THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Seldom, in times of peace, is the personality of a single individual
so important as that of Theodore Roosevelt during the early years of
the twentieth century. At the time of his accession to the presidency,
he lacked a month of being forty-three years old, but the range of his
experience in politics had been far beyond his age. In his early
twenties, soon after leaving Harvard, he had entered the Assembly of
the state of New York. President Harrison had made him Civil Service
Commissioner in 1889, and he had been successively President of the
Board of Police Commissioners of New York City, Assistant Secretary of
the Navy, an important figure in the war with Spain, and Governor of
New York. He had been known as a young man of promise--energetic,
independent and progressive--and in addition to his political
activities he had found time to write books on historical subjects,
see something of life on a western ranch and develop a somewhat
defective physique into an engine of physical power.
Brimming with energy, nimble of mind, impetuous, sure of himself, quick
to strike, a fearless foe, frank, resourceful, audacious, honest,
versatile--Roosevelt possessed the qualities which would challenge the
admiration of the typical American. One who frequently saw him at work
described thus the way in which he prepared a message to be sent to the
Senate:
He storms up and down the room, dictating in a loud and oratorical
tone, often stopping, recasting a sentence, striking out and
filling in, hospitable to every suggestion, not in the least
disturbed by interruption, holding on stoutly to his purpose,
and producing finally, out of these most unpromising conditions,
a clear and logical statement, which he could not improve with
solitude and leisure at his command.
The breadth of his interests, the democratic character of his
friendships--for he was equally at home with blue-stocking, politician,
cowboy and artisan--his complete loyalty to his friends and his
disregard of conventionalities gave him a grip upon popular favor that
had not been duplicated since the days of Andrew Jackson, unless by
Lincoln. The effectiveness of so compelling a personality was in no way
diminished by Roosevelt's possession of what a journalist would call
"news sense." He was made for publicity; he had an instinct for the
dramatic. His speeches were removed from mediocrity by his evident
sincerity, his abounding interest in every occasion at which he was
called upon to talk and the phrases that were half victories which he
coined almost at will. "Mollycoddle," "muckraking," "the square deal,"
"the big stick" became familiar idioms in the vernacular of politics
and the street. The political leadership of Roosevelt rested mainly
upon his personal prestige and upon his attributes as a reformer. With
unerring prescience he chose those political issues which would make
a wide appeal and which could be pressed quickly to a successful
conclusion. His complete integrity saved him from mere opportunism; his
ruggedly practical commonsense saved him from that combination of high
purpose and slight accomplishment which has characterized many other
reformers.
No estimate of the deficiencies in Roosevelt's personality and
leadership would be agreed upon at the present time. In some cases--as
in the realm of international relations--only the future can decide
whether he was a prophet or a chauvinist; in all cases, opinions have
differed widely, for Roosevelt could scarcely explore a river, describe
a natural phenomenon or urge a political innovation without thereby
arousing a controversy in which his friends and his opponents would
participate with equal intensity. His identification of himself with
his purposes was as complete as that of Andrew Jackson; opposition to
his proposals was reckoned as opposition to him as an individual. Like
many leaders of the fighting type, he was frequently weak when judging
the motives of those who disagreed with him. One of his admirers
declared that his greatest political defect was an impatience of any
interval between an expressed desire for an act and the accomplishment
of the deed itself--an inability to stand through years of defeat for
the future success of an ideal. A keener and equally sympathetic critic
dubbed him the "sportsman" in politics--honest, hard-hitting, but
playing the issue which had an immediate political effect.
At the outset of his administration Roosevelt was apparently an
adherent of the prevailing Republican creed--protective tariff, gold
standard, imperialism, _laissez faire_ and the rest. His first official
utterance after becoming President was an indication that he would
continue unbroken the policies of his predecessor, and to this end he
insisted that the cabinet should remain intact.[1] His foreign policy
was aggressive; his interest in the military and naval establishments
real and constant. Roosevelt was more venturesome than McKinley, and
more ready to experiment with new ideas. He took up the duties of his
position with an unaffected zest and enthusiasm; he looked upon the
presidential office as an exhilarating adventure in national and even
international affairs. As time went on, therefore, it became more and
more evident that he was prepared to play a big role on a great stage.
