CHAPTER XXIII

THE SIRDAR AND SAVAGE WARFARE

On the morning following the battle of Omdurman, a number of the

townspeople came out to the camp, complaining of the rough usage which

they had been subjected to at the hands of the Soudanese troops left in

charge of the town, and of the looting of their houses. The majority,

not knowing that the Sirdar and his staff were fluent Arabic scholars,

brought their complaints to me, and asked me to interpret for them.

In my then excited and half-dazed state, I rushed off to report the

matters. Colonel Maxwell at once called up a hundred men, and with an

officer and sergeant, instructed me to proceed to the town and see the

men posted to the houses of the complainants. The real truth of the

matter, of course, only came out later, and as I do not know of any one

else who is in as good a position as I am to relate it, I submit the

following.

Long before the troops reached the town, the inhabitants were busily

engaged in looting the Mahdieh institutions and the deserted houses

of the fleeing Baggara and others. Their local knowledge obviated the

necessity of _searching_ for loot; they knew where |282| there was

anything at all worth taking and took it, anticipating the troops by

half a day. Into every occupied house loot was being carried, if not

by the head of the household, then by the servants and others attached

to the establishment, while the head mounted guard. True, the soldiers

did loot towards midnight; but what? angareebs (the native seats and

bedsteads combined), on which to rest themselves instead of lying

down on the filth-sodden ground of Omdurman. Heaven knows they richly

deserved the temporary loan of these angareebs. Wherever residents

were looted, it was their own fault. The victorious and therefore

happy and grinning Blacks kept an eye on their hereditary enemies—the

lighter coloured population, as they passed backwards and forwards,

always entering their huts loaded and emerging empty-handed. In their

eagerness to collect all they could, they threw down their loot, and

hurried off for more, and during their absence the Black “Tommy”

annexed whatever he thought might be useful to him.

[Illustration: TROPHIES TAKEN AT OMDURMAN.]

The Sirdar himself could not have made a better arrangement than that

which came of itself. The troops were enabled to keep at their posts

with an eye open for any lurking Baggara; the looting was being done

for them by the residents, who knew exactly where to lay their hands

upon anything worth taking, instead of time being wasted by searching

empty houses, while the soldiers were kept in good spirits by having

the fun of the looting without running the risk of being suddenly |283|

confronted with half a dozen Baggara concealed in some hut or room.

When some one came staggering along under a particularly heavy load, a

Black would assist him with his burden; some of his comrades would join

in, and when the looter protested that he did not require any help,

a little Soudan horseplay was indulged in, and later on these little

pleasantries came up as grave charges of assault.

The only people in Omdurman who had anything worth looting were the

real Mahdists themselves—and they deserved to be looted of their

ill-gotten gains. In dealing with any claims for compensation for

having been looted, three things should be kept in mind—the complainant

should prove that he was not a real Mahdist; that what he was looted of

on the evening of the 2nd of September was not the proceeds of his own

looting during the day; and, having got so far, should reconcile the

fact of his having been looted of property and valuables with his tales

of abject misery, poverty, and semi-starvation.

It did not take me long to grasp the situation, for after seeing the

soldiers posted to the houses of the “Government” people, I started

on a voyage of discovery after the houses of the principal Baggara

and others, and having had them pointed out to me, I recommended the

soldiers to take their cleaning rods and bayonets, and probe the walls

of the hareem rooms for hidden valuables. I am pleased to say that the

suggested operations were not entirely without some gratifying results;

but a very small find indeed gratifies the native troops. Whoever

possessed property |284| in Omdurman was either a thief or murderer.

Most had bolted with the Khaleefa, and it was through no fault of

theirs that they left a few dollars behind for people who could make

good use of them. I regret now that I did not organize a looting party,

and place myself at the head of it.

I have heard of, but I have not read, the article or articles written

by one of the correspondents who accompanied the Khartoum Expedition,

consisting of a series of wholesale charges brought against the Sirdar

and the troops in connection with “Khartoum Day.” I gauge what the

articles must have been from some of the letters written in reply. As

every one appears to have criticized and shown how much better than the

Sirdar they could have carried out the reconquest of the Soudan, as the

“oldest resident” I think I am entitled to express an opinion, and to

criticize also.

The Sirdar, in my opinion, made one grave error—he gave quarter; and I

have no doubt that, in doing so, he knew that he was doing a positive

injustice to his Black troops in order to pander to an ignorant public

opinion which he knew existed elsewhere. I know that some people,

profoundly ignorant of the Soudan and its tribes, and their history,

religion, laws, customs, and legal rights, will hold up their hands

in holy horror, and jump to the conclusion that my long captivity has

engendered a spirit of vindictiveness against my captors which has

deadened in me every sense of humanity—and in this they will be wrong.

Lord Kitchener of Khartoum made a grave error in |285| extending to

a horde of murderers the advantages of civilized warfare, _and the

clemency he felt called upon to extend to them will cost England the

loss of many a gallant life yet_.

