government they gave it a Constitution, and in that Constitution they
enumerated the powers which they bestowed on it. That they had made it a
limited government, and defined its authority and restrained it to the
exercise of such powers as were granted, and all others were reserved to
the States or the people. But they did not stop there, being aware that no
Constitution could be so plainly written but what there would be a
difference of opinion on the construction of some points, consequently
they (the people) in order to avoid a recurrence of the difficulties
experienced under the old confederacy and render the laws of Congress
effective and binding upon all parties without applying to State
authority, thus rendering the government complete within itself, declared
the Constitution and the laws of the United States, made in pursuance
thereof, should be the supreme law of the land. In referring to the
tribunal in which to decide questions arising under the Constitution, Mr.
Webster said:
"But, sir, the people have wisely provided, in the constitution
itself, a proper, suitable mode and tribunal for settling questions of
constitutional law. There are, in the constitution, grants of powers
to congress, and restrictions on those powers. There are also
prohibitions on the States. Some authority must therefore necessarily
exist, having the ultimate jurisdiction to fix and ascertain the
interpretation of these grants, restrictions, and prohibitions. The
constitution has itself pointed out, ordained, and established that
authority. How has it accomplished this great and essential end? By
declaring, sir, that '_the constitution and the laws of the United
States, made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the
land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding_.'
"This, sir, was the first great step. By this, the supremacy of the
constitution and laws of the United States is declared. The people so
will it. No State law is to be valid which comes in conflict with the
constitution or any law of the United States. But who shall decide
this question of interference? To whom lies the last appeal? This,
sir, the constitution itself decides also, by declaring '_that the
judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the
constitution and laws of the United States_.' These two provisions,
sir, cover the whole ground. They are, in truth, the keystone of the
arch. With these it is a government; without them it is a confederacy.
In pursuance of these clear and express provisions, congress
established, at its very first session, in the judicial act, a mode
for carrying them into full effect, and for bringing all questions of
constitutional power to the final decision of the supreme court. It
then, sir, became a government. It then had the means of
self-protection; and but for this, it would, in all probability, have
been now among things which are passed. Having constituted the
government, and declared its powers, the people have further said,
that since somebody must decide on the extent of these powers, the
government shall itself decide--subject always like other popular
governments, to its responsibility to the people. And now, sir, I
repeat, how is it that a State legislature acquires any right to
interfere? Who, or what, gives them the right to say to the people,
'We, who are your agents and servants for one purpose, will undertake
to decide, that your other agents and servants, appointed by you for
another purpose, have transcended the authority you gave them?' The
reply would be, I think, not impertinent, 'Who made you a judge over
another's servants. To their own masters they stand or fall.'"
He then went on to show that a State could not make treason against the
United States legal, and, says he, when I maintain these sentiments, I am
but asserting the rights of the people; I state what they have declared
and insisted on as their right to declare it. They have chosen to repose
this power in the general government, and I think it my duty to support it
like other Constitutional powers.
In referring to the importance of having but one tribunal, whose decisions
should be final--Sir, said he:
"If we look to the general nature of the case, could any thing have
been more preposterous than to have made a government for the whole
Union, and yet left its powers subject, not to one interpretation, but
to thirteen or twenty-four interpretations? Instead of one tribunal,
established by all, responsible to all, with power to decide for all,
shall constitutional questions be left to four and twenty popular
bodies, each at liberty to decide for itself, and none bound to
respect the decisions of others; and each at liberty, too, to give a
new construction, on every new election of its own members? Would any
thing, with such a principle in it, or rather with such a destitution
of all principle, be fit to be called a government? No, sir. It should
not be denominated a constitution. It should be called, rather, a
collection of topics for everlasting controversy; heads of debate for
a disputatious people. It would not be a government. It would not be
adequate to any practical good, nor fit for any people to live under."
