POLITICS, 1908-1912
By 1908, the year of the presidential election, an influential portion
of the Republican members of Congress, particularly in the Senate, were
bitterly opposed to President Roosevelt. His attitude on the trusts and
the railroads was offensive to many, and on several occasions he had
gained the upper hand over Congress by means which were coming to be
known as "big-stick" methods. The so-called "constructive recess" of
1903 was an example.
Under the provisions of the Constitution, the president appoints many
officials with the advice and consent of the Senate, when it is in
session, and fills vacancies that happen during a recess by granting
commissions which expire at the end of the next session. On December 2,
1903, at noon, one session of Congress came to an end and another began.
Precisely at 12 o'clock, according to the official statement, the
President issued new commissions to W.D. Crum, a negro, to be collector
of the port of Charleston, and also to 168 army officers, of whom the
President's close friend Brigadier-General Leonard Wood was one. General
Wood was to be promoted to a major-generalship and the remaining
promotions were dependent upon his advance. The President's theory was
that a "constructive recess" intervened between the two sessions, during
which he could make recess appointments. Although the Senate was hostile
to both Crum and Wood, it reluctantly succumbed to Roosevelt's wishes
rather than withhold promotion from the 167 officers to whom it had no
objection.
In 1908, Senator Tillman, an outspoken Democratic critic of the
President, declared that senators vigorously denounced Roosevelt's
radical ideas in private but that in public they opposed merely by
inaction. Party loyalty was sufficient to keep these Republicans, in
most cases, from open and continued rebellion. Hardly less hostile to
the President were many of the business men of the country, who objected
to his economic policies, but the only alternative to Roosevelt was
Bryan, who, as one of the earliest proponents of radical legislation,
was even more offensive. On the other hand, a large majority of the rank
and file of the party, especially in the North and West, upheld the
President with unfeigned enthusiasm and made his position in the party
so strong that he could practically name his successor. Several
candidates had more or less local support for the nomination--Senator
Knox, of Pennsylvania, Governor Hughes, of New York, Speaker Cannon, of
Illinois, Vice-President Fairbanks, of Indiana, Senator La Follette, of
Wisconsin and Senator Foraker, of Ohio. The President's prestige and
energy, however, were frankly behind the candidacy of his Secretary of
War, William H. Taft.
The Republican convention of 1908 met in Chicago on June 16. Early in
the proceedings the mention of Roosevelt's name brought an outburst of
enthusiasm which indicated the possibility that he might be nominated
for a third term, despite his expressed refusal to allow such a move to
be made. In the platform the achievements of the retiring administration
were recounted in glowing terms; tariff reform was promised; and a
postal savings bank, the strengthening of the Interstate Commerce law
and the Sherman Anti-trust act, the more accurate definition of the
rules of procedure in the issuance of injunctions, good roads,
conservation, pensions and the encouragement of shipping, received the
stamp of party approval. Planks pledging the party to legislation
requiring the publicity of campaign expenditures, the valuation of the
physical property of railroads and the popular election of senators were
uniformly rejected. The closing paragraph declared that the "trend of
Democracy is toward Socialism, while the Republican party stands for
wise and regulated individualism." The contest over the nomination was
extremely brief, as Taft received 702 out of 979 votes on the first
ballot. James S. Sherman of New York was nominated for the
vice-presidency.
The Democrats, meanwhile, were in a quandary. A considerable fraction of
the party desired the nomination of somebody other than Bryan, whose
defeats in 1896 and 1900 had cast doubts upon the wisdom of a third
trial. Nevertheless the failure of Parker in 1904 had been so
overwhelming that the nomination of a conservative seemed undesirable
and, moreover, no candidate appeared whose achievements or promise could
overcome the prestige of Bryan. The national convention was held in
Denver, July 7-10, and Bryan dominated all its activities. The platform
welcomed the Republican promise to reform the tariff, but doubted its
sincerity; promised changes in the Interstate Commerce law, a more
elastic currency, improvements in the law of injunctions, generous
pensions, good roads and the conservation of the national resources. In
the main, however, the platform was an emphatic condemnation of the
Republican party as the party of "privileges and private monopoly." It
declared that the Republican speaker of the House of Representatives
exercised such absolute domination as to stop the enactment of measures
desired by the majority. It demanded the termination of the "partnership
which has existed between corporations of the country and the Republican
party," by which the business interests contributed great sums of money
in elections in return for an unmolested opportunity to "encroach upon
the rights of the people." It promised the enactment of laws preventing
corporation contributions to campaign funds and providing for the
publication before election of all contributions by individuals.
Detailed and definite planks in relation to trusts indicated that the
framers of the platform possessed at least the courage of their
convictions. Three laws were promised: one preventing the duplication of
directors among competing corporations; another establishing a license
system which would place under federal authority those corporations
engaged in interstate commerce which controlled as much as twenty-five
per cent. of the product in which they dealt, and which should likewise
protect the public from watered stock and prohibit any single
corporation from controlling over fifty per cent. of the total amount of
any commodity consumed in the United States; and, third, a law forcing
corporations to sell to purchasers in all sections of the country on the
same terms, after making due allowance for transportation costs.