Moreover, few doubts concerning the constitutional powers of the
executive position seem ever to have assailed him. Whatever may have
been his theory at the outset of his presidency, he came eventually to
believe that the executive power was limited only by the specific
restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution, or imposed
by Congress in laws which it had constitutional authority to pass. The
scope which this theory presented for the exercise of his energetic
originality is evident when contrasted with the theory of his
predecessors, who had, in times of peace, held to the belief that the
executive possessed only the powers specifically designated by the
Constitution.
Not until some future time, when the events of the early twentieth
century are better understood, will it be possible to judge accurately
the value of President Roosevelt's regime in its relation to the
control of railroads and corporations. There can be no doubt, however,
that one of the most serious problems that faced the American people
during that time was the position which the government ought to occupy
toward the business interests of the nation. Not only were the
railroads and the great corporations the center of the economic life
of the people, but their social and political effects were momentous.
Neither the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 nor the Sherman Anti-trust
law of 1890, it will be remembered, had accomplished what had been
expected of them. The Interstate Commerce law had met with grave
obstacles in the courts; the Sherman act had been seldom invoked by the
federal executive, and in the most prominent case, United States _v._
E.C. Knight Co., the government had failed to obtain the decision it
desired. Government regulation seemed like a broken reed.[2] A few
cases, however, had indicated the possibility that strength might be
discovered in the law. In United States _v._ the Trans-Missouri Freight
Association, the Supreme Court had declared that the Anti-trust act
applied to railroads and that it forbade agreements among them to
maintain rates; two years later, in 1899, the Court pronounced illegal
a combination of pipe manufacturers in the Middle West, on the ground
that its result was to restrain interstate commerce.
Roosevelt, like Bryan and La Follette, had been groping his way to an
understanding of the importance of the new problem. During his term as
Governor of New York he had clashed with the older political leaders
when he supported an act looking to the heavier taxation of railway
franchises. The first recommendations in his message to Congress on
December 3, 1901, concerned the subject of the relation of government
and industry. The accumulation of wealth in recent years in the United
States, he asserted, had been due to natural causes, and much of the
antagonism aroused thereby was without warrant. Nevertheless grave
evils had attended the process: overcapitalization was one; untruthful
representations concerning the value of the properties in which
business asked the public to invest was another. Such evils should be
attacked; with extreme care, to be sure, but also with resolution.
Combination and concentration, he thought, should be supervised and,
within reasonable limits, controlled. The remedies which the President
suggested were simple: in the interest of the public the government
should have the right to inspect the workings of organizations engaged
in interstate commerce; because of the lack of uniformity in corporation
legislation within the states, the federal government should so extend
its power as to include supervision of corporations; a Department of
Commerce and Industries should be established, whose head should be a
cabinet officer; the Interstate Commerce law should be amended; railway
rates should be just, and should be the same to all shippers alike, and
the government should be the agent to provide a remedy to this end.
The enthusiastic reception accorded the message by the press indicated
that one or another of its numerous recommendations met with approval.
The effect on Congress, however, of the portion dealing with interstate
commerce was represented by a cartoon in the New York _World_. Uncle Sam
was there portrayed stowing away for later attention a bundle of
manuscript labelled "President's Message 1901. 30,000 words," while he
smilingly remarked "When I git time!" But Roosevelt was not content to
let the matter drop, and in the following summer he took the unusual
step of carrying his message directly to the people. In the New England
states first, and later in the West, he declared his creed on the
federal regulation of industry. The effectiveness of the campaign was
increased by the moderation of the President, by his increasing
popularity and by the many telling phrases, with which he enforced his
main thesis. The Sherman act looked less like a broken reed when the
chief executive of the nation declared: "As far as the anti-trust laws
go they will be enforced ... and when (a) suit is undertaken it will not
be compromised except upon the basis that the Government wins." Here and
there objection was raised that the program was not sufficiently
definite; now and then a critic hazarded a conjecture that Roosevelt had
not consulted the leaders of his party; but in the main he succeeded in
obtaining a sympathetic hearing. At this juncture the coal strike of
1902 gave him one of those fortunate opportunities which were commonly
referred to as a part of "Roosevelt's luck." With no uncertain hand he
seized the opportunity which chance presented.
