Return of Yi Yong-ik.... Attack on Japanese Bank.... Government backs
down.... Roman Catholic troubles in Whang-hă Province.... trials at
Hă-ju.... difficulty settled.... Korean students to be sent to
Russia.... The Russian timber concession.... Russia enters
Yongampo.... Korean prophecies.... Japan, England and America urge
the opening of Yongampo.... Russia prevents it.... Russians exceed
limits of concession.... Japanese protest.... Port Nicholas....
Japanese suspend business in Seoul.... Korean pawn brokers stop
business.... Legation guards.... government protest against them....
fears of popular uprising.... native press incendiary.... fears of
trouble in the country....Foreigners threatened.
The year 1903 beheld the rapid culmination of the difficulties between
Japan and Russia. It had already become almost sure that war alone would
cut the Gordian knot, and if any more proof was necessary this year
supplied it.
Yi Yong-ik in Port Arthur received assurance from the Emperor that if he
returned he would be given a powerful guard, and in this he was
doubtless seconded by the Russians who could use him to better advantage
in Seoul than in Port Arthur. He telegraphed for 15,000 bags of Annam
rice and arrived in Chemulpo on the very day the rice came. It formed a
sort of peace offering which, in the temporary scarcity, was very
agreeable to the people. His return was the signal for a vigorous attack
upon Japanese interests. On the eleventh of the preceding September the
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs had issued an order prohibiting the
use of the Japanese bank notes, alleging that since they were not
government notes they were unsafe. This was a direct breach of faith,
because as we have seen the Japanese Bank had already obtained the full
consent of the government to issue and circulate these notes. It is
almost inconceivable that any man of ministerial rank would be so devoid
of ordinary common sense as to attempt such a thing as this. Of course
there was an instant and peremptory protest on the part of the Japanese
authorities and the government had to stultify itself by taking it all
back. The promise was made that the governors of the provinces would be
instructed to remove all objections to the circulation of the notes, but
the promise was never kept. Now on the seventeenth of January Yi
Yong-ik, who had but just returned, made a fierce attack upon the
Japanese bank and a note was sent from the Finance Department to that of
Foreign Affairs demanding by what right the latter had ventured to
interfere in the finances of the country. Cho Pyŭng-sik who had
reinstated the Japanese notes was dismissed from the Foreign Office and
everything fell into the hands of Yi Yong-ik. A few days later the Mayor
of Seoul posted a circular forbidding the use of these notes on pain of
severe punishment. This went all over the country and there was an
immediate run on the bank, which was tided over with the greatest
difficulty. Of course the Japanese were in a position to make reprisals,
and after a little pointed talk the bluster of the favorite subsided to
a weak whisper, and the authorities apologized in the most abject
manner. It should be noted that the Russians gave no help to Yi Yong-ik
when it came to the point of an actual breach with Japan.
For some time there had been great unrest throughout the province of
Whang-hă owing to the lawless acts of the Roman Catholic adherents
there. The matter was brought clearly before the notice of the
Government through American Protestant missionaries because many of the
Protestant native Christians had been involved in those troubles and had
been imprisoned, beaten, tortured and robbed by those who were avowedly
members of the Roman Church. A number of these lawless acts were
committed under the sign and seal of the Church itself. When the matter
became too notorious to escape action on the part of the Government a
native official named Yi Eung-ik was appointed as a special Commissioner
to go to Hă-ju, the capital of the province, and investigate the matter
thoroughly. Foreign representatives of both the Roman Catholics and of
the Protestants were present and the trial was instituted in a perfectly
fair and impartial manner. It was clear that the truth, the whole truth
and nothing but the truth was to be elicited by this trial and after
vain attempts to quash the indictment one of the French Catholic priests
left the place accompanied and followed by a considerable number of
those against whom there were most serious charges. These people
gathered at a certain town and assumed a threatening attitude toward the
Korean Government, but though all the foreign Roman Catholic
representatives refused to attend the trial of the dozen or more of
their adherents who had been arrested, the trial continued and charge
after charge of the most grievous nature was proved, one man being
convicted of murder. During the trial various attempts were made to
discredit the Commissioner but before the end of the trials his power
was greatly increased. The result was to put an end to the difficulties
and though those responsible for the outrages were never adequately
punished it is probable that the Korean Government sufficiently
demonstrated its purpose to deal with such matters in a strictly
impartial manner.
