_THE FIRST WARS AND FIRST REFORMS OF THE FLORENTINE COMMUNE._[144]
I.
After Countess Matilda's death the envoys despatched from Germany to
reassume the margraviate of Tuscany in the name of the Empire followed
one another in rapid succession.[145] But almost all were men of small
ability, pursuing a vacillating policy that led to no results. They
tried to exercise the power of margraves, but were merely temporary
officials of the emperor. Without resources, without knowledge of the
country, they relied now on this party, now on that, incapable of
distinguishing friends from foes, and never understanding the causes
of the wars continually breaking out on every side. This state of
things, well adapted to promote communal independence, lasted to 1162,
when Frederic Barbarossa began to make the weight of his hand felt
by initiating a clearer and more determined policy, although even his
talent failed to obtain any notable results.
The Florentines were those best able to profit by the weakness of the
Empire. In 1129 they took possession of the Castle of Vignalo in the
Val d'Elsa;[146] and in 1135 destroyed the stronghold of Monteboni,
belonging to the Buondelmonti, whose name was derived from it, and who
were now forced to submit to the Commune, yield it military service,
and dwell in the city a certain part of the year.[147] On this head
Villani remarks that the Commune now began to extend its borders "by
violence rather than by reason, ... subjecting every noble of the
_contado_, and demolishing fortresses." This was, in fact, the policy
of Florence, and it led to two inevitable results. An increase of
territory was the first; the second, that the always-increasing number
of nobles brought into the city paved the way for the formation of an
aristocratic party opposed to the people, and consequently promoting
civil strife and future changes of government.
In June, 1135, the Imperial envoy Engelbert entered Florence, and
seemed amicable to the Commune.[148] He speedily moved on to Lucca,
where he met with a serious defeat. The succeeding envoy, Errico of
Bavaria, came with a considerable force, and appeared ill-disposed
towards the Florentines. His stay, however, was short, and his
successor, Ulrico d'Attems, showed friendly intentions, and in 1141
even aided the Florentines in a skirmishing expedition against
Sienna.[149] But all these envoys came and disappeared like meteors.
Florence was now beginning its great war with Count Guido, surnamed
the Old, who had become their foe. A contested inheritance served as
a pretext for the rupture; but the real cause must have lain in the
increased power and menacing attitude of the count. His possessions
hemmed in the Republic on all sides, and Sanzanome said of him, "Per
se quasi civitas est et provincia."[150] The citizens first seized a
castle of his near Ponte a Sieve, and then attacked his stronghold of
Monte di Croce. But, aided by neighbouring towns, the count succeeded
in defeating the Florentines on June 24, 1146. Nevertheless, they
contrived even then to extort advantageous terms, namely: that part
of the walls should be dismantled, and that the castle should hoist
the banner of Florence.[151] All this was done, and there was truce
for a time, while the count seems to have been engaged on distant
expeditions. But later, the walls were restored, and thereupon the
Florentines,[152] declaring that the agreement had been violated,
suddenly stormed the castle in 1153, and rased it to the ground. And
thus, wrote Sanzanome, "_Mons Crucis est cruciatus_." Certainly all
this could not lead to peace. Count Guido ceded part of Poggibonsi to
the Siennese on condition of their fortifying and defending it against
the Florentines, who were preparing to make an assault. By accepting
the gift Sienna stood pledged to play an active part in the war, which
thus continued to spread.[153]
II.
Just at this time, however, the state of affairs changed, for Tuscany
was beginning to feel the influence of Frederic I. (Barbarossa).
This emperor, finding that Duke Guelfo was unable to make himself
respected, despatched (1162-3) the Archbishop Reinhold of Cologne, a
man of energy and brains, with the title of "Italiae archicancellarius
et imperatoriae maiestatis legatus," and charged to reorganise
the Imperial administration on a new plan. Frederic regarded the
dissolution of the margraviate as an accomplished fact, and wished to
assume the direct government of its various component parts by means
of German counts or Podestà, in the manner already adopted by him in
Lombardy. Reinhold set to the task with zeal, establishing German
governors and garrisons in the principal castles of the _contado_; and
where no castles remained new ones were erected.[154] San Miniato, with
its tower on the hill, dominating the suburb of San Genesio below, was
the headquarters of this new administration. Here Reinhold established
Eberhard von Amern with the title of "_Comes et Federici imperatoris
legatus_."[155] Frederic's scheme of policy was clear and precise; but
in order to carry it into effect against the will of communes that were
already emancipated, and against the interests of many native counts,
would have required much time and a great army, both of which were
lacking at the moment. Reinhold was soon called elsewhere for other
undertakings, and although his successor, the Archbishop Christian
of Mayence, was likewise a man of ability, their efforts led to few
practical results. Their only success consisted in the amount of money
squeezed from the people; for, as a chronicler puts it, "like good
fishermen, they drew everything cleverly into their nets." But they
established no firm political basis.
It is true that the new German Podestà, or _Teutonici_, as they were
called, were seen springing up on all sides. We now find, in fact,
continual mention of the _Potestas Florentiae and Florentinorum_,
and of the same dignitaries in Sienna, Arezzo, and many other towns.
Nevertheless, they exercised little or no power in great cities: these
being still governed by Consuls, who disputed the authority of the
_Teutonici_ of the _contado_ outside the walls. This state of things
could not be of long continuance. By special permission from the
emperor, the Consuls of certain well-affected cities were allowed to
exercise jurisdiction, in his name, not only within the walls, but
even sometimes over part of the _contado_; always, however, with a
reservation in favour of nobles, and often of churches and convents,
who were to remain subject to the Imperial authority alone.[156]
Everywhere else in Central Italy the Imperial Podestà were to take the
entire command, for the emperor admitted no doubt as to the complete
and absolute nature of his rights. But the question now hinged on
facts rather than on rights, and was only to be solved by a greater
force than that possessed by the Empire in Tuscany. Hence, an enormous
confusion ensued. All the great cities, and more especially Florence,
continued to rule themselves as before; while in the rural territories
(_contadi_), Imperial Podestà, Tuscan counts, feudal lords, Consuls
great and small, or other officers of the Commune, daily contested one
another's authority, and the masses no longer knew whom to obey. Even
the cities and nobles siding with the Empire not only failed to carry
out Frederic's designs, but actually opposed them; for, in point of
fact, this Teutonic over-lordship, wielded by grasping and tyrannous
Imperial officials, was equally odious to all.
