CLASSIFICATION OF TOPICS; STAGES OF EVOLUTION
I. PHILOSOPHIC CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES; THE ARRANGEMENT OF
VINCENT’S ENCYCLOPAEDIA, OF THE LOMBARD’S _SENTENCES_, OF
AQUINAS’S _SUMMA THEOLOGIAE_.
II. THE STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT: GRAMMAR, LOGIC, METALOGICS.
I
Having considered the spirit, the field, and the dual method, of mediaeval
thought, there remain its classifications of topics. The problem of
classification presented itself to Gerbert as one involved in the rational
study of the ancient material.[431] But as scholasticism culminated in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the problem became one of arrangement
and presentation of the mass of knowledge and argument which the Middle
Ages had at length made their own, and were prepared to re-express. This
ordering was influenced by a twofold principle of classification; for, as
abundantly shown by Aquinas,[432] theology in which all is ordered with
reference to God, will properly follow an arrangement of topics quite
unsuitable to the natural or human sciences, which treat of things with
respect to themselves. But the mediaeval practice was more confused than
the theory; because the interest in human knowledge was apt to be touched
by motives sounding in the need of divine salvation; and speculation could
not free itself of the moving principles of Christian theology. On the
other hand, an enormous quantity of human dialectic, and a prodigious mass
of what strikes us as profane information, or misinformation, was carried
into the mediaeval _Summa_, and still more into those encyclopaedias,
which attempted to include all knowledge, and still were influenced in
their aim by a religious purpose.[433]
As the human sciences came from the pagan antique, the accepted
classifications of them naturally were taken from Greek philosophy. They
followed either the so-called Platonic division, into Physics, Ethics, and
Logic,[434] or the Aristotelian division of philosophy into theoretical
and practical. The former scheme, of which it is not certain that Plato
was the author, passed on through the Stoic and Epicurean systems of
philosophy, was recognized by the Church Fathers, and received Augustine’s
approval. It was made known to the Middle Ages through Cassiodorus,
Isidore, Alcuin, Rabanus, Eriugena and others.
Nevertheless the Aristotelian division of philosophy into theoretical and
practical was destined to prevail. It was introduced to the western Middle
Ages through Boëthius’s Commentary on Porphyry’s _Isagoge_,[435] and
adopted by Gerbert; later it passed over through translations of Arabic
writings. It was accepted by Hugo of St. Victor, by Albertus Magnus and by
Thomas, to mention only the greatest names; and was set forth in detail
with explanation and comment in a number of treatises, such as
Gundissalinus’s _De divisione philosophiae_, and Hugo of St. Victor’s
_Eruditio didascalica_,[436] which were formal and schematic introductions
to the study of philosophy and its various branches.
The usual subdivisions of these two general parts of philosophy were as
follows. Theoretica (or _Theorica_) was divided into (1) Physics, or
_scientia naturalis_, (2) Mathematics, and (3) Metaphysics or Theology, or
_divina scientia_, as it might be called. Physics and Mathematics were
again divided into more special sciences. _Practica_ was divided commonly
into Ethics, Economics, Politics, or into Ethics and _Artes mechanicae_.
There was a difference of opinion as to what to do with Logic. It had, to
be sure, its position in the current Trivium, along with grammar and
rhetoric. But this was merely current, and might not approve itself on
deeper reflection. Gundissalinus speaks of three propaedeutic sciences,
the _scientiae eloquentiae_, grammar, poetics, and rhetoric, and then puts
Logic after them as a _scientia media_ between these primary educational
matters and philosophy, _i.e._ the whole range of knowledge, theoretical
and practical. Again, over against _philosophia realis_, which contains
both the _theoretica_ (or _speculativa_) and the _practica_, Thomas
Aquinas sets the _philosophia rationalis_, or logic; and Richard Kilwardby
opposes _logica_, the _scientia rationalis_, to _practica_, in his
division.[437]
The last-named philosopher was the pupil and then the hostile critic of
Aquinas, and also became Archbishop of Canterbury. He was the author of a
careful and elaborate classification of the parts of philosophy, entitled
_De ortu et divisione philosophiae_.[438] In it, following the broad
distinction between _res divinae_ and _res humanae_, Kilwardby divides
philosophy into _speculativa_ and _practica_. _Speculativa_ is divided
into _naturalis_ (physics), _mathematica_, and _divina_ (metaphysics). He
does not divide the first and third of these; but he divides _mathematica_
into those sciences which treat of quantity in continuity and separation
respectively (_quantitas continua_ and _quantitas discreta_). The former
embrace geometry, astronomy and astrology, and perspective; the latter,
music and arithmetic. _Practica_, which is concerned with _res humanae_,
is divided into _activa_ and _sermocinalis_: because _res humanae_ consist
either of _operationes_ or _locutiones_. The _activa_ embraces Ethics and
mechanics; the _scientia sermocinalis_ embraces grammar, logic, and
rhetoric. Such are Kilwardby’s bare captions; his treatise lengthily
treats of the interrelations of these various branches of knowledge.
An idea of the scholastic discussion of the classification of sciences may
be had by following Albertus Magnus’s ponderous approach to a
consideration of logic: whether it be a science, and, if so, what place
should be allotted it. We draw from the opening of his _liber_ on the
_Predicables_,[439] that is to say, his exposition of Porphyry’s
Introduction. Albert will consider “what kind of a science (_qualis
scientia_) logic may be, and whether it is any part of philosophy; what
need there is of it, and what may be its use; then of what it treats, and
what are its divisions.” The ancients seem to have disagreed, some saying
that logic is no science, since it is rather a _modus_ (mode, manner or
method) of every science or branch of knowledge. But these, continues
Albertus, have not reflected that although there are many sciences, and
each has its special _modus_, yet there is one _modus_ common to all
sciences, pertaining to that which is common to them all: the principle,
to wit, that through reason’s inquiry, from what is known one arrives at
knowledge of the unknown. This mode or method common to every science may
be considered in itself, and so may be the subject of a special science.
