CHAPTER IX.

_Wholesale Jobbing.—Insurance on Sick Men.—False

Intelligence.—Uselessness of Sir John Barnard’s Act.—Origin

of the Blackboard.—Opposition to Loans.—Lord Chatham’s

Opinion of Jobbers.—Inviolability of English Funds.—Parisian

Banking-Houses.—Proposition to pay off the National

Debt.—Extravagance of the Contractors.—Lord George Gordon’s

Opinion of them.—Members’ Contracts.—New System adopted.—Abraham

Goldsmid.—Bankers’ Coalition broken by him.—His Munificence.—His

Death.—Sensation in the City._

The following picture of wholesale jobbing, drawn from public and

private documents, from correspondence, from newspapers, and from

Parliamentary history, will show that gambling was equally pursued in

high places as in ’Change Alley.

Letters from abroad, containing false intelligence, were forwarded

to, or forged by, senators; names of importance were fraudulently

used; the news was promulgated, and funds raised or lowered according

to the wish of the contriver. But if the jobber was cheated in one

way, he took his revenge in another. The domestics of public men

were bribed by him; the secretaries of men in office were paid by

him; the mistresses of ministers were accessible to him; and, it is

said, even their wives were not seldom in the pay of members of the

Stock Exchange. Nor did many hesitate to declare that men in office

not only made profit of the news they really received, but that they

promulgated false intelligence, knowing, from their position, it

would be received as true, at the expense of their own character, and

to the ruin of the men who trusted them.

Another practice had obtained a notoriety so bad and baleful, that

it became necessary to stop its progress. Directly it was known that

any great man was seriously ill, insurances on his life, at rates

in proportion to his chance of recovery, were made. These bargains

were reported in the papers; and the effect on an invalid who knew

his health to be precarious may be imagined, when he saw in the

_Whitehall Evening Post_, that “Lord —— might be considered in great

danger, as his life could only be insured in the Alley at ninety per

cent.” The custom grew so rapidly, and the evil was so serious, that

the principal merchants and underwriters refused to transact business

with brokers who engaged in such practices.

Of a less questionable character was the habit of insuring property

in any besieged city; or the yet more common mode of paying a premium

to receive a certain sum, should the city be taken by the day named

in the contract. The Spanish ambassador was accused of insuring

£30,000 on Minorca, during the seven years’ war, when the despatches

announcing its capture were in his pocket.

The newspapers were the vehicles generally employed to spread false

intelligence; and an almost invariable success attended those who

made use of the press to promulgate, in bold type and inflated

language, “bloody engagement,” “rumored invasion,” or “great

victory,” to assist their city operations. Every class, from the

maiden who jobbed her lottery-ticket, to the minister who jobbed

his intelligence, was involved in the pursuit. All these bargains

were for time, and continued to prove that the act by which Sir John

Barnard hoped to abolish gambling was useless; and it is an anomaly

in the history of our great debt, that bargains in the very funds

which were raised to support the national credit are disallowed by

the national legislature. It is a law which has been tried and found

wanting. It does not prevent, in the smallest or slightest degree,

the system it was meant to crush; and it adds to the immorality of

the speculator and the risk of the broker, by allowing the former to

repudiate his bargain at the expense of the latter.

Under the early loan-acts, tallies were delivered to the first

contractors. When a sale was effected, the name of the purchaser was

indorsed upon the tally, and from that entered into the government

books, for the convenience of paying the dividends to the right

person. This clumsy machinery was afterwards abolished; but though,

in 1717, the transfers and dividends of the national debt were first

undertaken by the Bank, it was not until 1783 that the present method

of transfer was adopted.

The origin of the blackboard—that moral pillory—of the Stock Exchange

occurred in 1787. “There were no less than twenty-five lame ducks,”

said the _Whitehall Evening Post_, “who waddled out of the Alley.”

Their deficiency was estimated at £250,000; and it was upon this

occasion the above plan was first proposed, and a very full meeting

resolved, that those who did not either pay their deficiencies or

name their principals should be publicly exposed on a blackboard to

be ordered for the occasion. Thus the above deficiencies—larger than

had been previously known—alarmed the gentlemen of ’Change Alley, and

produced that system which is yet regarded with wholesome awe.

