since ‘never was any prince more bloody, wicked,
inhuman, lascivious, or gluttonous than he.’
| Rivalry of these states.
The rivalry of these five states, mutually repellent, yet unable to
establish complete independence, was to cause the ruin of Italy. Too
equally balanced to allow of the supremacy of one, too jealous of each
other and too divergent in the character of their peoples and the
form of their governments to unite in a federal bond, they lost all
sense of common national interest. The existence of numerous petty
states between their frontiers, which could only hope to survive by
dexterous intrigue, excited their cupidity and thickened the thread of
treacherous diplomacy which was now to call the foreigner into Italy.
| Intellectual activity and moral degradation of the
| Italians.
But if the quarrels of these Italian rulers led to the first invasion,
and subsequently prevented any permanent coalition, the condition
of the people of Italy destroyed all hope of successful resistance.
In reading the social history of Italy during the fifteenth century
two lessons are forced upon us: first, the fatal effect of the loss
of liberty, and of political faction on the moral fibre of a people;
secondly, the danger of luxury, and of devotion to art and literature,
if not chastened by the religious spirit.
In states like Milan and Naples, where all political liberty had been
destroyed, the only weapons of the oppressed were those the tyrant
had taught them--intrigue and assassination. In cities like Florence,
where constitutional forms remained but the spirit had fled, and
where the state was torn by deadly feuds which vented themselves
in cruel proscription and exile of the defeated, the people were
inspired by mutual suspicion and deep political hatreds. To lose
power was to lose everything. Hence men became desperate, forgot
the necessity for patience, the duty of a minority, and sought to
overthrow their enemies by secret conspiracy or open revolt. In the
smaller states things were worse. There was even less stability, the
factions were more bitter, the chance of successful revolt greater. No
doubt Venice and the Papal Dominions were more stable than the rest of
the Peninsula, but even there intrigue, corruption, and conspiracies
were not uncommon.
Amid such political circumstances as these, not only did all feeling
of Italian nationality perish, but patriotism for city or kingdom
died before the imperative instincts of self-preservation. The
worship of success replaced devotion to principle and obedience
to authority, while cleverness and selfishness flourished at the
expense of morality. Moreover, to protect themselves or to pursue
their schemes of conquest, the tyrants introduced the Condottieri.
The republics, partly from indolence, partly from the difficulty
of resisting the trained soldier with a half-disciplined militia,
followed suit, and Italy became the victim of mercenaries. Of war
these made a game: with no interest in the quarrels beyond their wage,
or their individual ambitions, they loved the battlefield by which
they lived, yet did not wish the battle to be decisive. Ever ready to
change sides at the dictates of self-interest, or for higher pay, they
set up and overthrew states and spread confusion around. Meanwhile
the citizens forgot the art of war, and, when the moment of their
trial came, finding themselves no match for the martial nations of the
North, were frightened at the fury of their onslaught.
The rapid increase of luxury and the development of literature and
art tended to the same results. Undue devotion to material comfort
made the Italians cowardly, selfish, and indolent. The revival
of the critical faculty led to scepticism; the critic destroyed
indeed, but had not the enthusiasm nor the faith to reconstruct.
The return to classical ideals caused a revival of paganism, while
the concentration of man’s mind on the pleasures of art, on the
sensuous delight in beauty of form and colour, led many on to
sensuality. The history of the Renaissance stands as a warning that
the æsthetic spirit is not necessarily religious or even moral.
No doubt it is easy to exaggerate. No doubt there were to be found
many who lived a pure and simple life. Perhaps the denunciations
of an enthusiast like Savonarola[8] are too extravagant. But the
contemporary evidence against the Italians is overwhelming. The
literature of the time must have found readers. The cynical frankness
with which Machiavelli disregards all moral scruples in his treatises
on the art of government are without parallel in the history of
political literature, and the carnival songs of Lorenzo are of
themselves enough to convince us of the depths of degradation to
which Italian morality had sunk. Thus Italy, without any sense of
nationality or patriotism, and devoid of those more sterling qualities
which might have rendered resistance possible, was to see her fair
plains the scene of other nations’ rivalries, and to fall eventually
under the yoke of a foreign dominion which lasted till our own day.
| French claims on Italy.
The French claims on Italy were twofold, and were of long standing.
The House of Orleans, in virtue of their descent from Valentina,
heiress of the Visconti of Milan, looked upon themselves as the
legitimate aspirants to the ducal throne, and considered the Sforzas
usurpers. The House of Anjou disputed the title of the Aragonese kings
of Naples and declared that Joanna II., who died in 1435, had left her
territories to René, the head of their house. The claims of the House
of Orleans were now represented by Louis of Orleans, cousin of Charles
VIII., who already held Asti, while those of the House of Anjou
had in 1481 fallen to the crown, together with Anjou and Provence,
according to the will of René I., the last Duke of Anjou. Louis XI.
had contented himself with Anjou and Provence, but his foolish and
ambitious son, fascinated with the dream of a southern kingdom which
might serve as a starting-point for a new crusade against the Turk,
was eager to enforce his claims in Italy. Yet even Charles might have
hesitated if a quarrel between Milan and Naples had not offered a
tempting opportunity.
| The Peace of Italy depended on the Triple Alliance of
| Milan, Florence, and Naples.
In 1435, Alfonso the Magnanimous, the rival of René of Anjou for the
kingdom of Naples, had warned Filippo Maria, who then ruled Milan,
that the French, once masters of Naples, would seek to extend their
territories in the north. Francesco Sforza, who secured Milan shortly
after Filippo’s death (1450), conscious that the legitimate claim to
Milan had passed with the hand of Valentina to the French House of
Orleans, needed no convincing. The result had been a close alliance
between these two powers, which had been strengthened by the marriage
of Ippolita, Sforza’s daughter, with Alfonso, Prince of Calabria.
Lorenzo, true to the traditional policy of the Medici, had joined
this league. He hoped, by a triple alliance of Milan, Naples, and
Florence, to maintain the balance of power in Italy, resist the desire
for territorial aggression shared by Venice and the Papacy, and, by
keeping peace within the Peninsula, deprive the foreigner of all
excuse for interference. Whether Lorenzo would have succeeded may well
be doubted, but certainly his death (April 1492) removed the only man
to whom success was possible.
| Rupture of the Alliance between Milan and Naples
| forces Ludovico to call in the foreigner.
Even before Lorenzo died, the alliance between Milan and Naples had
threatened to break up. The _coup d’état_ of 1479, by which Ludovico
‘Il Moro’ had seized the reins of power from Bona of Savoy, had
received the approval of Ferrante of Naples. In the following year,
however (1480), the death of Ippolita, Ludovico’s sister and wife of
Alfonso, son of Ferrante, broke the bond between the two families.
The subsequent marriage of the young Gian Galeazzo, with Alfonso’s
daughter, Isabella (1489), made matters worse. Alfonso became jealous
of Ludovico’s rule and wished to see his son-in-law, who had in
the year 1492 reached the age of twenty, recognised as duke. This
jealousy was shared by Isabella, who was envious of the higher honours
conferred on her kinswoman, Beatrice of Este, the wife of Ludovico.
Piero de Medici, who had just succeeded Lorenzo at Florence (1492),
joined Alfonso in a secret league against Ludovico, to which Ferrante
of Naples was somewhat unwillingly prevailed upon to accede. Thus the
triple alliance of Milan, Naples, Florence, upon which the safety of
Italy depended, was broken, and Ludovico was driven to look elsewhere
for support. To Maximilian, who in 1493 was elected emperor, he gave
the hand of his niece, Bianca, and gained in return the investiture
of his duchy, which had hitherto been denied to the Sforza family.
Despairing of more effective aid from that impecunious prince, he next
turned to France. San Severino, Count of Cajazzo, was sent to ‘tickle
Charles, who was but twenty-one years of age, with the vanities and
glories of Italy, and to urge the right he had to the fine kingdom of
Naples’ (Commines).
