THE TREND OF DIPLOMACY
After the international issues arising from the Civil War were settled,
and before foreign relations began to become more important late in the
nineties, our diplomatic history showed the same lack of definiteness
and continuity that stamped the history of politics during the same
years. Eleven different men held the post of Secretary of State during
the thirty-four years from 1865 to 1898, one of them, Blaine, serving
at two separate times. The political situation in Washington changed
frequently, few men of outstanding capacity as diplomatists were in the
cabinets, and most of the problems which arose were not such as would
excite the interest of great international minds. That any degree of
unity in our foreign relations was attained is due in part to the
continuous service of such men as A.A. Adee, who was connected with the
state department from 1878, and Professor John Bassett Moore, long in
the department and frequently available as a counselor.[1]
Even before the Civil War, Americans had been interested in the affairs
of the nations whose shores were touched by the Pacific Ocean.
Missionaries and traders had long visited China and Japan. During the
years when the transcontinental railroads were built, as has been seen,
the construction companies looked to China for a labor supply, and
there followed a stream of Chinese immigrants who were the cause of
a difficult international problem. Our relations with Japan were
extremely friendly. Until the middle of the nineteenth century the
Japanese had been almost completely cut off from the remainder of the
world, desiring neither to give to the rest of humanity nor to take
from them. In 1854 Commodore Matthew C. Perry of the United States
Navy had succeeded in obtaining permission for American ships to take
coal and provisions at two Japanese ports. Townsend Harris shortly
afterwards had been appointed consul-general to Japan and his knowledge
of the East and his tactful diplomacy had procured increased trade
rights and other privileges. In 1863 a Japanese prince had sought to
close the strait of Shimonoseki which connects the inland sea of Japan
with the outside ocean. American, French and Dutch vessels had been
fired upon, and eventually an international expedition had been sent to
open the strait by force. Seventeen ships of war had quickly brought
the prince to terms. An indemnity had been demanded, of which the
United States had received a share. The fund remained in the treasury
untouched until 1883 when it was returned to Japan. The latter received
the refund as "a strong manifestation of that spirit of justice and
equity which has always animated the United States in its relations
with Japan."
The purchase of Alaska in 1867, stretched a long, curved finger out
towards the Asiatic coast, but there was little interest in the new
acquisition and no knowledge of its size or resources.[2]
The first tangible and permanent indication that the United States
might extend its interests into the sphere of the Pacific Ocean
appeared as early as 1872, when an arrangement with a Samoan chief gave
us the right to use the harbor of Pagopago on the island of Tutuila.
Tutuila is far from American shores, being below the equator on the
under side of the world, but the harbor of Pagopago is an unusually
good one and its relation to the extension of American commerce in the
South Pacific was readily seen. Not long afterward, similar trading
privileges were granted to Germany and Great Britain. Conditions in the
islands had by no means been peaceful even before the advent of the
foreigners with their intrigues and jealousies, and in 1885 the
Germans, taking advantage of a native rebellion, hauled down the Samoan
flag on the government building in Apia and seemed about to take
control. In the following year, at the request of the Samoan king, the
American consul Greenebaum proclaimed a protectorate and hoisted the
United States flag. The act was unauthorized and was disavowed at once
by the government at Washington. In the hope of establishing order in
the islands, Bayard, Secretary of State in President Cleveland's first
administration, suggested a triple conference of Germany, Great Britain
and the United States in Washington. During a recess in the conference
a native rebellion overturned the Samoan government and Germany assumed
virtual control. While civil war raged among native factions, the
Germans landed armed forces for the protection of their interests. The
American and British governments, fearful of danger to their rights,
already had war vessels in the harbor of Apia and armed conflict seemed
almost inevitable when a sudden hurricane on March 16, 1889, destroyed
all the vessels except one. The _Calliope_, (English), steamed out to
sea in the teeth of the great storm and escaped in safety. In the face
of such a catastrophe all smaller ills were forgotten and peace reigned
for the moment in Samoa.
Meanwhile, just as Cleveland was retiring from office for the first
time, another conference of the three powers was arranged which
provided a somewhat complicated triple protectorate. After a few years
of quiet, another native insurrection called attention to the islands.