As soon as the platform was out of the way, the convention turned to the
nomination of the candidate. Only George Gray, of Delaware, and John A.
Johnson, of Minnesota, contested the leadership of Bryan, but their
support was so slight that he was chosen on the first ballot. John W.
Kern, of Indiana, was nominated for the vice-presidency.
Of the smaller parties which shared in the election of 1908, the
People's party and the Socialists should be mentioned. The Populists
adopted a program of economic reforms many parts of which had been
prominent in their platforms of 1892 and 1896. Both the Republicans and
the Democrats, however, had adopted so many of these earlier demands
that the Populists rapidly lost strength and disappeared after 1908. The
Socialists likewise advocated economic reforms, together with government
ownership of the railroads, and of such industries as were organized on
a national scale. The candidate nominated was Eugene V. Debs, a labor
leader who had gained prominence at the time of the Pullman strike.[1]
The only novelty in the campaign was Bryan's stand in regard to campaign
funds. By calling upon his supporters for large numbers of small
individual contributions, he drew attention to the fact that the
corporations were helping generously to meet Taft's election expenses.
At their leader's direction the Democratic committee announced that it
would receive no contributions whatever from corporations, that it would
accept no offering over $10,000 and that it would publish a list of
contributors before the close of the campaign.
The result of the election was the triumph of Taft and his party. The
Republican popular vote was 7,700,000; the Democratic, 6,500,000; the
Socialist, 420,890. The election also gave the Republicans control of
Congress, which was to be constituted as follows during 1909-1911:
Senate, Democrats, 32, Republicans, 61; House of Representatives,
Democrats, 172, Republicans, 219.
Few men in our history have had a wider judicial and administrative
experience before coming to the presidency than that of William H. Taft.
He was born in 1857 in Ohio, graduated from Yale University with high
rank in the class of 1878 and later entered upon the study of law. A
judicial temperament early manifested itself and Taft became
successively judge of the Superior Court in Cincinnati and of a United
States Circuit Court. From the latter post he was called to serve upon
the Philippine Commission, was later Governor of the Philippines and
Secretary of War in Roosevelt's cabinet. During the period of his
connection with the Philippines and his membership in the Cabinet he
visited Cuba, Panama, Porto Rico, Japan and the Papal Court at Rome in
connection with matters of federal importance.
Personally Taft is kindly, unaffected, democratic, full of good humor,
courageous. As a public officer he was slow and judicial, rather than
quick and executive like his predecessor. Although in sympathy with the
reforms instituted by Roosevelt, Taft was less the reformer and more
conscious of considerations of constitutionality. Roosevelt thought of
the domain of the executive as including all acts not _specifically
forbidden_ by the Constitution or by the laws of the nation; Taft
thought of it as including only those which were _specifically granted_
by the Constitution and laws. The one was voluble, a dynamo of energy,
quick to seize and act upon any innovation that gave promise of being
both useful and successful; the other thought and acted more slowly and
was less sensitive to the feasibility of change. One possessed well-nigh
all the attributes necessary for intense popularity; the other inspired
admiration among a smaller group. Roosevelt had a peculiarly keen
perception of the currents of public opinion, enjoyed publicity and knew
how to achieve it; Taft was less quick at discovering the popular thing
and less adept at those tricks of the trade that heightened the
popularity of his predecessor.
Despite the patent differences of temperament and philosophy between
Taft and Roosevelt, both expected that the new administration would be
an extension of the old one. Roosevelt indicated this in his frank
preference for Taft as his successor; Taft indicated it in his thorough
acceptance of the policies of the preceding seven years and in his
intention, expressed at the time of his inauguration, to maintain and
further the reforms already initiated. His first act, however, the
appointment of his official advisors, caused some surprise among the
friends of his predecessor who expected that he would retain most if not
all of the Roosevelt cabinet. When he did not do so, it seemed as if the
attempt to further the Roosevelt policies would lack continuity.[2]
The immediate problem that faced the new executive was the revision of
the tariff. The task was one which has frequently resulted in political
disaster, but the platform left no choice to the President:
The Republican party declares unequivocally for a revision of the
tariff by a special session of Congress immediately following the
inauguration of the next President.... In all tariff legislation the
true principle of protection is best maintained by the imposition
of such duties as will equal the difference between the cost of
production at home and abroad, together with a reasonable profit to
American industries.
The precise meaning of this declaration will perhaps always remain a
matter of dispute, although it is certain that the public in general
understood it to mean a distinct lowering of the tariff wall, and Taft
committed himself to downward revision in his inaugural address.