The policy of Ludovico has received undue condemnation. Every Italian
prince had called upon the French when it suited his purpose. Hitherto
Ludovico had been the most strenuous opponent of this policy, and
when in 1485, Innocent VIII. had urged René II. of Lorraine to press
the Angevin claims on Naples, it was he who had prevented it. Though
selfish, and a master of diplomatic treachery, he was by no means the
worst of the Italian princes of his day. It was the altered policy
of Naples which drove him to the fatal step. Moreover, Gian Galeazzo
was an incapable man, and it seems probable that Alfonso, who had an
insatiable lust for power, hoped to make him his puppet. Ludovico
neither desired nor expected the French to conquer Naples. Italians,
indeed, had so often used the threat of foreign intervention that they
had forgotten what it might mean. His appeal to Charles was but a
move in the game of intrigue which all were playing, and all that can
be said is that, while others had tried it without success, Ludovico
succeeded, to his own ruin, and that of Italy. Nor was he the only one
who at this moment called on Charles. His exhortations were supported
by the Prince of Salerno, a Neapolitan fugitive, eager to avenge the
cruelties which Ferrante, in violation of his promise, had exercised
on the leaders of the revolt of the Barons in 1485. To these were
added the solicitations of the Cardinal Julian della Rovere, the rival
and deadly enemy of Borgia, who had just ascended the papal throne as
Alexander VI. (August 1492).
| Charles decides on the expedition in spite of better
| advice.
‘The question of the expedition,’ says Philippe de Commines, ‘was
warmly debated, since by all persons of experience and wisdom it
was looked upon as a very dangerous undertaking.’ Anne of Beaujeu,
her husband, and many others, did their best to dissuade the King,
but ‘Charles was foolish and obstinate,’ and was supported in his
obstinacy by his favourites, Stephen de Vers, once gentleman of the
Chamber, now Seneschal of Beaucaire, and Briçonnet, Bishop of St.
Malo; the one hoping for lands in Naples, the other for a cardinal’s
hat, promised by the Milanese ambassadors. The younger nobles, eager
for the spoils of Italy, joined in the cry, and Charles rashly started
on an enterprise ‘for which neither his exchequer, his understanding,
nor his preparations sufficed.’
| Charles crosses the Alps. Sept. 2, 1494.
In August, the King, who had wasted the spring and early summer at
Lyons, spending on festivities and on amorous intrigues the money he
had collected or borrowed for his expedition, passed down the Rhone
to Vienne, and thence crossed the Alps by the pass of Mont Genèvre
(September 2). His army was not exclusively a French one, for German
landsknechts and Swiss mercenaries also accompanied it. Thus it was
a fit harbinger of those foreign invasions which were for the next
hundred years to desolate the fair plains of Italy.
| Charles crosses the Apennines and advances on
| Florence.
At Asti, where Ludovico met him, he was delayed first by his gaieties,
then by illness, and it was not until the 6th of October that he
left Asti for Piacenza. Here the question as to his future course
was debated. He was now to leave the territories of his ally. Venice
to the north-east was neutral. The Pope, had after some hesitation,
decided to resist the French. In Florence, opinion was much divided.
The citizens, true to their traditions, were for the French, and were
strengthened in their views by the warnings of Savonarola that a
scourge should chastise Italy. Piero, on the other hand, was in league
with Naples. Finally, it was decided to choose the more western route
by the Via di Pontremoli rather than the easier way through Bologna.
Charles would thus avoid the Neapolitan Prince, Ferrante, who had been
sent by his father, now King Alfonso, to hold the Romagna, and would
maintain his communications with the sea which had been won by the
victory of the Duke of Orleans over Don Federigo, the brother of the
King of Naples, at Rapallo (September 8). Florence, moreover, it was
hoped, would declare for France on the king’s approach.
| Piero driven from Florence. Nov. 9, 1494.
The pass was a difficult one, and the country through which it passed
was so barren that it did not even supply forage for the horses. Had
the French here been met with stubborn resistance they might never
have penetrated into Tuscany, for Ludovico was beginning to repent of
having called Charles into Italy. His suspicions of French designs on
Milan were already aroused, and the death of his unfortunate nephew,
Gian Galeazzo (October 1494), by poison, as was generally believed,
removed the need of French assistance against Naples. But the divided
counsels of the Florentines came to Charles’ aid. The French were
left to pass the defiles undisturbed, and after sacking the town of
Fivizzano, sat down before the fortress of Sarzana. Hither Piero,
terrified at the disaffection in Florence, hastened, and acceded to
Charles’ demands. He promised a sum of money; he surrendered four of
the most important cities: Sarzana, Pietra-Santa, Pisa, and Leghorn.
These humiliating concessions still further irritated the Florentines.
On Piero’s return to Florence (November 8) the citizens rushed to
arms, and he was forced to fly in disguise to Venice. The defection of
Florence threatened the position of Ferrante in the Romagna and opened
the way to Rome. Thither therefore Ferrante retired.
| Charles enters Florence, and having with difficulty
| made terms, passes on to Rome.
Meanwhile Charles, after granting to the Pisans freedom from their
hated mistress Florence, a present which was not his to give, passed
on to Florence. Disregarding the warning of Savonarola that he would
only be victorious if he showed mercy, especially to Florence, and
was not an occasion of stumbling, he entered the city ‘with lance
in rest’ as if he came as conqueror (November 17). This threatening
attitude was accompanied by extravagant demands. First, he asked
for the recall of Piero. That being refused, he insisted that a
French lieutenant should be left in the city, whose consent should be
necessary for every act. As the Florentines still demurred, the king
in anger said: ‘We shall sound our trumpets.’ ‘And,’ we answered,
‘Capponi shall sound our bells.’ Seeing that he might go too far,
Charles abated his demands. The Florentines consented to pay 120,000
florins in six months, and to allow two representatives of the king
to remain in Florence. But the Medici were not to be recalled, and
Charles promised to restore the cities ceded to him by Piero at the
end of the war (November 27). Having thus settled the difficulty
with Florence, Charles passed through Siena which accepted a French
garrison (December 2), and advanced on Rome.
| Alexander comes to terms. Jan. 15, 1495.
Alexander VI. had done his best for the cause of Naples, but he now
became seriously alarmed. His correspondence with the Turkish Sultan,
Bajazet II., in which, in return for help, the murder of the Sultan’s
brother, Djem, then in Alexander’s keeping, had been mooted, had
fallen into Charles’ hands. His enemies were crying for a General
Council. Ostia had been seized by Fabrizio Colonna in the name of his
enemy, della Rovere (September 18). He therefore determined to come
to terms, and, securing a free retreat for Ferrante and his army,
admitted the French within the walls of Rome, while he retired to the
castle of St. Angelo. The Cardinals della Rovere and Sforza urged
Charles to offer no further concessions, and to summon a General
Council which should depose the Pope and proceed to reform the Church.
But Briçonnet did not wish for a breach which might endanger his hope
of a cardinal’s hat; Charles was scarcely the man for a reformer; the
bribes of Alexander had their effect; and finally a compromise was
effected. The Pope agreed to surrender Civita Vecchia, Terracina,
and Spoleto, for safe keeping till the conclusion of the war, to
pardon the rebellious cardinals, and to deliver up Prince Djem. He
also conferred on the bishop of St. Malo the coveted cardinal’s hat,
and ordered his son, Cardinal Cæsar Borgia, to accompany Charles
as a hostage. No sooner had the king left Rome for the south than
Cæsar slipped away, and Djem died. The death of the latter, popularly
attributed to poison administered by Alexander, was probably due to
natural causes; but Cæsar’s disappearance warned Charles that no
trust could be placed in the promises of the Pope.
| Alfonso resigns his crown and goes to Sicily. Feb. 3,
| 1495.
The success of the French had been so extraordinary, that Alfonso
might well feel dismay. He knew that his subjects hated him with a
deadly hatred, and, with the cowardice so common to cruel men, he now
became a victim of superstitious terror. Declaring that ‘the very
stones and trees cried France,’ he resigned his crown to his son and
fled to Sicily (February 3, 1495).
| Charles enters Naples. Feb. 23, 1495.