A sufficiently accurate idea of this state of things may be gleaned
from the accounts of contemporary witnesses, who were summoned at
various times to furnish authentic details as to the condition of the
country. Those sent to report upon the monastery of Rosano describe
it as being subject to Count Guido, who was continually driven to
defend it "against the warden of Montegrossoli, other Teutons, and the
Florentine Consuls," all of whom tried to exercise authority there.
They also describe how at Monte di Croce, the Consuls of that place
and the _vice comites_ all held command simultaneously, and were
compelled to defend themselves from the _Teutonici_, and against the
encroachments of the Consuls and other officers of the Florentine
Commune.[157]
On another occasion an equally chaotic state of things is described in
the reports on the castle and valley of Paterno, of which Florentines
and Siennese disputed the dominion. One witness tells us that in his
day he saw a certain Pipino, _Potestas Florentiae_, holding sway
there, and over all the rest of the Florentine _contado_. Another
records how he visited the Paterno valley and the whole of the
_contado_, together with the consuls of the Commune and a _Teutonico_.
Several declare to have gone there now with Pipino, now with other
_Teutonici_, and at other times with the Consuls, and that all received
obedience and levied taxes in the same way. Then we have the curious
deposition of one Giovanni _de Citinaia_, who gives a long account
of recent events in the district. He tells us how a big pillar was
uprooted by a priest, who, not knowing for what purpose it had been
planted, wanted to use it for the church he was building. But it was so
heavy that even with a cart and two oxen he failed to remove it. And
some peasants who were looking on, cried out to him: "Domini sacerdos,
male fecisti, quia est terminus inter Florentinos et Senenses" ("Master
priest, thou hast done ill, for this is the boundary stone between
Florence and Sienna"). After this, the witness continues, two persons
went to the warden of Montegrossoli, and said that if he would help
them to rebuild the Castle of Paterno, they would furnish him with
proofs of his right over it. The warden cheerfully hastened to Florence
to get the permission of the authorities, but quickly returned,
saying that the building could not go on, for the Florentines refused
consent, because the Archbishop Christian of Mayence was already in
Lombardy on the way to Tuscany. Thereupon the Siennese made use of the
favourable opportunity to demolish the neglected works, and play the
masters themselves. It is certainly impossible to conceive a greater
multiplicity and confusion of contrasting rights and authorities.[158]
Hence the only course open to Florence and the Tuscan communes in
general was to seize every convenient occasion of asserting their
rights either by craft or by violence. The war between Pisa and Lucca
had already broken out, and as Count Guido, the foe of the Florentines,
had joined with Lucca, they formed an alliance with Pisa. This treaty
was very advantageous to their commerce, but it pledged them to an
active share in the war.[159] They willingly undertook this, for it
was an opportunity of fighting not only the Lucchese, but also the
latter's patrons, Count Guido and Christian of Mayence. At first it
seemed as though Pisa would be forced to make peace, for on March 23,
1173, Christian declared that city to be under ban of the Empire,
thus stripping it of all the privileges it had previously enjoyed. In
fact, on the 23rd of May an agreement was concluded (witnessed also by
the Florentines) to the effect that Pisa and Lucca should proceed to
an exchange of prisoners. The ban was raised on the 28th of the same
month, and peace was solemnly proclaimed in Pisa on the 1st of June.
But two months afterwards an unexpected event caused the war to be
speedily renewed. The archbishop had invited the Consuls of Pisa and
Florence to come to San Genesio on the 4th of August, and on their
arrival had them promptly seized and cast into prison. What could
have caused an act rendering war unavoidable, after such strenuous
efforts to establish peace? Many explanations have been suggested,
but one fact alone is well ascertained. Certain men of San Miniato,
having been expelled as rebels to the Empire, had sought the Bishop
of Florence[160] in his palace, and sworn not only to make common
cause with the Pisans and Florentines, but to cede them the territory
of San Miniato, should they succeed in retaking it, and even if the
fortress remained in the hands of the Germans.[161] This is certainly
true, for the document containing the agreement is still extant. It
is no regular treaty, being unwitnessed by Consuls, and lacking the
proper legal formulas. But the fact of its having been sworn to and
signed in the bishop's palace; of some leading citizens, including one
of the Uberti,[162] having been parties to it; and of the document
being preserved in the Archives,[163] proves that the rulers of the
two cities were not unaware of the agreement, but merely preferred to
hide, or rather disguise the real importance of it. All this, joined to
their reluctance and delay as to the exchange of prisoners, persuaded
Christian that they were trying to trick and betray him by a fictitious
peace. Accordingly, his patience being exhausted, he was led to commit
an imprudent and ill-considered action, that destroyed all hope of the
peace he was so anxious to conclude.
In fact, by August the Florentines were already at Castel Fiorentino,
and, reinforced by a contingent of 225 horse, accompanied by two
Consuls from Pisa, encamped at Pontedera. Christian quickly marched
against them, together with Guido and the Lucchese, but the latter
were obliged to forsake him, for the Pisans, by advice of the
Florentines, had entered the Lucca territory and were laying it waste.
Notwithstanding his diminished force he attacked the enemy, and
valiantly defended his banner, but was worsted in the fight. How the
war went on is unknown to us; but it is certain that Christian soon
took his departure, that in 1174 the rebels of San Miniato returned
with honour to their native town, and that finally in the following
year peace was concluded between the three hostile cities.[164]
Meanwhile the Florentines continued to subject the towns and castles of
the territory to their rule.[165] Before this, in 1170, they had wrung
hard conditions from the Aretines,[166] who were friendly to Count
Guido, and they now marched against Asciano, a walled town near Arezzo,
partly under their rule and partly under that of the Siennese, who were
now trying to get full possession of it. The latter were routed on July
7, 1174, and leaving a thousand prisoners in the enemy's hands were
accordingly obliged to submit to very disadvantageous terms.[167] The
negotiations were carried on slowly, but peace was concluded at last in
1176.
The Florentines were acknowledged as the legitimate masters of the
whole _contado_ of Fiesole and Florence, and obtained part of the
Siennese possessions at Poggibonsi, the said Siennese being bound to
help them in all wars,[168] save against the emperor or his envoys,
and likewise pledged to use every endeavour to conciliate the latter in
favour of Florence. Several more of the conditions were particularly
harsh.[169] That the Florentines could extort such terms as these after
the petty war of Asciano is an undeniable proof of their increased
power; but it is equally certain that unless the Siennese were
hopelessly ruined, this was only a fictitious peace, concluded after
great hesitation, and for the sole purpose of securing the release of
the prisoners.
