The Japanese Bank issues notes.... Independence Club scare....
light-houses.... Opening of work on Seoul-Wiju R.R.... combination
against Yi Yong-ik.... he is accused and degraded.... rescued by
Russian guard.... protest of the Japanese against his return.... Yi
Keun-t’ăk.... Russian complacency.... Russian policy in the Far
East.... contrast between Russia’s and Japan’s aims.
At this point the First Bank of Japan, called the Dai Ichi Ginko,
brought up a scheme for putting out an issue of special bank notes that
would not circulate outside of Korea. Korea was importing much more than
she exported and the balance of trade being against her it was
impossible to keep Japanese paper in the country in sufficient
quantities to carry on ordinary local trade. For this reason the bank
received the sanction of the Korean Government to put out this issue of
bank paper which could not be sent abroad but would be extremely useful
as a local currency. This was done and it was found to work admirably.
The Koreans had confidence in this money and it circulated freely. It
had two advantages not enjoyed by any form of Korean currency, namely,
it was a stable currency and suffered no fluctuations and it was in
large enough denominations to make it possible to transfer a thousand
dollars from one man’s pocket to that of another without employing a
string of pack-ponies to carry the stuff.
But we must retrace our steps and note some other events of interest
that happened in the spring months. One of these was the scare in
government circles over the reported revival of the Independence Club
under the encouragement of a so-called Korean Party in Tokyo, to which
it was believed some Korean political refugees belonged. A great stir
was made in Seoul and several men were arrested, but there was no
evidence that would pay sifting, and though it was evident that the
government would have been glad to find a true bill against some of the
men who were arrested it was forced by lack of evidence to let them go.
The incident was of importance only as showing the extreme sensitiveness
of the government on the point, and its determination, now that the
Independence Party was down, to keep it down.
The one important material improvement of the year was the adoption of a
plan for the building of some thirty light-houses on the coast of Korea.
Ever since the opening up of foreign trade the lack of proper lights
especially on the western coast had been a matter of growing concern to
shipping companies. This concern was warranted by the dangerous nature
of the coast where high tides, a perfect network of islands and
oft-prevailing fogs made navigation a most difficult and dangerous
matter. The fact that light-houses ought to have been built ten years
ago does not detract from the merit of those who at last took the matter
in hand and pushed it to an issue.
The month of May witnessed a spectacular event in the ceremony of the
formal opening of work on the Seoul-Wiju Railway. The spirit was willing
but the flesh was weak. Neither French nor Russian money was forthcoming
to push the work, and so the Korean government was invited to finance
the scheme. Yi Yong-ik was made president of the company and if there
had been a few thousand more ex-prefects to mulct he might have raised
enough money to carry the road a few miles; but it is much to be feared
that his financial ability, so tenderly touched upon by the Japanese
Minister in his speech on that “auspicious occasion,” was scarcely
sufficient for the work, and the plan was not completed. There is much
reason to believe that this whole operation was mainly a scheme on the
part of the Russians to preempt the ground in order to keep the Japanese
out.
As the year wore toward its close the usurpation of numerous offices by
Yi Yong-ik and his assumption of complete control in the palace bore its
legitimate fruit in the intense hatred of four-fifths of the entire
official class. He was looked upon as but one more victim destined to
the same fate which had overtaken Kim Hong-nyuk and Kim Yŭng-jun. But in
his case the difficulties were much greater. Yi Yong-ik had put away in
some safe place an enormous amount of Government money and he held it as
a hostage for his personal safety. Until that money was safely in the
Imperial treasury even the revenge would not be sweet enough to make it
worth the loss. Not only so but the whole finances of the Household were
in his hands and his sudden taking off would leave the accounts in such
shape that no one could make them out, and enormous sums due the
department would be lost. Yi Yong-ik had fixed himself so that his life
was better worth than his death however much that might be desired. But
the officiary at large cared little for this. There was no doubt that
the one person who should accomplish the overthrow of the favorite and
thus bring embarrassment to the Imperial purse would suffer for it, but
Korean intrigue was quite capable of coping with a little difficulty
like this. The result must be brought about by a combination so strong
and so unanimous that no one would ever know who the prime mover was.