Cleveland was again in the presidential chair, and in a message to
Congress he expressed his belief that the United States had made a
mistake in departing from its century-old policy of avoiding entangling
alliances with foreign powers. A year later he returned to the subject
more earnestly than ever. A report from the Secretary of State
presented the history of our Samoan relations and ventured a judgment
that the only fruits which had fallen to the United States were
expense, responsibility and entanglement. The President thereupon
invited an expression of opinion from Congress on the advisability of
withdrawing from our engagements with the other powers. For the time
nothing came of Cleveland's recommendation, but the continuance of
native quarrels later necessitated another commission to the islands.
The American member reported that the harbor of Apia was full of war
vessels and the region about covered with armed men, but that "not the
sail or smoke of a single vessel of commerce was to be seen there or
about the coasts of these beautiful islands." In 1899, the triple
protectorate was abandoned, as it had complicated the task of governing
the islands. The United States received Tutuila with the harbor of
Pagopago, Germany took the remainder of the group, and England retired
altogether. The trend of Samoan relations was significant: our
connection with the islands began with the desire to possess a coaling
station; the possession first resulted in entanglements with other
nations, and later in the question whether we ought not to withdraw;
and eventually we withdrew from some of the responsibilities, but not
from all. Despite its traditional policy of not contracting entangling
alliances, the United States was in the Pacific to stay.
When Cleveland came into power the first time, he found a long-standing
disagreement with Canada over the fisheries of the northeastern coast.
An arrangement which had resulted from the Treaty of Washington in 1871
came to an end in 1885, and the rights of American fishermen in
Canadian waters then rested upon a treaty of 1818. This treaty was
inadequate owing to various changes which had taken place during the
nearly seventy years that had elapsed since it was drawn up. Several
difficulties lay in the way of the arrangement of a new treaty, an
important one being the readiness of the Republican Senate to embarrass
the President and thus discredit his administration. Matters came to a
critical point in 1886 when Canadian officials seized two American
vessels engaged in deep-sea fishing. Cleveland then arranged a treaty
which provided for reciprocal favors, and when the Senate withheld its
assent the administration made a temporary agreement, (_modus
vivendi_), under which American ships were allowed to purchase bait and
supplies and to use Canadian bays and harbors by paying a license
fee.[3]
The peculiar geographical configuration of Alaska was, meanwhile,
bringing the United States into another diplomatic controversy. An arm
or peninsula of the possession extends far out into the Pacific and is
continued by the Aleutian Islands, which resemble a series of
stepping-stones reaching toward Siberia.[4] The Bering Sea is almost
enclosed by Alaska and the Islands. Within the Sea and particularly on
the islands of St. Paul and St. George in the Pribilof group, large
numbers of seals gathered during the spring and summer to rear their
young. In the autumn the herds migrated to the south, passing out
through the narrow straits between the members of the Aleutian group,
and were particularly open to attack at these points. As early as 1870
the United States government leased the privilege of hunting fur seals
on St. Paul and St. George to the Alaska Commercial Company, but the
business was so attractive that vessels came to the Aleutian straits
from many parts of the Pacific, and it looked as if the United States
must choose between the annihilation of the herds and the adoption of
some means for protecting them. The revenue service thereupon began the
seizure in 1886 of British sealing vessels, taking three in that year
and six during the next. The British government protested against the
seizures on the ground that they had taken place more than three miles
from shore--three miles being the limit to the jurisdiction of any
nation, according to international law. The Alaskan Court which upheld
the seizures justified itself by the claim that the whole Bering Sea
was part of the territory of Alaska and thus was comparable to a harbor
or closed sea (_mare clausum_), but Secretary Blaine disavowed this
contention. The United States then requested the governments of several
European countries, together with Japan, to cooperate for the better
protection of the fisheries, but no results were reached.
Continuance of the seizures in 1889 brought renewed protests from Lord
Salisbury, who was in charge of foreign affairs. Blaine retorted that
the destruction of the herds was _contra bonos mores_ and that it was
no more defensible even outside the three mile limit than destructive
fishing on the banks of Newfoundland by the explosion of dynamite would
be. Lord Salisbury replied that fur seals were wild animals, _ferae
naturae_, and not the property of any individual until captured. An
extended diplomatic correspondence ensued, which resulted in a treaty
of arbitration in 1892.[5]
A tribunal of seven arbitrators was established, two appointed by the
Queen of England, two by the President, and one each by the rulers of
France, Italy and Sweden and Norway, the last two being under one
sovereign at that time. Several questions were submitted to the
tribunal. What exclusive rights does the United States have in the
Bering Sea? What right of protection or property does the United States
have in the seals frequenting the islands in the Sea? If the United
States has no exclusive rights over the seals, what steps ought to be
taken to protect them? Great Britain also presented to the arbitrators
the question whether the seizures of seal-hunting ships had been made
under the authority of the government of the United States.
