GROWTH OF FOREIGN COMPETITION FOR TRADE—NEED FOR NEW MARKETS—INDIA
AND CHINA AS MARKETS—NECESSITY FOR CHEAP COMMUNICATIONS—ACTION
TAKEN BY MR COLQUHOUN AND MYSELF—PROBABLE EFFECTS OF THE
INDO-SIAM-CHINA RAILWAY—INDO-BURMESE CONNECTION IN COURSE OF
CONSTRUCTION—REASONS FOR CHOOSING MAULMAIN AS TERMINUS FOR
CONNECTION WITH CHINA—SIAMESE SECTION NOW UNDER SURVEY—EFFECTS
OF CONNECTING MAULMAIN WITH SIAMESE RAILWAY—COST OF
CONNECTION—PROSPECTIVE ADVANTAGES—CARAVAN-ROUTES FROM MAULMAIN
TO RAHENG—ESTIMATE FOR BRANCH TO OUR FRONTIER—APPROXIMATE
ESTIMATE FOR CONTINUING THE BRANCH TO RAHENG—COMPARISON BETWEEN
PROPOSED BRITISH AND RUSSIAN RAILWAYS—BRITISH INTERESTS IN
SIAM—MR SATOW’S LETTER—SIR ARTHUR PHAYRE’S OPINION ON OUR DUTY
TO PROTECT SIAM—CONNECTION OF BURMAH AND SIAM BY RAILWAY THE
BEST FORM OF SUPPORT—CANNOT ALLOW SIAM TO BE ABSORBED BY
FRANCE—EFFECT OF SUCH ABSORPTION UPON BURMAH—OPINIONS OF SIR
CHARLES BERNARD—CANNOT AFFORD TO HAND OVER OUR MARKETS TO
FRANCE—OPINION OF SIR HENRY YULE—PAYING PROSPECTS OF THE BRANCH
TO THE FRONTIER—SIR RICHARD TEMPLE’S OPINION—THE MOST PROMISING
OF ALL FUTURE RAILWAY LINES—EFFECT OF PROPOSED LINES—SIR CHARLES
BERNARD’S PROJECT—COMPARISON BETWEEN MAULMAIN AND BHAMO
ROUTES—TAKAW ROUTE—KUN LÔN FERRY ROUTES—THE MAULMAIN ROUTE OR
NOTHING—IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION.
In these days of commercial rivalry, when foreign nations are competing
with us in every neutral market in the world, when Europe and North
America are being closed against our goods by prohibitive tariffs, and
the Royal Commission appointed on the late depression of trade has
placed on record its opinion that over-production has been one of the
prominent features in the course of trade of recent years, and has urged
us to display greater activity in searching for and developing new
markets, we cannot afford to neglect any advantage we possess for the
extension of our trade.
The seaboard and navigable rivers of the world give access to only
limited areas for commerce. To open up new markets, we must penetrate
the great and populous but landlocked interiors of the unopened
continents of Asia and Africa, and our vast colonial possessions, with
railways thus providing cheap means of communication in the extensive
areas that are now shut off from our commerce by the prohibitive cost of
carriage.
India and China, the largest and most densely populated markets yet
undeveloped, contain together 700,000,000 inhabitants—one-half the
population of the earth. These consist of civilised people, with their
commerce uncramped at their ports by prohibitive tariffs, who would
gladly become our customers if by cheapening the cost of carriage we
could place our machine-made goods at their doors at a less price than
they can acquire local hand-made manufactures.
Since 1881 my friend Mr Colquhoun and I have been striving our utmost to
interest the public in the great and yet undeveloped markets of the
East. We have tried to impress upon Government and the mercantile and
manufacturing community, that Great Britain is in possession of certain
advantages which render her the envy of competing nations. She is in
possession of India and Burmah, and is thus the next-door neighbour to
the landlocked half of the great and populous empire of China.
We have endeavoured to awaken, and have awakened, an intelligent
interest in the subject of the importance of connecting India with China
by a railway; and by exploration have proved to the satisfaction of
every one who has studied the question, that a practical route between
these two great empires exists, and that along that route a railway can
be constructed at a reasonable cost, which would tend greatly to enhance
the commerce of Great Britain and India with its Eastern neighbours—Siam
and its Shan States, and the western half of China.
When this railway is constructed, its inland terminus at Ssumao will
assuredly form the nucleus of a system of Chinese railways which will
spread through the western, central, and southern provinces of China.
