of interest, but certain facts concerning them deserve attention. The
total number of regulars in the war service down to July 5, 1848, was
about 31,000. Of these, to use round numbers, 1600 were discharged
because their term expired, 2550 for disability, and 500 for other
causes; 2850 deserted; 530 were killed and 2100 wounded in battle;
400 died of their wounds; and there were 4900 ordinary or accidental
deaths. Of the volunteers 59,000 actually served; 7200 were discharged
for disability, and 2000 for other reasons before the expiration of
their term; 3900 deserted; 1350 were wounded; 600 were killed or died
of their wounds; and there were 6400 ordinary or accidental deaths.
So it appears that out of some 90,000 officers and men serving, 6750
deserted, 12,250 had to be discharged before their term expired, 11,300
met with ordinary or accidental deaths, and only 1550 were accounted
for by the enemy. The difference between the number mustered in and
the number available at the front, and also between the number who
lost their lives by fighting and the number who dropped out from other
causes, was most instructive. The Americans captured seem to have
numbered less than 1100. Of the volunteers, a very disproportionate
percentage went from the southwest; the northwest did well, and the
northeast lagged.[36.15]
From these figures it appears that approximately three out of one
hundred regulars were killed or died in consequence of wounds and eight
were discharged for disability, whereas the numbers for the volunteers
were one and twelve; and in fact the showing of the regulars was still
better, since the "new" regulars, officered with inferior men chosen
largely for political reasons, did not equal the record of the old
establishment. In many other respects also the volunteers ranked low.
Not only was there a greater percentage of sickness among them, but
the invalids required attendants. The volunteers wasted clothing,
provisions and ammunition both heedlessly and through ignorance of
administrative business; and their arms were not properly cared
for.[36.16]
They had no intention of submitting to the discipline and routine labor
of campaigning, and even at the close of the war could not be called
real troops. The volunteers, wrote one of them, "will not be treated as
regular soldiers."
"Sergeant, buck him and gag him, our officers cry,
For each trifling offence which they happen to spy,
Till with bucking and gagging of Dick, Pat and Bill,
Faith, the Mexican's ranks they have helped to fill,"
so another, an exceptionally good man, testified. "Soldiers will take
their merry frolics," an officer admitted. The camp slogan of a sturdy
North Carolina company was: "Soldier, will you work?" "Sell my shirt
first." "Soldier, will you fight?" "Twell I die." But even their
fighting did not prove entirely satisfactory. Individually they were
braver than the regulars; but the soldier's business is to fight when
the time comes, and the volunteers to a considerable extent wanted
to fight when they pleased. They might do splendidly and they might
not, their general knew. In a word, they were unreliable; and they
even imperilled their own cause by exasperating the people. Marcy
confessed that he felt disappointed. Yet there were offsets. Their
patriotism and enthusiasm stimulated their officers and the regulars;
and at their best--silent, grim, patient, with a look of kingship in
their faces--they glorified hardships, perils, wounds, disease and
death.[36.16]
A common idea of the regulars was expressed in the House by Tilden
of Ohio, who described them as "a set of puppets ... shut up without
exercise and in barracks, from year's end to year's end"; and the
"sausage democracy" looked with contempt upon West Pointers as both
puppets and aristocrats. The regulars, however, were preferable not
only in camp and on the march, but on the field. In addition to being
steady themselves, they helped immensely to steady the volunteers; and
the regular officers furnished volunteer generals with knowledge, skill
and sometimes resolution. As for their own commands, West Pointers
might curse their men, but they took splendid care of them; and it was
far better that men should fear their officers than that officers, like
many in the volunteer army, should fear their men. General Scott said
that without the science of the Military Academy his army, multiplied
by four, could not have set foot in the capital; and Patterson, like
him not a graduate of the school, concurred in this opinion.[36.17]
Our horse was to a large extent little more than mounted infantry;
and our real cavalry, besides riding like the French and therefore