Moreover, whether it was intended by the framers to commit the party
to downward revision or not, the method of defining the amount of
protection to be granted was both novel and unsatisfactory, as
Professor Taussig has pointed out. How could the costs of production
at home or abroad be determined? To what extent would the principle
announced in the platform be carried? Almost any commodity can be
produced almost anywhere if the producer is guaranteed the cost of
production, together with a reasonable profit. The wise revision of
the tariff is difficult enough under any circumstances; under so vague
a theory as was proposed in 1908, the chances of success became
remote.
The drafting of the tariff bill proceeded in the usual manner. The
Ways and Means Committee of the House, the chairman of which was
Sereno Payne, held preliminary public "hearings," which were open to
any who desired to offer testimony or make requests. Naturally,
however, the great body of the consuming public was little
represented; most of those who appeared were manufacturers, importers
and other interested parties. The bill drawn up by the Committee and
passed by the House revised existing duties, on the whole, in the
downward direction. The Senate Finance Committee, however, under the
leadership of Nelson W. Aldrich, an experienced and able proponent of
a high protective tariff, made 847 amendments, many of them important
and generally in the direction of higher rates. The Senate, like the
House, contained several Republicans, usually called "insurgents," who
were inclined to break away from certain of the party doctrines.
Senators Bristow, Cummins, Dolliver and La Follette were among them.
This contingent had hoped for a genuine downward revision, and when
they saw that the bill was not in accord with their expectations, they
prepared to demand a thorough debate. Each of the insurgents made an
especial study of some particular portion of the proposed measure so
as to be well prepared to urge reductions. Their efforts were
unavailing, however, and the bill passed--the insurgents voting with
the great majority of the Democrats in the negative. The bill then
went to a conference committee. Up to this point, the President had
taken little share in the formation of the bill. Yet as leader of the
party he had pledged himself to a downward revision and the result
seemed likely not to be in the promised direction. He therefore
exerted pressure on the conference committee and succeeded apparently
in getting some reductions, chiefly the abolition of the duty on
hides. The bill was then passed by both houses and signed by the
President on August 5, 1909.
The question whether the Payne-Aldrich act redeemed the pledge
embodied in the platform of 1908 will doubtless remain a debatable
question. On the one hand, a prominent Republican member of the
Committee on Ways and Means and of the Conference Committee, declared
that the act represented the greatest reduction that had been made in
the tariff at any single time since the first revenue law was signed
by George Washington. Roosevelt also defended the act. Experts outside
of Congress sharply differed. Professor Taussig analyzed the act in
all its aspects and concluded that no essential change had been made
in our tariff system. "It still left an extremely high scheme of
rates, and still showed an extremely intolerant attitude on foreign
trade." General public opinion was most affected by the fact that
duties on cotton goods were raised, and those on woolen goods left at
the high rates levied under the Dingley act. It also appeared that
many silent influences had been at work--the duty on cheap cotton
gloves, for example, being doubled through the efforts of an
interested individual who procured the assistance of a New England
senator.[3]
Not long after the passage of the act President Taft defended it in a
speech at Winona, Minnesota, as the best tariff bill that the
Republican party had ever passed. In regard to the woolen schedule he
frankly said:
Mr. Payne in the House, and Mr. Aldrich, in the Senate, although
both favored reduction in the schedule, found that in the Republican
party the interests of the wool growers of the Far West and the
interests of the woolen manufacturers in the East and in other
States, reflected through their representatives in Congress, were
sufficiently strong to defeat any attempt to change the woolen
tariff and that, had it been attempted, it would have beaten the
bill reported from either committee.... It is the one important
defect in the present Payne tariff.
The response of the press and the insurgent Republicans to the passage
of the bill and to the Winona speech were ominous for the future of the
party. Although not unanimous, condemnation was common in the West,
even in Republican papers. Particular objection was made to the high
estimate which the President placed upon the act and to his defence of
Senator Aldrich, who had come to be looked upon as the forefront of the
"special interests"; and western state Republican platforms in 1910
declared that the act had not been in accord with the plank of 1908.[4]
Coincidently with the disagreement over the Payne-Aldrich act, there
raged the unhappy Pinchot-Ballinger controversy. One of the last acts
of President Roosevelt had been to withdraw from sale large tracts of
public land which contained valuable water-power. The purpose and the
effect of the order was to prevent these natural resources from falling
into private hands and particularly into the hands of syndicates or
corporations who would develop them mainly for individual interests.
President Taft's Secretary of the Interior, Richard A. Ballinger, took
the attitude that the withdrawals were without statutory justification
and he therefore revoked the order for withdrawals immediately after
coming into office. Upon further investigation, however, he re-withdrew
a part of the land, although somewhat doubtful of his power to do so.