His son, Ferrante II., showed more spirit and joined his army at
San Germano. Here a mountain pass and the river Garigliano offered
a favourable opportunity for defence; but the news of the savage
conduct of the French at the storming of Monte San Giovanni spread
terror among his troops, and they fell back on Capua. A revolt at
Naples recalled Ferrante, to find that his general, Trivulzio, had
made terms with Charles. Naples now rose again, and the luckless King,
declaring that he suffered for the sins of his fathers, not his own,
and promising to come to the aid of his faithless subjects, should the
barbarity of the French cause them to wish for his return, sailed for
Sicily (February 21). On the following day Charles entered Naples, and
within a few weeks all the country, with the exception of one or two
fortresses, was in his hands.
| Reaction against the French.
‘The success of Charles,’ says Commines, ‘must be considered the work
of Providence.’ Almost without breaking a lance, he had traversed the
length of Italy and won a kingdom. It seemed as if his boast, that he
would lead a crusade against the Turks and conquer Constantinople,
would be fulfilled. But his triumph was short-lived, and ‘his fortunes
changed as suddenly as the day rises in Norway.’ The French, puffed
up by their success, ‘scarce considered the Italians to be men,’ and
alienated them by their cruelties and licence. Charles took no steps
to secure his conquest, but betook himself to his pleasures. No pains
were taken to conciliate the Neapolitan nobles; all offices were
conferred on Frenchmen, and the promised remission of taxes was never
fulfilled.
| The League of Venice. March 31, 1495.
Meanwhile a storm was gathering in the North. Ludovico had long
repented of his rashness in inviting the French, and feared that
Louis of Orleans might lay claim to Milan; the Pope dreaded a General
Council, and was only too glad to raise up enemies against the King;
Venice, which had at first laughed at the expedition, became seriously
alarmed; Ferdinand the Catholic had already remonstrated with Charles,
and began to apprehend an attack on Sicily; the dignity of Maximilian
was ruffled by the preponderance of the House of Valois. Negotiations
between these powers had long been going on at Venice. The conquest
of Naples brought matters to a climax, and on March 31, they formed
the League of Venice, ostensibly to defend their territories and to
prepare for war against the Turks. Guicciardini asserts that they
secretly engaged to drive the French from Italy. Their object was more
probably to protect themselves against further French aggression.
Florence alone refused to break faith with the French, hoping to
regain Pisa through their help.
| Charles retreats.
With incredible folly, Charles delayed till May, in the vain hopes of
receiving the papal investiture of Naples. Then hastily receiving the
crown at the hands of the Archbishop of Naples, he began his retreat
with scarce 10,000 men (May 20). The Count of Montpensier, ‘a good
soldier,’ says Commines, ‘but with little wisdom, and so indolent
that he did not rise till mid-day,’ was left as viceroy. Stephen de
Vers, now Duke of Nola, was made governor of Gaëta and controller
of the finances, and Stuart d’Aubigny, the best soldier of them all,
governor of Calabria. As Charles approached Rome, Alexander fled to
Orvieto; and thence to Perugia. Arrived in Tuscany, Charles found
all in confusion. Siena, Lucca, and Pisa had formed a league against
Florence, and pleaded for French assistance. The Florentines, who had
reformed their government after the advice of Savonarola, demanded
the restitution of the cities temporarily ceded to the King. Charles,
incapable of decision, put them off with negotiations, and leaving
French garrisons in the ceded towns, crossed the Apennines, June 23.
| The Battle of Fornovo. July 6, 1495.
But the French were not to escape from Italy without a battle. Their
fleet on the west coast protected them from the attack of Venetian
or Spanish ships, but on the mainland the forces of Milan and of
Venice under the Marquis of Mantua met them at Fornovo on the Taro.
The army of the League had the advantage of numbers and position,
and had they shown determination, might have inflicted a decisive
defeat. But the Italians were little eager to bring the French to
bay, and Charles, wisely wishing to pursue his march, pushed on his
vanguard. It was met by the Milanese troops under the Count Cajazzo,
but the attack was feeble and easily repulsed. This, according to
Guicciardini, was due to Ludovico. Fearing that too complete a victory
might place him in the power of the Venetian troops, which were far
more numerous than his own, and that too crushing a defeat might draw
on him the vengeance of the French, he had ordered his captain not to
press the French too closely. Meanwhile the assault on the centre and
rearguard was far more vigorous, and Charles was in momentary danger.
He was, however, saved by the enemies’ want of discipline; many of the
Italians turned to plunder his camp, the reserves did not attack, and
the French king, with loss of baggage but not of prestige, was able to
pursue his way.
| Treaty of Vercelli. Oct. 10, 1495.
At Asti, Charles was delayed by the question of Novara. Louis of
Orleans had occupied that town in June, only to be besieged by
Ludovico. In vain, Louis begged for instant aid. Charles would not
stir till reinforcements came, and meanwhile solaced himself with
amorous intrigues. Fortunately Ludovico was anxious to get the French
out of Italy, and in October came to terms. Louis surrendered the
town, but Ludovico, breaking with the League, promised to give free
passage to the French, and even to assist them whenever they might
march against Naples. This, however, seemed unlikely for the present.
| Charles leaves Italy and his conquests melt away.
No sooner had Charles turned his back on Naples than his conquests
began to melt away. The Neapolitans, according to Guicciardini, were
the most inconstant people of Italy, and the follies of the French
reminded them of Ferrante’s words. Ferrante accordingly returned at
the end of May, aided by troops sent by Ferdinand the Catholic under
Gonzalvo de Cordova, the most brilliant of the Spanish generals.
Defeated by Stuart d’Aubigny at Seminara, and driven to Messina, he
directed a second attack on Naples. The city rose, the gates were
opened, and Montpensier took refuge in the castle (July 7), which
he was forced to evacuate shortly after. The Venetians, in return
for money, were allowed to occupy Monopoli, Otranto, Brindisi, and
Trani. Montpensier struggled on for some time longer, hoping for
reinforcements from France. But Charles was immersed in pleasure;
Louis of Orleans, who was heir-presumptive to the throne, refused to
leave France, and finally Montpensier capitulated at Atella (July 21,
1496). D’Aubigny, though sick with fever, held out a little longer,
but by the close of the year 1496, all was lost to France. Ferrante
did not live to see the end. He died in September, and his uncle
Federigo quietly succeeded him. Thus five kings had sat on the throne
of Naples within three years.
Of Charles’ acquisitions, the only traces which remained were the
cities ceded to him by Florence. These should have been restored on
his retreat, but in hopes of return, Charles had evaded his promise,
and the officers he had left in command proceeded to violate it
entirely. Leghorn was indeed surrendered in September, but Sarzana was
sold to the Genoese, Pietra-Santa to Lucca, and the citadel of Pisa to
the Pisans. Of these Pisa was only regained in 1509, after a prolonged
struggle which exhausted the republic and contributed materially to
its fall, Pietra-Santa not till the Medici had been restored in 1513,
and Sarzana not at all. Thus the ally of France was the one to suffer
most.
| Death of Charles VIII. April 7, 1498.
Charles VIII. survived the Italian expedition scarce three years.
Always indulging in dreams of a renewed attack on Naples, he was at
first too much engrossed in his pleasures to carry them into effect.
During the last few months of his life he had, according to Commines,
‘resolved within himself to live a more strict and religious life.’
If so, death anticipated him. While staying at the castle of Amboise,
which was being embellished by Neapolitan artists, he struck his head
against the lintel of a door, and died at the age of twenty-seven of a
fit of apoplexy which resulted from it (April 1498).
Contemptible in mind, though with great bodily strength, inspired with
chivalrous ideas which he had not the capacity to execute, a victim to
profligacy, it is strange that he should have played such a leading
part in history, and yet it does not seem altogether unfit that those
Italian wars, which caused such infinite misery in Italy, and were
so disastrous to the best interests of France, should be associated
with his name. His children had all died in infancy, and the crown
accordingly passed to his cousin and brother-in-law, Louis, Duke of
Orleans, then a man of the age of thirty-six.