After further balancing of the reasons and authorities _pro_ and _con_,
Albertus concludes:
“It is therefore clear that logic is a special science just as in
ironworking there is the special art of making a hammer, yet its use
pertains to everything made by the ironworker’s craft. So this process
of discovering the unknown through the known, is something special,
and may be studied as a special art and science; yet the use of it
pertains to all sciences.”
He next considers whether logic is a part of philosophy. Some say no,
since there are (as they say) only three divisions of philosophy, physics,
mathematics, and metaphysics; others say that logic is a _modus_ of
philosophy and not one of its divisions. But, on the contrary, it is shown
by others that this view of philosophy omits the practical side, for
philosophy’s scope comprehends the truth of everything which man may
understand, including the truth of that which is in ourselves, and strives
to comprehend both truth and the process of advancing from the known to a
knowledge of the unknown. These point out that
“... the Peripatetics divided philosophy first into three parts, to
wit, into _physicam generaliter dictam_, and _ethicam generaliter
dictam_ and _rationalem_ likewise taken broadly. I call _physica
generaliter dicta_ that which embraces _scientia naturalis_,
_disciplinalis_, and _divina_ (_i.e._ physics in a narrower sense,
mathematics which is called _scientia disciplinalis_, and metaphysics
which is _scientia divina_). And I call _ethica_, that which, broadly
taken, contains the _scientia monastica_, _oeconomica_ and _civilis_.
And I call that the _scientia rationalis_, broadly taken, which
includes every mode of proceeding from the known to the unknown. From
which it is evident that logic is a part of philosophy.”
And finally it may be shown that
“if anything is within the scope of philosophy it must be that without
which philosophy cannot reach any knowledge. He who is ignorant of
logic can acquire no perfect cognition of the unknown, because he is
ignorant of the way in which he should proceed from the known to the
unknown.”
From these latter arguments, approved by him and in part stated as his
own, Albertus advances to a classification of the parts of logic, which he
makes to include rhetoric, poetics, and dialectic, and to be
demonstrative, sophistical or disputatious, according to the use to which
logic (broadly taken) is applied and the manner in which it may in each
case proceed, in advancing from the known to some farther ascertainment or
demonstration.[440] Soon after this, in discussing the subject of this
science, Albertus points out how logic differs from rhetoric and poetics,
although with them it may treat of _sermo_, or speech, and be called a
_scientia sermonalis_; for, unlike them, it treats of _sermo_ merely as a
means of drawing conclusions, and not in and for itself.
From the purely philosophical division of the sciences we pass to the
hybrid arrangement adopted by Vincent of Beauvais, who died in 1264. This
man was a prodigious devourer of books, and for a sufficient pabulum, St.
Louis set before him his collection of twelve hundred volumes. Thereupon
Vincent compiled the most famous of mediaeval encyclopaedias, employing in
that labour enormous diligence and a number of assistants. His ponderous
_Speculum majus_ is drawn from the most serviceable sources, including the
works of Albertus, his contemporary, and great scholastics like Hugo of
St. Victor, who were no more. It consisted of the _Speculum naturale_,
_doctrinale_, and _historiale_; and a fourth, the _Speculum morale_, was
added by a later hand.[441] Turning its leaves, and reading snatches here
and there, especially from its Prologues, we shall gain a sufficient
illustration of the arrangement of topics followed by this writer, whose
faculties seem to drown in his shoreless undertaking.[442]
In his turgid _generalis prologus_ to the _Speculum naturale_, Vincent
presents his motives for collecting in one volume
“... certain flowers according to my modicum of faculty, gathered from
every one I have been able to read, whether of our Catholic Doctors or
the Gentile philosophers and poets. Especially have I drawn from them
what seemed to pertain either to the building up of our dogma, or to
moral instruction, or to the incitement of charity’s devotion, or to
the mystic exposition of divine Scripture, or to the manifest or
symbolical explanation of its truth. Thus by one grand _opus_ I would
appease my studiousness, and perchance, by my labours, profit those
who, like me, try to read as many books as possible, and cull their
flowers. Indeed of making many books there is no end, and neither is
the eye of the curious reader satisfied, nor the ear of the auditor.”
He then refers to the evils of false copying and the ascription of
extracts to the wrong author. And it seems to him that Church History has
been rather neglected, while men have been intent on expounding knotty
problems. And now considering how to proceed and group his various
matters, Vincent could find no better method than the one he has chosen,
“to wit, that after the order of Holy Scripture, I should treat first of
the Creator, next of the creation, then of man’s fall and reparation, and
then of events (_rebus gestis_) chronologically.” He proposes to give a
summary of titles at the end of the work. Sometimes he may state as his
own, things he has had from his teachers or from very well-known books;
and he admits that he did not have time to collate the _gesta martyrum_,
and so some of the abstracts which he gives of these are not by his own
hand, but by the hand of scribes (_notariorum_).
Vincent proposes to call the whole work _Speculum majus_, a Speculum
indeed, or an _Imago mundi_, “containing in brief whatever, from
unnumbered books, I have been able to gather, worthy of consideration,
admiration, or imitation _as to things which have been made or done or
said in the visible or invisible world from the beginning until the end,
and even of things to come_.” He briefly adverts to the utility of his
work, and then gives his motive for including history. This he thinks will
help us to understand the story of Christ; and from a perusal of the wars
which took place “before the advent of our pacific King, the reader will
perceive with what zeal we should fight against our spiritual foes, for
our salvation and the eternal glory promised us.” From the great slaughter
of men in many wars, may be realized also the severity of God against the
wicked, who are slain like sheep, and perish body and soul.[443]
As to nature, Vincent says:
“Moreover I have diligently described the nature of things, which, I
think, no one will deem useless, who, in the light of grace, has read
of the power, wisdom and goodness of God, creator, ruler and
preserver, in that same book of the Creation appointed for us to
read.”