One of these lines would be made to join our terminus at Ssumao with
Pakhoi, the southern treaty-port in the China Sea, and thus complete a
through line from the Persian Gulf to the China Sea by a railway
extending solely through British, Siamese, and Chinese territories. This
line would pass through and develop the richest part of Asia, foil the
designs of the French, who are hoping and endeavouring to oust our trade
from Southern China and Central Indo-China, and give us vast markets for
the future expansion of British and British-Indian commerce.
Our project divides itself into two portions—the Indo-Burmese and
Burmo-Chinese railways. The first involves the connection of the Indian
and Burmese systems of railways by a line joining the railways in
Northern Assam, viâ Mogoung, with the Rangoon and Mandalay line,
together with an extension of that railway from Rangoon to Maulmain. The
connection of Rangoon with Maulmain by railway has since been advocated
by Sir Charles Crosthwaite, the present chief commissioner of Burmah, so
far as proposing that its first section should be surveyed and put in
hand by the Government of India.
The connection of the Indian and Burmese railways viâ the Patkoi pass
met with unreasonable opposition; but actual exploration, carried out by
the Government, has lately proved that, as we have averred all along,
the route is the easiest, cheapest, and most feasible that exists for
the connection of these two systems of railways. The section of the line
from Sagain—a town opposite Mandalay—to Mogoung, is already sanctioned,
and about to be commenced; and the other portion of the railway will
doubtless be taken in hand as soon as the first section is completed.
The second portion of our project is the connection of Burmah with Siam
and China by railway. Our study of previous explorations, followed by
exploration-surveys conducted by myself in Siam and its Shan States, and
by my colleague Mr Colquhoun through Southern China and by the Bhamo
route into Northern Burmah, afforded positive proof that the path for a
railway from Burmah to China should have its western terminus at
Maulmain. By starting from that seaport, the following advantages would
be gained:—
1. The difficult country lying between the Irawadi and Salween rivers in
Upper Burmah would be entirely avoided, because Maulmain is situated
near the mouth of the Salween, and on its eastern bank.
2. By proceeding eastwards from Maulmain, you cross the hill-ranges by
the best route, as can be seen by comparing the Bhamo route, which
trends eastwards over an alpine country from Bhamo at the navigation
head of the Irawadi river, with the Takaw route, lying 230 miles to the
south of the Bhamo route, and with the Maulmain route, which lies 350
miles farther to the south. It is evident that the farther you go to the
north, the more difficult do the routes leading from Burmah to China
become.
3. The line from Maulmain, owing to the easy country through which it
passes, could be constructed at a fraction of the cost of any line
projected from Upper Burmah, and would have the advantage of easier
gradients throughout, and would be the shortest possible route for
connecting Burmah with the capital of the Chinese province of Yunnan.
4. The line from Maulmain, from its shortness, would possess great
advantages in competing with the lines projected by the French from
their Tonquin seaboard, and would thus enable us to carry our goods from
Maulmain to Ssumao, the frontier-post of South-western China, for £3 a
ton, or about one-twentieth of the average tariff now charged upon our
goods by the French customs in Tonquin.
5. The line from Maulmain would likewise connect with the projected
system of Siamese railways, and thus tend greatly to the advantage of
Burmah, and to the development of British trade throughout Central
Indo-China.
6. The Siamese system of railways projected by us, and now being
surveyed and estimated for the King of Siam by English engineers, if
joined on with Maulmain by our projected branch to the frontier, would
connect our seaport of Maulmain with Bangkok, the capital and chief
seaport of Siam, thus affording us more rapid mail communication with
China and Australasia, and would complete more than two-thirds of our
projected railway to China. The remaining 230 miles could be cheaply
constructed, and would open up the British States lying to the east of
the Salween throughout their length, and thus give us an easy control of
the country.
The branch line which we propose for the connection of our seaport of
Maulmain with the Siamese system of railways at Raheng, as I shall
proceed to explain, would probably cost less than one and a half million
sterling,[24] the cost of fifteen average miles of English railway. Half
of this line lies in Siamese territory, and the other half in the Indian
province of Burmah; and approximately half of the cost would have to be
defrayed by the King of Siam, leaving only three-quarters of a million
sterling as the charge to the Indian Government.
This branch alone would open out to our seaport of Maulmain the nine
million inhabitants of Siam and its Shan States, and would, together
with the Siamese line to Kiang Hsen, greatly decrease the cost of
carriage to our British Shan States lying to the east of the Salween,
which are believed to contain about one and a half million inhabitants.
It would likewise greatly decrease the cost of carriage to the Chinese
province of Yunnan, and thus, by lowering the prices, tend greatly to
increase the number of our customers. The journey from Maulmain to our
frontier at Myawadi, on the Thoungyeen river, is performed by porters in
four days, and by cattle caravans in about eight days.