§ 2. _Savonarola and Florence._
A month after the death of Charles VIII., the Friar Savonarola, who
had done so much to give an air of mystery to the Italian expedition,
fell a victim to his enemies.
| Savonarola, Prior of San Marco, 1491.
This remarkable man was born at Ferrara in 1452. Having gradually won
a reputation as a preacher of wonderful power and zeal, he was in the
year 1491, elected Prior of the Dominican Convent of San Marco in
Florence. In spite of the independent attitude which he here assumed,
Lorenzo showed him no ill favour, and even summoned the friar to his
deathbed to ask a blessing.[9] In all probability, however, Savonarola
would have remained a great revivalist preacher and nothing more, had
it not been for the expedition of Charles VIII. The constant theme of
his sermons had been that the scourge of God should visit Italy to
punish her for her sins and purify her by fire. The French invasion,
and the rapid success of Charles were looked upon as the fulfilment
of his prophecy, and Savonarola became one of the leading men in
Florence.
| Savonarola and the revolution of 1494.
In the overthrow of the Medici he did not take an active part, but
on Piero’s flight (November 1494) he was sucked into the politics
of the city. Supported by his powerful advocacy from the pulpit in
the Duomo, and guided by his advice, the popular party, to which he
naturally belonged, was able to introduce and carry a reform of the
Constitution. By the decree of December 23, the government was to be
as follows:--
A permanent Great Council (_Consiglio Maggiore_) was to be composed
of all eligible ‘citizens,’ that is, of all citizens of the age of
thirty whose father, grandfather, or great-grandfather had been
elected to the greater offices of state. This Council, numbering some
3000, was to elect out of its own members a ‘senate’ (_Consiglio
degli ottanta_), holding office for six months, and forming with the
Consiglio Maggiore the legislative body of the city. Further, the
Great Council was to nominate the Signory and other magistrates out of
a list presented by a body of nominators, themselves elected in the
Council, and to hear appeals on criminal cases. The Signory remained
as it was before, composed of the Gonfalonier and the eight priors:
it was to be elected every two months, while the Ten of Liberty and
Peace (_Dieci di Libertà e Pace_), in whose hands lay the conduct of
foreign affairs, were to hold office for six months.
The constitution can scarcely be called a democratic one, for at least
7000 citizens were disenfranchised. In common with most theorists
of his day, Savonarola admired the stability of Venice, and vainly
thought to secure this for his native city by establishing a closed
and permanent electoral and legislative body, the Consiglio Maggiore,
after the Venetian type. Nevertheless, the government was preferable
to the old system, by which the city, a republic in name, had fallen
into the control of a single family and their clique.
Savonarola did not content himself with this. From his pulpit he
insisted on moral reformation as the necessary basis of true liberty,
and pressed for a general amnesty which might allay the dangers of
party strife. In thus becoming a politician, Savonarola protested that
he acted unwillingly. In his sermon of December 21, 1494, he declared
that he had pleaded with God to be excused from meddling with the
government, but had been bidden to go on and establish a holy city,
which favoured virtue and looked to Christ as its master.
| Savonarola becomes associated with a political party
| and arouses enmity at home and abroad.
That Savonarola was sincere we may well believe. None the less
the interference in politics was a fatal error. Thereby he became
closely associated with a party, responsible for its faults, and
dependent on its success. This weakened his position as a reformer,
while his adherents had henceforth to count as enemies all those who
disliked his attempts at a reform of morals. A serious opposition
was thus aroused. The Bigi (the Greys) worked for the restoration
of the Medici; the Arrabiati (the enraged), while casting off the
Medici, objected to the changes in the Constitution; the Compagnacci
(companions) disliked the preacher’s interference with their
pleasures. These three groups, working at first with very different
aims, were eventually united together in common opposition to the
Piagnoni (weepers), the followers of the friar. But if Savonarola’s
interference in the politics of the city weakened his position in
Florence, the attitude of his party drew down upon him the enmity of
foreign statesmen. The desire to regain Pisa was an overmastering
passion at Florence, and there was nothing she would not suffer to
attain that end. She had refused to join the League of Venice, in
the hopes of regaining Pisa from the hands of Charles. These hopes
had been disappointed. Still the adherents of the friar headed by
Francesco Valori, clung fondly to the dream that Charles would
once more enter Italy, and at last fulfil his promise. In these
expectations they were supported by the preaching of Savonarola,
who announced that Italy must yet suffer much, but that eventually
Florence should after much tribulation be saved by God. By thus
refusing to join the League, Florence drew down upon her the enmity
of Ludovico, of Maximilian, of Venice, and of the Pope. The three
first in turn supported the Pisans with arms, and, in October 1496,
Maximilian himself came to Italy. But mutual jealousies prevented
united action, and the expedition of Maximilian ended in a fiasco.
| Alexander VI. interferes. Sept. 1495.
The opposition of the Pope was to prove more serious. Alexander VI.
cared but little for the denunciation of the reformer against the
vices of the times, but his interference with politics he would not
brook. Accordingly, in September 1495, he had suspended him from
preaching. Savonarola at first obeyed, and was silent during the
following Advent. But, in the Lent of 1496, the Signory, then composed
of the friar’s partisans, ordered him to resume his preaching. He
complied, and in the Carnival of 1496, the enthusiasm of the Piagnoni
broke forth in religious processions. The children swept the streets
in thick array, bearing olive-branches in their hands and chanting
hymns. This disobedience Savonarola justified, by declaring that no
papal prohibitions should move him from his duty, and that if they
contradicted the Law of Love set forth in the Gospel, they must be
withstood, since ‘a Pope that errs does not represent the Church,’ of
which he claimed to be a loyal son. Even this bold conduct did not
immediately rouse Alexander--nay, some would fix this as the date when
he tried to win the friar by the offer of a cardinal’s hat. If so,
Savonarola contemptuously rejected the offer, and the Pope was driven
to take further measures.
| Reaction against Savonarola.
The Tuscan congregation of the Dominican order had, at Savonarola’s
request, been separated from that of Lombardy. This had given him
a position of exceptional independence, which aroused the jealousy
of many of his order. Alexander now united the convent of San Marco
with a new formed Tusco-Roman congregation (Nov. 7, 1496). This was
clearly within the competence of the Pope, it was popular with the
order generally, and the Pope hoped to strike at the friar through
a superior of his own brotherhood. Savonarola, however, refused to
obey, and was supported by some 250 of his brethren of San Marco. The
Carnival of 1497 followed. Here the enthusiasm of the Piagnoni reached
its highest pitch. The children going from house to house begged for
‘vanities.’ Cards, trinkets, immodest books, pictures, works of art,
were handed up, and these, heaped promiscuously in one common pyre,
were solemnly burned in the Piazza. These and other extravagances,
which unfortunately cannot be denied,[10] disgusted many, and added
to the number of the friar’s enemies. The reaction was seen in the
election of Bernardo del Nero, a secret adherent of the Medici, to
the office of Gonfalonier, March 1497; in the unsuccessful attempt of
Piero to regain Florence in April, and in a riot in the Duomo, raised
by the Compagnacci, while Savonarola preached, on Ascension Day,
May 4.
| The Pope excommunicates him. May 1497.
Influenced, perhaps, by the knowledge that Savonarola was losing
ground, Alexander now decided to strike. After a vain appeal to the
Florentines, in which he even promised to regain Pisa for them if they
would join the League, a promise which they prudently distrusted,
he declared that they were being misled by the prophecies of a
chattering friar, and proceeded to excommunicate him, May 1497. The
Signory meanwhile had attempted to stay the excitement in Florence by
forbidding all preaching either from Savonarola or his opponents, and
things remained more quiet for a time.
| The Piagnoni regain power.