Before 1899, there had been no organization of the anthracite miners
with sufficient strength to force any changes in the conditions under
which the men performed their work. During that year the United Mine
Workers of America began to send organizers into the Pennsylvania
region. In 1900 the men struck, but an agreement was reached with the
operators and work was resumed. The settlement, however, was not
satisfactory to either side, and in 1902 the workers asked for a
conference. The presidents of the coal companies and the coal-carrying
railroads replied that they were always ready to meet their own
employees but would have no dealings with a general labor organization.
Smaller causes of unrest were the demand for more pay, shorter hours,
and payment for coal by weight instead of by the car, but the
fundamental issue was the recognition of the union--the workmen
insisting on collective bargaining, the operators refusing it. The men
were helpless except as a union; the roads were sure of keeping the
upper hand if they dealt with the men individually or in small groups.
When attempts at conference failed, the miners struck and from May 12
until October 23 nearly 147,000 of them remained idle. The total loss
to miners and operators was nearly $100,000,000.
Since the Pennsylvania fields were almost the sole source of supply
for anthracite coal, discomfort was soon felt in the North and West,
and as the cooler weather came on, suffering became acute and public
feeling bordered on panic. A winter without hard coal could hardly be
contemplated without grave misgivings. Popular opinion, meanwhile,
went increasingly to the side of the miners. The refusal of the
operators to confer, and the propriety of the conduct of the workmen
made a wide impression that was favorable to the union. Moreover,
George F. Baer, President of the Philadelphia and Reading Company,
spoke of himself and his associates in a letter to a correspondent as
those "Christian men to whom God in His infinite wisdom has given the
control of the property interests of the country." The remark was
widely quoted and generally looked upon as evidence of a selfish and
uncompromising individualism.[3] The strike having now become a matter
of national importance, President Roosevelt requested the operators
and representatives of the miners to meet him in Washington, October
3. At this conference the spokesman of the railroads refused mediation,
while the leader of the United Mine Workers, John Mitchell, proposed
arbitration and pledged the workers to accept it.
After the refusal of the operators to accept the President's
conciliatory offer, he decided to apply pressure. He obtained the
consent of Grover Cleveland to act as chairman of a commission of
investigation and determined to seize the mines by military force, if
necessary, operate them as a receiver and await the report of his
commission. In some way, which can not now be indicated with certainty,
the operators were influenced to accept mediation, and the President
appointed a commission with Judge George Gray as chairman.[4] The
miners immediately returned to work, coal began again to flow to the
North, and public rejoicing was extreme. The President's Commission at
once repaired to Pennsylvania, heard 558 witnesses, visited the mines,
and inspected machinery and the homes of the miners. It concluded that
neither side was completely in the right, and therefore made an award
that satisfied some of the complaints of both parties. In the history
of the relation between the federal government and the business
interests of the nation, the anthracite strike of 1902 is of marked
significance. The operators had given evidence of a failure to
understand that their business so concerned the nation that the
interest of the public in it must be heeded. The successful outcome
enhanced the prestige of the government and of the President, and an
example of the need of greater control over corporations received wide
publicity at the precise moment when the general subject was uppermost
in the popular mind.
The first legislative evidence of the result of the agitation for the
more effective regulation of industry was an act approved on February
11, 1903, by which any suit brought in a Circuit Court by the United
States government under the Sherman Anti-trust act or the Interstate
Commerce law, could be given precedence over other cases at the desire
of the Attorney-General. Three days later a law was passed which
established a Department of Commerce and Labor, whose chief was to be a
cabinet officer. Included in the Department was a Bureau of Corporations
headed by a Commissioner, who was authorized to investigate the
organization and conduct of the business of corporations. Within another
five days the Elkins Act had been passed--a law designed to eliminate
rebating. Despite the Interstate Commerce act, the practice of rebating
had continued. Agreement was general that railroad men who, in other
respects, were perfectly scrupulous, commonly violated the law in order
to get business in competition with their rivals. Among the railroad men
who had violated the law but who deprecated the necessity of so doing,
was Paul Morton, president of the Santa Fe system. Morton volunteered to
assist Roosevelt in stamping out the evil, and the Elkins law was
designed to aid in this process. It forbade any variation from published
rates, made both a corporation and its agents punishable for offenses
against the law, prohibited the receiving of rebates as well as giving
them, and made the penalty for failure to observe the provisions of the
Act a fine of one thousand to twenty thousand dollars. Furthermore,
during February, 1903, Congress appropriated $500,000 to be expended
under the direction of the Attorney-General for the better enforcement
of the anti-trust and interstate commerce laws.