There was not a man in the Black Battalions who had not, by the old

Law of Moses, the laws of his country in which he was then fighting,

the law of the Prophet, and the religious law, irrespective of the law

handed down from the remotest ages, more right to take a life on that

day than any judge in a civilized country has to sentence to death a

man who has personally done him no wrong. Every man there was entitled

to a life in retaliation for the murder of a father, the rape of a

mother, wife, daughter, or sister, the mutilation of a brother or son,

and his own bondage. To prevent, as the Sirdar did prevent, these

soldiers from exercising their rights, was doing them an injustice,

and running a risk as well, when it is remembered how they had slaved

for this “Day of Retaliation.” There may have been, doubtless were,

many cases of the killing outright of wounded dervishes; this was no

more murder than a judicial hanging; and looking at the matter from

a humanitarian point of view, would it not have been better to send

those Blacks over the field to put the wounded out of their misery,

and thus kill two birds with one stone? For let it be remembered, that

when a dervish sits and lies wounded, he is wounded to death, and only

by force of will keeps himself alive until he dies happy at the moment

when he sends his spear through the heart of his would-be saviour. I

repeat, the Sirdar |286| committed a grave error in extending to the

dervishes the advantages of civilized warfare. I who have lived amongst

the people, who have discussed with their greatest exponents of the

religious law, and made comparisons between the administration of their

and our laws, consider that I am well qualified to express an opinion,

and better qualified than those who, with a command of language, can

so present their views to the public that the cant, ignorance, and

humbug—not to say hankering for notoriety which underlies it all—is

hidden.

You who have held up your hands in holy horror at the foregoing,

prepare to hold them up again.

The day after the battle of Kirbekan an outpost was being sent forward.

Moving to its position, it espied a wounded dervish making signs for

water. One of the soldiers slipped off his camel to give him some, and

his comrades moved on. As time went on, and their chum did not catch

them up, they came back to see what had happened. There he was, still

attending to the wounded dervish, his hand resting on his shoulder,

but there was no movement from either. Approaching—this was the tale

plainly written. The lines on the ground showed that “Tommy” had taken

the wounded man in his arms, and half supporting and half dragging

him, had placed him in a sitting posture in the shade, with his back

against a rock; then, taking his water-bottle, he began to pour the

life-giving drops down the throat of the dervish, for he still grasped

the empty water-bottle. With returning life came, of course, returning

strength—sufficient |287| strength for the dervish to slip off his

knife, poise his hand for a second of time behind “Tommy’s” back,

while he was occupied with his mission of mercy, and then, plunging

it in with sufficient force to divide the spinal column, the dervish

died happy as “Tommy” fell dead across his shoulder. That dervish was

glorified in the Soudan, and thousands of others were awaiting the

opportunity of dying as gloriously. Do you like the picture now? These

are the sort of people you howl for the protection of. If you wish the

wounded dervishes to be attended to against their will, then institute

some special decoration for those who return alive from their mission

of mercy, and when you have discovered that for each decoration given,

a few hundred valuable lives have been sacrificed, perhaps you will

agree to the issue of orders which I, knowing what I do know, should

issue now.

If I had my say in the matter, when next the Government troops come

face to face with the tribes, whom Lord Kitchener in his clemency

spared to gather again around the Khaleefa, I should make it a

drum-head court-martialling business for any doctor who risked the

lives of his wounded in hospital by attempting to throw away his own

in attending to a wounded dervish who does not want to live. He is

wounded to death or would not be lying or sitting there, and he wants

to die—but to die killing; he wants your life’s blood, not your aid

and succour. As he wants to die—as he _must_ die—then shoot him at

once and put him out of his misery. In doing this, you are but acting

humanely to a dying but still ferocious |288| animal in the guise of

a man. You are not taking a life needlessly, but in all probability

saving a better one; and as the troops pick their way over the field

of battle, another bullet should be put into the “dead” and “wounded”

from a distance a yard beyond the point to which a dervish can throw

a spear, to prevent any more accidents. The number of soldiers killed

by “dead” and “wounded” dervishes is great enough already, and it

would be criminal to add to it. Have you no thought for some English

mother mourning the loss of her brave lad, who threw away his life in

attending to a wounded dervish, when she had been looking forward to

his return as the hero of the village? How many cottages in England

have been made desolate by the hands of “dead” and “wounded” dervishes?

If none of the foregoing suggestions are acceptable, then let each

correspondent accompanying an expedition into the heart of Africa

declare whether he votes for first aid to the wounded dervishes or not.

If he does not, then let him hold his peace if he sees things which

he would not expect to come across, were he witnessing the sequel to

a fight between civilized peoples. If he declares for first aid, then

give him a packet of bandages and a water-bottle, and let him put his

principles into practice, while his more enlightened brother knights of

the pen tag on to their despatches his obituary notice.

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A Prisoner of the Khaleefa: Twelve Years Captivity at Omdurman · 第 23 / 25 章