Madras on the morning of the 26th, having travelled two hundred and
ninety miles in little more than three days. I knew of the flagrant act
of disobedience which the subsidiary force at Hyderabad had committed,
in refusing to allow the 2d battalion of the 10th regiment to march to
Goa, to which station it had been ordered in prosecution of the plan
for dividing the native corps so as to place them under the check of
his Majesty's regiments[50]. I thought it probable that this event
would give rise to some strong measures on the part of Government, and
I was most anxious to communicate all the information I had collected
before any such were adopted: but, though no danger could have resulted
from delay, the Governor, who knew I would be at Madras on the morning
of the 26th, did not deem it necessary to wait even for a few hours,
though strongly urged to do so by Major-General Gowdie[51], the
commander of the forces; and the moment of my arrival was that of the
execution of the orders of the 26th of July for the separation of the
officers from their men. I did not see Sir George Barlow till next day:
and the cold manner in which I was received, the slighting view which I
saw was taken of my efforts at Masulipatam, and the reserve maintained,
not only by him, but by others, left me without a doubt that I was no
longer honoured with his confidence; which I was now, indeed, convinced
I had never possessed but in a very limited degree. I therefore
resolved, in future, to confine myself to an obedience of any orders
I might receive, and no longer to expose myself to that failure and
disgrace which must always attend the person who acts as a confidential
agent, on delicate and important occasions, to one with whose
proceedings his mind does not accord, whose confidence he does not
enjoy, and of whose plans he is but imperfectly informed. But, before
I proceed to explain the subsequent part I took in these transactions,
it will be proper to offer some remarks on the observations made in
the letter, under date 10th September, 1809, from the Government of
Fort St. George to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors,
respecting my conduct at Masulipatam. The following is an extract from
the letter from the Governor of Fort St. George upon this subject.
"On receiving intelligence of the mutiny, we appointed
Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, in whose zeal and talents we entertained
the fullest confidence, to the command of the Madras European regiment,
and the garrison of Masulipatam, for the purpose of re-establishing
the authority of Government over the troops, inquiring into the
causes of the mutiny, and placing the most guilty of the offenders
under arrest. Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm was not furnished with any
written instructions: it was left to his discretion to adopt such
measures as circumstances might render advisable, with the view to the
accomplishment of the objects of his deputation.
"Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm immediately proceeded by sea to
Masulipatam. On his arrival he found that the officers of the garrison
had formed themselves into a committee, in which every officer had
a voice. The greatest anarchy and confusion prevailed; and it was
with difficulty that he prevailed on the officers to acknowledge his
authority.
"As it never was in the contemplation of the Government to disband the
European regiment, it was expected that Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm
would have taken the earliest opportunity to communicate to the men
a distinct and public disavowal of that intention on the part of the
Government, and have employed the most strenuous exertions to recall
the men to a sense of their duty, by impressing upon their minds the
degree of guilt and danger in which their officers, for purposes
entirely personal to themselves, had endeavoured to involve them. It
was also expected that Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, by establishing his
influence and authority over the troops composing the garrison, would
have secured their obedience, and by that measure have deprived the
officers of the power of prosecuting their designs, and brought the
leaders to trial for their mutinous conduct.
"Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm appears, however, to have adopted a course
of proceedings entirely different from that which we had in view in
deputing him to Masulipatam. He abstained from making any direct
communication to the men: and when we authorized him, with the view
of detaching the troops from the cause of their officers, to proclaim
a pardon to the European and native soldiers for the part which they
might have taken in the mutiny, he judged it proper to withhold the
promulgation of the pardon, from an apprehension (as stated in his
letter to our President, dated the 18th of July) of irritating the
minds of the European officers, and driving them to despair.
"To this apparent unreasonable forbearance and attention to the
feelings of the officers, who had, by their acts of violence and
aggression, forfeited all claims to such consideration, may, we
conceive, be ascribed Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm's failure in the
establishment of any efficient control over the garrison: and he
appears to have been principally occupied, during the period of
his residence at Masulipatam, in negociations with the disorderly
committees; calculated, in our opinion, to compromise rather than
establish his authority; and in fruitless attempts to induce them, by
argument, to return to their duty, and abandon the criminal combination
in which they had engaged. Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm's reasons for
pursuing this line of conduct, and for recommending to us the adoption
of conciliatory and temporizing measures, are detailed in his letters
to our President, dated the 4th, 5th, and 6th of July. In those letters
he states, that the officers at Masulipatam had received assurances
from most of the military stations of the army, applauding their
conduct, and promising them effectual support; that the whole army were
united in a resolution to oppose the authority of Government; that
there was not a single corps, from Ganjam to Cape Comorin, which was
not prepared to break out into open rebellion. The measures recommended
by Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, as constituting, in his opinion, the
only means of averting the most dreadful calamities, consisted of a
modified repeal of the orders of the 1st of May; the restoration to
the service, and to their appointments, of all the officers whom we
had found it necessary to suspend or remove; with an intimation to the
army, that their claims to Bengal allowances would be brought to the
notice of the Honourable the Court of Directors. Lieutenant-Colonel
Malcolm returned to Madras, on the arrival of Major-General Pater at
Masulipatam to assume the command of the northern division of the
army, having succeeded no further in accomplishing the objects of his
mission, than in preventing the officers from adopting any flagrant
acts of outrage to authority during his residence at Masulipatam."
The first charge is hardly less than a direct accusation of
disobedience of orders. It is stated, that as it never was in the
contemplation of Government to disband the European regiment, it was
expected I would have taken the earliest opportunity to communicate
to the men a distinct and public disavowal of that intention. In
the succeeding paragraph I am accused of having adopted a course of
proceeding entirely different from what Government had in view in
deputing me; and I am positively charged _with_ "_having abstained
from making any direct communication to the men_." My letter to
Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, of the 18th July, is a number of this
dispatch, and has been printed with it. This letter contains the
following passage: "You will satisfy Sir George Barlow, that one of
the first things that I did, after I came on shore, was to satisfy the
minds of the officers, and, through them, of the men, of the intentions
of Government in ordering a party of marines from the corps; _and you
will see, by the enclosed extract from my Journal, that I took the
first good opportunity that offered of_ STATING THIS FACT _in the most
public and impressive manner to the whole regiment_." I may ask, with
great surprise and some indignation, Why the extract alluded to in this
letter was not transmitted to the Honourable the Court of Directors?