During the administration of Mr. Pitt, in 1786, a sinking fund

was again attempted; the various branches of revenue being united

under the title of the Consolidated Fund. One million was annually

taken from it, and placed in the hands of the Commissioners for the

Redemption of the National Debt, and was applied in purchasing such

funds as might be deemed expedient at the prices of the day. The

interest of the debt thus redeemed, the life-annuities which fell in,

or the annuities which expired, were added to the fund, the interest

of which, when the principal amounted to four millions, was no longer

to be applied to it, but remain at the disposal of Parliament.

The difficulties which every minister met in every new loan, were

more in proportion to the power of the opposition, than to the

fairness or necessity of the demand. In unpopular wars, these

difficulties were doubly increased. In the American contest, the

whole population demanded peace; and nothing but the obstinacy of

“the best farmer and worst king,”—nothing but a corrupt Parliament,

wholesale places, a dominant aristocracy, and large premiums to the

moneyed interest,—could have carried Lord North through the session,

enlivened by his humor, and the enmity created by the war. The loans,

therefore, of this period were fiercely attacked; ’Change Alley

fiercely denounced; and the plans of the government hotly contested.

The mode of conducting the loans was then, as before, made conducive

to the majority of the ministry, at the expense of the people. Out

of 60,000 lottery-tickets, 22,000 were given to a few members,

producing £44,000 profit. When the system was attacked, precedent,

the bane of official people, was quoted; and because it was known

that, in 1763, Mr. Fox had £100,000, Mr. Calcraft and Mr. Drummond

£70,000, the Governor of the Bank £150,000 for the corporation, and

£50,000 for himself, and other members similar sums, it was deemed a

sufficient and an unanswerable defence. But though by such methods

the minister got the votes of the House, he found it more difficult

to get the money from the public after it was voted. In 1779, he was

greatly troubled to procure it on reasonable terms. From bankers he

went to contractors, from contractors to stock-jobbers, and from

stock-jobbers he went back to the bankers, paying a much higher rate

than they at first demanded. “It was but yesterday,” writes Horace

Walpole, “that Lord North could tell the House he had got the money

on the loan, and is happy to get it under eight per cent.” The loan

of 1780 brought them again into disrepute. Half was given to members

of the House of Commons; more than three millions was allotted to one

person; and, without regard to the welfare of the nation, the price

was determined at a rate so favorable to the contractors, that, from

no cause save the low terms on which it had been taken, the scrip

arose at once to eleven premium. In 1781, it was said that Lord

North had made an infamous bargain in a bungling manner; and that,

in 1782, he had made a bungling bargain in an infamous manner; and

this was solemnly protested against as an improvident operation, a

corrupt job, and a partial distribution. There cannot be a doubt that

the mode of conducting these loans was detrimental to the national

interest, and conducive to that of the Stock Exchange. There were

three plans up to this period. The first was in the offers of private

individuals, stating the sum each would advance; the second was an

open subscription at the treasury; and the third a close subscription

with a few. By the first, the members of Parliament were bribed;

and by the third, the bankers; then the principal contractors were

enriched. Their interest, and it was great, with their votes in the

House, and they were many, were, therefore, at the disposal of the

government. In 1783, out of a loan for £12,000,000, £7,700,000 were

given to bankers. So disgraceful was the whole affair, that Lord

John Cavendish was compelled to apologize for the terms on which it

had been granted, because “the former minister had left the treasury

without a shilling.” By attempting to please men of all parties, Lord

John, as usual, pleased none. He was abused by some for dividing it

among so small a number; he was rated by others for allowing so many

to have a share. Mr. Smith, of the house of Smith & Payne, made a

formal complaint that he had been neglected in the allotment; that

his firm was the only one left out; and that, in consequence, a

stigma of a very disagreeable character was attached to it. By the

explanation, it appeared that another house of the same name had

been accused of tempting customers from the various bankers, by

giving portions of the loan to those who would secede. The meanness

had been attributed to Smith, Payne, & Co., and Lord John omitted

them in consequence from his list. Mr. Smith was very irate on the

subject; and although his Lordship explained, as the explanation

was unaccompanied by a share of the loan, it was, probably, very

unacceptable to the indignant banker. Although this gentleman saw no

harm in receiving a portion of the loan, other bankers had higher

views. Mr. Martin, believing that, as a senator, he ought not to

contract, lest it might bias his votes, conscientiously refused to

accept any portion of loan or contract; and thus sacrificed his

pocket to his principle.

When jobbing occurred in the senate, who can wonder at the jobbing

in the funds, or at the strong feeling which such contemptible

squabbling created, and which fell upon the members of the House of

’Change as fiercely as on the members of the House of Commons?