Mr. Hayne, already overborne with the overwhelming and unanswerable
arguments, was yet destined to receive the most cutting rebuke from his
vanquisher. Mr. Webster said:
"And now, Mr. President, let me run the honorable gentleman's doctrine
a little into its practical application. Let us look at his probable
_modus operandi_. If a thing can be done, an ingenious man can tell
_how_ it is to be done. Now, I wish to be informed _how_ this State
interference is to be put in practice. We will take the existing case
of the tariff law. South Carolina is said to have made up her opinion
upon it. If we do not repeal it, (as probably we shall not,) she will
then apply to the case the remedy of her doctrine. She will, we must
suppose, pass a law of her legislature, declaring the several acts of
congress, usually called the tariff laws, null and void, so far as
they respect South Carolina, or the citizens thereof. So far, all is a
paper transaction, and easy enough. But the collector at Charleston is
collecting the duties imposed by these tariff laws--he, therefore,
must be stopped. The collector will sieze the goods if the tariff
duties are not paid. The State authorities will undertake their
rescue: the marshal, with his posse, will come to the collector's aid;
and here the contest begins. The militia of the State will be called
out to sustain the nullifying act. They will march, sir, under a very
gallant leader; for I believe the honorable member himself commands
the militia of that part of the State. He will raise the _nullifying
act_ on his standard, and spread it out as his banner. It will have a
preamble, bearing that the tariff laws are palpable, deliberate, and
dangerous violations of the constitution. He will proceed, with his
banner flying, to the custom house in Charleston--
"all the while
Sonorous metal blowing martial sounds."
Arrived at the custom house, he will tell the collector that he must
collect no more duties under any of the tariff laws. This he will be
somewhat puzzled to say, by the way, with a grave countenance,
considering what hand South Carolina herself had in that of 1816. But,
sir, the collector would, probably, not desist at his bidding. Here
would ensue a pause; for they say, that a certain stillness precedes
the tempest. Before this military array should fall on custom house,
collector, clerks, and all, it is very probable some of those
composing it would request of their gallant commander-in-chief to be
informed a little upon the point of law; for they have doubtless a
just respect for his opinions as a lawyer, as well as for his bravery
as a soldier. They know he has read Blackstone and the constitution,
as well as Turenne and Vauban. They would ask him, therefore,
something concerning their rights in this matter. They would inquire
whether it was not somewhat dangerous to resist a law of the United
States. What would be the nature of their offence, they would wish to
learn, if they, by military force and array, resisted the execution
in Carolina of a law of the United States, and it should turn out,
after all, that the law _was constitutional_. He would answer, of
course, treason. No lawyer could give any other reason. John Fries,[5]
he would tell them, had learned that some years ago. How, then, they
would ask, do you propose to defend us? We are not afraid of bullets,
but treason has a way of taking people off that we do not much relish.
How do you propose to defend us? 'Look at my floating banner,' he
would reply; 'see there the _nullifying law_!' Is it your opinion,
gallant commander, they would then say, that if we should be indicted
for treason, that some floating banner of yours would make a good plea
in bar? 'South Carolina is a sovereign State,' he would reply. That is
true; but would the judge admit our plea? 'These tariff laws,' he
would repeat, 'are unconstitutional, palpably, deliberately,
dangerously.' That all may be so; but if the tribunals should not
happen to be of that opinion, shall we swing for it? We are ready to
die for our country, but it is rather an awkward business, this dying
without touching the ground. After all, this is a sort of _hemp_-tax,
worse than any part of the tariff.
"Mr. President, the honorable gentleman would be in a dilemma like
that of another great general. He would have a knot before him which
he could not untie. He must cut it with his sword. He must say to his
followers, defend yourselves with your bayonets; and this is
war--civil war."
Mr. Webster continued to show that to resist by force the execution of a
law of the United States was treason, and that the Courts of the United
States could take no notice of a State law to authorize persons to commit
that grave crime. Said he, the common saying that a State cannot commit
treason herself, is nothing to the purpose. Can it authorize others to do
so? If John Fries[5] had produced an act of Pennsylvania annulling the
law of Congress, would it have helped his case? Talk about it as we will,
these doctrines go the whole length of revolution. They are incompatible
with any peaceable administration of the government. They lead directly to
disunion and civil commotion, and therefore it is, that at the
commencement, when they are first found to be maintained by respectable
men, and in a tangible form, that I enter my protest against them all. Mr
Webster proceeded to show that the people of the United States have not
chosen the State authorities as their guardians against encroachments from
the general government. Said he:
"Sir, the people have not trusted their safety, in regard to the
general constitution, to these hands. They have required other
security, and taken other bonds. They have chosen to trust themselves,
first to the plain words of the instrument, and to such construction
as the government, itself, in doubtful cases, should put on its own
powers, under their oaths of office, and subject to their
responsibility to them; just as the people of a State trust their own
State governments with a similar power. Secondly, they have reposed
their trust in the efficacy of frequent elections, and in their own
power to remove their own servants and agents, whenever they see
cause. Thirdly, they have reposed trust in the judicial power, which,
in order that it might be trustworthy, they have made as respectable,
as disinterested, and as independent as practicable. Fourthly, they
have seen fit to rely, in case of necessity, or high expediency, on
their known and admitted power to alter or amend the constitution,
peaceably and quietly, whenever experience shall point out defects or
imperfections. And finally, the people of the United States have at
no time, in no way, directly or indirectly, authorized any State
legislature to construe or interpret _their_ instrument of government;
much less to interfere, by their own power, to arrest its course and
operation.