In referring to the route from Myawadi to Raheng, the ‘British Burmah
Gazetteer’ states that “the route between them, being much frequented,
is clear and open, and the journey can thus be performed in two days.”
The hills between the Thoungyeen and Raheng were surveyed for the King
of Siam some years before my visit; and the copy of the survey, which
was lent me by the governor of Raheng, showed no less than eleven
distinct caravan-routes crossing the hills: the passes crossed are said
to be low, the greatest height attained by Mr Ross on his journey from
Maulmain _viâ_ Myawadi to Raheng did not exceed 2400 feet above
sea-level; and I was informed by some of our leading foresters who
worked the forests in these hills, that the routes traversing them were
quite as easy as those crossing the range which separates Maulmain from
our frontier at Myawadi.
Myawadi lies 60 miles east of Maulmain, 40 miles west of Raheng, and 630
feet above the level of the sea. It is separated from Maulmain by a
range of hills over which the caravans clamber by a pass having its
summit 1600 feet above sea-level, or 800 feet lower than the pass
between Myawadi and Raheng. The ascent, however, from Myawadi to the
crest of the Raheng pass is reduced by 630 feet—the height that Myawadi
lies above the sea; and the descent to Raheng by 400 feet—its height
above the sea-level.
Sir Charles Bernard, when chief commissioner of Burmah, estimated the
cost of connecting Maulmain with our frontier station of Myawadi by
railway at 105 lakhs of rupees, which, at the present rate of exchange,
1s. 4¼d., is equivalent to £710,938, or less than three-quarters of a
million sterling; and he informed me that he had received a letter from
Mr Satow, our consul-general in Siam, giving his opinion that “Siam
would be ready to carry out its part of the Burmah-Siam railway if the
Government of India expressed its willingness to connect the two
countries by railway at the frontier.”
As Myawadi is one-third less distant from Raheng than from Maulmain, and
the country to be crossed is barely more difficult than to Maulmain, it
is not likely that the cost of the section from Myawadi to Raheng would
exceed that of the portion from Maulmain to Myawadi: therefore the
expense of joining the terminus of our section at Myawadi with the
Siamese main line at Raheng would not exceed three-quarters of a million
sterling; and the whole of the branch, from the main line to Maulmain,
would not cost more than one and a half million sterling.
Unlike the projected and partially completed Russian line across Asia,
which passes through the great deserts and wastes neighbouring the north
of the Chinese dominions, our line would traverse the richest part of
Asia. It would, as already stated, foil the designs of the French, who
are striving to oust our trade from Southern China and Central
Indo-China, and would give us vast markets for the future expansion of
British and British-Indian commerce.[25]
The British stake in Siam already exceeds that of any other nation.
According to Mr Satow, our fellow-subjects trading and working in that
country comprise about ten thousand souls; and in his letter to Earl
Granville, dated Bangkok, May 7, 1885, he stated that “nine-elevenths of
the total export trade [of Siam], valued at nearly £1,650,000, is with
Hong Kong and Singapore, and must contribute greatly to the prosperity
of those two colonies. Of the imports, about £340,000 represents English
manufactures; £200,000 products of British India; while Hong Kong sends
goods, partly of British, partly of Chinese origin, to about the same
value. From the Straits Settlements produce is imported to the value of
£22,000, making in all £762,000, or over three-quarters of a million
sterling.
“The imports from the continent of Europe are valued at £164,000, and
from the United States £50,000. If we suppose the imports from Hong Kong
to be equally divided between goods of British and Chinese origin, the
result will be, articles produced in Great Britain and British
possessions to the value of £640,000, against £314,000 from the
continent of Europe, the United States, and China combined.
“The commercial interests of Great Britain in Siam, as compared with the
rest of the world, are consequently—In fixed capital, as 2 to 1; in
steamers, as 8 to 1; in exports, as 9 to 2; in imports, as 2 to 1.
“It is further to be noted that the import duties are only 3 per cent
_ad valorem_. If Siam proper were to pass into the hands of any European
Power with protectionist tendencies, it cannot be doubted that the
tariff would be greatly increased; and it is by no means improbable, if
we are to judge by what has been proposed with regard to the trade of
Tonquin, that differential duties would be imposed to the disadvantage
of British trade.”
After reading this report, it is not surprising to find the late Sir
Arthur Phayre, who had been for many years chief commissioner of Burmah,
writing to the ‘Times,’ in his letter dated October 12, 1885, that “I
beg to add that British interests appear also to require that the King
of Siam, so long the friend and ally of the United Kingdom, should be
assured of support in the conservation of his independence and of the
integrity of his dominions.” No better assurance of support could have
been given by us to the King of Siam than the promise of co-operation in
the junction of the two countries, Burmah and Siam, by railway. Our
trade with Siam would in that case vastly and rapidly expand, our fixed
capital in the country would increase, and our railway route to China,
which would pass through Northern Siam and its Shan States, would never
be allowed to pass into French hands, and the French, knowing this,
would cease all thought of further encroaching on the king’s
territories.
