Cinarca. He had been educated in Pisa, and the Republic had assisted
him to regain and increase his hereditary possessions in the island.
Governing there as a vassal of Pisa, he nevertheless transferred his
allegiance to the Genoese, who occupied another part of the island.
Later on, after perpetrating every species of cruel and tyrannous
deeds, he turned against the Genoese and devastated their Corsican
towns. Taking refuge at Pisa, that republic granted him protection as
a former vassal, equally regardless of the subsequent treaties, by
which he had sworn fealty to Genoa, and of all the barbarities he had
committed. Pisa tried to reinstate Sinucello in Corsica by force, but
as the Genoese were determined to keep him at a distance, this served
to provoke hostilities. In fact, being sent back to the island with
120 horse and 200 foot, he was able to recapture his possessions; but
from that moment (1282) the Genoese and Pisan ships were always chasing
one another over the Mediterranean in order to engage. Accordingly,
from the end of 1282 to the August of 1283, a continual series of
sanguinary conflicts took place, sometimes attaining the proportions of
real naval battles; and although the Pisans were generally defeated,
they always rallied their forces, and prepared to resume the struggle.
On one occasion half their fleet perished in a storm; nevertheless,
shortly after this (1284) they sent twenty-four galleys to escort Count
Fazio to Sardinia, where collisions with the Genoese were of constant
occurrence. In fact, on the 1st of May, they encountered the latter's
fleet, gave battle, and carried on an obstinate fight that lasted
the whole day. Finally, however, the Pisans were beaten off, leaving
thirteen galleys and a great number of prisoners in the enemy's hands.
Notwithstanding this reverse, the same year witnessed another naval
battle between the two republics, that proved one of the most memorable
fights on record in the Middle Ages.
Genoa, whose victories had cost her dear, caused vessels to be built
and equipped in every port of the Riviera; while Pisa, although
exhausted by so many conflicts on sea and land, made prodigious
efforts of all kinds. By appealing to the patriotism of her noblest
families, she elicited a worthy response. The Lanfranchi, a numerous
Pisan clan, equipped no less than eleven galleys at their own expense;
the Gualandi, Lei, and Gaetani, furnished six; the Sismondi three;
the Orlandi four; the Upezzinghi five; the Visconti three; the Moschi
two; and other families joined in equipping one. Andrea Morosini,
the Venetian, one of the highest naval celebrities of the time, was
chosen Podestà, with full powers to make all requisite preparations
for the war, and to then assume the chief command of the fleet at sea.
Thus both sides sent forth the most formidable armaments to be seen
in those times. Genoese writers reckon their vessels to have been
ninety-six in number, and those of Pisa seventy-two; whereas Pisan
historians reckon their fleet at 103 sail against 130 of the Genoese.
At any rate, both are agreed that the Genoese fleet outnumbered the
Pisan, and that its superiority was enhanced by the greater skill of
its commanders. The two armadas cruised in search of each other for
some time, and then tacked about before giving battle, each trying to
gain the better position. It is averred that the Pisans sailed to the
entrance of the port of Genoa, discharging silver arrows and balls
covered with purple cloth, in order to make a display of wealth, after
the usage of the time. Anyhow, it is known that some of their galleys
were anchored off Porto Pisano, and others lying in the Arno, between
the two bridges of the city, when the news came that the Genoese fleet
had been sighted. All Pisa was in a turmoil; scattered crews hastened
on board, and the archbishop, attended by his clergy, and bearing the
banner of the Republic, appeared on the Ponte Vecchio, and blessed
the fleet. Thereupon, amid joyful shouts, the galleys weighed anchor,
and swept down the river to the sea. It is related that at the moment
the benediction was pronounced the crucifix on the standard fell down,
which was judged a bad omen.
The 6th of August, 1284, was a memorable day. The two fleets met off
Meloria, at a short distance from Porto Pisano. Here in past times
the Genoese had been severely defeated by the Pisans, and here they
now sought revenge in the famous battle so fully recorded by our
historians. The remoteness of the event, and the discrepancies between
Tuscan and Genoese accounts, make it very difficult to obtain absolute
knowledge of all the details of this fight. Accordingly it will be
safer to fix our attention on the best ascertained and more remarkable
points.
The Pisan fleet consisted of three squadrons. Of these, Admiral Andrea
Morosini commanded the first; while the second was under Count Ugolino,
who, in spite of his courage, was no trustworthy leader, on account of
the devouring personal ambition urging him to subordinate the interests
of the State to his own greed for power. The third was commanded by
Andreotto Saracini. Oberto Doria, an officer of great courage and
experience, was high admiral of the Genoese fleet. As it first hove in
sight, this armada seemed no greater than that of the Pisans, but only
because a reserve of thirty galleys, commanded by Benedetto Zaccaria,
lay hidden behind Meloria--or, according to other accounts, behind
Montenero--ready to join in the fight when required. Soon after midday
the battle began, and raged for some hours without any decisive result.
But when the two flag-ships met, both fleets closed in a general
engagement. On either side vast numbers of combatants, killed, wounded,
or stunned, were hurled into the sea. The waves were crimsoned with
blood; drowning men clutched at oars to save their lives, but were
relentlessly thrust under by the rowers' next strokes, owing to the
impossibility of checking the manoeuvres in the thick of the fight,
and at the most critical moment. Just then Benedetto Zaccaria, having
been signalled for, hove in sight, full sail, and with sweeping oars,
in time to decide the fate of the day. Seeing him draw near, the Pisans
knew they were outnumbered, and their courage began to fail, although
they continued the fight with undiminished ardour. As Zaccaria dashed
in, he contrived to bring his galley alongside Doria's, so as to wedge
Morosini, whose flag-ship was making a gallant defence. At the same
time the galley bearing the Pisan standard was also surrounded by the
foe. On all sides the sudden arrival of the reserve squadron had given
fresh courage to the Genoese and diminished the hopes of Pisa. The
struggle was now too unequal; nevertheless, both sides were unwilling
to end it, for each bitter enemy was seeking to destroy not only the
other's fleet, but the very life of the rival Republic.
But the conflict could not go on for ever. The Pisan banner, on its
tall iron shaft, was suddenly seen to bend, and the next instant it
fell with a horrible crash beneath a storm of blows, while at the same
moment the admiral's flag-ship began to give way, and Morosini, who
had been shockingly wounded in the face, was forced to surrender. At
this juncture Count Ugolino, for his own treasonable purposes, gave
the signal for flight, and thus completed the catastrophe. Seven Pisan
galleys were sunk, twenty-eight captured by the foe, while, according
to the inscription on the Church of St. Matteo at Genoa, no less than
9,272 prisoners were taken. Certain Pisan writers raise the number to
eleven, and some even to fifteen thousand; but this may have included
many of the slain, who may undoubtedly be reckoned at five thousand.
At all events, after the battle of Meloria, it became a common saying
in Tuscany that one must now go to Genoa in order to see Pisa.