This extract was a copy of my speech made to the European regiment
under arms on the 15th of July. The whole of this speech is in my
Journal[52]. The following is a part of it.
"I consider it my duty to declare to you at this moment, that it never
was in the contemplation of Government to _disband_ or disperse this
corps; and that it never meant to employ any officer or man of the
regiment in any manner, or upon any service, but such as was suited to
the character of British soldiers; and which it, of course, conceived
both officers and men would be forward to proceed upon."
Is it possible that any disavowal could be more distinct, or made in
a more proper and military manner? Yet I am directly charged with
_having abstained_ from making any such communication to the _men_! It
is possible a charge so completely unfounded may have originated in
mistake or neglect: but where there exists, as on the present occasion,
an evident desire to criminate; where the secret nature of the blow
afforded no opportunity of defence; such mistake, even if proved,
neither can nor ought to disarm honest resentment. It is too much to
have a character, that has been obtained by the struggle of a whole
life, assailed in such a manner. But the knowledge which the Governor
of Fort St. George had of my proceeding, upon this point, was not
limited to this communication through Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay. The
day after my return to Madras, I read to him the whole of my Journal.
It is true he did not pay much attention to it: and the little value
he attached to the detail of my proceedings was the cause of my not
loading my public report with a copy of its contents. I had neither
received at that moment, nor at any subsequent period, the slightest
official notice of even dissatisfaction; and the probability of my
conduct being misrepresented to my superiors in England in the manner
it has been, never once entered into my imagination.
In answer to the charge, "That I did not employ my strenuous exertions
to recall the men to a sense of their duty, by impressing upon their
minds the degree of guilt and danger in which their officers, for
purposes entirely personal to themselves, had endeavoured to involve
them," I must reply in the most solemn manner, that I was not withheld
from acting in the manner the Government here state they expected
I would, merely because I had no orders to do so, but because I
considered that such a proceeding would have had an operation directly
opposite to all Sir George Barlow's intentions, as expressed when I
left Madras. His desire then was, (as has already been shown,) to
conciliate and reclaim the officers of the Company's army, not to
render them desperate. I was particularly instructed to point their
views to England, to persuade them by every effort to await the
decision of the Honourable the Court of Directors, and to prevent
their precipitating themselves into a guilt from which they could
never retreat. Sir George Barlow appeared satisfied I could effect
this through the influence of my general character, and the power of
reason, aided by the justice of the cause I had to support: and I most
solemnly affirm, that if the Government of Madras desire to insinuate
(as the substance of these passages in their letter would imply) that I
acted contrary to the instructions of Sir George Barlow, communicated
to me in private, that the charge is not founded in fact: and it is
fortunate for me that the subsequent communications made by Sir George
Barlow's Secretary, and all the circumstances of this case, completely
corroborate and establish the truth of that unqualified assertion,
which I have deemed it due to my character to make on this point. A
letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay[53], dated the 12th of July, and
written by the Governor's order, in reply to my communications from
Masulipatam of the 4th, 5th, and 6th of July, in which I had required
further orders, repeats nearly the same sentiments in the same language
Sir George Barlow had used before I left Madras. "You cannot," he
observes, "render a more acceptable service to the public interests,
than by the exertion of your influence and ability in keeping the
garrison of Masulipatam firm to their duty, and _satisfying the
officers_ that it is not less for their interests than it is consistent
with their duty, to await the decision of the authorities in England on
the several questions which have occasioned so much agitation in the
minds of a considerable portion of the army of this establishment."
The same officer wrote to me a short letter on the 20th of July, in
which he repeats these sentiments, and concludes by stating, that the
greatest service I could render my country, in the actual situation of
affairs, was "to keep the garrison in order, and bring the _minds of
the officers back to reason_."
I was authorized, through the same channel, to proceed with the
inquiry, (if I thought it advisable,) without waiting for my
colleagues, reporting _the result, for the orders of Government_: and a
discretion was vested in me to grant a pardon to the non-commissioned
officers and privates of the garrison, if I should judge it necessary:
but this was evidently in reference to the possible occurrence of a
case of extreme emergency, which Colonel Barclay stated the Governor
felt assured would not arise.
It will certainly not occur, on a perusal of what I have stated, that
there existed the slightest ground for the Government of Fort St.
George indulging those expectations which they have declared they did
in their letter to the Secret Committee. Is it possible that they
could, at the moment, have expected that an officer, instructed as I
was, should have commenced his proceedings with "strenuous exertions
to excite the men against officers," whom he was directed to reclaim
to their duty by the efforts of reason and argument? And when he had
been commanded to carry on a military inquiry, in order to ascertain
the nature and degree of the crimes of different individuals, was it
reasonable to suppose he would disappoint the very object[54] for
which that was instituted, by a premature attempt to seize and bring
ringleaders to trial, on whose guilt he was expressly told "it was his
duty to report, and to await the orders of Government?"
It is sufficiently obvious, from what has been stated, that when the
Government of Fort St. George wrote those paragraphs (which have been
quoted) to the Secret Committee, the object was more to preserve a
character of consistence, than to give a correct view of the actual
situation of affairs at the moment of the occurrence of those events
which are described. The Government, in a subsequent part of the
same dispatch, gives a more just account of the character of this
proceeding. "We had hitherto," they observe, "continued to expect,
that the firmness of our measures, and the good sense of the officers
of the army, would have finally succeeded in restoring order: but we
were convinced, by the failure of Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm's mission,
by the addresses received from Hyderabad, and by the intelligence
received from other quarters, that it was necessary to calculate on
the possibility of the officers proceeding to the last extremities
of rebellion; and to consider the means of preventing, or finally of
meeting, that arduous state of things. The moderate course of conduct
pursued by the Government, and which was founded on a favourable
opinion of the loyalty of the army, had failed; and we were reduced to
the alternative of making the concession demanded by the officers, or
subduing them by force."