The strengthening of the French hands in Indo-China by the absorption of
Siam would render France a more formidable antagonist, for it would keep
a larger army in Indo-China and have a larger recruiting-field for its
native auxiliaries. The absorption of Siam by France would place the
French frontier within sixty miles of Maulmain; would render the country
to the south of Burmah, between it and our Straits Settlements, French
territory; would destroy our trade in Siam and its Shan States; stop the
recruitment of cattle[26] and elephants from those countries, which are
the breeding-grounds for Burmah; would ruin our pedlars, foresters,
timber-traders, and other fellow-subjects in Siam; and would block for
ever our connection with China by railway.
There seemed to be every reason for making arrangements with Siam for
connecting it with Burmah, and continuing the proposed railway to China;
and if Sir Arthur Phayre had been still chief commissioner of Burmah,
doubtless the advisability of pushing on the railway would have been
strongly urged upon the Government. Unfortunately for the extension of
our trade in the East, the reins of the province were in the grasp of an
official of a different school. In a letter which I have leave to quote,
Sir Charles Bernard gave me his reasons, in a very straightforward
manner, for opposing the connection of Burmah with Siam by railway. He
said: “I demur to the correctness of any statement that I ‘had set my
face against our being linked on to Siam.’ I have distinctly and
repeatedly said that I would gladly see a railway from Maulmain _viâ_
Raheng to Bangkok and the Yunnan border. And I have repeatedly said that
such a railway would do great good to that part of British Burmah, and
especially to the port of Maulmain. But I have at the same time said
that in my judgment that railway would be too dearly purchased if it
involved a guarantee from India to Siam against French aggression. And I
have also said that in my belief the railway from Maulmain to Raheng
would not pay for many years; also, that there are other railways in
Burmah and in India on which money from the Indian Treasury would be
more usefully spent than on the Maulmain-Raheng line. If you or any one
else can get British Burmah linked by railway to Siam, I shall regard
you as benefactors to British Burmah. But, as you are aware, benefits
can be bought at too high a price.”
We have seen in Mr Satow’s letter to Earl Granville that the interests
of Great Britain in Siam are greater than those of any other nation—and,
indeed, than those of the rest of the world combined. We have been
warned by him that if Siam is allowed to pass into the hands of any
European Power with protectionist tendencies, it would be the death-blow
to our commerce in the country. We have seen that the late Sir Arthur
Phayre considered British interests in Siam already sufficient to
require us to assure the King of Siam of support in his independence,
and of the integrity of his dominions.
The connection of Siam with Burmah by railway would certainly increase
our stake in Siam by developing British and Indo-Siamese trade; but I
fail to see how it would increase the responsibilities of the Government
of India. Our trade is not in such a position as to allow us to hand
over markets to the French. The Siamese dominions are at present nearly
exclusively British markets, and it cannot be expected that the British
nation will calmly stand by and see its goods turned out of those
markets by our French rivals.
I was glad to find during the discussion of the paper in which I gave an
account of my explorations before the Royal Geographical Society, that
the India Council, as represented by Colonel (now Sir Henry) Yule, the
most eminent authority on Indo-China, did not consider the French
bugbear a sufficient reason for blocking the Burmah-Siam-China Railway,
and with it, the extension of our commerce in South-eastern Asia. He
said: “As to the projects themselves, described in the paper, I cannot
now say much, for what I have to say will probably have to be said
elsewhere [in the India Council]. I feel the difficulties that beset
them—not engineering difficulties, but of quite another kind. Still, I
cannot but hope that events which are even now [November 1885] upon the
wing [the annexation of Upper Burmah and its Shan States] may help to
clear the way for the execution of the projects which Mr Colquhoun had
at heart, and on which he and Mr Hallett have expended an amount of
thought and energy which I cannot believe will be in vain.”
As to the statement by Sir Charles Bernard, that in his “belief the
railway from Maulmain to Raheng would not pay for many years,” that is
merely a matter of opinion, and estimates based upon opinions as to the
prospective trade that would accrue to projected railways in Burmah have
always proved below the mark. The paying prospect of railways in Burmah
was officially allowed by the Government of India, in its despatch to
the Secretary of State in January 1881, where it stated that—“The great
financial success of the Rangoon-Prome Railway (a success almost
unprecedented in railway construction in India) has demonstrated that
railways in Burmah will, on account of the enterprising character of the
people, and the great undeveloped wealth of the country, not only give
large indirect returns in land, customs, and forest revenue, but will
pay, within a very short period after being opened to traffic, a fair
percentage of net income on their capital cost.”