The great preponderance of Russian influence was manifested early in
1903 by the decision on the part of the Government to send a number of
young Koreans to Russia to study, but when it came to the point of
selecting the men it was found that there was no desire on the part of
the students to go. This was due in part to the feeling that Korean
students abroad are not looked after very carefully by the authorities
and there are long delays in, if not complete cessation of, transmission
of money for their support.
Early in the year it transpired that the Russians had obtained from the
Korean Emperor a concession to cut timber along the Yalu River. The
thing was done secretly and irregularly and the government never
received a tithe of the value of the concession. By this act the
government dispossessed itself of one of its finest sources of wealth
and sacrificed future millions for a few paltry thousand in hand, and a
promise to pay a share of the profits, though no provision was made for
giving the government an opportunity of watching the work in its own
interests. Soon after the Russians had begun to work the concession they
began to make advances for the obtaining of harbor facilities in
connection with it. The port of Yongampo was decided upon and the Korean
government was asked to allow the Russians the use of it for this
purpose. This created a very profound impression upon Japan and upon the
world at large. It was felt that this was giving Russia a foothold upon
the soil of Korea, and Russia’s history shows that, once gained, the
point would never be given up. The activity of Russia in the north gave
rise to the notion that Japanese influence was predominant in the
southern half of the peninsula and Russian in the northern half. This
gave birth to all sorts of rumors among the Korean people and the
ancient books were ransacked for prophecies that would fit the
situation. One of these is worth repeating since it illustrates very
perfectly the Korean tendency to consult some oracle in times of
national peril. This particular prophecy is supposed to say that “when
white pine-trees grow in Korea the northern half of the peninsula will
go to the Tartar and the southern half to the Shrimp.” Japan, from its
shape, is said to resemble a shrimp, while Tartar covers the Muscovite.
The people interpreted the “white pines” to refer to the telegraph
poles! And thus the prophecy was considered to mean that when Korea is
opened to foreign intercourse it will be divided between Russia and
Japan. It cannot be said that this caused any considerable stir among
the people and its only value lies in the certain indication that it
afforded of the general unrest and suspicion among them. As a whole the
attitude of the Korean has always been a rational and consistent one as
between Russia and Japan. He has a greater personal antipathy for the
latter because they have come into closer contact, but there is a
mysterious dread in his heart which warns him of the Russian. He will
never say which he would rather have in power here, but always says, “I
pray to be delivered from them both.”
Japan began to urge upon the government the necessity of opening
Yongampo to foreign trade, but Russia, of course, opposed this with all
her powers of persuasion. Great Britain and the United States joined in
urging the opening of the port. The United States had already arranged
for the opening of the port of Antung just opposite Yongampo, and for
the sake of trade it was highly desirable that a port on the Korean side
of the Yalu should be opened. It had no special reference to the Russian
occupation of the port, but as pressure was being brought to bear upon
the government to throw open the port it was considered an opportune
time to join forces in pushing for this desired end. And it was more for
the interest of Korea to do this than for any of the powers that were
urging it. Such an act would have been a check to Russian aggression and
would have rendered nugatory any ulterior plan she might have as regards
Korea. But the Russian power in Seoul was too great. It had not upheld
the cause of Yi Yong-ik in vain, and the government, while using very
specious language, withstood every attempt to secure the opening of the
port. At last the American Government modified its request and asked
that Wiju be opened, but to this Russia objected almost as strongly as
to the other. There can be little doubt that this uncompromising
attitude of Russia on the Korean border confirmed Japan in the position
she had doubtless already assumed. It was quite evident that the force
of arms was the only thing that would make Russia retire from Korean
soil.