“Such gentry,” said one, “coin disaster to sink the funds without

cause. If gospels mended mankind, there should have been a new

sermon preached on the mount, since ’Change Alley was built, and

money-changers were driven out of the temple all over Europe.” “Ten

thousand lies are propagated every week, not only by both sides, but

by stock-jobbers. Those grave folks, moneyed citizens, contribute

exceedingly to embroil and confound history, which was not very

authentic before they were spawned.”

Lord Chatham was not backward in expressing an opinion of those whom

he designated “the cannibals of ’Change Alley.” “To me, my Lords,” he

once said, “whether they be miserable jobbers of ’Change Alley, or

the lofty Asiatic plunderers of Leadenhall Street, they are equally

detestable.” The same strong feeling animated him when he was told

that one of his measures had caused a decline in the stocks. “When

the funds are falling, we may be sure the credit of the country is

rising.”

A finer spirit—and that spirit is the principle which has pervaded

the whole public transactions of England—was evinced when the same

nobleman was advised to retaliate on the Dutch merchants,—who had

committed several outrageous frauds on the English,—by seizing their

immense property in our funds. “If the Devil himself had money

there,” he replied, “it must rest secure.” To his Lordship, and to

the political assertion he made, that “not a gun should be fired in

Europe without England knowing why,” it was of the utmost importance

that the integrity of the nation should be maintained.

During the American war, many of those in arms had property in the

funds; and the provinces, as bodies corporate, had money in the

same securities. It is to the credit of the revolutionists, that,

though they fully expected this property would be confiscated,

they persisted in their course; and it is equally to the credit of

England, that their capital was as secure, and their interest as

regularly paid, as if they were not in open rebellion.

Not only in loans were the people wronged and robbed,—the word is

harsh, but expressive,—the contracts for the public service exhibited

also the most gross and glaring favoritism. From time to time the

evil was exposed; Parliament grew violent, and the public waxed

wroth. Every quarter of a century, an inquiry was instituted, and the

whole ended partly in some influential person being disgraced, and

partly in an expression, that “the said frauds and abuses were one

great occasion of the heavy debt that lies upon the nation.” A few

specimens may serve to indicate the wrongs which, from time to time,

have aggrandized an unpopular government, have swollen the pockets of

the few, and increased the wants of the many.

The borough-monger, who for years had been in possession of a pocket

borough, found his property disturbed, and his constituents tampered

with, by the contractor, who, as a candidate for the honor of the

forum, was marked by vice, extravagance, and folly. As a member of

the senate, he assumed the purity of the patriot, complained of

the absence of economy, and declared how much cheaper the public

business might be accomplished. He teased the minister; he perplexed

the Parliament; he puzzled the government; until, by giving him a

job, the patriot was turned into a contractor, and from that hour he

marked the public money as his own. If the First Lord of the Treasury

were indolent, the contractor availed himself of his sloth; if

ignorant, he taught him, and made the country pay for the lesson.

The very name of a contractor was odious, and their luxuries were

bitter in the eyes of the people. Their abodes were like those of

princes; their daughters wedded with nobles; the follies of their

sons were the talk of the town; they died possessed of fortunes which

kings might envy; and, as nearly all were members of Parliament,

attention became pointed at men whose mansions and whose manors,

bought with public money, challenged public notice.

“The minister,” remarked Mr. Fox, “said to him, ‘I will give you a

contract, if you will give me a vote.’ The contractor replies, ‘Now

I have given you a vote, give me a contract. I voted that we had

forty-two ships when we had but six, and that the French fleet did

not consist of thirty-two ships. You must not, therefore, quarrel for

twopence a gallon on rum, or a farthing on a loaf of bread.’”

Lord George Gordon, shortly before his extraordinary conduct in 1780,

said,—“This dunghill of contracts has given an ill air to our whole

proceedings. It has got abroad, and proves very offensive to the

public nostrils. Our constituents begin to smell a rat. They nose

us in the lobby, and call us tailors and shoemakers, cobblers and

cabbage-salters, potato forestallers, sour-krout makers, and swine

contractors. The dignity, reputation, and fair fame of the Commoners

is smothered and sinking in porter and salted cabbage, shoes,

sour-krout, and potatoes.” Lords of trade ordered pewter inkstands

by the hundred, sold them, and purchased silver ones with the money

they produced; or ordered green velvet bags for official papers, and

employed the velvet of which they were composed to make court dresses.