"If, sir, the people in these respects had done otherwise than they
have done their constitution could neither have been preserved nor
would it have been worth preserving. And if its plain provisions shall
now be disregarded, and these new doctrines interpolated in it, it
will become as feeble and helpless a being as enemies, whether early
or more recent, could possibly desire. It will exist, in every State,
but as a poor dependent on State permission. It must borrow leave to
be, and will be no longer than State pleasure, or State discretion
sees fit to grant the indulgence and to prolong its poor existence.
"But, sir, although there are fears, there are hopes also. The people
have preserved this their own chosen Constitution for forty years, and
seen their happiness, prosperity and renown grow with its growth, and
strengthen with its strength. They are now generally strongly attached
to it. Overthrown by direct assault, it cannot be; evaded, undermined,
_nullified_ it will not be, if we and those who succeed us here, as
agents and representatives of the people shall conscientiously and
vigilantly discharge the two great branches of our public trust
faithfully to preserve and wisely to administer it."
We believe that after perusing the evidence already advanced, every
reasonable, unprejudiced person must come to the conclusion that the
fathers of our country established the government of the United States
with the full understanding and intent that it should be supreme, so far
as its delegated authority extended. That it was a unit and capable of
sustaining itself by force, if necessary. Mr. Madison's views are
repeatedly expressed on this point, explaining the advantages of
conferring sufficient powers upon the general government to enable it to
suppress internal violence and insurrection, thus providing against the
civil commotion that had overthrown other republics of a weaker and less
binding obligation on the part of the members composing them. See pages
24, 25 and 26 of this book. The papers here referred to are the more
important on account of being written while the question of adoption or
rejection of the Constitution was being discussed before the people.
Again, on pages 30 to 32, the defects and imperfections of the old
confederation in relation to the principles of legislation for the States
in their collective capacities, showing more fully that the intention was
to create a _government for the people of the United States_ that should
be binding on all persons, or combination of persons, for all time to
come. And again, on page 34, is another quotation from the joint
production of Madison, Jay and Hamilton, showing that the government was
expected to reach individuals without the aid, and independent of, State
authority. And still another quotation, on pages 35 and 36, goes to show
that there was a full understanding that the people were conferring
certain powers upon the general government, and of course taking them from
the States for the purpose of forming one great, inseparable and
indissoluble nation. There is not a particle of evidence to prove that the
people contemplated reserving or recognizing any State distinction or
State sovereignty, so far as the powers of the general government were
concerned; but the whole drift of evidence goes to show that they were
conscious of the necessity of uniting themselves under one grand
government, making themselves one people, reserving only to the States or
themselves such powers as were thought necessary to regulate their local
affairs, leaving the States in nearly the same relation to the general
government that a city municipality is to the government of the State in
which it is located; but all must owe obedience to the government of the
United States.
But this is not all the evidence we have on this subject. As we review the
history of the government, we find that Washington, Jackson, Webster,
Clay, and in fact nearly every statesman of any prominence in our
political history have either by their acts or words committed themselves
to this same policy. The proclamation of General Jackson, and the extracts
given of Mr. Webster's arguments, are the key-stone to the arch; they are
both conclusive in themselves, and comment by me would be but a weak
advocate of their masterly and unanswerable arguments, hence I close the
subject, conscious of having proven to the satisfaction of myself at
least, and, I trust, to some of my doubting Democratic friends and
weak-hearted Republican brethren, that we at least have a government,
established by our forefathers, constituting us one nation, one people,
with one common country and destiny. Whether we shall be found brave
enough to defend it and perpetuate it is a question which the God of
nations only knows, and time alone will reveal to man.
THE UNION.
Shall this Union he maintained, or shall it be dissolved? are questions
that are the all absorbing topics of conversation amongst all classes of
people, through the length and breadth of our entire country. There seems
to be a great lack of firmness and decision at this time, in relation to
the proper course to be pursued in view of the momentous question now
about to be presented, discussed and decided upon by the American people.