III.
Nevertheless, these triumphs abroad were counteracted by unforeseen
events in Florence itself. Owing to the prevalence of the popular party
in the consular government, powerful houses in general, and the Uberti
faction in particular, were increasingly excluded from public affairs,
and naturally showed signs of discontent. At this moment we seldom find
any of their names at the head of the Commune.[170] Meanwhile, however,
many neighbouring castles and lands having been reduced to submission,
the number of nobles of the _contado_ dwelling in the city had been
greatly augmented. These, being merely counted as _assidui habitatores_
or _cives salvatichi_, could have no share in the government, but there
was nothing to prevent them from joining the disaffected party and
swelling its numbers and strength. And when, in course of time, they
became full citizens, their power of action was enlarged. Accordingly,
at last, in 1177, the Uberti were encouraged to hazard the revolution
that first initiated civil war in Florence.
All the chroniclers speak of this war, and it must have been of
considerable importance, seeing that it was pursued for nearly two
years with much bloodshed and the destruction by fire of the greater
part of the city. Likewise, the river Arno overflowed and broke down
the Ponte Vecchio. Villani describes the two fires of 1177, saying that
the first extended from the bridge to the Old Market; the second, from
San Martino del Vescovo to Santa Maria Ughi and the Cathedral. He also
relates the fall of the bridge, adding, as usual, that all this was a
righteous chastisement from Heaven on the proud, ungrateful, sinful
city. He speaks of the revolution that occurred at the same time as
though it had nothing to do with the burning of the town. He goes on to
say that the Uberti, who were the "principal and most powerful citizens
of Florence, with their followers, both noble and plebeian, began to
make war against the Consuls, lords and rulers of the Commune, at a
fixed moment and on a fixed plan, from hatred of the Signory, which
was not to their liking. And the war was so fierce, that in many parts
neighbours fought against neighbours from fortified towers, the which
were 100 to 120 _braccia_ in height (150 to 180 feet). Likewise certain
new towers were erected by the street companies with monies obtained
from neighbours, and these were called the Towers of the Companies.
For two years the fighting went on in this fashion, and with much
slaughter; and the citizens became so inured to perpetual strife,
that they would fight one day and eat and drink together the next,
recounting one to another their various deeds and prowess. At last,
tired out, they made peace, and the Consuls remained in power; but
these things created and gave birth to the accursed factions which soon
broke out in Florence."[171]
On the other hand, the pseudo Brunetto Latini dates the first fire
extending from the bridge to the Old Market, on August 4, 1177. But
he quickly adds that in the same year began the "discord and war,
for the space of twenty-seven months, between the Consuls and the
Uberti, who refused to obey either the Consuls or the Signory, yet
nevertheless formed no government of their own. This strife among the
citizens caused great mortality, robbery, and arson. The city was set
on fire at five different points; the Sesto d'Oltràrno, and the part
between the Churches of San Martino, del Vescovo, and Sta. Maria, were
burnt down."[172] According to the same chronicler, the fall of the
bridge took place on November 4, 1178, and the civil war only came to
an end in 1180, with the triumph of the Uberti, one of whom, Uberto
degli Uberti, actually became Consul. "The which afterwards led to
the creation of Podestà, who were nobles, powerful, and of foreign
birth."[173]
In spite of a few seeming contradictions on the part of both
chroniclers, their evidence, joined to that of others, clearly proves
that in 1177 a revolution led by the Uberti took place and lasted about
two years, accompanied by rapine, murder, and arson. The Uberti did
not gain a complete victory, since the consular government survived;
but they and their friends were in power more frequently than before,
and for this reason the pseudo Brunetto Latini considers them to have
conquered. All this gave the government a more patrician tendency. It
heralded the change that replaced the Consuls by a Podestà, and cast
the first seed of the factions and civil wars destined to involve the
city in long-continued strife and bloodshed. Such, in fact, is the
gist of the chronicles, and all later documents and events serve to
confirm it. Nevertheless, peace was re-established within the walls for
the nonce, and the policy of Florence remained unaltered. The partial
triumph of the aristocracy had at least one good effect; inasmuch as
the nobles, being satisfied for the moment, lent efficacious assistance
to the Commune, and enabled all its affairs to be pushed forward more
briskly.
In fact, on February 3, 1182, the people of Empoli were reduced to
submission, bound over to pay annual tribute and to yield military
service at the request of the Florentine Consuls, whether of the
Commune or the Guilds, save in the event of a war against the Counts
Guidi.[174] The people of Pogna, which was a fief of the Alberti,[175]
were the next to make surrender on the 4th of March. And these Pognesi
not only pledged themselves to take the field at the command of the
Florentine Consuls, but to abstain from constructing new walls or
fortresses, either on their own territory or the neighbouring lands
of Semifonte. Also, should others attempt to fortify those places,
they (the Pognesi) were bound to oppose it and give notice of the
fact to the Florentines, who, on their side, promised friendship and
protection.[176] In the same year the Castle of Montegrossoli was
captured by the Florentines.[177] On July 21, 1184, they made an
alliance with the people of Lucca, who promised to send them yearly a
contingent of one hundred and fifty horse and five hundred foot, for
at least twenty days' service, in all wars waged within Florentine
territory.[178] In October the Florentines attacked the Castle of
Mangona in the Mugello, but as this fortress belonged to the Alberti,
the latter stirred Pogna to rebellion, and the Florentines quickly
marched against that town.[179] Count Alberti seems to have taken part
in the fight that ensued at Pogna, for it is known that by November he
was in captivity and forced to accept very hard terms for himself, his
wife and his children. He had to promise to dismantle his fortress of
Pogna the following April, only retaining his own palace and tower; to
demolish the tower of Certaldo, and never rebuild that of Semifonte.
He was to cede to the Florentines whichever one of the Capraia towers
they chose to take; he was to give them one-half of the ransom or tax
to be levied on all his possessions in general between the Arno and the
Elsa. Finally, as soon as he should be released from prison ("_postquam
exiero de prescione_"), he was pledged to compel all his men to swear
fealty, and to the payment of four hundred pounds of good Pisan money.