When those who had escaped returned to Pisa, all the town flocked into
the streets to ask news of their kindred, and nearly all had to mourn
the loss of some killed or captured relations. A host of old men,
women, and children wandered about the city maddened with despair, so
that at last the magistrates were forced to ordain that all should
keep to their own homes. Soon all the inhabitants were clad in black,
and only women were seen in the streets. Genoa, on the contrary,
rejoiced and made glad; but victory had no wise softened its hatred
against Pisa. This was proved when the fate of the prisoners came to
be discussed. Some citizens proposed putting them to a heavy ransom;
others to exchange them for the Castel di Castro in Sardinia, the key
of the Pisan possessions there; but neither suggestion was approved.
Orators raised their voices, crying that it were best to retain the
prisoners until the war should be really at an end. Thus the women,
being practically widowed, but unable to re-marry, population would
be checked, and the Pisan army prevented from repairing its losses.
In fact, the war continued sixteen years longer; and by the time the
prisoners were released, their number was reduced to one thousand and
odd, all the rest having succumbed to disease, old age, injuries, or
hardships.
VIII.
It is difficult to decide which rose to greater proportions during
these years--the heroic endurance of calamity on the part of the
Pisans, or the insatiable hatred of their victors. Soon after the
catastrophe of Meloria, Florence and Lucca proposed an alliance with
Genoa, in order to join that power in completing the extermination of
the rival republic. This alliance was to be maintained for twenty-five
years from the conclusion of the war. Hostilities were to commence
within fifteen days, Genoa being pledged to provide fifty galleys,
and Florence and Lucca to furnish an army. Thus the allies could make
combined attacks by sea and by land, and were bound to carry on the
campaign for at least forty days every year. Pisa understood that
her total overthrow was decreed, and her detestation of Lucca, and
still more of Florence, was so keen that, to avoid yielding to those
states, she professed her readiness to accept instead the terms of
submission Genoa had sought to impose. But it was now too late. On
the 13th of October the treaty of alliance was subscribed, in the
Badia at Florence, by delegates from Lucca and Genoa, together with
the representatives of Florence, of whom Brunetto Latini was one. An
arrangement was also made allowing the other Tuscan cities to join the
League, and, what was far more remarkable, another clause provided for
the admission of Pisan prisoners of influential position who should
have sworn to make war on their own state. Even Count Ugolino, his
sons, and the Judge of Gallura, were to be admitted on the same terms,
provided they became Genoese citizens and acknowledged the suzerainty
of Genoa over their estates. Nevertheless, no prisoners were to be
admitted without the general consent of the allies, and were not to
exceed twenty in number. This clause clearly proves that many Pisans
were traitorous, or disposed to treason. Nor was Florence forgetful
of the aim she had constantly in view; for even on this occasion she
took care to insert profitable commercial agreements in the treaty of
political alliance.[323]
Several other cities of Tuscany speedily adhered to the League, and
preparations for war began. Pisa was soon surrounded on all sides.
The Florentines marched into Val d'Era, the Lucchese captured several
castles, while Spinola's Genoese squadron attacked Porto Pisano and
wrought much damage there. Suddenly, however, the Florentines showed so
much slackness in lending their aid, as to excite the grave discontent
of Lucca and Genoa. Their chief object was to promote their own
commerce; hence, while anxious to break Pisa's pride, and reduce the
city to submission on the plan pursued with other Tuscan towns, it did
not suit their views to let the Genoese usurp the chief share of the
work, much less the lion's share of the profit. Yet, as things stood,
the latter's naval superiority rendered this result only too certain.
For, were Genoa once mistress of Pisa, the Mediterranean would be
practically hers, and, with so much increased power, would be truly
formidable to Florence.
Accordingly, after raising such a host of enemies against Pisa, the
Florentines now tried to turn things to their own exclusive advantage,
and, with the usual double dealing of the period, paid little respect
to the treaties they had sworn to observe. The Pisans instantly saw
their opportunity and sought to profit by it; but in so bungling a
fashion as to hasten their ruin. As we have already related, they had
vainly attempted to come to terms with Genoa, and, their grievous
calamities rendering them unable to cope with assailants equally
formidable by land and by sea, they now made endeavours to conciliate
Florence. For this purpose they nominated Count Ugolino to the office
of Podestà, and even entrusted him subsequently with the direction of
the war, in spite of the general belief that he had played the traitor
at Meloria. For, knowing him to be Guelph, and secretly favourable to
the Florentines, they considered him fitted to fulfil their purpose
of detaching the latter from the Genoese interests. They knew, also,
that the count was absorbed in the single idea of establishing his own
domination in Pisa; therefore he would be ready to come to terms, if
required, with the enemies of his country, and be capable of the worst
crimes in order to gratify his enormous ambition. But, this ambition
once sated, the Pisans believed that, possessing many friends among
the Guelphs, his courage and astuteness would enable him to arrange
satisfactory terms. This proved to be the case, but his intervention
led to very unexpected results.
The chroniclers relate that Ugolino sent the rectors of Florence a
present of Vernaccia wine, with gold florins at the bottom of every
flask as a bribe.[324] This legend merely signifies that he was
considered capable of employing any means to attain his own ends. At
all events, he was obliged to impose very cruel sacrifices on Pisa
before the Florentines could be induced to suspend hostilities. It was
necessary to cede important domains, castles such as Sta Maria a Monte,
Fucecchio, Sta Croce, and Monte Calvoli, and to restore the city to the
Guelphs by banishing all the Ghibellines--the direst humiliation to a
republic that had always been steadfastly Ghibelline. But, with her
very existence at stake, Pisa was bound to submit even to this.
When, however, the Genoese and Lucchese discovered that the Florentines
had deserted them and were siding with Pisa against Lucca, they
complained so bitterly of this breach of faith, that Count Ugolino
deemed it well to at least silence Lucca by the cession of Bientina,
Ripafratta, and Viareggio. In this manner the haughty Pisan Republic
was stripped of nearly all its territories outside the city gates, and
deprived of all power of defending the coast, at a time when its ships
were being chased and plundered by the Genoese on every sea. Amid the
general ruin and desolation, however, Ugolino triumphed; for now, being
absolute lord of Pisa, his dearest desire was fulfilled. Nevertheless,
his power was much less secure than he supposed, for the fiery Pisan
spirit was not entirely extinguished, and already the majority of the
citizens were growing intolerant of a tyranny at home failing to spare
them humiliations abroad. The smallest occasion served to show that
public feeling was on the verge of an outbreak.
Much discontent was also provoked in the course of negotiations
with Genoa for the restitution of the prisoners, comprising many of
Pisa's best sons. Their release was desired at any cost; but the
count, knowing them to be Ghibellines, and consequently opposed to
himself, daily invented fresh obstacles to prevent their return, and
by proposing terms the Pisans could not accept, always caused fresh
delays. Thus, as he intended, no conclusion could be arrived at. But
his arrogance finally produced discord even among his own party. His
nephew, Nino Visconti, judge of Gallura, and the natural head of the
Guelph faction, began to make overtures to the Ghibellines for the
purpose of combating his uncle. Thereupon Ugolino promptly sent many
other Ghibellines into exile, and demolished ten of their grandest
palaces. This produced an outburst of indignation. Nino made close
alliance with the Gualandi and Sismondi, and all tried to hasten the
prisoners' release, while the count found fresh pretexts for delay by
reviving causes of dispute with Genoa.