In 1903, likewise, was initiated an important judicial proceeding in the
direction of the enforcement of the Sherman law. The Great Northern
Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company operated
parallel competing lines of road extending from the region of Lake
Superior to the Pacific Coast. An attempted consolidation of the two had
been declared illegal under the statutes of the state of Minnesota. On
November 13, 1901, under the leadership of two of the foremost railway
magnates of the nation, J.J. Hill and J.P. Morgan, there had been
organized the Northern Securities Company, to purchase and control at
least a majority of the shares of the capital stock of the two lines of
railway. In this way the two roads would be operated as one, their
earnings pooled, competition between the two eliminated and a virtual
consolidation effected. On the advice of the Attorney-General, Philander
C. Knox, President Roosevelt directed that proceedings be instituted
against the holding company--an act that seemed almost useless in view
of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Knight Case. But the
decision in the Northern Securities Case, handed down in 1904, was a
surprise. By a vote of five to four the Court declared the company a
combination in restraint of trade, and therefore illegal under the
Sherman act, and enjoined any attempt on its part to control the affairs
of either of the two railways.
Nineteen hundred and four, the year of the presidential election, found
Roosevelt in a strong position. His success in handling the coal strike
and his energetic preparations for the crusade against trust evils had
struck a responsive chord in the popular mind. Late in 1903 he had
announced to Congress that frauds had been discovered in the post
office and land office, and urged the appropriation of funds for the
prosecution of the offenders. The result was a house-cleaning which
involved the conviction of many officials, including two United States
senators. Roosevelt's popularity became greater than ever.
It was to be expected, however, that some opposition would appear to the
nomination of Roosevelt for a continuation of his term of office, and it
was around the forceful Mark Hanna that the opposition began gradually
to center. Hanna had attained remarkable influence as a senator, was
highly trusted by the business interests and was popular among southern
Republicans. But his death in February, 1904, effectively ended any
opposition to Roosevelt, since it was then too late to focus attention
upon any other competitor. The Republican nominating convention,
therefore, which met in Chicago on June 21, lacked any semblance of a
contest, and the President was renominated without opposition. The
platform was of the traditional sort. The history of the party was
approved; its achievements in giving prosperity to the country and
peaceful government to the island possessions were recounted; the
protective tariff, the gold standard, an isthmian canal, the improvement
of the army and navy, the continuation of civil service reform and a
vigorous foreign policy,--on all these the party utterance was that of
other days. Surprisingly little was said upon the subject of the
regulation of corporations. The few steps already taken were approved,
but as to the future, the platform was almost colorless:
Combinations of capital and of labor are the results of the
economic movement of the age, but neither must be permitted to
infringe upon the rights and interests of the people. Such
combinations, when lawfully formed for lawful purposes, are
alike entitled to the protection of the laws, but both are
subject to the laws, and neither can be permitted to break them.
The Democratic convention met in St. Louis on July 6, and the
excitement which marked its proceedings compensated for the lack of
interest at the Republican meeting. As drawn up by a sub-committee of
the Committee on Resolutions, the platform was, in many of its planks,
a distinct return to the programs of the days before 1896. It urged a
reduction of the tariff, generous pensions and civil service reform,
together with the enforcement of the anti-trust laws and the popular
election of senators. In the main, it was devoted to a condemnation
of the existing Republican administration, which it denounced as
"spasmodic, erratic, sensational, spectacular and arbitrary." It also
contained a paragraph declaring that the question of the money standard
had ceased to be an issue, on the ground that recent discoveries of
gold had enormously increased the supply of currency in the country.
Bryan did not approve. With characteristic energy he threw himself into
an all-night fight in the Committee in behalf of a silver plank. His
defeat indicated that the convention was in the hands of his opponents
and the platform as adopted contained no reference to the currency.