His sons were to reside in Florence two months of the year in time of
war, one month in time of peace.[180] The subjection and humiliation
of this Count Alberto was a very significant fact in itself. And when
we reflect that it occurred after Florence had already overthrown the
Cadolingi, lowered the power of the Guidi house, and concluded most
favourable alliances with Pisa, Sienna, and Lucca, it will be easily
seen how quickly the Commune had been able to soar to a position of
very great and almost menacing strength.
IV.
All this certainly contributed no little to hasten the coming of the
Emperor Frederic I., and, in fact, we find him in Tuscany for the
deliberate purpose of reducing the country to subjection in the year
1185. But he came without an army, reliant on the might of the Empire,
on his own shrewdness, and his own reputation. He believed in the
possibility of achieving his plans by alienating some of the Tuscan
cities from Florence, and compelling them to side with the Empire
against her. Above all, he counted upon Pistoia, situated between Lucca
and Florence, and hostile to both; upon Pisa, whom he hoped, by means
of large concessions, to win back to the Imperial cause, to which she
had so often adhered before. He became still more hopeful of success
when, on reaching San Miniato, in the summer of 1185, many nobles
of the _contado_ came to do him homage, with loud complaints of the
oppressive rule of the free cities. On the 25th of July he emancipated
many of these nobles, and some of their fiefs, from the jurisdiction of
Lucca.[181] On the 31st of the same month he entered Florence, still
surrounded by nobles of the _contado_, who, as Villani says, complained
bitterly of the city, "which had seized their castles, and thus grossly
insulted the Empire."[182] Hereupon, the chroniclers affirm that
Frederic deprived Florence of the right of jurisdiction over her own
territory, even just outside the city walls; and even assert that he
adopted the same measure with regard to all the Tuscan towns, excepting
Pisa and Pistoia.[183] But this point has been seriously disputed,
many refusing to admit the possibility of a fact unsupported by any
documentary proof. On the other hand, some writers consider it to be
proved by a later event, the which is not only related by several
chroniclers, but also confirmed by existing documents.
In fact, by a patent dated June 24, 1187, Henry VI., in reward, as
he expressed it, for services rendered by the Florentines to his
father and himself, granted them judicial rights over the city and
the _contado_ beyond, to the distance of one mile in the direction of
Fiesole, of three towards Settimo and Campi, and of ten in all other
directions.[184] Even within these narrow limits, however, the nobles
and soldiery were to be independent of the city. In token of gratitude
for this liberality on the part of the emperor, the Florentines were
bound to present him every year with a piece of good samite, _bonum
examitum_.[185] Similar and equally limited concessions were granted
to other cities also.[186] Accordingly, some have said, since Henry
restored right of jurisdiction to the Florentines, it is clear that
his father had deprived them of it. In fact, we know that throughout
Tuscany Frederic established Imperial Podestà, who bore the names of
their respective cities.[187] Also, reasoning in this style, those
writers went so far as to suppose Florence to have been deprived of
judicial powers even within the city walls. But, as we have seen,
Henry's patent does not speak of restitution--only of the liberality
shown in rewarding the services of the Florentines, although it is
impossible to understand what those services could have been.[188]
On the other hand, it is hard to believe that Florence, who had
dared, in weaker times, to use violent measures against the Imperial
envoys, murdering Rabodo and putting Christian of Mayence to flight,
should now, when so much stronger, and the chief power in Tuscany,
unresistingly submit to deprivation of judicial rights throughout her
own territory, and even within the city walls. In addition to all
this, there seems no doubt that there were Consuls of Florence during
the same period, and therefore the theory of there being Imperial
Podestà in the city itself naturally falls to the ground. In fact, the
Consuls' names are recorded in documents of 1184. It is true that,
for the three following years, the pseudo Brunetto Latini is the only
authority by whom they are mentioned; but it is difficult to suppose
that he invented them all, or that he could have been mistaken three
consecutive times. Although during these three years no documents give
the names of the Consuls, they afford, indirectly, continual hints of
their existence.[189]
Hence it is necessary, in my opinion, to begin by recognising that,
according to the ideas and the policy of Frederic I., there was no
question as to his right of exercising jurisdiction over Tuscany;
and that if the cities had virtually exercised this right without a
special grant to that effect, they had violated thereby the rights
of the emperor, who was accordingly justified in resuming them. For
this end, he had commissioned Reinhold and Christian to establish
Podestà everywhere,[190] and to restore affairs to what he deemed
their sole legal and normal condition. Only the difficulty here was
not in proving his right, according to the Imperial theory, but in
being able to enforce it. It was a question of fact, only to be
resolved by force. As we have seen, Imperial Podestà were established
on all sides; and while even in the _contado_ they could only obtain
partial and somewhat contested obedience, in the greater cities, and
particularly in Florence, they obtained none at all. The _Potestates
Florentiae_, or _Florentinorum_, as of Sienna or the Siennese, whose
names so often occur, are almost invariably--and in the case of
Florence, one may say quite invariably--Imperial Podestà, established
in the _contado_, and disputing its jurisdiction with the Consuls.
Now, seeing that the commune considered the _contado_ to be its own
territory, and therefore craved the sole command of it, while from the
Imperial point of view city and _contado_ were equally subject to the
Podestà of the Empire, it naturally followed that these dignitaries
were commonly styled Podestà of Florence or of the Florentines; and in
the same way, Podestà of Sienna or of the Siennese, of Arezzo or the
Aretini, &c. But, as a matter of fact, they not only failed to command
obedience within the gates of great cities, but even in the _contado_
outside were continually in conflict with the consular authority. We
have already seen what a chaos was the result. Nevertheless, it seems
natural to believe that the arrival of Frederic I. in Tuscany must
have strengthened immensely the power of these Podestà, and that, at
least for a time, they must have been enabled to enforce their judicial
rights throughout the country, and to the very gates of the town. This
made the chroniclers assert that the emperor had stripped Florence of
its _contado_. It is certain, however, that on his departure things
rapidly lapsed into their previous condition. That is to say, the
consuls did their utmost to neutralise the action and authority of the
Imperial officials. The rise of the communes had created a new state of
things which the Empire was powerless to destroy, even while refusing
to acknowledge its legal value. Therefore Henry was finally driven to
accord a partial valuation, in the guise of a generous concession, to
an actuality that by this means he might at least hope to keep within
definite limits.