During the summer of 1909, Gifford Pinchot, the Chief Forester,
addressed an irrigation Congress in Spokane and asserted that the
water-power sites were being absorbed by a trust. Much interest was
aroused by the charge, which was looked upon as an attack on the
Secretary of the Interior and his policy. Within a short time the idea
became widespread, through the press, that Ballinger was associated
with interests which were desirous of seizing the public resources and
that this fact lay back of his partial reversal of the policy of his
predecessor. This impression was deepened by the charges of L.R.
Glavis, an employee of the Department of the Interior, concerning the
claims of a certain Clarence Cunningham, representing a group of
investors, to some exceedingly valuable coal lands in Alaska. Glavis
asserted that the Cunningham claims were fraudulent, that many of the
Cunningham group were personal friends of Ballinger and that the latter
had acted as attorney for them before becoming Secretary of the
Interior. President Taft, with the backing of an opinion from
Attorney-General Wickersham, upheld Ballinger and dismissed Glavis. The
press again took the matter up and the controversy was carried into
Congress, where an investigation was ordered. About the same time
Pinchot was removed for insubordination, and additional heat entered
into the disagreement. The majority of the congressional committee of
investigation later made a report exonerating Ballinger, but his
position had become intolerable and he resigned in March, 1911. The
result of the quarrel was to weaken the President, for the idea became
common that his administration had been friendly with interests that
wished to seize the public lands.
Republican complaint in regard to the tariff and the Pinchot-Ballinger
controversy were surface indications of a division in the party into
conservative or "old-guard," and progressive or insurgent groups. The
same line of demarcation appeared in a quarrel over the power of the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Joseph G. Cannon. Cannon had
served in the lower branch of Congress almost continuously for
twenty-seven years, and in 1910 was filling the position of speaker for
the fourth consecutive time. Much of his official influence rested on
two powers: he appointed the committees of the House and their
chairmen, a power which enabled him to punish opponents, reward friends
and determine the character of legislation; and he was the chairman and
dominant power of the Committee on Rules which determined the procedure
under existing practice and made special orders whenever particular
circumstances seemed to require them. It was widely believed that
Cannon, like Aldrich in the Senate, effectually controlled the passage
of legislation, with slender regard to the wishes or needs of the
people. "Cannonism" and "Aldrichism" were considered synonymous. For
several years an influential part of the Republican and Independent, as
well as the Democratic press had attacked Speaker Cannon as the enemy
of progressive legislation. Many of them laid much of the blame for the
character of the Payne-Aldrich act at his door. _The Outlook_ decried
"government by oligarchy"; _The Nation_ declared that he belonged to
another political age; Bryan queried what Cannon was selling and how
much he got; Gompers, the head of the American Federation of Labor,
pointed him out as the enemy of all reforms.
The outcry against the Speaker in the House itself, reinforced by the
gathering opposition outside, found effective voice in a coalition of
the Democrats and the insurgent Republicans. In mid-March, 1910, an
insurgent presented a resolution designed to replace the old Committee
on Rules by a larger body which should be elected by the House, and on
which the speaker would have no place. The friends of Cannon rallied to
his defence; other business fell into the background; and debate became
sharp and personal. One continuous session lasted twenty-six hours,
parliamentary fencing mingling with horse-play while each side
attempted to get a tactical advantage over the other.[5] Eventually
about forty insurgent Republicans joined with the Democrats to pass the
resolution. The result of the change was to compel the speaker to be a
presiding officer rather than the determining factor in the passage of
legislation. About the time that Cannon's domination in the House was
being broken, the announcement that Senator Nelson W. Aldrich and his
staunchly conservative associate, Eugene Hale, of Maine, were about to
retire indicated a similar change in the Senate. These men had served
for long periods in Congress and were looked upon as the ablest and
most influential of the "reactionary" element in the upper house.
Coincidently with the partial disintegration of the conservative wing
of the Republican party in Congress, there was passed a large volume of
legislation of the type desired by the insurgents. The public land laws
were improved; acts requiring the use of safety appliances on railroads
were strengthened; a Bureau of Mines was established to study the
welfare of the miners; a postal savings bank system was erected; and an
Economy and Efficiency Commission appointed to examine the several
administrative departments so as to discover wasteful methods of doing
business. Of especial importance was the Mann-Elkins Act of June 18,
1910, which further extended the powers of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Experience had brought out serious defects in the
rate-fixing procedure set up by the Hepburn Act. By that law, to be
sure, a shipper could complain that the roads were charging him an
unreasonable rate and the Commission might, in course of time, uphold
him and order relief; but in the meantime the shipper, especially if he
were a small one, might be crushed out of existence through the large
rates, and the consuming public would have paid increased prices for
commodities with no possibility of a remuneration to them, even if the
Commission decided that the rates levied were unreasonably high. The
Mann-Elkins law, therefore, provided that the Commission might suspend
any proposed change in rates for a period not greater than ten months,
and decide during that time whether it was reasonable and should go
into effect or not. In this way the burden of proving the justice of a
suggested change was placed upon the railroads.[6]
An act of June 25, 1910, which was amended a year later, required the
publication of the names of persons contributing to the federal
campaign funds of the political parties, and the amounts contributed,
as well as a detailed account of the expenditures of the committees and
the purposes for which the expenses were incurred. President Taft also
urged the passage of an income tax amendment to the federal
Constitution and indicated that he was in favor of an amendment
providing for the popular election of senators. Amendments for both
these purposes passed Congress; but they were not ratified and put into
effect until 1913.