After vain attempts to rouse the people against him, Nino and his
friends resorted to legal measures, hoping in this way to curb his
tyrannous excesses. He had been nominated Captain-general of the
people, but had illegally usurped the office of Podestà in addition,
and fixed his residence in the palace of the Signory, where he had no
right to dwell. His nephew and the others sued him for this before the
_Anziani_, and obliged him to leave the palace in conformity with the
law. He obeyed for a short time, but soon resumed his former supremacy
by force. Meanwhile, party hatred grew stronger, the count fomenting
discord with Genoa, while his enemies, as another means to his
overthrow, were doing their utmost to conclude peace and deliver the
prisoners.
At last the count discerned his peril, and tried to find some way
of escape. Seeing that certain Guelphs were no less hostile than
the Ghibellines and had joined with them against him, he decided on
conciliating the latter, in order to detach them from the Guelphs who
had forsaken his cause. Thus he might at once defeat these deserters,
and, having isolated the Ghibellines, find it easy to destroy them
later on.
But, in spite of these ingenious devices, both parties finally combined
against him, under the command of Archbishop Ruggiero, one of the most
powerful of the Ghibellines. Civil war raged in the city; the public
palace was alternately seized by the archbishop, and re-captured by
the count; while the latter, blinded by his fury for revenge, rejected
the warnings and advice of even his closest adherents. One day, when
the popular discontent had come to a climax, in consequence of the
high price of provisions, and no one ventured to inform him of it, one
of his nephews demanded audience, explained the state of things, and
advised him to suspend the levying of customs, so as to lower the price
of food. But this enraged the count to such a point that, drawing his
dagger, he stabbed the speaker in the arm. A nephew of the archbishop
chanced to be present, and being a friend of the wounded man, rushed
forward to shield him from further attack. Thereupon the count,
maddened with fury, caught up an axe that lay near, and with one blow
stretched the intruder dead at his feet.
The Archbishop Ruggieri dissimulated for a while, waiting his chance
to take revenge. It came at last. On July 1, 1288, the council of
the Republic was assembled in the Church of St. Sebastian to discuss
the arrangement of peace with Genoa. Both the Ghibellines and people
yearned for peace at any cost; but the count raised fresh obstacles,
still relying on the support of his friends. As the meeting dispersed,
the archbishop perceived that the favourable moment had arrived, and
that no time must be lost. The Gualandi, Sismondi, Lanfranchi and other
houses joined with him, and all proceeded to attack Ugolino. The latter
made a valiant resistance, aided by two of his sons, two nephews,
and a few devoted followers. After the first encounter, in which
Ugolino's natural son was slain before his eyes, he took refuge in the
palace of the people, and defended it from midday to dusk, when the
besiegers decided to set it on fire. Then, forcing their way through
the flames, they captured the count, with his two younger sons, Gaddo
and Uguccione, and his nephews Nino, surnamed Brigata, and Anselmuccio.
The prisoners were thrown into the Gualandi tower on the Piazza degli
Anziani, and Ruggieri kept them most closely confined there for several
months.[325] Finally the key of the tower was cast into the Arno,
and all left to die of starvation, amid the torments immortalised by
Dante's pen.[326]
IX.
These events, while still further reducing the strength of the
unfortunate city, likewise caused the overthrow of the Pisan Guelphs,
by once more driving them into exile, and promoted the hopes of the
Ghibellines, who now seemed to have gained new life in Tuscany.
Accordingly Florence was again compelled to recur to arms. Charles
I of Anjou was no more, and Pope Honorius, being favourable to the
Ghibellines, had instigated his kinsman, Prenzivalle del Fiesco, to
assume the post of vicar-imperial in Tuscany, But as the cities of
the League gave him a very rough reception, he retired to Arezzo, and
vainly promulgated edicts against the Guelphs. By this time no one
heeded the words of Imperial vicars. On realising this he went back to
Germany, leaving Arezzo a prey to conflicts, in which the Ghibellines
won the victory, with the help of numerous Florentine exiles. The
Guelphs sought refuge in neighbouring castles, whither reinforcements
reached them from the Florentine Signory. Thus the war spread even to
the Upper Val d'Arno; for as the Ghibellines had returned to power,
both in Arezzo and Pisa, led by the spiritual lord of either town, they
had now to be encountered on two sides. In Pisa their chief was the
Archbishop Ubaldini, in Arezzo, Guglielmo degli Ubertini, an equally
Ghibelline prelate. The latter was also a better warrior than priest,
the lord of many strongholds, and being of a very slippery nature,
first attempted to betray the city to the Florentines, in return for
an agreement guaranteeing him his possessions. The men of Arezzo
contrived, however, to compel him to keep faith with his own party.
On June 1, 1288, the army of the League took the field. It comprised
nobles and _popolani_ from every part of Tuscany, and together with
the mercenary troops reached a total of 2,600 horse and 12,000 foot.
They carried on the campaign for twenty-two days, capturing and razing
about forty castles, great and small, on the Aretine territory; but
then a great storm wrought so much damage to their encampments, that
they were forced to beat a retreat. As a mark of insult to the enemy,
they had held races under the walls of Arezzo, naming twelve knights
_di corredo_;[327] but then, raising the siege, they went back to
Florence, leaving their foes unconquered and undismayed. In fact, when
the Siennese separated from the main body on the way to their own city,
they were surprised by a band of Aretines in ambush, and thoroughly
routed.
During the month of August the Florentines joined with the Pisan
Guelph exile, Nino di Gallura, made raids on Pisan lands, and occupied
the Castle of Asciano; then, in September, they marched against the
Aretines, who had now gathered an army of seven hundred horse and eight
thousand foot. No pitched battle, however, took place, for the enemy
retreated before the Florentines, leaving them to devastate the country
at their will, but afterwards made reprisal in the beginning of 1289,
by laying waste the Florentine territory, and penetrating almost as far
as San Donato. These variously important skirmishes paved the way for
more serious hostilities.
All Tuscany was now preparing for war. The captain elected by Pisa was
Count Guido da Montefeltro, who had risen to the highest distinction by
his victory over the French troops of Charles of Anjou at the battle
of Forlì. He was undoubtedly one of the bravest warriors of the time,
and on his arrival in Pisa quickly reorganised the militia, and created
a new body of light infantry of three thousand crossbowmen, able to
do good service against the heavy cavalry then considered the chief
strength of an army. On the other hand, the Aretines increased their
forces so much, that when Charles II. of Anjou passed through Florence
on the way to his coronation in Naples, the Florentines were obliged to
grant him an escort of their best horse and foot soldiers, to protect
him from the attack threatened by the men of Arezzo. On this occasion
they asked the king for a good leader, to enable them to pursue the
campaign energetically, and Amerigo de Narbonne being appointed to the
post, he joined them, accompanied by William de Durfort and one hundred
men-at-arms.