The elections of July, however, again gave the Piagnoni a majority
in the Signory; and in August, the city was startled by the news
that five of the leading citizens stood accused of complicity with
the Medicean plot of the preceding April. On condemnation, they were
refused their right of appeal to the Great Council, contrary to the
express provision of the new Constitution, and executed. The condemned
belonged to Savonarola’s opponents, and some of them, notably Bernardo
del Nero, had lately held office. Their execution therefore, for a
time, materially strengthened Savonarola’s position, and from this
date until the ensuing March the Signory was filled with Piagnoni.
Accordingly, on Christmas Day, Savonarola celebrated the Mass in San
Marco. In the Carnival another pyre of vanities was burnt; and on
invitation by the Signory to resume his preaching, the friar mounted
the pulpit of the Duomo with Consecrated Host in hand, called on God
to strike him dead if he deserved excommunication, and declared that
if the instrument by which God ruled the world withdrew himself from
God, he was but broken iron, and need not be obeyed.
| Final reaction against Savonarola.
But Savonarola had at last miscalculated his strength. Religious
enthusiasm is avowedly subject to relapses, and such a relapse now
came on Florence. The extravagances of his followers, and his own,
had swelled the number of his enemies. Many originally well disposed
towards him were shocked at his open defiance of the Pope, and at his
daring to administer the sacrament when excommunicated. The Franciscan
order, always jealous of the Dominicans, now redoubled their attacks,
led by Savonarola’s old rival Fra Mariano de Genazzano. Even the
majority of the Dominicans outside San Marco declared against him.
Of this reaction his enemies were quick enough to take advantage.
Accordingly the Signory of March, 1498, only counted three of his
adherents among its members. Still many of the Dieci, who having been
elected for six months did not leave office, were in his favour. When
therefore Alexander threatened the city with an interdict, unless
Savonarola ceased preaching and came to Rome for absolution, the
Government adopted a middle course; they persuaded the friar to cease
preaching, yet would not force him to leave for Rome.
| The ordeal by fire.
It is doubtful whether in any case Alexander would now have stayed
his hand, for Savonarola had begun to speak of a General Council,
and it was known that Charles VIII. was likely to support the cry,
while the opponents of Savonarola, more especially the Franciscans of
Santa Croce, were open-mouthed for his destruction. In any case the
fatal suggestion of the ordeal by fire precipitated the crisis. This,
whether first suggested by the Franciscans or no, was eagerly taken up
by them. ‘I believe I shall be burned,’ said the Franciscan, Francesco
da Puglia, ‘but I am ready to die to free this people. If Savonarola
does not burn, you may hold him to be a true prophet.’
Savonarola himself declined to thus tempt God, but Fra Domenico da
Pescia, his most faithful follower, declared his willingness to stand
his champion. Savonarola could scarcely refuse; the Signory after
much debate consented; and on April 7, an eager crowd assembled on
the Piazza to witness the ordeal. It may be questioned whether either
party expected that the ordeal would really be essayed; in any case
it was the Franciscans who raised objections. Declaring that they
feared magic on Savonarola’s part, they first demanded that his
champion should lay aside his chasuble and his vestments; they then
objected to his bearing the crucifix, and finally insisted that he
should not carry the Host into the fire. Here at last Savonarola
refused compliance. Meanwhile the day wore on. It began to rain, and
finally the Signory postponed the trial. The mob was now mad with
disappointment, and next day the Compagnacci seized the opportunity to
attack San Marco (April 8). Francesco Valori, the firmest supporter
of Savonarola, who had often held office as Gonfalonier, was slain
among others. The brethren, however, stood firm at San Marco until
the Signory intervened and arrested Savonarola and his two chief
supporters, Fra Domenico and Fra Silvestro.
| Execution of the Friar. May 23, 1498.
Alexander now demanded that the friar should be handed over to him
for trial. After much negotiation it was agreed that the Pope should
send two commissaries to judge of the spiritual offences, while
the Florentine commissioners should decide on the offences against
the city. At the same time, Alexander granted to Florence a tax of
three-tenths on ecclesiastical revenues. ‘Three times ten makes
thirty,’ said a Piagnone; ‘they have sold our master, as Christ was
sold, for thirty pieces of silver.’ Meanwhile Savonarola had been
put to the torture, and was said to have confessed that he was no
true prophet. But it is acknowledged that confessions extorted under
torture are not worthy of the slightest credit; there is good reason,
moreover, to believe that his depositions were falsified. His enemies
were determined on his ruin. All that was necessary to secure their
final triumph was that the elections of May should return a Signory
hostile to the friar. This was attained by excluding 200 Piagnoni
from the Great Council. A Signory of Arrabiati was thus secured.
Savonarola and his two followers, found guilty of heresy by the papal
commissaries, and of treason to the State by his fellow-citizens, went
to their death with all the constancy of martyrs, May 23, 1498.
Contemporaries were much divided in their opinions on the merits
of Savonarola, and the contest rages still. ‘The thing I shall be
most anxious to know when I get into Heaven,’ said a later Pope, ‘is
whether Savonarola was a righteous man or no.’ Those who denounce him
as a hypocrite, pretending to believe in divine guidance, and in the
gift of prophecy to attain his ends, are surely ignorant of the subtle
influences under which religious leaders have ever acted; men who
carry with them into life a profound conviction of the divine ruling
of the world. Those who lightly dismiss him as a fanatic, have never
felt the burning shame of sin which consumes the reformer’s soul. That
he was led to think that God had intrusted him with a mission and had
used him as the trumpet of His warnings we may well believe; that he
was betrayed into some extravagances will only convict him of ordinary
human frailty.
As has been stated above, his real mistake lay in trespassing on the
sphere of politics. Had he confined himself to the work of a moral
reformer, he perhaps would not have risen so high; yet he would have
escaped from many contradictions, and never have fallen so low. The
office of the preacher and that of the statesman are not easily
reconciled. When once he had associated himself with the fortunes
of a political party, nothing but complete supremacy could save him
from disaster. For the rest, the work of Savonarola must not be
confused with the later Reformation. He had no idea of breaking from
the Church, or of disputing her doctrines. His mind was set in a
mediæval mould. He belongs to the long list of those great reformers
who, like St. Francis of Assisi, strove to bring the life of man into
closer harmony with Christian teaching as then understood, but did not
dispute the accepted interpretation of that teaching. He stands forth
as the opponent of that godless pagan spirit which marred the movement
of the Renaissance, to rebuke the moral turpitude of his country,
which was surely working her ruin.
§ 3. _Louis XII. The War of Milan and Naples._
| Internal policy of Louis XII.
The accession of Louis XII. was popular. He had in his earlier
years led the opposition against Anne of Beaujeu, and for that had
suffered imprisonment, but of late he had been the loyal supporter
of King Charles. Careless and fond of pleasure as a young man, he
had, while retaining his generous and chivalrous spirit, now become
more serious. Declaring at his accession that ‘the King did not
remember the wrongs done to him as Duke,’ he showed favour to Anne of
Beaujeu and her husband, whom he had once so bitterly resisted. On
the marriage of their only child, Susanna, with the young Charles,
Count of Montpensier, he annulled the decree of Louis XI. which had
declared that, in the default of male issue, the dominion of Bourbon
should fall to the crown. By this act of generosity, he postponed the
incorporation of the last great noble domain in France.
| Louis determines to attack Milan.
The reign was inaugurated by several useful measures. The ‘taille’[11]
was reduced; the sale of judicial offices forbidden; an attempt was
made to check the venality of the magistrates. Provence and Normandy
were given local _Parlements_ or courts of justice, which might serve
as a counterbalance to the _Parlement_ of Paris, while the extravagant
privileges of the University of Paris in the matter of jurisdiction
were curtailed. Political interest may by some be held to justify
Louis’ divorce from his first wife Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI.,
and his marriage with Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII.; for
Jeanne was childless, and Brittany threatened to break away again
from France. But, in the negotiations with the Pope concerning the
divorce, the King acted meanly, and the stipulation insisted on by
Anne of Brittany, that her duchy should not be united to the crown
of France, might have led to further trouble, had not Francis of
Angoulême, subsequently King Francis I., married Claude, the issue
of the marriage. In a word the home policy of the King might justify
his title of ‘Father of his People,’ had not his ambition led him to
follow in the steps of Charles and seek for conquests in Italy. If
his chivalrous spirit demanded war, the renewed attempt of Maximilian
to regain Burgundy and the lands on the west of Flanders, which
he still claimed as the heritage of his son, the Archduke Philip,
would have fully justified Louis in taking the offensive, and adding
Franche-Comté to his dominions. But his eyes, like those of Charles,
were dazzled with the fair skies and plains of Italy, and Italy alone
would satisfy French ambitions. Milan, however, and not Naples, was
the first object of Louis’ attack.