In June, 1910, Roosevelt returned from Africa whither he had gone for a
hunting trip, after the inauguration of President Taft. Both elements
in the Republican party were anxious for his sympathy and support.
Roosevelt himself seems to have desired to remain outside the arena, at
least for a time, but for many reasons permanent separation from
politics was impossible. He became a candidate for the position of
temporary chairman of the New York Republican State Convention against
Vice-President James S. Sherman. The contest in the convention brought
out opposition to him on the part of the old-guard, and his triumph
left that wing of the party dissatisfied and disunited. During the
summer and autumn of 1910 he made extensive political tours. At
Ossawatomie, Kansas, he developed the platform of the "New
Nationalism," which included more thorough control of corporations, and
progressive legislation in regard to income taxes, conservation, the
laboring classes, primary elections at which the people could nominate
candidates for office, and the recall of elective officials before the
close of their terms. He urged such vigorous use of the powers of the
federal government that there should be no "neutral ground" between
state and nation, to serve as a refuge for law-breakers. Critics
pointed out that these proposals had been urged by the insurgents and
the followers of Bryan, and there could be no doubt where the
sympathies of Roosevelt lay in the factional dispute within the
Republican party.
While conditions within the organization were such as were indicated by
the hostile criticism of the Payne-Aldrich act, by the Pinchot-Ballinger
controversy, the overturn of Speaker Cannon and the disintegration of
the Aldrich-Hale group, the congressional election of 1910 took place.
Signs of impending change had already become evident. Insurgent
Republicans were carrying the party primaries; and the Democrats, who
were plainly confident, emphasized strongly the tariff act, Cannonism
and the high cost of living as reasons for the removal of the
Republicans. The result was a greater upheaval than even the Democrats
had prophesied. In nine states the Republicans were ousted from
legislatures that would elect United States senators; the new Senate
would contain forty-one Democrats and fifty-one Republicans--too narrow
a Republican majority in view of the strength of the insurgents. In the
choice of members of the lower branch of Congress there was a still
greater revolution; the new House would contain 228 Democrats, 161
Republicans and one Socialist, while Cannon would be retired from the
speakership. In eastern as well as western states, Democratic governors
were elected in surprising numbers. Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New York, New Jersey, Ohio and Oregon were among them. Of particular
importance, as later events showed, was the success in New Jersey of
Woodrow Wilson, former president of Princeton University.
Not long after the election of 1910 the President sent to Congress a
special message urging the adoption of a reciprocal trade agreement
with Canada. The arrangement provided for freedom of trade in many raw
materials and food products, and for substantial reductions on some
manufactured articles. He believed that the project would benefit both
countries economically and improve the already friendly relations
existing between them, and he set his heart upon its adoption.
Opposition appeared at once: the farmers' organizations protested
vigorously at the reduction of the tariff on agricultural products; the
high protectionists were fearful of an entering wedge which might lead
to further tariff reductions; and the paper and wood pulp interests
also objected. Although the agreement eventually passed both houses of
Congress by large majorities, the opposition was composed chiefly of
Republicans. Objection to the arrangement in Canada turned out to be
stronger than had been anticipated. The fear that commercial
reciprocity might make the Dominion somewhat dependent on the United
States seems to have caused a manifestation of national pride, and Sir
Wilfred Laurier, who had led the forces in favor of the agreement, was
driven out of power and reciprocity defeated. The result for the
administration was failure and further division in the party.
Democratic control of the House during the second half of Taft's term
effectually prevented the passage of any considerable amount of
legislation. A parcel-post law, however, was passed, a Children's
Bureau was established for the study of the welfare of children, and a
Department of Labor provided for, whose secretary was to be a member of
the cabinet. Aided by the insurgents, the Democrats attempted a small
amount of tariff legislation. Although a general revision of the entire
tariff structure would be a long and laborious task, specific schedules
could be revised which would indicate what might be expected in case of
Democratic success in 1912. The sugar, steel, woolen, chemical and
cotton schedules were taken up in accord with this plan and bills were
passed which were uniformly vetoed by the President.
In his attitude toward the regulation of big business, President Taft
was in harmony with his predecessor and was in thorough sympathy,
therefore, with suits brought under the Sherman law against the
Standard Oil Company, and the American Tobacco Company. In May, 1911,
the Supreme Court decided that both of these companies had been guilty
of combining to restrain and to monopolize trade, and ordered a
dissolution of the conspiring elements into separate, competing units.