The delegates had, in fact, come to the meeting with the distinct
purpose of returning to the "safe and sane" democracy of Grover
Cleveland. To that end, the platform was to drop the silver issue and
Bryan was to be replaced by a more conservative leader. The radical
forces centered their strength upon William R. Hearst, but they were in
a distinct minority, and in the end, the Cleveland wing succeeded in
nominating Judge Alton B. Parker of New York. As soon as he was
notified of his nomination, Judge Parker telegraphed to the convention
that he regarded the gold standard as irrevocably established and that
he must decline to be the party candidate if his attitude on the
currency was unsatisfactory to the delegates. Thereupon the convention
replied that the platform was silent on the question of a monetary
standard because it was not regarded as a campaign issue. Parker was
satisfied with the reply, and the last word was written upon a question
that had disturbed politics for many years.
The succeeding campaign was unusually listless. Parker did not inspire
enthusiasm, although a man of undoubted integrity and ability, and the
personality of Roosevelt was the controlling force. Only at the close
of the canvass did a passing interest appear in some charges made by
Parker. He called attention to the fact that Secretary Cortelyou of the
Department of Commerce and Labor had been charged with the duty of
examining the acts of corporations and had then resigned to become
chairman of the National Republican Committee. Parker insinuated that
Cortelyou was using information about corporate misdoing, which he had
discovered, in order to force large contributions from the business
interests. He also declared that the Republican campaign was being
financed by the corporations. Roosevelt did not answer the charges
until three days before the election, and then he asserted that the
statements made by Parker were "unqualifiedly and atrociously false."
Later investigations have shown that in general Parker was correct in
his complaint as to the activities of the corporations, although he
would have found difficulty in proving his charges in detail. The same
investigations, however, indicated that some of the Democratic campaign
fund had come from similar sources.
[Illustration:
Election of 1904 by Counties]
The election resulted in the choice of President Roosevelt, whose
popular vote was 7,600,000 to Parker's 5,000,000. In the more populous
sections of the country, which were normally Republican, the party vote
scarcely exceeded that of 1900, but in the Far West, the increases were
notable. Beyond the Mississippi River, except in the southern states,
hardly a county gave a majority for Parker, showing that the region
which had gone to Bryan in 1896 was substantially solid for Roosevelt.
Indeed, the policies to which Roosevelt was committed bore a greater
resemblance to the principles of Bryan than to the _laissez faire_
philosophy to which many important Republican leaders adhered. Despite
their dissent, however, his victory in the election was so overwhelming
that he could carry out his program with the irresistible pressure of
public opinion behind him.
During the campaign year, the Commissioner of Corporations was busy
investigating the activities of the so-called "beef-trust," and a suit
against the combination was pressed to a successful conclusion in
January, 1905. In its decision in the case (Swift & Company _v._ United
States), the Supreme Court dwelt at some length on the charges made
against the Company. A dominant proportion--six-tenths--of the dealers
in fresh meat in the United States were alleged to have agreed not to
bid against one another in the live-stock markets; to restrict the
output of meat in order to raise prices; to keep a black-list; and to
get illegal rates from the railroads to the exclusion of competitors.
To the objection of the members of the trust that the charges against
them were general and did not set forth any specific facts, the Court
retorted that the scheme alleged was so vast as to present a new
problem in pleading. The decision was against the combination, which
was ordered to dissolve. The publicity given to the case and to the
methods of the meat packers assisted in the passage of legislation
requiring government inspection of meats.
An unexpected phase of the Sherman act appeared in 1908, in the case
Loewe _v._ Lawlor. The American Federation of Labor, acting through its
official organ, had declared a boycott against D.E. Loewe, a hat
manufacturer of Danbury, Connecticut. The Court decided that a
combination of labor organizations designed to boycott a dealer's goods
was a combination in restraint of trade and that the manufacturer might
maintain an action against the Hatters' Union for damages.[5]
In the meantime, another prominent trust had played into the hands of
the administration. The American Sugar Refining Company imported large
amounts of raw sugar, on which it paid tariff duties. In November,
1907, it was discovered that the Company had tampered with the scales
on which the incoming sugar was weighed, in such a manner as to defraud
the government. In the resulting legal actions, over $4,000,000 were
recovered from the Company, criminal prosecutions were carried on
against the officials and employees, and several of them were
convicted. The close relation between the railroads and the great
corporations was indicated when the Standard Oil Company of Indiana was
brought into court on the charge of receiving rebates on petroleum
shipped over the Chicago and Alton Railroad. The decision by Judge K.M.