Moreover, to know about things is useful for preachers and theologians, as
Augustine says. But Vincent is conscious of another motive also:
“Verily how great is even the humblest beauty of this world, and how
pleasing to the eye of reason diligently considering not only the
modes and numbers and orders of things, so decorously appointed
throughout the universe, but also the revolving ages which are
ceaselessly uncoiled through abatements and successions, and are
marked by the death of what is born. I confess, sinner as I am, with
mind befouled in flesh, that I am moved with spiritual sweetness
toward the creator and ruler of this world, and honour Him with
greater veneration, when I behold at once the magnitude, and beauty
and permanence of His creation. For the mind, lifting itself from the
dunghill of its affections, and rising, as it is able, into the light
of speculation, sees as from a height the greatness of the universe
containing in itself infinite places filled with the divers orders of
creatures.”
Here Vincent feels it well to apologize for the limitlessness of his
matter, being only an excerptor, and not really knowing even a single
science; and he refers to the example of Isidore’s _Etymologiae_. He
proceeds to enumerate the various sources upon which he relies, and then
to summarize the headings of his work; which in brief are as follows:
The Creator.
The empyrean heaven and the nature of angels; the state of the good,
and the ruin of the proud, angels.
The formless material and the making of the world, and the nature and
properties of each created being, according to the order of the Works
of the Six Days.
The state of the first man.
The nature and energies of the soul, and the senses and parts of the
human body.
God’s rest and way of working.
The state of the first man and the felicity of Paradise.
Man’s fall and punishment.
Sin.
The reparation of the Fall.
The properties of faith and other virtues in order, and the gifts of
the Holy Spirit, and the beatitudes.
_The number and matter of all the sciences._
_Chronological history of events in the world, and memorable sayings,
from the beginning to our time_, with a consideration of the state of
souls separated from their bodies, of the times to come, of
Antichrist, the end of the World, the resurrection of the dead, the
glorification of the saints and the punishments of the wicked.
One may stand aghast at the programme. Yet practically all of it would go
into a _Summa theologiae_, excepting the human history, and the matter of
what we should call the arts and sciences! A programme like this might be
handled summarily, according to the broad captions under which it is
stated; or it might be carried out in such detail as to include all
available information, or opinion, touching every part of every topic
included under these universal heads. The latter is Vincent’s way.
Practically he tries to include all knowledge upon everything. The first
of his tomes (the _Speculum naturale_) is to be devoted to a full
description of the forms and species of created beings, which make up the
visible world. Yet it includes much relating to beings commonly invisible;
for Vincent begins with a treatment of the angels. He then passes to a
consideration of the seven heavens; and then to the physical phenomena of
nature; then on to every known species of plant, the cultivation of trees
and vines, and the making of wine; then to the celestial bodies, and after
this to living things, birds, fishes, savage beasts, reptiles, the anatomy
of animals,--and at last comes to man. He discusses him body and soul, his
psychology, and the phenomena of sleep and waking; then human anatomy--nor
can he keep from considerations touching the whole creation; then human
generation, and a description of the countries and regions of the earth,
with a brief compendium of history until the time of Antichrist and the
Last Judgment. Of course he is utterly uncritical, even the
pseudo-Turpin’s fictions as to Charlemagne serving him for authority.
Vincent’s Prologue to his second tome, the _Speculum doctrinale_, briefly
mentions the topics of the _tota naturalis historia_, contained in his
first giant tome. In that he had brought his matter down to God’s creation
of _humana natura, omnium rerum finis ac summa_--and its spoliation
(_destitutio_) through sin. _Humana natura_ as constituted by God, was a
_universitas_ of all nature or created being, corporeal and spiritual. Now
“in this second part, in like fashion we propose to treat of the
plenary restitution of that destitute nature.... And since that
restitution, or restoration, is effected and perfected by _doctrina_
(imparted knowledge, science), this part not improperly is called the
_Speculum doctrinale_. For of a surety everything pertaining to
recovering or defending man’s spiritual or temporal welfare
(_salutem_) is embraced under _doctrina_. In this book, the sciences
(_doctrinae_) and arts are treated thus: First concerning all of them
in general, to wit, concerning their invention, origin, and species;
and concerning the method of acquiring them. Then concerning the
singular arts and sciences in particular. And here first concerning
those of the Trivium, which are devoted to language (grammar,
rhetoric, logic); for without these, the others cannot be learned or
communicated. Next concerning the practical ones (_practica_), because
through them, the eyes of the mind being clarified, one ascends to the
speculative (_theorica_). Then also concerning the mechanical ones;
since, as they consist in making (_operatio_), they are joined by
affinity to the _practica_. Finally concerning the speculative
sciences (_theorica_), because the end and aim (_finis_) of all the
rest is placed by the wise in them. And since (as Jerome says) one
cannot know the power (_vis_) of the antidote unless the power of the
poison first is understood, therefore to the _reparatio doctrinalis_
of the human race, the subject of the book, something is prefixed as a
brief epilogue from the former book, concerning the fall and misery of
man, in which he still labours, as the penalty for his sin, in
lamentable exile.”
So Vincent begins with the fall and misery of man; the _peccatum_ and the
_supplicium_. Then he proceeds to discuss the goods (_bona_) which God
bestows, like the mental powers, by which man may learn wisdom, and how to
strive against error and vice, and be overcome solely by the desire of the
highest and immutable good. He speaks also of the corporeal goods bestowed
on man, and the beauty and utility of visible things; and then of the
principal evils;--ignorance which corrupts the divine image in man,
concupiscence which destroys the divine similitude, sickness which
destroys his original bodily immortality. “And the remedies are three by
which these three evils may be repelled, and the three goods restored, to
wit, Wisdom, Virtue, and Need.”
Here we touch the gist of the ordering of topics in the _Speculum
doctrinale_, which treats of all the arts and sciences:
“For the obtaining of these three remedies every art and every
_disciplina_ was invented. In order to gain Wisdom, _Theorica_ was
devised; and _Practica_ for the sake of virtue; and for Need’s sake,
_Mechanica_. _Theorica_ driving out ignorance, illuminates Wisdom;
_Practica_ shutting out vice, strengthens Virtue; _Mechanica_
providing against penury, tempers the infirmities of the present life.