The Court also undertook to answer some of the knotty questions that
had arisen in relation to section 1 of the act, which declares illegal
"every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade." Did the prohibition against every
contract or combination mean precisely _every_ contract, whether
important or not? Or did it refer merely to large and unreasonable
restraints? The phraseology of the statute seems to prohibit restraints
of all kinds, and the previous decisions of the Court had been in line
with this view. When, then, the decisions in these two cases erected
the "rule of reason" and declared that only those restraints were
forbidden that were unreasonable, the attention of some opponents of
the trusts was focussed on the _obiter dictum_, rather than upon the
decisions themselves. In taking this position, they had the support of
Mr. Justice Harlan who agreed to the decision but condemned the _obiter
dictum_, asserted that the exact words of the law forbade _every_
contract, and deprecated what he believed to be the amendment of
statutes by the courts. The dissolution of the companies into competing
units, however, had no apparent effect that was of benefit to the
public. In fact, immediate increases in the value of Standard Oil
stocks indicated that the decision was of slight consequence.
In the meantime the widening of the breach in the Republican party was
indicated by the formation of the National Progressive Republican
League on January 21, 1911. Its most prominent leaders were Senators
Bourne, Bristow and La Follette; and leading progressives in different
states were invited to join--among them ex-President Roosevelt. It was
the hope that if the latter joined the League, the step might help to
place him in more open opposition to the Taft administration. The
purpose of the organization was the passage of progressive economic and
political legislation, especially acts providing for the election of
senators by vote of the people, direct primaries for the nomination of
elective officers, direct election of delegates to national
conventions, the initiative, referendum and recall in the states, and a
thorough-going corrupt practices act.
Early in 1912 the factions in the Republican party began to consider
the question of a leader for the coming presidential campaign, some of
the progressive element looking to La Follette as the natural
candidate, and others to Roosevelt when it was seen that he would not
support Taft for a renomination. On February 21, Roosevelt addressed a
constitutional convention in Columbus, Ohio, and expressed a political
creed that closely resembled the program of the National Progressive
Republican League. In the meantime the demand for Roosevelt as a
candidate had been incessant on the part of numerous Republicans of
insurgent sympathies, who realized how many more progressive principles
he had accepted than Taft. Finally on February 24 he replied to an
appeal from a group of his supporters, including seven state governors,
that he would accept a nomination. Thereupon most of the progressives
transferred their allegiance from La Follette to the ex-President.
President Taft's fighting spirit had become aroused, in the meanwhile,
and he had declared that only death would keep him out of the fight.
The call had already been issued for the Republican Nominating
Convention to be held in Chicago, in June, and the contest began for
the control of the 1,078 delegates who would compose its membership.
The supporters of Taft, being in possession of the party machinery,
were able to dictate the choice of many of these delegates, especially
from the South, by means that had been usual in politics for many
years. The friends of Roosevelt, in order to overcome this handicap,
began to demand presidential preference primaries, in which the people
might make known their wishes, and in which his personal popularity
would make him a strong contender. During the pre-convention campaign,
twelve states held primaries and the others held the usual party
conventions. At first Taft did not actively enter the contest, but the
efforts of Roosevelt were so successful and his charges against the
President so numerous that he felt compelled to take the stump. The
country was then treated to the spectacle of a President and an
ex-President touring the country and acrimoniously attacking each
other. The progressives, Taft asserted, were "political emotionalists"
and "neurotics"; Roosevelt, he complained, had promised not to accept
another nomination, had broken his agreement, and had not given a fair
account of the policies which the administration had been following.
Roosevelt charged Taft with being a reactionary, a friend of the
"bosses" and with using the patronage in order to secure a
renomination. And he grated on the sensibilities of the nation by
referring to his influence in getting Taft elected in 1908 and
remarking, "it is a bad trait to bite the hand that feeds you." The
result of the presidential preference primaries in the few states that
held them was overwhelmingly in favor of Roosevelt; in the states where
conventions chose the delegates, Taft obtained a majority; in the case
of over 200 delegates, there were disputes as to whether Taft or
Roosevelt men were fairly chosen. These contests, as usual, were
decided by the National Republican Committee, with the right of appeal
to the Convention itself. The Committee decided nearly all the contests
in favor of Taft's friends, and since all the delegates thus chosen
would sit in the Convention and vote on one another's cases, the
decision seemed likely to be final.
The scene of action then shifted to Chicago where the Convention
assembled on June 18. Aroused by the action of the Committee in the
contests, Roosevelt went thither to care for his interests.[7] The
election of a temporary chairman resulted in the choice of Elihu Root,
who was favorable to Taft. The Roosevelt delegates, declaring that the
contests had been unfairly decided, enlivened the roll-call by shouts
of "robbers," "thieves"; and when Root thanked the Convention for the
confidence which it reposed in him, his words were greeted with groans.