And in reality his patent of 1187 granted Florence much less than
she had possessed for some time before. If, in fact, the territory
of the Commune was not to extend more than one mile in the direction
of Fiesole, this latter city remained outside the border, although
already subjected to Florence by force of arms, together with the
whole of its _contado_, which, indeed, as proved by every treaty,
had been incorporated in the Florentine territory since 1125. Also,
as though this were not enough, Henry declared all nobles within
the circumscribed area left to the city, to be exempted from its
jurisdiction, even including those who had legally and officially
made submission to it. Notwithstanding all this, Florence found it
best to accept the Imperial grant. Thus things remained practically
as before--that is to say, the Commune could continue to hold the
virtual command, and snatch as much more as should be possible. The
chronicler Paolino Pieri, in recording this concession, states that the
Florentines regained the _contado_--"that is, they took it back," and
by this phrase he unconsciously defines the real condition of things.
Meanwhile, the Empire yielded the point legally by recognising the
judicial rights of the Consuls within the city and over part of the
_contado_ outside. As to the rest, it was left to be decided, as in
the past, by force of arms. All this serves, in our opinion, to make
things clear, and likewise to explain the inexactitude and confusion
of the chroniclers, who, unable to distinguish between the practical
and legal side of the question, continually jumbled both together.
Undoubtedly it was hard to disentangle them, seeing that the fact was
confronted by two, or rather three, separate rights, each refusing to
acknowledge the others--namely, the right of the Empire, that of the
Commune, and, lastly, that of the Pope, whose voice was always heard
repeating--although always in vain--that the Church was Matilda's sole
heir.
V.
Nevertheless, the presence in the _contado_ of German Podestà or counts
exercised some influence, even if indirectly, on the city itself.
Or rather, their presence contributed to modify its constitution by
promoting in a certain way the creation of a new civic magistracy,
bearing their own title. In fact, the Latin term of _potestas_,
_potestà_, or _podestà_ was given to every chief authority during the
Middle Ages; even in 1068 it was the title attributed to Duke Goffredo
of Tuscany. Later, it was bestowed on the German counts governing
the _contado_ in the name of Frederic I. From them it was afterwards
transferred to municipal magistrates. It seems to have been given first
to officials despatched by the Commune to the _contado_, when this
was already occupied by German counts, in order to imitate and oppose
them. At least, there is reason to believe that certain officials
with Italian names, and bearing the title of Podestà of Florence--or
of Florentine Podestà--before any such post had been created in the
city, must have been of this class. Two of these officials, Renuccio
da Stagia and Guerrieri, are known to us and mentioned more than once
in the Rosano reports.[191] It seems probable enough that Renuccio may
have been appointed before the year 1180[192]--that is, when there
were assuredly Consuls in Florence.[193] Hence it is to be concluded
that he held office in the _contado_. But whether or no this theory be
admissible, it should be noted that all Florentine documents of the
time, when mentioning the Consuls, always add the words: "sive Rector
vel Potestas, vel Dominator." At first it is merely a generic formula,
vaguely suggesting the possibility of another magistrature. But little
by little the formula assumes a more concrete character; the term
_Potestas_ becoming of so much more importance, as to often precede
that of _Consules_.[194] Then, the new office is on the point of birth;
and finally, in 1193, makes its appearance in the person of Gherardo
Caponsacchi, a Florentine belonging to a consular family.
Ammirato was mistaken in thinking that there had been a magistrate
of this kind in the year 1184, because he found that the treaty
of alliance between Florence and Lucca mentioned no individual in
particular, but made a general allusion to the office of Podestà.[195]
As we have observed, however, too many similar allusions occur in State
papers, even when Florence was certainly ruled by Consuls, to allow us
to draw the same conclusion. It may be that Florence had a Podestà even
earlier than 1193, but until we find some document specifying the name
of a person filling that office, we cannot venture to assert it as a
fact.
At any rate, the institution of the new magistracy was preceded by an
increased influx of nobles within the city walls. This, indeed, was one
of the chief causes of the change. Continual proofs to this effect are
afforded by contemporary documents, and confirmed by the narratives
of the chroniclers. The pseudo Brunetto Latini tells us that in 1192
the Consuls included "Messer Tegrino of the Counts Guidi, 'paladin'
in Florence, and Chianni de' Fifanti." Now, to find a count and count
palatine or paladine among the Florentine Consuls is an absolutely new
thing. The same writer also says that in the same year "a decree was
issued in Florence that the Counts Guidi and the Counts Alberti and
the Counts da Certaldo, Ubaldini et Figiovanni, Pazzi and Ubertini,
the Counts of Panago, and many other nobles, being citizens, were to
dwell in the city of Florence during four months of the year." However
much or little value this chronicler may have, his statement agrees
with the information found in documents, and explains the origin of
the new magistrature. Assuredly the nobles cannot have relished being
subject to the popular consular government, against which they had
struggled since the year 1177, and must have particularly disliked
being under the jurisdiction of persons they deemed their inferiors
in rank and dignity. Besides, as the elements composing the mass of
the citizens became more heterogeneous, thus increasing the danger of
civil war, so much the more the possibility of being judged by their
political adversaries must have seemed unbearable to them. Hence the
need was felt of a new magistrature of a different and, preferably, of
an aristocratic character, and an Imperial institution, such as that of
the Podestà, was chosen for a model. The holder of this office is no
mere judge, as many believed and recorded; he is the positive head and
representative of the Commune; he signs treaties, commands the army,
and fills the place of the Consuls.
In fact, when on July 14, 1193, the Castle of Trebbio made submission
to Florence, the Commune was officially represented by Gherardo
Caponsacchi _Potestas Florentie et eius consiliarii_, together with
the seven rectors of the headships (_Capitudini_) of the guilds.[196]
The councillors, whose names are inserted in the document, are
likewise seven, and almost all of consular houses; two, indeed, are
nobles--namely, a Count Arrigo (perhaps of Capraia) and a Tegghiaio
Bundelmonti. It seems certain that Consuls were again chosen in 1194,
since the pseudo Brunetto Latini names two, one of whom was an Uberti.
In 1195 a Podestà reappears in the person of _Rainerius de Gaetano, cum
suis consiliariis_, among whom a _Consul iustitiae_ is included.[197]
It may be considered a certainty that these councillors, whose number
is continually varying in the documents, were no other than the
Consuls, who survived in this transitory form for some time, with the
Podestà as their chief. Together with him they represent the Commune,
sometimes even without him. But by degrees their importance diminishes,
while that of the Podestà is increased. In short, there is a period of
transformation during which the new, and as yet, ill-defined form of
government alternates with that of the Consuls.