This at least is a plausible theory and the only one that adequately
explains how and why the scheme miscarried. The whole course of the
intrigue is so characteristically Korean and includes so many elements
of genuine humor, in spite of its object, that we will narrate it
briefly. It must of course be understood that the officials were keenly
on the lookout for an opportunity to get the hated favorite on the hip
and in such a manner that even his financial value to the Emperor would
not avail him.
One day, while in conversation with Lady Om, the Emperor’s favorite
concubine who has been mistress of the palace since the death of the
Queen, Yi Yong-ik compared her to Yang Kwi-bi a concubine of the last
Emperor of the Tang dynasty in China. He intended this as a compliment
but as his education is very limited he was not aware that he could have
said nothing more insulting; for Kwi-bi by her meretricious arts is
believed to have brought about the destruction of the Tang dynasty. At
the time Lady Om herself was unaware that anything derogatory had been
said and she received the supposed compliment with complacency; but her
nephew who was present, not understanding the reference, went and asked
someone else about it and learned the truth of the matter. He doubtless
knew that Yi Yong-ik was not aware of his _gaucherie_ and so held his
peace for a time, but in some way the Prime Minister and the Foreign
Minister heard a rumor that something insulting had been said. They
called up the nephew of Lady Om and from him learned the damning facts.
They also knew well enough that no insult had been intended but here was
a “case” to be worked to its fullest capacity. The most sanguine could
not hope that the hated favorite would give them a better hold upon him
than this: for the position of Lady Om was a very delicate one and there
had been a dispute on for years between the Emperor’s counsellors as to
the advisability of raising her to the position of Empress. A word
against her was a most serious matter.
Everything was now ready for the grand _coup_ and on the 27th of
November fourteen of the highest officials memorialized the throne
declaring that Yi Yong-ik was a traitor and must be condemned and
executed at once. His Majesty suggested a little delay but on the
evening of the same day the same men presented a second memorial couched
in still stronger language, and they followed if up the next morning
with a third. To their urgent advice was added that of Lady Om herself
and of many other of the officials. A crowd of officials gathered at the
palace gate and on their knees awaited the decision of the Emperor.
There was not a single soul of all that crowd but knew that the charge
was a mere excuse and yet it was nominally valid. It was the will of
that powerful company against the will of the Emperor. The tension was
too great and His Majesty at last reluctantly consented, or at least
expressed consent; but he first ordered the accused to be stripped of
all his honors and to render all his accounts. This was nominally as
reasonable as was the charge against the man. It was a case of “diamond
cut diamond” in which the astuteness of the Emperor won. The accusers
could not object to having the accused disgorge before being executed
but it was at this very point that they were foiled Yi Yong-ik’s
accounts were purposely in such shape that it would have taken a month
to examine them, for he alone held the key. Nothing can exceed the
desperate coolness of the man under the awful ordeal. At one point, just
after the acquiescence of the Emperor, the written sentence of death is
said to have gone forth but was recalled just as it was to have gone out
of the palace gates, after which there would have been no recall. No man
ever escaped by a narrower margin. When Yi Yong-ik presented his
accounts the Emperor announced that it would take some days to
straighten matters out since the accused was the only man to unravel the
skein. Here was probably the crucial point in the intrigue. If the white
heat of the day before had been maintained and the officials had
demanded instant punishment, accounts or no accounts, the thing would
have been done, but as it happened the consciousness of having won
relaxed the tension to such a degree that the accused gained time. This
time was utilized by calling in a Russian guard and spiriting the
accused away to the Russian Legation. This accomplished His Majesty
suavely announced that the case would be considered, but that meanwhile
the officials must disperse. There were further memorials, resignations
_en masse_, passionate recriminations until at last two or three
officials who had held their peace saw that the game was up and, in
order to curry favor themselves, offered a counter memorial charging Yi
Yong-ik’s accusers with indirection. This was listened to and the Prime
Minister was deprived of his official rank. This made possible a
compromise whereby both Yi Yong-ik and the Prime Minister were restored
to all their former honors and all went “merry as a marriage bell.” But
it was thought best to let Yi Yong-ik travel for his own and his
country’s good, so he was made Commissioner to Buy Annam Rice, which was
itself a pretty piece of diplomacy since it recalled prominently to the
people the one phase of the injured man’s career which they could
unhesitatingly applaud. He was taken off in a Russian cruiser to Port
Arthur—to buy Annam rice!