The decisions were uniformly against the American contention. It was
decided that our jurisdiction in the Bering Sea did not extend beyond
the three mile limit and that therefore the United States had no right
of protection or property in the seals. A set of regulations for the
protection of the herds was also drawn up. Another negotiation resulted
in the payment of $473,000 damages by the United States for the illegal
seizures of British sealers.[6]
Relations with the Latin American countries south of the Mexican border
had been unstable since the Mexican War, an unhappy controversy that
left an ineradicable prejudice against us. John Quincy Adams and Henry
Clay had hoped for a friendly union of the nations of North and South
America, led by the United States, but this ideal had turned out to
have no more substance than a vision. Moreover, the increasing trade
activity of Great Britain and later of Germany had made a commercial
bond of connection between South America and Europe which was, perhaps,
stronger than that which the United States had established. Yet some
progress was made. Disputes between European governments and the
governments of Latin American countries were frequently referred to the
United States for arbitration. An old claim of some British subjects,
for example, against Colombia was submitted for settlement in 1872 to
commissioners of whom the United States minister at Bogota was the most
important. The problem was studied with great care and the award was
satisfactory to both sides. In 1876 a territorial dispute between
Argentina and Paraguay was referred to the President of the United
States. In the case of a boundary controversy between Costa Rica and
Nicaragua, President Cleveland appointed an arbitrator; Argentina and
Brazil presented a similar problem which received the attention of
Presidents Harrison and Cleveland.
It fell to James. G. Blaine to revive the idea of a Pan-American
conference which had been first conceived by Adams and Clay. As a
diplomat, Blaine was possessed of outstanding patriotism and
enthusiastic imagination, even if not of vast technical capacity or of
an international mind. As Secretary of State under President Garfield
in 1881 he invited the Latin American countries to share with the
United States in a conference for the discussion of arbitration. The
early death of Garfield and the ensuing change in the state department
resulted in the abandonment of the project for the time being. Blaine,
however, and other interested persons continued to press the plan and
in 1888 Congress authorized the President to invite the governments of
the Latin American countries to send delegates to a conference to be
held in Washington in the following year. By that time President
Harrison was in power. Blaine was again Secretary of State and was
chosen president of the conference. Among the subjects for discussion
were the preservation of peace, the creation of a customs union,
uniform systems of weights, measures and coinage, and the promotion of
frequent inter-communication among the American states. Little was
accomplished, beyond a few recommendations, except the establishment of
the International Bureau of American Republics. This was to have no
governmental power, but was to be supported by the various nations
concerned and was to collect and disseminate information about their
laws, products and customs. The Bureau has become permanent under the
name Pan American Union and is a factor in the preservation of friendly
relations among the American republics. The reciprocity measure which
Blaine pressed upon Congress during the pendency of the McKinley tariff
bill was designed partly to further Pan-American intercourse.
In the case of a disagreement with Chile, Blaine was less successful. A
revolution against the Chilean President, Balmaceda, resulted in the
triumph of the insurgents in 1891. The American minister to Chile was
Patrick Egan, an Irish agitator who sympathized with President
Balmaceda against the revolutionists and who was _persona non grata_ to
the strong English and German colonies there. While Chilean affairs
were in this strained condition, the revolutionists sent a vessel, the
_Itata_, to San Diego in California for military supplies, and American
authorities seized it for violating the neutrality laws. While the
vessel was in the hands of our officers, the Chileans took control of
it and made their escape. The cruiser _Charleston_ was sent in pursuit
and thereupon the revolutionists surrendered the _Itata_. Not long
afterward, however, a United States Court decided that the pursuit had
been without justification under international law and ordered the
release of the _Itata_. The result was that the United States seemed to
have been over-ready to take sides against the revolutionists, and the
latter became increasingly hostile to Americans.