badly, showed no mastery in sword practice. On the other hand our field
artillery was excellent in personnel and material; and the engineers,
though not fully trained according to the most exacting standards,
earned abundant praise. More than once they made the very strength
of the Mexican position help our men while they were preparing to
attack; and the report of General Smith upon certain officers--"Nothing
seemed to them too bold to be undertaken, or too difficult to be
executed"--might have been applied to the corps as a body.[36.18]
In organization our armies were inferior to the best European models;
but, said Gabriel Ferry in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, the soldiers
made up for this defect by displaying an energy adequate for every
need. The infantry were criticised by foreign observers for a lack of
correctness and snap in their movements. "What is called the American
army," wrote the minister of Spain, to imply that we had no real
troops. But they husbanded their strength in this way; it was therefore
ready for emergencies; and they had the initiative, ingenuity,
independence and self-reliance that have been cultivated of late years
abroad in place of conventional precision.[36.19]
Despite all technical defects, the faults of the volunteers and the
admixture of mere immigrants among the regulars, we had soldiers to
remember with pride. So many of the officers were superior men that
almost all caught the inspiration more or less, and the privates felt
ready to obey and follow them. The troops as a body acquired a sense
of invincibility. "We may be killed, but we can't be whipped," was a
favorite watch-word; and they fully meant it, said Karl von Grone.
Dangers and hardships were bravely faced, as a rule, and often were
faced with gayety. "Oh, this is a glorious life of mine," exclaimed
Lieutenant Hamilton; "a life in a land of fruits and flowers, of
dark-eyed maidens and sunny skies, of snow-capped mountains and of
flowering valleys; a life of adventure, of calm and storm, of bivouac
and battle."[36.20]
No doubt the political and social conditions of Mexico helped our
troops greatly, but in addition to routing every time an enemy who was
by no means intrinsically contemptible, outnumbered us and knew the
ground, they had to war against deserts, war against mountains, war
against fearful storms, war against a strange climate, war against a
devouring pestilence; and in spite of every difficulty Scott, after
capturing more than a thousand officers and more than six hundred
cannon, occupied the capital of Mexico with less than six thousand men.
The troops themselves, instead of boasting, pronounced it a "miracle";
but the critical and unfriendly _Journal des Débats_ declared: "The new
conquerors have equalled by their exploits the great Cortez himself, if
they have not eclipsed him."[36.20]
Yet after all it was "a war of conquest," we have long been told.
Popularly "conquest" is in truth an odious word, for it has commonly
been associated with odious deeds: aggression and cruel tyranny; but
"circumstances alter cases," and when the facts are unobjectionable, so
is the term. Legally, the idea has prevailed that conquest is robbery;
but this idea seems to have grown from the old conception that the
government owned the country, and such is not our opinion to-day.[36.21]
Forcible acquisitions may indeed be commendable. In that way Rome
civilized Europe, England gave peace, order and comparative happiness
to India, and our own country came into being; and none of us would
undo these results. The welfare of humanity is the true principle.
Life has the right of way over death; enlightenment and energy over
ignorance and torpor. Possession means use; power and opportunities
mean service. The primary law is that all shall move forward and
coöperate in achieving the general destiny. Like individuals, every
nation must run its course to the best of its ability, and if it
grossly flags, pay the penalty. In the absence of any other tribunal,
war must enforce this penalty. "Whosoever hath [in use], to him shall
be given, ... but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even
that which he hath." Such is eternal right; not the justice of the law
schools, but the justice of the Supreme Power.[36.21]
Of all conquerors we were perhaps the most excusable, the most
reasonable, the most beneficent. The Mexicans had come far short of
their duty to the world. Being what they were, they had forfeited a
large share of their national rights. Even Humboldt said that Mexico
"ought not to expect to withhold, from the uses of civilization and
improvement," such neglected territories as New Mexico and California.