All through the summer complaints came in from the north that the
Russians were working their own will along the northern border and
taking every advantage of the loose language in which the agreement had
been worded. Again and again information came up to Seoul that the
Russian agents were going outside the limits specified in the bond but
there was no one to check it. It was impossible to police the territory
encroached upon and there is reason to believe that the Government
chafed under the imposition. At least the telegraph lines which the
Russians erected entirely without warrant were repeatedly torn down by
emissaries of the Government and apparently without check from the
central authorities.
In the Summer when the text of the proposed Agreement between Russia and
Korea anent Yongampo became public the Japanese Government made a strong
protest. She probably knew that this was a mere form but she owed it to
herself to file a protest against such suicidal action on the part of
Korea. The insolence of the Russians swelled to the point of renaming
Yongampo Port Nicholas.
In October the Japanese merchants in Seoul and other commercial centers
began calling in all outstanding moneys, with the evident expectation of
war. All brokers and loan associations closed their accounts and refused
to make further loans. It is more than probable that they had received
the hint that it might be well to suspend operations for the time being.
From this time until war was declared the people of Korea waited in
utmost suspense. They knew war only as a universal desolation. They had
no notion of any of the comparative amenities of modern warfare or the
immunities of noncombatants. War meant to them the breaking up of the
very foundations of society, and many a time the anxious inquiry was put
as to whether the war would probably be fought on Korean soil or in
Manchuria. Once more Korea found herself the “Shrimp between two whales”
and doubly afflicted in that whichever one should win she would in all
probability form part of the booty of the victor.
The year 1904, which will be recorded in history as one of the most
momentous in all the annals of the Far East, opened upon a very
unsatisfactory state of things in Korea. It had become as certain as any
future event can be that Japan and Russia would soon be at swords
points. The negotiations between these two powers were being carried on
in St. Petersburg and, as published later, were of the most
unsatisfactory nature. Japan was completing her arrangements for
striking the blow which fell on February the ninth. Of course these
plans were not made public but there was conflict in the very air and
all men were bracing themselves for the shock that they felt must soon
come. The action of Japanese money-lenders in suspending operations was
followed in January by the Korean pawn-brokers and at a season when such
action inflicted the greatest possible harm upon the poor people of the
capital, who find it impossible to live without temporarily
hypothecating a portion of their personal effects. This together with
the excessive cold aroused a spirit of unrest which came near assuming
dangerous proportions. Some of the native papers were so unwise as to
fan the embers by dilating upon the hard conditions under which the
Koreans labored. Their sharpest comments were directed at the Government
but their tendency was to incite the populace against foreigners.
All through the month the various foreign legations were bringing in
guards to protect their legations and their respective nationals and
this very natural and entirely justifiable action was resented by the
Government. It protested time and again against the presence of foreign
troops, as if their coming were in some way an insult to Korea. The
officials in charge thereby showed their utter incompetence to diagnose
the situation correctly. It was well known that the disaffection among
the Korean troops in Seoul was great and that the dangerous element
known as the Peddlars Guild was capable of any excesses. The unfriendly
attitude of Yi Yong-ik and Yi Keun-tăk towards western foreigners,
excepting Russians and French, together with their more or less close
connection with the Peddlars was sufficient reason for the precautionary
measures that were adopted. But the native papers made matters worse by
ridiculing both the government and the army. At one time there was
considerable solicitude on the part of foreigners, not lest the Korean
populace itself would break into open revolt but lest some violent
faction would be encouraged by the authorities to make trouble; so
little confidence had they in the good sense of the court favorite. It
was fairly evident that in case of trouble the Japanese would very soon
hold the capital and it was feared that the violently pro-Russian
officials, despairing of protection at the hands of Russia, would cause
a general insurrection, hoping in the tumult to make good their escape.
It was felt that great precautions should be taken by foreigners not to
give any excuse for a popular uprising. The electric cars diminished
their speed so as to obviate the possibility of any accident, for even
the smallest casualty might form the match while would set the people on
fire.