Landis was that the Company was guilty on 1,462 separate counts and
must pay a fine of $29,240,000. On appeal to a higher court the case
was dismissed, partly on a question concerning the meaning of the law.
The efforts of Roosevelt in the direction of control of the railroads
resembled his activities in relation to industrial combinations. A
variety of circumstances had combined to arouse a popular demand for
the reinforcement of existing legislation: the discovery of grave
abuses in connection with the transportation of petroleum; the
continuance of favoritism and rebating, together with increasing public
knowledge of their existence; the rise in freight rates; and the
consolidation of the railroads into a few large systems, with the
accompanying concentration of power in the hands of a small number of
persons. In his public speeches and in his messages to Congress in 1904
and 1905, President Roosevelt made himself the spokesman of the popular
will. In particular--and it was here that the conflict was destined to
rage--the President called for the transfer to the Interstate Commerce
Commission of the power to determine the rates which the roads should
be allowed to charge. The project was not a new one, having already
taken shape in previous years, but at no time was Congress prepared to
pass definite legislation. The reaction of the railroads to the rising
demand was energetic. A costly propaganda was entered upon designed to
prove to the public that the roads should be let alone. A powerful
lobby worked insistently upon Congress, first to prevent action and
later, when action was seen to be inevitable, to weaken the legislation
wherever possible. The railroad's campaign of popular education,
however, helped to convince the popular mind that new laws were needed,
and came coincidently with the disclosures of corporate mismanagement
and wrong-doing. The outcome was the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906.
Its major provisions were five in number. It enlarged the scope of the
Interstate Commerce Act so as to include control of express and
sleeping car companies, pipe lines, switches, spur tracks and
terminals. Free passes, which had hitherto been productive of much
favoritism and the source of political corruption, were strictly
forbidden, except to a few specified classes. The "commodity clause"
forbade railroads to carry goods, other than timber, in which they had
an interest, except such as they were going to use themselves. This
provision was designed mainly to check the activities of those
companies which owned both coal mines and railroads, and which used
their advantageous position to crush independent operators. Its force,
however, was largely nullified by subsequent decisions of the courts.
The Hepburn law also enabled the Commission to prescribe the methods of
book-keeping which the roads must follow, to call for monthly or
special reports and to employ examiners who should have access to the
books of the carriers. The roads were even denied the right to keep any
records except those approved by the Commission. These drastic features
of the law were due in part to the practices of certain roads which hid
away corrupt expenditures in their accounts in such a manner that
detection was almost impossible. Most important, however, among the
provisions of the Act was that in relation to rate-making, which not
only empowered the Commission to hear complaints that rates were unjust
or unreasonable, but even enabled it to determine what would be a just
and reasonable charge in the case, and to order the carrier complained
of to adhere to the new rate. The rate-making section of the Hepburn
Act immediately resulted in a large increase in the number of
complaints entered by shippers against the carriers. Previously, few
cases had been taken to the Commission--only 878 in eighteen
years--because relief was seldom obtained and then only at great cost
in time and money. Under the new law more than 1500 cases were entered
within two and a half years, and several thousand others were
informally settled out of court.
The example of the federal government in adopting restrictive railway
legislation was followed by the states, on a nation-wide scale. Hours
of labor were regulated, liability for accidents defined, railroad
commissions given larger powers, and freight and passenger rates
determined. The result was a tangle of local regulations, many of which
were designed to embarrass the roads and others of which were passed
with slight knowledge of the practical questions involved.