The line to our frontier, besides opening out and developing the country
through which it passed, would have the advantage of conveying the
traffic to and from the Siamese lines with which it would be connected;
and when the line is extended to China, a vast increase of traffic would
be ensured. There is not the slightest reason to doubt that when the
Siamese railways are constructed, this branch line to our seaport would
be the most profitable line in our Indian dominions. It would not be
undertaken until the connection between Raheng and Bangkok is completed;
and if opened up at the same time as the Siamese section of the branch,
it is certain that it would in the first year far more than recoup the
Government for the interest upon the outlay for its construction.
Sir Richard Temple, who has administered some of the largest provinces
in India, in writing of our proposed line to China, gave his opinion
that—“By all the accounts of exploration, also on a consideration of the
commercial and political geography, this is _the most promising of all
the future railway lines that can be devised_.” And in comparing our
north-western frontier of India with our north-eastern or Burmese
frontier, Sir Richard says: “The ways across the north-western frontier,
from the British side, lead to nothing profitable for British interests.
On the other hand, the ways across the north-eastern frontier lead to
regions full of prospective advantage for British commerce and for
British expansion in every way.... On our north-western frontier the
railways are mainly for strategic or political objects, and only in part
for commercial objects. But on this our north-eastern or Indo-Chinese
frontier, the railways will be mainly for commerce, for the opening of
new markets, for the spread of cultivation and habitation, for material
development in every way.” Our system of railways would act like
arteries, developing the resources, mineral and agricultural, of all the
regions they traversed, and would enable us to throw British goods right
into the interior, and bring back in return the produce of Siam and
China for shipment at Maulmain.
Let us compare this project with that which is favoured by Sir Charles
Bernard. In his address to the Scottish Geographical Society in November
1887, some months before Sir Andrew Clarke had arranged with the King of
Siam for the surveying of the Siamese system of railways, he said: “A
railway is now being made, and will be open within eighteen months, to
Mandalay. That line will doubtless be continued to Bhamo, 700 miles from
the sea, and 35 miles from the border of China. The ancient route of
traffic between Burmah and China was by Bhamo and the Irawadi valley. We
ought to make the most of that route, and exhaust its possibilities,
before we committed ourselves to creating another and a wholly new
route. No doubt the lofty passes on the old path between Bhamo and
Yunnan-fu are most serious obstacles to a railway on that route. But it
might be possible to find much easier gradients if the Shweli valley and
other valleys leading towards Sunning-fu, instead of to Tali-fu, were
examined. A thorough examination of the country would take one or two
seasons.”
We have seen that the branch line for connecting Maulmain and Raheng
will probably cost about 1½ million sterling. Mr Archer, our vice-consul
at Zimmé, reported in 1887 upon the portion of our proposed railway from
Raheng to China that lies in Siam and its Shan States, as follows:—
“_Best Route for Railway through Northern Siam._—If the railroad were
made to pass through Zimmé, the great mass of mountains between the city
and Kiang Hai would probably prove a serious difficulty. But if it were
to follow the valleys of the Meh Nam and Meh Wang as far as Lakon (our
route), there would appear to be no great natural difficulties to
overcome, and thence north-eastward to Muang Ngow the road would lie
over easy undulating country. From Muang Ngow to Penyow the watershed of
the Meh Nam and Meh Kong must be crossed; but it is of no great
elevation (merely undulating ground), and I believe would not present
any serious difficulties. Once this range is passed, the whole way to
Kiang Hsen, and some distance farther northward, is on almost quite
level ground, apparently highly suitable for a railway. This route I
think preferable, not only because it offers greater natural facilities,
but because a large portion of the country traversed is capable of great
development, and it is evident that the advantages of a railway to these
States are based, not on the actual wealth, but on the consequent
development, of the country.”