But popular unrest was not confined to Seoul. A serious movement was
begun in the two southern provinces where, it was reported, hundreds of
the _ajuns_ or prefectural constables were preparing to lead a
formidable insurrection. The firm hold that these men have upon the
people made it not unlikely that it would prove much more serious than
the Tonghak insurrection of 1894. From the north, as well, persistent
reports came of the banding together of the disaffected people, and
foreign residents in those parts affirmed that they had never before
seen such a state of affairs. One of them was driven from a country
village and threatened with death if he should ever return. The Korean
soldiers who formed the garrison of Pyeng-yang joined the police in
breaking into the houses of wealthy natives and stealing money and
goods. The authorities remonstrated, but without effect. By the
twentieth of January the tension became so great in Seoul that a
considerable number of the wealthy natives began removing their families
and their valuables to the country.
About the 20th of January the report circulated that Russia had proposed
that northern Korea be made a neutral zone and that Japan exercise
predominant influence in the south. This was only an echo of the
negotiations which were nearing the breaking point in St. Petersburg,
and it confirmed those who knew Japan in their opinion that war alone
could settle the matter. On the following day the Korean Government
issued its proclamation of neutrality as between Russia and Japan. This
curious action, taken before any declaration of war or any act of
hostility, was a pretty demonstration of Russian tactics. It was evident
that in case of war Japan would be the first in the field and Korea
would naturally be the road by which she would attack Russia. Therefore
while the two were technically at peace with each other Korea was
evidently induced by Russia to put forth a premature declaration of
neutrality in order to anticipate any use of Korean territory by
Japanese troops. At the time this was done the Foreign Office was shorn
of all real power and was only the mouth-piece through which these
friends of Russia spoke in order to make their pronouncements official.
It was already known that two of the most powerful Koreans at court had
strongly urged that Russia be asked to send troops to guard the imperial
palace in Seoul and the Japanese were keenly on the lookout for
evidences of bad faith in the matter of this declared neutrality. When,
therefore, they picked up a boat on the Yellow Sea a few days later and
found on it a Korean bearing a letter to Port Arthur asking for troops,
and that, while unofficial in form, it came from the very officials who
had promulgated the declaration of neutrality, it became abundantly
clear that the spirit of neutrality was non-existent. It must be left to
the future historian to declare whether the Japanese were justified in
impairing a declared neutrality that existed only in name and under
cover of which the Korean officials were proved to be acting in a manner
distinctly hostile to the interests of Japan.
All through January the Japanese were busy making military stations
every fifteen miles between Fusan and Seoul. All along the line small
buildings were erected, sufficiently large to house twenty or thirty
men. On January 22nd Gen. Ijichi arrived in Seoul as military attaché of
the Japanese Legation. The appointment of a man of such rank as this was
most significant and should have aroused the Russians to a realizing
sense of their danger, but it did not do so. Four days later this
general made a final appeal to the Korean Government, asking for some
definite statement as to its attitude toward Russia and Japan. The
Foreign Office answered that the government was entirely neutral. Two
days later the Japanese landed a large amount of barley at the port of
Kunsan, a few hours’ run south of Chemulpo, and a light railway of the
Decauville type was also landed at the same place. On the 29th all
Korean students were recalled from Japan.
On February the first the Russians appeared to be the only ones who did
not realize that trouble was brewing, otherwise why should they have
stored 1,500 tons of coal and a quantity of barley in their godowus on
Roze Island in Chemulpo Harbor on the second of that month? On the
seventh the government received a dispatch from Wiju saying that several
thousand Russian troops were approaching the border and that the
Japanese merchants and others were preparing to retire from that place.
The same day the Foreign Office sent to all the open ports ordering that
news should be immediately telegraphed of any important movements.
On the eighth day of February the Japanese posted notices in Seoul and
vicinity that what Japan was about to do was dictated by motives of
right and justice and that the property and personal rights of Koreans
would be respected. Koreans were urged to report any cases of
ill-treatment to the Japanese authorities and immediate justice was
promised. From this day the port of Chemulpo was practically blockaded
by the Japanese and only by their consent could vessels enter or clear.