Is it not evident from this paragraph alone, if other evidences were
wanting, that the Government considered my mission to Masulipatam as
a proceeding which was calculated, by its moderation, to reclaim the
officers to their duty; and in no degree whatever related to that
course of measures which was subsequently adopted? A most desperate
remedy was ultimately applied to the existing evils: and in having
recourse to the expedient of exciting the men against their officers,
and in impairing the strength if not destroying that link by which
almost all are agreed we hold India, the Government of Fort St.
George might perhaps be justified by the emergency of the moment; and
the controlling authorities in England may be satisfied that this
operation, however terrible, was necessary and politic; but assuredly
(even if all this is granted) no person can believe that any authority
but Government could adopt such a measure. It appears too much to have
expected, that an officer sent to moderate the minds of a body of
officers, and to reclaim them to their duty by argument and reason,
should (_acting upon his own discretion, and without orders_) have
adopted this desperate expedient; and that he should have commenced his
efforts to persuade the officers to return to their duty, by exciting
their men to throw off their authority.
The Government of Madras proceed to state, that it ascribes my failure
to an apparent unreasonable and unwise forbearance and attention to the
feelings of officers who had, by their acts of violence and aggression,
forfeited all claims to consideration; that my time was occupied in
negotiations with disorderly committees, and in fruitless attempts to
bring officers back to their duty by argument. A reference is made to
my reasons for this conduct, as stated in my letters[55] under date
the 4th, 5th, and 6th of July. The measures which I recommended are
there stated. These, the Government observed, "consisted of a modified
repeal of the orders of the 1st of May; the restoration to the service,
and to their appointments, of all the officers whom we had found it
necessary to suspend or remove; with an intimation to the army, that
their claims to Bengal allowances would be brought to the notice of the
Honourable the Court of Directors." It is stated in the conclusion of
this paragraph, that I returned to Madras, "having succeeded no further
in accomplishing the objects of my mission, than in preventing the
officers from adopting any flagrant acts of outrage to authority during
my residence at Masulipatam." As my failure is ascribed to an apparent
unreasonable and unwise attention to the feelings of officers who had
by their acts of violence forfeited all claims to consideration, may
it not be asked, What was the situation of these officers when I was
deputed by Sir George Barlow with instructions to restore them to
better feelings, and a juster sense of duty, by the efforts of reason
and argument? Were they not in a state of outrageous mutiny? Their
commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, had been placed under
sentries, and it was hourly expected they would openly throw off even
the show of obedience; and yet at such a period I received instructions
from Sir George Barlow to use every effort of reason and argument to
reclaim the officers to their duty. When I had, as appears from my
Journal[56] and letters, in a great degree succeeded, having released
Colonel Innes from his arrest, prevailed upon a mutinous garrison to
abandon its design of immediately throwing off its allegiance, and of
marching to Hyderabad, obtained from them a reluctant recognition of
my authority, and was proceeding with the inquiry which I had been
directed to make: when all these changes, I say, had been effected
without _one concession_, by the force of that reason which I was
directed to employ; and I had reported all that I had done; I received
a letter from Colonel Barclay, written by order of Sir George Barlow,
approving of my measures, desiring me to continue my efforts to reclaim
the officers, and to direct their attention to the decision of the
authorities in England: and yet, when my success within the few days
I was at Masulipatam had been as great as it was possible to expect
such means could produce, (for changes in men's minds that are effected
by reason and argument must be gradual,) I am accused, in a secret
dispatch to my superiors in England, of having failed in my mission,
from a forbearance, which, though subsequently termed unreasonable and
unwise, I have shown Sir George Barlow deemed, or professed to deem,
at the moment of my departure from Madras, wise and politic; and from
an attention to the feelings of those very officers, to whose feelings
and reason, when their crimes were at the greatest height, I had been
directed, by the verbal instructions of Sir George Barlow, _and the
letters_ of his secretary, to address myself.
It is stated, that my time was occupied in communication with
disorderly committees. To this I reply, that I never recognised
any committee in any public or official manner that could either
compromise my own authority, or commit the dignity of Government. I
communicated, it is true, chiefly with those officers who, from their
rank or ability, appeared to have most influence over the rest. Not
to have done so, would have been to neglect the employment of those
means to which I have shown Sir George Barlow exclusively trusted for
my success. I learnt, that there existed a garrison committee, of
which every officer was a member, and which could never meet without
danger of a mutiny that in its consequences would have precipitated
a rupture between the Government and most other parts of the army:
an extreme which it was my constant labour to retard, if I could
not altogether avert. This committee I endeavoured, by my influence
with the senior and more reflecting officers of the garrison, to
dissolve; and I considered my success in this point as a great step
towards the restoration of order. The control of the proceedings of
the whole became vested in a few senior officers of comparative
moderation, whose minds were more accessible to reason, and whose
small numbers rendered them less liable to those violent impressions
which produce such mischief in large and turbulent meetings. But all
the communications I ever had, either directly or indirectly, with
any individual or bodies of officers at Masulipatam, are stated in my
journal: and, it will be seen from that, I never made the slightest
concession to the repeated demands of the officers of that garrison.
That my proceedings were not such as is prescribed by an observation of
the regular course of military discipline there can be no doubt: but
Government had itself decided that question. They had refrained (for
the reasons stated in the dispatch to which I have so often referred)
from resorting to the usual means, the employment of force for quelling
the mutiny at Masulipatam. I was deputed on what is termed in this very
dispatch _a mission_, (a word in itself including a volume,) in order
that I might reclaim to duty, by the efforts of reason and argument,
the officers of a garrison which were known to be almost to a man
unanimously bent on mutiny and opposition to authority; and yet I am
subsequently condemned by the Government that sent me, for having used
the only means by which it was possible I could accomplish that object.