On June 2, 1289, the new captain, Narbonne, took the field with an army
of one thousand horse and ten thousand foot soldiers of the League. It
comprised the flower of the Florentine nobles and commons, including
six hundred of the best-equipped knights ever furnished by the city.
Prato, Pistoia, Sienna, and all the allies, including the Guelphs
of Romagna, had sent their due contingents. Meanwhile the Aretines
had collected all the Ghibellines from neighbouring cities, and were
encamped at Bibbiena with eight hundred horse and eight thousand foot,
under the command of their captains, the greatest of whom was the
daring Bishop Guglielmo degli Ubertini. On finding that he could not
make terms with Florence to secure his own strongholds, without being
exposed to the vengeance of the Aretines, he had plunged into the war
with youthful ardour. His conduct was arrogant and full of assurance;
for he relied on his own courage and that of his men, and despised the
Florentines, because, so he said, they were as sleek as womenfolk.
On the 11th of June the two armies met in the plain of Poppi, near
Campaldino, where the engagement began. The battle is known by that
name, and rendered all the more celebrated by the fact of Dante
Alighieri--then young and unknown--having fought in it. The Florentines
had placed a mixed host of infantry, crossbowmen, and bucklermen in
the van, and their wings were formed of 150 skirmishing light horse,
who were all picked men. Vieri de' Cerchi was among the latter; for,
having been entrusted with the choice of those of his _sestiere_, he
insisted, in spite of illness, on accompanying his son and nephews to
the battlefield. In the rear of the first division a stronger force
of heavy cavalry and infantry was drawn up, with the baggage-train
behind. Corso Donati led a band of about 250 foot and horse from Lucca,
Pistoia, and foreign parts. He was Podestà of Pistoia at the time, and
was directed to hold his reserve back until the commander-in-chief
gave the signal to advance. On either side there was a fever of
emulation between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines, and to gratify the
ambition of their respective leaders, some were awarded the honour
of knighthood that day, in order to spur them to greater feats. The
Florentines were under orders to await the enemy's charge, and Messer
Simone dei Mangiadori of San Miniato shouted to his men, "Signori!
our Tuscan battles used to be won by vigorous assault, but are now to
be won by standing still." The Aretines, on the contrary, trusting
to their own courage and their leader's skill, made so impetuous a
charge to the cry of "_Viva San Donato!_" that the Florentine army
wavered, and gave way before the shock. Nearly all the light horse
were hurled from their saddles, and the main body fell back. But the
foot soldiers flanking the second corps moved forward to the cry of
"_Narbona cavaliere!_" and by threatening to surround the enemy,
checked its advance, and thus gave their comrades time to re-form.
Count Guido Novello, in command of 150 Aretine mounted skirmishers,
lost his presence of mind, and by failing to attack the foe at the
moment when their ranks were in confusion, caused much harm by the
delay. But this was his usual behaviour, and presently, as the fight
grew hotter, he took to flight--also as usual. On the other hand,
Corso Donati, although instructed to keep his men steady, and not to
advance until expressly summoned, could not remain inert on beholding
the Florentines waver at the first shock of encounter, and cried aloud,
"If we lose, I will perish with my fellow-citizens; if we win, let who
likes come to Pistoia to punish our disobedience;" and so saying, gave
the command to take the enemy in flank. Thus the attacking Aretines
were now charged in their turn. They made an admirable resistance, and
their cavalry being insufficient, the infantry crawled on all fours
among the advancing troops, and disembowelled their steeds. But no
prodigies of personal courage could avail to decide the battle. There
was a fierce and prolonged mêlée; the Florentines fought stubbornly,
and nearly all the leaders of the Aretines were killed. Archbishop
Ubertini fell, sword in hand; so, too, his nephew, Guglielmino dei
Pazzi, held to be one of the bravest captains in Italy, and Buonconte,
the Count of Montefeltro's son. Many Florentines perished, including
three of the Uberti and one of the Abbati. Count Guido Novello alone
saved his skin by flight. The Aretines were thoroughly routed, and,
according to Villani, left seventeen hundred dead on the field, and two
thousand prisoners in the enemy's hands. But of these only 740 reached
Florence, the rest having escaped or been ransomed. This is not very
surprising, when we remember that in these Guelph and Ghibelline wars
fellow-citizens, and old friends or relations, often had to meet in
combat; and that consequently leniency was more natural than hatred,
although there are only too many instances of the ferocity to which
the latter feeling was carried. The Florentine losses were slight and
unimportant. Corso Donati, whose daring charge greatly contributed
to decide the struggle, and Vieri de' Cerchi were both covered with
glory. Many men previously deemed of little account won high reputation
that day, while many others forfeited their fame. At any rate, all the
best citizens and captains returned safely to Florence, and there was
general rejoicing in the city.[328]
The Florentines had felt assured of victory from the outset. In fact
we are told that the priors, having fallen asleep on the day of the
battle, worn out by their previous vigils, they were suddenly awakened
by the sound of a voice seeming to cry: "Arise, for the Aretines
are beaten." At that moment all the citizens were in the streets,
waiting impatiently the arrival of news. At last the desired messenger
appeared, and there was an outburst of joy and festivity. Later on
discontent was excited by hearing that the army had failed to follow
up the victory by giving pursuit to the foe. For had the latter been
driven back into Arezzo, that town might have been easily seized.
Instead of this, the forces captured Bibbiena, belonging to the bishop,
plundered several castles, and devastated the country for twenty
days. They ran races round the walls of Arezzo, and used their rams
to drop asses crowned with mitres into the town, in order to insult
its inhabitants. But they suspended all serious hostilities for the
time, although, when the new priors had been chosen, the government at
once despatched two of them to the camp, in order to push forward the
war in person, and hasten the capture of the city. But the favourable
moment had passed, for the Aretines made some successful sallies, and
set fire to all the besiegers' engines of assault. Accordingly, leaving
a sufficient force to guard the captured castles and unfinished
siege-works, the Florentines returned home on the 23rd of July, much
to the displeasure of the citizens, who murmured that the enemy's gold
must have been poured into the camp. Nevertheless, a great victory had
been won, and the soldiers were received with vast demonstrations of
delight. All the people, with the banners and insignia of every guild,
and the whole of the clergy, went forth in procession to welcome the
conquerors. The Captain, Amerigo de Narbonne, and Ugolino de' Rossi,
the Podestà, entered the town in state, beneath sumptuous canopies
of cloth of gold, borne by the noblest of Florentine knights. The
entire cost of the campaign was paid by levying a property tax of six
_lire_, six _soldi_ per cent. in the city and its territory. This tax
soon yielded a product of thirty-six thousand gold florins, owing,
as Villani remarks (vii. 132), to the admirable administration and
organisation of the financial affairs of the Commune at that time.