A philosopher like Josiah Royce, a moralist like Francis Lieber and
an unsympathetic historian like Dr. von Holst agree substantially
that our duty called upon us to occupy the Golden Gate. Not merely an
administration or a party, but the nation believed that our destiny
called us there, and felt ready to assume the high responsibility of
taking possession.[36.22]
Besides, while ours could perhaps be called a war _of_ conquest, it
was not a war _for_ conquest--the really vital point. We found it
necessary to require territory, for otherwise our claims and indemnity
could not be paid. The conflict was forced upon us; yet we refused to
take advantage of our opportunity. "It is almost impossible," says
Bryce, "for a feeble State, full of natural wealth which her people
do not use, not to crumble under the impact of a stronger and more
enterprising race." But we gave back much that we took, and paid for
the rest more than it was worth to Mexico. "All deserve praise, who ...
have been more just than their actual power made it necessary to be,"
said Thucydides; and we were not only just but liberal. Finally, we
gave proof, in the prosperity and usefulness of our new territories,
that our responsibility was amply met.[36.22]
So the account was fairly adjusted and more. But something still
remains to say. A closer acquaintance with us and with real national
life taught Mexico some of her mistakes, confirmed the political
relations of her states, and helped greatly to liberalize her ideas and
institutions. "The sad part of it is that our chastisement is merited,"
preached Ramírez. "He that reflects how useful are the lessons of
suffering and misfortune," declared the minister of relations, "will
admit that no one could show more clearly the deformity of our errors
than the foreign invader [has done], and that there could have been
no more efficacious means of elevating our reason above the bastard
interests of political passion."[36.23]
[THE WAR LEAVES MEXICO FRIENDLY]
Still warmer sentiments prevailed. One of the chief obstacles in the
way of making a treaty was the desire of not a few Mexicans to have
the United States annex their country; and after that plan failed,
the American general-in-chief was actually invited to become dictator
for a term of years, backed by American troops. With reference to
Trist, our commissioner, Couto and Cuevas remarked on presenting the
treaty to Congress, "Of him there remain in Mexico none but grateful
and honoring recollections"; and when bidding Clifford good-by, the
President expressed--in no perfunctory way--a sincere desire for the
most "sisterly" relations between the two countries, as essential to
the welfare of Mexico. Indeed, that nation had not felt so cordial
toward the United States for many years as it did immediately after the
war.[36.23]
In Europe, too, fairer views and feelings regarding us began to be
entertained. "If nothing occur to tarnish what has been so well
begun," wrote our minister at the court of St. James in June, 1846,
"the moral influence produced here and in Europe generally will be
worth all the expenses of the war." "It was a hard lesson for England
to learn, but she has learned it," reported Bancroft, who succeeded
him; "that America means to go on her own way, and that Europe ... must
give up the thought of swaying her destiny." Our triumphs over Mexico,
remarked C. J. Ingersoll in the House, "have been admirable lessons
... to the world, that the [wise] policy of all nations is peace with
these United States." Only on respect and appreciation can peace and
mutual helpfulness be founded, and both our victories and the manner
in which they were used promoted harmony between us and the powers of
Europe.[36.23]
Humanity and moderation--such humanity and moderation as are
practicable amid hostilities--gilded our arms. "The elevated and
kindly character of Taylor and Scott," said the Mexican historian,
Roa Bárcena, "lessened as far as was possible the evils of war." The
Americans always treated us during the conflict with "the most noble
courtesy," wrote Ceballos. "We shall certainly consider it as an
unprecedented event if this enormous booty [the wealth of the Mexican
churches] escapes from pillage," proclaimed the London _Times_; and it
did escape. We have beaten the enemy, felt Robert E. Lee, the knightly
soldier, "in a manner no man might be ashamed of." Even Theodore
Parker, though opposed to the war, made this public acknowledgment: "It
has been conducted with as much gentleness as a war of invasion can
be." And a brave officer of rare intelligence uttered on the floor of
our Senate these words: "We have cause to be proud of the record this
war will leave behind it--a monument more lasting than brass. We, the
actors of to-day, must soon crumble to dust; the institutions we now
maintain, and hope will be perpetual, may pass away; the Republic may
sink in the ocean of time, and the tide of human affairs roll unbroken
over its grave; but the events of this war will live in the history of
our country and our race, affording in all ages to come, proof of the
high state of civilization amongst the people who conducted it."[36.24]