Having arrived at the point of actual rupture between Japan and Russia,
it is necessary before entering into any details of the struggle to
indicate the precise bearing of it upon Korea. Japan has always looked
upon Korea as a land whose political status and affinities are of vital
interest to herself; just as England once looked upon the _Cinque_
ports, namely as a possible base of hostile action, and therefore to be
carefully watched. One of two things have therefore been deemed
essential, either that Korea should be thoroughly independent or that
she should be under a Japanese protectorate. These two ideas have
animated different parties in Japan, and have led to occasional
troubles. There is one radical faction which has consistently and
persistently demanded that Japan’s suzerainty over Korea should be
established and maintained, and it was the unwillingness of the Japanese
authorities to adopt strong measures in the Peninsula which led to the
Satsuma Rebellion. Another large fraction of the Japanese, of more
moderate and rational view, are committed to the policy of simply
holding to the independence of Korea, arguing very rightly that if such
independence is maintained and the resources of the country are
gradually developed Japan will reap all the material advantages of the
situation without shouldering the burden of the Korean administration or
meeting the violent opposition of the Koreans which such a step would
inevitably entail. It is this latter policy which has prevailed and
according to which Japan has attempted to work during the past three
decades. It is this which actuated her during the period of China’s
active claim to suzerainty and finally caused the war of 1894 which
finally settled the question of Korea’s independence. But following upon
this came the encroachments of Russia in Manchuria and the adoption of a
vigorous policy in Korea. Japan’s efforts to preserve the intrinsic
autonomy of Korea were rendered abortive partly through mistakes which
her own representatives and agents made but still more through the
supineness and venality of Korean officials. The subjects of the Czar at
the capital of Korea made use of the most corrupt officials at court and
through them opposed Japanese interests at every point. Furthermore they
made demands for exclusive rights in different Korean ports and
succeeded in encroaching upon Korean sovereignty in Yongampo. The
evident policy of Russia was to supplant Japan in the peninsula, and no
reasonable person can fail to see that it was their ultimate plan to add
Korea to the map of Russia. The cause of the war was, therefore, the
necessity laid upon Japan of safe-guarding her vital interests, nay her
very existence, by checking the encroachments of Russia upon Korean
territory.
But before submitting the matter to the arbitrament of the sword Japan
exerted every effort to make Russia define her intentions in the Far
East. With a patience that elicited the admiration of the world she kept
plying Russia with pertinent questions until at last it was revealed
that Russia intended to deal with Manchuria as she wished and would
concede Japanese interests in Southern Korea, only and even then only as
Japan would engage not to act in that sphere as Russia was acting in
Manchuria.
All this time the Japanese people were clamoring for war. They wanted to
get at the throat of their manifest foe; but their Government, in a
masterly way, held them in check, kept its own secrets so inviolable as
to astonish the most astute diplomatists of the day, and at last, when
the hour struck, she declared for war without having weakened the
enthusiasm of her people and without giving occasion to adverse critics
to say that she had yielded to popular importunity. When she
communicated to Russia her irreducible minimum one would think that even
the blind could see that war was certain to follow soon. But even then,
if there is any truth in direct evidence, the great majority of the
Russians laughed the matter aside as impossible. The moderation and
self-control of Japan was counted to her for hesitation, so that when
the moment for action came and Japan sprang upon her like a tigress
robbed of her whelps, Russia cried aloud that she had been wronged. It
was on the morning of the seventh that Baron Rosen’s credentials had
been handed back to him in Tokyo. The evening before this the Japanese
Minister had left St. Petersburg. This in itself was a declaration of
war, but forty hours elapsed before Japan struck the first blow. During
those hours Russia had ample time in which to withdraw her boats from
Chemulpo even though the Japanese refused to transmit telegrams to
Seoul. A fast boat from Port Arthur could easily have brought the
message.