In 1200 the Podestà is no longer a Florentine, but a foreigner, and
already represents the government, unaided by councillors, who have
disappeared altogether in 1207--namely, when the government has assumed
its definite shape. Or, to express it more accurately, their function
was continually changed and their number increased, until they were
converted into a special council of the whole city, beside the ancient
council or senate that was changed into a general council. On arriving
at that time we shall find the government represented by the Podestà
and two councils, sitting either separately or jointly, and styled in
the latter case the general and special council. Thus the consular
office may be considered to have been altogether extinguished. In
fact, excepting one final attempt in 1211 and 1212, when Consuls were
once more elected, we never meet with them again. What we have related
will make it easier to understand why the chroniclers attribute the
origin of the Podestà to various dates. The pseudo Brunetto Latini
makes the office begin in 1200--namely, the year when it was first
held by a foreigner, and alien birth considered an indispensable
qualification for the post. Therefore, before that time, the chronicler
seems to regard the Podestà chiefly as a head Consul.[198] We can
also understand why Villani, on the contrary, should have dated the
origin of the office from 1207. This, in fact, was the year in which
it assumed a really definite shape, since the Podestà was not only a
foreigner, but appears unescorted by councillors. Nevertheless, Villani
makes a mistake in representing him as a magistrate chosen for the
sole purpose of administering justice more impartially, and in adding
that "the signory of the Consuls did not cease then, inasmuch as they
continued to hold power over all other affairs of the Commune." He
makes two blunders here, but the second is little more than a simple
anachronism. In fact, although his statement cannot be true as regards
1207, it may have been at least partially true with reference to the
preceding years, when the Consuls still survived their own decease, as
it were, in the guise of councillors to the Podestà.
VI.
It is certain that there was a recurrence of consular government
between 1196 and 1199.[199] But just at that time an event of
considerable importance worked a radical change in the general
policy of Tuscany, and is accordingly worthy of notice. The Emperor
Frederic I. died on September 27, 1197, and his death led first to the
abandonment and then to the total ruin of the Imperial system he had
so persistently striven to establish throughout central Italy. The
people of San Miniato destroyed the fortress held by the Germans, and
subsequently the walls of St. Genesio.[200] The Florentines bought back
the Castle of Montegrossoli, which had been re-occupied and fortified
by nobles, who proved very troublesome.[201] After this Florence set a
greater undertaking on foot, by forming a league of the Tuscan cities
against the Empire. It was finally arranged at St. Genesio on November
11, 1197, when first the Lucchese, and then the Florentines, Siennese,
the people of San Miniato, and the Bishop of Volterra made oath to
maintain it, and the solemnity of the occasion was enhanced by the
presence of two cardinals of the Church. The main terms of the treaty
were, an alliance for the common defence against all opponents of the
League, and a pledge that neither peace nor truce should be made "cum
aliquo Imperatore vel Rege seu Principe, Duce vel Marchione," without
the consent of the Rectors of the said League. It was also agreed to
attack all cities, towns, counts, or bishops refusing to join the
alliance when requested so to do.[202] What was the pressing danger?
Why this alliance against the Empire at the moment when it was no
longer a source of alarm? There is one stipulation that best explains
the real object in view. It is to the effect that castles, towns, and
small domains were only to be admitted to the League as dependents
of the legitimate owners of the territory whereon these castles or
domains might be situated; but a single exception was made in favour of
Poggibonsi,[203] because its dominion was disputed by many claimants.
Montepulciano was to be admitted as a dependence of Sienna whenever
that city should be able to prove its right of dominion.
It seems clear from all this that the genuine purpose of the League was
to take advantage of the emperor's decease in order to secure to the
cities the complete possession of their respective territories. To this
end it was necessary that Tuscany should be united, and consequently
adherence to the League was to be, as far as possible, obligatory. Its
subsequent documents leave no doubt as to the true aim in view; indeed,
they furnish very ample proof that Florence had promoted the League,
in order that all Tuscany might aid her to regain speedy possession
of the _contado_. But, although the League was against the Empire, it
was by no means intended for the defence of the Pope, since it utterly
disregarded his pretensions to Matilda's inheritance. For refusing to
recognise any emperor, king, duke, or margrave, without the approval
of the Roman Church, a proviso was added showing that should the
Pope desire to join the League, he must accept its terms in order to
win admittance. Should he request assistance to reconquer his own
territories, everything was to be done according to the orders of the
Rectors of the League. But should the territory he wished to reconquer
be already in the hands of the communes, or of any of the allied
cities, the League could afford him no help. It was impossible to speak
more clearly. Accordingly, when Innocent III. became Pope, early in
1198, we soon find him manifesting much disapproval of the conduct of
the League, in spite of being adverse to the Empire and favourable to
the national Italian spirit.
At Castel Fiorentino, on December 4, 1197, the Rectors of the League
were sworn in. First among them were the Bishop of Volterra and the
Florentine Consul Acerbo, who was practically the head, although that
title was accorded to the bishop by reason of his ecclesiastical rank.
For the moment Pisa and Pistoia held back; but these and other Tuscan
cities had retained the right of adhering to the League.[204] Arezzo
had already joined on the 2nd of December, Count Guido gave his oath
on February 5, 1198, and Count Alberto on the seventh of the same
month. Nevertheless, in signing the second of these two treaties, the
Florentines expressly reserved their right to attach Semifonte, and
procure the submission of the Alberti estates of Certaldo and Mangone,
even by force if required.[205] Thus many other adhesions were
obtained by means of stipulations virtually implying acts of submission
to Florence.