After humiliating the two hostile cities of Arezzo and Pisa, the
Florentine Republic had overthrown the Ghibellines and assured the
triumph of the Guelphs throughout Tuscany, and thus gained almost
unlimited influence, both political and commercial. Hence there was a
vast and rapid increase of prosperity. Great festivities and banquets
were held in all the wealthiest houses, and palace courtyards, covered
with silken canopies and draped with gorgeous stuffs, served as places
of entertainment for the citizens. In token of rejoicing the womenfolk
paraded the streets wearing garlands of flowers. Nevertheless, there
was a general wish to continue the war, in the hope of completing the
overthrow of the two most powerful Ghibelline cities. This, however,
was no easy task.
In 1289 there were fresh skirmishes between the Guelphs and
Ghibellines, although none of any importance. The Florentines made
several attempts to capture Arezzo by force and by fraud, but always
in vain. In November they had contrived a secret arrangement by means
of which it was hoped to surprise the city. A decree was suddenly
issued summoning all able-bodied men to assemble outside the walls
before a candle lighted at one of the gates should have time to burn
down. The army thus hastily gathered made a forced march on Arezzo; but
the treason plotted there had been already discovered: a dying man,
rumour said, having revealed it to his confessor. At any rate, the army
was obliged to withdraw from a bootless errand.
In the June of the ensuing year, 1290, the Florentines resumed the
campaign with an army of 1,500 horse and 6,000 foot, furnished by the
League. Surrounding Arezzo, they devastated the territory within a
circuit of six miles, for the space of twenty-nine days, but without
achieving any farther result. At that period all cities were fortified,
and before the invention of gunpowder siege operations had no chance
of success, save by treason, against a resolute defence. Now, too, the
Florentines were trying to carry on a double campaign, against Arezzo
on the one hand and Pisa on the other. In fact, presently leaving three
hundred horse and a considerable number of foot soldiers to garrison
the neighbouring strongholds, they transferred the rest of the army
from the Upper to the Lower Val d'Arno, to act against Pisa.
In the preceding year, aided by Florence and the League, Lucca had
taken the field with four hundred horse and two thousand foot, in
order to carry on the war with Pisa, while the Florentines were busied
with Arezzo. This force encamped before Pisa, and, according to usage,
held races there; harried the territory for twenty-five days, captured
the Castle of Caprona, and made several assaults on Vico Pisano, but
achieved no farther result. Now, in 1290, the Florentines resumed the
attack in combination with all the great forces of the League. And
while this army was making a general attack by land, the Genoese fleet
swooped down on the coast with deadly effect. Leghorn and Porto Pisano
were taken, the four towers guarding the harbour were thrown into the
sea, and the Meloria lighthouse destroyed in the same way, together
with its keepers. Before setting sail the Genoese blocked the mouth of
the harbour by sinking four ships laden with ballast, and demolished
all warehouses and palaces. But the havoc wrought by land was confined
to the destruction of crops and the demolition of petty strongholds.
Meanwhile the Pisans made a brave resistance on all sides. Guido di
Montefeltro, their captain, used his newly invented troop of light
horse to excellent effect against the Tuscan infantry of the League and
the heavy cavalry in its pay. By his successful sallies he repeatedly
achieved a bloody revenge for past losses. In December, 1291, the
Pisans marched on the Castle of Pontedera, and finding it slackly
defended, accomplished its capture, and shortly afterwards stirred
the Castle of Vignale to revolt against San Miniato. Thereupon the
Florentines decided on sending an army to provoke a fresh engagement;
but the expedition was too long delayed, and the troops had hardly
started before torrents of rain inundated the country and compelled
them to retreat.
Military operations now slackened more and more, for mischief was
brewing in the city, and all men foresaw that worse troubles were at
hand. Therefore, although urged to resume hostilities by their valiant
and energetic leader, the Judge of Gallura, the Florentines so sorely
needed tranquillity that they finally concluded a treaty of peace
at Fucecchio on June 12, 1293. According to its stipulations, all
prisoners of war were to be released; no duties were to be levied on
inhabitants of the communes of the League in passing through Pisa, nor
on Pisans passing through the said communes. The office of Podestà or
Captain of Pisa was only to be held by a member of the League, and it
was expressly forbidden to confer that post on any rebel or adversary
of the said League, or any scion of the Montefeltro house. Further,
Count Guido, the brave chief who had shown so much energy and daring
in defence of the Pisan Republic, was to be dismissed, together with
all the foreign Ghibellines; and twenty-five citizens of the best
Pisan blood were to be given in hostage to secure the due observance
of the terms. Such was the reward of the veteran leader's fidelity and
heroism! On being paid off, he entered the council chamber, and after
reproving the ingratitude of the Pisans in dignified words, took his
leave without expressing any wish for revenge. Yet, being still in
command of an experienced army devoted to himself, vengeance lay in his
power, had he chosen to follow the fashion of the times. Another clause
of the treaty provided that the descendants of Count Ugolino and the
Judge of Gallura should be freed from outlawry and reinstated in all
their possessions.[329]
X.
From this moment the Florentines devoted their chief attention to the
affairs of the city, although these had not been altogether neglected,
even during the last wars. Continual improvements had been made in
the administration of the Republic, and in many respects it was a
model administration, while there was also a notable increase of
commerce, trade, and wealth. At the same time many public works had
been completed under the direction of the famous architect Arnolfo
di Cambio, the creator of some of the grandest public buildings in
Florence. He planned the alterations for the enlargement of the city,
first undertaken in 1285, and afterwards built the third circuit
of walls, the which work was also superintended by the celebrated
chronicler Giovanni Villani. It was likewise by Arnolfo's care that
the Loggia of Or' San Michele, then used as a corn market, was built
in and paved, the Piazza dei Signori supplied with a pavement, and the
Badia embellished and restored. Folco Portinari, the father of Dante's
Beatrice, founded, at his own expense, the church and hospital of Santa
Maria Nuova. The Piazza of Santa Maria Novella was laid out, and many
other public works of a similar kind were begun.[330]
Meanwhile political reforms were uninterruptedly carried on, and among
them the notable measure passed in 1289, reducing the Podestà's term of
office from twelve to six months.[331] The post was then conferred on
Rosso Gabrielli of Gubbio, a city supplying many Podestàs and Captains
of the people not only to Florence, but to all parts of Italy. At that
period Romagna, Umbria, and the Marches seemed to be a nursery of these
dignitaries, the inhabitants of those provinces being not only well
trained to arms, as is proved by the horde of captains and soldiers of
adventure they sent forth, but also well versed in the legal lore of
the neighbouring university of Bologna. This reduction to six months of
the Podestà's tenure of office was not long maintained, but had been
decreed for the same motives as the change of Signory every two months.
The power of a magistrate authorised to administer justice, in command
of the army and invariably escorted by a body of armed followers in his
private pay, might be easily transformed into a formidable despotism,
as several Italian republics had already found to their cost. Hence
it was endeavoured to avert this danger from Florence by changing
the magistrates so frequently as to allow no time for hatching plots
against the Commonwealth, or forming a party whose adherence could be
counted on for any length of time.