When he returned to Seoul a few weeks later the Japanese lodged a strong
protest against his return to political power but the Russian
authorities made a counter-proposition urging that he was the only man
capable of handling the finances of the country. Under existing
circumstances the very protest of the Japanese was an argument in his
favor and he came back into power on the flood tide, backed, as he had
never been before, by the full favor of the Russian party. They
naturally expected substantial payment for having saved him, and so far
as he was able he liquidated the debt.
Meanwhile another man, Yi Keun-t’ăk, had risen to power through servile
adherence to Russian interests. The somewhat enigmatical character of Yi
Yong-ik made him to a certain extent an unknown quantity. Not even the
Japanese considered him wholly given over to Russia; but this new man
was definitely committed to Russian interests and with his rise to
important position it became evident for the first time that the Korean
Government had decided to rely upon Russia and to reject the aid or the
advice of Japan. The end of the year 1902 may be said to have been the
approximate time when Japan first realized that all hope of a peaceful
solution of the Korean problem was gone. One naturally asks why Korea
took this step, and, while we are still too near the event to secure an
entirely dispassionate estimate or opinion, there seems to be little
doubt that it was because Russia made no pretensions, and expressed no
desire, to reform the administration of the Government. She was
perfectly content to let things go along in the old way in the
peninsula, knowing that this would constantly and increasingly
jeopardize the interests of Japan while she herself had practically no
commercial interests to suffer.
The immemorial policy of Russia in Asia sufficiently accounts for her
work in Korea. Her policy of gradual absorption of native tribes has
never held within its purview the civilizing or the strengthening of
those tribes, until they have been gathered under her aegis. On the
other hand, until that has been accomplished she has either waited
patiently for the disintegration of the native tribes or has actually
aided in such disintegration. History shows no case in which Russia has
strengthened the hands of another people for the sake of profiting by
the larger market that would be opened up; for until very recently the
commercial side of the question has scarcely been considered, and even
now the commercial interests of Russia depend upon an exclusive market.
So that in any case a dominant political influence is the very first
step in every move of Russia in the East. Why then should Russia have
advised administrative or monetary or any other reform, since such
action would inevitably form a bar to the success of her own ultimate
plans?
The historian of the future, taking his stand above and out of the smoke
of battle, will take a dispassionate view of the whole situation. He
will mark the antecedents of these two rival Powers, he will compare
their domestic and foreign policies, he will weigh the motives that
impelled them, he will mark the instruments wielded by each and the men
whom they employed as their intermediaries and agents. Then and not till
then will it be possible to tell whether the present recorders of events
are right in asserting that while the policies of both Powers are
essentially selfish the success of Russia’s policy involves the
disintegration and national ruin of the peoples she comes in contact
with while the success of Japan’s policy demands the rehabilitation of
the Far East.
Much depended upon the attitude which Korea should finally assume toward
these two mutually antagonistic policies. If she had sided with Japan
and had shown a fixed determination to resist the encroachments of
Russia by adopting a policy of internal renovation which would enlist
the interest and command the admiration of the world, the present war
might have been indefinitely postponed. Whether it could have been
finally avoided would depend largely upon the changes that are taking
place in Russia herself where in spite of all repressive agencies
education and enlightenment are filtering in and causing a gradual
change. Here again the future historian may be able to say with
confidence that it was better that the war came when it did in that it
confirmed Japan in her course of commercial, industrial and intellectual
expansion, guaranteed China against disintegration and opened the eyes
of the Russians themselves to their need of radical internal reform. And
he may be able to say that the temporary suspension of Korean autonomy
was but a small price to pay for these enormous benefits to the Far East
and to the world at large.