This was the moment chosen by the newly elected Pope Innocent, soon
after his consecration in the same month of February, to write to the
two cardinals who had witnessed the oath to the League, stating that on
many points he considered the said treaty "nec utilitatem contineat,
nec sapiat honestatem," inasmuch as it neglected the fact of the Duchy
of Tuscany appertaining to the Church, "ad ius et dominium Ecclesiae
Romanae pertineat." He intended, therefore, to enforce his rights. If
the members of the League submitted to him, he would compel the Pisans,
under threat of interdict, to likewise join them against the Empire;
otherwise he would leave them at liberty to do as they chose.[206] But
as no attention was paid to him, he had to make a virtue of necessity
and considerably lower his tone.[207] Some slight concessions, though
of what nature is unknown, seem, however, to have been made to him,
for afterwards, when writing to the Pisans, he appeared to be better
satisfied, and urged them to join the League. It is, however, certain
that they persisted in their refusal, and although the Pope, grown
shrewder by experience, afterwards became a declared and energetic
champion of the League against the Empire, this fact only availed
to augment his moral and political influence, without winning him a
single handsbreadth of territory, or enabling him to enforce any one of
his pretended rights over Tuscany. The Florentines, on the contrary,
profited more and more by this state of things. On April 10, 1198,
Figline entered the League, not only made submission to Florence, but
paid a yearly tribute also[208]; and on the 11th of May Certaldo agreed
to identical terms.[209] The Republic persevered in the course it had
marked out with equal shrewdness and energy. It allowed the nobles to
take an increasing part in the government, so as to secure their hearty
co-operation in achieving the aim it had in view. The same Count Arrigo
da Capraia, who in 1193 was on the council of Podestà Caponsacchi, was
actually promoted to the consulship in 1199.[210] Finally, in 1200, a
foreigner was elected Podestà,[211] in the person of Paganello Porcari
of Lucca, a measure that, as we have already noted, the nobles had
long desired to carry out. And as Porcari showed energy and daring
in the conduct of the war he was again chosen the following year.
Then, in February, 1201, Count Alberto made oath to cede the height
of Semifonte, with its fortress and walls, to the Florentines; and to
assist them, whenever required, to gain possession of Colle, Certaldo,
and the town of Semifonte.[212] The Bishop of Volterra likewise made
oath to assist them in these campaigns.[213] All this seemed to come
about as an inherent consequence of the terms of the League, and before
long the allies, finding themselves reduced to serve the interests
of Florence alone, naturally began to show signs of weariness and
suspicion. But, heedless of all else, the Commune made ready for the
expedition against Semifonte, for which all these treaties had paved
the way.
Florence had long contemplated the seizure of that stronghold, for,
owing to its strategic advantages and the ease with which the position
could be reinforced by friendly neighbours, it had been a thorn in
her side. Accordingly the now haughty Republic determined to make
an end of it. We have already related how in 1184 Count Alberto had
been compelled to accept the same terms exacted from the people
of Pogna in 1182--namely, to give his solemn promise to build no
defences. Nevertheless, profiting by the arrival of Frederic I. and
the difficulties in which Florence was then involved, he had presently
erected the Castle of Semifonte on the Petrognano rock, and Florence
had never forgiven this offence. He had also assumed the title of
_Comes de Summofonte_. Near the castle a town had sprung up, and, as
many sought refuge there from neighbouring places conquered and taxed
by Florence, its population had rapidly increased. Indeed there was
already this rhyme afloat in the _contado_:
"Firenze, fatti in là,
Che Semifonte si fa città."[214]
It was for these reasons that the Republic so persistently tried to
secure pledges of help from its neighbours by the numerous treaties to
which reference has been made, and likewise by others concluded through
the efforts of the energetic Podestà. But Sienna had still to be
reckoned with, and Sienna might do good service to the hostile Alberto,
who was already prepared for defence. Accordingly the Florentines
signed an alliance with that state on March 29, 1201, promising their
aid against Montalcino, which showed as threatening a front to Sienna
as the Semifonte position towards their own city.[215] Also Colle
was made to swear to accord no help to the people of Semifonte.[216]
Thereupon the war finally began.
The chronicler Sanzanome, who witnessed it, declares, with his habitual
exaggeration, that it lasted five years, but he may have counted
in all the preliminary skirmishes.[217] At any rate, it was a hard
struggle, for, treaties notwithstanding, Semifonte received help from
all its neighbours, whose jealous dread of Florence had considerably
increased. Then, too, owing to the strength of its position and the
ability of Scoto, its valiant Podestà, the castle opposed so vigorous
a resistance to the beleaguring army surrounding it on all sides, that
the Florentines, seeing no hope of winning it by force, called treason
to their aid. A certain Gonella, with some other fugitives, escaped
from an adjoining territory, had taken refuge in the castle, and been
entrusted with the defence of the Bagnuolo tower. This man made use of
his post to betray the place to the enemy. But at the moment that he
and his comrades were in the act of opening the gate, the defenders of
Semifonte fell on them with fury and killed them all. Nevertheless,
the evil deed had done its work, for Semifonte was speedily forced
to surrender. Even if this was not brought about by treason alone,
as Villani asserts (v. 30), the betrayal of the tower undoubtedly
contributed to that result. In fact, on February 20, 1202, the Consuls,
then returned to office in Florence, granted a perpetual exemption from
all dues or taxes to the descendants of Gonella and his companions
fallen in the cause of the Republic.[218] The same year, on the 3rd of
April, the terms of the castle's surrender were subscribed and sworn.
The Florentines assured pardon, protection, and the return of all
prisoners to the people of Semifonte, but the latter were bound to
demolish their fortress and walls; were to desert the hill and settle
in the plain; and all save the soldiery and the churches were to pay a
yearly tax of twenty-six _denari_ on every hearth.[219]
The Pope expostulated strongly with the Florentines for their cruelty
towards Semifonte, but after sending him a letter of justification
in reply, the Consuls continued to follow their own course, and
picked a quarrel with the Siennese.[220] The point of dispute was
the Castle of Tornano, in the Paterno valley. Florence wished to get
possession of it, and the Siennese declared that it was not theirs
to give, seeing that it was the property of independent lords.
Thereupon the Florentines set to work in their usual way, by persuading
Montepulciano, a large town belonging to Sienna, to swear submission
to them, and also promise an annual tribute.[221] Accordingly, war
would have broken out at once, but for the intervention of Ogerio, the
Podestà of Poggibonsi. Being accepted as arbiter, he carefully studied
the question of border lines, and conscientiously defined them. His
verdict was given on June 4, 1203.[222] According to the boundaries
traced by Ogerio, Florence retained the whole of the Fiesolan and
Florentine _contado_, and the valley of Paterno was comprised in
these limits. The Siennese were to do their best to persuade the
lords of the castle to cede that as well. Both sides agreed to this
arrangement;[223] it was scrupulously respected by the Siennese, and on
May 15, 1204, it was sanctioned by Pope Innocent III., at the express
desire of the Florentines.[224] Nevertheless, the latter continued
their secret practices with Montepulciano, and on the 30th and 31st
of May induced that town to renew its oath of offensive and defensive
alliance against Sienna.[225] As soon as this became known, there were
fresh complaints, fresh protests from the Siennese. They brought the
affair before the League, and the Rectors of the same were expressly
assembled at San Quirico di Osenna, April 5, 1205, under the presidency
of the Bishop of Volterra, the Florentines and Aretines having declined
to appear. By the examination of witnesses, it was clearly proved that
Montepulciano appertained to the Siennese.[226] We do not know whether
the verdict was then pronounced, nor do we know the final result of
the quarrel. But it seems clear that from this moment the League was
virtually dissolved, and by the act of the Florentines, its original
initiators. Their primary object was now achieved in the main, and
henceforth they could expect nothing from their allies save impediments
to the fulfilment of their ulterior designs. For, more or less, all
distrusted their ambition, and were tired of playing the part of
passive tools.