The invasion of Charles VIII. should have taught the Italians the
necessity of union. But this was not to be. Even in the League of
Venice, the aims of Italian statesmen had been purely selfish, and the
common danger once removed, their old rivalries returned and broke up
the coalition.
| Alexander and Venice desert the League of Venice and
| ally themselves with France.
Savonarola had been ‘sacrificed by the Pope, because Florence would
not join the League’--yet no sooner was he gone than Alexander VI.
deserted it himself. The chief aim of Alexander’s pontificate was
to strengthen the temporal dominion of the Papacy. Following in the
steps of Sixtus IV., he hoped to gain his end through his family. His
eldest son, the Duke of Gandia, was first chosen as his instrument.
He designed to make him Lord of the Patrimony of St. Peter and crush
the Orsini, who had given him a pretext by supporting the cause of
Charles VIII. But the Orsini had proved too strong. The attempt had
failed, and the mysterious murder of the duke in June 1497, seemed
for the moment to ruin his hopes. The Pope, however, was not a man
easily dismayed. He shortly resumed his scheme, and now looked to his
third son, the notorious Cæsar Borgia. Cæsar, unfortunately, was
both deacon and cardinal; but in August 1498, his father released him
from his ecclesiastical vows ‘for the good of his soul.’ Having thus
removed this primary obstacle, the Pope at first designed to marry him
to Carlotta, the daughter of Federigo of Naples, whereby Cæsar might
some day gain a claim to the throne of that kingdom. Baulked in this
hope by the refusal of Federigo, Alexander turned to France. In return
for the papal bull sanctioning the divorce of his first wife Jeanne,
and a cardinal’s hat for George of Amboise, his chief adviser, Louis
XII. invested Cæsar with the counties of Valentinois and Diois, and
the title of duke. Subsequently he bestowed upon him the hand of his
niece, the beautiful Charlotte d’Albret (May 1499), and promised to
assist him in his designs on the Romagna. Thus Alexander was detached
from the League.
The relations between Venice and Ludovico had never been cordial.
At the battle of Fornovo, the duke had played it false, and ordered
his troops not to press the French too closely. Shortly after this
the Pisan War led to further disagreement. Angry at the refusal of
Florence to join the League of Venice, Ludovico and Venice had both
supported Pisa in her struggle for independence. But the lust of
conquest soon began to tempt them, and, as both could not hold Pisa,
a quarrel was inevitable. At first Ludovico called upon the Emperor
Maximilian to secure that city, hoping eventually to wrest it from his
hands; but the expedition had failed (October 1496), and Ludovico,
rather than see the city fall under Venetian control, deserted the
Pisan cause, and aided the Florentines with men and money (May 1498).
Venice accordingly turned a ready ear to Louis’ offers, and in the
Treaty of Blois (February 1499), agreed to support his claim to the
Duchy of Milan with arms: Louis, on his side, promising her Cremona
and the Ghiara d’Adda, a small district on the left bank of that
river, as her share of the Milanese spoil.
| Desperate position of Ludovico.
Thus Louis had succeeded in breaking up the League, and Ludovico
was left without an available ally. Ferdinand of Spain was already
thinking of seizing Naples for himself, and had no mind to interfere
in Lombardy; Federigo of Naples was trembling for his throne, and was
in no position to lend him aid; while Maximilian, at this time engaged
in a war with the Swiss, and at variance with his Diet on questions
concerning the Imperial Constitution, could not render any assistance.
In his despair Ludovico stirred up the Turks, and Bajazet II. sent an
army to ravage the Venetian territories in Friuli, an act which did
not materially assist him, and still further irritated his enemies.
| The French enter Italy. August 1499.
In August 1499, the French army crossed the Alps commanded by three
redoubtable leaders: the Lombard Trivulzio, who had deserted the
cause of Alfonso of Naples and adopted France as his country, a man
of whom Ludovico said, ‘a halter awaits him as soon as caught’;
Stuart d’Aubigny, who had already earned a reputation in the war of
Naples; and Louis de Luxembourg, Count of Ligny, the patron of the
Chevalier Bayard, whose chivalrous exploits in the coming campaigns
remind us that the Middle Age had not yet departed. The Duke of Savoy
gave them free passage through Piedmont. At Asti they were joined
by a contingent of 5000 Swiss, sent by the Cantons, who had made a
treaty with Louis. The advance on Milan met with scant resistance. The
village of Annona, fortified by Ludovico, indeed held out, but was
taken by assault on the second day, and the garrison put to the sword.
Terrified by their fate, and beguiled by the promises and the bribes
of Trivulzio, castles and cities opened their gates. Alessandria,
evacuated by the Milanese army under Galeazzo di San Severino, who
was probably bribed by the French, made submission, but was cruelly
pillaged, and the French crossed the Po.
| The Venetians advance on Lodi.
| Ludovico flies to Innsbruck. The French and Venetians
| occupy the Milanese. Sept. 1499.
| Reaction against the French.
Meanwhile the Venetian army from the east occupied Caravaggio, and
advanced to Lodi. Ludovico now saw that his cause was lost. Warned by
a riot in Milan that the capital could not be trusted, he despatched
his two sons and his treasure to Germany, threw provisions into
the castle of Milan, and fled to seek assistance of Maximilian at
Innsbruck (September 2). Ludovico gone, the citizens of Milan hastened
to offer the keys of the city to the French. On September 14, the
citadel itself surrendered; Genoa followed suit, and thus within
a month, the French and Venetians found themselves masters of the
Milanese, without having had to fight a single important battle. But
they were not to hold their conquest without another struggle. The
rapidity of the French conquest, like that of Naples by Charles VIII.,
illustrates the weakness of Italy. The treachery and cowardice of the
soldiery was the result of the evil traditions of Italian condottier
warfare. The army once gone, the citizens could scarcely have resisted
if they would, and they would not if they could. Devoid of all sense
of patriotism or loyalty, they feared the vengeance of the French, and
listened easily to their promises of milder government, and lighter
taxation. These indeed Louis attempted to fulfil, but extravagant
expectations had been raised, and the choice of Trivulzio as Governor
of Milan was an unfortunate one. A Lombard himself, he became a party
man; his severity alienated the lower classes, while the pride and
insolence of the French soon lost them the affection of their new
subjects.
| Ludovico returns. Feb. 1500.
| The French evacuate Milan, but take Ludovico prisoner
| at Novara, April 5, and re-occupy the city.
A few months sufficed to disillusionise the Italians, and when, in
February 1500, Ludovico returned with an army he had collected in the
North, the French were forced to evacuate Milan and surrender their
conquests as quickly as they had gained them. All seemed lost, when in
April the French army, reinforced from France, again moved forward to
relieve the citadel of Novara, which, with the castle of Milan, alone
held out. The motley character of the army of Ludovico, composed as
it was of mercenaries from Franche-Comté and Switzerland, Albania
and Lombardy, would in any case have rendered victory doubtful,
but the chances of battle were never tried owing to the treachery
of the Germans and the Swiss. The latter pleaded as an excuse that
they could not fight against their countrymen who were serving the
French with leave of the Confederation. The only pretext the Germans
could find was arrears of pay. Allowed by the French to retire,
these honourable companions in arms did not even insist on the same
terms being granted to their Milanese comrades, or to the Duke. When
therefore the Milanese troops attempted to retreat, they were cut down
by the French. The Duke was discovered among the Swiss in the disguise
of a friar, and on April 17, the French re-entered the capital. The
rich Duchy of Milan was now theirs, with the exception of the strip of
country to the east of the Adda, which fell to the Venetians, and the
district round Bellinzona, which was seized by the Swiss in the pay of
Louis, and which they retain to this day.
| Fortunes of the Sforza family.