The statement made in the same paragraph of this dispatch regarding
the character of those measures which I recommended, with a view of
terminating the agitation of the army, will, I am assured, not be
considered as either fair or liberal, by any person who gives an
attentive perusal to my secret and confidential letter to Sir George
Barlow upon that subject. I saw, immediately after my arrival at
Masulipatam, that some conciliatory measures must be instantly adopted
by Government, if it intended to avoid the desperate extreme of a
contest with its own army. A contest which, it will be recollected,
I never doubted would early terminate in favour of the former: but
success, I was convinced, would bring dangers of a hundred fold
greater magnitude than any that could result from issuing the
order[57] that I recommended.
On the succeeding day I wrote another letter[58], which contained the
following paragraph:
"I can think of no improvement to this order, except you conceive
the great object of avoiding hostilities would justify the following
addition to it. 'Government received a representation from a number of
the officers of the coast army, in which they solicit the equalization
of their allowances with those of the officers of the Bengal army: This
is a subject, the consideration of which must exclusively rest with the
Honourable the Court of Directors, under whose notice this application
will, _in course_, be brought, and by whose decision it will be the
duty of the officers of the coast army to abide.'"
I may ask, Whether the order I suggested in my letter of the 5th of
July justifies the assertion in the letter from the Madras Government,
that I recommended "the restoration to the service and their
appointments of all the officers the Government had removed." The terms
of the order I suggested were only, that _in the full confidence_ that
the officers of the coast would immediately abandon their proceedings,
Government would _recommend_ the _officers suspended to the Court of
Directors_. That it restored Colonels Bell and Chalmers to command,
from which they had been removed, and also one or two staff officers
who were in a similar predicament. There is assuredly a wide difference
between the immediate restoration of all the officers suspended from
the service, and the conditional promise of a favourable recommendation
to that authority by which, under every circumstance, the fate of
these officers must have been decided. With respect to Colonel Bell,
I conscientiously believed at the moment, from what I knew of the
case of that valuable officer, that Sir George Barlow would not be
reluctant to consent to his restoration; and with regard to that of
Colonel Chalmers and one or two others in nearly similar predicaments,
I conceived that if any measure of this kind was adopted, it should
be as complete as it was possible to make it, without affecting the
principle which was to carry _conciliation in act_ (words, after what
had passed, could be of little or no avail) as far as was possible,
without serious injury to the authority and dignity of Government.
It was this consideration which led to the communication already
quoted from my letter of the 6th of July regarding the first Memorial
forwarded by General McDowall. What I recommended was nothing more
than what had, I believe, been done as an act of course, and was
stated in a mode which, though conciliatory, reminded the army of
their duty, and gave them no reason to believe more, than that the
Court of Directors _would see_ the document in question. I think at
this moment, as I did at that in which I recommended this measure,
that nothing could have been more fortunate than its adoption. I know
I differ on this point from very high authorities, who believe that
any concessions, (and such they would appear to deem _every act_ of
conciliation,) however modified and corrected, would have been ruinous
to Government: but, in spite of these imposing opinions[59], I must
ask reflecting men to look near the subject, to examine the evil which
this measure could have produced, consider the ills that were at that
moment to be expected, and to think on those that have resulted from
the complete success to authority that the most sanguine could have
anticipated, and then to pronounce their cool and deliberate judgment.
There certainly could be no apprehension entertained that this order
would have strengthened, to any purpose of immediate violence or
opposition, the discontented and turbulent: but the danger stated is,
that those would have deemed it a victory. Let us for a moment suppose
they had been led, by their first feelings of joy at their escape from
a punishment which they had merited, to have considered it as such,
what permanent effect could such a feeling produce? What had they
gained? _Nothing._ The fate of the officers who had been suspended
remained to be decided by the Directors; with whom it must, under all
circumstances, ultimately rest. Their Memorial for an increase of
allowances was to be brought before the same body, but without even
a promise from Government of any recommendation. There was an end to
their combinations and committees[60], and, with them, to all those
threats they had thrown out against the local Government, which, it
was evident, would acquire such a vast accession of strength by the
spirit of moderation and conciliation which it had shown, as would
fully enable it to enforce the most severe discipline, and particularly
in all cases which were attended with a danger of the recurrence of
evils of a similar character to those it had so recently encountered.
The majority, indeed, of the officers of the army, and all the most
respectable, had seen at this moment the desperate situation into which
they had unwarily suffered themselves to be led. They would have had no
sentiments but those of gratitude to a Government, whose consideration
had presented them with the means of escape. All these would, if such
an indulgence had been shown to their errors, have ranged themselves
with enthusiasm on the side of Government, and would have been the most
forward to retrieve the character of the service, by the punishment of
those whom a hardened spirit of disaffection and turbulence had led to
continue in opposition. That such a class would also have remained,
there is no doubt; and Government might have been satisfied, at the
moment this measure was taken, that future punishments would have
corrected any erroneous opinions regarding the true motives that had
induced so generous and politic a proceeding.
The situation of affairs at the period stated was such, that though
there could be little doubt of the ultimate success of Government even
under the violent course it pursued; yet that did not appear likely
to be attained, if extremes were resorted to, without bloodshed. His
Majesty's regiments at Hyderabad[61] and Travancore would be, if a
contest was precipitated, in the utmost danger; and if the combat
between our European and native troops had once commenced, feelings
would have been instantly engendered, the dreadful action of which no
man could calculate. That these results were averted, was owing to a
variety of causes, very little, if at all, connected with either the
foresight or vigour of the Government of Fort St. George.
But, passing over what was likely to be the probable results of the
desperate extreme to which the Government of Fort St. George had
resort, (though it is by a consideration of these results that the
merit of my suggestions should be tried,) let us contemplate what
has occurred, from the most favourable issue that could have been
anticipated. The officers of the coast army must long continue to feel
that degradation which they have endured. Years must elapse before the
action of this feeling will cease to produce disunion and discontent in
that establishment. But these are comparatively light considerations,
as all questions must be, connected with a body of men over whom
we must always have such strong ties and efficient control as the
European officers of our armies in India. It is the firm allegiance
and continued obedience of the natives of which the strength of those
armies is composed, which forms by far the most important principle
in our government of this great Empire. This can never be denied: and
it is as true, that in that almost religious respect with which the
sepoy of India has hitherto regarded his European officer, consisted
what has been always deemed the chief link of this great chain of
duty and obedience. That link (as far as relates to the sepoys of the
coast establishment)[62] has, if not broken, been greatly shattered
and impaired. A temporary object of importance, no doubt, has been
gained by a sacrifice of one a thousand times the value of the object.