_Theorica_, in all that is and that is not, chooses to investigate the
true. _Practica_ determines the correct way of living and the form of
discipline, according to the institution of the virtues. _Mechanica_
occupied with fleeting things, strives to provide for the needs of the
body. For the end and aim of all human actions and studies, which
reason regulates, ought to look either to the reparation of the
integrity of our nature or to alleviating the needs to which life is
subjected. The integrity of our nature is repaired by Wisdom, to which
_Theorica_ relates, and by Virtue, which _Practica_ cultivates. Need
is alleviated by the administration of temporalities, to which
_Mechanica_ attends. Last found of all is Logic, source of eloquence,
through which the wise who understand the aforesaid principal sciences
and disciplines, may discourse upon them more correctly, truly and
elegantly; more correctly, through Grammar; more truly through
Dialectic; more elegantly through Rhetoric.”[444]
Thus the entire round of arts and sciences is connected with man’s
corporeal and spiritual welfare, and is made to bear directly or
indirectly on his salvation. All constitutes _doctrina_, and by _doctrina_
man is saved. This is the reason for including the arts and sciences in
one tome, rightly called the _Speculum doctrinale_. We need not follow the
detail, but may view as from afar the long course ploughed by Vincent
through his matter. He first sketches the history of antique philosophy,
and then turns to books and language, and presents a glossary of Latin
synonyms. Book II. treats of Grammar, Book III. of Logic, Book IV. of
_Practica scientia_ or _Ethica_, first giving pagan ethics and then
passing on to the virtues of the monastic life. Book V. is a continuation
of this subject. Book VI. concerns the _Scientia oeconomica_, treating of
domestic economy, then of agriculture. Books VII. and VIII. take up
Politica, and, having discussed political institutions, proceed to a
treatment of law--the law of persons, things, and actions, according to
the canon and the civil law. Books IX. and X. consider Crimes--simony,
heresy, perjury, sacrilege, homicide, rape, adultery, robbery, usury. Book
XI. is more cheerful, _De arte mechanica_, and tells of building, the
military art, navigation, alchemy, and metals. Book XII. is Medicine, and
Books XIII. and XIV. discuss Physics, in connection with the healing art.
Book XV. is Natural Philosophy--animals and plants. Book XVI., _De
mathematica_, treats of arithmetic, music, geometry, astronomy, and
metaphysics cursorily. Book XVII. likewise thins out in a somewhat slight
discussion of Theology, which was to form the topic of the tome that
Vincent did not write.
But Vincent did complete another tome, the _Speculum historiale_. It is a
loosely chronological compilation of tradition, myth, and history, with
discursions upon the literary works of the characters coming under review.
It would be tedious to follow its excerpted presentation of the profane
and sacred matter.
We may leave Vincent, with the obvious reflection that his work is a
conglomerate, both in arrangement and contents. It has the pious aim of
contributing to man’s salvation, and yet is an attempted universal
encyclopaedia of human knowledge, much of which is plainly secular and
mundane. The monstrous scope and dual purpose of the work prevented any
unity in method and arrangement. More single in aim, and better arranged
in consequence, are the _Sentences_ of Peter Lombard and the _Summa
theologiae_ of Aquinas. For although their scope, at least the scope of
the _Summa_, is wide, all is ordered with respect to the true aim of
_sacra doctrina_, just as Thomas explained in the passage which we have
already given.
The alleged principle of the Lombard’s division strikes one as curious;
yet he got it from Augustine: _Signum_ and _res_--the symbol and the
thing: verily an age-long play of spiritual tendency lay back of these
contrasted concepts. Christian _doctrina_ related, perhaps chiefly, to the
significance of _signa_, signs, symbols, allegories, mysteries,
sacraments. It was not so strange that the Lombard made this antithesis
the ground of his arrangement. Quite as of course he begins by saying it
is clear to any one who considers, with God’s grace, that the “contents of
the Old and New Law are occupied either with _res_ or _signa_. For as the
eminent doctor Augustine says in his _Doctrina Christiana_, all teaching
is of things or signs; but things also are learned through signs. Properly
those are called _res_ which are not employed in order to signify
something; while _signa_ are those whose use is to signify.” Then the
Lombard separates the sacraments from other _signa_, because they not only
signify, but also confer saving aid; and he points out that evidently a
_signum_ is also some sort of a thing; but not everything is a _signum_.
He will treat first of _res_ and then of _signa_.
As to _res_, one must bear in mind, as Augustine says, that some things
are to be enjoyed (_fruendum_), as from love we cleave to them for their
own sake; and others are to be used (_utendum_) as a means; and still
others to be both enjoyed and used.
“Those which are to be enjoyed make us blessed (_beatos_); those which
are to be used, aid us striving for blessedness.... We ourselves are
the things which are both to be enjoyed and used, and also the angels
and the saints.... The things which are to be enjoyed are Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit; and so the Trinity is _summa res_.”
So the Lombard’s first two Books consider _res_ in the descending order of
their excellence; the third considers the Incarnation, which, if not
itself a sacrament, and the chief and sum of all sacraments, is the source
of those of the New Law, considered in the fourth Book. The scheme is
single and orderly; the difficulty will be in actually arranging the
various topics within it. Endeavouring to do so, the Lombard in Book I.
puts together the doctrine of the Trinity, the three Persons composing it,
and their attributes and qualities. Book II. considers in order, the
Angels, and very briefly, the work of the Six Days down to the creation of
man; then the Christian _doctrina_ as to man is presented: his creation
and its reasons; the creation of his _anima_; the creation of woman; the
condition of man and woman before the Fall; their sin; next free-will and
grace. Book III. treats of the Incarnation, in all the aspects in which it
may be known, and of the nature of Christ, His saving merit, and the grace
which was in Him; also of the virtues of faith, hope, and charity, the
seven gifts of the Spirit, and the existence of them all in Christ. Book
IV. considers the Sacraments of the New Law: Baptism, Confirmation, the
Eucharist, penance, extreme unction, ordination to holy orders, marriage.
It concludes with setting forth the Resurrection and the Last Judgment.