NOTES
XXI. BEHIND THE SCENES AT MEXICO
21.1. This is a good illustration of Santa Anna's political ability.
21.2. Farías appears to have had no share in this quarrel with Salas
(México á través, iv, 593).
21.3. _The course of Mexican politics_. _Federalista Puro_, No. 3,
supplmt.; No. 6, supplmt. London _Times_, Feb. 9, 1847. Apuntes, 71-3,
76, 124-6. =13=Bankhead, Nos. 120, 136, 140, 146, 153, 157, 160, 169,
180, 1846. =52=Consul Campbell, Nov. 10, 1846. =52=Consul Black, Aug.
22, 27; Sept. 17, 22, 26, 1846. Comunícación Circular de ... Peña y
Peña. García, Revol. de Ayutla, 18, 20, 27. Ultimas Comunicaciones
habidas entre ... Salas y ... Rejón. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii,
538. Prieto, Memorias, ii, 195, 199. =13=Thornton to Addington, June
29, 1847. =13=Gutiérrez de Estrada to Palmerston, Mar. 1, 1847. Méx.
en 1847, 12-4. Ramírez, México, 12, 142-4, 149, 152-4, 156, 165, 172,
176. =83=Rejón to Berdusco, Dec. 23. _Eco_, Nov. 4, 7, 11, 14, 1846.
Escudero, Mems., 8, 13, 14. Dublán, Legisl., v, 171, 238-9. Memoria
de ... Relaciones, Dec, 1846. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 332,
res.; 343, res.; 345, res.; 346; 368. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii,
100-1, 118, 120, 124, 126-8. =83=Gov. Querétaro to Farías, Oct. 20.
Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 144. Rivera, Los Gobernantes, ii, 310. Lara,
Resumen, 65, note. Mora, Papeles Ineditos, 64-5. =162=Conner, Dec. 31,
1846. =164=_Id._ Jan. 5, 1847. Bustamante, Campaña, 7. Ho. 60; 30, 1,
p. 1125 (S. Anna). Baz, Juárez, 43. México á través, iv, 576-7, 589,
591-2, 600-1, 698. _Republicano_, Sept. 28; Oct. 20, 28; Nov. 17; Dec.
24, 1846; Jan. 1, 22-3; Feb. 3, 1847. _Monitor Repub._, Sept. 25-6,
30; Oct. 19-23, 26; Dec. 25, 1846. _Diario_, Sept. 23, 25, 29; Oct.
9, 12, 14, 16, 31; Nov. 24; Dec. 18-9, 22, 28, 29, 1846. And from
=76= the following Procl. gov. S. L. P., Oct. 22, 1846. J. Alvarez,
Oct. 22. Comte. gen. Mex., Oct. 16. Canalizo to comte. gen. Mex.,
Oct. 18. Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Oct. 24. Salas, procl., Oct. 25. Guerra,
circulars, Oct. 14, 19, 22; Dec. 23. Relaciones to gov. Fed. Dist.,
Dec. 23. Relaciones circular, Oct. 19. Comte. gen. Chiapas, Nov. 3.
Also others of minor importance. Otero was associated with Pedraza in
the leadership of the Moderados.
21.4. So far as possible, revenue was anticipated, even at a great
loss. _E.g._, if a merchant expected a cargo to arrive at Vera Cruz,
he sent a broker (_agiotista_) to the minister of the treasury, and by
paying a sum in advance he obtained drafts on the Vera Cruz customhouse
that were receivable at par for the duties. Of course the merchant,
the broker and the minister made profits, and the treasury lost (N.