The dignity of the local Government of Fort St. George has been saved
from an imputation of weakness, by a measure which threatens the most
serious danger to the future safety of our whole empire in India. An
evil, for which there were many and certain remedies, has been averted,
by incurring one, the progress of which (from its character,) cannot be
calculated; which is, from its nature, irremediable; and of which we
know nothing, except that it is efficient to our destruction.
The Government of Fort St. George appear resolved to withhold the
expression of their sense of that benefit which the substance of their
dispatch obviously shows flowed from my observation and conduct. Sir
George Barlow, through his secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, to
me, under date the 12th of July, states, that, "_in consequence of
the information which I had communicated_" _from_ Masulipatam, he had
ordered the assembling of a considerable force near Madras; and it is
to this precautionary measure, adopted upon my information, to which
the Government of Madras ascribes in a great degree the success of its
subsequent proceedings: and it seems also to have entirely escaped the
recollection of the Government, that if I had not, by my exertions,
reclaimed the garrison of Masulipatam from their design of marching to
join the Hyderabad force, and prevented from the 4th till the 22d of
July their committing any outrage, that a great part of the army would,
during that eventful period, have been precipitated into a rupture
before the Government had time for executing any plan for the defeat
of their designs. I do not mention these circumstances with a view of
claiming any merit from my exertions at that period; but to show that
the same principle, which led to an unfounded insinuation against my
character, has caused an omission of every fact that could bring my
services to the favourable notice of my superiors.
I shall resume my narrative, and state shortly what share I had in
the transactions at Madras, from my return from Masulipatam till the
arrival of Lord Minto at that settlement.
I have already stated that Sir George Barlow directed me, before I
went to Masulipatam, to write the draft of a letter to the commanding
officers at Hyderabad and Jaulnah, and had approved of what I had
written. I had carried a copy of that draft to Masulipatam, and had,
on my first violent discussion with the officers of that garrison,
adduced it as a proof of the moderation and temper with which the
Governor had acted. In a short period, however, it appeared that no
such document had reached Hyderabad, and I was exposed to the charge
of intended deception. I addressed a note to Colonel Barclay the day
after I arrived at Madras, stating this fact, and begged that he would,
by his answer, enable me to repel such a charge[63]. I received the
following reply, dated Fort St. George, 28th July 1809.
"DEAR MALCOLM,
"I have just received your note of this date. I recollect perfectly
well, that before your embarkation for Masulipatam you put into my
hands, to be delivered to Sir George Barlow, a paper in the form of a
draft of a letter to be written to Colonel Montresor, on the subject of
addresses from the Hyderabad subsidiary force. I delivered the paper
according to your desire. I know that Sir George Barlow did not approve
of it; and I believe that no letter of the nature of it was sent to
Colonel Montresor.
"I remain, &c. &c.
(Signed) "R. BARCLAY."
Greatly surprised at this answer, I wrote the following note:
"DEAR BARCLAY,
"There must be a mistake, as the draft I gave you was written, by
direction of Sir George Barlow, from a memorandum now in my possession,
which I had read to Sir George not half an hour before, and of which
he at that moment approved, or he would not have desired me to put
it in the shape of a letter. I beg the nature of the request I made
in my note of yesterday may not be misunderstood. I am aware Sir
George Barlow, when he asked my opinion on the question of the reply
to be made to the representation from the Hyderabad force, might,
even if he approved my suggestion at the moment, be led by a thousand
considerations to alter his sentiments before the tappal[64] was
dispatched; but as I sailed for Masulipatam under the impression
that no change had occurred in his opinion, and made use of the
information I had upon the subject, to satisfy misguided men that they
were in error regarding his disposition towards them, and by doing
so have subjected myself to a charge of _intended deception_, I was
naturally anxious to clear my character from this imputation; and the
circumstances were evidently such, that it appeared in my mind I would
be enabled to do so without the slightest embarrassment to either you
or Sir George Barlow. If, indeed, I had not been satisfied of this, I
should never have written, at a moment like the present, upon such a
subject. Your note conveys no idea but that I had, without any previous
communication with Sir George Barlow, sent a draft of a letter to him
through you, of which he disapproved; and so far from answering the
object for which it was solicited, could make no impression but that my
assertions were founded on an ill-grounded presumption of my possessing
an influence over the judgment of Sir G. Barlow. _This, you must be
aware, is exactly opposite to the circumstances of the case, as I have
stated them to you at the period of their occurrence_; for I told you
it was by desire of Sir George Barlow I gave you the draft.
"I have felt it due to myself to say so much, but am not desirous a
word more should pass on the subject. I trust it never has and never
can be supposed, that I could either in word or deed do any thing that
could occasion the slightest embarrassment upon any question, much less
upon one of so personal a nature.
"Yours sincerely,
(Signed) "JOHN MALCOLM."
To this communication I received the following more satisfactory reply:
"DEAR MALCOLM,
"I have been so busy for the last two days, that I could not refer to
the answer which I wrote on the 28th ultimo to your letter of that
date, respecting the draft of the letter which you gave me for Sir
George Barlow previous to your embarkation for Masulipatam.
"I now find that it is not mentioned in that answer that you had
prepared the draft at Sir George Barlow's desire, after a long
conversation with him on the subject; _but I recollect perfectly well
that you told me so when you gave me the draft_.
"I remain, &c. &c.
(Signed) "R. BARCLAY,
"M. S."
"Fort St. George,
1st August, 1809."