To learn the character of the country along our route between Kiang Hsen
and Kiang Hung, we can turn to Garnier’s account of the part of his
journey skirting the river from Kiang Hsen to Sop Yong, a place half-way
between Kiang Hsen and Kiang Hung. There were no serious physical
difficulties noted by him on this part of his journey, and his party
turned inland at Sop Yong simply because it was the rainy season, and
the plains neighbouring the river were swampy. The only other European
observer who has traversed any portion of our route between Kiang Hsen
and Kiang Hung is Mr Archer, who, in his journey back from Kiang Tung in
1887, struck it at Muang Len (Lim, a place 35 miles to the north of
Kiang Hsen). In the account of his journey he reports that “Muang Len
has a more prosperous appearance than any Chiengtung (Kiang Tung)
district I had yet seen. The valley is broad, and there are numerous
villages with extensive rice-fields. These settlements are comparatively
new, for, after the destruction of Chiengsen (Kiang Hsen) in 1803,
Chiengmai (Zimmé) advanced up the valley of the Meh Kong and took off
captives all the inhabitants they could find. The junction of the Meh
Len with the Meh Kong is about a day’s journey from the village where we
encamped. From Muang Len to Huapong, also a prosperous-looking district,
is a day’s journey on a good road, mostly through bamboo forest; and the
next day, May 31st, we passed through Hong Luk, crossed the Meh Sai, and
reached Ban Tham in Chiengsen, about 10 miles below the Siamese fort.
Hong Luk is a populous and well-cultivated district. In passing through
Wieng Phan, just south of the Meh Sai, and close to the Siamese fort, I
saw a settlement just being made in the jungle by Chiengtung people, who
were busy putting up their houses.”
From all information gained by explorers, it is evident that from Raheng
northwards to Kiang Hung, a distance of 470 miles, the line for our
proposed railway is exceptionally free from physical difficulties. Kiang
Hung lies 2000 feet above sea-level. Near this important town the Meh
Kong or Cambodia river will have to be crossed; and after crossing the
river, an ascent of 2520 feet will have to be made by the railway along
the slope of the Yunnan plateau to Ssumao, the frontier-post of China.
The total length of this line from Maulmain to Ssumao is estimated at
700 miles.
Mr Colborne Baber’s survey and levels along the Bhamo route, which
proceeds from Bhamo—a town 700 miles from a seaport, situated at the
head of the steamer navigation on the Irawadi—through Tali-fu to
Yunnan-fu, the capital of the Chinese province of Yunnan, showed that
the country traversed by the route was of an alpine character, and
exceedingly difficult. The passes over the series of mountains between
Bhamo and Tali-fu have their summit at a greater altitude than that of
any of the passes over the Alps, with the exception of the Stelvio,
which lies 800 feet above the level of perpetual snow. The Bernina, the
next highest to the Stelvio, only rises 7658 feet above sea-level,
whereas the pass between Bhamo and the Salween river lies at an altitude
of 8730 feet; that between the Salween and the Meh Kong at 8166 feet;
that between the Meh Kong and Chutung at 8510 feet; that between Chutung
and the Shan-Pi river at 8410 feet; and that between the Shan-Pi and
Tali-fu at 8090 feet.
To connect Bhamo with Yunnan-fu, the chief town of the Chinese province
of Yunnan, would require a railway at least 967 miles in length. The
stupendous cost of such a line can be judged from the report of Mr
Colborne Baber, who surveyed and levelled the portion of the route lying
between Momein and Yunnan-fu. He says—“The trade-route from Yunnan-fu to
Teng-yuch (or Momein, the frontier-post of China with the Chinese Shan
States) is the worst possible route with the least conceivable trade.”
Again he says—“I do not mean that it is absolutely impossible to
construct a railway. By piercing half-a-dozen Mont Cenis tunnels and
erecting a few Menai bridges, the road from Burmah to Yunnan-fu could
doubtless be much improved.”
The advocates of the Bhamo route assume that because the crow-line
distance from Bhamo to Yunnan-fu is only 375 miles in length, these two
places can be easily and cheaply connected by railway.[27] They seem not
to have studied, or if they have studied, are unable to comprehend Mr
Baber’s report, maps, and sections, which were made by him when
accompanying the Grosvenor Mission from Yunnan. These have been issued
both by the Royal Geographical Society and as a Parliamentary Blue-book
(China, No. 3, 1878), and are therefore easily accessible.
In the Blue-book the maps are drawn to a large scale, 3 miles to the
inch, and the levels of the route above sea-level are written upon it,
and given separately in a table on pp. 30 and 31 of the report. The
country passed over by the caravan-route is clearly delineated on these
maps. The track is seen traversing high passes, between great hills,
towering up thousands of feet above the crest of the passes, and
crossing deep ravines and steep valleys, not in a level crow-line (that
would necessitate viaducts many thousand feet high, at an expense in
comparison with which the cost of the Panama Canal would be as nothing),
but zigzagging up and down the valleys and ravines, and following the
general contortions of the passes. Thus the crow-line of 375 miles is
developed into 489½ miles for caravan traffic, so as to enable mules and
human beings to clamber over the mountain-passes between the two places.