Relations finally broke under the strain of a street quarrel in the
city of Valparaiso in the fall of 1891. A number of sailors from the
United States ship _Baltimore_ were on shore leave and fell in with
some Chilean sailors in a saloon. A quarrel resulted--just how it
originated and just who was the aggressor could not be determined--but
at any rate the Americans were outnumbered and one was killed. The
administration pressed the case with vigor, declining to look upon the
incident as a sailors' brawl and considering it a hostile attack upon
the wearers of an American uniform. For a time the outbreak of war was
considered likely, but eventually Chile yielded, apologized for its
acts and made a financial return for the victims of the riot. Later
students of Chilean relations have not praised Egan as minister or
Blaine's conduct of the negotiations, but it is fair to note that the
Chileans were prejudiced against the American Secretary of State
because of an earlier controversy in which he had sided against them,
and that the affair was complicated by the presence of powerful
European colonies and by the passions which the revolution had aroused.
Blaine was compelled to face another embarrassing situation in dealing
with Italy in 1891-1892. In October, 1890, the chief of police of New
Orleans, D.C. Hennessy, had been murdered and circumstances indicated
that the deed had been committed by members of an Italian secret
society called the Mafia. A number of Italians were arrested, of whom
three were acquitted, five were held for trial and three were to be
tried a second time. One morning a mob of citizens, believing that
there had been a miscarriage of justice, seized the eleven and killed
all of them. The Italian government immediately demanded protection for
Italians in New Orleans, as well as punishment of the persons concerned
in the attack, and later somewhat impatiently demanded federal
assurance that the guilty parties would be brought to trial and an
acknowledgment that an indemnity was due to the relatives of the
victims of the mob. Failing to obtain these guarantees, the Italian
government withdrew its minister. When a grand jury in New Orleans
investigated the affair it excused the participants and none of them
was brought to trial.
The government at Washington was hampered by the fact that judicial
action in such a case lies with the individual state under our form of
government, whereas diplomatic action is of course entirely federal. If
the states are tardy or derelict in action, the national government is
almost helpless. President Harrison urged Congress to make offenses
against the treaty rights of foreigners cognizable in the federal
courts, but this was never done. Diplomatic activity, however, brought
better results, and an expression of regret on the part of the United
States, together with the payment of an indemnity of $24,000 closed the
incident.
Among the many troublesome questions that faced President Cleveland
when he entered upon the Presidency in 1893 for the second time, the
status of the Hawaiian Islands was important. Since the development of
the Pacific Coast of the United States in the forties and fifties,
there had been a growing trade between the islands and this country.
Reciprocity and even annexation had been projected. In 1875 a
reciprocity arrangement was consummated, a part of which was a
stipulation that none of the territory of Hawaii should be leased or
disposed of to any other power. In this way a suggestion was made of
ultimate annexation. Moreover the commercial results of the treaty were
such as to make a friendly connection with the United States a matter
of moment to Hawaii. The value of Hawaiian exports had increased,
government revenues enlarged, and many public improvements had been
made. In 1884 the grant of Pearl Harbor to the United States as a naval
station made still another bond of connection between the islands and
their big neighbor.
The King of Hawaii during this period of prosperity was Kalakaua.
During a visit to the United States, and later during a tour of the
world he was royally received, whereupon he returned to his island
kingdom with expanded theories of the position which a king should
occupy. Unhappily he dwelt more on the pleasures which a king might
enjoy than upon the obligations of a ruler to his people. At his death
in 1891 Princess Liliuokalani became Queen and at once gave evidence of
a disposition to rule autocratically. Because of her attempts to revise
the Hawaiian system of government so as to increase the power of the
crown, the more influential citizens assembled, appointed a committee
of public safety and organized for resistance. On January 17, 1893, the
revolutionary elements gathered, proclaimed the end of the monarchical
regime and established a provisional government under the leadership of
Judge S.B. Dole. The new authorities immediately proposed annexation to
the United States and a treaty was promptly drawn up in accord with
President Harrison's wishes, and presented to the Senate. At this point
the Harrison administration ended and Cleveland became President.
Cleveland immediately withdrew the treaty for examination and sent
James H. Blount to the islands to investigate the relation of American
officials to the recent revolution. The appointment of Blount was made
without the advice and consent of the Senate and was denounced by the
President's enemies, although such special missions have been more or
less common since the beginning of our history.[7] Blount reported
that the United States minister to Hawaii, J.L. Stevens, had for some
time been favorably disposed to a revolution in the islands and had
written almost a year before that event asking how far he and the naval
commander might deviate from established international rules in the
contingency of a rebellion. "The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe,"
Stevens had written to the State Department, early in 1893, "and this
is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it." Blount also
informed the President that the monarchy had been overturned with the
active aid of Stevens and through the intimidation caused by the
presence of an armed naval force of the United States.