This trifling but irritating circumstance confirmed me in the
resolution I had taken regarding my own conduct. I had come from Bombay
with the intention of joining my station at Mysore; but I had received,
when at Masulipatam, a letter from Lord Minto reappointing me to
Persia; and I had, since I reached Madras, been directed by a letter
from his Lordship, under date the 15th of July, to await his arrival
at that place. With such orders I could only offer my service as a
volunteer to Sir George Barlow; and I had little encouragement to do
that. He had, it is true, at the interview I had on the 27th, expressed
in a cold manner his wish that I should go to Mysore; but that wish had
never been repeated: he had made no further communication to me since
my return; nor had I even been required to give that information which
he knew I possessed. Under such circumstances, I felt that it was my
duty to obey the orders of the Governor-General, and not to intrude my
voluntary services when they were evidently not sought. In consequence
of this determination I addressed a private letter to Sir George
Barlow on the 1st of August; in which, after explaining very fully the
sentiments by which my conduct was regulated, I offered the following
observations on what had passed, and what might be expected from the
measure he had adopted:
"You are no stranger to that enthusiasm with which I embarked in the
present scene: and, whatever has been my success, I am assured that
you are satisfied I have not been deficient in zeal in the exertion
of my humble endeavours to reclaim my brother officers to temper and
to the path of duty: and I indulged, to the very moment of my arrival
at Madras from Masulipatam, a hope that this great object of your
solicitude would be effected without having recourse to coercive
measures; or at least that a great proportion of the officers of the
Company's army (including almost all who had weight and influence with
the men) would be recovered, and that the early submission of the rest
would have been a certain consequence of the return of their seniors to
their duty.
"The highly criminal violence of the force at Hyderabad, which is
known to the whole army to be guided by weak and wrong-headed men,
has unfortunately precipitated a very different issue to that which I
was so sanguine as to expect. That force has declared that they speak
the sentiments of the whole, or at least those of a great proportion
of the Madras army; though it is evident, at the moment they made
such an assertion, they could not have received an answer from any
station to that absurd paper which they term an _Ultimatum_, which
they have had the audacity to forward to Government; but which, I
conscientiously believe, would, if it had been publicly promulgated,
have been disowned and disclaimed by great numbers of the senior and
most respectable officers at every station in the army. I can speak
positively with regard to some, indeed all of the senior officers of
the garrison of Masulipatam upon this subject, and they have lately
been considered as the most violent of the whole. I am far from meaning
(such meaning would, indeed, be as contrary to that high respect I
have ever entertained for your character, as to the duties of my
situation) to offer even an opinion on the wisdom and policy of that
step which Government has lately adopted with the Company's officers
of this establishment. The test these were required to sign was, as
far as I understood it, a mere repetition of the obligations of the
commission that every one of them held; and the only rational objection
that could be made to it by men who were devoted to their duty, and
who had never deviated from it in thought, word, or deed, was, that
it was unnecessary; that it was, with regard to them at least, an act
of supererogation, and one that had a taint of suspicion in it. These
were, indeed, the feelings that passed in my mind when this paper was
first put into my hands; but they were instantly subdued by a paramount
sense of public duty; and I signed it to show (as far as my example
could show) my perfect acquiescence in a measure which the Government
I served had thought proper to adopt: but I am satisfied it was not
the terms of this paper which led the great majority of the Company's
officers both in camp and at the Mount, and in the garrison, to refuse
their signatures; it was the manner in which it was presented, and the
circumstances by which the whole proceeding was accompanied. The minds
of the most honourable, and of those most attached to Government and
to their Country, revolted more at the mode than the substance of the
act: they felt (perhaps erroneously) that they were disgraced, because
the manner in which their consent was asked showed they were not in
the least trusted: and this was, I am assured, one of the chief causes
of their almost general rejection of this proposed test of fidelity.
It appears to me of the greatest importance that you should be aware
of every feeling that this proceeding excited; and it is in discharge
of the duties of that friendship with which you have ever honoured me
that I have stated my sentiments so freely upon this subject. I am
very intimately acquainted with a great number of the officers of whom
I speak: some of them would, I am certain, have given their lives for
Government at the very moment they refused to give a pledge which they
thought, from the mode in which it was proposed, reflected upon their
honour; and others, who had unfortunately gone to a certain extent
in the late culpable and unmilitary proceedings, but who viewed the
criminal excesses of some of their brother officers with undisguised
horror and indignation, would, I am assured, if it had been possible
for Government to have pardoned what was past, and to have expressed,
in indulgent language, its kind intentions for the future, have
been the most forward in their efforts to punish those who, by an
unwarrantable perseverance in a guilty career, merited all the wrath of
the state: but, unfortunately, (though such an intention, I am assured,
never entered into your mind,) an almost general sentiment prevailed,
that it was meant the service should be destroyed by the first blow,
and that all were therefore included in one general mass, as just
objects of suspicion and disgrace.
"I am far from defending such an interpretation of this measure
of Government; I have only stated what I consider to be the fact,
and explained, as far as I could, those causes by which I believe
it to have been produced: their operation is, I fear, now almost
irremediable, and events must take their course. I know (and my
personal conduct has proved it,) that my brother officers are deeply
wrong; and I am quite heart-broken when I reflect on the consequences
to themselves and country which the guilt of some of them is likely to
produce. I need not assure you of my sincere happiness at the success
which has hitherto attended the execution of the measure you have
adopted, and I anxiously hope it may meet with no opposition. I have
never doubted the success of this measure, if it was resorted to, as
far as related to the accomplishment of its immediate object; and I
most earnestly pray that my judgment may have deceived me with regard
to the collateral and remote consequences by which I have always deemed
it likely to be attended."
The only reply I received to this communication, was by a note from
Colonel Barclay, under date the 2d of August, to acquaint me, that,
for the reasons I had stated, "Sir George Barlow would not press me
to go to Mysore, and that it was the Governor's intention to reply
to the other parts of my letter at more leisure." He never, however,
condescended to make such a reply, or indeed to honour me with any
subsequent communication whatever, either personally, or through the
medium of any of his staff: and an event occurred sometime afterwards,
which produced such irritation upon his mind, as to make him deny me
the common civilities due to an officer in my public station. Some
time after my return to Madras, an address[65] from the inhabitants
of Madras to Sir George Barlow was drawn up, and sent in circulation.
