[40] These were the persons who fabricated those reports that were
circulated and believed by numbers, respecting promises of aid and
support from the officers of Bengal and Bombay.
[41] _This fear of being thought afraid_, is, perhaps, of all motives
of human action one of the weakest, though it wears a mask of boldness,
and under that is often productive of infinite mischief.
[42] I thought so at that period, though I have been since convinced I
was mistaken.
[43] Sir George Barlow not only thought so, but must, from the Governor
General's letter to the secret committee of the 12th of October
1809, have conveyed the same impression to Lord Minto. The merit of
foresight will not assuredly be claimed as one among the talents that
were displayed by the Governor of Fort St. George upon this memorable
occasion.
[44] See Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm's letter to General Gowdie, in the
Appendix.
[45] Lieutenant Maitland, the dismissed quarter-master, was ordered
to command the marines; and Lieutenant Forbes, who had been banished
to Condapilly, was directed to proceed to relieve an officer of the
regiment on duty at Prince of Wales's Island. This second punishment
was a torturing revival of those wrongs, of which not only the parties,
but all the officers of the corps, had before, with some justice,
complained.
[46] Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay afterwards returned me the original
note.
[47] The following paragraph of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel
Montresor to Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton, dated Secundrabad, the
10th July, 1809, is a proof of the light in which this measure was
viewed, and the use made of it to reclaim the most violent to duty
and submission.--"When the address was forwarded from Jaulnah, the
officers could not have known that the Government of Madras had taken
such steps as were most likely to quiet the public mind, in consequence
of the unpleasant state of affairs at Masulipatam. Lieutenant-Colonel
Malcolm, whose sound sense, knowledge of the army, and conciliatory
manners, peculiarly qualified him for the difficult task of allaying
the ferment in the northern division of the army, has already arrived
at Masulipatam, and a committee has been ordered to inquire into the
late occurrences, composed of three officers among the most popular
in the army: therefore I am sure the officers of Jaulnah will see the
bad effects of forwarding an address, at this moment, of any nature
whatever, as it could only tend to add to the irritation of the public
mind." Vide printed Correspondence, No. 2, page 35.
[48] Two days after I went away, and when no event had occurred of any
consequence, he was persuaded (as has been before shown) to commence
the plan for placing the native corps under check of his Majesty's
regiments, and the orders were sent to Hyderabad for the march of the
2d of the 10th to Goa.
[49] Instead of sending this letter, the order for the march of a
battalion from Hyderabad to Goa, in prosecution of the plan for
dividing the sepoy corps, was sent two days after my departure, and
provoked (as was, under such circumstances, to have been expected) open
resistance and rebellion.
[50] This irritating and imprudent order (which has been before
noticed) was sent to Hyderabad a day or two after I sailed; and the
same influence that obtained the adoption of this measure, prevented
the dispatch of the letter to the commanding officers of Hyderabad and
Jaulnah, which I drafted, and which Sir George Barlow at the moment
approved, and _assured me he would send_.
[51] The Major-General assured me of this fact.
[52] Vide Appendix.
[53] All the letters from this officer to me while I was at
Masulipatam, are in the printed Correspondence.
[54] One of the chief objects for which this proceeding was recommended
and adopted, was to gain time.
[55] See Appendix.
[56] Vide Appendix.
[57] See a copy of that order in the Appendix, in a letter to Sir
George Barlow, dated 5th July.
[58] See Appendix.
[59] I always thought, and always must think, that there is a wide
difference between the seditious combination of a body of officers
and a mutiny of soldiers, and that the two cases require a distinct
treatment. With the latter there can hardly be two modes of proceeding;
with the former there may be various, and all equally safe. They may
be restored by the influence of reason, and subdued by the operation
of their own feelings. Their minds may be reclaimed by many modes that
could not be applied to their men; and there is, in the worst extremes,
a character in their opposition that admits more of the application
of such remedies than the mad and instinctive action of a mutinous
soldiery. These two cases were certainly confounded at Madras; and most
of the evils that arose may be imputed to the fallacy of treating a
seditious combination of officers as a mutiny of soldiers.
[60] The danger that had been incurred was sufficient to authorize
Government to take the most decisive measures to guard against the
revival of such combinations against authority: and though numbers who
might have merited punishment had escaped, _not one object of benefit
to either individuals or the army at large had been attained_; and it
is therefore quite extravagant to assert such a termination could ever
have tended to encourage future proceedings of a similar nature.
[61] The account of what occurred at this station on the day General
Close made the noble effort he did to carry the orders of the
Government of Madras into execution, shows the desperate hazard that
was incurred. If, says an officer of high rank, during the period that
between four and five thousand troops were in a state of mutinous
violence and uproar, "one musket had gone off by accident, not a man of
his Majesty's 33d regiment would have been left alive, and a general
massacre of almost all Europeans would have been the most certain
result."
[62] No consideration of this question can be local or limited. If a
successful example of disobedience or rebellion was exhibited by our
native troops on the Madras establishment, its baneful effects would
not be limited to that part of our possessions.
[63] I spoke to Colonel Barclay before I wrote upon this subject,
and he said he would show my note to Sir G. Barlow, and obtain me an
answer that would vindicate my character from the charge to which the
Governor's change of resolution had made me liable. This circumstance
left me without a doubt that the cautious reply I received from that
officer was by the direction of Sir G. Barlow. Indeed, I was satisfied
that this excellent and respectable officer, for whom I have always
entertained the same sentiments of esteem and friendship, never acted
in any part of those transactions, in which his name appears, _but by
the specific instructions or orders the Governor_.
[64] Post.
[65] See a copy of this in the Appendix.
[66] The officers of that force had signed the test.
[67] It was considered, at the moment when this note was written, that
almost the whole of the two corps from Chittledroog had been destroyed.
[68] Vide letters to Lords Wellesley and Wellington, pages 64, 65.