Upon the failure of an attempt to revise the decision of the National
Committee in the cases of the contested delegates, Roosevelt announced
that he was "through." One of his supporters read to the Convention a
statement from him charging that the Committee, under the direction of
Taft, had stolen eighty or ninety delegates, making the gathering no
longer in any proper sense a Republican convention. Thereafter most of
the Roosevelt delegates refused to share either in the nomination of
the candidate or in the adoption of a platform. The choice of Taft as
the candidate was then made without difficulty.
The platform contained the usual planks concerning the party's past,
the protective tariff and the civil service; and it reflected something
of the rising interest in economic and political reforms in its
advocacy of laws limiting the hours of labor for women and children,
workmen's compensation acts, reforms in legal procedure, a simpler
process than impeachment for the removal of judges, additions to the
anti-trust law, the revision of the currency system, publicity of
campaign contributions and a parcel-post.
As the Republican convention was drawing its labors to a close, the
dissatisfied adherents of Roosevelt met and invited him to become the
candidate of a new organization. Upon his acceptance, a call was issued
for a convention of the Progressive Party, to be held in Chicago on
August 5. The discord among the Republicans was viewed with undisguised
content by the Democratic leaders, for it seemed likely to open to them
the doorway to power. Yet the same difference between liberals and
conservatives that had been the outstanding feature of the Republican
convention was evident among the Democrats, and nobody could be sure
that a schism would not take place.
There was no lack of aspirants for the presidential nomination. J.B.
("Champ") Clark, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Governor
Judson Harmon, of Ohio, O.W. Underwood, Chairman of the House Committee
on Ways and Means, and Governor Woodrow Wilson, of New Jersey, all had
earnest supporters. In contests in the state conventions and primaries,
Speaker Clark was most successful, although not enough delegates were
pledged to him to secure the nomination.
The convention met in Baltimore on June 25, and for the most part
centered about the activities of Bryan. On the third day he presented a
resolution declaring the convention opposed to the nomination of any
candidate who was under obligations to J.P. Morgan, T.F. Ryan, August
Belmont, or any of the "privilege-hunting and favor-seeking class." An
uproar ensued, but the resolution was overwhelmingly adopted. Balloting
for the candidate then began. Speaker Clark had a majority, but was far
from having the two-thirds majority which Democratic conventions
require; Governor Wilson was more than a hundred votes behind him.
While the fourteenth ballot was being taken, Bryan created a new
sensation by announcing that he should transfer his vote from Clark to
Wilson, on the ground that the New York delegates were in the hands of
Charles F. Murphy, the leader of Tammany Hall, and that Murphy was for
the Speaker. The relative positions of the two leading candidates
remained unchanged, however, for five ballots more. Then the tide began
to turn. At the thirtieth, Governor Wilson led for the first time, and
on the forty-sixth Clark's support broke and Wilson was nominated.
The platform resembled that of 1908. It called for immediate downward
revision of the tariff, the strengthening of the anti-trust laws,
presidential preference primaries, prohibition of corporation
contributions to campaign funds, a single term for the president and
the revision of the banking and currency laws.
The organization of the Progressive party, in the meantime, was rapidly
proceeding, and on August 5 the national convention was held. It was an
unusual political gathering both in its personnel--for women delegates
shared in its deliberations--and in the emotional fervor which
dominated its sessions. At the Democratic convention the delegates had
awakened the echoes with the familiar song "Hail! Hail! The gang's all
here"; the Progressives expressed their convictions in "Onward,
Christian Soldiers." Roosevelt's speech was called his "confession of
faith"; his charge that both of the old parties were boss-ridden and
privilege-controlled epitomized the prevailing sentiment among his
hearers. Without a contest Roosevelt was nominated for the presidency
and Hiram Johnson of California for the vice-presidency.
The platform adopted was distinctly a reform document. It advocated
such political innovations as direct primaries, the direct election of
senators, the initiative, referendum and recall, a more expeditious
method of amending the Constitution, women's suffrage, and the
limitation of campaign expenditures. A detailed program of social and
economic legislation included laws for the prevention of accidents, the
prohibition of child labor, a "living wage," the eight-hour day, a
Department of Labor, the conservation of the nation's resources, and
the development of the agricultural interests. The third portion of the
platform dealt with "the unholy alliance between corrupt business and
corrupt politics." It declared the test of corporate efficiency to be
the ability "to serve the public"; it demanded the "strong national
regulation of interstate corporations," a federal industrial commission
comparable to the Interstate Commerce Commission and the protection of
the people from concerns offering worthless investments under highly
colored and specious appearances.