This address was said to have originated with a staff officer of rank.
None of the usual forms of convening the inhabitants had taken place;
and the mode adopted to obtain signatures was still more extraordinary
than this glaring departure from common usage. Gentlemen of the first
respectability in the civil service informed me, that when they had
testified an aversion to sign this address unless parts of it were
modified, they had received such plain intimations regarding the
consequences with which their refusal would be attended, as left them
in no doubt but that they must either sacrifice their opinions, or
bring immediate distress, and perhaps final ruin, upon themselves
and their families. Under these circumstances some had signed; while
others had actually absented themselves for days from their own houses,
to escape the painful importunities to which they were exposed. It
is necessary here to state, that almost all ranks were ready at this
moment to come forward with a public declaration of duty and attachment
to Government, and of their readiness to sacrifice their lives and
fortunes in its defence; but a strong objection was entertained by many
to that part of the circulated address which cast reflections upon
that body of officers who had embraced the alternative of retiring for
a period from their duty, rather than sign the test which Government
had proposed. It was said, and with great truth, that at the moment
when Government professed its desire to reclaim these officers to a
more active allegiance, nothing could be more unwise and useless than
exasperating their minds to a sullen perseverance in error, by an abuse
of them in an address signed by a few civil and military inhabitants
of Madras; and that it was perfectly evident such an expression of
sentiment could only have the effect of widening a breach it was most
desirable to close, and of creating (by exciting discussion) further
dissensions and difference of opinion among those of whose devoted
attachment to Government there could be no doubt. Such were my own
sentiments regarding this address: and while I foresaw the mischief it
was calculated to produce, I could divine no possible good from its
agitation. It was sent for my signature, with the following note from
Colonel Leith:
"The accompanying address is submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm
for his consideration, which, as soon as he is done with, it is
requested he will return to the bearer."
To this I immediately sent an answer, as follows:
"Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm returns the address to Lieutenant-Colonel
Leith. He has not signed it, for reasons very foreign to any want of
respect and regard for Sir George Barlow, or of duty, obedience, and
attachment to that constituted authority of his country under which he
is placed."
I cannot recollect that I ever in my life took a step in which my mind
was more decided respecting its propriety, on every public and private
principle, than upon this occasion. I considered the address, both from
the irregular mode in which it was brought forward, the unbecoming
means resorted to in order to obtain signatures, and the expressions
contained in it, as an unwise measure, which had originated in that
spirit of undistinguishing violence which I conscientiously believed
had been the chief means of producing a crisis that this act was
calculated to inflame. It did not appear to my mind to be attended with
the slightest benefit, for it brought no new friends to Government:
and though it could not shake the attachment to the legitimate
authority of their country of any persons whose principles were fixed,
its tendency was to excite jealousy and division among those who were
most warmly attached to order and Government: and among these, however
actuated by a sense of public duty, it was natural that a difference
of _private opinion_ should exist. Some were, no doubt, more disposed
than others to approve violent and unqualified proceedings, or perhaps
less disposed to maintain that independence of mind which no man should
ever be censured for maintaining upon such points; otherwise addresses
of this stamp would not only lose their value, but become tests of
the most odious and invidious nature that a tyrannic Government could
invent, to degrade or alienate the minds of its subjects.
I certainly was most reluctant to believe that this measure had Sir
George Barlow's sanction: it seemed to me of a character opposite to
all the principles and habits of his life: nor could I forget those
grounds which he had assumed when he recently refused to permit me
to frame an address of a very opposite tendency, and one that would,
in all probability, have prevented those evils which this seemed
calculated to inflame. I never was more surprised than when (some
days subsequent to my note to Colonel Leith) I was informed by a
confidential officer of the Governor's staff, to whom I mentioned what
I had done, and the reasons by which I was actuated, that the address,
from the first, had the Governor's complete sanction and approbation.
In closing this subject, it may be necessary to state, that this
address, after all the unbecoming efforts that were used to obtain
signatures, had only fifty-seven names affixed to it; among which,
twenty-four only were civilians and inhabitants of Madras: the
remainder were officers of his Majesty's service, with a few of the
staff of the Company's army. If all those who did not sign it were
not actually considered as disaffected, they were deemed by those
whom this measure had formed into a party, as lukewarm in the public
cause. This species of injustice is too common to such times, to
afford any individual a right of complaint; but there should be a
difference between the momentary feeling of a violent party during a
period of commotion, and the deliberate sentiments of a public ruler.
I have already mentioned, that the crime of having presumed, though
in the most respectful manner, to act conformably to the dictates
of my own judgment on a question which was referred to me as a
private individual, subjected me, at the moment, to the loss of those
civilities from Sir George Barlow to which I had a right from my public
station; and I did not require the evidence I have now obtained, from
the publication of the letter from the Government of Madras to the
Secret Committee, to satisfy my mind that my character has since had to
war with all the weight that belongs to the influence and opinion of
Sir George Barlow: but, great as this odds may appear to many, it can
excite no apprehension in a mind fortified as mine is by a conscious
sense of never having deviated from the path of private rectitude, or
public duty.
Though, subsequent to this transaction, all personal intercourse
between Sir George Barlow and me had ceased, I could not look with
indifference on the events that occurred; and when the mad desperation
of the officers of the two corps which marched from Chittledroog to
proceed to Seringapatam led to an action, I thought the opportunity
favourable to close this horrid scene in a manner every way suited to
the dignity of Government. I first communicated my sentiments upon this
point to Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, and afterwards ventured to address
the following note to Sir George Barlow, expecting that the importance
of the subject, and a consideration of former acquaintance and regard,
would at least obtain a pardon for such a liberty.
"DEAR SIR,
"I wrote a note to Colonel Barclay some hours ago, which he informed
me he sent to you for perusal. I have since received a letter from
Masulipatam, at which place they are between hope and despair; but
have refrained from further guilt, and mean to refrain, unless called
upon by those who have now, thank God! shown them an example of
returning to their duty. I am assured you will not blame that extreme
anxiety which makes me intrude, unasked, my opinion at a moment like
the present. I have, I am satisfied, the fullest information of the
real temper of this army at this present period; and, if I am not the
most deceived man in the world, there is an opportunity given, by the
conduct of the Hyderabad force[66], which enables you to combine the
immediate and complete settlement of these afflicting troubles with
the advancement of the reputation, power, and dignity, of Government.