The first chapters of Genesis were the ultimate source of the Lombard’s
actual arrangement. And the _Summa_ will follow the same order of
treatment. One may perceive how naturally the adoption of this order came
to Christian theologians by glancing over Augustine’s _De Genesi ad
litteram_.[445] This Commentary was partially constructive, and not simply
exegetical; and afforded a _cadre_, or frame, of topical ordering, which
could readily be filled out with the contents of the _Sentences_ or even
of the _Summa_: God, in His unity and trinity, the Creation, man
especially, his fall, the Incarnation as the saving means of his
restoration, and then the Sacraments, and the final Judgment unto heaven
and hell. One may say that this was the natural and proper order of
presenting the contents of the Christian _sacra doctrina_.
So the great _Summa theologiae_ of Thomas Aquinas adopts the same order
which the Lombard had followed. The _Pars prima_ begins with defining
_sacra doctrina_.[446] It then proceeds to consider God--whether He
exists; then treats of His _simplicitas_ and _perfectio_; next of His
attributes; His _bonitas_, _infinitas_, _immutabilitas_, _aeternitas_,
_unitas_; then of our knowledge of Him; then of His knowledge, and therein
of truth and falsity; thereupon are considered the divine will, love,
justice, and pity; the divine providence and predestination; the divine
power and beatitude.
All this pertains to the _unitas_ of the divine essence; and now Thomas
passes on to the _Trinitas personarum_, or the more distinctive portions
of Christian theology. He treats of the _processio_ and _relationes_ of
the _divinae Personae_, and then of themselves--Father, Son, Holy Spirit,
and then of their essential relationship and properties. Next he discusses
the _missio_ of the divine Persons, and the relations between God and His
Creation. First comes the consideration of the principle of creation, the
_processio creaturarum a Deo_, and of the nature of created things, with
some discussion of evil, whether it be a thing.
Among created beings, Thomas treats first of angels, and at great length;
then of the physical creation, in its order--the work of the six days, but
with no great detail. Then man, created of spiritual and corporeal
substance--his complex nature is to be analysed and fathomed to its
depths. Thomas discusses the union of the _anima ad corpus_; then the
powers of the anima, _in generali_ and _in speciali_--the intellectual
faculties, the appetites, the will and its freedom of choice; how the
_anima_ knows--the full Aristotelian theory of cognition is given. Next,
more specifically as to the creation of the soul and body of the first
man, and the nature of the image and similitude of God within him; then as
to man’s condition and faculties while in a state of innocence; also as to
Paradise.
This closes the treatment of the _creatio et distinctio rerum_; and Thomas
passes to their _gubernatio_, and the problem of how God conserves and
moves the corporeal and spiritual; then concerning the action of one
creature on another, and how the angels are ranged in hierarchies, and
although purely spiritual beings, minister to men and guard them; then
concerning the action of corporeal things, concerning fate, and the action
of men upon men.
Here ends _Pars prima_. The first section of the second part (_Prima
secundae_) begins. In a short Prologue Thomas says:
“Because man is made in the image of God, that is, free in his thought
and will, and able to act through himself (_per se potestativum_),
after what has been said concerning the Exemplar, God, and everything
proceeding from the divine power according to His will, it remains for
us to consider His image, to wit, man, in so far as he is the source
or cause (_principium_) of his own works, having free-will and power
over them.”
Hereupon Thomas takes up in order: the ultimate end of man; the nature of
man’s beatitude, and wherein it consists, and how it may be attained; then
voluntary and involuntary acts, and the nature and action of will; then
fruition, intention, election, deliberation, consent, and actions good and
bad, flowing from the will; then the passions; concupiscence and pleasure,
sadness, hope and despair, fear, anger; next habits (_habitus_) and the
virtues, intellectual, cardinal, theological; the gifts of the Spirit, and
the beatitudes; the vices, and sin, and penalty. Thereupon it becomes
proper to consider the external causes (_principia_) of acts: “The
external cause (_principium_) moving toward good is God; who instructs us
through law, and aids us through grace. Therefore we must speak, first of
law, then of grace.” So Thomas discusses: the _essentia_ of law, and the
different kinds of law--_lex aeterna_, _lex naturalis_, _lex
humana_--their effect and validity; then the precepts of the Old Law (of
the Old Testament); then as to the law of the Gospel and the need of
grace; and lastly, concerning grace and human merit.
The _Secunda secundae_ (the second division of the second part) opens with
a Prologue, in which the author says that, having considered generally the
virtues and vices, and other things pertaining to the matter of ethics, it
is needful to consider these same matters more particularly, each in turn;
“for general moral statements (_sermones morales universales_) are less
useful, inasmuch as actions are always _in particularibus_.” A more
special statement of moral rules may proceed in two ways: the one from the
side of the moral material, discussing this or that virtue or vice; the
other considers what applies to special orders (_speciales status_) of
men, for instance prelates and the lower clergy, or men devoted to the
active or contemplative religious life. “We shall, therefore, consider
specially, first what applies to all conditions of men, and then what
applies to certain orders (_determinatos status_).” Thomas adds that it
will be best to consider in each case the virtue and corresponding gift,
and the opposing vice, together; also that “virtues are reducible to
seven, the three theological,[447] and the four cardinal virtues. Of the
intellectual virtues, one is Prudence, which is numbered with the cardinal
virtues; but ars does not pertain to morals, which relate to what is to be
done, while ars is the correct faculty of making things (_recta ratio
factibilium_).[448] The other three intellectual virtues, _sapientia_,
_intellectus_, _et scientia_, bear the names of certain gifts of the Holy
Spirit, and are considered with them. Moral virtues are all reducible to
the cardinal virtues; and therefore, in considering each cardinal virtue,
all the virtues related to it are considered, and the opposite vices.”
This classification of the virtues seems anything but clear. And perhaps
the weakest feature of the _Summa_ is this scarcely successful ordering,
or combination, of the Aristotelian virtues with those more germane to the
Christian scheme. However this may be, the author of the _Summa_ proceeds
to consider in order: _fides_, and the gifts (_dona_) of _intellectus_ and
_scientia_ which correspond to the virtue faith; next the opposing vices:
_infidelitas_, _haeresis_, _apostasia_, _blasphemia_, and _caecitas
mentis_ (spiritual blindness). Next in order come the virtue _spes_, and
the corresponding gift of the Spirit, _timor_, and the opposing vices of
_desperatio_ and _praesumptio_.[449] Next, _caritas_, with its _dilectio_,
its _gaudium_, its _pax_, its _misericordia_, its _beneficentia_ and
_eleemosyna_, and its _correctio fraterna_; then the opposite vices,
_odium_, _acedia_, _invidia_, _discordia_, _contentio_, _schisma_,
_bellum_, _rixa_, _seditio_, _scandalum_. Next the _donum sapientiae_, and
its opposite, _stultitia_; next, _prudentia_, and its correspondent gift,
_consilium_; and its connected vices, _imprudentia_, _negligentia_, and
its evil semblances, _dolus_ and _fraus_.