The results of the election indicated how complete the division
in the Republican party had been. In the electoral college Wilson
received 435 votes to Roosevelt's 88 and Taft's 8. Yet Wilson's
popular vote--6,300,000--fell far short of the combined Roosevelt-Taft
vote--7,500,000--and was less than that of Bryan in 1896, 1900, and
1908.[8] The fact that the combined Roosevelt-Taft vote was less than
that received by Taft in 1908 seems to indicate that many Republicans
refused to vote. The control of Congress, in both houses, went to the
Democrats, even such a popular leader as Speaker Cannon failing of
reelection. In twenty-one of the thirty-five states where governors
were chosen, the Democrats were triumphant. Whether, then, the schism
in the Republican party was responsible for the success of the
opposition, or whether the electorate was determined upon a change
regardless of conditions in the party which had hitherto controlled
popular favor, the fact was that the overturn was complete. And
circumstances that could not have been foreseen and that affected the
entire world were destined to make the political revolution profoundly
significant.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
In the main, periodical literature written with more or less partisan
bias must be relied upon.
For the election of 1908, F.A. Ogg, _National Progress_ (1918), and the
better newspapers and periodicals. W.H. Taft may be studied in his
_Presidential Addresses and State Papers_ (1910), _Present Day
Problems_ (1908), and _Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers_ (1916).
On the Payne-Aldrich tariff: S.W. McCall in _Atlantic Monthly_, vol.
CIV, p. 562; G.M. Fisk in _Political Science Quarterly_, XXV, p. 35;
H.P. Willis in _Journal of Political Economy_, XVII, pp. 1, 589, XVIII,
1; in addition to Tarbell and Taussig.
The documents in the Pinchot-Ballinger controversy are in _Senate
Documents_, 61st Congress, 2nd session, vol. 44 (Serial Number 5643),
and 3rd session, vol. 34 (Serial Numbers 5892-5903).
For other incidents: C.R. Atkinson, _Committee on Rules and the
Overthrow of Speaker Cannon_ (1911); Canadian reciprocity in _Senate
Documents_, 61st Congress, 3rd session, vol. 84 (Serial Number 5942);
Appleton's _American Year Book_ (1911). The decisions in the Standard
Oil and American Tobacco cases are in _United States Reports_, vol.
221, pp. 1, 106; a good discussion will be found in W.H. Taft,
_Anti-Trust Act and the Supreme Court_ (1914). For the rise of the
insurgent movement and the election of 1912, F.E. Haynes, _Third Party
Movements_ (1916); R.M. La Follette, _Autobiography_; B.P. De Witt,
_Progressive Movement_ (1915); W.J. Bryan, _Tale of Two Conventions_
(1912); besides Ogg, Beard and Stanwood.
The _American Year Book_ (1910-), becomes serviceable in connection
with major political events. Its articles are usually non-partisan and
may be relied upon to bring continuing tendencies and practices up to
date.
* * * * *
[1] Above, p. 322.
[2] The cabinet was composed of: P.C. Knox, Pa., Secretary of State; P.
MacVeagh, III., Secretary of the Treasury; J.M. Dickinson, Tenn.,
Secretary of War; G.W. Wiekersham, N.Y., Attorney-General; F.H.
Hitchcock, Mass., Postmaster-General; G.L. Meyer, Mass., Secretary of
the Navy; R.A. Ballinger, Wash., Secretary of the Interior; J. Wilson,
Ia., Secretary of Agriculture; C. Nagel, Mo., Secretary of Commerce and
Labor. Meyer and Wilson had been in Roosevelt's cabinet.
[3] Other features of the act were the establishment of a Court for the
settlement of tariff disputes, provisions for a tariff commission and a
tax on corporation incomes.
[4] Mr. Dooley, who was well known as a humorous character created by
F.P. Dunne, made merry with the claim that the tariff had been reduced,
by reading to his friend Mr. Hennessy the "necessities of life" which
had been placed on the free-list and which included curling stones,
teeth, sea-moss, newspapers, nuts, nux vomica, Pulu, canary bird seed,
divy divy and other commodities.
[5] A sample of the jocosity that partially relieved the tension is the
following portion of the _Congressional Record_ for March 18:
The Speaker _pro tempore_: The House will be in order. Gentlemen
will understand the impropriety of singing on the floor, even though
the House is not at this moment transacting any business. The House
is not in recess.
Chorus. "There'll be a hot time in the old town to-night."
The Speaker _pro tempore_. That was last night, not to-night.
(Laughter.) The House will be in order.
Mr. Shackleford. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that the
tap-tapping of the Chair's gavel interferes with the music.
(Laughter.)
Cf. Atkinson, _Committee on Rules_, 115.
[6] A Commerce Court was also provided, so as to expedite the decision
of appeals from orders of the Commission. Its career was brief, for
Congress was not well-disposed toward the project, and the Court was
abolished in 1913.
[7] When Roosevelt arrived in Chicago, he remarked that he felt like a
"bull moose," an expression which later gave his party its popular
name.
[8] Roosevelt, 4,000,000; Taft, 3,500,000.