Under the Pelham administration, members received regular stipends

in bank-notes, from £500 to £800 yearly, varying according to the

influence or ability of the senator. “This largess I distributed,”

added the person who took charge of the delicate department,—and

the particulars are worth enumerating,—“in the court of requests

on the day of the prorogation of Parliament. I took my stand there;

and as the gentlemen passed me, in going to or returning from the

House, I conveyed the money in a squeeze of the hand. Whatever

person received the ministerial bounty, I entered his name in a book

which was preserved in the deepest secrecy, it being never inspected

by any one but the king and Mr. Pelham.” This book was afterwards

demanded of Mr. Roberts, the almoner, but he resolutely refused to

yield it except by the king’s express command, or to his Majesty in

person. In consequence of his refusal, the king sent for him to St.

James’s, where he was introduced into the closet. He was then ordered

to return the book in question, with which injunction Mr. Roberts

immediately complied. At the same time, taking the poker in his hand,

his Majesty put it into the fire, made it red hot, and, while the

ministers and Mr. Roberts stood round him, he thrust the book into

the flames, where it was immediately reduced to ashes.

These evils were so manifest and manifold, that, after various

attempts to pass a measure which should be some check on government,

a bill was introduced, by which all contracts were made subject to a

species of auction, although the minister was not compelled to accept

the lowest offer.

During the debates which were held upon the subject, many other facts

were elicited, which confirm all the previous remarks, and prove

the iniquity with which the money of the country was disposed of.

One member possessed a contract producing £30,000 a year more than

the legitimate profit. Mr. Alderman Harley made £37,000 too much by

another. On a contract for remitting gold, £35,000 was paid more than

was necessary. At an earlier period it was discovered, that, out of

16,000 tuns of beer contracted and paid for, only 7,000 tuns were

delivered. The rum contract was granted at fifty per cent. above

a remunerating price. The transport service paid twenty per cent.

too much. Millions were lying for years in the hands of favorite

placemen, favorite agents, and favorite contractors, while the

country was borrowing at an exorbitant interest; and, after a careful

perusal of the evidence, there can be no doubt that the charge of

corrupting the House was true; nor was it in the nature of a member

of Parliament in the eighteenth, any more than in the nineteenth

century, to possess profitable contracts, the continuation of which

depended on war, and yet speak honestly and earnestly for peace.

The names of Abraham and Benjamin Goldsmid will recall to the memory

of many of our readers the forms and features of these magnates of

the money-market. Of singular capacity, and of equally singular

good fortune, the firm of which they were the members rose, from

comparative obscurity, to be the head and front of ’Change Alley.

Prior to 1792 they were little known,—Mr. Gurney, the eminent

bill-broker, regards them as his predecessors,—but by that year they

occupied an important position, and became successful competitors for

the national loans. They were the first members of the Stock Exchange

who competed with the bankers for the favors of the Chancellor,

and diverted from their purses those profits which were scarcely

a legitimate portion of banking business. The combination of that

interest being thus broken, the bargains for public loans became

more open; there was no confederation to limit and lower the prices;

and the ministry and country reaped the benefit in improved terms.

The house of Sir William Curtis, whose fortunes were founded in

this manner; of Dorrien and of Boldero, names which, great in their

day, have almost passed from the roll of city bankers; of Grote,

now better known as the philosophical historian of Greece; were

all competitors, three quarters of a century ago, for those loans

which the necessities of the country made so frequent. Nor were

people wanting who openly accused the entire banking interest of an

unfair confederation to realize their views. This interest was first

attacked by the boldness of Abraham and Benjamin Goldsmid; and it is

easy to imagine the feelings of the bankers when unknown men reaped

the prize which they had hitherto gathered.

The daily papers bore an almost daily testimony to their munificence.

Naturally open-handed, the poor of all creeds found kindly

benefactors. On one day, the grandeur of an entertainment to royalty

was recorded; and on the next, a few words related a visit of mercy

to a condemned cell. At one time, mansions, vieing in architectural

beauty with those of our nobility, were described; at another, some

great and gracious act of charity was recorded. Entertainments

to princes and ambassadors, reviving the glories of the Arabian

Nights, were frequent; and galleries, with works of art worthy the

magnificence of a Medici, graced their homes. They were awhile

Fortune’s chief and most especial favorites. When, in 1793, the old

aristocracy of England’s traders fell, as in 1847, and the Bank in

one day discounted £4,400,000, their losses amounted but to £50.

Prizes, under circumstances little inferior to romance, followed

their purchases of lottery-tickets; and they knew, as if by instinct,

a bill of exchange with a bad name to it.

The brothers had faced the storm of life in their earlier years.