While true men are thus dumfounded and amazed; I might say silenced with
almost a paralyzing astonishment at the daring and rapid movements of the
internal enemies to our country; the eyes of the civilized world are
turned towards us, and every true friend of liberty and human progression
is awaiting our decision upon this grave question, with an almost
breathless suspense. In view of this state of things, what course shall we
pursue in order to acquit ourselves honarably and preserve our nation from
the ruin that seems threatening to blot out the only guarantee that there
is such a government as "The United States?" There can be but one answer
to this from every true American patriot, and that is, that every attempt
to break up this government, let it come from few or many, will be met, be
the consequences what they may. The _integrity_ of this Union must and
shall be maintained, should be the watch-word of every man, woman and
child that values the blessing of liberty under which we have prospered as
individuals and as a nation. It is contended by some that it is better to
allow those States that choose to secede to go in peace than to enter into
a civil war, the end of which no man can foretell. This would look very
plausible were it not that there is a principle at stake which is at the
very foundation of every Democratic government, and without the
maintenance of this vital principle self-government is but a farce and a
deception. And what is this principle? Why it is nothing more nor less
than compelling the minority to submit to the constitutional acts of the
majority. Now, who will pretend that a Democratic government can be
sustained without this principle is both recognized and, if necessary,
enforced?
I am not one of those who think that the question of slavery is the great
and only cause of our present troubles; far from it, you may banish every
vestige of slavery from our country, and other differences of opinion will
rise up, and cause other disputes equally as difficult to settle. Nor is
the extent of our country, or the variety of the climate to be charged
with our difficulties, for even in our city and State elections we find
there is a wide difference of opinion, which results in crimination and
recrimination. The same will be found in the various school districts and
in many of the churches. Where ever there is a government there must and
will be a difference of opinion. It is not to be expected that we will all
agree in relation to the various schemes that are presented from time to
time for our consideration. But shall we revolt and overthrow the
government because our pet scheme is defeated? If not, then should we
allow others to involve us in one common ruin because of their defeat?
There would be no end to this rebellious spirit if the obligation to
submit to a constitutional election was removed. What would be the result
of giving way to those who are now threatening our peace? Would not every
other community have the same right; and we having once granted the right
by allowing a portion of the nation to set up an independent government,
how could we in justice punish those who choose to go and do likewise?
State governments will have the same difficulty to contend against that
the United States have now, and instead of strength and prosperity we will
be weak and divided and without honor at home or abroad.
I think that every sane man will agree with me when I say that it is much
better to meet on one grand battle field and settle this question at once
than to dodge the responsibility for the present, only to allow dissention
to spread broad cast over the land. When this great nation has been torn
into fragments by this ranting, ungovernable spirit, we, or our children,
will have to enforce this great principle, that some of our best meaning
friends are willing to abandon for the sake of peace.
THE EFFECT OF A WAR TO SUSTAIN OUR GOVERNMENT.
The effect of a war to sustain our government would be to plant the seed
of true patriotism in the breast of every law-abiding and liberty-loving
citizen of America. We should be able to contrast the two extremes of our
unheard of prosperity and the miseries and horrors of civil war--which of
itself would do much towards insuring peace for centuries to come. Let
those who expect that we love peace so well, or dread war so much as to
allow them to bid defiance to all laws, learn that they are mistaken; that
we are not the degenerate sons of a noble ancestry, but knowing our rights
and loving our country, we are determined to defend them against every
encroachment, and we will hear no more threats about disunion or rebellion
in consequence of a political defeat. We shall then have established
beyond a controversy that the minority must and shall submit to the
constitutional acts of the majority. We will then have established in the
minds of the civilized world that our government is not one of straw, but
that it is not only capable of vindicating its honor in defiance of
foreign foes, but it is equally able to chastise those who rebel against
its authority at home. War would be to our political system, what the
thunderstorm is to the atmosphere. Its purifying influences would be
manifested by inspiring new life, vigor and purity into everything that
surrounds us. Political demagogues will be cast aside as unfit for public
confidence, and better and more patriotic men will spring up from among
the masses who will have before them the history of the troubles through
which their country has passed as lesson and a warning to shun a like
calamity.
We have heretofore shown ourselves to be equal to our undertakings, and
now when the great crisis in our national affairs is at hand, and the eyes
of the friends of liberty throughout the civilized world are gazing upon
us with the deepest anxiety, shall we be found unworthy of the liberties
we enjoy? Should we be found unfaithful to the trust imposed on us by our
forefathers? We would be the just object of scorn and contempt, and the
historian who shall undertake the task of writing the true history of the
rise and fall of the American government, will have the painful duty of
drawing the contrast between the noble and patriotic heroes who
established it, and the cowardly, selfish and unprincipled traitors who
became its destroyers.
SHALL THE PEOPLE RULE?