Says Thomas: _Consequenter post prudentiam considerandum est de Justitia_.
Whereupon follows a juristic treatment of _jus_, _justitia_, _judicium_,
_restitutio_, _acceptio personarum_; then _homicide_ and other crimes
recognized by law. Then come the virtues, connected with _justitia_, to
wit, _religio_, and its acts, _devotio_, _oratio_, _adoratio_,
_sacrificium_, _oblatio_, _decimae_, _votum_, _juramentum_; then the vices
opposed to _religio_: _superstitio_, _idolatria_, _tentatio Dei_,
_perjurium_, _sacrilegium_, _simonia_. Next is considered the virtue of
_pietas_; then _observantia_, with its parts, i.e. _dulia_ (service),
_obedientia_, and its opposite, _inobedientia_. Next, _gratia_ (thanks) or
_gratitudo_, and its opposite, _ingratitudo_; next, _vindicatio_
(punishment); next, _veritas_, with its opposites, _hypocrisis_,
_jactantia_ (boasting), and _ironia_; next, _amicitia_, with the vices of
_adulatio_ and _litigium_. Next, the virtue of _liberalitas_, and its
vices, _avaritia_ and _prodigalitas_; next, _epieikeia_ (_aequitas_).
Finally, closing this discussion of all that is connected with _Justitia_,
Thomas speaks of its corresponding gift of the Spirit, _pietas_.
Now comes the third cardinal virtue, _Fortitudo_--under which _martyrium_
is the type of virtuous act; _intimiditas_ and _audacia_ are the two
vices. Then the parts of _Fortitudo_, to wit, _magnanimitas_,
_magnificentia_, _patientia_, _perseverantia_, and the obvious opposing
vices. Next, the fourth cardinal virtue, _Temperantia_, its obvious
opposing vices, and its parts, to wit, _verecundia_, _honestas_,
_abstinentia_, _sobrietas_, _castitas_, _clementia_, _modestia_,
_humilitas_, and the various appropriate acts and opposing vices related
to these special virtues.
So far,[450] Thomas has been considering the virtues proper for all men;
and now he comes to those specially pertaining to certain kinds of men,
according to their gifts of grace, their modes of life, or the diversity
of their offices, or stations. Of the special virtues related to gifts of
grace, the first is _prophetia_, next _raptus_ (vision), then _gratia
linguarum_, and _gratia miraculorum_. After this, the _vita activa_ and
_contemplativa_, with their appropriate virtues, are considered. And then
Thomas proceeds to speak _De officiis et statibus hominum_, and their
respective virtues.
Here ends the _Secunda secundae_, and _Pars tertia_ opens with this
Prologue:
“Inasmuch as our Saviour Jesus Christ (as witnesseth the Angel,
_populum suum salvum faciens a peccatis eorum_) has shown in himself
the way of truth, through which we are able to come to the beatitude
of immortal life by rising again, it is necessary, for the
consummation of the whole theological matter, after the consideration
of the final end of human life, and of the virtues and vices, that our
attention should be fixed upon the Saviour of all and His benefactions
to the human race.
“As to which, first one must consider the Saviour himself; secondly,
His sacraments, by which we obtain salvation; thirdly, concerning the
end (_finis_), immortal life, to which we come by rising again through
Him.
“As to the first, one has to consider the mystery of the Incarnation,
in which God was made man for our salvation, and then those things
that were done and suffered by our Saviour, that is, God incarnate.”
This Prologue indicates sufficiently the order of topics in the _Pars
tertia_ of the _Summa_, through Quaestio xc., at which point the hand of
the Angelic Doctor was folded to eternal rest. He was then considering
_penance_, the fourth in his order of Sacraments. All that he had to say
as to the person, and attributes, and acts and passion of Christ had been
written; and he had considered the Sacraments of baptism, confirmation,
and the eucharist; he was occupied with _poenitentia_; and still other
sacraments remained, as well as his final treatment of the matters which
lie beyond the grave. So he left his work unfinished, and, in spite of
many efforts, unfinishable by any of his pupils or successors.[451]
II
Inasmuch as the matter of their thoughts was transmitted to the men of the
Middle Ages, and was not drawn from their own observation or constructive
reasoning, the fundamental intellectual endeavour for mediaeval men was to
apprehend and make their own, and re-express. Their intellectual progress
followed this process of appropriation, and falls into three
stages--learning, organically appropriating, and re-expressing with added
elements of thought. Logically, and generally in time, these three stages
were successive. Yet, of course, they overlapped, and may be observed
progressing simultaneously. Thus, for example, what was known of Aristotle
at the beginning of the twelfth century was slight compared with the
knowledge of his philosophy that was opened to western Europe in the
latter part of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth. And while,
by the middle of the twelfth century, the elements of Aristotle’s logic
had been thoroughly appropriated, the substantial Aristotelian philosophy
had still to be learned and mastered, before it could be reformulated and
re-expressed as part of mediaeval thought.
Looking solely to the outer form, the three stages of mediaeval thought
are exemplified in the Scriptural Commentary of the later Carolingian
time, in the twelfth-century _Books of Sentences_, and at last in the more
organic _Summa theologiae_. With this significant evolution and change of
outer form, proceeded the more substantial evolution consisting in
learning, appropriating, and re-expressing the inherited material. In both
cases, these three stages were necessitated by the greatness of the
transmitted matter; for the intellectual energies of the mediaeval period
were fully occupied with mastering the data proffered so pressingly, with
presenting and re-presenting this superabundant material, and recasting it
in new forms of statement, which were also expressions, or realizations,
of the mediaeval genius. So the mediaeval product may be regarded as given
by the past, and by the same token necessitated and controlled. But, on
the other hand, each stage of intellectual progress rendered possible the
next one.