It was on the sixth and seventh that reports circulated in Seoul that
the Japanese were landing large bodies of troops at Kunsan or Asan or
both. These rumors turned out to be false, but beneath them was the fact
that a fleet was approaching Chemulpo. The question has been insistently
asked why the Russian Minister did not inform the commanders of these
Russian vessels and see to it that they were clear of the harbor before
these rumors were realized. The answer as given is that the Russian
Minister had no control over these boats. They had their orders to
remain in Chemulpo and they must stay. One would think that there would
be at least enough _rapport_ between the civil and military (or naval)
authorities to use the one in forwarding the interests of the other.
Even yet the Russians did not appreciate the seriousness of the
situation, but they decided that it was time to send notice to their
authorities in Port Arthur of what was rumored at Chemulpo. So the small
gunboat _Koryetz_ made ready to move out. Her captain, Belaieff,
proposed to the Russian Consul that the Russian steamship _Sungari_,
which was in port, should go with the _Koryetz_ and thus enjoy her
protection, but the agent of the company which owned the steamship
strongly objected to her leaving the neutral port at such a time. He
evidently realized in part the acuteness of the situation. So the
_Sungari_ remained at her anchorage and the _Koryetz_ steamed out of
port at two o’clock in the afternoon. Now, the harbor of Chemulpo is a
somewhat peculiar one, for in one sense it is land-locked and in another
it is not. It is formed by islands between which there are many openings
to the open sea, but most of these are so shallow that ships of medium
draught do not dare attempt them. There is but one recognized entrance
and that is from the southwest, or between that and the south. This
entrance is several miles wide and in the center of it lies Round
Island. When the _Koryetz_ arrived at the exit of the harbor she
suddenly found herself surrounded by torpedo-boats. The only witnesses
of what occurred at this point are the Japanese and the Russians and we
can only give their accounts. The Russians say that the Japanese
launched four torpedoes at the _Koryetz_ and when within ten feet of her
side they sank. Another statement is that a shot was fired on board the
_Koryetz_ but it was a mere accident! The Japanese claim that the
_Koryetz_ fired first. If we try to weigh the probabilities it seems
impossible that the torpedoes of the Japanese should have missed the
_Koryetz_ if the torpedo-boats were as near as the Russians claim. On
the other hand the admission on the part of a single Russian that the
first gun was fired on the _Koryetz_, even though by accident, is rather
damaging, for it is more than singular that an accident should have
happened at that precise time. It is a tax on the credulity of the
public to give this lame excuse.
In any case it makes little difference who began the firing. The
Japanese had already seized the Russian steamer _Mukden_ in the harbor
of Fusan and the war had begun. The Japanese doubtless held with
Polonius, that “if it is necessary to fight the man who strikes first
and hardest will have the advantage.” The _Koryetz_ turned back to her
anchorage and the Russians became aware of the extreme precariousness of
their position. Whatever attitude one may take toward the general
situation it is impossible not to extend a large degree of sympathy to
these Russians personally. Through no fault of their own they were
trapped in the harbor and found too late that they must engage in a
hopeless fight in order to uphold the honor of the Russian flag. But
even yet it was not sure that the neutrality of the port would be
ignored by the Japanese. Lying at anchor among neutral vessels in a
neutral harbor, there was more or less reason to believe that they were
safe for the time being.
About four o’clock in the afternoon of February eighth, which fell on
Monday, three Japanese transports entered Chemulpo harbor from the
south, convoyed by cruisers and torpedo-boats. They seemingly took no
notice of the two Russian boats lying at anchor and were evidently sure
that the Russians would not fire upon the transports. It would be
interesting to know whether the Japanese were relying upon the declared
neutrality of the port in thus venturing or whether they felt sure that
their own superior strength would keep the Russians still, or whether,
again, they were certain that the Russians had orders not to fire the
first gun. But it is bootless to ask questions that can never be
answered. Here is where the assailant has the advantage. He can choose
the time and method of his attack. We may surmise that had the Russians
divined the intentions of the Japanese and had foreseen the outcome they
would have acted differently, but divination of Japanese intentions does
not seem to be Russia’s strong point.