But political and social changes of a very different and far graver
kind were now brewing among the citizens of Florence. Signs of a new
and radical transformation were becoming daily more pronounced; hence
the greater need of assuring peace in order to withstand the inevitable
and imminent shock of coming revolutions. The presence of the Angevins
in Florence, the example set by their nobles, and their continual
creation of new knights, had swelled the arrogance of the leading
Guelphs to a boundless extent. These patricians were now known by the
name of _grandi_, and in imitation of the French nobility assumed
manners ill-suited to a republican state, trying to rule everything
and all men according to their will. A serious riot took place in
1287, because one of these chieftains, named Totto Mazzinghi, being
condemned to death by the Podestà for murder and other crimes, Messer
Corco Donati, one of the leading nobles of Florence, attempted to
rescue him by force on the way to the scaffold. Thereupon the Podestà,
resenting such open violation of the law, caused the alarm bell to be
rung. The people flocked to the place of execution sword in hand, some
mounted, some on foot, to the cry of "_Giustizia, Giustizia!_" and the
sentence was then carried out with the uttermost rigour of the law.
The condemned Mazzinghi was dragged through the streets before being
hung; the promoters of the revolt against the magistrates were heavily
fined, and order was re-established in the city. But these disturbances
were indicative of deeper evils to come, and Florentine statesmen were
full of anxiety. In order to check the arrogance of the _grandi_,
and prevent them from combining with the populace, the middle-class
Guelphs began to grant political rights on a continuously wider scale,
while restricting the power of the nobles. As we have already seen,
the latter had been obliged to provide sureties personally responsible
for their actions, to swear to abstain from deeds of vengeance, from
oppressing the people and so forth. The very remarkable law passed
on August 6, 1289, served to overthrow the might of the nobles, both
within and without the city walls, and to enhance that of the people by
destroying the last lingering remains of the feudal system. Thanks to
this decree, serfdom was entirely abolished throughout the territory;
for in terms resembling a proclamation of the rights of man, it
declared liberty to be an imprescriptible, natural right, a right never
to be dependent on another's will; and that the Republic was determined
not only to maintain liberty intact throughout its dominions, but
likewise increase the same.[332] Thus every species of bondage, whether
for a term or for life, was abolished, together with all contracts or
agreements infringing on the liberty of the individual.
It has been thought by some writers that the Commune of Bölogna had
already achieved this most important reform in 1256, and that Florence
only followed its example thirty-three years later. But this was an
error induced by supposing that in the Italian communes the abolition
of serfdom was completed at one stroke, whereas, on the contrary, it
was carried out very slowly and in different degrees. In the territory
there were not only _nobles_ and their _serfs_, but also _fideles_,
whose personality was already recognised by law, but who still remained
dependents of the _nobiles_ and bound to yield them service and
tribute. At a later date the condition of the _fideles_ was further
ameliorated; they could hold land in fee from their lords, or by
payment of a yearly rent (a _livello_), but remained bound to them on
terms of villeinage, and therefore bound to the soil. For this reason
the lords believed, or feigned to believe themselves entitled to sell
the soil, together with the _fideles_ attached to it, even when this
was no longer in accordance with the spirit of the law. The Bölognese
abolished serfdom in 1256, but the peasantry remained in their master's
dependence, that is, more or less as _fideles_, and although these
conditions were ameliorated in 1283 they were not altogether abrogated.
But even earlier than 1289 serfs had ceased to exist in the Florentine
territory, and, judicially, the _fideles_ had been long considered
almost independent of their masters, although the latter, by the abuse
of purely personal contracts, often compelled them to remain attached
to the soil and claimed the right of disposing of them, as well as
of the land. These were the abuses condemned and suppressed by the
Florentines in 1289, as being adverse to liberty, "the which is a
natural and therefore inalienable right." The new law likewise decreed
that in consequence of this natural right all the above-mentioned sales
became null and void; and cancelling every illegal contract, it finally
guaranteed complete freedom to the peasantry. And by another clause
every peasant was thenceforth enabled (irrespective of any sale of the
land) to purchase his emancipation from any personal contract binding
him to the proprietor of the soil. Thus the law of 1289 did not abolish
serfdom, inasmuch as that institution had been already suppressed by
the Florentines some time before, but it assured, for the first time,
complete liberty to the cultivators of the soil. Economically, the new
law was very advantageous to the Commune, by converting the peasantry
into direct contributors, and no less advantageous to the democracy,
inasmuch as it broke the last links of the feudal system, and weakened
the power of the nobles throughout the _contado_.[333]
Many other measures were also passed in 1289 and 1290 for the purpose
of strengthening the position of the people in the city, and serving to
show that Florence steadily pursued the work of political and social
transformation. First of all, the number of legally constituted guilds
was increased by adding five more to the seven greater guilds, and
all having their special insignia, organisation, arms, and political
attributes.[334] We now find records of twelve greater guilds in the
archives of the Republic, whereas, previously to this date, seven
only were mentioned. It is true that the number was very soon reduced
again to seven; but then the five omitted were joined to nine others,
these fourteen designated as the lesser guilds, and the total number
of the guilds was finally fixed at twenty-one. In 1290 another law was
passed, called _the law of prohibition_, decreeing that no prior could
be re-elected to office until three years had elapsed. Later on this
prohibition was partially extended even to the kinsmen of a prior.[335]
The scope of these measures was always to prevent the rise of any
future tyranny and to keep the growing arrogance of the nobles in check.
Other laws were also framed for the same purpose. As, for instance,
the two decrees carried almost unanimously on June 30, and July 3,
1290.[336] By these all guild-masters were prohibited, under severe
penalties, from forming monopolies, agreements, compacts, fictitious
sales, or other arrangements tending to the imposition of arbitrary
prices, regardless of the rules prescribed by statute. And not only the
individuals guilty of such infringement were subject to punishment and
to be mulcted in the sum of 100 _lire_, but the guild to which they
belonged was also subject to a fine of 500 _lire_ for neglecting to
enforce obedience to the laws, and its rectors and consuls were to be
mulcted in 200 _lire_.
On January 2, 1291, another law was passed of a far weightier import,
with the clearly expressed aim of curbing by force the wolfish
rapacity of the nobles (volentes lupinas carnes salsamentis caninis
involvi).[337] This decree rigorously prohibited recourse to any
tribunal or magistrate save to the legally constituted authorities,
such as the priors, the Captain, Podestà, or the judges in ordinary
of the Commune. All persons having obtained from the Pope, Emperor,
King Charles, or their respective vicars exemptions of any kind, or
right of appeal to other magistrates, and pretending to exercise such
right, and all persons who, with the same intent, should assert the
power of exercising old feudal privileges, were warned to refrain
from attempting to use such rights under penalty of the severest
punishment. The new law minutely described different forms of similar
fictitious exemptions, and determined the penalties incurred by
their use. What seems strangest of all is, that this law decreed the
punishment not only of persons asserting and trying to exercise the
above-mentioned rights, of the notaries transcribing the acts, and the
lawyers declaring them valid; but in cases where the real criminals
should escape punishment, it likewise held responsible the relations
and distant connections of the guilty, and even their labourers and
tenants. At that period the populace, the well-to-do burghers and the
nobles (_grandi_) formed as it were three classes of citizens, or,
indeed, three distinct social bodies, who both for offence and defence,
in all questions of party rancour, revenge or political privilege,
acted as though every one was willingly and of necessity bound to be
responsible for the deeds of his colleagues. Hence, recognising this
state of things, certain extreme measures were decreed, which, although
opportune and even imperative at the moment--in order to forward
the democratic cause by assisting the weak to struggle against the
powerful class--were none the less arbitrary. However, the necessity of
employing the most stringent remedies was becoming daily more obvious.