The first stage of learning is represented by the Carolingian period,
which we have considered. It was then that the patristic material was
extracted from the writings of the Fathers, and rearranged and reapplied,
to meet the needs of the time. The mastery of this material had scarcely
made such vital progress as to enable the men of the ninth and tenth and
eleventh centuries to re-express it largely in terms of their own
thinking. In the ninth century, Eriugena affords an extraordinary
exception with his drastic restatement of what he had drawn from
Pseudo-Dionysius and others; and at the end comes Anselm, whose genius is
metaphysically constructive. But Anselm touches the coming time; and the
springs of Eriugena’s genius are hidden from us.
As for the antique thought during these Carolingian centuries, Eriugena
dealt in his masterful way with what he knew of it through patristic and
semi-patristic channels. But let us rather seek it in the curriculum of
the Trivium and Quadrivium. What progress Gerbert made in the Quadrivium,
that is, in the various branches of mathematics which he taught, has been
noted, and to what extent his example was followed by his pupil Fulbert,
at the cathedral school of Chartres.[452] The courses of the
Trivium--grammar, rhetoric, logic--demand our closer attention; for they
were the key of the situation. We must keep in mind that we are
approaching mediaeval thought from the side of the innate human need of
intellectual expression--the impulse to know and the need to formulate
one’s conceptions and express them consistently. For mediaeval men the
first indispensable means to this end was grammar, including rhetoric, and
the next was logic or dialectic. The Latin language contained the sum of
knowledge transmitted to the Middle Ages. And it had to be learned. This
was true even in Italy and Spain and France, where each year the current
ways of Romance speech were departing more definitely from the parent
stock; it was more patently true in the countries of Teutonic speech.
Centuries before, the Roman youth had studied grammar that they might
speak and write correctly. Now it was necessary to study Latin grammar, to
wit, the true forms and literary usages of the Latin tongue, in order to
acquire any branch of knowledge whatsoever, and express one’s
corresponding thoughts. And men would not at first distinguish sharply
between the mediating value of the learned tongue and the learning which
it held.[453]
Thus grammar, the study of the Latin language, represented the first stage
of knowledge for mediaeval men. This was to remain true through all the
mediaeval centuries; since all youths who became scholars had to learn the
language before they could study what was contained in it alone. One may
also say, and yet not speak fantastically, that grammar, the study of the
correct use of the language itself, corresponded spiritually with the main
intellectual labour of the Carolingian period. Alcuin’s attention is
commonly fixed upon the significance of language, Latin of course. And the
labours of his pupil Rabanus, and the latter’s pupil Walafrid, are as it
were devoted to the grammar of learning. That is to say, they read and
endeavour to understand the works of the Fathers; they compare and
collate, and make volumes of extracts, which they arrange for the most
part as Scripture commentaries; commentaries, that is, upon the
significance of the canonical writings which were the substance of all
wisdom, but needed much explication. Such works were the very grammar of
knowledge, being devoted to the exposition of the meaning of the
Scriptures and the vast burden of patristic thought. A like purpose was
evinced in the efforts of the great emperor himself to re-establish
schools of grammar, in order that the Scriptures might be more correctly
understood, and the expositions of the holy Fathers. In fine, just as
knowledge of the Latin tongue was the end and aim of grammar, so a correct
understanding of what was contained in Latin books was the aim of the
intellectual labours of this period. It all represented the first stage in
the mediaeval acquisition of knowledge, or in the presentation or
expression of the same; and thus the first stage in the mediaeval
endeavour to realize the human impulse to know.
The next course of the Trivium was logic; and likewise its study will
represent truly the second stage in the mediaeval realization of the human
impulse to know, to wit, the second stage in the appropriation and
expression of the knowledge transmitted from the past. We have spoken at
some length of the logical studies of Gerbert, and his endeavours to
adjust his thinking and classify the branches of knowledge by means of
formal logic.[454] Those discussions of his which seem somewhat puerile to
us, were essential to his endeavours to formulate what he had learned, and
present it as rational and ordered knowledge. Logic is properly the stage
succeeding grammar in the formulation of rational knowledge. At least it
was for men of Gerbert’s time, and the following centuries. Rightly
enough they looked on logic as a _scientia sermotionalis_, which on one
side touched sheer linguistics, and on the other, had for its field the
further processes of reason. Thus Hugo of St. Victor, Abaelard’s very
great contemporary, says:
“Logic is named from the Greek word _logos_, which has a twofold
interpretation. For _logos_ means either _sermo_ or _ratio_; and
therefore logic may be termed either a _scientia sermotionalis_ or a
_scientia rationalis_. _Logica rationalis_ embraces dialectic and
rhetoric, and is called _discretiva_ (argumentative and exercising
judgment); _logica sermotionalis_ is the genus which includes grammar,
dialectic and rhetoric, to wit, discursive science
(_disertiva_).”[455]
The close connection between grammar and logic is evident. Logic treats of
language used in rational expression, as well as of the reasoning
processes carried on in language. Its elementary chapters teach a rational
use of language, whereby men may reach a more deeply consistent expression
of their thoughts than is gained from grammar. Yet grammar also is logic,
and based on logical principles. All this is exemplified in the logical
treatises composing the Aristotelian _Organon_, which the Middle Ages
used. First comes Porphyry’s _Isagoge_, which clearly is bound up in
language. Likewise Aristotle’s _Categories_ treat of the rational and
consistent use of language, or of what may be stated in language. Next it
is obvious that the _De interpretatione_ treats of language used to
express thought, its generic function. The more advanced treatises of the
_Organon_, the _Prior_ and _Posterior Analytics_, the _Topics_, and
_Sophistical Elenchi_, treat directly and elaborately of the reasoning
processes themselves. So one perceives the grammatical affinities of the
simpler treatises in the _Organon_. The more advanced ones seem to stand
to them as oratorical rhetoric stands to elementary grammar. For the
_Analytics_, _Topics_, and _Sophistical Elenchi_ are a kind of _eristic_,
training the student to use the processes of thought and their expression
in order to attain an end, commonly argumentative. The prior treatises
have taught the elements, as it were the orthography and etymology of the
rational expression of thought in language; the latter (even as syntax and
rhetoric), train the student in the use of these elements. And one
observes a nice historical fitness in the fact that only the simpler
treatises of the _Organon_ were in common use in the early Middle Ages,
since they alone were necessary to the first stage in the appropriation of
the substance of patristic and antique thought. The full _Organon_ was
rediscovered, and retaken into use in the middle or latter part of the
twelfth century, when men had progressed to a more organic appropriation
of the patristic material and what they knew of the antique philosophy.