As soon as the Japanese came to anchor preparations were made for the
immediate landing of the troops, and the cruisers and torpedo-boats,
that had convoyed them in, left the port and joined the fleet outside.
This fleet consisted of six cruisers and several torpedo-boats. The
_Asama_ and the _Chiyoda_ were the most powerful of the cruisers, the
former being nearly half as large again as the _Variak_.
Night came on, and throughout its long hours the Japanese troops, by the
light of huge fires burning on the jetty, were landed and marched up
into the town. When morning came everyone was in a state of expectancy.
If there was a Japanese fleet outside they doubtless had other work on
hand than simply watching two Russian boats. Nor could they leave them
behind, for one of them was Russia’s fastest cruiser and might steam out
of the harbor at any time and destroy Japanese transports. Knowing, as
we do now, that an immediate attack on Port Arthur had been decided upon
we see it was impossible to leave these Russian boats in the rear. Japan
had never recognized the neutrality of Korea, for she knew that the
declaration was merely a Russian move to embarrass her, and she never
hesitated a moment to break the thin shell of pretense.
About ten o’clock a sealed letter was handed to Captain Rudnieff of the
_Variak_. It was from the Japanese Admiral and had been sent through the
Russian Consulate. It was delivered on board the _Variak_ by the hand of
Mr. N. Krell, a Russian resident of the port. This letter informed the
Russian commander that unless both Russian boats should leave the
anchorage and steam out of the bay before twelve o’clock the Japanese
would come in at four o’clock and attack them where they lay. Captain
Rudnieff immediately communicated the startling intelligence to Captain
Belaieff of the _Koryetz_ and to the commanders of the British,
American, French and Italian war-vessels. We are informed that a
conference of the various commanders took place and that the Russians
were advised to lie where they were. The British commander was deputed
to confer with the Japanese. This was done by signal and it is said a
protest was made against the proposed violation of neutrality of the
port, and that the neutral boats refused to shift their anchorage. But
all complications of this nature were avoided by the determination of
the Russians to accept the challenge. This they deemed to be due their
flag. It is not improbable that they now foresaw that the neutrality of
the port would not avail them against the enemy. By remaining at anchor
they could only succeed in involving France, Italy, Great Britain and
the United States, and there would be sure to be those who would charge
the Russians with cowardice. If this was to begin the war it must at
least prove the dauntless courage of the servants of the Czar. So the
commander of the _Variak_ ordered the decks cleared for action. It has
been stated that he would have preferred to have the _Koryetz_ stay at
her anchorage, for by a quick dash it was just possible that the swift
_Variak_ alone might be able to evade the Japanese and run the gauntlet
successfully. But the commander of the _Koryetz_ refused to listen to
any such proposition. If the only honor to be gotten out of the affair
was by a desperate attack he was not going to forego his share of it. He
would go out and sink with the _Variak_. So the _Koryetz_ also cleared
for action. It was done in such haste that all moveables that were
unnecessary were thrown overboard, a topmast that would not come down in
the usual manner was hewn down with an axe and by half past eleven the
two vessels were ready to go out to their doom. It was an almost
hopeless task—an entirely hopeless one unless the Japanese should change
their minds or should make some grave mistake, and neither of these
things was at all probable. The Russians were going to certain
destruction. Some call it rashness, not bravery, but they say not well.
The boats were doomed in any case and it was the duty of their officers
and crews to go forth and in dying inflict what injury they could upon
the enemy. To go into battle with chances equal is the act of a brave
man, but to walk into the jaws of death with nothing but defeat in
prospect is the act of a hero, and the Japanese would be the last to
detract from the noble record that the Russians made. Time has not yet
lent its glamor to this event, we are too near it to see it in proper
proportions, but if the six hundred heroes of Balaclava, veterans of
many a fight, gained undying honor for the desperate charge they made
how shall not the future crown these men who, having never been in
action before, made such a gallant dash at the foe?