Aside from his connection with the anti-trust campaign and the movement
for railroad regulation, Roosevelt's most significant activities during
his second administration related to conservation. As early as 1880 the
Superintendent of the Census had called attention to the exhaustion of
the best public lands. The truth of his assertion had been exemplified
in the rush of settlers to Oklahoma when the former Indian Territory
was opened to settlement on April 22, 1889. At noon on that day the
blast of a cavalry bugle was the signal that any settler might enter
and stake out his claim. On foot, on fleet horses, in primitive wagons,
an excited, jostling mob rushed toward those lands that seemed most
desirable. Trains were crowded to the roofs; tools, furniture, and
portable houses were carried in from Texas, Nebraska and Kansas. By
nightfall a stretch of waving prairie became Gruthrie, with a
population of 10,000 persons; by the evening of the first day Oklahoma
possessed a population of 50,000; twenty years later it had over a
million and a half, contained flourishing cities, many public
enterprises, and a beautiful state university.
The fact that desirable land was becoming so rare called attention to
the waste and dishonesty in connection with our public land system. In
his annual report for 1884 the Secretary of the Interior had complained
that large amounts of land had been acquired under fictitious names or
by persons employed for the purpose. Their holdings were then passed
over to speculators who retained huge areas for a rising market.
Railroads had kept lands granted to them, without fulfilling the
conditions of the grants. Titled Englishmen and English land companies
had gained control of tracts of unbelievable size, one of them being
estimated at 3,000,000 acres. The history of the disposal of the public
land had almost been duplicated in the history of the forest-bearing
public domain, except that measures had earlier been taken to conserve
the remnant of the once magnificent supply of standing timber. An act
of 1891 had enabled the president to set apart as public reservations
any lands bearing forests. All the presidents, from Harrison down, had
availed themselves of their power, and had established great numbers of
reservations, most of them in states west of the Mississippi.[6]
A few far-sighted individuals had long urged caution in the disposal of
the public resources. Some beginnings in fact had already been made in
the Division of Forestry in the Department of Agriculture, where
Clifford Pinchot was actively interested in forest preservation. In
1901 and later his functions had been expanded, and the forestry
service had taken up protection against fire, the sale of timber, and
reforestation. In 1907 President Roosevelt appointed a commission to
study the inland waterways, which after careful investigation
recommended a convention for the discussion of conservation problems.
Thereupon the President invited the governors of the states to
Washington for a conference, at which conservation questions were
thoroughly discussed. The resulting recommendations composed a
complete, although general plan of reform: the natural resources of the
country to be used for the prosperity of the American people;
reclamation of arid lands; conservation of forests, minerals and
water-power; the protection of the sources of the rivers; and
cooperation between Congress and the states in developing a
conservation program. A National Conservation Commission was later
appointed which coordinated the work of organizing the movement, and
made an exhaustive inventory of the nation's natural resources.
The conservation movement also called attention to the possibilities of
the arid region between the western parts of Kansas, Nebraska and the
Dakotas, and the eastern border of California. Within this vast area
were large tracts of land that would be fertile if sufficiently
supplied with water. The most important legislation in a series of acts
designed to meet this need was the Reclamation Act of 1902. Under its
provisions the federal government set aside the proceeds of the sale of
public land in sixteen states and territories as a fund for irrigation
work. With the resources thus obtained, water powers were developed,
reservoirs built and large tracts supplied with water. Private
companies and western states also carried out numerous projects. The
Department of Agriculture after its establishment in 1889 also
conducted many undertakings which, in effect, were conservation
enterprises. It helped educate the American farmer in scientific
methods, sought new crops in every corner of the globe, discovered and
circulated means of combating diseases and insects, studied soils,
distributed seeds and gathered statistics. In the arid and semi-arid
regions the discovery of dry farming was of great value. This consists
of planting the seed deep and keeping a mulch of dust on the surface by
frequent cultivation, in order to retard the evaporation of the
moisture in the ground underneath.[7]
Nothing can be more apparent than the complete change of position which
was brought about during the eight years after the death of President
McKinley. At the end of that period, both the industrial corporations
and the railways were on the defensive, and the public had secured the
whip hand. Industry, especially the railroads, was tamed and
hobbled--some thought, crippled. Many factors contributed to the
revolution. President Roosevelt was its most active agent, to be
sure,--its "gigantic advertiser" and popularizer. But it could hardly
have taken place--at least at the time and in the way it did--without
the great upheaval of 1896, without the publicity which the "muck-rake"
magazines and daily newspapers were able to offer, without the
industrial consolidations of 1898 and later, and without the refusal of
industry and the railways to obey earlier and less drastic laws, and
their skilled and insistent attempts to find loop-holes in legislation.