But the Florentine Consuls allowed nothing to check their course of
action, and quarrelled next with the Counts of Capraia owning a castle
of the same name on the right bank of the Arno, near the Pistoian
frontier. In conjunction with the Pistoiese, these nobles could easily
bar the Arno against the Florentines. Accordingly, before this, in
1203, the latter had deemed it well to erect another castle on the
opposite bank at a place called Malborghetto. The very significant
name of Montelupo that they gave to the new building was sufficiently
expressive of its purpose. In fact, men already repeated the saying,
"To destroy this goat, there needs a wolf."[227] This affair also would
have provoked strife had not the Florentines, with their accustomed
diplomatic subtlety, profited by the friendly offices of the Lucchese
to turn it to their own advantage, and avoid coming to blows. In fact,
a treaty was arranged in June, 1204, by which Florence was bound to
leave the right bank of the river unmolested, and the Counts of Capraia
to respect the left bank of the same.[228] And before long the count
decided to swear alliance and fealty to the Florentines, together with
his dependents, all of whom, excepting the soldiery, became subject to
a yearly hearth tax of twenty-six _denari_. He also ceded his castle
and other possessions on the left side of the Arno, near Montelupo,
being likewise pledged to the defence of this fort.[229]
According to the pseudo Brunetto,[230] and one of the old lists of
Consuls, although with no documentary evidence of the fact, Count
Rodolfo, son of Count Guido di Capraia, became Podestà of Florence in
1205. Now, if this be true, it must be concluded that his nomination
had been also stipulated in the treaty.[231] In the ensuing year the
consular government seems to have been resumed, but in 1207 we come
at last to the genuine Podestà of foreign birth, in the shape of
Gualfredotto Grasselli of Milan, who henceforth represented the Commune
without requiring the assistance of his _consiliarii_. Grasselli,
too, was re-elected the following year, to enable him to carry on the
campaigns the Florentines had planned with so much ardour some time
before. An occasion for renewing hostilities was not long delayed.
The Montepulciano question had become angrier; and accordingly the
Siennese, considering that territory to be theirs by right, resolved
to attack it. In the certainty of being reinforced, Montepulciano made
a most obstinate defence; and the Florentines, after waiting awhile,
also recurred to arms in 1207. In co-operation with Lombard, Romagnol,
and Aretine allies, they marched with their _Carroccio_ to the assault
of the Castle of Montalto della Berardenga, between the rivers Ambra
and Ombrone, which the Siennese had guarded on all sides with their
Pistoian, Lucchese, and Orvietan friends. These were all routed on the
20th of June, leaving many prisoners in the enemy's hands. According
to Paolino Pieri the number taken was 1,254. The castle was destroyed,
but the war went on, notwithstanding the Pope's efforts to bring about
a peace. The Florentines then made a furious attack on the Castle of
Rigomagno, and when the scaling ladders broke down they climbed on
one another's shoulders and thus won the walls. The capture of this
stronghold made them masters of the Ombrone valley.[232] Thereupon
(February, 1208) the Siennese were forced to accept peace on very
hard terms. By the treaty concluded between the 13th and 20th of
October,[233] they were pledged to yield all their possessions at
Poggibonsi, to cede Tornano and its tower, to observe the boundaries
adjudged by Ogerio, in every direction, and to leave Montepulciano
unmolested. The prisoners on either side were exchanged.
But this war already betokens the advent of a new period in Florentine
history. The conquest of the _contado_ was no longer in question, for
the Republic already possessed it in full. With the growing prosperity
born of its numerous victories, the city had now to open roads for
its vast commerce. It was not only the vagueness of their respective
frontiers and the wish to enlarge them that caused Sienna and Florence
to be continually at strife; it was their commercial rivalry in the
markets of Italy, and especially as regarded the trade with Rome; this
near neighbour having become, through the widespread relations of the
Church, the principal centre of financial affairs in the civilised
world. For some time past it had been the aim of Florence to obtain a
monopoly of these affairs, and this was one reason why she had always
adhered to the Guelphs. She had had frequent disputes with Arezzo,
Volterra, and above all with Sienna, as being the most powerful city on
the road to Rome. So the two rivals were perpetually stirred to fresh
and fiercer strife. So, too, before long, the irresistible need of
Florence for free communication with the sea became the chief cause of
her equally long and sanguinary wars with Pisa, the city barring her
way to the coast. But as this conflict had not yet begun, the subject
will be resumed in due time. In fact, the peace of Sienna was followed
by some years of truce with foreign foes, although there was little
peace within the city, where the seeds of civil war were already on the
point of bursting forth.
The foreign Podestà, unattended and unchecked by the former
councillor-consuls, as they might be called, has now become a settled
institution; and, save for their brief re-establishment during 1211 and
1212, the Consuls, as already related, have vanished for ever. This was
undeniably a triumph for the patricians, to whom the working people
had bent for the nonce, in order to secure their co-operation in the
difficult task of reducing the _contado_ to submission. The achievement
of this conquest gave an extraordinary impulse to trade, and by opening
an increasingly wide field for commercial enterprise, induced the
desire to develop it still more. Hence, it was not to be expected
that a republic whose prosperity and strength were wholly based on
its industry and commerce, could or would be satisfied, in the long
run, with a government suited to nobles, whose constant tendency was
to grow stronger, haughtier, and more overbearing. From this moment,
therefore, a struggle between the people and the patricians (_grandi_)
was inevitable. The long series of civil wars, lacerating the city and
staining its stones with blood, is in fact on the point of beginning.
[Illustration]