* * * * *
"ESQUIRE" AND "GENTLEMAN."
The custom of addressing almost every man above the rank of an artizan
or a huckster as "Esquire," seems now to be settled as a matter of
ordinary politeness and courtesy; whilst the degradation of the
gentleman into the "Gent," has caused this term, as the title of a
social class, to have fallen into total disuse. Originally, they were
terms that had their respective meanings as much as Duke, Knight,
Yeoman, or Hind; but now they simply mean courtesy or contempt towards
{438} the person to whom they are applied,--with the exception, indeed,
of certain combinations of circumstances under which the word
"Gentleman" is applied _as a character_.
It would be an interesting occupation to trace the mutations of meaning
which these words have undergone, and the circumstances which gave rise
to the successive applications of them. The subject has been often
touched upon more or less slightly; but I know of no work in which it is
discussed fully, though, indeed, there may be such. Of course, many of
your readers are men whose pursuits have lain in other directions than
social customs, social language, and social tastes; and, as one of them,
I may be permitted to ask either where a full discussion can be found,
or that some of your correspondents will furnish through your medium a
clear and tolerably full exposition of the question. I believe it would
be of general and public interest.
We naturally expect, that in _official correspondence_, the public
boards, through their proper officers, would be very precise in
assigning to every person his proper title, in the address of a letter.
Yet nothing can be more negligent and capricious than the way in which
this is done. I have held an appointment in the public service, which is
generally considered to carry with it the title of "Esquire," (but
really whether it do or not, I am unable to tell), and have at different
times had a good deal of official correspondence, sometimes mere
routine, and sometimes involving topics of a critical character. From my
own experience I am led to think that no definite rule exists, and that
the temper of the moment will dictate the style of address. For
instance, in matter-of-course business, or in any correspondence that
was agreeable to official persons, I was addressed as "Esq.;" but if the
correspondence took a turn that was unpleasant, it was "Mr. ----;" and
on one occasion I received a note addressed with my name denuded of all
title whatever, even of the office I filled. The note, I hardly need
say, was "full of fire and fury;" and yet, in less than half an hour, I
received a second (the writer having discovered his mistake), opening
with "My dear Sir," and superscribed with the "Esquire" at full length.
This, I think, proves the capriciousness of men in public stations in
their assignment of titles of this kind.
I certainly expected to find, however, in the "List of the Fellows of
the Society of Antiquaries," due attention paid to this circumstance.
The one just circulated was therefore referred to, and it would seem to
be as full of anomalies as a "Court Guide" or a "Royal Blue Book." We
have, indeed, the Knights and Baronets duly titled, and the Peers, lay
and spiritual, sufficiently distinguished both by capitals and mode of
insertion. All those who have no other title (as D.D. or F.R.S.)
recognised by the Society, are courteously designated by the affix
"Esq." In this, it will be strange indeed if _all_ be entitled to the
appellation in its legitimate sense; or, in other words, if the
principle of courtesy does not supersede, amongst the otherwise untitled
mass of Fellows, the principle of social rank. To this in itself, as the
distinction of "Gent" after a man's name has become derogatory, there
cannot be the least objection; for antiquarianism does not palliate
rudeness or offensive language.
At the same time, the adoption of this principle should surely be
uniform, and invidious distinctions should not be made. The title
"Esq.," should not be given to one man, and left out in designating
another whose social position is precisely the same. For instance, we
find in this list "----, M.D.," and "----, Esq., M.D.," employed to
designate two different Doctors in Medicine. We find "----, F.R.S." and
"----, Esq., F.R.S." to designate two Fellows of the Society of
Antiquaries, who are also Fellows of the Royal. We see one or two D.D.'s
deprived of their titles of "Rev.," and, as if to make amends (in point
of quantity at least), we have one Fellow with titles at each end of his
name that seem incompatible with each other, viz., "Rev. ----, Esq."
Anomalies like these can only be the result of sheer carelessness, or of
the ignorance of some clerk employed to make out the list without
adequate instructions given to him. It has, in my hearing, been held up
as a specimen of invidious distinction to gratify some petty dislike;
but this notion is simply absurd, and deserves no notice. At the same
time, it betokens a carelessness that it is desirable to avoid.
As a mere question of _dignity_, it appears to me to savour too much of
Clapham-Common or Hampstead-Heath grandeur, to add much to our
respectability or worldly importance. It would, indeed, be more
"dignified" to drop, in the lists, all use of "Esq." under any
circumstances; or, if this be objected to, to at least treat "M.A.,"
"D.D.," "F.R.S." as higher titles, in which the "Esq." may properly be
merged, and thus leave the appellation to designate the absence of any
higher literary or scientific title.
A good deal of this is irrelevant to the primary object of my letter;
but certainly not altogether irrelevant to the dignity of the highest
English representative body of archæology, the Society of Antiquaries. I
hope, at least, that this irrelevancy will give neither pain nor offence
to any one, for nothing could be further from my wish or intention than
such an effect. I have only wished to illustrate the necessity for an
accurate description of what are really the original, subsequent, and
present significations of the words "Esquire" and "Gentleman," and to
urge that either some definite rule should be adopted as to their use in
official {439} and semi-official cases, or else that they should be
discontinued altogether.