The nobles had been too much uplifted by the favours heaped on them by
the Pope and the Angevins. And the brilliant success recently achieved
at Campaldino, where victory had been decided by the prowess of Corso
Donati and Vieri de' Cerchi, had so swelled their pride that they
openly vaunted their contempt for the law, and constantly violated its
prescriptions. This state of things finally produced the revolution of
1293, resulting in the constitution of the second popular government
(_il secondo popolo_) and the total overthrow of the nobles.
NOTE A.
"In Dei nomine amen. Anno sue salutifere incarnationis
millesimo ducetesimo octuagesimo nono, indictione secunda,
die sexto intrante mense augusti. Cum libertas, qua cuiusque
voluntas, non ex alieno, sed ex proprio dependet arbitrio,
iure naturali multipliciter decoretur, qua etiam civitates et
populi ab oppressionibus defenduntur, et ipsorum iura tuentur
et augentur in melius, volentes ipsam et eius species non
solum manutenere, sed etiam augmentare, per dominos Priores
Artium civitatis Florentie, et alios Sapientes et bonos viros
ad hoc habitos, et in domo Ghani Foresii et Consortum, in
qua ipsi Priores pro Comuni morantur, occasione providendi
super infrascriptis unanimiter congregatos, ex licentia,
bailia et auctoritate in eos collata, et eisdem eshibita et
concessa in Consiliis et per Consilia domini Defensoris et
Capitanei et etiam Comunis Florentie, provisum, ordinatum
extitit salubriter et firmatum: Quod nullus, undecumque sit et
cuiuscumque conditioni dignitatis vel status existat, possit
audeat vel presumat per se vel per alium tacite vel espresse
emere, vel alio aliquo titulo, iure, modo vel causa adquirere
in perpetuum vel ad tempus aliquos Fideles. Colonos perpetuos
vel conditionales, Adscriptitios vel Censitos vel aliquos
alios cuiuscumque conditionis existant, vel aliqua alia iura
scilicet angharia vel perangharia, vel quevis alia contra
libertatem et condictionem persone alicuius, in civitate vel
comitatu vel districtu Florentie; et quod nullus, undecumque
sit, et cuiusque condictionis, dignitatis vel status existat,
possit, audeat vel presumat predicta vel aliquid predictorum
vendere, vel quovis alio titulo alienare, iure modo vel causa
concedere in perpetuum vel ad tempus alicui persone, undecumque
sit, vel cuiusque condictionis dignitatis vel status, in
Civitate vel comitatu vel districtu Florentie, decernentes
irritum et inane et ipso iure non tenere, si quid in contrarium
fieret in aliquo casu predictorum. Et tales contractus et
alienationes quatenus procederent, de facto cassantes, ita
quod nec emptoribus vel acquisitoribus ius aliquod acquiratur,
nec etiam ad alienantes vel concedentes ins redeat, vel
quomodolibet penes eos remaneat: sed sint tales Fideles, vel
alterius conditionis astricti, et eorum bona, et filii et
descendentes libere condictionis et status. Et nihilominus
tales alienantes, vel quomodolibet in alios transferentes,
in perpetuum vel ad tempus, per se vel per alium et quilibet
eorum, et ipsorum et cuiusque eorum sindici, procuratores et
nuntii, et tales emptores, vel alio quovis titulo, modo, causa
vel iure acquirentes, per se vel per alium in perpetuum modo
vel ad tempus, et eorum procuratores, sindici et nuntii et
iudices et notarii et testes, qui predictis interfuerint vel ea
scripserint, et quilibet eorum, condempnentur in libris mille
f. p., que effectualiter exigantur, non obstantibus aliquibus
pactis vel conventionibus, etiam iuramento vel pena vallatis,
iam factis vel in posterum ineundis, super predictis vel aliquo
predictorum vendendis, permutandis vel alio quovis modo vel
titulo transferendis. Quos contractus supradicti domini Priores
et Sapientes nullius valoris et roboris fore decreverunt, et
quatenus de facto processissent vel procederent, totaliter
cassaverunt et cassant. Decernentes etiam quod si aliquis
non subiectus iurisdictioni Comunis Florentie, et qui non
respondeat in civilibus et criminalibus regimini florentino,
vel non solvat libras et factiones Comunis Florentie,
undecunque sit, per se vel per alium, predictos contractus vel
aliquem predictorum iniret aliquo modo iure vel causa, quod
pater et fratres et alii propinquiores ipsius, si patrem vel
fratrem non haberet, et quilibet eorum condempnentur in libris
mille f. p., que pena effectualiter exigatur; reservantes
etiam sibi et populo florentino potestatem super predictis et
quolibet predictorum acrius providendi contra tales concedentes
vel concessiones recipientes per se vel per alium in aliquibus
casibus de predictis. Et quod in predictis omnibus et singulis
et circa predicta domini Potestas et Defensor et Capitaneus
presentes et futuri et quilibet eorum plenum, merum et liberum
arbitrium habeant et exercere debeant contra illos, qui in
predictis vel circa predicta committerent in personis et rebus,
ita et taliter quod predicta omnia et singula effectualiter
observentur et executioni mandentur. Salvo tamen quod Comuni
Florentie quilibet possit licite vendere et in ipsum Comune
predicta iura transferre; et etiam ipsi Fideles et alii
supradicti se ipsos et eorum filios et descendentes et bona
licite possint redimere sine pena; et illi tales qui talia
iura haberent, possint ipsa iura ipsis fidelibus volentibus
se redimere vendere et eos liberare a tali iure licite et
impune. Et hec omnia et singula locum habeant ad futura et
etiam ad preterita, a kallendis ianuarii proxime presentis
citra, currentibus annis Domini millesimo CC^{o} LXXXVIII^{o}
indictione secunda."
This law was read and approved of in the general and special
council of the captain and of the _capitudini_, as was the
custom, but not in that of the Podestà. It has been published
many times, but not without mistakes and omissions: by the
lawyer Migliorotto Maccioni in a work of his in favour of
the Counts of Gherardesca (vol. ii. p. 74); by C. F. Von
Rumohr, "Ursprung der Besitzlosigkeit des Colonen in neuren
Toscana" (Hamburg, 1830), pp. 100-103; and in the "Osservatore
Fiorentino" (vol. iv. p. 179). Florence: Ricci, 1821. We give
it as it is in the original text in the State Archives of
Florence, _Provvisioni_ Registro 2, a. c. 24-25.