The Sforza family suffered cruelly for Ludovico’s fatal act in first
calling the French into Italy and for his subsequent breach of faith.
The Duke, who had vaunted himself on his cleverness, ended his days in
the dungeons of Loches in Touraine (1508). His brother, the Cardinal
Ascanio, and Francesco, son of the unfortunate Gian Galeazzo, also
fell into French hands. Ascanio was released in 1503, but died in
1505. Francesco was forced to become a monk and died in 1511, and
the only important representatives of the male line of the Sforza
who remained were the two sons of Ludovico, Maximilian and Francesco
Maria, who were hereafter for a period to regain the duchy.[12]
The collapse of the power of Ludovico is a signal illustration of
the insufficiency and untrustworthiness of mercenary troops. Caring
nothing for the cause they had momentarily espoused, they were ever
open to bribes, or ready to desert when desertion served their turn.
| Short-sighted policy of Venice.
For the rest, the policy of Venice in thus calling the French for the
second time into Italy, was as short-sighted as it was blameworthy.
The Venetians pleaded as a pretext their fears of the ambitious
schemer Ludovico, yet he was never likely to be so formidable as the
French, and, as Machiavelli well observes, ‘in their desire to win two
districts in Lombardy they helped Louis to become master of two-thirds
of Italy.’
| Treaty of Granada between Louis and Ferdinand.
| Nov. 11, 1500.
Louis once master of Milan hurried on his preparations against Naples.
The only opponent who was likely to be formidable was Ferdinand
the Catholic. He had helped to restore the Aragonese dynasty after
the retreat of Charles, and might well put in his claim, if the
illegitimate branch of his house were to be excluded. ‘But how,’ said
his envoy, ‘if you were to come to some agreement with us respecting
Naples as you did with Venice about Milan?’ The suggestion was
welcomed by Louis, and in November 1500, the secret Treaty of Granada
was signed. An excuse for that shameless compact was found in the
alliance which Federigo in his distress had made with the Turk. After
deploring the discords of Christian princes, which weakened them
before the Turk, the preamble asserts that ‘no other princes, save the
Kings of France and Aragon, have any title to the crown of Naples, and
as King Federigo has excited the Turk to the peril of Christendom, the
two powers, in order to rescue it from this danger and to maintain the
peace, agree to compromise their respective claims, and divide the
kingdom of Naples itself.’ The northern provinces, consisting of the
Abruzzi and the land of Lavoro, with the title of king, were to go to
Louis; the Duchy of Calabria and Apulia in the south as a dukedom to
Ferdinand. That there was danger to be apprehended from the Turks was
true enough; not only had they ravaged Friuli in the autumn of 1499,
they had also defeated the Venetian fleet off Sapienza, and taken
Modon and Navarino in the Morea. That the cry of a crusade was not a
mere pretext is proved by the treaties made by Louis in the spring of
1500 with Ladislas, King of Bohemia and Hungary, and with the King
of Poland; by the fleet despatched by Ferdinand to aid the Venetians
in the siege of St. George in Cephalonia (September 1500), and by
the French attack on Mitylene in 1501. It is even possible, that the
conquest of Italy from the north alone saved that country from falling
before the Turk, but the advance of the Sultan might have been more
successfully opposed by a joint European coalition, and, as events
showed, lust of conquest was the primary motive of the allies.
The treaty of Granada was ‘the first open assertion in European
politics of the principles of dynastic aggrandisement; the first of
those partition treaties by which peoples were handed over from one
Government to another as appendages to family estates.’ Not only was
the treaty of Granada a crime, it was also a fatal blunder on the
part of Louis. ‘The French,’ says Machiavelli, ‘have little skill in
matters of State, for whereas before, Louis was sole umpire in Italy,
he now entertained a partner, and whereas Louis might have made the
king of Naples his pensioner, he turned him out and put the Spaniard
in his place, who turned out Louis himself.’ The compact was at first
kept secret, and Federigo still hoped for assistance from Ferdinand.
In June 1501, however, when the French army under D’Aubigny entered
Rome on its southward march, Pope Alexander publicly ratified the
treaty, declared Federigo deposed as a traitor to Christendom, and
invested Louis and Ferdinand with his dominions.
| Federigo abdicates and retires to France. August 1501.
Federigo, despairing of his cause, did not dare to meet the French
in the field. Capua, which alone stood out, was taken by assault on
July 23, and handed over to a brutal soldiery who massacred the men
and outraged the women. To save his country from further misery, the
unfortunate King capitulated, and, accepting the terms of Louis,
retired to France, to live till 1504 a pensioner, with the title of
Duke of Anjou.
The southern part of the kingdom made a somewhat more vigorous
resistance to the Spaniards. They would have preferred, they said, the
French as masters. But on the fall of Taranto in March 1502, Ferrante,
the young Duke of Calabria, surrendered, and, in violation of a
promise that he might retire whither he would, was sent to Spain to
die in 1550.[13] Thus in less than two years the two families, whose
quarrels had first invited the foreigner into Italy, had been driven
from their country.
| Quarrel between Louis and Ferdinand.
Naples and Milan conquered, Western Europe found itself dominated
by two great leagues, that of Louis XII., closely allied with the
Pope and some of the German princes, and that of the Austro-Spanish
houses. The latter was a family league cemented by the marriage of the
Archduke Philip, son of the Emperor Maximilian, with Joanna, eldest
daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella,[14] and included England and
Portugal. At this moment there seemed a prospect of these two leagues
coalescing. In 1501, it had been agreed that Charles, the young son
of the Archduke Philip, should marry the Princess Claude, daughter
of Louis XII. The children were yet young, but the joint conquest
of Naples by the Spanish and the French seemed a guarantee of their
future friendship, and that the marriage would eventually take place.
Had this compact stood, Europe would have been united as it had never
been before, and, if there was some danger that this powerful league
would have destroyed the political balance, and ridden rough-shod over
the smaller princes, at least a crusade to check the advance of the
Turks, or even to drive them from Europe, might have been possible.
The dream, however, was soon to be dispelled by the quarrel of Louis
and Ferdinand over their spoil in Naples. In the original treaty of
partition no definite mention had been made of the Basilicata,[15] the
Capitanata, and the two districts of the Principati. These furnished
an easy cause of dispute, which was further complicated by the claim
to the tolls paid on the sheep-flocks as they passed from their summer
pasture in the Abruzzi to their winter quarters in the Capitanata. The
quarrel might possibly have been compromised had it not been fomented
by the internal factions of the country. The old partisans of Anjou
were strongest in Apulia, while the Spaniards found many adherents in
districts held by the French.
| The War of Naples. July 1502.
These dissensions soon led to an open rupture, and in July 1502, the
war began. The ensuing struggle is famous in the history of chivalry,
which gleamed forth for the last time in these Italian wars, and is
well depicted in the picturesque pages of the life of Bayard. On the
French side, we find Imbercourt, ‘to whom, wherever there was a battle
to fight, the heat of the Italian noontide seemed like the cool of
morning’; the aged La Palice, who in the _mêlée_ forgot his age;
and Bayard himself, the soul of knightly courtesy and valour. On the
side of Spain, stood Diego de Paredes, whose feats of extravagant
daring furnish the theme for many a Spanish romance; and Pedro de
Paz, a squinting dwarf, who scarce could be seen above the head of
his charger, yet had the heart of a lion; while Gonzalvo de Cordova,
the ‘Great Captain’ himself, added to his masterly qualities as a
general the chivalrous courtesy and manners of a knight-errant. These,
and many others, fought, not so much for victory, as for honour.