Y. _Herald_, Jan. 18, 1845). Another way in which the minister could
make money was to accept at face value as part of a loan or payment
government paper that had cost the one who tendered it only a trifle,
and take a share of the net proceeds. "Agiotista" became an odious
term. It was given out that Santa Anna would accept no pay, but the
treasury books showed that he drew his salary for even the time
while he was at Havana (=335=Worrall to Trist, Nov. 28, 1847). They
apparently showed also that in 1846 millions were distributed among
generals, brokers and others. The British minister said that Iturbe
was the ninth finance minister whom he had seen devoting "his peculiar
attention to the augmentation, of his private means while in office"
(=13=Bankhead, no. 104, 1846). Another great evil was that, in spite
of express prohibitions, state officials drew upon the proceeds of the
tobacco monopoly. The following table illustrates the state of the
treasury (1846):
_Oct. 12_ _Oct. 16_ _Dec. 26_ _Dec. 29_
On hand $8510 $3410 -- $1148
Rec'd -- 3500 $7162 3700
Paid 1402 3628 5713 4367
A poll tax was thought of by Rejón, but evidently the government dared
not propose it (=73=Bermúdez de Castro, nos. 332, res., 346, 1846).
21.5. _Mexican financial history_ (see also the first part of chap.
xxxiii). Comunicación Circular de ... Peña y Peña. Memoria de ...
Relaciones, Mar., 1845; Dec., 1846. Rivera, Jalapa, iii, 368, 716.
_Ilustrador Católico_, no. 239. Hacienda, series of Memorias.
Hacienda, Manifiesto de la Admin. y Progresos. London _Times_, July
6, 1846. Breve Resumen. Casasus, Hist. de la Deuda contraida, etc.,
_passim_. Paredes, address to Cong., June 6, 1846 (_Diario_). Alamán,
Liquidación. Esposición del Cong. Gen. =11=Martin, Apr. 30, 1827; July
4; Aug. 25, 1828. =11=Series of Mémoires on the Spanish Colonies.
Sierra, Evolution, i, 178, 218. Zamacois, Méx., xii, 254. =52=Consul
Jones, Aug. 1, 1839. =56=W. S. Parrott, Oct. 4, 11, 1845. =58=Howland &
Aspinwall, Mar. 1, 1847. _Republicano_, Feb. 2, 1847. =13=Ashburnham,
nos. 39, 51, 1837; 3, 97, 1838. =13=Pakenham, nos. 28, 1833; 6, 1836;
44, 62, 1839. =13=Bankhead, nos. 81, 1844; 6, 38, 70, 106, 1845; 21,
104, 127, 146, 169, 1846. =52=Poinsett, Jan. 4; Aug. 5, 1825; July
16, 1828. =52=Butler, July 16, 1832. _Revista Econ._, Dec. 14, 1843;
Feb. 5, 1844. Tornel, Reseña, 9, 171. Macgregor, Progress, i, 674-83.
Thompson, Recolls., 12, 27-8, 87. =52=D. Green, Oct. 28; Nov. 12, 29,
1844. N. Y. _Herald_, Jan. 18, 1845. _Siglo XIX_, June 14, 1844; Dec.
2, 1845. _Patriota Mexicano_, Dec. 9, 1845. _Reforma_, Jan. 23, 1846.
London _Times_, Mar. 29; May 15; Sept. 9; Nov. 11; Dec. 6, 1845; Mar.