NOTE B.
The defender of the artisans and of the guilds, Captain and
_Conservatore_ of the city and commune of Florence, brought
forward the proposal in the special and general council on
June 30, 1290, "presentibus et volentibus Dominis Prioribus
Artium," and the proposal, carried almost unanimously (_placuit
quasi omnibus_), ran as follows:--"Quia per quamplures homines
civitatis Florentie fide dignos, relatum est coram officio
dominorum Priorum Artium, quod multi sunt artifices et
comunitates seu universitates Artium et earum Rectores, qui
certum modum et formam indecentem, et certum precium incongruum
imponunt in eorum mercantiis et rebus eorum Artium vendendis
contra iustitiam et Rempublicam." It ended by strictly
forbidding every sort of monopoly and every contract of sale
arranged in a manner contrary to custom or to the laws, "et
quod dogana aliqua vel compositio non fiat contra honorem et
iurisdictionem Comunis Florentie, per quam vel quas prohibitum
sit a Rectoribus vel Consulibus ipsorum Artis, quod aliqui vel
aliquis ad certum modum et certam formam et certum precium
vendant, vel vendere debeant mercantias," ec. To which Guidotto
Canigiani added, that the signory should henceforward formulate
other articles, not so as to weaken the said provision, but
only to strengthen it more and more in the interest of the
guilds. And his amendment was approved together with the
provision itself (State Archives, Florence, _Provvisioni_,
Registro iv. c. 29). And on the 3rd of July, by reason of the
former amendment, the _priori_ of the guilds, together with the
other wise men consulted by them, decreed: "Quod nulli Consules
vel Rectores alicuius Artis, aut aliquis alius, vice et nomine
alicuius Artis, vel aliqua singularis persona alicuius Artis,
utatur aliquo ordinamento scripto vel non scripto, extra
Constitutum Artis approbatum per Comune Florentie, vel aliter
vel ultra quam contineatur in statuto talis Artis, ec.... Et
siqua facta essent in contarium vel fierent in futuro tacite
vel expresse, non valeant nec teneant ullo modo vel iure, sed
sint cassa et irrita ipso iure ec. Et quod nullus notarius
vel alius scriptor scribere debeat aliquid de predictis vel
contra predicta, et nullus nuntius vel alius precipiat aliquid
aliquibus artificibus contra predicta: sub pena Rectori et
Consuli contrafacienti auferenda librarum cc. pro quolibet et
qualibet vice; et Arti, librarum quingentarum; et sub pena
librarum centum pro quolibet, qui observaret talia ordinamenta
vel precepta prohibita; et sub pena libr. centum cuilibet qui
de predictis ordinamentis prohibitis faceret precepta Arti seu
artificibus alicuius Artis." This provision was to be read in
the captain's council every month and cried about the city.
(_Provvisioni_, Registro, iv. a. c. 30-31.)
NOTE C.
On the 31st of January (new style, 1291) a provision was
made, beginning with this singular proemium:--"Ad honorem,
ec. Ut cives et comitatini Florentie non opprimantur sicut
hactenus oppressi sunt, et ut hominum fraudibus et malitiis
que circa infrascripta committi solent, debitis remediis
obvietur et resistatur, quod quidem videtur nullomodo fieri
posse, nisi iuxta sapientis doctrinam, dicentis quod contraria
suis purgantur contrariis; ideoquo volentes lupinas carnes
salsamentis caninis involvi et castigari debere, ita quod lupi
rapacitas et agni mansuetudo pari passu ambulent, et in eodem
ovili vivant pacifice et quiete," ec.
It goes on to severely forbid that any one should dare
to: "aliquas litteras impetrare vel impetrari facere, aut
privilegium vel rescriptum, per quas vel quod aliquis vel
aliqui de civitate vel districtu Florentie citentur vel
trahantur ad causam, questionem vel litigium aut examen
alicuius indicis, nisi coram domino Potestate, Capitaneo et
aliis officialibus Comunis Florentie;" and that he who, having
falsified, did not cease from falsifying, when reprimanded,
and failed to pay damages and interest within three days, was
to be fined one hundred small _fiorini_, or more, according
to the judgment of the _Podestà_ or of the captain, or of any
other magistrate who had undertaken the prosecution. And if
any one sought to disobey or escape from the jurisdiction of
the magistrates, "teneantur Potestas et Capitaneus, qui de
predictis requisitus esset, condemnare patrem vel filium vel
fratrem carnalem vel cuginum ex parte patris vel patruum et
nepotes eius, ec., in dicta pena, et dictam condemnationem
exigere cum effectu, et etiam in maiori pena, ad arbitrium
eorum et cuiuscunque eorum, si eis vel alteri eorum videbitur
expedire. Et nichilominus compellat eos et quemlibet eorum
dare et facere tali contra quem dicerentur tales littere vel
privilegium vel rescriptum impetrata, omnes expensas quas
faceret vel fecissit, occasione predicta, credendo de predictis
expensis iuramento huiusmodi contra quem dicerentur predicta
vel aliquod predictorum impetrata."
Moreover, as we have said before, any one, who in the city,
Commune, or district of Florence, directly or indirectly
published such acts, together with the notary who wrote
them out, and the lawyer who defended them, was subject to
severe penalties. The Podestà and the captain could proceed
as they pleased against any one who, "audeat vel presumat
facere precipi eis vel alicui eorum, quod faciant aliquid vel
ab aliquo desistant, vel citari Potestatem vel Capitaneum
vel Priores vel Consiliarios vel aliquem officialem Comunis
Florentie, vel eorum offitia impedire vel retardare coram
aliquo vel aliquibus, ex autoritate aliquarum licterarum,
privilegii vel rescripti, vel ex auctoritate alicuius indicii
ordinarii, delegati vel subdelegati, vel vicarii." And as usual
the penalties could be applied to relations.
As it happened that many requested the support of civil
justice (_brachium seculare_) "in deffectum iuris et in
lesionem et in preiuditium personarum et locorum subdittorum
Comuni Florentie," ec., it was decreed that this support
should be given only when the suit was over, before competent
magistrates, and after it had been examined. If in this case
the magistrates refused, then action could be taken against
them. But otherwise, those who should demand an unjust
sentence were subject to penalties, together with their
relations, according to the first paragraph of this law. "Verum
si consanguineos, ut dictum est, non haberet, procedatur contra
bona talis pretentis brachium seculare, et contra inquilinos,
laboratores, pensionarios et fictaiuolos eiusdem potentis, et
illorum cuius occasione petitur, et ad alia procedatur, prout
ipsis dominis Potestati vel Capitaneo et Prioribus videbitur
expedire." Two other paragraphs follow, of which there are
ten in all, but at this point a gap occurs in the manuscript,
(_Provvisioni_, Registro ii. a. c. 175-177).
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