The blunt language which Cleveland employed in his message to Congress
on the subject, left no doubt about his opinion of the transaction.
"The control of both sides of a bargain acquired in such a manner is
called by a familiar and unpleasant name when found in private
transactions." Believing that an injustice had been done and that the
only honorable course was to undo the wrong, he sent A.S. Willis as
successor to Stevens to express the President's regret and to attempt
to make amends. One of the conditions however which President Cleveland
placed upon the restoration of the Queen was a promise of amnesty to
all who had shared in the revolution. The Queen was at first unwilling
to bind herself and when she later agreed, a new obstacle appeared in
the refusal of the provisional government to surrender its authority.
Indeed it began to appear that the President's sense of justice was
forcing him to attempt the impossible. The provisional government had
already been recognized by the United States and by other powers, the
deposition of the Queen was a _fait accompli_ and her restoration
partook of the nature of turning back the clock. Moreover, force would
have to be used to supplant the revolutionary authorities,--a task for
which Americans had no desire. The President, in fact, had exhausted
his powers and now referred the whole affair to Congress. The House
condemned Stevens for assisting in the overturn of the monarchy and
went on record as opposed to either annexation or an American
protectorate. Sentiment was less nearly uniform in the upper chamber.
The Democrats tended to uphold the President, the Republicans to
condemn him. Although a majority of the committee on foreign relations
exonerated Stevens, yet no opposition appeared to a declaration which
passed the Senate on May 31, 1894, maintaining that the United States
ought not to intervene in Hawaiian affairs and that interference by any
other government would be regarded as unfriendly to this country.
In the outcome, these events merely delayed annexation; they could not
prevent it. In Hawaii the more influential and the propertied classes
supported the revolution and desired annexation. In the United States
the desire for expansion was stimulated by the fear that some other
nation might seize the prize. The military and naval situation in 1898
increased the demand for annexation, and in the summer of that year the
acquisition was completed by means of a joint resolution of the two
houses of Congress.[8] While negotiations were in progress Japan
protested that her interests in the Pacific were endangered. Assurances
were given, however, that Japanese treaty rights would not be affected
by the annexation and the protest was withdrawn. The United States was
now "half-way across to Asia."
Most dangerous in its possibilities was the controversy with Great
Britain over the boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela. British
Guiana lies on the northern coast of South America, next to Venezuela
and extends inland, with its western boundary roughly parallel to the
valley of the Orinoco River. A long-standing disagreement had existed
about the exact position of the line between the two countries--a
disagreement which harked back to the claims of the Dutch, who had
acquired Guiana in 1613 and had turned it over to the British in 1814.
In 1840 England commissioned a surveyor named Schomburgk to fix the
boundary but his decision was objected to by the Venezuelans who
claimed that he included a great area that rightfully belonged to them.
Gradually the British claims included more and more of the territory
claimed by Venezuela, and the discovery of gold in the disputed region
not only drew attention to the necessity of a settlement of the
boundary but also attracted prospectors who began to occupy the land.
In 1876 Venezuela began negotiations for some means of deciding the
dispute and came to the conclusion that arbitration was her only
recourse. On the refusal of Great Britain to heed her protests, the
Venezuelan government suspended diplomatic relations in 1887, although
the United States attempted to prevent a rupture by suggesting the
submission of the difference to an arbitral tribunal. This offer was
not accepted by Great Britain, and repeated exertions on the part of
both Venezuela and the United States at later times failed to produce
better results. When Cleveland returned to the presidency in 1893 he
again became interested in the Venezuelan matter and Secretary of State
Gresham urged the attention of the British government to the
desirability of arbitration.
President Cleveland was a man of great courage and had a very keen
sense of justice. In his opinion a great nation was playing the bully
with a small one, and the injustice stirred his feelings to the depths.
With the President's approval Secretary Olney, who had succeeded
Gresham on the death of the latter, drew up an exposition of the Monroe
doctrine which was communicated to Lord Salisbury. This despatch, which
was dated July 20, 1895, brought matters to a climax. In brief the
administration took the position that under the Monroe doctrine the
United States adhered to the principle that no European nation might
deprive an American state of the right and power of self-government.