2, 1846. _Revue Indep._, Apr. 25, 1845. =52=Consul Black, Aug. 23,
1845. =52=Consul Dimond, no. 338, May 7, 1846. =73=Bermúdez de Castro,
no. 346, 1846. =52=Consul McCall, no. 65, Sept. 26, 1845. Balbontín,
Estado, 66. Wash. _Union_, Feb. 2, 1848 (Poinsett). N. Y. _Globe_, June
3, 1846. _Diario_, Sept. 18, 1846. _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 27, 1846;
Jan. 9, 1847. Ward, Mexico, i., 331-7. =76=To S. Anna, Nov. 25. Vicario
Capitular, Contestación. Priestley, José de Gálvez, Chap. x.
21.6. _The present financial problem._ Dublán, Legislación, v.,
172, 211-6, 235-7, 240. =77=Relaciones circular, Nov. 27, 1846.
=13=Bankhead, no. 6, 1845; nos. 21, 127, 153, 167, 169, 1846.
=52=Consul Black, Dec. 29, 1846. Apuntes, 76, 124-6. Ramírez,
México, 171. =335=Worrall to Trist, Nov. 28, 1847. Rivera, Jalapa,
iii, 716. _Ilustrador Católico_, i., 281. Méx. en 1847, 14-19, 24.
_Don Simplicio_, Feb. 13, 1847. =86=Relaciones, Oct. 26, 1846.
_Zempoalteca_, Nov. 27, 1846. Escudero, Mems., 8, =92=Gov. Fed.
Dist., procl., Jan. 16. =82=Gov. Durango to legisl., Nov. 8, 1846.
_Columna de la Libertad_, Jan. 8, 1847. Sierra, Evolution, i, 178,
217-8. =52=McLane, no. 5, 1845. =56=W. S. Parrott, Oct. 4, 11, 1845.
=11=Mémoire, 1828. D. Green to Calhoun, Oct. 28; Nov. 12 in Jameson,
Calh. Corresp., 976-80, 991. _Siglo XIX_, Jan. 14, 1844. London
_Times_, Sept. 9; Dec. 6, 1845; Oct. 8, 1846; Jan. 8, 1847. Memoria de
... Relaciones, Dec., 1846 (Lafragua). =73=Bermúdez de Castro, nos.
316, res., 346, 371, res., 445. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 128.
=75=Relaciones, circulars to govs., Oct. 9; Dec. 17, 1846; circs. nos.
233, 238, 255, 1846. =75a=Hacienda, circulars, Oct. 10; Nov. 9; Dec.
5, 31, 1846. =86=V. Cruz state treas. to gov., Jan. 11; Feb. 4, 1847.
_Constitutionnel_, Dec. 18, 1846. Wash. _Union_, Jan. 18, 29; May
11, 1847. _Monitor_, Oct. 12. =166=Pommarès to Conner, Oct. 7, 1846.
_Republicano_, Oct. 22; Nov. 5, 13, 24; Dec. 8, 1846; Jan. 23, 1847.
_Monitor Repub._, Sept. 25, 30; Oct. 18; Nov. 19, 30; Dec. 19, 1846.
_Diario_, Sept. 23, 25, 29; Oct. 2, 3; Nov. 21, 23; Dec. 4, 13, 15, 21,
29, 30, 1846; Jan. 1, 7-9, 1847. México á través, iv, 589, 600, 628-9.
=76=S. Anna, Nov. 7, 9, 19; Dec. 3, 4, 7, 30, 1846; Jan. 1, 2, 4, 7,
1847. =76=J. Alvarez, Sept. 30, 1846. =76=Circ. to comtes. gen., Sept.
28, 1846.
21.7. The law was a compromise (Apuntes, 124). Rejón, as he frankly
told the Spanish minister (note 21.6), was for nationalizing--_i.e._,
confiscating--the property of the Church. Santa Anna preferred to let
the clergy keep the title to their wealth, and require a loan from them
now and then--a process termed "milking" (Jameson, Calhoun Corresp.,
992). The essential basis on which the law passed was the practical
necessity of raising money for the war; but many who recognized this
necessity and even the desirability of reducing the wealth and power of
the Church could not bring themselves to act.