To any competent engineer who studied the maps, it would be evident that
the length of a railway with a ruling gradient of 100 feet to a mile,
carried from Bhamo to Yunnan-fu, would be at least 967 miles.
Some of the ravines are so steep, that if the crow-line were adhered to,
mules, or even goats, could not crawl up them. Let us take, for
instance, the descent from the crest of the pass lying to the west of
the Salween to the bridge over that river. The dead drop in a crow-line
of one mile is 6300 feet, and a zigzag seven miles in length has had to
be made up the face of the ravine to enable mules to ascend and descend
it. Railway trains are neither flies, nor crows, nor mules, and
therefore can neither crawl up precipices, follow a crow-line through
the air, nor proceed up a mule-track. To ascend this ravine, this
crow-line distance of one mile, the railway track, if straight, would
have to be at least 63 miles long, in order to allow a locomotive to
haul up a load equal to six times its own weight in addition to itself.
The 100–feet-to-the-mile gradient up on the straight portions would have
to be flattened at every curve of the zigzags: this means additional
length, which, together with the necessary level-lengths which are
required to give runaway trains a chance of being again brought under
control, would add three or four miles on to the 63 miles mentioned
above. It will be rather within than without the mark to allow 66 miles
for the alignment of a railway over this single crow-mile of country.
The difficulties, so well described by Mr Baber, lie in Chinese
territory, and it is not reasonable to expect that the Chinese would
ever consent to undertake such a costly railway through such a poor and
sparsely populated hilly region as is traversed by the Bhamo route.
The only other route from Upper Burmah to Yunnan that has been followed
by Europeans is that from Hlinedet (Hlaingdet), a station about 80 miles
to the south of Mandalay, _viâ_ Kiang Tung and Kiang Hung, to Ssumao. In
1872 Dr Cushing ascended the Hlinedet pass to Poayhla, 4160 feet above
the sea, and proceeded to Moné or Mong Nai, crossing four hill-ranges.
From Moné he passed over three ranges of hills, and descended to the
Takaw ferry, where he crossed the Salween. Between the Salween and Kiang
Tung three or four ranges of hills, as well as four or five spurs,
making eight ascents and descents, occur on the route, one of the passes
rising to 6400 feet above the level of the sea, and another to 5500
feet. The country between Kiang Tung and Kiang Hung is equally
difficult, the route crossing five mountains before reaching the Meh
Kong river at Kiang Hung.
The Salween river might be reached from Poayhla by another route,
swaying slightly to the north, if it is found possible to carry a
railway across the Nattit pass, 4800 feet above sea-level. This pass,
however, is so difficult, that it is feared it will prove an
insurmountable obstacle. Anyhow, a railway from Hlinedet to the Salween
will prove a most expensive undertaking; and the country to the east of
the ferry, between it and the Meh Kong, although much easier than on the
Bhamo route, is so difficult that it is in the uttermost degree unlikely
that it will ever be traversed from west to east by a railway.
Two other routes—the ones that are at present apparently favoured by the
Government for the connection of Burmah and China—converge on the
Salween at the Kun Lôn ferry. One starts from Mandalay and proceeds
eastward through Theebaw and Thoungze to the ferry; and the other, after
ascending the Shan plateau by the pass leading from Hlinedet to Poayhla,
takes a north-easterly direction to the ferry. Some of the difficulties
on the first route are evidenced by the report of the Government
surveyors on the portion of the route lying between Mandalay and
Thoungze. From this it appears that the cart-road to Maymyo (Pyinulwin),
a place 24 miles to the east of Mandalay, has had to be contoured to 44
miles, and ascends in this distance 3300 feet. The descent to Thoungze
from Maymyo is given by our surveyors at 1600 feet, and the greater part
of the ascent from the plain of the Irawadi is said to be very steep.
Thoungze lies on the route to Theinni, and is only 40 miles in an
air-line from Mandalay, or about one-fourth of the air-line distance
from Mandalay to the Kun Lôn ferry, where the route would cross the
Salween. The difficulties of the route, according to people who have
traversed it, are said to be still greater beyond Thoungze. The great
gash in the country, between 1100 and 1200 feet deep, called the Goteik
defile, has to be descended by steps cut in the face of the rock for 800
feet to a natural bridge across the ravine, and, having crossed it, the
precipice on the other bank has to be ascended in the same manner. The
banks of the ravine are 3600 feet above the level of the sea. Between
Thoungze and Theebaw, besides this ravine one descent of 800 feet and
another of 1600 feet have to be made, as well as ascents of 1500 feet,
800 feet, and 900 feet. Even on reaching Theebaw you are only half-way
to the Salween, and have not crossed the high range which divides the
drainage of the Irawadi from that of the Salween.