This had been established American policy for seventy years. The
Venezuelan boundary controversy was within the scope of the doctrine
since Great Britain asserted title to disputed territory, substantially
appropriating it, and refused to have her title investigated. At the
same time Secretary Olney disclaimed any intention of taking sides in
the controversy until the merits of the case were authoritatively
ascertained, although the general argument of the despatch seemed to
place the United States on the side of Venezuela. Moreover, Secretary
Olney adopted a swaggering and aggressive, not to say truculent tone.
He drew a contrast between monarchical Europe and self-governing
America, particularly the United States, which "has furnished to the
world the most conspicuous ... example ... of the excellence of free
institutions, whether from the standpoint of national greatness or of
individual happiness." The United States, he asserted, is "practically
sovereign on this continent" because "wisdom and justice and equity are
the invariable characteristics" of its dealings with others and because
"its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it
master of the situation ... as against any or all other powers."
Lord Salisbury did not reply to Secretary Olney for more than four
months. He then asserted that President Monroe's message of 1823 had
laid down two propositions: that America was no longer to be looked
upon as a field for European colonization; and that Europe must not
attempt to extend its political system to America, or to control the
political condition of any of the American communities. In Lord
Salisbury's opinion Olney was asserting that the Monroe doctrine
conferred upon the United States the right to demand arbitration
whenever a European power had a frontier difference with a South
American community. He suggested that the Monroe doctrine was not a
part of international law, that the boundary dispute had no relation to
the dangers which President Monroe had feared and that the United
States had no "apparent practical concern" with the controversy between
Great Britain and Venezuela. He also raised some objections to
arbitration as a method of settling disputes and asserted the
willingness of Great Britain to arbitrate her title to part of the
lands claimed. The remainder, he declared, could be thought of as
Venezuelan only by extravagant claims based on the pretensions of
Spanish officials in the last century. This area he expressly refused
to submit to arbitration. The language of the Salisbury note was
diplomatically correct, a fact which did not detract from the effect of
the patronizing tone which characterized it.
President Cleveland doggedly proceeded with his demands. On December
17, (1895), he laid before Congress the correspondence with Lord
Salisbury, together with a statement of his own position on the matter.
Disclaiming any preconceived conviction as to the merits of the
dispute, he nevertheless deprecated the possibility that a European
country, by extending its boundaries, might take possession of the
territory of one of its neighbors. Inasmuch as Great Britain had
refused to submit to arbitration, he believed it incumbent upon the
United States to take measures to determine the true divisional line.
He suggested therefore that Congress empower the executive to appoint a
commission to investigate and report. His closing words were so grave
as to arouse the country to a realization of the dangerous pitch to
which negotiations had mounted:
When such report is made and accepted it will in my opinion be the
duty of the United States to resist ... the appropriation by Great
Britain of any ... territory which after investigation we have
determined of right belongs to Venezuela. In making these
recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred,
and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow. I am
nevertheless firm in my conviction that while it is a grievous thing
to contemplate the two great English-speaking peoples ... as being
otherwise than friendly ... there is no calamity ... which equals
that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice.
Congress at once acceded to Cleveland's wishes and appropriated
$100,000 for the proposed investigation. For a brief moment neither
Great Britain nor America quite realized the meaning of the President's
warlike utterance. In America it had generally been felt previously
that his foreign policy was conciliatory rather than aggressive and,
besides, the Venezuelan dispute had but little occupied popular
attention. When it became evident that war was a definite possibility,
public interest followed every step with anxiety. Newspaper sentiment
divided. The press generally judged Cleveland's stand strong and
"American." On the other hand, a few periodicals like the _Nation_
insinuated that the President was actuated by the desire to make
political capital for a third term campaign and characterized his
action as "criminally rash and insensate," "ignorant and reckless,"
"impudent and insulting." Influential citizens in both countries made
energetic attempts to prevent anything that might make war inevitable.
The Prince of Wales and Lord Roseberry threw their influence on the
side of conciliation. A.J. Balfour declared that a conflict with the
United States would carry something of the "horror of civil war" and
looked forward to the time when the country would "feel that they and
we have a common duty to perform, a common office to fulfill among the
nations of the world."
The President appointed a commission which set to work to obtain the
information necessary for a judicial settlement of the boundary, and
both Great Britain and Venezuela tactfully expressed a readiness to
cooperate. Their labors, however, were brought to a close by a treaty
between the two disputants providing for arbitration. A prominent
feature of the treaty was an agreement that fifty years' control or
settlement of an area should be sufficient to constitute a title, a
provision which withdrew from consideration much of the territory to
which Venezuela had laid claim. In October, 1899, the arbitration was
concluded. The award did not meet the extreme claims of either party,
but gave Great Britain the larger share of the disputed area, although
assigning the entire mouth of the Orinoco River to Venezuela.