I am aware of the very deep guilt into which almost all have gone;
some in intention, others in act: but the force at Hyderabad, who,
since the 1st of May, have been the cause of all the present evils,
and who lately insulted Government with demands, are now supplicating
clemency: a dreadful[67] example has occurred in Mysore, which will
make a lasting impression on both officers and sepoys, of the horrors
to which such illegal combinations lead. If it were possible to close
the scene here, an impression must be made that will for ever prevent
the repetition of such crimes; and the effect of shame and contrition,
which the clemency and magnanimity of Government must produce, will
have more effect upon the minds of liberal men than twenty examples.
Men's minds will be at once reclaimed, and they will be fixed in their
attachment by a better motive than fear. But this is not all. The
officers at Hyderabad, like those of other stations, act at the present
crisis entirely from the impulse of passion and feeling; and they fly,
as I have witnessed, from one extreme to another, with a facility that
is not to be credited by persons under the influence of calm reason.
Such persons can never be depended upon, whatever pledges they make,
while any strong causes of agitation remain: and no act, therefore,
which does not embrace the whole, can give that complete security and
tranquillity which is the object of desire. If a single question of
irritation and inflammation be left, it is a spark which may again
create a general explosion.
"You will, I am assured, pardon this communication. Nothing could
have induced me to the freedom, but a conviction that this is one
of those happy moments when all the dangers that threaten us may be
dissipated. If you can, on the grounds of your granting that clemency
to supplication, which you never would to demand; of military justice
being satisfied, and the army lessoned, in the dreadful example that
has been made in Mysore; and of your thinking it not derogatory, at
such a moment, to grant a general amnesty, and to bury the past in
oblivion: desiring all those who mean to perform their duty to join
their corps, and those who do not, to consider themselves out of the
service; and proclaiming every man a traitor, and liable to immediate
military execution, who opposes legal authority one hour after the
receipt of this order, I will answer with my life for the immediate
re-establishment of the public authority on more secure grounds than it
perhaps ever rested. Such an act as this will, I am assured, while it
advances the fame and dignity of Government, raise your own reputation
in the highest degree; and you will receive, as you will merit, the
blessings of thousands, with the applause of your country.
"I have perhaps already said too much upon this subject; and I could
adduce many more equally forcible reasons to those I have urged; but
I shall not trouble you further. If you think the suggestions I have
offered worthy of any attention, I shall attend you, and state them.
With regard to the success of this measure I cannot have a doubt. If
all did not immediately submit, they would be completely disunited: and
those that ventured to oppose (if there were any such), would be the
proper objects for example.
"I am, with great respect,
"Your obedient servant,
(Signed) "JOHN MALCOLM."
The receipt of this note was not even acknowledged; and it was, of
course, the last communication I made to Sir George Barlow. When Lord
Minto arrived at Madras, I laid every part of my conduct before him.
I gave him every information I could regarding the actual state of
affairs; and submitted with freedom my sentiments of those principles
which should govern his final judgment on the important points that
remained for his decision. He expressed no dissatisfaction at my
conduct; he thanked me for my information; and though he differed with
me in many of the opinions I stated, he did not condemn me for that
difference: on the contrary, he appeared pleased with the liberty I
took in offering my advice with such boldness and freedom. The whole
of the manner, as well as the substance of the conduct, which this
able and virtuous nobleman observed towards me on this occasion, had
the effect of reconciling my mind to further exertions in the public
service; from which, I confess, it was, before his arrival, much,
if not wholly alienated. I had been employed, as I have shown, in a
confidential manner, without being trusted. I had been deputed on
a delicate and arduous mission, and recommended to pursue a system
which mixed firmness with conciliation, while it proposed to reclaim
by reason more than by terror; and before any time was given for the
operation of the measures I had taken, a new course was adopted,
grounded _on coercion_ alone: and because I had not by inspiration
divined that such would be the ultimate result, I now discover that I
have been most unjustly censured, as disappointing the expectations of
the Government: and it has been insinuated (a direct charge would have
been too bold) that I acted contrary to orders. I trust I have refuted
every charge of this nature: and if some should continue to think I
have committed errors; none, I am assured, can accuse me of crimes. Let
it be recollected that I was placed, throughout all the transactions
I have described, in a most painful and difficult situation. I had no
prescribed or distinct duty to perform; I was called upon by Sir G.
Barlow to exert, in the manner I thought best adapted to the end, all
the influence of my character to reclaim men with whom he thought I had
great weight; and he appeared for a period to give me his confidence,
and to trust implicitly to my discretion and judgment. I was all
along sensible to the full danger of the situation in which I placed
myself; but was too earnest in the cause to attend to prudence: and
I may conscientiously add, that I never was more assured of meeting
approbation from Sir George Barlow than at that moment when I found
myself estranged from all share in his confidence, and treated with
the most pointed neglect. But I had myself to reproach. I should
certainly have foreseen that my efforts would have been useless, when
combined with a system of measures to which they bore little or no
affinity; and I was (I must confess it,) wrong in supposing, for a
moment, that my advice, or any arguments I could adduce, could, under
any circumstances, permanently divert the Governor of Fort St. George
into a course that mixed feeling, and consideration for human failings,
with the established maxims of his ordinary rule. I should have known
better; and in fact I did, as my letters[68] before I went to Madras
prove: but, when on the spot, my heart conquered my head, and I tried
an impossibility: but I never shall regret the attempt, nor blush for
having recommended principles of action that are congenial to the best
feelings of human nature, that are calculated to make Government an
object of rational attachment, and to give the mind a generous pride
in submission and obedience; and which, so far from being of dangerous
example, and subversive of order, are familiar in the practice to every
free state, and have never been rejected in the most despotic, when
such have been governed by great and wise rules.