Thus in mediaeval education, and in the successive order of appropriating
the patristic and the antique, logic stood on grammar’s shoulders. It was
grammar’s rationalized stage, and treated language as the means of
expressing thought consistently and validly; that is, so as not to
contravene the necessities of that whereof it was the vehicle. And since
language thus treated was in accord with rational thought, it would accord
with the realities to which thought corresponds; and might be taken as
expressing _them_. This last reflection introduces metaphysics.
And properly. For the three stages in the mediaeval appropriation and
expression of knowledge were grammar, logic, metaphysics. Logic has to do
with the processes of thought; with the positing of premises and the
drawing of the conclusion. It does not necessarily consider whether the
contents of its premises represent realities. This is matter for ontology,
metaphysics. Now mediaeval metaphysics, which were those of Greek
philosophy, were extremely pre-Kantian, in assuming a correspondence
between the necessities or conclusions of thought and the supreme
realities, God and the Universe. Nor did mediaeval logic doubt that its
processes could elucidate and express the veritable natures of things. So
mediaeval logic readily wandered into the province of metaphysics, and
ignored the line between the two.
Yet there is little metaphysics in the _Organon_; none in its simpler
treatises. So there was none in the elementary logical instruction of the
schools before the twelfth century at least.[456] One may always
distinguish between logic and metaphysics; and it is to our purpose to do
so here. For as we have taken logic to represent the second stage in the
mediaeval appropriation of knowledge, so metaphysics, poised in turn on
logic’s shoulders, is very representative of the third stage, to wit, the
stage of systematic and organic re-expression of the ancient matter, with
elements added by the great schoolmen.
Metaphysics was very properly the final stage. The grammatical represented
an elementary learning of what the past had transmitted; the logical a
further retrying of the matter, an attempt to understand and express it,
formulate parts of it anew, with deeper consistency of expression. Then
follows the attempt for final and universal consistency: final inasmuch as
thought penetrates to the nature of things and expresses realities and the
relationships of realities; and universal, in that it seeks to order and
systematize all its concepts, and bring them to unity in a _Summa_--a
perfected scheme of rational presentation of God and His creation. This
will be, largely speaking, the final endeavour of the mediaeval man to
ease his mind, and realize _his_ impulse to know and express himself with
uttermost consistency.
So for mediaeval men, metaphysics stood on logic’s shoulders and
represented the final completion of their thought, in a universal system
and scheme of God and man and things.[457] But the first part of this
proposition had not been true with Greek philosophy. Metaphysics is
properly occupied with being, in its ultimate essence and relationships;
with the consistent putting together of things, to wit, the presentation
or expression of them so as not to disagree with any of the data
recognized as pertinent. The thinker considers profoundly, seeking to
penetrate the ultimate reality and relationships of things, through which
a universal whole is constituted. This makes ontology, metaphysics--the
science of being, of causes, and so the science of the first Cause, God.
Aristotle called this the “first” philosophy, because lying at the base of
all branches of knowledge, and depending on nothing beyond itself. Some
time after his death, the Peripatetics and then the Neo-Platonists called
this first science by the name of Metaphysics, “after” or “beyond”
physics, if one will, perhaps because of the actual order of treatment in
the schools.
The term Metaphysics is vague enough; either “first” philosophy or
“ontology” is preferable. Yet as to Greek philosophy the term has apt
historical suggestiveness. For it did come after physics in time, and was
in fact evoked by the imperfect method and consequent contradictions of
the earlier philosophies. From the beginning, Greek philosophy drove
straight at the cause or origin of things--surely the central problem of
metaphysics. Thales and the other Ionians began with rational, though
crude, hypotheses as to the sources of the universe. These were first
attempts to reach a consistent expression of its origin and nature. Each
succeeding philosopher considered further, from the vantage-ground of the
recognized inconsistencies or inadequacies in the theories of his
predecessors. He was thus led on to consider more profoundly the essential
relationships of things, the very truth of their relationships, and on and
on into the problem of their being. For the verity of relations must be
according to the verity of being of the things related. The world about us
consists in relationships, of antecedents and sequences, of cause and
effect; and our thought of it is made up of consistencies or
contradictions, which last we struggle to eliminate, or to transform to
consistencies.
These early philosophers looked only to the Aristotelian material cause
for the origin and cause of things; yet reflection plunged them deeper
into a consideration of the nature of being and relationships. The other
causes were evoked by Anaxagoras and then by Plato, and by them were led
into the arena of debate; and philosophers discussed the efficient and
final cause as well as the material. Such discussions are recognized by
Plato, and finally by Aristotle as relating to the first principles of
cognition and being, and so as constituting metaphysics. The constant
search for a deeper consistency of explanation had led on and on through a
manifold consideration of those palpable relationships which make up the
visible world; it had disclosed the series of necessary assumptions
required by those visible relationships; and thus the search for causality
and origins, and essential relationships, became one and the
same--metaphysics.
Metaphysics was not ineptly called so, since it had in time come after the
cruder physical hypotheses. But such was not the order of _mediaeval_
intellectual progress. The Middle Ages passed through no preliminary
course of physical hypotheses, explanatory of the universe. Not physics,
but logic (introduced by grammar) led up to the final construction--or
rather adoption and reconstruction--of ultimate hypotheses as to God and
man, led up to the all-ordering and all-compassing _Theologia_.
_Metalogics_, rather than Metaphysics, would be the proper name for these
final expressions or actualizations of the mediaeval impulse to know.