Besides giving new life to the Monroe doctrine as an integral part of
our foreign policy, the incident served to illustrate the dangers of
settling international disputes in haphazard fashion. In January, 1897,
therefore, Secretary Olney and the British Ambassador at Washington,
Sir Julian Pauncefote, negotiated a general treaty for the settlement
of disputes between the two countries by arbitration. Even with the
example of the possible consequences of the Venezuelan controversy
before it, however, the Senate failed to see the necessity for such an
expedient, defeated the treaty by a narrow margin and left the greatest
problem of international relations--the settlement of controversies on
the basis of justice rather than force--to the care of a future
generation.
On the whole, as has already been noted, the history of American
diplomacy from 1877 to 1897 is scarcely more than an account of a
series of unrelated incidents. Not only did the foreign policy of
Blaine differ sharply from that of Cleveland, but there was no great
question upon which public interest came to a focus, except temporarily
over the Venezuelan matter, and no lesser problems that continued long
enough to challenge attention to the fact that they remained unsolved.
There were visible, nevertheless, several important tendencies. Our
attitude toward Samoa and Hawaii indicated that the instinctive desire
to annex territory had not disappeared with the rounding out of the
continental possessions of the United States; American interest in
arbitration as a method of settling disputes was expressed again and
again; the place of the Monroe doctrine in American international
policy was clearly shown; and the determination of the United States to
be heard in all affairs that touched her interests was demonstrated
without any possibility of doubt.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
The most complete and reliable authority is J.B. Moore, _A Digest of
International Law_ (8 vols. 1906), by one who was intimately connected
with many of the incidents of which he wrote; the text of the treaties
is in W.M. Malloy, _Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, etc.,
between the United States of America and other Powers_ (2 vols., 1910).
Valuable single volumes are: J.B. Moore, _American Diplomacy_ (1905);
and C.B. Fish, _American Diplomacy_ (1915). W.F. Johnson, _America's
Foreign Relations_ (2 vols., 1916), is interesting but somewhat marred
by the author's tendency to take sides on controversial points; see
also J.B. Henderson, _American Diplomatic Questions_ (1901). J.S.
Bassett, _Short History of the United States_ (1913), contains a brief
and compact chapter.
Essential material on particular incidents is found in the following.
On Japan, "Our War with One Gun" in _New England Magazine_, XXVIII,
662; J.M. Callahan, _American Relations in the Pacific and the Far
East_ (1901); W.E. Griffis, _Townsend Harris_ (1896). On Samoa, J.W.
Foster, _American Diplomacy in the Orient_ (1903); R.L. Stevenson,
_Eight Years of Trouble in Samoa_ (1892). On the seal fisheries, J.W.
Foster, _Diplomatic Memoirs_ (2 vols., 1909). On Hawaii, Cleveland's
message in J.D. Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Presidents_,
IX, 460. On Venezuela, Grover Cleveland, _Presidential Problems_,
Chap. IV.
* * * * *
[1] The development of the United States as a commercial power was
seen in the increased use of consuls as agents for procuring and
publishing industrial and commercial information.
[2] Cf. Fish, _American Diplomacy_, 398.
[3] For later aspects of the controversy, see below, pp. 532-533.
[4] Cf. map p. 10.
[5] J.W. Foster, who was intimately connected with the case, suggests
that the defects in the American argument were due partly to following
briefs prepared by an agent of the Alaska Commercial Company in
Washington. The agent was interested in getting everything possible for
his company but his knowledge of the law in the case was slight. Cf.
Foster, _Memoirs_, II, 26 f.; Moore, _American Diplomacy_, 97-104.
[6] The attempts to protect the herds by government regulation failed
to have any important results. An international arrangement was made in
1911, but the slaughter had proceeded so far that grave question arose
whether any agreement would be effective short of absolute prohibition.
In 1912 Congress passed a law forbidding any killing on the land for a
term of five years; in 1917 when the restrictions were released the
herds had greatly increased. In 1918 the seals numbered 530,480.
_American Year Book_, 1918, 503-4.
[7] Cf. _Political Science Review_, Aug., 1916, 481-499.
[8] Cf. below, p. 387 ff. Hawaii was brought into the Union as a
territory in 1900.