From the standpoint of politics, the effect of the Roosevelt
administrations was notable. As has been seen, the Republican party had
become largely the party of the business and commercial classes,
conservative and unyielding to the new demands of the late nineteenth
century. Its leadership had been sharply challenged by the forces of
unrest in 1896. On an issue other than a monetary one, the success of
Bryan would have been possible. The failure of the attempt to get
control of the federal government in the interest of the Populist
program was only a temporary defeat, for the revival of unrest,
although checked by the war with Spain, was sure soon to reappear. In
President Roosevelt, the forces of discontent, especially in the Middle
and Far West, saw their hoped-for champion, and their support of him
was instant and complete. The dominant leadership and much of the rank
and file of the Republican party had become liberal. The situation was
anomalous, however, for no great political party can experience a
thorough-going change of philosophy in a few years. Only the future,
therefore, could tell whether the newer and more liberal element would
continue to control the party, or whether a reaction against its
leadership would take place.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
It is too early to expect a biography of Roosevelt which is informed
and critical, as well as sympathetic. The keenest judgment is to be
found in _Atlantic Monthly_ (CIX, 577), "Mr. Roosevelt." The following
are also available: L.F. Abbott, _Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt_
(1919); F.E. Leupp, _The Man Roosevelt_ (1904); W.R. Thayer, _Theodore
Roosevelt_ (1919); C.G. Washburn, _Theodore Roosevelt; the Logic of His
Career_ (1916). Roosevelt can be partly understood through a critical
reading of his writings, especially his _Addresses and Presidential
Messages_ (1904), and his _Autobiography_ (1913).
On the coal strike consult the _Autobiography_, and _Senate Reports_,
58th Congress, special session, Document No. 6 (Serial Number 4556),
the report of the President's Commission. The election of 1904 is
discussed in Latane, Croly and Stanwood: see also C.M. Pepper, _The
Life and Times of Henry Gassaway Davis_ (1920). The new railroad acts
are well discussed in W.Z. Ripley, _Railroads: Rates and Regulations_
(1912), and by F.H. Dixon in _Quarterly Journal of Economics_, XXI, 22.
The literature of conservation is very large. An excellent single
chapter is in Katherine Coman, _Industrial History of the United
States_ (rev. ed., 1910); C.R. Van Hise, _The Conservation of Natural
Resources in the United States_ (1913), is a standard work; R.P. Teele,
_Irrigation in the United States_ (1915), is detailed; for documents
concerning the conference of governors, _House of Representatives
Document_ No. 1425, 60th Congress, 2nd session (Serial Number 5538).
The anti-trust campaign is best followed in Theodore Roosevelt,
_Addresses and Presidential Messages_, and in the _Autobiography_. The
Northern Securities decision is in _United States Reports_, vol. 193,
p. 197.
* * * * *
[1] In view of the later activities of President Roosevelt, there is
point in the remark of a satirist that Roosevelt did carry out the
policies of McKinley--and bury them. _Atlantic Monthly_, CIX, 164.
[2] Above, p. 257.
[3] It was later denied that Baer made the statement, but a
photographic copy of the letter was printed in Lloyd, _Henry D. Lloyd_,
II, 190. See also Mitchell, _Organized Labor_, 384; Peck, _Twenty
Years_, 693-6.
[4] Rumor says that Roosevelt sent Elihu Root to the eminent financial
magnate, J.P. Morgan, with information of his intent to appoint the
Cleveland Commission, and that Morgan applied the pressure to the coal
operators.
[5] In 1917, fourteen years after Loewe's first suit, he recovered
damages from the Union.
[6] In 1918, 151 national forests aggregated 176,000,000 acres.
Secretary of the Interior, _Annual Report_, 1918, 61.
[7] The territory of Alaska contains immense stores of natural resources
which are being conserved with more wisdom than characterized the
disposal of our continental supplies. The area of the territory,
586,400 square miles, constitutes a, kingdom. It has uncounted wealth in
fish, furs, timber, coal and precious metals. At present the federal
government is building a railroad which will tap some of the resources
of the region. _Enc. Brit._, "Alaska."