Not content with the opportunities offered by the regular military
operations for the display of their prowess, they challenged each
other to jousts and tourneys, which, though fought _à l’outrance_,
were conducted with all the punctiliousness, and all the ceremony of
the lists. As we read the history of their combats, we fancy that we
are present at a tournament of the Middle Ages--the contest, one for
knightly prestige, the prize, some guerdon awarded by lady’s hand.[16]
But the real issue was not decided by these feats of personal valour.
On the declaration of hostilities, the French had the advantage in
numbers and in the quality of their troops, as well as the command of
the sea.
| D’Aubigny’s victory at Terranova, Dec. 15, 1502.
| Siege of Barletta.
In December 1502, the victory of D’Aubigny at Terranova, over a force
which had just landed from Spain, gave him the whole of Calabria.
Gonzalvo de Cordova, the Spanish commander-in-chief, unable to keep
the field, assumed the defensive attitude, and threw his troops
into the fortified towns of Apulia. Of these, Barletta was the
most important. Here the Spanish general entrenched himself, and
patiently waited for reinforcements from Sicily and Spain; but
Ferdinand was remiss in sending aid; while a French fleet, holding
the sea, prevented troops or supplies being shipped from Sicily. The
distress was so severe that Gonzalvo de Cordova had great difficulty
in preventing a surrender, and had the French general, the Duc de
Nemours, shown more energy, the Spaniards might have been driven from
the country.
| Treaty of Lyons. April 5, 1503.
In April 1503 there seemed a chance of peace. The Archduke Philip,
as he passed through France, visited Louis XII. at Lyons, and there
made a treaty by which it was agreed that Naples should eventually
go to the young Charles and the Princess Claude, who, in 1501, had
been betrothed. Until the children should be old enough to marry, the
French portion of the kingdom was to be administered by a nominee of
Louis, the Spanish, by the Archduke Philip, or some deputy appointed
by Ferdinand. Whether Ferdinand had allowed these negotiations to be
entered into merely to gain time, as the French declare, or whether,
as seems more probable, Philip, who was not on good terms with his
father-in-law, had exceeded his instructions, the results to France
were fatal.
| Hostilities renewed.
The treaty signed, Louis countermanded the embarkation of
reinforcements from Genoa, and ordered a suspension of hostilities
in Naples. Meanwhile the position of the Spaniards had materially
improved. In February, their general, taking advantage of the foolish
movement of the Duc de Nemours to recover Castellaneta, which had just
revolted to Spain, made a sortie from Barletta, captured Ruvo, and
took La Palice prisoner. In March, the defeat of the French fleet gave
the command of the sea to Spain.
Now strengthened by reinforcements, Gonzalvo de Cordova openly
repudiated the treaty of Lyons, and at last assumed the offensive. So
overwhelming was the superiority of the Spaniards that two battles
fought within eight days of each other sufficed to make them masters
of the country.
| French defeated at Seminara, April 20, 1503; and
| Cerignola, April 28.
The defeat of D’Aubigny at Seminara by the Spanish General, Fernando
de Andrada, on April 20, and his surrender which shortly followed,
gave them Calabria. On the 27th, the Great Captain at last leaving
Barletta, where he had lain entrenched so long, sought the French
at Cerignola (April 28). Here taking up a strong position, with his
front protected by a ditch, which he filled with pointed stakes and
strengthened with a rampart, he awaited the onslaught of the French.
The Duc de Nemours, true to that cautious strategy which had hitherto
prevented him from taking full advantage of his superior strength, was
for postponing the attack. Stung, however, by the reproaches flung
at him by Ives d’Allègre, one of his officers, he rashly ordered an
advance as evening was already closing in. ‘Now,’ said he, ‘perhaps
those who vaunt the loudest will be found to trust more to their
spurs than to their swords.’ The event justified the taunt. In vain,
the French flung themselves with desperate valour on the ditch and
ramparts. They were exposed to the concentrated fire of the enemy and
beaten back. The Duc de Nemours himself, and Chandieu, the leader of
the Swiss contingent, were slain. The explosion of a Spanish powder
magazine caused more confusion to the French than to the foe, and
Gonzalvo de Cordova, seizing the moment, ordered a general advance.
The French, wearied by their long struggle, broke and fled.
| The French driven from Naples.
Henceforth, the advance of the Spaniards was unchecked. The French
proved the truth of the Italian saying that, ‘while in their attacks
they were more than men, they were less than women in their retreats.’
In one day, thirty castles surrendered to the ‘Great Captain.’ On the
13th of May, Naples opened its gates, and Gaëta, Venosa, and Santa
Severina remained the only important places in French hands.
| Renewed attempts of Louis XII.
Louis XII. made desperate attempts to retrieve his disaster. Three
large armies were raised: one to penetrate into Spain by the way
of Fontarabia; the second to invade Roussillon and seize Salces on
the frontier; the third to re-enter Italy. Two fleets were also
equipped, one in Genoa, the other in Marseilles; the first to support
the invasion of Naples, the other to co-operate with the attack on
Roussillon by threatening the coast of Catalonia. But fortune did
not smile upon his efforts. The invasion of Spain was delayed by the
supineness or the treachery of the commander, Alan d’Albret.[17] The
fleet intended for Catalonia was driven back by heavy weather. The
attack on Roussillon was equally unfortunate. The fortress of Salces,
strengthened by Pedro Navarra, the best engineer of his day, was too
strong to be taken by assault; and in October, Ferdinand, marching to
its relief with a superior force, drove the French over the frontier.
Disheartened by these reverses Louis XII. consented to a truce of five
months (15th November), which was subsequently extended. Curiously
enough, the unfortunate Federigo of Naples was called upon to act as
peacemaker between the two robbers who were still quarrelling over the
kingdom they had dispoiled him of. For Naples was not included in the
truce, and thither the third French army had marched in July 1503,
under the leadership of La Trémouille.
| Death of Alexander VI., Aug. 18, 1503, and election of
| Pius III.
But the death of Pope Alexander, on August 18, caused delay. The
papal tiara had long been the aim of Cardinal d’Amboise, an ambition
favoured by Louis XII. Under the idea that the presence of the
army might influence the election, it was ordered to halt within a
few miles of Rome. The cardinals were indignant at this attempt to
overawe them, and the movement of a Spanish force from the south,
as well as the presence of Cæsar Borgia with his troops in the
Castle of St. Angelo, made them fear lest the matter might lead to
a conflict. D’Amboise therefore allowed the army to depart. Shortly
after, despairing of success, he supported the election of Cardinal
Piccolomini who, on September 22, became Pope Pius III. This delay of
a month was fatal to the French cause. The expedition was postponed to
the autumn and winter, which proved to be exceptionally wet and cold.
La Trémouille fell ill and resigned his command to the Marquis of
Mantua, an inferior general, and time was given to Gonzalvo de Cordova
to obtain reinforcements.
| Battle of the Garigliano, Dec. 28, 1503.
Even as it was, however, the French were superior in numbers, and
the ‘Great Captain’ found it necessary to abandon the siege of
Gaëta, which still held out for the French, and to drop back on the
river Garigliano. The French, after a desperate conflict, succeeded
in throwing a bridge over the river (November 6), but failed in
dislodging the Spaniards from their position about a mile to the rear,
which had, as usual, been strengthened by Don Gonzalvo. Finally,
throwing up an earthwork to protect the bridge, they dropped back to
their old position. Seven weeks of inaction followed, broken only by
partial skirmishes and personal combats.
Meanwhile the weather, which had been wet, grew worse. From this,
owing to the lowness and swampiness of their position, the Spaniards
suffered much. Yet Gonzalvo de Cordova succeeded in imparting to
his men his unconquerable determination to hold the position at any
cost. Urged to retreat he answered, ‘I would not fall back a step to
gain a hundred years of life.’ The effect on the French was far more
disastrous. In spite of their being on higher, and therefore drier
ground, the troops and the horses did not endure the wet and cold
so well. The country and even the roads became so sodden, that the
movements of the cavalry, and still more those of the artillery, the
two forces in which the French excelled, were seriously impeded.
| The French finally lose Naples, 1504.