It is a miserable state of mind to have few things to desire, and
many things to fear; and yet that commonly is the case of kings, who,
being, at the highest, want matter of desire,[209] which makes their
minds more languishing; and have many representations of perils and
shadows, which makes their minds the less clear; and this is one
reason, also, of that effect which the Scripture speaketh of, “that
the king’s heart is inscrutable;”[210] for multitude of jealousies,
and lack of some predominant desire, that should marshal and put in
order all the rest, maketh any man’s heart hard to find or sound. Hence
it comes, likewise, that princes many times make themselves desires,
and set their hearts upon toys: sometimes upon a building; sometimes
upon erecting of an order; sometimes upon the advancing of a person;
sometimes upon obtaining excellency in some art or feat of the hand,—as
Nero for playing on the harp; Domitian for certainty of the hand with
the arrow; Commodus for playing at fence;[211] Caracalla for driving
chariots, and the like. This seemeth incredible unto those that know
not the principle, that the mind of man is more cheered and refreshed
by profiting in small things than by standing at a stay[212] in great.
We see, also, that kings that have been fortunate conquerors in their
first years, it being not possible for them to go forward infinitely,
but that they must have some check or arrest in their fortunes, turn
in their latter years to be superstitious and melancholy; as did
Alexander the Great, Diocletian,[213] and, in our memory, Charles the
Fifth,[214] and others; for he that is used to go forward, and findeth
a stop, falleth out of his own favor, and is not the thing he was.
To speak now of the true temper of empire, it is a thing rare and hard
to keep, for both temper and distemper consist of contraries; but it is
one thing to mingle contraries, another to interchange them. The answer
of Apollonius to Vespasian is full of excellent instruction. Vespasian
asked him, “What was Nero’s overthrow?” He answered, “Nero could touch
and tune the harp well; but in government sometimes he used to wind the
pins too high, sometimes to let them down too low.”[215] And certain
it is, that nothing destroyeth authority so much as the unequal and
untimely interchange of power pressed too far, and relaxed too much.
This is true, that the wisdom of all these latter times in princes’
affairs is rather fine deliveries, and shiftings of dangers and
mischiefs, when they are near, than solid and grounded courses to keep
them aloof; but this is but to try masteries with fortune, and let men
beware how they neglect and suffer matter of trouble to be prepared.
For no man can forbid the spark, nor tell whence it may come.
The difficulties in princes’ business are many and great; but the
greatest difficulty is often in their own mind. For it is common with
princes (saith Tacitus) to will contradictories: “Sunt plerumque regum
voluntates vehementes, et inter se contrariæ;”[216] for it is the
solecism of power to think to command the end, and yet not to endure
the mean.
Kings have to deal with their neighbors, their wives, their children,
their prelates or clergy, their nobles, their second nobles or
gentlemen, their merchants, their commons, and their men of war; and
from all these arise dangers, if care and circumspection be not used.
First, for their neighbors, there can no general rule be given (the
occasions are so variable), save one which ever holdeth; which is, that
princes do keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbors do overgrow
so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches,
or the like), as they become more able to annoy them than they were;
and this is generally the work of standing counsels to foresee and to
hinder it. During that triumvirate of kings, King Henry the Eighth of
England, Francis the First, King of France,[217] and Charles the Fifth,
Emperor, there was such a watch kept that none of the three could win
a palm of ground, but the other two would straightways balance it,
either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war; and would not,
in any wise, take up peace at interest; and the like was done by that
league (which Guicciardini[218] saith was the security of Italy) made
between Ferdinando, King of Naples, Lorenzius Medicis, and Ludovicus
Sforza, potentates, the one of Florence, the other of Milan. Neither is
the opinion of some of the schoolmen to be received, that a war cannot
justly be made, but upon a precedent injury or provocation; for there
is no question, but a just fear of an imminent danger, though there be
no blow given, is a lawful cause of a war.
For their wives, there are cruel examples of them. Livia is
infamed[219] for the poisoning of her husband; Roxolana, Solyman’s
wife,[220] was the destruction of that renowned prince, Sultan
Mustapha, and otherwise troubled his house and succession; Edward the
Second of England’s Queen[221] had the principal hand in the deposing
and murder of her husband.
This kind of danger is then to be feared chiefly when the wives have
plots for the raising of their own children, or else that they be
advoutresses.[222]
For their children, the tragedies likewise of dangers from them have
been many; and generally the entering of fathers into suspicion
of their children hath been ever unfortunate. The destruction of
Mustapha (that we named before) was so fatal to Solyman’s line, as the
succession of the Turks from Solyman until this day is suspected to be
untrue, and of strange blood; for that Selymus the Second was thought
to be supposititious.[223] The destruction of Crispus, a young prince
of rare towardness, by Constantinus the Great, his father, was in like
manner fatal to his house; for both Constantinus and Constance, his
sons, died violent deaths; and Constantius, his other son, did little
better, who died indeed of sickness, but after that Julianus had taken
arms against him. The destruction of Demetrius,[224] son to Philip the
Second of Macedon, turned upon the father, who died of repentance. And
many like examples there are; but few or none where the fathers had
good by such distrust, except it were where the sons were up in open
arms against them; as was Selymus the First against Bajazet, and the
three sons of Henry the Second, King of England.
For their prelates, when they are proud and great, there is also danger
from them; as it was in the times of Anselmus[225] and Thomas Becket,
Archbishops of Canterbury, who, with their crosiers, did almost try it
with the king’s sword; and yet they had to deal with stout and haughty
kings; William Rufus, Henry the First, and Henry the Second. The danger
is not from that state, but where it hath a dependence of foreign
authority; or where the churchmen come in and are elected, not by the
collation of the King, or particular patrons, but by the people.
For their nobles, to keep them at a distance it is not amiss; but to
depress them may make a king more absolute, but less safe, and less
able to perform anything that he desires. I have noted it in my History
of King Henry the Seventh of England, who depressed his nobility,
whereupon it came to pass that his times were full of difficulties and
troubles; for the nobility, though they continued loyal unto him, yet
did they not coöperate with him in his business; so that, in effect, he
was fain to do all things himself.
For their second nobles, there is not much danger from them, being
a body dispersed. They may sometimes discourse high, but that doth
little hurt; besides, they are a counterpoise to the higher nobility,
that they grow not too potent; and, lastly, being the most immediate
in authority with the common people, they do best temper popular
commotions.
For their merchants, they are “vena porta:”[226] and if they flourish
not, a kingdom may have good limbs, but will have empty veins, and
nourish little. Taxes and imposts upon them do seldom good to the
king’s revenue, for that which he wins[227] in the hundred[228] he
loseth in the shire; the particular rates being increased, but the
total bulk of trading rather decreased.
For their commons, there is little danger from them, except it be where
they have great and potent heads; or where you meddle with the point of
religion, or their customs, or means of life.
For their men of war, it is a dangerous state where they live and
remain in a body, and are used to donatives; whereof we see examples in
the Janizaries[229] and Prætorian bands of Rome; but trainings of men,
and arming them in several places, and under several commanders, and
without donatives, are things of defence and no danger.
Princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause good or evil times;
and which have much veneration, but no rest. All precepts concerning
kings are in effect comprehended in those two remembrances, “Memento
quod es homo;”[230] and “Memento quod es Deus,”[231] or “vice
Dei;”[232] the one bridleth their power and the other their will.