Fortune, which crowned their efforts, proved that prosperity had no

power to divide them; and when, in the early part of the nineteenth

century, Benjamin Goldsmid destroyed himself, the survivor felt the

loss so severely, that he never recovered the shock. The death of

Benjamin caused no abatement in the benevolence of Abraham Goldsmid;

and one who knew him well has written with enthusiasm of his “general

philanthropy, his ready munificence, his friendly demeanour, his mild

and unassuming manner.”

Many anecdotes, singularly illustrative of his kindly feeling, are

still remembered. It is stated that, on one occasion, noticing a

great depression in the waiter who usually attended him where he

dined, he inquired the cause, ascertained that it was pecuniary,

gave the astonished man double the amount he required, and refused

to listen to the thanks of the recipient. Another story is extant

to the same purport. He became acquainted by accident with one of

those simple and single-minded country curates, whose poverty was the

disgrace, and whose piety was the glory, of the Church of England.

This was the man for Abraham Goldsmid at once to appreciate and

to benefit. He obtained all the necessary particulars, and in a

few weeks a letter was received, which told the curate he had been

allotted a share of a new loan. The letter was a mystery to the

country clergyman, who placed it on one side, with a confused notion

that a hoax was intended. He had not long to wait. The next day

brought a second letter, and with it comfort and consolation, in the

shape of a large sum which had been realized on the allotment. These

things are pleasant to record; and it is doubtful whether the check

gave most pleasure to the wealthy Hebrew to write, or the country

curate to receive.

In 1810, the houses of Baring and Goldsmid were contractors for the

ministerial loan of fourteen millions. But Sir Francis Baring dying,

the support of the market was left to his companion. The task was

difficult, for a formidable opposition had arisen, which required the

united energies of both houses to repress. It was the interest of

this opposition to reduce the value of scrip, and it succeeded. Day

by day it lowered; and day by day was Mr. Goldsmid’s fortune lowered

with it. He had about eight millions in his possession; and with the

depression of his fortune, his mind grew dispirited and disordered.

Another circumstance occurred at this particular moment to increase

his embarrassment. Half a million of exchequer-bills had been placed

in his hands to negotiate for the East India Company; and the latter,

fearing the result of the contest on the Stock Exchange, claimed the

amount. His friends did not rally round him, as at such a moment, and

with such a man, his friends should have done; and Abraham Goldsmid,

dreading a disgrace, which his sensitive and honorable nature

magnified a hundredfold, after entertaining a large dinner-party,

destroyed himself in the garden of his magnificent residence, in

Surrey.

This sad event created a sensation in the city, unparalleled by the

loss of any single individual. The death of the great loan-contractor

was regarded as of national importance. Expresses were sent with the

news to the king and the Prince of Wales. The funds fell three per

cent. The journals united in eulogizing the man whose death they

recorded. The jobbers of Capel Court crowded in anxious inquiry. The

merchants of the Exchange assembled before the accustomed time. The

thoroughfares resounded with rapid questions and hurried replies.

Little or no business was done; and, it is said, the great question

of peace or war never created a similar confusion. The jury recorded

their opinion, and, when the remains were carried to their home, the

procession was followed by a crowd, who, partaking of his charity

in life, thronged to honor him in death. Sobs and suppressed moans

attested the reality of their sorrow, and bore a fitting testimony to

his worth. The high-priests and elders paid every distinction which

the Mosaic ordinances allowed; but, in conformity with the commands

of the great lawgiver, they withheld from him the customary rites;

and unconsecrated ground received the remains of Abraham Goldsmid,

the Hebrew suicide.

In 1792, another sinking fund was established, of one per cent.

on the nominal capital of each loan, to which the interest on the

capital redeemed by this fund was to be added. When annuities for

lives, or for a longer term than forty-five years, were granted, the

value which would remain after forty-five years was to be estimated,

and one per cent. on that value set aside for their redemption.

This fund was to be kept separate, and applied to redeeming debts

contracted subsequent to its institution; and this, it was estimated,

would redeem every loan in forty-five years from its contraction.

£400,000 was granted in aid of the previous sinking fund; and

£200,000 annually till 1802, when the grant was rendered perpetual.

All money saved by the reduction of interest was also to be added;

but, as no savings occurred, this clause might as well have been

omitted. In 1798, however, the application of one per cent. on the

capital of the loans was deviated from, as the claims of the war were

too pressing to allow of its application.

Chronicles and characters of the stock exchange · 第 9 / 18 章