I have no information as to the level of the country beyond Theebaw, but
I find in the accounts of a journey from Theinni to the Kun Lôn ferry,
that 20 miles out of the 52 miles is very difficult. Looking at these
particulars, it will be seen that the ascent from Mandalay to the summit
of the plateau at Maymyo is nearly double as great as the ascent from
our frontier to the crest of the pass on the Maulmain-Raheng route, and
the descent to Thoungze is nearly equal to that to Raheng. It is
therefore evident that the difficulties to be encountered within 40
miles of Mandalay by a railway from Mandalay to the Salween must be
considerably greater than those which would be met by the
Burmah-SiamChina Railway between our frontier and Raheng, and probably
greater than those on the whole of the line from our frontier to Kiang
Hung.
The second route starts from Hlinedet, and clambers the steep western
flank of the Shan plateau to Poayhla, from which place the Kun Lôn ferry
across the Salween can be reached by caravans by various routes, all of
which are difficult. The northerly route over the Nattit hill is
believed to be impracticable for a railway. Another, proceeding
eastwards, crosses four ranges of hills before it reaches Mong Nai. It
thence proceeds northwards to the ferry, crossing a very difficult range
of hills before reaching the Salween. The portion of this route between
Hlinedet and Poayhla, and between Poayhla and Mong Nai, presents serious
obstructions to the construction of a railway. To avoid one of the hills
between Poayhla and Mong Nai, and to cross the others by easier passes,
Mr Scott, the assistant superintendent of the Shan States, proposes that
the railway, after leaving Poayhla, shall take a great sweep southwards
to Mong Hpai, and from Mong Hpai proceed in a north-easterly direction
to Mong Nai. This will involve a railway distance between Rangoon and
Mong Nai of about 525 miles, and, according to him, Mong Nai is distant
200 miles from the Kun Lôn ferry across the Salween. The distance from
Rangoon to the Kun Lôn ferry would therefore be at least 725 miles, or a
greater distance than Maulmain is from the Chinese frontier at Ssumao.
The most serious obstacle between Mong Hpai and Mong Nai, according to
Mr Scott, is “the deep gash in the hills made by the rapid waters of the
Nam Pwon,” and it is not yet known whether that “deep gash” can be
avoided. Anyhow, the avoidance of the gash might add considerably to the
length of the railway.
I have previously shown how difficult the country east of the Salween,
along the Bhamo and Takaw routes, is—one line lying to the north of the
Kun Lôn ferry route, and the other south. There is every reason to
believe that the difficulties to be encountered on the Kun Lôn ferry
route, although perhaps less than on the Bhamo route, will be greater
than on the Takaw route.
The Bhamo and Kun Lôn ferry routes, which seemingly are the only ones
finding any favour with Government, deal only with the country west of
the Salween, are purely local routes, and can never be anything else, as
their termini would still be on the western or Burmah side of the
enormous physical barriers crossed by the caravan-routes from Upper
Burmah to Yunnan. To talk of either Bhamo or the Kun Lôn ferry as on the
Chinese frontier for the purposes of trade, is altogether misleading, as
both these places are separated from the fertile and populous regions of
Southern China by alpine country, over which the Chinese would never
consent to carry a railway.
The more the subject is examined, the more evident does it become that
the only possible railway connection between Burmah and China must be by
the Maulmain route projected by us. It is a case of that or nothing.
The enterprise which we propose is big with promise, not only for the
present but for future generations. Our policy, political as well as
commercial, should be to develop by every means in our power our
intercourse and intercommunication between India and China—between
British manufacturers and millions of Chinese, Siamese, and Shan
customers. A prudent and yet resolute readiness to undertake reasonable
responsibilities, inseparable from the duties of a great commercial
nation, should be the key-note of our national policy, and should be the
badge of no particular party. It is for the commercial community and
working classes to see that such a policy is undertaken and adhered to.
We are a nation of shopkeepers, and it is by trade that we live. Every
nerve should be strained by the manufacturer and working man to gain for
British commerce the great market existing in Western China. The French
are already in the field to snatch it from us; surveyors and engineers
are at work surveying and estimating for the railways from the Tonquin
seaboard. The race in this case is to the swift, and it still remains to
be seen whether French or British enterprise will win the much-coveted
prize.
It will be strange indeed if, with the advantage we now possess by the
annexation of Upper Burmah and its Shan States, the press, the
mercantile community, the manufacturers, and working classes of this
kingdom, cannot induce the Government to make or guarantee the sections
of our railway to China which lie in British territory, and thus throw
open for British commerce the most magnificent, unopened, and available
market in the world.